BOOK REVIEWS


How was the American priest educated? What were his relations with his superiors, with his intellectual and cultural environment, and with religious orders? How did he deal with the social problems of his age? These are the questions to which this collection of essays, edited by John Tracy Ellis, the dean of American Catholic historians, addresses itself in a highly readable and on the whole well-researched historical analysis of the American priest.

Ellis' "Formation of the American Priest" traces the history of American seminaries from their usually bucolic settings to the movement of the late 1960's to urban and academic settings. Despite pleas for a national seminary in the first (1829) and second Provincial Councils of Baltimore (1833), the American bishops with a mistaken idea of what Trent required worked until the 1960's to establish a seminary in every diocese regardless of the quality of education, of library resources, and of accreditation—there were 607 seminaries for religious and diocesan clergy in 1966. E. delineates the three major traditions in American seminary education: the French Sulpician, the dominant model, which emphasized "forming devout priests rather than men of learning" (p. 18); the Irish seminaries with French-trained faculties teaching moral rigorism and an Irish brand of Gallicanism in Church-state thought; and the university experience of some German priests, which seems to have had little influence on the American seminaries established by German Americans. The establishment of the American colleges at Louvain (1858) and at Rome (1859) did little to stimulate seminary intellectual life. Moreover, Roman education in particular became a steppingstone to the episcopacy—between 1916 and 1966 about 40% of the more than 400 American bishops were chosen from Roman alumni.

Closed in thought, isolated geographically, and provincial in character, the American seminary received further setbacks in the aftermath of Americanism and Modernism. E. places the former's condemnation in the context of a series of curial decrees aimed at the American Church and stifling the emerging intellectual life of the American priest. Modernism likewise had a deleterious effect on seminary education as ecclesiastical witch-hunts replaced openness to scholarship and seminaries lapsed into a (manual) dogmatic slumber from which they awakened only after Vatican II and its call for renewal and reform.

Robert Trisco's "Bishops and Their Priests in the United States" is a
small book (163 pages) delineating the relations between priests and bishops from the election by priests of John Carroll as the first bishop, through Rome's intervening to give them some rights in the operation of dioceses and episcopal elections, to their virtual exclusion (by Rome) from the electoral process in the twentieth century. The situation of the American Church from 1789 to 1908 was a paradox—there was a regularly established hierarchy but no canonically erected parishes (except in New Orleans). As a result, priests had no tenure in office and could be transferred at the bishop's will. Priests were excluded from a choice in the election of bishops and in the running of dioceses. This canonical situation gave rise to heated disputes over a bishop's right to remove a priest ad nutum. T. covers in detail the entire American canonical history of clerical discipline: the form of trial adopted at the first Provincial Council of St. Louis (1855) and later extended to the whole Church; Propaganda's *instructio* of 1878 providing for an investigative commission; and Bishop Bernard McQuaid's success in obtaining Propaganda's declaration that this commission was consultative only. T. gives a thorough account of the defenders of priests' rights, such as Fr. Eugene O'Callaghan of the diocese of Cleveland, who wrote in the late 1860's under the name of "Jus" in the New York *Freeman's Journal*, edited by a sympathetic layman, James McMaster.

One effect of the tension between priests and bishops was to make the former ultramontane. Rome was the court of appeal, and universal canon law, not then operative in this country, was seen by clerical agitators as the solution to all priests' grievances. They regarded the visit to the U.S. of Bishop George Conroy as a Roman response to their situation and would have heartily approved, if they had known of it, of his suggestion that an apostolic delegate be sent to hear priests' complaints and of his strong reservations on the quality of bishops and manner of selecting them. For priest-bishop relations the Third Plenary Council was a watershed, and in this regard T. presents the most readable and accurate account of that council to date. Under Roman pressure the bishops grudgingly legislated for the irremovability of the rectors of some missions, but then watered down the original Roman schema on diocesan consultors to that of their giving only advice and not consent in the alienation and appropriation of property. For the first time since Carroll, priests—the consultors and irremovable rectors—were granted the right to submit a *terna* for vacant sees. What is surprising is the role played by Bishop John Lancaster Spalding, long regarded as one of the most progressive and intellectual members of the American hierarchy. He opposed the irremovability of some rectors (p. 242) and thought that "if priests are given the right of electing [their bishop],
the people will also covet it” (p. 245). On the other hand, it is not surprising to learn that Spalding (and other progressives like John Ireland) would take this position. It is beyond the scope of T.’s essay, but it is important to note that the American bishops had developed a sense of collegiality and a concept of a strong episcopacy in which the elements were independence of Rome, of the lower clergy, and of religious orders. Ultimately the ultramontane sentiments of the priests were satisfied and the independence of the bishops curtailed with the appointment of the first apostolic delegate in 1893. T.’s conclusions are most judicious, objective, and provocative.

