BOOK REVIEWS


This is an invaluable book, yet one that by its deliberate limitations raises interesting questions of judgment. It is an English translation of the second German edition (1970) of Werner Georg Kümmel's Das Neue Testament: Geschichte der Erforschung seiner Probleme, first published in 1958.

The book is a monumental survey of the history of NT research problems that in their lines of inquiry and in their methods "have proved to be of permanent significance or to anticipate further developments" (p. 7). The invaluable contribution that the work makes—previously in its German editions and now more widely through this English translation—results not only from the detailed thoroughness with which K. presents the history, but also from the consistency of his presentation in showing the organic process of development that has characterized NT research as new lines of inquiry and subsequently new questions have continually emerged from the answers that new discoveries and new insights have led researchers to give to old questions.

K. has richly documented his history with page after page of quotations from the most significant works of the most significant NT researchers of the past. The quotations greatly enhance the history, because in the problems treated and in the views expressed in these lengthy excerpts there are often seminally present other problems and their possibilities of solution that shall only later emerge into clearer focus and consequently be isolated as the objects of special disciplines. This provides the reader with a context of continuity for the problems being researched at particular times by linking them with their respective pasts and futures. The chances for the historian's vision of the past (or for the vision of a present-day NT researcher) being blurred by a temporal provincialism that has narrowly locked his interpretive view into any particular present are thereby diminished.

K. begins with brief chapters on the prehistory of NT scholarship, which for him includes the ancient, medieval, and Reformation periods, since "It is impossible to speak of a scientific view of the New Testament until the New Testament became the object of investigation as an independent body of literature with historical interest, as a collection of writings that could be considered apart from the Old Testament and without dogmatic or creedal bias" (p. 13). In his judgment this did not take place until the Enlightenment. The advances made in textual criti-
cism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by such men as Richard Simon, Johann Albrecht Bengel, and Johann Jokob Wettstein and the simultaneous emergence of the critical study of religion by English Deism prepared the way for what K. sees to be the first conscious attempts at a fundamentally historical examination of the NT, those of J. S. Semler and J. D. Michaelis in the latter half of the eighteenth century. From this point K.'s problem-oriented history of research proceeds up to 1930, where it stops abruptly and deliberately. And it is this that raises the questions of judgment.

In the preface to the 1958 German edition K. wrote: “Whether a new line of inquiry was permanently important and was later to prove fruitful cannot be determined for the period of research to which we ourselves belong. Consequently . . . I have traced the new lines of inquiry only into the first decade of the period after World War I, lines of inquiry in pursuit of which we are still engaged today.” In his preface to the second edition (1970) K. says that he decided to abide by that earlier decision to limit his description of research up to 1930, “since the reasons given there seem to me to be valid still.” Consequently such important turning points in the history of NT research during the last forty years as Bultmann’s 1941 essay “New Testament and Mythology” and the inauguration of the new quest of the historical Jesus by Ernst Käsemann’s 1953 Marburg lecture “The Problem of the Historical Jesus” are omitted. There is no mention of redaction criticism. Such influential contributors to NT research as Willi Marxsen and Hans Conzelmann are not mentioned, not even in the updated bibliographical references in the footnotes.

Do these omissions mean that K. cannot yet determine whether these new lines of inquiry are “permanently important” or have proved “fruitful”? Or is it that he thinks these lines of inquiry are continuations of lines of inquiry that were opened before 1930, “lines of inquiry in pursuit of which we are still engaged today”? The latter is the answer in the case of Bultmann’s 1941 call for demythologizing the NT. In footnote 466 K. says: “To demythologize the New Testament through existentialist interpretation is the fully appropriate continuation of the fundamental methodological principles expressed in his works from 1925 to 1928 . . . .” Does K. similarly see redaction criticism as pursuing further lines of inquiry already opened up, e.g., in F. C. Baur’s “tendency criticism”? What about the new quest of the historical Jesus or the new hermeneutic? Or are all these developments within NT research over the last forty years simply lines of new inquiry that have not yet been proven in K.’s judgment to be “of permanent significance or to anticipate future developments”?

These questions are in no sense intended as a criticism of K.’s history.
It is most excellent as far as it temporally goes. Nor are they meant to question K.'s right to halt his coverage of history where he chooses. They simply express the questions that the reasons he twice gives for his 1930 cut-off inherently raise.

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Edward Glynn, S.J.


Like the series which preceded it, the New Clarendon Bible is intended primarily for the sixth forms in British secondary schools preparing for the General Certificate of Education (GCE), advanced level, and for undergraduates in universities and teachers’ training colleges. In the U.S., where the survey course rather than the set book is the norm at the corresponding levels, these commentaries will first become useful for seminarians in exegesis courses. They are scholarly, but concise and less ambitious than a full-scale commentary. While assuming that at least some readers have sufficient classical background to recognize an occasional Greek work in Greek type, they could be read by those without a knowledge of that language.

T. is a priest of the Church of England who, after taking a first at Oxford, became known to the reviewer as a student at Queen’s College, Birmingham, nearly a quarter century ago. The reviewer cannot claim him as a pupil, as he had done his work in NT before entering seminary. After a spell as Vice Principal of Salisbury Theological College, he is now a country parson.

The Introduction begins with the normal topics of date, authorship, and purpose. T. sees no difficulty in accepting the traditional authorship and rather surprisingly favors a date before the death of Paul ca. A.D. 65. The introduction is particularly noteworthy for its section on Luke as a historian, in which Luke’s writing is compared point by point with Lucian’s criteria for historiography, with the result that Luke comes out with flying colors. T. favors the three-source theory, but rejects the proto-Luke hypothesis. The pattern of the Gospel is then analyzed, and Luke’s theology is presented under the concept of “kingship” and “deliverance.” A final section deals with Luke’s presentation of the teaching and person of the historical Jesus. There are two maps and one plan, but, unlike the early commentary in this series, there are no pictorial illustrations.

In the commentary itself the RSV text is printed at the top of the page, and underneath it a general survey of each pericope in larger type, and
more detailed comment on phrases or words in smaller type. Particular attention is paid to historical background.

Historical-critical questions are dealt with and usually settled in a conservative direction; in accordance with this tendency, the exegesis is carried out mainly at the Jesus level rather than at the level of the Lucan redaction. Granted the commentator's presuppositions about Luke, this is a thoroughly competent piece of work, well suited to the purpose for which it is designed.

It is over the presuppositions that questions will arise. T., of course, shares the general assumption of British scholarship: Luke is seen primarily as a reliable historian rather than as a creative theologian. The problem is, however, whether Conzelmann and the German redaction critics can be answered by invoking the ghosts of Sir William Ramsay and Adolf von Harnack.

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REGINALD H. FULLER


This exercise in the tradition criticism of Jn 18:1—19:30 (no explanation is given why the investigation is not continued to the end of chap. 19, or at least to v. 37) is a dissertation presented to the University of Würzburg by a student of Rudolf Schnackenburg. Its principal conclusion regards the nature of the narrative source underlying the Johannine Passion story: neither a tradition parallel to and independent of the Synoptic, nor yet the Synoptics themselves, but a tradition in which elements from all three Synoptics had been fused via oral transmission. In part this position has been anticipated in recent works by Nils Dahl and Peder Borgen. In a Nachtrag, D. also deals with studies which have appeared since the time of his major research, notably those of Ferdinand Hahn (on the trial of Jesus in Jn) and Robert Fortna (The Gospel of Signs, which adventurously links the now generally accepted signs-source—including, however, chap. 21 "restored" to a Lucan order—with a Passion-Resurrection narrative to form a mini-gospel on the Synoptic model). With these he finds broad areas of agreement but feels that neither has been sufficiently impressed by the literalness of some of the Synoptic parallels. This disagreement presupposes an old debate, of course, and it is to D.'s credit that he has brought to bear some massive argumentation that will keep the debate alive. In the process he has made some not inconsiderable contributions to Synoptic research, including the probability of Marcan priority, which is now under fire again.

Predictably, D. isolates the Johannine source by paring away the re-
dactional work of the Evangelist, which, again predictably, he finds evi­
denced in characteristic speech and style, composition technique, and
theological content. For purposes of examination he has divided the text
In the first of these segments, the story of Jesus’ arrest, he works to the
conclusion that it is the Evangelist who has involved the Romans in the
action: the speira and chiliarchos were in the source, but there they re­
ferred to the Jewish temple police (as in Lk). This appears to be an as­
sumption that is hardly proved. Verses 4–9 he considers to be Johannine
in toto, with no dependence on tradition; where the tradition has been
most thoroughly reworked is in the saying about the sword. The scene of
Jesus before Pilate he rightly recognizes to be the high point of the fourth
Gospel’s Passion narrative. In this thoroughly Johannine passage the
source has been responsible for the general scene itself (the order and
significance of the crowning with thorns has been shifted), for the details
determining the date of Jesus’ death, and for the denial of the ius gladii
to the Jews (a statement turned into direct discourse by the Evangelist).
Consistent with his ascription of the Passover setting to the source, D.
finds no intention on the part of Jn to identify Jesus as the true Passover
lamb. Along with most of those who maintain this position, he feels
obliged to get rid somehow of the hyssōpō of 19:19, though he admits the
lack of manuscript justification for doing so.

The second major division of this book, somewhat more than a third of
the whole, has been reserved for theological conclusions emerging from
the critical analysis. The present reviewer confesses to having found this
section a disappointment: he had anticipated that D.’s meticulous study
would have produced more new and insightful results. There is a fairly
routine treatment of the crucifixion as glorification and as an exercise of
obedience. An overlong discussion of the transitive or intransitive nature
of the ekathisen of 19:13b ends in the recognition that it is, after all, in­
transitive. The analysis of the political-apologetical tendencies of the
narrative seems to be somewhat old-fashioned now; D. could have profi­
itted from the work of J. Louis Martyn, even without necessarily adopt­
ing Martyn’s position as his own. Perhaps the most interesting part of
this section is that dealing with the role of the beloved disciple, whom D.
represents to have been a real person, not the Evangelist, but the witness
standing behind his tradition.

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Bruce Vawter, C.M.

THE SAYINGS OF JESUS IN THE CHURCHES OF PAUL: THE USE OF THE SYN­
OPTIC TRADITION IN THE REGULATION OF EARLY CHURCH LIFE. By David L.
David Dungan is Associate Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Tennessee, and this book grows out of a Harvard Divinity School Th.D. dissertation under the direction of K. Stendahl. It is an intriguing book that deserves to be read carefully and weighed critically at every juncture of its argument. The question that it poses is an old one but well worth asking anew: What is the relation between the life of the early Pauline churches and the sayings-of-Jesus tradition reflected in the Synoptics? In effect, this question is a specific facet of the hallowed Jesus-Paul problem. D.’s answer is in a good sense conservative and illuminating at the same time, for he documents the relationship between Pauline teaching and the sayings of Jesus in a careful manner. His research produces a rich blend of conviction and resistance in the reader and for that reason merits being taken seriously.

After a short introduction combining a history of the question with a statement of purpose, D. confines his investigation to two legal sayings cited in 1 Corinthians: the command about support for the apostles (9:14) and the prohibition of divorce (7:10-11). In each case the method involved is to determine exegetically the precise meaning of the Pauline passage, Paul’s attitude toward the saying, the Synoptic tradition regarding the saying (or its equivalent in that tradition), and Paul’s relationship to the editors of the Synoptics. A concluding section presents the results of the study, and these are provocative. In the first instance, Paul sets aside a church regulation—knowing it is rooted in a saying of Jesus and sharing this knowledge with his addressees—because he has seen the abuses to which it can give rise. For the sake of the unimpeded proclamation of the gospel, he can relativize even the dominical-sayings tradition. In the second case, Paul correctly understood Jesus’ intention—to forbid remarriage but not divorce—but he refers to it only allusively, without citing the wording of the saying. The general conclusion to which this study leads is important and sound, namely, that in his application of these sayings in the context of his churches, Paul fits almost perfectly into the pattern of interpretation and application exemplified in the Synoptic Evangelists.

While welcoming the general thrust of the book, the reviewer is ill at ease with many of its arguments. Some examples. The discussion of 1 Cor 9 makes a great fuss over Paul’s seemingly contradictory stance toward support from his churches before laboriously arriving at the obvious point that Paul merely does not accept support from a church he is presently evangelizing. The long sections on the Synoptic tradition almost make the work into two books interwoven at key points. D. is at pains to show in each case that the Matthean form of the tradition is the more original (a stronger case in the divorce discussion, as is well known, than in the mis-
sion discourse). Where this argument leads is a major problem in itself, but that is not the point of the book. More serious in my view is the failure to apply to Mt 10, for instance, the same sort of redaction-critical argument that is used to show that Lk 10 is secondary; to have done so would have weakened the case for the originality of Matthew. The divorce question is such a contorted issue that consensus may never be obtained. It seems a bit unfair to characterize freedom to remarry in 1 Cor 7:15 as a Roman Catholic exegesis. D. could well have consulted Conzelmann’s commentary on 1 Corinthians (1969) and found just such an interpretation. Both in this passage and even more in the Jesus saying itself, the notion that remarriage and not divorce was the focus of Jesus’ prohibition seems to me unsound. D.’s argument is nuanced but ultimately unconvincing. He may be right that the formulation as found in Mt 19:9 and its several parallels is the product of development, but Mt 19:6b is the heart of the discussion. But none of these points really touches the main thrust of the book, and for the latter it deserves a hearty welcome.

Weston College, Cambridge, Mass. George W. MacRae


In this rather substantial tome Walgrave, the noted Newman scholar, gives a full historical and systematic account of the problem of doctrinal development. The book gets off to a slow start with two rather cumbersome chapters setting up the problem and the basic notions. Then, in several intermediate chapters, it surveys theories propounded from the first to the seventeenth centuries. This historical section would have been enriched had greater consideration been given to the idea of continuing revelation as found in the Fathers and practically all medieval theologians.

The modern period is treated in three chapters that deal respectively with three types of solution: the “logical,” the “transformistic,” and the “theological.” W.’s analysis of the “logical” theories is appropriately subtle and arid. The positions of Bañez, Molina, Suarez, de Lugo, and Vasquez regarding the possibility of defining virtually revealed truths are dutifully expounded. The chapter comes to a climax with an ample presentation of Marín-Sola. The intricate distinctions of these authors are difficult to follow, but not much is lost, for the reader will probably agree with Walgrave that all the theories covered in this chapter are seriously deficient; they rest upon a merely propositional theory of revelation and a purely syllogistic conception of reasoning.

With the presentation of the “transformationist” theories arising out
of liberal theology the book begins to come alive. The sections dealing with the nineteenth-century idealists are rewarding, as are the critical summaries of Bultmann and Tillich. The five pages devoted to van Buren at the end might well have been omitted, because W. makes the radical secularist theology seem almost unworthy of attention.

The discussion of the "theological" theories is the high point of the book. In Möhler, Newman, and Blondel W. finds the principal inspiration for his own position. In expounding these authors he shows how it is possible to accept the principle of dogma without falling into immobilism and to admit a real development that is neither strictly additive nor transformationist. In thus transcending the dichotomy between the scholastic and the liberal theories, W. aligns himself with the mainstream of twentieth-century Catholic theology. Close to von Balthasar and de Lubac, he stands closer still to Rahner and Schillebeeckx.