The focus of Michael Gannon’s “Before and after Modernism: The Intellectual Isolation of the American Priest” is stated in the title. On the one hand, the priest in the midst of an immigrant population was the acknowledged leader skilled, learned, and competent in every sphere of life. On the other hand, he had to transplant the Church from abroad to a new country and adopt “a particular scale of values on which intellectual pursuits ranked lowest and pastoral-administrative-building achievements ranked highest” (p. 307). Until the end of the nineteenth century only a few priests and bishops could be considered to be in the intellectual mainstream and, as J. L. Spalding remarked in 1881, no American seminary, except the Jesuit Woodstock College, inculcated the “best intellectual culture” (p. 321)—a fact which led to the establishment of the Catholic University of America. The core of G.’s essay is his significant treatment of the New York Review (1905–1908) and the progressive reforms undertaken at St. Joseph’s Seminary at Dunwoodie. The Review was a scholarly periodical publishing the work of leading European theologians; its orientation and its American contributors and editors indicate the nascent intellectual life among American priests, all of which was ended with the condemnation of Modernism. The renaissance came only in the 1950’s, spearheaded by the pioneering work of J. C. Murray and G. Weigel.

John Marshall’s “Diocesan and Religious Clergy” considers the strained relations between religious orders on the one hand and bishops and diocesan priests on the other. Disputes over jurisdiction and finances were the main causes of ill feelings, but the tension is also symbolized in the maintenance of separate seminaries for diocesan and religious clergy. M. does not intend to give a comprehensive view of the problem, but selects a few examples. There are a few cautions necessary, however, in using M.’s essay (e.g., he notes at length the bias against religious orders of Bishop Michael O’Connor of Pittsburgh, but he fails to note that O’Connor later became a Jesuit). There is also one lacuna which would strengthen M.’s argument: the Third Plenary
Council adopted a decree, which did not win Roman approval, forbidding religious orders which used the diocesan name to raise funds for purchasing property or building to retain title to the property.

David O'Brien's "American Priest and Social Action" is the final essay in the book and moves from the time when priests were forbidden to speak on politics to the contemporary scene when priests are actively engaged in almost every political and social issue, from the time when a priest defended his own people against a largely Protestant managerial class to the present when a priest might be defending non-Catholic poor against his own fellow Catholics. O'B. describes the historical factors which involved the priest in social action from the beginning. The priest of the immigrant Church was the leader of his people seeking to defend them and their faith in the new world. By World War I several priests, notably John A. Ryan and William Kerby, were in the vanguard of professionalizing social action, but such priests always had to be careful not to let their pleas for social reform "endanger the Church's unity or respectability" (p. 441). O'B.'s essay is valuable not only for its historical survey of priests involved in labor reform, the liturgical movement, and other organizations, but also for his inclusion of lesser-known figures like Thomas McGrady and Thomas Hagerty, who became socialists. His conclusions and reflections on contemporary social action are also insightful.

The authors have succeeded in their task of presenting the various aspects of the history of the American priest in a manner which is equally useful to the scholar and the general reader. The book's value is enhanced by a comprehensive index, but it is regrettable that the notes are given at the end of each essay.

Woodstock College, N.Y.C. Gerald P. Fogarty, S.J.


The first and most important thing that must be said about the Kennedy-Heckler study is that it is a significant contribution to the study of the psychological dimensions of the American Catholic priesthood. The study was part of a larger study organized with the support of the American bishops. Other parts of the over-all study included historical, theological, and sociological investigations of the priesthood which have been published elsewhere—with the exception of the theological section. The results of the study are based on interview and testing data from 271 priests who had responded to an invitation
to be interviewed. These priests were respondents out of a larger group of 719 priests who had been extended invitations to participate in the study. The larger group had been selected randomly from the subjects in the sociological study.

The first points that I would wish to make are positive commendations of the manner and spirit in which the study was conducted. It was conducted competently and with methodological sophistication. It was conducted with considerable sensitivity and respect for the professional calling and the life difficulties of the subjects of the study, men who are engaged in the active and difficult life of the priesthood.

There is also no question that the data provided by this study are of considerable value. I know of no other study with as extensively and carefully gathered and evaluated psychological findings about the American priesthood. This study is long overdue and has been badly needed.

The second point that needs to be made is a more critical one: the study has certain limitations. There are limitations stemming from the obvious restrictions of insufficient funds and time, as well as limitations in the amount and type of information that can be provided by the techniques employed. There are other specific limitations that should be taken into account in evaluating the impact of this study. The first limitation, perhaps the most obvious, is the lack of a suitable control group. I am sure that the decision to eliminate a control group or groups was a deliberate one, but whatever the reasons the study leaves us with a nebulous background against which to evaluate the significance of the data.

The second limitation is the choosing of the interviewing personnel from a single department, from which the study was conducted, and having all the interviewers clinical psychologists from the same department. There are obvious advantages in having such uniformity among the interviewing personnel, but there are also considerable disadvantages and limitations which such a choice introduces into the data. The authors, for example, emphasize the uniformity of empathy with Catholic values. One would have to wonder whether such empathy would run the risk of glossing over or benignly interpreting what might otherwise appear to be serious pathology. One might also wonder more broadly to what extent significant biases and interpretive distortions might have been introduced into the data simply by reason of the fact of the considerable uniformity among interviewers. Studies of experimenter bias have been impressive in demonstrating the degree to which expected or anticipated results can determine experimental outcomes. The same questions of bias and determination of results have to be
raised in the context of an investigation of the kind reported in this study as well.

There are also questionable biases that arise from the selection procedures. The actual sample of interviewed subjects on whose data the results are drawn up constitutes a mere 38% of the group to whom invitations for the psychological interview were extended. There is good reason to suspect—and K.-H. themselves take passing note of this—that the respondents may well represent the more psychologically secure, and therefore the less anxious and troubled, segment of the population in question. The data, therefore, would have to be seen as weighted in the direction of normality and away from psychological difficulties.