Essential to W.'s thesis, as spelled out in the closing chapter, is the inseparability between Christian revelation as an illumination of the spirit and the divinely guaranteed expression of that revelation in word and history. The assent of faith, he maintains, goes out to the total reality of God's self-communication—a reality infallibly attested by the canonical Scriptures and by the magisterium of the Church. The development of dogma is a progressive analysis and systematization of the "idea" previously assented to in its indistinct wholeness. Development occurs, according to W., by way of interpretation of divinely certified statements that cannot be falsified by subsequent investigation. Crucial to W.'s theory is the power of the public preaching authority of the Church, assisted by the Holy Spirit, to settle disputes in a definitive way.

Although W.'s position is carefully argued, I have two principal points of dissatisfaction. In the first place, I miss in this book any adequate elaboration of the case for an infallible public teaching authority. Perhaps if W. had composed this work since the publication of Küng's Infallible? he would have given more attention to this point. He assumes too easily that the power of a single public authority to settle disputes is the only possible way in which God could keep the Christian revelation intact. His strong insistence on magisterial authority as the decisive norm of authentic development seems too extrinsic and authoritarian to harmonize with his generally personalistic and existential philosophy of knowledge. His view of magisterium is sketched in very broad strokes, without any explanation of how the official teaching authority is related to the total Church as a community of faith.

Secondly, one might have hoped to find in this book a more detailed discussion of the variety of possible types in doctrinal development. W. studies the problem of development as if it were a single generic prob-
lem. I would personally feel that there are very significant differences in the patterns of development in view of the variety of content, motivation, and historical circumstances. If it be granted that development must be proportioned to the needs and possibilities of different ethnic and cultural groups, one would have to ask what kind of development is needed today for the various regions of the world. On this question *Gaudium et spes*, and authors such as Karl Rahner, have had more to say than W. does in this book.

These two shortcomings, however, do not detract from the very real merits of W.'s treatise. He has constructed a well-integrated theory of the process by which the Christian "idea" is progressively analyzed and systematized, and has shown how his theory fits into the general history of theological opinions. In the course of setting forth his views, W. provides many excellent insights into the nature of revelation, the "special" character of Christian revelation, and the relationships between the interior grace of faith and the objective deposit of Scripture and tradition. Perhaps this book will ultimately prove as important for its contribution to the theology of revelation as for its views regarding the process of doctrinal development.

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**AVERY DULLES, S.J.**


By critically examining the notion of dogma, which is crucial to any theory of development, this work admirably complements and balances Walgrave's work reviewed above. Nolte in this learned and copiously documented dissertation follows the lead of his Tübingen professors, Hans Küng and Walter Kasper. N.'s scholarship, however, stands on its own merits.

N. points out that in Scripture, in the ancient Church, and in the Middle Ages the term "dogma" was predominantly used either in a doctrinal sense to signify the teaching characteristic of a philosophical school or sect, or in a juridical sense, to signify an institutional decree. Not until Kant's polemic against dogmatism did the term "dogma" come to connote a position immune to criticism or alteration. The concept of dogma as an immutable revealed truth first appears about the end of the eighteenth century in an indexed book by the "Gallican" Philip Neri Chrismann. In the mid-nineteenth century the Roman magisterium adopted a more papalist form of this authoritarian, antihistorical concept of dogma. For Neo-Scholasticism dogma was a sheer *lex credendi* imposed upon the
faithful. Such a view, according to N., is dogmatistic; it tends to repress creative thinking and to bring about evasive and dishonest speech.

The antidogmatic spirit abroad in our time, N. further points out, contains in itself a hidden vestige of dogmatism. To avoid both dogmatism and dogmatic antidogmatism, according to N., one must recognize that dogma and criticism must remain in constant tension. As implied in the title of his book, N. believes that dogma is not exempt from the necessary historicity of human thought. To recognize this limitation is not to deny transitoriness but to affirm it, for transitoriness means "going beyond"; it implies transitoriness. Definitiveness is not the assertion but rather the negation of transitoriness. To accept historicity is to protect dogma against the distortion of dogmatism, and thus to help defend dogma.

Marshalling much evidence from linguistic philosophy, N. shows the impossibility of imprisoning the content (Sache) of revelation in a definitive formula that could be imposed upon men of all times and places. In a particularly valuable section of this book, with some dependence on Küng's *Infallible?*, Nolte distinguishes three basic forms of dogmatic statement. In Scripture and the early Church one finds confessional formulas that express the faith in summary form; although they have something of the character of dogmas, these formulas are not intended as exclusive or definitive. Closer to the modern concept of dogma are the definitions of the ancient councils; these are exclusive, in the sense that they intend to protect the faith against a heresy, but they are regarded as emergency measures rather than as eternal statutes. Many of these ancient definitions succeeded so well that they continue to fulfil a paradigmatic role with regard to posterity. The modern period is characterized by explicative-tendentious dogmas, as N. calls them. These are extensive in character and are not drawn up in response to any grave crisis. N. finds dogmas of this third type tainted with dogmatism, and he welcomes the decision of Vatican II not to enact any new dogmas of this kind. He hopes that the Church in our day may be passing into a metadogmatic phase, in which dogma would be purified of the defects of dogmatism.

This brilliant work is, in my opinion, one of the most important contributions to Catholic fundamental theology in recent decades. An honest confrontation with the problems raised in this book could greatly help to revitalize the Church in our day.

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AVERY DULLES, S.J.

**Der Sinn der Kanonbildung: Eine historisch-theologische Untersuchung der Zeit vom 1. Clemensbrief bis Irenäus von Lyon.** By Isidor
The canon of the NT involves one of the most important and yet one of the most difficult problems of contemporary theology. Recent studies such as those of N. Appel, *Kanon und Kirche: Die Kanonkrise im heutigen Protestantismus als kontroverstheologisches Problem* (Paderborn, 1964) and I. Lønning, *Kanon im Kanon* (Oslo, 1972), survey the issue in broad historical and theological scope. Essential to progress in this area, however, in my opinion, is particular attention to the most decisive historical period in the development of the canon, the second century. To a great extent the canon question has been stimulated and determined by Protestant NT exegetes (see the compilation of essays edited by E. Käsemann, *Das Neue Testament als Kanon*, Göttingen, 1970). But the diversity of exegetical “solutions” makes it obvious that the discussion has been fraught with historical and theological presuppositions which can be evaluated only by a historical-critical analysis applied to the documents of the second century as rigorously as it has been applied to the literature of the first. Therefore Frank’s doctoral dissertation (Freiburg im Breisgau) is to be welcomed as an important Catholic contribution to the discussion and a significant critique of current theories.

The book is comprehensive in scope and methodologically sound in execution. In two major chapters F. examines chronologically the literature up to and including Justin, which, he maintains, contains “the basic elements for the formation of the canon” (p. 17) and then the material up to and including Irenaeus, the period in which the formation itself took place. The first chapter includes *1 Clement, Didache, Ignatius of Antioch, Polycarp, Barnabas, Pastorals, 2 Peter, Papias, Shepherd of Hermas, 2 Clement, Epistula apostolorum*, Aristides, and Justin. The second treats Tatian, Melito, Athenagoras, Theophilus, Hegesippus, the Muratorian Fragment, and Irenaeus.

F. is well aware that any given author’s conception of the canon is fully apparent only within the total sweep of his thought. Likewise, the various theological tendencies represented by the individual documents must be appreciated if the historical impulses toward canon formation are to be determined (pp. 16-17). To each document is dedicated an isagogical gem *in nuce*. Questions of authorship, date, place of composition, theology, and Christology are treated, as well as the specific positions taken on the concept of apostolicity, scriptural and dominical norms cited, and references to ecclesial office. Brief summaries recall the most salient features of each document, and summaries at the conclusion of each of the two main periods situate the literature in the over-all historical and theological trends of the time.
In the Church's confrontation with Judaism, Gnostic teaching, and pagan philosophy, F. concludes, certain questions become paramount, namely, the authority and scope of office, doctrine, and Scripture. In the period through Justin a marked diversity of positions is evident whereby eventually the question of doctrinal unity becomes crucial. In the following period through Irenaeus, F. argues, it is the Gospel of John and its Logos doctrine which finally provides the decisive means for the demarcation of Old and New Testament (Melito), the harmonization of the gospels (Tatian), the canonization of the apostolic writings (Muratorian Fragment), and the victory over Greek philosophy with the proclamation of the one, true God (Irenaeus).

In the light of this thesis F. concludes with a critique of the five main theories of the *criteria canonicitatis* briefly outlined in his introduction. The historical evidence fails to confirm (1) K. Barth's theory of the *autopistia scripturae*, a "dogmatic historical projection" (p. 204); (2) O. Cullmann's stress on apostolic authorship, based on the erroneous assumption that the formation of the canon concluded prior to A.D. 150; (3) N. Appel's notion that the canon reflects the unity of doctrine in the early Church, an unhistorical *Wunschtraum* (p. 206); (4) H. von Campenhausen's position that Marcion and Montanism were the main causes of canon formation as too late and too insufficiently documented (p. 207); and (5) W. G. Kümmel's, H. Braun's, and E. Käsemann's insistence upon "evangelical content" as "too abstract," "too unhistorical," and "too dogmatic" respectively (p. 209).

In general I concur with F.'s criticisms and welcome his study as a response to my "call for a historical criticism" expressed in my article "A Catholic Gospel: Reflections on 'Early Catholicism' in the New Testament," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 31 (1969), 213–23. F.'s own position, however, leaves me still a bit unconvinced. In order to associate the Johannine Gospel with authors such as Hegesippus and Irenaeus, F. resorts to sheer speculation about their common geographical provenance. If the Logos theory accounts so heavily for the eventual importance of the fourth Gospel, how are we to understand Tatian's minimal reference to this Johannine feature in view of the fact that for him John is the "key to the Synoptics" (p. 140)? If the Church's reservation regarding Paul in the second century is due to his thoughts on church order, how can F. maintain that the fourth Gospel was responsible for his inclusion in the Muratorian Canon when John's own ecclesiology is as incompatible with the developing catholic consensus as that of Paul? F. attributes the preeminence of the fourth Gospel in the Muratorian Fragment not only to its apostolic authorship but especially to the fact that it represents the authority of all the apostles. But how is this to be reconciled with the fact
that John is described as "ex discipulis" in distinction from Andrew "ex apostolis" to whom it was revealed that "with all of them reviewing [it], John should describe all things in his own name"? Is Andrew the apostle presented here as the immediate guarantor of John's tradition, as Paul is of Luke's? Furthermore, could it not be argued that it is the "one sovereign Spirit (uno ac principali spiritu)" to whom the Fragmentist attributes the unity of the diverse teachings rather than the total apostolic authority which John is supposed to represent? It seems to be the particularities (singula) of John as well as his authority for which the Fragmentist is seeking to account. Finally, F.'s designation of John's significance within the Muratorian Canon as the "canon within the canon" (pp. 184, 188) is rather puzzling. If, as F. asserts, the Gospel of John was "the concrete written form" of a "certain confession of faith [which] was the criterium for the selection of the canonical books" (p. 185), is not F. positing an ultimate "canon above the scriptural canon"? What creed does F. have in mind? What are its contents and to what extent are they reflected in the Gospel of John? In any case, with this line of thought F. is diverting the meaning of the phrase "canon within the canon" implied by its proponents Kümmel, Braun, and Käsemann.

Nevertheless, F.'s case for the fourth Gospel's contribution to the formation of the canon still merits close attention. Further investigation might profit from a work to which F. did not refer: T. E. Pollard's Johanne Christology and the Early Church (Cambridge, 1970). In sum, F. has performed an invaluable historical-critical task; he has presented some telling criticisms of current theories regarding the formation of the canon; and he has offered a hypothesis which might well occupy scholars for years to come.

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JOHN H. ELLIOTT


This splendid book is as accomplished as it is ambitious. Known for The Formation of Historical Theology, our first full-length English study of Ferdinand Christian Baur (cf. TS 28 [1967] 141–44), H. has now brought his understanding of historical and dialectical method to bear on the person and mission of Jesus. He proceeds with an impressive knowledge of sources, both traditional and contemporary, and the forceful, clear structure of his essay makes it not only a scholarly but also a rhetorical achievement of the first order.

Though his context is the absence of God in contemporary culture, H. intends to move through and beyond this experience to a new interpret-
tion of God's presence. He regards neo-orthodoxy's dialectic of the presence and absence of God as insufficiently constructive and seeks himself a new mode of humanly liberating transcendence. Agreeing with Moltmann and Pannenberg on the presence in history of God as its future, H. insists on asking how this future God is present. Language, he argues, is the crucial medium, and "if God's presence is to be experienced afresh, then what is required is a rebirth of language" (p. 23). But a "faithful language" is not simply at man's disposal; it is essentially a gift, the power of the future which gathers man into presence with himself and his world. For H., presence "means the dynamic, living unity of future-past present, accomplished by means of word" (p. 24). It is God who, in an absolute way, has the word that is the power of the future. Thus God, as the primordial unity of time, is essentially presence (or identity, reconciliation, true life, to use words which are all closely related for H.).

H. belongs to the hermeneutical school and is especially influenced by Heidegger and Ebeling. This is particularly evident in his fine chapter on method, in which his basic concern is to establish the proper dialectic between the historical Jesus and the present Christ, or, as he develops this relationship, between the critical-historical and the practical-responsive dimensions of Christology. Jesus present in the Christian community as the agent of reconciliation is understood as the inspiration for that community's ever renewed quest for a more adequate interpretation of Jesus as the historical ground, criterion, and witness of faith. The two moments of interpretation and response are held together in tension by the ongoing process of living understanding which, with Gadamer, H. considers to be an event transcending the interpreter. (I wonder, however, if H. recognizes the systematic tension between Gadamer's emphasis on "the event of truth" and Habermas' understanding of emancipative interest, a theme which in effect dominates the last chapters of H.'s book.) By thus understanding the structure of Christology in a fundamentally hermeneutic way, H. is also able to interpret its classical distinctions as hermeneutic ones which can only be understood dialectically: "the 'person' of Jesus refers to his historical existence as the one in whom presence was fully accomplished," "his 'work' signifies the making present—the efficacious realization for us today—of his being as presence" (p. 55). Jesus as presence is thus the focus for Part 2 of the book, Jesus as present the focus for Part 3.

Critical of ascending, descending, and futurist Christologies, H. wants to develop a contemporary word-Christology by radicalizing the concept of word or language. He borrows from Heidegger's reflection on the ontological difference between being and beings and applies the structure of this reflection to his own notion of word or language as the medium of
presence which, though not itself a personal agent, does constitute personhood when it becomes appropriately expressed in particular speech. For H. it is language which gathers a man into identity with himself temporally, language which establishes his world spatially, and word as language which transcends all its forms in actual speech. The temporal and spatial horizons of presence are founded in the third horizon of transcendence, and it is in this horizon of finite transcendence that man's word may come to correspond or "become homologous" to God's word of true freedom. (H.'s view that temporal presence is first of all presence to oneself and that spatial presence is presence primarily to the world seems to me unsuccessful and overschematized; I should rather hold that both the individual and communal poles of personhood are primordially spatio-temporal; but I do agree with him that language is the critical factor in the constitution of our common world.)