These limitations serve notice that considerable caution is required in the interpretation or utilization of the results. Another criticism, however, has to do more with problems of interpretation rather than with presentation of data. For clarity and simplicity, I shall take a quite opposite point of view to that espoused by the authors. My point of view is that of a clinical psychiatrist. My orientation is toward identifying clinical pathology. But I should also warn the reader that I have no information about the data in this study other than what I have read there. Consequently it is risky to try to draw adequate conclusions or to make valid criticisms. Nonetheless, it seems to me that there is a tendency in the presentation of the findings to gloss over serious difficulties and to present them in a rather benign light. My impression on reading this study, in effect, is that K.-H. are reading the data through rose-colored glasses. Let me try to document that impression. First, the framework of presentation is that of a developmental schema. While this is a useful and helpful way to think about such problems, it seems to be used somewhat optimistically. K.-H. try to disengage retarded psychological development from psychological sickness, and argue that what we are dealing with is not psychopathology but merely incomplete growth. I do not think that the two can be so easily separated.

Let us look at the breakdown of the categories. Four categories are described: the maldeveloped, the underdeveloped, the developing, and the developed. Approximately 8% of the respondents were classified as maldeveloped. These are individuals with psychotic or borderline personality disorders. About 66%, or two thirds of this population, is categorized as underdeveloped. From the description in the study these men seem to have severe neurotic character disorders, for which psychiatric treatment would seem to be indicated. The developing category comprises about 18% of the sample. These individuals seem
to have achieved a reasonable level of adjustment—not, however, without neurotic difficulties. The difficulties are not severe or incapacitating, but they are in many ways constraining and inhibiting. Such difficulties would seem to be indications for psychiatric treatment. Finally, only about 7% of the sample is categorized as developed, in the sense that they are living satisfactory and fulfilling lives and have achieved a healthy and positive level of adjustment. The conclusion I draw from this—somewhat staggering even as I write it down—is that well over 90% of the priests sampled by this study either require or seriously need or could profit from psychiatric treatment. If one adds to this the built-in bias of the study, which K.-H. suggest may be in the direction of selecting the healthier subjects, it reinforces the impression that the degree of psychopathology in this group is higher than the authors acknowledge.

My last point has to do more with the question of what one can do about the results of this study. K.-H. argue—again, I think, optimistically—that since the problem is only a matter of growth, one need only provide the proper conditions of growth and the innate potentialities of the human organism, for growth can then be activated. They pose the question in terms of priorities: whether to assist priests to achieve greater maturity and therefore greater effectiveness in their ministry, or whether to put the priority on adjustment to the expectations of the institutional priesthood—even at the price of undercutting development. If one could ease the constraints and inhibitions involved in the role and status of the priesthood as an institutionalized function within the Church, then presumably psychological growth would ensue. I can only say that I think the orientation behind such a position is somewhat one-sided. It reflects a hope—so often proven misleading—that environmental manipulation can correct for identifiable psychopathology.

However much it hurts to say it, it seems to me that the invaluable data turned up in this study suggest that the extent of psychopathology in the American priesthood is significant. I have no real quarrel with the authors’ view that greater freedom and responsibility and a relaxation of institutional constraints are advisable in considering the situation of the American priesthood. My view, however, is that this attitude is incomplete. There is an inner dimension to the problem that cannot be ignored or wished away. Inner conflicts, constraints, defensiveness, anxiety, compulsions, etc. are real forces which significantly impede the effectiveness of American priests and cause them considerable inner anguish and doubt. To ignore or play down that side of it would be a disservice to American priests.
We have come far enough along the road so that we can leave behind the bugaboos, taboos, and demonology about emotional difficulties and problems. The priesthood is too precious to us, and the priest himself too important, not to avail ourselves of every avenue of help. What is needed is a greater awareness of such personal and emotional difficulties and a greater willingness to deal with them effectively. Certainly the Kennedy-Heckler study illumines better than any before the extent and significance of the problem for the American priest.

Cambridge, Mass.  

W. W. MEISSNER, S.J., M.D.


After all the discussion about the International Synod of Bishops of 1970, with the hints of spectacular findings in the studies sponsored by the American bishops, it is refreshing and very instructive to read this sensitive sociological study of the priesthood in America. Why sensitive? Perhaps it is because of the calm and carefully nuanced manner of the writing. Perhaps it is because there are a host of questions which logically follow the study. Let it be said immediately that a study of this sort cannot possibly begin to respond to or even to ask the countless questions that can arise. For one thing, this is the first systematic study of the priesthood on such a scale. There is little data to compare the findings to. Therefore questions will be mainly speculative hypotheses. And therefore, in my opinion, this limitation of questions might be one of the assets of the Sociological Investigations. Here is the data; the hypotheses should be developed by the reader.

Further, this study is proposed as one of a series of policy studies. In this case, it is a scientific investigation which offers some ordered insight into the complex sociological phenomenon of the priesthood. It is not a religious treatise. It can make no value judgments about the data it proposes. The use or nonuse of the data and conclusions is solely up to the sponsors of the project—in this case, the bishops. And with the publication of the volume it becomes possible for each reader to formulate, at least to some degree, his own questions and hypotheses about the American priest.

The organization of the book makes it possible to read it on a number of levels or in a variety of ways. Depending on these, the possibility of hypothetical explanatory questioning becomes greater and greater. The carefully schematized questions and answers throughout and the
excellent introduction and conclusion form a kind of propositional overview. This can be read very quickly and will cover the core conclusions of the work. Or a person can take some time and study the descriptive data (well summarized in the numerous tables) on which the schematized conclusions are built. This demands more effort but also opens the possibility for some deep questioning.

Or the reader can dig into the analytic causal model developed point by point through each chapter. This demands greater study and utilization of the extensive appendices as well as some knowledge of behavioral-science reasoning. It is interesting to note that the model does not include parental education, age at entry to the seminary, amount of postseminary education, being a member of a religious order, or the size of one's diocese or religious order. These were found not to correlate with the operative causal variables. The variables that are found to be important predictors of the future of priests are: age, family tension, religious experience, personal values, work problems, morale, and the desire to marry. The desire to marry is important both for predicting the future plans of priests (mainly because the desire to marry is coupled with loneliness) and for explaining (along with problems of authority) why priests had resigned.

But the main part of the work is in the descriptive data. Here a number of fascinating questions can arise. The study shows, e.g., that priests in general are happy and dedicated professional men who spend upwards of fifty hours a week doing directly priestly work. And yet, as one reads through the chapters and examines the tables on the various factors, it becomes clearer and clearer that a dichotomy pattern is emerging between the bishops on the one hand and diocesan priests, major religious superiors, and religious priests on the other. This is not strictly an authority split, for the major religious superior (an ordinary) is almost always classed with the two categories of priests. Nor is it an age problem, for the dichotomy is found between bishops and priests of all ages. Items about fundamental beliefs as well as perception of power and its exercise heighten this difference. "These systematic differences indicate a serious and potentially dangerous 'gap' between the priest and the hierarchy" (p. 312). What is the relation between this dichotomy and the picture of dedicated priests? Has the bishop become so isolated (or paralyzed) in his office that the priest simply acts without any concerned reference to him? Will the growing promise of collegiality (especially as priests' senates become more common and more powerful) lead to a clash rather than to mutual discerning of the Spirit in one another?

Take another element that appears throughout the work. The authors
remark that there is no generation *gap* among priests. But when the
differences on variables are divided by age categories, a generation
*slope* is discovered. Does this not make questions of old vs. young more
complex and more real? What genius or saint a man must be to accept a
job of co-ordinator, overseer, superior, or bishop in such an organization!
How could he ever realize a decision, no matter how it was arrived at,
which would be acceptable to most, if not to all? Or perhaps one could
propose that all these differences along the age slope are a good idea;
for they balance each other and could be the Spirit’s way of specifying
His instruments for the varieties of people that must be ministered to.

“Speculation,” as the report mentions, “adds spice and variety.”
But because of the vastness of the project (over six thousand carefully
selected respondents), its exhaustive concern for accurate data, the
reader must be the one to choose whether he will add a sharp tang, a
gentle nudge, or a smooth richness to his dining. *Sociological Investiga­
tions* offers the grounds for all of these. It is well worth the price of the
meal.

*Canisius College, Buffalo*  
*Joseph T. Angilella, S.J.*

**Priests in the United States: Reflections on a Survey.** By
$5.95.

This twenty-fourth literary child of the well-known Chicago priest-
sociologist presents a roaming set of personal observations and recom­
mendations on the results of the $500,000 National Opinion Research
Center survey on America’s priests for the Catholic bishops. The NORC
findings are summarized separately in a clear and succinct fashion at
the beginning of each chapter. Explicitly treated are the ethnic back­
grounds of American priests, their emotional maturity, their spiritu­
ality, sexuality, and celibacy, their religious, social, and ecumenical
attitudes, their authority and structure, work and morale, why they
leave, the ones who leave, and vocational recruitment.

As one who was in on the two-year study from the beginning, Greeley
is certainly in a position to offer many valuable critical remarks on the
priest situation in America, and often does. The problem is that in
making a point he generally beats it to a pulp. When this happens re­
peatedly with many a personal aside thrown in, the reading becomes
very tiresome. Despite numerous valuable insights, the result is an
uneven, wordy book.

Still, the good points are many. G. stresses throughout that more
research on the subject of lay attitudes toward the clergy, including
those who leave, needs very much to be done. "The principal weakness of the present research on the Catholic priesthood is that nobody has bothered to speak to the clients" (p. 15). In chap. 1 he does an admirable job of placing the problem in its historical context, in the "transition trauma" between immigrant and postimmigrant Catholicism, which obviously "has hit the clergy far more sharply than the laity" (p. 24). He writes a very fair appraisal of the old seminary system that he and most of the priests in America have known. In chap. 8 he hammers away at the need for offices of experimentation to promote, monitor, and evaluate experimental ministries in both dioceses and religious orders. He further recommends for the credibility of Church authority that "there must be participation first of all by the clergy and then in due time by the laity in the process of nominating bishops" (p. 114). "John Carroll, in insisting that the first American bishop be selected by his colleagues in the clergy, argued that in a country with the political style and social values of the United States this was the only appropriate way to select bishops. If such an argument could be made in 1790, it could certainly be made more strongly in 1972" (pp. 111-12).