H. suggests a dialectical relation between God and His word: "God is the one who has word absolutely and in this sense is the primordial word-event, the event of being" (p. 116). Since being is essentially temporal, this means that God must be conceived as "primordial and infinite temporality." Personal presence is always both relative and absolute, H. argues; for God, the primary relativity is to Himself, while His absolute character is read from the perfection of His temporal self-relatedness. But inasmuch as H. understands God's presence as the integration of the modes of time, he finds it possible to affirm both God's absolute transcendence and the absolute freedom of His immanent relation to the world. If one asks how he derives his final conception of God as absolute or perfect, I do not know that he has given another source than faith. But I am not sure that this does justice to his own contention that philosophical concepts are significant for the content of theology. Nor am I satisfied with his suggested argument that what Heidegger really means by being is what Christian faith means by God; at any rate, it does not seem possible simply to translate Heidegger's conception of being into a specifically theological statement on the absolute.

We can say, H. continues, that Jesus is the word of faith, that the correspondence between the word of God's power and the word of man's need is completed in Him. This implies that "Jesus was 'presence' in a unique and definitive sense" (p. 153). This he was in three basic ways. Jesus' word was uniquely faithful, a new language in its authority, truthfulness, and correspondence to God's word. Further, what Jesus said about faith proclaimed a new mode of existence in the power and wholeness of its openness for God's coming "kingdom of presence." Finally, Jesus lived faith in such a way that He also established a new praxis of freedom, responsibility, and obedience to the will of God. Understand-
ably enough, the ontological difference between word as primal event and word as ontic occurrence is not always neatly paralleled by the event of Jesus as the word of faith which is revealed in His particular sayings and acts. In fact, there are obvious strains on H.'s thesis as he repeatedly strives to recall the word character of Jesus' presence. The three new dimensions revealed by Jesus' word with respect to the three horizons of presence is a schematization that does not always convince. But H. is well aware of this, and if his effort to radicalize the concept of word calls for a development of his (ontological) anthropology, it nevertheless has already provided him with a sensitive and accurate instrument with which to interpret the NT record of Jesus' presence.

Throughout this book H. insists on the inseparability of word and practice, agreeing with Barth's rejection of the usual distinctions between logos and ethos and arguing for the primacy of language as human event which expresses its truth in action. Jesus' inauguration of a new practice thus provides an appropriate transition to H.'s final chapter, in which he proposes to understand resurrection as the practice of presence. Inseparably connected with the crucifixion of Jesus, the resurrection is nevertheless to be understood as a historical event only in its present modality, which is one of being called to faith and sent to mission: to confess Jesus' resurrection is to confess that God has brought Him to stand in the world as the agent of reconciliation. Such a confession constitutes a community whose mission it is to carry on the cause of Jesus, His faithful word. Thus the resurrection, as Moltmann says, belongs to "the history of the practice of Christian freedom."

While the actual argument of H.'s book is a powerful and attractive one, I think it equally admirable in the promise it gives of assimilating and integrating other insights. He himself remarks the importance of bringing the viewpoints of analytic philosophy and linguistics to bear on his own approach to language. His fine temporal analysis of presence could be expanded and given body by more attention not only to the pluriformity of language but also to its concrete social expression. This might also clarify how it is that faithful language actually renews society and how the coming of the eschaton is "accomplished at least in part through the dialectic of historical process" (p. 285). Undoubtedly there will be many to join H. in these tasks. Already, however, his own approach to Jesus as the Christ has put us so much in his debt that we can only hope to become more so.

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LEO J. O'DONOVAN, S.J.

The Juan de Avila Institute of the Theology Faculty of Burgos has been holding annual reunions since 1969 on the theology of the priesthood, with the subsequent publication of the papers. It has been an admirable achievement, perhaps not as well publicized as it should, especially outside Spain and Portugal. The subject of the first session and volume, in 1969, was general methodology, and included a long bibliography on the subject up to the year 1968; each subsequent volume has included a bibliography up to date, with critical notes, and scholars in the field will find this one of the most indispensable elements of the entire series. The second volume (1970) discussed the priesthood and the laity; the third (1971), the priest as minister of the people of God; the fourth, the present volume, is centered around the concept of the priesthood in the NT and the Fathers down to Gregory the Great; the bibliography by Juan Esquerda Bifet covers the years 1970 and part of 1971 and is divided into eleven categories.

Of the sixteen papers, three concern the NT and apostolic period, six deal with the Fathers (Irenaeus, Tertullian, Cyprian, the Cappadocians, Chrysostom, and Gregory the Great), one with Church history, and one (on the concept of ministerium, by A. d’Ors) with a linguistic-historical evolution in ecclesiastical terminology. It is indeed a quite varied volume, given the possibility (in a work of this sort) of duplication and conflict. All the papers seem to possess high quality, and every scholar of the early period of Church history should find something to his interest. J. Coppens’ study of the priesthood in the NT brilliantly surveys the evidence and gently refutes the extreme views of Hans Küng and D. Olivier; this article will remain fundamental in all future discussions of the priestly character in the early Church. Oñatibia, in addition to writing the pref-ace, presents an analysis of the presbyterate in the apostolic period. José de Aldama, S.J., surveys Irenaeus’ treatment of the priesthood and concludes that he seems to lay more stress on the charismatic (as opposed to the sacrificial) character of the Christian priest. José Capmany’s long paper on Cyprian enumerates the qualities of the priest and bishop as Cyprian saw them, against the background of persecution and theological controversy in North Africa. Lucas F. Mateo-Seco’s essay on the three Cappadocian Fathers is an admirable synthesis: the cultic function of the priest is foremost, as the source of distribution of Christ’s atoning graces to men. Of especial interest, too, is Pio Gonçalo Alvés de Sousa’s study of the purpose of Chrysostom’s De sacerdotio, as a treatise primarily on the episcopate. José Hernando Pérez presents a well-documented study of priesthood and ministry in Gregory the Great. Manuel Guerra Gómez studies the concept of plebs in its transition from pagan to Christian society in the early Church and, in a second paper, the ideas of dignitas and ministerium in Tertullian and Cyprian.
Four other papers are of more concern for the priest of today: Feliciano Pagés Vidal, on Paul and the priest; Joseantonio Albad Ibáñez, on the theology of the new Holy Thursday preface; T. I. Jiménez Urresti, on the theology of the priesthood; and P. Venanzio Caprioli, O.C.D., on the modern role of the priest according to the magisterium. Juan Esquerda Bifet surveys the results of the episcopal synod of 1971, and concludes the volume with an excellent critical bibliography on the priesthood (1970–71), especially valuable for its items in French and Spanish.

Especially pleasant to note is the ease with which the difficult texts of the Latin and Greek Fathers are discussed in a day when patristic scholarship would appear to be losing ground in the Church; and there is also evident a certain Iberian sense for tradition which strikes the reader as one of the proud hallmarks of the entire Juan de Avila series. English-speaking Catholics should rightly be envious. In any case, this will become a valuable addition to the growing literature on the priesthood in the early Church, alongside of R. Gryson's *Le prêtre selon saint Ambroise* (Louvain, 1968) and A. Vilela’s classic *La condition collégiale des prêtres au IIIe siècle* (Paris, 1971), especially in view of Hans Küng's monograph *Wozu Priester?* (Zurich, 1971). It is interesting to note that our present volume has a bibliographical entry under the heading “The Priesthood of Women” (pp. 471–72); Bifet wryly concludes his comment by saying: “This question cannot be solved theologically by counting votes on either side.” The problem, he agrees, must be given deeper study. Let us urgently hope that the theological sessions at Burgos continue to grow and that their results will be more widely publicized. I am unsure at the present writing whether the bibliographies are available in a separate printing; if not, they should be. It would be helpful, too, if each of the volumes had at least a selective index.

*Fordham University*  
HERBERT MUSURILLO, S.J.


The purpose of this ambitious work is to submit a portion of the vast literature on agape to analysis. With the exception of Kierkegaard, the authors surveyed are all twentieth-century writers. The initial six chapters examined the major claims concerning agape made by representative Roman Catholic and Protestant authors, e.g., the two Niebuhrs, Nygren, Gillemann, D’Arcy. In these chapters O. first considers agape as a normative principle with a specifiable meaning or content, then relates agape to self-love and justice as two principles with which it is compared and contrasted, continues by examining how agape as a basic norm is linked to subsidiary rules and to the agent’s own moral being,
and concludes by investigating a major metaethical question, namely, the justification of agape as a basic principle or standard. Chap. 7 focuses on the position that agape occupies in the thought of Karl Barth, "both because he has illuminating things to say on this subject in particular and because he seems now to be at the very least the most significant Christian theologian in the first half of the twentieth century" (p. 205). In the final chapter O. revisits the issues discussed throughout the preceding part of the book in an endeavor to locate some of the most critical and unresolved issues, to pursue some implications and offer tentative solutions, and to identify the "fundamental content of human agape" and "some characteristic problems of such content" (p. 4).

Although the space given to individual writers in the first five chapters is necessarily compressed, O. succeeds in showing how Christian thinkers who unanimously accept agape as a basic normative principle demanding an unalterable commitment to and regard for the neighbor simply because he exists differ tremendously in their appraisal of what this means and requires. For example, for some (Nygren) self-love is wholly nefarious and totally incompatible with agape, whereas others (D'Arcy, Johann) consider self-love not only as something reasonable and prudent, as do Tillich and Reinhold Niebuhr, but also as an obligation definitively rooted in agape itself. While Nygren radically opposes agape to justice, others (Reinhold Niebuhr, Ramsey) distinguish agape from justice but see the two as intimately interrelated and frequently overlapping, and still others (Fletcher) totally identify justice and agape. Furthermore, as the situation-ethics debate so lucidly demonstrated, some writers (Fletcher) view norms other than agape merely as useful illuminators, whereas others (Ramsey) insist that agape must be embodied in rules of quite specific sort. O.'s analysis of these and other issues on which controversies rage is helpful in aiding the reader to sort out the divergent claims and to see whether the divergencies are substantive or verbal and, if the latter, whether these stem from conflicting theological frameworks that cannot be reconciled or merely reflect superficial differences capable of resolution.

Chap. 6, devoted to the metaethical question of the ultimate justification of agape, is perhaps the most challenging and valuable section. Here O.'s major interest is in the justification of agape within a religious context. As his analysis clearly demonstrates, attempts by theologians to answer the question "Why be loving?" reflect deeply the basic differences rooted in the theological systems that provide the ultimate framework for their replies. One of the basic divergencies among theologians considered here is that between those writers, mainly in the Catholic tradition, who see a basic continuity between what a Christian
knows through reason and experience and what he holds as divinely revealed, and those thinkers, typified by Nygren and others working from within the context provided by Reformation theology, who are either totally skeptical or at least much less confident about this continuity. These attitudes are obviously crucially significant in the way theologians regard appeals for living agapeically that are based on empirical considerations and philosophical reasoning—a subject occupying O. during the final pages of this chapter. O.'s own suggestions on the relationship between theological and philosophical ethics, it should be noted, merit careful attention, inasmuch as they are intelligently and modestly proposed.

The extensive discussion of Barth's views on agape is both a superb presentation of his thought and an instructive example of the way in which a truly great theologian can, at times, overcome the conflicts that plague believers in working out the implications of agapeic love. O. certainly does not endorse all that Barth had to say (he has some telling criticisms of Barth's faith-hope correlation, for example). Yet Barth's thought does, it seems, creatively bridge conflicts concerning agape as self-sacrifice and mutuality, neighbor-love and love of God, love of others and love of self—or at least points the way to a fruitful resolution of conflicts.

O.'s own "revisit" of the issues is perhaps most significant for his suggestions that the centrality of equal regard can prevent the self-sacrificial aspect of agapeic love from becoming an invitation to exploitation and that an agapeistic attitude is necessary to prevent philia from becoming an elitism, and for his comments on self-love relative to the demands of agape.

Although at times it is hard to see the forest for the trees, this is a valuable study meriting close attention and suggestive of future research.

Catholic University of America

WILLIAM E. MAY


The Church and the Development of the World is the first of Aubert's two volumes on contemporary social ethics, which are jointly entitled Towards a Theology of the Industrial Era. The second volume, which will appear shortly, will be called Major Problems of the Modern Economy. A., professor of social ethics at Strasbourg, has presented in the opening volume a work of astonishingly comprehensive scholarship. This fusion of theological, philosophical, and economic expertise con-
stitutes a unique contribution to the study of social ethics. A. aspires to do more, namely, to articulate a comprehensive theory of social ethics which will allow the Catholic tradition (and Church authorities) to interpret contemporary economic events from a moral perspective and to exercise leadership in resolving some of the social crises peculiar to our times. While A.'s scholarship is unequaled and invaluable, his contribution to the formulation of a comprehensive theory of social ethics is perhaps less certain.

The present volume includes (1) a historical study of the Church's attitude to economic development from its inception up to the present; (2) an economic analysis of the dynamics of development, with special attention to the development gap which excludes third-world nations from an equitable share of the world's wealth; (3) a speculative (philosophical/theological) study of the Church's responsibility and resources for influencing economic changes through her teaching role.

Two chapters deserve special notice for their solidity of scholarship and flexibility of reflection. Chap. 5, "The Dynamics of Development: Towards an Industrial Society," discusses the problem of the development gap in a balanced manner which combines a sophisticated knowledge of the economic factors in development with perceptive attention to the human factors, including the essential right of developing nations to choose their own model of development, rather than accepting an alien ideal of modernization. In chap. 7, "Towards a Hermeneutic of Natural Rights," the author displays similar deftness in recovering the original inspiration of the Thomistic synthesis in ethics, while indicating that more recent scholastic interpretations of ethics have obscured that vision by tendencies towards voluntarism or physicalism. A. concludes that Thomism established a standard of reason whereby men could discriminate among social policies and institutions on the basis of their compatibility with basic human tendencies to integral development.

Vol. 2 will complete these explorations of social ethics by studying: work, property, trade, monetary systems; domestic economic policies of developed nations; and the moral imperatives implied in the development gap. One hopes that the economic implications of escalating military budgets will not be ignored in the course of this forthcoming volume.

This first volume is a distinguished contribution to interdisciplinary scholarship in the field of social ethics. A. presents his work modestly, as a stimulus to further research. An American reader feels that such prospective research will have to focus on the problem of establishing a contemporary theory of social ethics. Thomistic ethics, which A.
relies on as his own theoretical framework, is unlikely to provide the theory of social policy needed today because of its notions of (1) the proper starting point of ethical reflection, and (2) the role of authority in formulating social policy. On the first point, A. betrays an anachronistic starting point for ethical reflection when (p. 320, [3.b.]) he interprets the sociality of man to mean that social relations are necessary for man to be truly adequate as an individual. Some contemporary ethicists (such as H. Richard Niebuhr, Gibson Winter, and Erik Erikson) reverse this by insisting that individual development is necessary for man to be an adequate partner for others in society. The primary focus in much contemporary ethics is not on an individual and his actions but on the relationship between individuals. This subtle shift in focus is the central insight of contextualist ethics, which is quite likely not compatible with the Thomistic interpretation of man. The second deficiency of Thomistic ethics, which restricts its applicability to contemporary problems of social policy, is its integral reliance on the judgment of "the wise" to determine the application of general principles to concrete cases. The pluralistic nature of contemporary society seems to preclude general agreement on the designation of "the wise." Hence, any viable social ethics must look for the emergence of social policy from a process of partnership within a pluralistic society rather than from the decisions of authority. One of the principal merits of contextualist ethics has been to establish the legitimacy and even the imperative quality of the pluralistic process itself as a substitute for wisdom provided earlier by established authorities.

Georgetown University

Francis X. Winters, S.J.


This Festschrift for Methodist ethicist Walter Muelder of Boston University presents a snapshot of the present moment in the rapidly changing enterprise of American Protestant social ethics. The essays gathered here are evidence in support of editor Paul Deats's statement that "There is, at present, no coherent discipline of social ethics." Though this anthology does not produce such a discipline, it indicates some of the reasons why the field lacks unity and points toward possible fruitful developments.

Part 1, dealing chiefly with methodological issues, contains two of the more meaty contributions. With his usual precision, James Gustafson develops the problem of the tension between historical relativism and
the need for some continuity in social life as the foundation for normative judgments. If ethical judgments are to be made on the basis of nonarbitrary analogies between past and present, we must "presuppose that man has a nature as well as a history." In contrast with this hermeneutic approach, Ralph Potter follows the lead of recent Anglo-American philosophical ethics by formulating the methodological issue in terms of logical and conceptual analysis. Potter believes that the present concerns of Christian social ethics are entirely too broad. Trying to wield the tools of theology, historical research, philosophy, and all the behavioral sciences has given the ethicist "an immodest stance within the Church and a ridiculous appearance in the academic community." More modestly, Potter proposes the humble task of critical analysis and clarification of the logic of the moral discourse of Christians as an aid to decision and action. Important as such analysis is in a time when rhetoric often outruns reason, it is ironic that this proposal should be urged when philosophers such as William Frankena are beginning to question the possibility of a clean division between normative and analytic ethics.

Part 2 concentrates on the contribution of various social and political perspectives to the ethical debate. Running through the essays of Tex Sample, Joseph Stamey, and Philip Wogaman is a concern over the relative importance of conflict and consensus as the basic foundation of social interaction. The arguments put forward in support of a third alternative which accepts the legitimacy of power and coercion while also acknowledging the importance of an ideal ethos are part of the continuing struggle among Protestants to overcome the dilemma of having to choose between an optimistic social gospel and a more somber realism. The interest in these essays lies in the fact that they indicate that the dilemma is not simply a theological one. The social or political theory one presumes as the foundation for ethics plays a determining role, and there is notable disagreement about which theories are correct. It is unfortunate that the issue of pluralism among social and political theorists is not given more precise treatment.

The third group of essays is gathered under the title "The Church and Social Responsibility." Here the focus is more directly on action. Senator George McGovern describes how he attempts to bring his Christian convictions into political life. This essay obviously should be of interest to many. Preston Williams argues that much of the past and present action of the churches in the social sphere is based on an ethic which underestimates race as an independent source of social conflict not reducible to the categories of class analysis. Essays by Methodist Bishop James Matthews, Harold DeWolf, Alan Geyer, and François
Houtart, reflections on the life and work of Muelder by Deats and C. Eric Lincoln, and a final response by Muelder round out the collection.

Despite its many helpful probes toward the future of social ethics, this is a distressing book. Disjointedness is a danger in all anthologies, but most of the authors realize that there is a deeper problem here. Tensions between commitments to social change, loyalty to the churches, and academic rigor and respectability are evident in the individual essays and in the collection as a whole. Pluralism in social analysis, in the ways church leaders envision their roles, and in the interpretation of the place of the theologian or Christian ethicist in the secular university underlie the lack of definition of the task of social ethics. Because of this necessary pluralism and diversity of primary institutional commitments, perhaps the development of a coherent discipline of Christian social ethics is not what is called for. The way into the future may lie in developing a social theory and praxis more critically aware of its presuppositions, a more reflective Church, and a university more aware of the importance of ethical questions in its own life. Would a more fruitful development occur if, instead of trying to unite these three enterprises under the one rubric of social ethics, greater specialization in the social, ecclesiastical, and academic approaches were pursued within communities of activists, churchmen, and academics aware of their need for each other? Roman Catholics have not yet been confronted with these sorts of questions on the level of social-ethical reflection and therefore have much to learn from the Protestant attempt to find some answers.

Yale University

DAVID HOLLENBACH, S.J.


This work is an outstanding contribution to the study of Syriac literature and the history of Nestorianism. It provides material which is of interest to students of patristics, Church history, historical theology, and scriptural exegesis and interpretation.

The first volume is a photographic reproduction of a late-nineteenth-century Syriac manuscript, Cambridge Or. 1319, reduced to 75 per cent of its original size. The facsimile is remarkably easy to read. The clear Nestorian script is that of Daniel, who was also the final copyist of Cambridge Or. 1312, which contains the Liber Heraclidis of Nestorius. Written probably between 1892 and 1899 at Urmia in Persia, Cam-
bridge Or. 1319 is a transcript of a manuscript dating from the year 1333/34 (or possibly 1233/34). The second volume provides an English translation, preceded by introductory commentary and followed by valuable indexes.

The collection reached its present form probably in the late eighth or early ninth century, during the heyday of the Nestorian Church. It defends two natures, two hypostases, and one prosopon of union in Christ. This had become official Nestorian orthodoxy in the year 612. Abramowski and Goodman divide the contents into twelve groups of texts as follows. (1) Excerpts from Shahdost (Eustathius) of Tarihan, who flourished in the middle of the eighth century. Some noteworthy points are the statement that Nestorius lived after the Council of Ephesus for twenty-two years, and a rather mild judgment on Chalcedon: the latter was unacceptable because of the theotokos and the one hypostasis in Christ, but it could not be anathematized because it taught the two natures whose properties were preserved. (2) Excerpts attributed to Isaac of Nineveh. A. and G. do not accept the attribution. Pseudo-Isaac's judgment on Chalcedon ("the bad synod") is much harsher than Shahdost's. (3) From Michael Malpana and directed against the theotokos and the Christology of Cyril, the Severians, and the Julianists. (4) Two anonymous excerpts from the documents of 612 A.D. These are also found later in 7. (5) A long excerpt from an anonymous apology for Narsai. It begins with a collection of scriptural passages referring to the Logos, the prosopon of union, and (at much greater length) the prosopon of the manhood. Then four passages from Nestorius are quoted. Finally, statements of Narsai are correlated with supporting biblical testimony. (6) An anonymous refutation of Cyril's twelve anathemata, dated by A. and G. to the year 433. (7) The creed and chapters from the document of 612, an important statement of Nestorian orthodoxy. (8) From Henanisho's disputations against the doctrine of a composite hypostasis in Christ. (9) Chapters from Pseudo-Nestorius on various questions dealing with nature, hypostasis, prosopon, union, etc. These are of considerable theological interest. (10) Either an excerpt or a very short treatise by Babai the Great on the two natures, two hypostases, and one prosopon in Christ. (11) Again the twelve anathemas of Cyril followed by twelve theses of Pseudo-Nestorius on the Trinity and Christ. (12) Four excerpts from (Pseudo-) Ephrem on God.

With the exception of Cyril's anathemas, the documents of 612 A.D., and the first of the excerpts from Ephrem, all the texts of this collection are published here for the first time. Publication of the Syriac text and the English translations is itself a noteworthy con-
tribution. But A. and G. have given us much more: excellent introduc­
tions to each part of the compilation and four very valuable indexes. The first of these, the Index of Biblical Quotations, not only permits one to locate immediately all the occurrences of a given scriptural verse, but also enables the reader to learn which were the popular Nestorian "proof texts." The most often cited verse is Jn 1:14 (25 times), then Heb 1:2 (10 times), Lk 2:52 and Phil 2:7 (9 times each), Jn 2:19, 21 and Col 2:9 (8 times each). The Index of Other Quotations lists the passages which are cited from the Fathers and the councils. The use of an asterisk to mark previously unknown or partly unknown quotations shows at a glance how much new material is to be found in the collection. There are, e.g., eight new quotations attributed to Narsai and seven to Nestorius. Over half of the deliberately selective Index of Subjects is devoted to Christological terms. It is perhaps the single most valuable part of the book for theologians, indicating as it does such things as definitions of nature, hypostasis, and prosopon, and arguments for two hypostases in Christ. The final Index of Names includes not only those from Christian antiquity but recent scholars as well, so that one may quickly find to what extent A. and G. accept, challenge, or correct the scholarship of such notables as Baumstark, Loofs, Ortiz de Urbina, and Vööbus.

The authors are to be commended for their painstaking accuracy as well as for the depth and breadth of their erudition.

Woodstock College, N.Y.C. ROBERT E. CARTER, S.J.


This is a paradoxical book, with some strong points, but lacking in profundity. It is well written and contains a large bibliography (pp. 231-47) which is a valuable tool in itself for the study of Jewish-Christian relations in the early Church. But one senses a faulty development within the work from an initial presentation of Cyril of Alexandria as a fanatic Jew-hater, to an extended and sympathetic presentation of Cyril's theology, which in the main is not overtly or covertly "hostile" to the Jews, as W.'s further explication itself shows. If your goal is to present an analysis of Cyril's biblical theology and its relationship to Judaism, why begin by introducing Cyril "at his worst" with the quotation on p. 1, and then proceed to unravel a myriad of Cyrillian texts which are at all events quite unlike the initial encounter? Why hang your
man before you have heard his case? Especially on such a sensitive issue, the watchword should be interpretation, not exploitation.

On the positive side, W. brings out some important aspects of Cyril's theology. Primarily he utilizes the exegetical works of the great Alexandrian as his source, pointing out that these have generally been neglected in favor of the dogmatic writings. From this large corpus of material he selects a number of themes, which constitute the main body of his book, including the general relationship between the Testaments, worship in spirit and in truth, the second Adam, the heavenly man, the new creation (chaps. 3–8). Then come two chapters which relate these themes to Cyril's Christology and the controversy with Nestorius (chaps. 9, 10). The initial two chapters are designed to give the historical background of Jewish-Christian contacts in the later Roman Empire, and with them may be compared an article of the same author in the series *Essays in Divinity 2: The Impact of the Church upon Its Culture* (Chicago, 1968), which is entitled "*Insignissima religio, certe licita?* Christianity and Judaism in the Fourth and Fifth Centuries."

The uncomfortable ambiguity which one feels in the over-all structure of the book reappears in the estimate held by the author of Cyril's theology. "The great tragedy of Cyril's theology," he writes (p. 226), "is that he developed this view of Christ not only through the exegesis of the Bible but also at the expense of Judaism. The beautiful things Cyril has to say about Christ are said by contrast to Moses and Judaism. The law kills and Christ brings life." One might counter with the words addressed to the Church of Laodicea: "I know thy works, that thou art neither cold nor hot: but I would thou wert cold or hot" (Ap 3:15). Because the author's own position vis-à-vis Christianity and Judaism is uncertain, or has become so through the faulty structure of the book, the reader becomes baffled by the theological stance of Cyril, who is largely influenced by St. Paul. The book contains a great deal of interesting information, and it is a pity that the focus is generally blurry.

*Boston College*  

**Margaret Schatkin**


Early Christianity in the British Isles continues to fascinate both the Church historian and the general reader: Celtic Christianity, largely isolated on two islands in the Atlantic, independent of the universal Church and heading for the inevitable confrontation with that larger Church; Anglo-Saxon Christianity, fighting for survival, challenged by Germanic paganism without and by the Celtic-Roman struggle within. As archeological discoveries and critical editions of insular manuscripts steadily increase, the stories of Celtic and Anglo-Saxon Christianity must constantly be re-evaluated and retold. These two works represent the latest attempts to tell these stories.

H. presents an outline of the beliefs and practices of the Celtic Church, excluding the liturgy and ecclesiastical institutions, which he claims are beyond the scope of this work, a questionable claim since topics as vast as Celtic monasticism and exegesis are included. His theme is a simple one: the Celtic Church lived the plain life of the gospel, uncontaminated by the works and pomps of its Mediterranean counterparts, until the day its independence was crushed by Rome. He finds many instances of Celtic uniqueness, which he interprets as opposed to Roman practices, not to those of the universal Church. Disagreement with Rome can mean only one thing, and, sure enough, H.'s independent Celts are in fact proto-Protestants. The Celts had Christ alone as their intercessor, and "this view must be set against that in Roman Christianity with its many intercessors" (p. 57); "So man is saved not by the merits of his deeds, 'but by God and His grace.' This Celtic viewpoint was again stressed by the Reformers" (p. 65); "Aloof from the religious stresses of the Mediterranean countries, the teachers of the Celtic west went their own ways, seeking to understand the will of God for them as revealed in the Scriptures" (p. 73).

H.'s approach is suspect and so is his expertise. He tries to document whatever he says but regularly overlooks facts which might qualify his interpretation. "Irish writers frequently allude to the four laws of Ireland" (p. 64), found in the *Félire Oengusso* and prohibiting the slaying of clergy, women, and cattle and the transgression of Sunday. But the Irish writers also frequently alluded to the four laws of nature, letter, prophecy, and gospel, a theme common to both liturgical and exegetical works. Sometimes H. simply makes unsupportable statements. "Without the influence of the views of the church fathers Celtic theologians set about discovering what the Scriptures meant" (p. 51). Hiberno-Latin biblical commentaries offer abundant examples of use of patristic authority in matters of interpretation. There are also a number of typographical errors which are not unimportant: "Annergray" for "Annegray" (p. 158), "Cogían" for "Colgan" (p. 233), "Inifallen" for
“Inisfallen” (p. 234). In sum, this work contains much information but information that is not well presented and is often misinterpreted.

Crossing the Irish Sea, we find that M.-H. offers a solid study which regrettably covers much the same material treated by Peter Hunter Blair’s *The World of Bede*, published only months earlier (cf. *TS* 33 [1972] 339-41). But unlike many previous writers, including Hunter Blair, M.-H. gives due credit to the British Christians and the Irish monks as well as to the Roman missionaries in converting the Anglo-Saxons. He does not minimize the Celtic-Roman conflict but repeatedly demonstrates that both parties placed the struggle against the ever-resurgent paganism and their mutual admiration of each other’s Christian virtues above their differences. The Irish trained English boys for service in the increasingly Romanized English Church; the Venerable Bede and Theodore of Tarsus both admired Irish asceticism and holiness. These were Christians first, then Romans and Celts.

Relying upon recent archeological evidence and a critical re-evaluation of the literary sources, M.-H. rejects many earlier stereotypes. Contacts between the British and English Christians were often peaceful: Romanized English monks were granted land in Wales; Saxons and Celts worshiped side by side in Wessex. Wilfrid of York was not the dedicated Romanist but an independent bishop of the Gallic stripe as well as a monk and ascetic who revered the Irish tradition. The Synod of Whitby was not the turning point in the Celtic-Roman struggle for Great Britain. It was “very much a Northumbrian affair” (p. 108) and little affected Christianity south of the Humber. The Synod was a defeat for the Irish but did not mark the end of their influence in Northumbria, which continued to be strong even to the days of Bede.

M.-H. tells his story well; his prose is often engaging, if occasionally exaggerated. (An Irish or Anglo-Saxon *paruchia* was not a “monastic empire” [p. 157]!). The clear account of the conversion and the valuable survey of the “Christian achievement” (including learning, liturgy, hagiography, monastic organization, and socioreligious institutions) make this an excellent introduction to early Christian England and deserving of wide circulation. One can hope it will eventually be offered at a more accessible price.

*John Carroll University*  

*JOSEPH F. KELLY*

**Psychologie und Metaphysik der menschlichen Freiheit: Die ideengeschichtliche Entwicklung zwischen Bonaventura und Duns Scotus.** By Ernst Stadter. *Veröffentlichungen des Grab-
This study on the psychological and metaphysical dimensions of human freedom in the Middle Franciscan School was presented as a Habilitationsschrift in philosophy at the University of Salzburg in 1969.