With regard to priests who have resigned, G. concurs with the majority of priests in the survey sample (54%) that those who wish to return to the ministry should be allowed to return at least to some form of part-time ministry (pp. 189-92). He further recommends in the strongest possible terms that extensive research be done on the origin and cures of the present vocational problem. The NORC findings show that whereas five years ago 64% of diocesan and 56% of religious priests actively encouraged boys to enter the seminary, these percentages have now dropped to 33% and 27% respectively.

One carefully qualified suggestion by G., a staunch advocate of clerical celibacy, is creating the possibility of a five-year celibate contract for service to the Church, with an option on both sides to renew the contract. "It is necessary for ecclesiastical leaders to begin to think of ways in which the role and training of the priest can be redefined in order to make the priesthood attractive for strong, self-assertive, vigorous men... However, one very much wonders whether Ignatius Loyola, Vincent de Paul, Francis of Assisi, Robert Bellarmine or Philip Neri would have been attracted to the seminary or the ministry if they were alive in our own time" (p. 52). Still, "in the long run only the reorganization of Church structures and the effective reformulation of the Christian message will attract young men to the ministry."

What G. would like to see happen, and does not see happening, is that the American bishops start directing in a positive way an organic growth in the Catholic Church that will assure both genuine develop-
ment and long-range continuity. "The majority of American bishops (in my own experience, the overwhelming majority) are gracious, kindly, democratic in their personal styles, and seriously concerned about the Church. Yet relatively few of them are willing to stand up to the power elite and take a vigorous and forceful role in modernizing ecclesiastical structures. . . . A tiny handful of men . . . determine the policies of the American Catholic hierarchy. They impose their wishes on their colleagues by appealing to Roman authority, by the prestige and power they enjoy and by the control of appointments and promotions which they have completely locked up" (p. 110).

Many indeed cannot stomach the Greeley style, but few can deny that this book is saying some accurate things about priests and the Catholic Church in America. Moreover, it takes no dreamer to see that many of the things G. calls for have to come about before the vast majority of America's priests will be able to find enough confidence, joy, and enthusiasm in the priesthood to be willing to encourage followers from a new generation. These fellow priests, who are now long accustomed to taking much of the Greeley "bull by the horns," know that he was one of the few absolutely correct in predicting the outcome of the 1971 Synod in Rome, and that he is one of the few today genuinely echoing in his own sometimes flippant, sometimes cantankerous, sometimes scalding way many of the real questions they themselves are trying to work out.

New York City

RAY ROBERT NOLL, S.J.


In May 1972, Küng's latest theological boat-rocker dealing with Catholic ministry appeared in English. The work is actually a longish, provocative, overpriced essay in four parts: (1) the Church as community of liberty, equality, fraternity; (2) New Testament foundations; (3) the development of the traditional understanding of office; (4) the shape of the Church's ministry of leadership. It would not be unfair to call his attempt both praiseworthy and disappointing.

K. takes as point of departure "the ecclesial community in a democratic age." He thereby hopes "to prevent anyone ever again beginning an essay on Church ministry by discussing an office instead of the Church and from too readily presuming as self-evident that which has to be said about the community of believers" (p. 34). This starting point is certainly to be praised, especially when one considers how the
manuals on Church orders in the past often skirted the whole ecclesial context. That he chose to leave the real trouble areas (Parts 2 and 3) without the solid documentation they genuinely deserve, however, is indeed disappointing.

A great portion of K.'s essay is devoted to developing a "new image" of the one who presides in the Christian community. He states apodictically: "It is evident that the old sacralized late Roman-Byzantine-medieval-post Tridentine priest image has become untenable in both theory and practice. The younger a person is the more he will reject it." According to K., the new image must be such "that even a young person will be able to identify once again with the image of the Church leader—something that is essential for the survival of the Church" (p. 108). Complicating the problem is the fact that "the old image was very detailed and clear, right down to clothing and signs of rank.... The new image, at first, is not so clear. It used to be easy to draw a picture of a king too; and it took time until a reasonably clear image of a democratic leader emerged" (p. 108). Still, despite a certain concrete priority that must be given to practical experience in developing this "new" image, K. insists that the modern Church already has such an image on paper. In perhaps his best-worked-out section, he proposes the apostle Paul as "the ideal image of the Church leader."

What is, in fact, K.'s "proposal for a new Church ministry"? An ecumenically-oriented nuanced democratization of the Catholic Church, putting aside forever the use of ecclesiastical power to dominate rather than to serve, inspiring in the faithful a new willingness to shoulder the real portion of the responsibility Vatican II assures them is theirs, and rethinking in terms of variables and constants (drawn from "the New Testament and the demands of modern democratic society") the form and function of the ministry of presiding, working with "leadership" as the basic category. Many a priest in America would have little difficulty affirming such a program—that is, until confronted with Küng's list of variables: the Church's ministry of leadership does not have to be full-time, for life, a status in society, set aside in a sacral sphere, trained academically, celibate, or exclusively male. Then comes the invariable question: but what about the canons of Trent? Did not Trent make most of these "variables" into constants more than four centuries ago, and have they ever really been rescinded by pope or council? I emphasize this simply because the decisions of the magisterium, particularly those of Trent, do in fact constitute the major obstacle to a renewal of ministry and ministerial structures for most of the fellow priests K. is trying to help. Wozu Priester? Eine Hilfe was the original German title. Moreover, his own three-page treatment of Trent is, to me, the weakest and least convincing part of his whole essay.
What does K. say about Trent? First he shows how Vatican II's Constitution on the Church offers three corrections to one of Trent's central anathematizing canons (Sess. 23, can. 6), dealing with the establishment by divine ordinance of a hierarchy of bishops, presbyters, and deacons. This he follows with five "basic critical questions" asking whether Trent (1) was representative of the universal Church, (2) really condemned or even understood the Reformers, (3) was pastorally oriented in its doctrinal decrees, (4) took into account the historical development in sacramental theology and practice up to that time, and (5) even reflected on the original Christian message. Conclusion: "These questions make clear not only the historical relativity of the external form that Church ministry has at the moment but also the relativity of its dogmatic formulation." But these five questions of themselves do not make it all that clear. Solidly documented answers to these and questions like them on the use of language and actual intention of the fathers at Trent might have given some credibility to his conclusion. That there is a certain amount of historical relativity in the Tridentine documents looked at from today's vantage point seems obvious. But the ultimate issue goes a step beyond that. Given a certain historical relativity, what is and what is not fully binding? Who has the right to say Trent's canons are no longer binding, in whole or in part, if they have never been rescinded by pope or council? Many a bishop, pastor, and curate in America would say, I think: those old anathematizing canons of Trent have formed the solid rock of priestly existence for more than four hundred years. If Küng is going to say that "the definitions of Trent cannot constitute a decisive obstacle to a new understanding and restructuring of Church ministry" (p. 59), he has got to do better than pose a few questions.

Unfortunately, at this point K. closes out the issue, maintaining that "only a fundamental solution to the infallibility question can create the freedom to bring to the problems coming from Trent an answer which can be maintained in the face of modern times and the claim of the gospel." In short, his final answer is to drag in the old infallibility herring, as if to say: we have now reached the ultimate impasse, because the great Catholic abomination, the infallibility question, has not been solved ex officio. This unprobing, almost defeatist attitude I find disappointing.

Many hopeful directions are opening up in Trent research today, and K. may have found, had he looked, some solid material with which to build a long-range case for his position. The careful work of Louvain's Piet Fransen, S.J., comes to mind immediately. In 1953 Fransen first discovered that our classical interpretation of Trent was wrong. His own study of the acta, supported by the work of the Bonn theologian
A. Lang, convinced him that the classical interpretation was reading the Vatican I content of such central notions as *fides et mores, haeresis, definire* (for Trent's *diffinire*), etc., back into the Tridentine texts of the mid-1500's, where they carried neither the same precise content nor weight. This is not fancy theological footwork along the *via reinterpreta-tionis* like that which K. mistrusts so profoundly; it is sound, precise, documented historical research in the same tradition as the "Tübinger Schule." Working out a case along these lines would not immediately negate the canons of Trent, nor would it call for a denial of the infallibility teaching, but in the long run it might better convince K.'s readers—possibly even some in Rome—of the validity of what is perhaps the key statement of his whole book: "Even today we are still too little aware of the extent to which the ecclesial community has the freedom, derived from the gospel (which in this respect too is not a law), to shape the concrete forms of the Church's ministry of leadership and too little aware of how great the possibilities are to satisfy modern man's diverse requirements in today's society" (pp. 75–76).

**New York City**

RAY ROBERT NOLL, S.J.


When Congar sets pen to paper, the result invariably reflects that same wisdom, integrity, broadness of vision, and mastery of Catholic tradition that has marked him for years as one of the great theologians of Western Europe. This volume of nine recent articles on ministries in the Church is no exception. His discussions range widely from the ecclesiology of the papacy to the meaning of the local church and the contemporary problems in the priesthood. He includes articles on the history of episcopal collegiality, on the Synod in relation to primacy and collegiality, on infallibility and indefectibility (including his highly praised review of Küng's book), and on unity and pluralism in the Church. Even more important, though, are his first three articles, where one can find sketched in broad strokes what C. would envision as a viable theology of ministries for the Catholic Church in our age.

His first article, "My Path-Findings in the Theology of Laity and Ministries," has been translated in *Jurist* 32, no. 2 (1972). Here, as also in the second article, C. insists on the plural term "ministries," in faithfulness to the biblical witness, rather than the ministry. "It signifies," he says, "that the Church of God is not built up solely by the actions of the official presbyteral ministry but by a multitude of diverse modes of service.... Such modes of service proceed from gifts of nature or
grace, from those callings which St. Paul named ‘charisms’ since they are given ‘for the common good’ (1 Cor. 12:7, 11) ... [which] up to now were not called by their true name, ministries, nor were their place and status in ecclesiology recognized. To move on to this double recognition is extremely important for any just vision of things, for any satisfactory theology of the laity. As to terminology, it is worth noticing that the decisive coupling is not ‘priesthood–laity,’ as I used it in my Lay People in the Church, but rather ‘ministries–modes of community service’” (p. 17).