Sharp differences of opinion on the question of freedom are not peculiar to our age. Indeed, the present study reveals a wide range of positions in the thirteenth century. The confrontation between Christian theology and Aristotelian philosophy touched the very center of Christian self-consciousness in the Middle Ages. The secular tone of Aristotle seemed to stand in opposition to the otherworldly ethos of medieval Christianity in general and to the vision of the Franciscan Spirituals in particular. The problem of human freedom became paramount, for it was seen as basic to Christianity and it seemed to be lost in the determinism that emerged when the Aristotelian principle of motion was applied in the area of human psychology. The condemnation of 1270 expressly rejected determinism, and that of 1277 involved even some of the positions of Aquinas. The present study sheds light on the significance of medieval Aristotelianism precisely in relation to the problem of freedom and determinism.

The point of departure for this study is the position of Bonaventure, who sees the will not as a passive potency but as a faculty that involves a maximum of power, energy, and self-determination. This insight becomes a special concern of the Middle Franciscan School, each author developing it in his own peculiar way. For Bonaventure himself, the sovereignty of the will is to be understood in terms of its reflective power by reason of which the will has dominion in relation both to its object and to its act.

The sovereignty of the will becomes a special theme in Walter of Brügge, who uses cosmological and hierarchical models to express his concern. While Walter works largely in terms of his concept of the soul as a microcosm or as a hierarchy of powers with the will at the apex, Peckham approaches the question in terms of a philosophy of life. Life is immanent activity moving to self-perfection, and at its highest point it becomes free immanent activity. Thus, in the philosophy of life, the Aristotelian principle of motion is rejected. The self-movement of the will is the highest act of living reality, for at that level self-realization is carried out freely.

The style of Olivi, conditioned by his Spiritualist background, is emphatically phenomenological and introspective, concentrating on the inner realm of the spirit as an experienced reality. However one may try to explain it, freedom is a fact of experience. It is the basic pre-
supposition not only of Christian perfection but of all human values. The Spiritualist tendency of Olivi leads him to see Aristotelian philosophy as a threat not only to the gospel but to any philosophy of man. His is an extremely voluntaristic position worked out in a strongly polemic style. The will is a self-moving power and is not moved to act by something outside itself.

S. presents a very brief statement of a number of other authors, but the burden of his argument is found in his treatment of Walter of Brügge, Peckham, and Olivi. The treatment sheds light on the position of Scotus in a new way, for it now becomes clear that the Scotistic position is not as radically new as it sometimes appears to be. Rather, it is rooted in a tradition the inner logic of which Scotus brings to a high point of coherence and articulation.

Through the entire development we find the Franciscan concern for the will as an active force, an immanent power of self-determination in contrast with the Aristotelian view that sees the will as a passive potency brought to act from without. For the Aristotelians, the fundamental characteristic of spirit resides in its immateriality; for the Franciscans, it is to be found in its freedom. Thus, for Scotus, if man were endowed only with an intellect, he would be an intellectual animal, but an animal nonetheless. The true dignity of man lies in his power of self-determination.

S. views this section of history as an exemplary case of the development of ideas. In an excellent final chapter he offers a summary of the main lines of development, indicating how the content of the Aristotelian terminology undergoes a radical change reflecting the different metaphysical position of the Franciscan School.

Not only does such a study shed light on the Franciscan School itself, but it helps us gain new insights into the view of Aquinas, who approached the problem in a much different way. S.'s work reveals the thoroughness of methodology one has come to expect from the publications of the Grabmann Institute. This book is a much-needed addition to medieval research, filling out at least partially what had been a vast lacuna and thus helping to clarify more precisely the historical position of Scotus as well as that of Aquinas.

Catholic Theological Union, Chicago
ZACHARY HAYES, O.F.M.


This book concerns Thomas Le Myésier (+1336), one of the first disciples of Ramon Lull (+1315) in Paris. Le Myésier is of significance
because his library, his works, and his *Electorium* (an anthology of Lullian treatises) formed one of the most important sources for the diffusion of Lullism in Europe, and particularly in France, from the beginning of the fifteenth to the end of the seventeenth century. Le Myésier appeared in Paris for the first time about 1280. After studies in arts and medicine, he received the degree of doctor of medicine there. Although he also studied under Henry of Ghent and knew the works of Johannes Quidort, Giles of Rome, and Godfrey of Fontaines, he never took a degree in theology. He appears to have made Lull’s acquaintance during the latter’s first visit to Paris in 1287–89. At the time of Lull’s second visit in 1297–99 Le Myésier was in Arras, where he was (at least by the time of his death) a canon of the cathedral.

Whereas after his first visit Lull left Paris discouraged by the “fragilitas humani intellectus” which he there encountered, he seems on this second visit to have had more success. Not only did Le Myésier direct to him some questions on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard which reveal a good knowledge of his works, but Lull also established the beginnings of a lifelong contact with the Carthusians of the monastery of Vauvert. Two final visits in 1306 and 1309–11 seem to be connected with a shift in Lull’s purposes. In Paris to seek the support of Philippe le Bel for the foundation of colleges for Oriental languages (after having abandoned the hope of achieving this purpose through the papacy), Lull encountered the problem of Latin Averroism (Jean de Jandun became master of arts in 1310) and was led to modify his purposes to include the suppression of such opinions (a shift which is reflected in the *Vita coetanea*, a biography written for Lull on his last visit by one of the monks of Vauvert).

It was on this last visit that Lull enjoyed his greatest public success. At this time he wrote his celebrated anti-Averroistic treatises, lectured on his *Ars brevis* before the masters of arts and of medicine, and drew up, together with Le Myésier, the plan for the *Electorium*. Originally four types were planned: an *Electorium magnum*, *medium*, *parvum*, and *minimum*. The *Electorium medium* and *minimum* were either never completed or have disappeared. The *Electorium parvum*, otherwise known as the *Breuiculum* (now MS Karlsruhe, Landesbibl., St. Peter perg. 92), is a magnificent volume with illustrations of Lull’s activity. It seems to have been completed about 1321 under commission of Queen Jeanne of Burgundy-Artois. Far more important from a doctrinal standpoint is the *Electorium magnum* (now MS Paris B.N. lat. 15450). This work, which is meant to be a sort of summa of Lull’s doctrine in the form of excerpts from his very numerous and varied works, is made up of nine parts. Part 1 consists of an introduction by
Le Myésier and extracts supplying the epistemological basis for the Art. Parts 2 to 5 follow the plan of Lull’s great *Ars generalis ultima* (1308). Part 6 deals with Averroist errors, 7 with the demonstration of the faith, 8 with the nature of Christ as the perfection of all creatures, 9 with the conversion of the infidels and the recovery of the Holy Land. The whole work is preceded by a selection of contemporary writings which makes manifest Le Myésier’s opposition to Aristotle and Averroism.

The book covers in great detail and with elaborate documentation Lull’s life, especially his later life and his relations with the court of France, as well as the life of Le Myésier and his relations with Lull, and provides a survey of the influence of the *Electorium* and Le Myésier’s library (which came into the Sorbonne and then into the Bibliothèque Nationale) down to the times of Ivo Salzinger, the great editor of the monumental *Raimundi Lulli opera* (8 vols., Mainz 1721–42; reprint Frankfurt: Minerva, 1965). It will remain the definitive treatment of the diffusion of Lullian manuscripts until the completion of the *Raimundi Lulli opera Latina* (Palma de Mallorca, 1957 ff.).

*Raimundus-Lullus-Institut, Freiburg*  
**Jordi Gayà**

**The Church and the Secular Order in Reformation Thought.**


This informative, well-written book represents a thoughtful examination and comparison of the distinctive ecclesiologies of three Protestant reformers: Luther, Calvin, and Menno Simons. T. specifically discusses the reformers’ respective views on the institutional Church and its relationship to secular society. To this end, he first shows how these views are rooted in significantly different Christological and eschatological perspectives. Thus each of the book’s three central chapters first delineates the “theological foundations” of the particular reformer’s ecclesiology in his Christology and eschatology, and only then proceeds to unfold his understanding of “the institution in the world.” An introductory chapter surveys “the medieval heritage” in ecclesiology from Augustine through the conciliarists to Wyclif and Hus; the concluding chapter appraises “the Reformation heritage” in the light of its significance for contemporary thinking on Church and world.

T. offers no strikingly new or original insights. The basic thesis is a familiar one: the leading medieval theologians largely surrendered the Augustinian eschatological tension or polarity between the heavenly city and the empirical Church; Luther and Calvin reasserted the transcendence of the true Church over its specific institutional forms; in
the process they also preserved the integrity and independence (but not isolation) of both the Church and the secular order, yet allowed neither to be exempt from ongoing divine judgment (although Calvin's transformationist mode of thinking, rooted in his view of the institutional Church as God's chosen instrument for conforming man and the world to the divine will, entailed the danger of ecclesiastical triumphalism); Menno envisioned the Church as the spotless bride of Christ, elevated above the corruption of the present evil age and thus standing in total opposition to the world; this radical dualism, however, facilitated a definite tendency to perfectionism in Menno's view of the institutional Church (which must be distinguished by its visible conformation to Christ and to the apostolic martyr-Church); in this way Menno obscured Luther's and Calvin's sense of the Church as an eschatological community living constantly under God's transcendent judgment and awaiting in faith and hope the final perfecting of the saints.

If the thesis is familiar, it is nonetheless argued in a clear, coherent, and quite compelling manner. T. avoids facile generalizations; he is sensitive to the complexities and subtle nuances of the viewpoints under discussion; he knows the primary sources and brings forward pertinent, illuminating citations; he takes pains to be fair and judicious in his evaluative comments. In short, there is nothing superficial about this book and it merits wide and attentive reading.

I do have several criticisms, however, which can only be listed here without explanatory comment. (1) Granted that Luther's ecclesiology is rooted in his Christology and eschatology, all these facets of his thought must be related, in turn, to his underlying theologia crucis. T. fails to do this in any detail or depth. (2) While the leitmotif of Calvin's Christology is indeed spiritual union with Christ (insitio in Christum), the same is equally true of Luther's outlook wherein faith is most properly construed as fides Christi, i.e., the Christusgemeinschaft. T. seems to suggest that this motif is unique to Calvin, yet it received classic expression in Luther's 1535 Galatians Lectures. (3) Lastly, and most notably, T.'s entire presentation is so exclusively preoccupied with theological or ideational matters that the significance of the actual historical context (the "secular order") is almost totally overlooked. Yet the three reformers' understanding of both the institutional Church and secular society clearly underwent certain important developments in the light of their concrete personal encounters with sixteenth-century prelates, princes, and peasants.

Union Theological Seminary, N. Y. C.    DAVID W. LOTZ

Claude Welch, Professor of Historical Theology and Dean of the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley, Calif., has undertaken here to write a history of Protestant theology in Germany, Great Britain, and the United States during the nineteenth century. The present work, the first of two volumes, covers 1799 to 1870; a second volume will review Protestant thought up to the outbreak of World War I in 1914. In an introductory chapter, W. admits that there have been a number of scholarly works dedicated to the history of nineteenth-century Protestant theology. Yet these have been largely national in scope, with only a passing reference to kindred theological speculation in other countries. It is time, therefore, to interpret the history of theology more broadly in terms of intellectual and cultural currents which transcend national boundaries (and, a fortiori, individual thinkers or particular schools of theology within any one country).

The book is divided into two parts, the first of which covers the period from 1799 to 1835. The dominant theological issue in this first third of the nineteenth century was, according to W., the vindication of theology as an academic discipline with distinctive truth-claims. In the previous century, first Hume and then Kant had virtually undermined the foundations of traditional metaphysics, so that progressive theologians were now actively in search of a new philosophical rationale to support belief in the existence of God and the other articles of Christian belief. Schleiermacher, Hegel, and Coleridge responded to this challenge with a new synthesis of philosophy and theology. Hence W. gives a detailed analysis of the thought of each of these three men. In the final chapter of this first part, he surveys theological speculation in the U.S. at the same time, concentrating above all on the theology of Nathaniel W. Taylor at Yale and of William E. Channing, the father of American Unitarianism.

The second part of the book covers the middle period of the nineteenth century, that extending from the publication of David Friedrich Strauss's Leben Jesu in 1835 to the appearance of the first volume of Albrecht Ritschl's Justification and Reconciliation in 1870. In the years between, Protestant theologians in Germany, England, and the U.S. were trying to cope with the new problems created by the application of historical method to both speculative theology and Scripture. In particular, the reality and significance of Jesus Christ as a historical person became a subject of sharp controversy. Strauss opened the debate with his hypothesis that the historical Jesus is to be distinguished from the Christ of faith and worship. An analysis of the mythical basis of Scripture reveals that in Christ men worship an Idea of their own glorified humanity rather than a historical person. Strauss's conjectures in scriptural studies were confirmed on purely philosophical
grounds by Ludwig Feuerbach: not only is the concept of God strictly correlative to man’s self-understanding, but theism itself will eventually be replaced by a new religion of humanity. Likewise in America, Ralph Waldo Emerson was promoting the divinization of man through the philosophy of transcendentalism.

It was no surprise, then, says W., that a conservative reaction soon took place among Protestant churchmen in all three countries. Confessionalism among German Lutherans, the Oxford Movement in England, and the Princeton school of theology in the U.S. were each in its own way a deliberate response to the growing secularist tendencies of mid-nineteenth-century Protestant theology. Fortunately, this return to orthodoxy in Protestant circles produced some highly imaginative, instead of strictly reactionary, thinkers. W. singles out for special treatment Frederick Denison Maurice in England and Horace Bushnell in the United States. Both of these theologians were profoundly concerned with the philosophical problem of truth and its theological counterpart, the development of dogma. W. concludes this survey of Protestant theology in mid-century with a chapter on Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard emphasized the element of personal choice in the process of becoming a Christian and thus anticipated the existentialist theologies of the twentieth century. But in his insistence on the ultimate subjectivity of religious truth he only reaffirmed under another guise the basic insight of Schleiermacher, Hegel, and Coleridge earlier in the century.

This book is to be recommended for its eminent readableness as well as for its patient scholarship. W. exhibits that easy mastery of his subject which allows him to write both clearly and perceptively on the various philosophers and theologians who make up the history of Protestant thought in the nineteenth century. The chapter on Hegel was, in my opinion, especially well done. On the basis of the present work, one may with confidence look forward to the publication of the companion volume, covering the years 1870–1914.

St. Mary of the Lake, Mundelein, Ill. JOSEPH A. BRACKEN, S.J.


Rarely does the title of a book so precisely express the purpose, content, and achievement of a work as this one does. B. aims to make “a genuine contribution to a future comprehensive history of modernism,” and “to clarify once and for all von Hügel’s place in the movement” (p. xi). If this is a modest and limited intention, it is also an important
and necessary task, and B. has carried it through with thoroughness and distinction. The book is a doctoral thesis, researched at Cambridge under the direction of W. Owen Chadwick. It is heavy going, and it will appeal, I believe, only to close students of von Hügel and of Modernism. Even more certainly, however, such students will find that B. has established himself here as an impressive authority in his area of historical research.