C. further maintains that a contemporary theology of ministries should first be placed in its proper context, which for him, in the light of Vatican II and subsequent developments, is an ecclesiology of community and a broader theology of apostolicity than we have heretofore appreciated (cf. his third article, “Apostolicity of Ministry and of Faith,” pp. 52-94). He notes that the door whereby one enters on a question such as this decides the chances of a happy or less happy solution. “If one starts from the concept of ‘efficient (instrumental) cause’ and enters by the door of hierarchical priesthood, the laity will appear as participating in the hierarchical apostolate (Pius XI and Catholic Action) or, according to the broader formula of Pius XII, ‘co-operating’ with the priesthood. That is certainly not a passive situation to be in, but is this conception sufficient? Entry by the door and concept of community would be more satisfactory. One would thus escape two inadequate conceptions, one more unsatisfactory than the other. There would be no linear scheme (Christ makes the hierarchy, the hierarchy make the community of the faithful) with its danger of making the hierarchical priesthood a mediating agency which would suppose a people in a state of minority, impotent and passive. Nor would there be a ‘democratism’ of the sort which is not in fact professed by Protestants, even if sometimes certain of their expressions are disquieting in this respect” (p. 18).

In light of the present malaise on the exact nature of vocation to the ministry, C. suggests the great need for sound historical studies as a means of recovering a sense of deep tradition. He feels that “since the middle ages with their scholastic analytic (and canon law) we have too much separated things which are moments in an organic whole.” With respect to ordination, e.g., he points to the “communional” and collegial genius of the Church prior to the Middle Ages. “Instead ofsignifying, as happened from the beginning of the twelfth century, the ceremony in which an individual received a power henceforth possessed in such a way that it could never be lost, the words ordinare, ordinari, ordinatio signified the fact of being designated and consecrated to take
up a certain place, or better a certain function, *ordo*, in the community and at its service. Does not all that hang together with a vision of things whose point of entry is community," he asks, "rather than the hierarchical priesthood defined at the outset for itself and seen as efficient cause? Does it not cohere with a conception of the laity and ministries not defined in isolation and thus to some extent in opposition but seen organically within the communitarian reality?" (p. 21).

C. cites the need of situating Church ministries within a broader understanding of apostolicity. "The theology of apostolicity . . . has been made to consist almost exclusively in a theory of 'apostolic succession.' Within this the imposition of hands and the validity of the consecratory rite have been accorded privileged status." He observes, however, that Vatican II's *Dei verbum* (no. 10) speaks rightly both of the whole Church as apostolic and of the pastors as having, within this apostolicity, a particular function which answers to their mission and charism in the organic unity of the *ecclesia*. "Here too," he says, "I have gradually corrected my vision which at first was principally and spontaneously clerical. Mine is no isolated case. What is in question is a general movement of ideas in the 'age of the Church' as Dibelius in 1926 described the twentieth century. It is possible and even very probable that this readjustment of images plays its part in the present crisis of priesthood—by which I mean here the presbyteral minister" (p. 22).

In his second article, "Ministries and the Structuring of the Church," C. considers some of the conditions which in our day give rise to questions about Church ministries: the light that historical and biblical scholarship has shed on the issue, the Vatican II movement in the direction of collegial structures and its recognition of charisms in the construction and life of the Church, the progress that has been made in ecumenical dialogue, and the widespread discussion on the nature of authority in the Church. He notes, e.g., how studies of ancient Christianity and the NT have clearly shown us a certain pluralism in ministry at that time. "The very numerous titles designating these ministries are the titles of function or of action, most often taken from secular language. The tasks to be accomplished are what determine the ministries" (p. 31). He shows, too, with numerous examples from Christian antiquity how and how much the head of a community was seen as within it. "This theology of ministries viewed as *within the community* has not yet been sufficiently developed by us" (p. 37).

One of the few negative aspects of the book, due undoubtedly to its article format, is C.'s frequent repetition of key themes, particularly the need for an ecclesiology of community and a broader view of apos-
tolicity, but perhaps themes such as these deserve to be repeated. The book is recommended to anyone concerned with Catholic ministries. These quiet, scholarly articles will probably do more to dissolve the all-too-tight Church structures that arose in the last century (and open them to an evolution that again takes into account the long experience of history) than any number of provocative works now making the rounds.

New York City

RAY ROBERT NOLL, S.J.


"His [Garry Wills] concern is the concern of a man who loves truth and is committed to his Church; he is therefore angered by statements and attitudes that seem to him calculated to injure either or both.... Mr. Wills approaches his task with the passion of a believer and the conscience of a scholar...." (n.p.). Thus did the author of this book appear to Will Herberg in the foreword the latter wrote to Mr. Wills's Politics and Catholic Freedom (Chicago, 1964). Precisely how Prof. Herberg would characterize the author's present state of mind were he writing a foreword to Bare Ruined Choirs, I do not know. I suspect, however, that the emphasis would not be quite the same, for the Wills mood of nine years ago has meanwhile changed. Flashes of anger still appear, especially when W. is writing of his bête noire, certain liberals whom he castigated in 1964 for their interpretation of papal encyclicals in terms of their own bias while allowing no genuine freedom for the views of those who disagreed with them. But in the present book these are flashes rather than a prolonged assault unrelieved by cool analysis, wit, and wisdom—gifts that W. possesses in ample measure.