The book is modest yet important, in that neither von Hügel nor England is the whole, or even the half, of Modernism. But B. knows this. And he also knows—and conclusively proves, I think—that the larger story of Modernism has not been and cannot be accurately told (and such attempts have been made) until the important English contribution to the movement, and von Hügel’s major role in this contribution, have been understood and acknowledged. B.’s study is much further limited, but is not less valuable, in that Modernism is not the whole, indeed is probably only a fraction, of the possible meaning and value that von Hügel may have for us. The profound religious thinker (in areas beyond the questions of biblical studies and of authority which B. mainly treats of here), the brilliant historical, theological, and psychological analyst of mysticism, and the genius of spiritual direction scarcely appear here. But if Modernism is only a fraction in the sum that makes up von Hügel, it is nevertheless a fraction that is indispensable and decisive for understanding everything else about him. No estimates of von Hügel’s own life or spirituality can remain unaffected by the work that B. has done. In its own way, therefore, it is a contribution to the whole range of von Hügel and Modernist studies.

The book is exhaustively researched, with much new documentation not previously available. B.’s own sympathies are not hidden as he portrays this one aspect of the gigantic struggle that took place within the Roman Church in the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the present one—a struggle still alive today through the issues themselves as well as through its famous documents and men: Duchesne, Ward, Providentissimus Deus, Anglican orders, Loisy, Tyrrell, Rinnovamento, Lamentabili, Pascendi—and von Hügel himself. But if B. offers us the viewpoint of his own sympathies—a good thing in an historian—he also offers us documentation that has breadth and cogency sufficient not only to recommend those sympathies, but also to provide ample room for the reader to think things through for himself. A fine, generous work. Fearfully expensive. It has a good index and the best von Hügel bibliography yet published.

Baltimore

JOSEPH P. WHELAN, S.J.
Several years ago William Hamilton remarked that the most decisive theological influence on the younger generation of Protestants of the day was Dietrich Bonhoeffer. He went on to add, however, that this influence was largely confined to America, since B. was not considered an important figure in the traditional European centers of Protestant theology. It may well be that this lack of attention is now being remedied, with the publication of these important studies by Dumas (University of Paris) and Ott (University of Basel) following close upon the long-awaited release of Eberhard Bethge's monumental biography.

In general, Dumas, in a shorter volume, has written a more profound and systematic study of the influences and major themes of B.'s writings. He is also quite fortunate to have a theologian of the stature of Robert McAfee Brown for the translation, which is eminently readable. By comparison, Ott's volume appears less organized and often repetitive. The translation is only fair, with an annoying number of grammatical and idiomatic peculiarities. Despite these qualifications, Ott's book remains a useful companion volume, especially since it represents the viewpoint of a Roman Catholic theologian.

One valuable element of D.'s book is a chapter devoted to a critique of previous studies of B., including the works of Barth, Ebeling, Hansfried Muller, Altizer, Hamilton, Jean Bauberot, Ott, and Benjamin Reist; in other chapters he remarks in passing on the views of John Godsey and John Phillips. As a consequence of this review, he makes the interesting remark that B. seems to have acted like a kind of Rorschach test for his many interpreters and would perhaps have preferred, like Kierkegaard, to let his writings speak for themselves. D. himself stresses the coherence and continuity in B.'s thought (in opposition to the "radical-shift" school) and devotes considerable attention to the pervasive influence of Hegel.

In an important discussion of B.'s theological method, D. believes that it is neither transcendental (Barth) nor existential (Bultmann) nor liberal (nineteenth-century Protestantism), although he carefully notes certain affinities with these systems. The true method could best be described as structural, with the two dominant concepts in B.'s thought consisting of a formal principle of structuring (Gestaltung) plus a substantive principle of deputyship (Stellvertretung): "Structure
indicates the place that is never vacated, while deputyship indicates the meaning of what is lived there” (p. 36). This spatial rather than historical approach locates God in Jesus Christ in the midst of the concrete reality of the world, giving the world its ontological structure, and envisions the role of Christ and His Church as one of responsibility for others within the world.

Thus, according to D., B.’s famous slogan of “religionless Christianity” must not be viewed as an attempt to eradicate organized religion, but rather as an effort to recall the Church to its true vocation. Consequently, his ecclesiology runs parallel with his dominant Christology: “The church is the concrete reminder that humanity was created one” (p. 90). The “religion” that B. seeks to undermine is a false religion, one that seeks God at the periphery rather than in the midst of the world, or one that seeks to escape to a Neoplatonic transcendent world and avoids the here-and-now orientation of the gospel of Jesus Christ. It is interesting to note that B.’s lifelong attraction to the OT seems to have been based precisely on the fact that there the living God is experienced only in the concrete reality of everyday life.

By comparison to D., Ott’s approach is less structural and, above all, much more adulatory. B. is described as “the most hope-inspiring figure of modern Protestantism,” “the most radical and modern Protestant thinker of our time”; indeed, Ott goes so far as to say that “we can find in this theologian the approach to a solution of almost every essential problem which is the concern of theology today” (p. 32). Ott’s hermeneutic for understanding B. is one of dialogue, which he discusses at length (noting, a bit acerbically, that theologians today seem more interested in polemic). In contrast to D.’s systematic approach, the dialogic mode enables Ott to move in many directions, discerning similarities and differences between B. and theologians with whom Ott is familiar. Thus, he notes that Teilhard de Chardin and B. were very much alike in their Christological universalism, even though they seem to have no immediate contact with each other’s thought. Again, he sees Bultmann and B. as engaged in the same effort for an existential understanding of Christianity, although their materials were essentially different. Finally, there are many comparisons to the work of Karl Rahner and a rather lengthy treatment of analogies with Thomas Aquinas.

Perhaps the best summary of Ott’s approach occurs in his observation on B. that “it is striking how he pushes forward along the same road to insights which appear to be peculiarly ‘Catholic’” (p. 62). This passing reference might help to explain the powerful attraction of Catholics to B.’s thought. Perhaps what they have gained from him is
not an original theological synthesis, but simply the opportunity to re­
discover and revivify the Christological humanism that has such deep
roots in their own tradition of theology and, above all, of spirituality.

Le Moyne College, Syracuse

ALFRED HENNELLY, S.J.

THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE OF REVOLUTIONARIES. By Eugene C.

my review in TS 31 [1970] 360-63) argued that revolutionary movements
ran the real risk of becoming either overromanticized or deeply and
despairingly cynical if they were not grounded in the radical hope that
God would freely grant the full humanization of man in the Future. B.'s
book takes issue with that thesis, both because he feels that it smacks
of Christian imperialism and because he hopes to show that the revo­
lutionary impetus is fundamentally religious in itself. He attempts to
document this contention with a close study of the life and thought of
six modern revolutionaries: Che Guevara, Daniel Berrigan, Malcolm X,
Martin Luther King, Jr., Abbie Hoffman, and Frantz Fanon.

B. defines at the outset what he conceives the religious experience
to be: “the experience of personal self-transcendence towards
freedom in community” (p. 7). This experience is symbolized sub­
jectively by images of coherence, wonder, and morality that point to a
wholeness of life and the possibilities for growth and becoming. The
objective symbols of the religious experience are such images as God
and the New People. These subjective and objective images tend to
coalesce into an internalized human experience which B. would call
transcendent and/or religious. In short, B. takes quite seriously the
notion that religion can be profitably investigated beyond its more ap­
parent denominational or explicit forms; he underscores approvingly
Langdon Gilkey’s interest in “a phenomenology of religious apprehe­
nsion in secular life.”

The obvious merit of B.’s study is that he has attempted to add
significantly to the ongoing efforts of those who have tried to detect what
Peter Berger has called “signals of transcendence” in the contemporary
experience. By a thoughtful and, in my judgment, generally valid de­
scription of the religious experience he has made it possible to ap­
proach the whole revolutionary enterprise from a somewhat different
point of view. Given the inevitable growth of third-world revolutionary
movements, it is very helpful to have extended discussions on these
issues from a variety of viewpoints, not excluding the religious one.
More specifically, B. has taken men who have tended to produce
either instant adulation or wholesale revulsion and scrutinized them in a more dispassionate manner in order to show that their lives were consistently shaped by hopes, aspirations, images, and metaphors that bear striking resemblances to those aspirations, images, and metaphors which we tend to call religious. Let us hasten to add that B. is not merely seeking to establish some analogies (e.g., Marxism is the last great Christian heresy; Maoism is a thinly disguised messianic cult, etc.); rather, he wants to show that the revolutionary impulse is an existentially religious posture—he is talking about religion, not analogies with religion, and, more precisely, the revolutionary stance as a religious stance.

B.'s book is both well argued and provocative. It is also, I am afraid, somewhat vulnerable. It is especially vulnerable to the “cheap shot”: he describes Abbie Hoffman's Dionysian exorcism of modern society as “a timeless now that transcends the common servitude in technocratic society to clocks and schedules” (p. 149). Such a description also defines profound retardation rather well. Again, a conservative religious reader might slyly point out the laborious attempt of B. to show that the life of Guevara is religious despite the absence of explicit religious images and metaphors, while in the next chapter he takes equal pains to prove that the explicit religious language of Daniel Berrigan is really, at its basic level, secular and this-worldly. At this level, William F. Buckley et al. would have a heyday.

B. is vulnerable at a deeper level which he himself sees: the whole question of revolutionary violence. Two of his religious revolutionaries were deeply committed to the mystique of violence either existentially or philosophically. Guevara was in Cuba during the days of the post-revolutionary trials and Fanon called repeatedly for an apocalyptic and purificatory violence to exorcise the madness of colonial domination. I am not competent to judge whether violence is necessary to bring about elementary justice in the third world. But, I would suspect, it will take a good deal of careful thought to convince me that violence as a basic tactic can be easily linked to an authentic religious vision. B. is aware of this difficulty (pp. 212-15) but is not terribly adept in coping with it. It simply does not help to say of Guevara's violent force that “the broad intentionality of his military operations must be placed in the context of combating an oppressively violent status quo” (p. 213). The reverse of that statement can read like a sad parody of the religious impulse: the mutilated bodies of bomb victims and the shattered minds of the children of Belfast must be viewed in the context of the desire of the I.R.A. to overthrow oppression. I think not.

In sum: despite a certain nervousness about B.'s handling of the theme
of violence, I think that this book is a first-rate contribution to the work of trying to discern the "rumor of angels" in the revolutionary movements of today. I am more convinced by B.'s theories of the religious experience than I am by his application of them to concrete personalities. My hope would be that he continue to write and think in this sensitive area, for he has proven himself to be a provocative and original thinker with the added ability of a lucid style of presentation. I am not totally convinced by his total effort but am profoundly grateful that he has made it.

*Florida State University*  
Lawrence S. Cunningham


The development of a black theology based on a renewed awareness of the black religious heritage in America has surely been one of the distinctive features of Christian thought in the past decade. Scholars who have stayed abreast of this movement have recognized that it has been influenced by both the heritage of black churchmanship and by the more recent stream of militant black leadership. It is common to think of black theology as sparked by Joseph Washington's *Black Religion* (Boston, 1964), flowering under the charisma of Martin Luther King, challenged by militants such as H. Rap Brown and Stokeley Carmichael, and synthesized by theologians such as James H. Cone, Major Jones, and De-Otis Roberts. Although the major spokesmen today differ as to the norm of black theology, there are similar emphases on liberation, self-help, black chosenness, and black unity.

This volume, written by the Martin Luther King Professor of Social Ethics at Boston University, fills an important need in the critical analysis of black religion. It is basically a historical study of the black religious experience in America, with special emphasis on the spiritual heritage of Africa and the various movements for black freedom which have persisted in black religion. The major part of the book examines liberation movements and leading personalities within the black religious experience in America, and shows that blacks were never completely assimilated into the doctrine and worship forms of their white oppressors. The early slaves retained an element of African spirituality which continued to provide sustenance for them in difficult times. The heritage of Africa, W. argues, has provided the "soul" of black religion in America for several centuries.

Wilmore points out that many white perceptions of black religion have been erroneous stereotypes. Leaders in the black church, for example,
have not been "generally kindly, ignorant, foot-shuffling clowns." Black religion can never be completely described by words such as "docile" or "otherworldly"; it has always had a counterpoint of militancy which has opposed the white man in its search for freedom. The manifesto of David Walker in 1829, e.g., had a wide impact upon blacks in its condemnation of slavery and in showing how white Christianity supported the system of slavery. Indeed, many of the slave insurrections of the eighteenth and nineteenth century are shown to have roots in a theologically informed black radicalism. The book clarifies the role of influential black ministers in the "black church freedom movement" and documents the role of the independent black churches in fostering elements of black pride and self-determination. The basic point established in this historical analysis is that black churchmanship and black "radicalism" (i.e., movements for self-determination) are not antithetical to each other, but are intertwined in the same cultural context.

Any white reader of this volume will be impressed that there really is a distinctive black Christian heritage in America: it is the heritage of Richard Allen, Martin Delany, Edward Blyden, Henry M. Turner, Marcus Garvey, and W. E. B. DuBois; it is the struggle of a poor and alienated group to find pride and identity within a hostile culture. The fusion of black folk religion and concern for black dignity helps explain why the black church has combined both reactionary and radical elements, and why the nature and function of the black church have continued to be controversial points within black theology.

In his analysis of the black theological renewal, W. explains the genesis of organizations such as the National Council of Black Churchmen, the Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization, and the Black Economic Development Conference. White readers will learn much from his description of the goals of such groups. Theologically he is closest to James Cone in his sense of black theology: it must provide for blacks a "new consciousness, a new way of perceiving and ordering religious, cultural and political data from the black community" (p. 301).

This book does not add a new dimension to black theology as much as it clarifies the roots and cultural consciousness which are the basis for that theology. It is clearly written, is well documented, and has a helpful index. It is an essential book for anyone who wants to probe the relationship of black history, black radicalism, and black theology.

*Florida State University*  
*John J. Carey*
SHORTER NOTICES


"Old Testament theology today is undeniably in crisis" is the opening sentence of the Introduction. Hasel, in view of this crisis, undertakes to examine not only the "unresolved problems" and the "crucial issues" but to proffer his "own proposals for doing OT theology." The discussion and evaluation of the descriptive, confessional, cross-section (Eichrodt), diachronic (von Rad), and NT-quotation (B. S. Childs) methods which have hitherto been employed by biblical theologians raise the three major questions of the central part of the book: the question of history, history of tradition, and salvation history; that of the "center" of the OT and NT theology, whether such "center" be the covenant or the people of God or God's holiness; finally, that of the relationship between the Testaments.

The various answers provided by biblical theologians reveal "basic inadequacies in the current methodologies and approaches" (p. 81). To remedy the inadequacies, several proposals are made in H.'s concluding chapter. These, together with the critiques of the various approaches discussed in the central chapters, raise more questions than they pretend to answer: Are not "the themes, motifs, and concepts" of the biblical text "philosophical"? Is the affirmation that "God is the center of the OT" a premise or a conclusion of biblical theology? Is the "one theology" foreshadowed by the name of the discipline a consequence of the biblical theologian's faith? Or is it the presupposition of the whole discipline? Thus the book makes for stimulating reading. The ample bibliographical information provided throughout makes it useful as well.

Stanley B. Marrow, S.J.


The title refers to the first part of the book in which eleven studies are collected. The second part, Otros estudios, contains two lengthy studies on other subjects. Following is a brief summary of the contents. A. Muñoz Alonso, "Dios, hoy" (pp. 7-14), presents a philosophical essay on God's presence to man, with no overt biblical significance. D. Muñoz, "Monoteismo bíblico: Evolución de la idea y de la formulación del monoteísmo en la Biblia" (pp. 15-66), traces the evolution from the Mosaic period to its final victory. Characteristic of it are confession, decision, life involvement, principle of unity, historical dimension, and missionary program. J. García Trapiello, O.P., "El epíteto divino 'Yahveh Seba'ot' en los libros históricos del Antiguo Testamento" (pp. 67-129), gives a thorough analysis of the title and concludes that it originated in the North towards the end of the twelfth century B.C. and that it was simply a name applied to the God of Israel, only indirectly related to the Ark. J. Guillén Torralba, "El Dios de la alianza y el Dios cósmico" (pp. 131-192), stresses the historical character of Yahweh ("History is Yahweh's first creature," p. 138), who, the God of a people, became the God of all nations and creator of the universe. J. Alonso Díaz, S.J., "Proceso antropomorftizante y desantropomorftizante en la formación del concepto bíblico de Dios" (pp. 147-59), argues that neither
of the two tensions can be avoided without deforming God. D. Muñoz León, "Soluciones de los Targumin del Pentateuco a los antropomorfismos" (pp. 161-79), studies the strong anti-anthropomorphistic efforts of the Targumists. J. L. Cunchillos Ibarri, SS.CC., "Los b'ne ha'elohîm en Gen. 6, 1-14" (pp. 181-207), argues on the basis of Ugaritic usage that they are gods inferior to Yahweh, the Lord of life. B. Celada, O.P., "Concepto de Dios en Egipto" (pp. 209-50), studies tendencies to immanence and transcendence, monotheism and polytheism in ancient Egypt. C. de Villapadierna, O.F.M.Cap., "Concepto de Dios en San Pablo" (pp. 253-63), studies those kinds of texts which speak of God without relation to Jesus Christ, and those which speak of him as "God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ."

A Salas, O.S.A., "Dios premia según las obras (Rom. 2, 6-11)" (pp. 265-86), distinguishes between the initial and the eschatological reward; the latter is not unconditioned by works. M. Herranz, "Demonología del A.T.: Los sedim" (pp. 287-99), traces the development of the sedim from "protector powers" to evil demons. S. Muñoz Iglesias, "Lucas 1, 35b" (pp. 303-24), argues that there is no reason, critical or exegetical, for adding to or subtracting from the Greek text. In a booklet-length study, "El vocabulario técnico de Qumran en relación con el concepto de comunidad" (pp. 325-443), J. M. Casciaro Ramírez presents important evidence of the background of the NT concept of community and church. The articles are almost all competent and informative, a worthy collection. The text is riddled with innumerable typographical errors. There is an index of persons.

Eugene H. Maly


Sixteen essays which came out of graduate seminars in Christology at Cambridge University. Because of their brevity, they are superficial and incomplete. A few examples will give some idea of the style and range of this collection. M. F. Wiles claims that the doctrine of the Incarnation arose out of traditional beliefs in the creation and the Fall. Now that we no longer attribute the Fall to a "datable calamity," neither should we tie redemption to one particular act or life. Sebastian Moore describes Jesus as coming out of the religious and cultural background of His people, but then confronting them as bearing the judgment of God on this world. He was led to His destiny by a "daimon" which His people could not understand and He himself could not name. His followers were convinced that He had been vindicated. G. H. W. Lampe advocates a Spirit Christology rather than a Logos/Son Christology. He claims that the latter almost inevitably leads to a diminution of either Christ's humanity or His deity. By the mutual interaction of the Spirit's influence and the free response of the human spirit such a unity of will and operation was established that in all His actions the human Jesus acted divinely. However, Lampe does not sufficiently show how he has overcome the pitfalls faced by the ancient School of Antioch.

In conclusion, one would have wished for fewer essays with more development of thought. Very little that is new is to be found in this book.

Seely Beggiani


These are days in the Church when
ministry is a prime concern. A new understanding of ministry is needed and new forms must be developed. The reintroduction of the permanent diaconate has a special significance in this context. It can and must be innovative in itself, it can be a ferment, renewing the ministry of bishops and priests, and it can provide a thrust toward ministries now in the discussion stage, such as that of women, of the married, of part-time ministers, and also toward new apostolates for the laity.

E.'s short book gives a detailed account of diaconate in the past, treating its early development, its problemated history, and its final decline. The history gives not a single, static picture, but one in process, and it presents problems theological and pastoral which troubled the past and are going to be with us again.

As for the future, E.'s treatment is necessarily sketchy for reasons of space and because no one can be expected to know how the permanent diaconate will develop. And yet, as a church, we must try to identify the special ministry that can make the diaconate meaningful for our times. E. gives a good account of the threefold traditional diaconal role: liturgy, word, charity. More importantly, he presents the deacon as a mediator of reconciliation and as an intermediary between bishop and priest and the people of the Church and of the world, a role most properly diaconal, the role of service, brought to new birth in Christian consciousness by Vatican II's Constitution on the Church in the Modern World.

E.'s book can help all who are concerned for this Vatican II ministry. The historical part raises questions and issues, and the epilogue on the future is a good beginning toward a vision of what the diaconate can mean for the building up of the Church.

George V. Fogarty


This useful collection gathers five papers by French-Canadian biblical scholars who discuss both for specialists and well-informed nonspecialists themes concerning our resurrection and Christ's. Harvey surveys well current opinion on the following topics: the anthropology behind the notion of resurrection, post-mortem survival in Oriental thought, life and death in the OT, developments in late Judaism, and resurrection in the NT. He concludes by stressing the need both for a contemporary anthropology and for interdisciplinary approaches to the resurrection. There follow papers by L. Audet (an analysis of 1 Cor 15:44), R. Lapointe ("Our Resurrection"), D. Fraikin ("Jesus Resurrected: An Observed Phenomenon or a Revealed Mystery?"), and M. Dumais ("Resurrection at the Moment of Death?").

I liked best Lapointe's piece, although he failed to persuade me that the structure of our resurrection will be simply identical with that of Christ's resurrection (pp. 60, 67). John and Paul link Christ's victory over death to His divinity and saving work in a way that implies some differentiation between our resurrection and His. Fraikin's paper was spoiled by alternatives: theological faith versus merely historical faith (pp. 77-78), an observed phenomenon versus a revealed mystery, etc. (Is it impossible for an observed phenomenon, e.g., the sight of someone being crucified, to be revealing?) Such alternatives are less than helpful. Pace Fraikin, there are some scholars who deny that the resurrection is "an historical fact in the strict sense" (which in a seemingly positivistic fashion he identifies with "a physical phenomenon"), and yet
hold that Christ’s tomb was empty (p. 70).

Gerald O’Collins, S.J.


In this work of thorough scholarship, Prof. Russell critically reviews previous literature on the subject and offers a rich and always lucid account of the different strains of religion, sorcery, and folklore that fed the mainstream of medieval belief in witchcraft. Setting aside facile attributions of the phenomenon to pagan survivals or to the climate of inquisitorial repression in the Late Middle Ages, he stresses the eleventh-century rise in alleged witches’ practices and relates it to tensions generated by the acceleration of socioeconomic change. These tensions tended to manifest themselves in heterodox religious movements, within the family of which Russell prefers to locate the verifiable practices of witches. From the eleventh to the fifteenth century, women accused of witchcraft met increasingly brutal treatment in France, the Low Countries, the Rhineland, the Alpine lands, and northern Italy: “In such a society, where the spiritual world was considered as real or even more real than the material, tension and hostility tended to be expressed in spiritual rather than material terms. ... As society’s patterns shifted, people’s roles became undefined, and in that condition they developed greater anxieties. ... They were open to the suggestion that the cause of their misery was a hostile and powerful group of people” (pp. 266, 270).

R.’s book contributes two important glosses to the history of medieval behavior: he disentangles the early medieval roots of witchcraft and he maps out the common ground it held with persecuted heretical groups. While he accumulates evidence to show that witchcraft was practiced in the Middle Ages, he also demonstrates how certain preconceptions about these practices recur in inquisitorial interrogations and chroniclers’ accounts. The development of demonology in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries tended to foster the association of suspicious behavior with a satanic pact. From the fourteenth century on, torture was used to obtain confessions of having entered an alliance with the devil, which some authors considered the unholiest of heretical practices. The most influential of medieval views on witchcraft flowed into the Malleus maleficarum, a treatise printed in 1486 which was destined to be the witch-hunters’ summa for the next three centuries.

Fernando Picó, S.J.


This book is neither biography nor—thank God—hagiography. It is an extended meditation on an incredibly complex man who lived out a life in the imitation of Christ in an age that was as complex as he himself was. Starting with the presupposition that Francis of Assisi was an extraordinary Christian with a wide appeal to people outside the confines of institutional religion, the author attempts to show the significance of Francis for our day. Thankfully, he is not reluctant to speak about some of the “problem” areas of the life of Francis which are usually omitted in the more breathless books on him: the relationship of Francis and Clare; the
possible connections between the Franciscan movement (as distinguished from the later creation known as the Franciscan Order) and the Waldensians; the intermingling of the ideas of Francis and those of the much earlier Joachim of Flora; the shabby treatment of the Spirituals, etc. This book is meant for popular consumption and these topics are not dwelt on at length, but at least they are mentioned in passing and, in the process, highlight the complexity of the study of Francis.

There is an interesting chapter on the notion of poverty in the teaching of Francis but only passing allusions to the analogues of the poor life in our time; surely we must see the radical identification with the poor in such persons as Dorothy Day, the Little Brothers and Sisters of Charles de Foucauld, and Mother Teresa rather than identify Franciscan poverty with the pleas for a less ostentatious church. This is not to make light of the interventions of Cardinal Lercaro at the Council, but simply to point out that the idea of Francis was far more radical—radical, perhaps, in the sense of the fundamental critique of material possession made by someone like Helder Camara.

G.'s discussion of the spirituality of Francis as a working-out of the idea of cortesia was most fascinating and, at least for me, the most suggestive part of the book. The Franciscan notion that one should treat the world and its inhabitants with the same cortesia that God has first shown to us is a profoundly biblical insight, an imaginative use of a human concept in a spiritual way, and an idea that would have much attractiveness for those who desperately search for a humanness in religion.

In sum: a suggestive and timely meditation on Francis with many possibilities for further investigation. The translation reads well for the most part. The book has some magnificent color photos of Franciscan Umbria but, unfortunately, the layout of the pictures is clumsy and the text that accompanies them is, by turns, banal or distracting.

Lawrence S. Cunningham


This is the final volume on Luther's sacramental teaching, and its six items span the years 1529–44. The unfruitful meeting between Luther and Zwingli at the "Marburg Colloquy" (1529) is described in the reports by Hedio, Collin, Osiander, and Brenz. Luther's firm and unwavering teaching on the Real Presence against Zwingli and Oecolampadius was emphatically expressed at Marburg, and it again finds expression in his final confession, the last selection in the volume. In his pastorally oriented "Admonition concerning the Sacrament of the Body and Blood of Our Lord" (1530) Luther wanted to provide motives for his ministers and preachers to use in attracting the faithful to the Sacrament. "The Private Mass and the Consecration of Priests" (1533) is the reformer's polemic against the Catholic position on the Eucharistic sacrifice and priesthood. When Luther's teaching in this last-named work had been interpreted as being Zwinglian, he immediately published "A Letter of Dr. Martin Luther concerning His Book on the Private Mass" (1534), in which he reaffirms his belief in the Real Presence and neutralizes some of his polemic against the Catholics. There follows the tedious "The Disputation concerning the Passage: 'The Word Was Made Flesh' (John 1:14)" (1539), in which Luther attempts to show that truth is not one, but that which is true in theology can be false in philosophy. Luther is better as a reformer than as a philosopher. The final treatise in the vol-
ume is his "Brief Confession concerning the Holy Supper" (1544), written but two years before his death. Written at such a late date, after many years of controversy, it can be said that this is the essence of his Eucharistic thought. Though he entitles it a "Confession," it is also an attack on Zwingli, dead some thirteen years. This is perhaps Luther's harshest treatment of Zwingli, who is said to have been "insincere [in] heart and tongue" at Marburg, "an enemy of the holy sacrament," and "a full-blown heathen" (pp. 289-90).

L.'s translations are admirable, quick-reading, and colloquial as was Luther's style; his introductions to the treatises are especially noteworthy, for he not only delineates the immediate historical background to each treatise but links each with Luther's entire reform movement.

Joseph N. Tylenda, S.J.


The subtitle sums up the structure of the book: "Towards an 'inductive' discovery of norms of a 'new morality.'" "New Morality" has served as a label for various ethical trends; S. uses it to designate the movement of the sixties represented by Joseph Fletcher, Harvey Cox, and John A. T. Robinson, and characterized by a secular, social, Anglo-Saxon form of Christian ethics. ("Anglo-Saxon" means, for S., an attention to empirical data rather than to fundamental confessional or philosophical questions.) The three central chapters deal respectively with the ethics of Fletcher, Cox, and Robinson. S.'s end is not to outline objectively the system of each, but to find for himself elements that can help towards personal knowledge of the moral norm and, even more, towards its systematic presentation and formulation for a moral community. He calls his method "critical dialogue." He follows his Anglo-Saxons where it serves his purpose, at times taking over their reasoning and concepts, at times taking up for himself the questions they raise.

The subtitle also sums up the structure of the study as seen by a different crosscut. Its problematic is the "'inductive' discovery of norms." The secular, social, and empirical accents being in some respects novel in Christian ethics, one can well ask how such an ethic formulates its moral norm. S. narrows the question to "How does it find 'inductively' its moral norm?" He recognizes that the "inductively" as part of the question presupposes, from the start of the inquiry, a particular epistemology of ethics. He argues that the critical dialogue he carries out with the three ethicists substantiates and clarifies the epistemology. To express the framework of this "inductive" epistemology, S. borrows from my TS article of 1966. Ethical judgments are formed on two kinds of evidence: the evidence of basic "intuitive" insight and the further evidence of actual consequences that follow upon the act. The latter evidence justifies the word "inductive," the former, the quotation marks about the word. Within this framework S. develops a suggestive, illuminating epistemology, which covers different ground, but parallels my 1971 TS article (apparently not available to S. before press time). For S., as for myself, it is only in personal experience, generated by personal action, that both the basic, intuitive insight and the inductive, empirical collating offer and evolve their evidence. This epistemology could stand further critical discussion.

John Giles Milhaven

E., a Jungian analyst and teacher, investigates religious experience in terms of Jung's concepts of the ego and the Self and of the three principal stages in which he sees them as related to each other. When the ego is identified with the Self, it falls prey to compulsive inflation or deflation; when the ego is alienated from the Self, it is filled with meaninglessness and despair. Encounters of the ego with the Self are felt with all the awe, terror, and majesty of the soul's encounter with its god. The range and depth of E.'s understanding of the Jungian tradition and the ample illustrations he provides from his own clinical practice as a psychotherapist make this absorbing reading and very useful, I would think, to theologians as well as to therapists, though it does manifest some attitudes which those of religious training and sensibility may find difficult or dubious.

E. reduces religious symbols to their ego-Self components alone and thus departs from Jung's notion of the true symbol as not being reducible to anything beyond itself: the symbol “is an expression for something that cannot be characterized in any other or better way” (Psychological Types, in Collected Works 6, par. 816, p. 474). This leads to some problems. One gets the feeling that E. wants to unwrap religious symbols in order to extract their kernel of psychic meaning and to discard the personal and historical packages in which they present themselves to us. This understanding is obviously contrary to religious experience and, curiously enough, is also at odds with Jung's notion of the concretization of archetypes.

A central tenet of Christian doctrine (enunciated in the theology and imagery of the Incarnation) is that the revelation of truth is through the human person. To make contact with that truth, one must respond as a person through affective commitment to the bearer of truth as well as to the truth itself. Jung's understanding of archetypes makes a similar point from an oblique angle: one cannot get to the archetypal core; one can only apprehend it through its images and the patterns of emotional and behavioral response it elicits in people in specific historical situations. Thus only through the concrete stuff of personal, social, and cultural existence are we touched by the archetype of the Self. We cannot extract its meaning in psychic terms alone. To try to do so leaves unexamined and unexplained the issues that surround otherness—the issues of people, culture, history, politics, and God.

Despite its determination to see everything religious solely in psychological terms, this remains a valuable book, written clearly, concisely, and with excellent illustrations. E. demonstrates Jung's method of amplification of symbols particularly well and offers a cogent formulation of the Jungian understanding of the relation of ego and Self.

Ann Belford Ulanov


Theology of Play contains a lengthy essay by Moltmann and brief responses by Robert Neale, Sam Keen, and David L. Miller. In his essay M. attempts to “reassert the value of aesthetic joy against the absolute claims of ethics” and to suggest that “liberation from the bonds of the present system of living takes place by playing games.” The humanizing emancipation of man begins in the existing game patterns only if we “move from a merely reproductive imagination, which in its leisure recapitulates the rhythm of the working world, to an imagination pro-
ductive of a more liberated world.” Liberated play, for M., functions to celebrate God’s good will toward man and to experiment with alternative futures. M. wishes to go beyond the categories of doing, having, and achieving in order to appropriate the “categories of being, of authentic human existence and demonstrative rejoicing in it.” In his theological reflection M. employs play as a world symbol to suggest that creation, incarnation, and redemption are like play in that they are meaningful yet unnecessary divine activities. Similarly, he calls for the Church to turn from concentration on its practical moral value to demonstrate its freedom as a liberating community in the world.

M.’s essay echoes many motifs already explored in Harvey Cox’s Feast of Fools. Though M. calls for a productive imagination, his theological reflection tends towards the reproductive when he grafts traditional theological categories onto play imagery. The responses by Neale, Keen, and Miller more clearly show productive (i.e., playfully liberated) imaginations. Neale argues that M. is incorrect in maintaining that the cross has nothing to do with the category of play; Keen presents a poetic meditation which correlates the harsh realities of existence with play; Miller probes the paradox of winning through losing. The imaginative jolt created by juxtaposition of M.’s essay and these engaging, though very limited responses is the most striking aspect of an otherwise disappointing volume. The book presents, however, a helpful articulation of alternative scenarios for the future development of the interrelationship of play and theology.

_Ted L. Estess_


American Christians are perhaps not quite ready for a concept such as “political theology,” although those who know the work of Johannes Metz should at least be familiar with the term. Still less, it would seem, are they ready to conceive of a “Marxian guide” to such a theology. P. attempts to make both concepts acceptable. To this end he stresses first the need of a theology which will not be blind to the social dimensions of the Christian’s existence in the world but will enable him to become involved in this world and to be “sensitized to issues that call for social change through effective action” (p. vii). This is where Marxism comes in. For Marx, the function of philosophy was not to understand the world but to change it. P. sees theology called upon to perform a similar function. Since, however, the Christian view (“onlook” is the term used) lacks the equipment for “scientific” social analysis, it must look elsewhere for an “analytic instrument for grappling with the social processes of the world” (p. 2). Marxism, which begins its analysis with man as the maker of history and not with some antecedent ideal pattern of society, provides just such an instrument. In fact, precisely because the Church has historically shown a preference for static political systems and has ignored the significance of human activity in shaping the course of history, it needs the lessons which Marxism can teach it.

With the problem thus somewhat summarily set up, P. proceeds to give the Marxist analysis, on the theoretical level, of “alienation” and of “liberation” (dealienation), followed by a chapter on Christian “Ecclesial Praxis,” which not only would be as revolutionary as Marxism but would learn from Marxism how to be revolutionary. In these three middle chapters P. has unquestionably gathered some of the most impressive passages in the writings of Marx and Engels, Lenin, Mao Tse Tung, Castro and
Che Guevara, but he has in doing so compiled what looks more like a Marxist reader than a book on “political theology,” particularly since the “theology” is confined to a few attempts to interpret both OT and NT as presenting a distinct political thrust and to assign to “ecclesial communities” the task of providing “specific tactics for the transformation of oppressive . . . structures” (p. 176) and thus of implementing the political dimension of Christian theology. Having shown—more by implication than by direct application—what Marxist social analysis can do for Christian theology, P. suggests in a final chapter what Christian theological concepts can add to the political struggle. The question to be asked is: “Can theistic religion, with its predominantly other-worldly and reactionary history, play a revolutionary or liberating role within the social process?” (p. 229) The answer, presumably, is yes, but P. does not allow himself a great deal of space in which to show that this is so.

Although P. has absolved himself of the necessity of providing a negative critique of Marxist positions—a mere collection of readings perhaps does not demand this—one still wonders whether the absence of critique is justified. If P. wants to insist that the Marxist position is “scientific” rather than “utopian,” the claim should be carefully evaluated. What is more, Marxism provides more than an analysis of social ills; it offers a solution based on a particular concept of man and a particular theory of history. The analysis, the solution, the concept, and the theory cannot simply be presented as though criticism were beside the point. P. himself asserts that “no single model of reality or mode of analysis provides a total explanation of social praxis” (p. 29), but one looks in vain here for alternate models or modes of analysis. The conclusion to be drawn, it would seem, is that the “Marxian guide” to “Christian political theology” still remains to be written.

Quentin Lauer, S.J.


In the present discussion of the environmental crisis the blame is often laid at the door of the Judeo-Christian tradition—more specifically, God’s command to man at the dawn of creation to “subdue” the earth (Gn 1:28). D. is skeptical about the fairness of this charge, and I agree with him on this point. He identifies the “Manichean” culture of contemporary society as the villain of the piece. Modern Manicheanism manifests itself not as a religion but as a deep-seated hatred of creation, revealed on the one hand in contemporary technomania (a fight against the world) and on the other in the counterculture of the young (a flight from the world). D. summons us to a general conversion. We must recognize once again the goodness of creation and practice reasonable asceticism, for man is not only the master of the world but also its steward (Gn 2:15).

One may indeed question the connection between the environmental crisis and medieval Manicheanism (or D.’s alternate tag “Gnosticism”), since the author appears to include under these “heresies” just about everything which he, as a traditional Roman Catholic,discountenances: homosexuality (p. 46), the “psychoanalytical priesthood” (p. 62), current questioning of ecclesiastical authority (p. 67), population control (p. 116), etc. Nevertheless, his point that the
problem of the environment cannot be solved solely by a program of action but requires a change of heart must be taken seriously.

Of course, the Christian cannot go along with the neopagan divinization of the material universe which sometimes appears to be part of contemporary ecological ideology. D. does not perhaps fully recognize how unsentimental and unmystical the biblical view of the world really is. But the Bible does exclude, through its belief in the unity of mankind, that irresponsible “après moi, le déluge” attitude which is at the root of our present plight. It is our private, corporate, and national selfishness, far more than any ancient theological heresies, which is responsible for the mess we are in: the selfishness of a family which cannot be bothered to pick up the debris after a rustic picnic; the selfishness of a giant industry which refuses to pay the cost of processing its own waste products; the selfishness of a country for which a constantly soaring gross national product is the unquestioned goal.

D. writes with erudition and urbanity, in the tradition of Chesterton and C. S. Lewis, whom he frequently cites. Occasional prejudices break through: Teilhard appears as a “great Gnostic visionary” (p. 61); “the supreme vanity and extravagance of the space-flight programme” elicit a reaction of “dismay” (p. 111). Nevertheless, this is a worthwhile book on an important subject, and D.’s passionate conviction that Christianity has something to say in this matter deserves a hearing.

Schuyler Brown, S.J.


An example of good theological method, the integration of ethical principles with experience. Part 1 is a narrative of Captain Roger L. Shinn’s experiences as a company commander in World War II, complete with a blow-by-blow description of his capture in the Battle of the Bulge. At the coaxing of a friend, S. agreed to dust off his World War II diary and allow the reader to follow him through his capture, interrogation, imprisonment, and lengthy journey by foot through Germany and Poland, and, finally, his liberation in Bavaria at the closing moments of the war. The account is intensely personal and full of the human dimensions which are sometimes lacking in books about war. Particularly intriguing is the inside look at Germany under the Third Reich, the attitudes of the common people as they housed captives in their barns and bartered food for GI cigarettes, the common currencies in time of war.

Part 2 is a quest for meaning. What is war all about? Shinn the soldier becomes Shinn the theologian. The quest is not so much a scholarly treatise as the personal odyssey of a sensitive ethicist through the landscape of war, conscientious objection, and nuclear deterrence. He comes out, in the main, a realist. “Violence and war on less than maximum scale still have instrumental meaning; that is, men and groups still use them effectively to attain some ends, good or bad.” But the attraction of war, the camaraderie, the excitement of a firefight which S. himself felt on the front must be weighed in the balance with the degradation and the ultimate destructiveness of war.

S.’s book raises many questions about war without burdening the reader with facile answers or solutions. Exploring the human dimension of conflict adds considerably to S.’s theological reflections.

Patrick P. McDermott
H. makes three claims: (1) Protestants, especially Calvinists and Puritans, have embraced the voluntarist position in theology; (2) the voluntarist position is compatible with the Bible, whereas the intellectualist position is not; (3) the voluntarist position is more conducive to scientific endeavor than the intellectualist position. However, certain features of the support he offers for these propositions seem deficient.

It is probable that the voluntarist and intellectualist positions can be so formulated that they contradict one another. This reviewer is not competent to judge whether H. can then establish position 1 according to generally accepted canons of historical inquiry. But 2 and 3 are not secured according to any understanding of “prove” acceptable to contemporary analytic philosophers.

To prove 2, one would first have to select from the Bible a set of statements (S) which is both consistent and basic. Secondly, one would have to establish that the expanded set S in union with V, where V denotes a consistent set of statements adequate to define the voluntarist position, is still consistent. Finally, one must establish that some sentence ρ and its negation -ρ can be deduced logically from S in union with I, where I denotes a consistent set of statements adequate to define the intellectualist position. H. has not performed these tasks.

Statement 3 is ambiguous in the context of the book. H. is not claiming that the voluntarist position is embodied in any particular scientific theory or in any universally accepted formulation of scientific methodology. He is apparently trying to determine the motivation of religious men involved in the inception of modern science. Occasionally he indicates that he is establishing that the majority of “founders of modern science” left written testimony that voluntarism enhanced their scientific activity, while intellectualism hindered it. Such claims are verifiable. However, he often suggests a quite straightforward rendering of 3: that voluntarism is “more compatible” with scientific activity than is intellectualism. But because no metric of “compatibility” exists, it is impossible to conclude that the doctrine that the world is the captive of God is less discouraging to any potential experimenter than the doctrine that the world is the direct expression of divine ideas.

Gerrit Smith


The topics covered by the nineteen essayists represented in this volume range from the nature of language to spirituality in Middle English lyrics, to Milton’s Samson and Keats’ Chris tabel, to the Oxford mythmakers, to Howard Nemerov and Bernard Malamud. Beyond a general concern for relationship of literature and the Christian faith, it is difficult to locate a material focus in the disparity of subjects. Written primarily by literary critics, the essays are, on the whole, of high quality: solid, not exciting literary-critical scholarship, largely of the expository and descriptive type.

Owen Barfield’s contribution, “Either: Or,” is theoretically the most substantial essay. B. here continues his determined effort to assist the twentieth century with appropriating Coleridge’s doctrine of the imagina-
tion. In this addition to that project, B. traces the way in which Coleridge's philosophy, theology, and psychology stem from the premise of the dynamic polarity of opposites. The notion of polarity is presented as a way out of "a kind of arbitrary and limiting parochialism in the Aristotelian and Cartesian either: or."

The volume's most significant appeal will be to persons interested in the mythopoetic imagination of Charles Williams, George MacDonald, and, most prominently, C. S. Lewis. Walter Hooper's essay, strengthened by materials drawn from close association with Lewis, is especially helpful for a study of the Narnian Chronicles. It is of interest that a concern for fantasy would emerge from these persons, many of whom, as did this reviewer, spent a formative portion of their lives in the imaginatively barren landscape of American Evangelicalism. These authors suggest that fantasy literature may augment the imaginal poverty of an austere religious ethos. The point appears to be that spirited religiosity must enlist imaginative spirit, that in our world come of age we need with C. S. Lewis to put "away childish things, including the fear of childishness and the desire to be very grown up."

Douglas Olsen's "Such Stuff as Dreams: The Poetry of Howard Nemerov" is important for persons attempting to articulate the relation between religion and art. Nemerov envisages the poet as a spokesman for being itself, hence "the world of art is religious in nature... because it shows of its own nature that things drawn within the sacred circle of its forms are transfigured, illuminated by an inward radiance which amounts to goodness because it amounts to being itself."

Readers will find this volume valuable for elucidation of particular topics, such as the literature of C. S. Lewis. The broader and more intriguing issues involved in the relationship of imagination and spirit are left undeveloped.

Ted L. Estess


Among those critics who concern themselves with theology and literature, M. writes with clarity and insight. His purpose is to derive from literary and theological sources a typology representing the various eschatological language traditions in their successive historical phases. With a debt to Mircea Eliade, Perry Miller, and H. Richard Niebuhr among others, M. traces the notion of apocalypse both in its biblical setting and as applied by American writers. He notes that genuine apocalypse has always functioned as a warning against the presumption of man and that apocalyptic literature uses the mythic framework of the regeneration of the world as an idiom for an important Christian concern, the meta-noia of the individual.

M. has selected one work by each of twelve writers and analyzed these works in terms of their apocalyptic motifs. He has chosen authors, black and white, from Protestant, Jewish, and Roman Catholic backgrounds, including Nathaniel Hawthorne, Herman Melville, Mark Twain, William Faulkner, Flannery O'Connor, Ralph Ellison, and Kurt Vonnegut. Because of M.'s balanced criticism, one could wish that he had included more novels by the authors he selected: Faulkner's *A Fable* modifies the apocalyptic vision present in *As I Lay Dying*; Twain's *A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court* is
more representative of his works than *The Mysterious Stranger* and lacks *The Mysterious Stranger*’s unique textual difficulties; and Melville’s *Moby-Dick* complements some of the eschatological concerns found in the less enjoyable *The Confidence Man*.

In all, M. has successfully analyzed works which reflect modes of apocalyptic reaction to three different phases of the American experience: the first phase manifests a reaction against the romanticism and liberalism of nineteenth-century American thought; the second represents an apocalyptic concern exposing the perennial weaknesses of man; and the third, including black writers and humorous apocalyptists, is a reaction against the myths perpetrated to distract us from the reality of impending universal cataclysm, a phase reflecting to a great extent a modern culture that is itself universally apocalyptic.

*Patrick Samway, S.J.*

**BOOKS RECEIVED**

[All books received are listed here whether they are reviewed or not]

**SCRIPTURAL STUDIES**


Moule, C. F. D. *La genèse du Nouveau Testament*. Tr. by Robert Mazer-


**DOCTRINAL THEOLOGY**


Halverson, Richard C. *How I Changed My Thinking about the Church*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1972. Pp. 120. $3.95.


**HISTORICAL**


MORAL, LAW, LITURGY


Liber orationum psalmographus: Collecta de salmos del antiguo rito hispánico. Critical edition by Jorge


PASTORAL AND ASCETICAL


PHILOSOPHY


SPECIAL QUESTIONS