Five of the fifteen essays that comprise the book are reprints from articles previously published in the New York Times, Critic, Playboy, and Esquire. It will occasion no surprise that they should have found a place in these sophisticated journals, for W.'s literary gifts are of a kind that would attract and hold the attention of readers of any smart magazine, especially when his theme is in the main a critique of features of contemporary Catholicism that have caught the public eye such as the Encyclical Humanae vitae, the Berrigan brothers, and newsworthy developments among the American Jesuits centering around Woodstock College. When these topics are interspersed with periodic darts and jabs sent in the direction of Harvey Cox, the dispirited God-is-dead theologians, and the Jesus freaks, with William Buckley and his conservative brother the Senator now and then tossed in for good
measure, an editor would have to be a dull fellow indeed not to respond to such appealing grist for his mill.

If W. would admit of any current heroes on the American Catholic scene, they would probably be the Berrigans, for whom, one suspects, he entertains a kind of reluctant admiration prompted by their forthrightness, openness, and direct application, as they see it, of the teaching of Jesus. The American bishops are briefly mentioned and then left to their lonely vigil, since, it is implied, neither their own people nor those outside their Church seem to have much interest in what they might be doing or what they might have to say. As for the popes, I got the impression that W. might have felt more warmth toward John XXIII had not the old pontiff been taken so much to heart by the liberals. In this connection he would find Cardinal Wright’s article in the *Homiletic and Pastoral Review* of November, 1972, a far more true-to-life portrayal of Pope John and his ideology than the fantasies spun about the pontiff by some of the so-called liberals. While not altogether lacking in sympathy for Paul VI, I have not read anywhere a more devastating analysis of the origin and unhappy sequel of *Humanae vitae* than is to be found here, a treatment in which a relentlessly logical approach is carried out through a series of questions that impales the defenders of the Encyclical in a manner that allows of little or no escape. Yet in fairness to Paul VI he should not be judged on *Humanae vitae* alone but rather on the broad canvas of the entire pontificate since 1963 along the lines of Francis X. Murphy’s article in the *Washington Post* of Oct. 8, 1972.

The absence of footnotes and bibliography is, I suppose, understandable in a work of this kind, even if the absence of an index is less excusable. W. is obviously a widely read man whose preoccupation with contemporary issues has not been allowed to dim or to detract from the richness of his classical education. In fact, he would doubtless never be the superb stylist that he is if he had not put a high premium on a knowledge of the classics, of history, and of the world’s best literature. The narrative is relatively free of factual errors, and the following slips illustrate that the errors are not of a major character. The poor Catholic immigrants pictured as making great sacrifices to build the parochial schools commanded by the bishops in the Baltimore Council of 1884 (p. 23) had been doing just that for a generation before the Council, a phenomenon notably true in the large German parishes of W.’s own city of Baltimore; the essay mentioned as published in 1957 actually appeared in 1955 (p. 46); was not Bury Saint Edmunds meant rather than Saint Edmundsbury (p. 51); the Bishop of Orleans of Vatican Council I fame, Félix Dupanloup, was never a cardinal (p. 152); and John Ury who was executed in New York in 1741 was an Anglican, not a Catholic (p. 240).
Turning to more substantial matters, after due credit has been given for the author's brilliant literary style, for his arresting account of certain features of postconciliar Catholicism in the United States, for the penetrating questions he raises about papal authority in the wake of Humanae vitae and about the Jesuits' American future as viewed through Woodstock College, for the vivid picture of the general bewilderment and confusion that at present obtain throughout the Catholic community of this country—after acknowledgment of all these has been made, one who seeks in this book a clue to the Catholic Church's future is left with more questions raised than uncertainties resolved.

It was little wonder that Gary North, the non-Catholic reviewer in the Wall Street Journal (Oct. 22, 1972), should have asked: "What does Wills want for the Church?" After a careful reading of the book, I feel as puzzled about the answer to that question as Mr. North, nor did I find any true relevance in Richard Locke's concluding comment in Life (Nov. 3, 1972) to the effect that the book was "especially welcome at a time when the babble of mendacious bureaucrats drown out the still small voice of the nation's conscience." Even the editor in chief of America (Nov. 11, 1972) did not move beyond a speculation that W. would seem to be seeking through an analysis of the Church, or more particularly of the Woodstock Jesuits, "to shed light on the ills that beset a world in crisis." In fact, an attempt to offer a proper analysis of this puzzling book is to suggest an assignment almost akin to Winston Churchill's perplexity about Soviet Russia, which he once described in the well-known words as "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." I shall have to risk making certain judgments of my own, therefore, about W.'s book, prefacing them by a paraphrase of Kingsley's memorable question addressed to John Henry Newman: "What, then, does Dr. Wills mean?" One might wish that as clear an answer could be given as Newman returned to Charles Kingsley in the Apologia Pro Vita Sua. But since W. has not lightened our task, as Newman did in 1864, by furnishing a detailed spiritual autobiography, I shall have to chance the danger of misinterpreting his mind in what I say about his latest book.

Bare Ruined Choirs, as I see it, may best be characterized as an essay in disillusionment. The author's keen mind, so long quickened by a deep commitment and love for the Catholic faith, has watched with increasing dismay as the beliefs and practices associated with it have seemingly fallen away. One can understand and sympathize with this state of mind, for much that was until recent date interwoven with Catholicism has indeed collapsed and in all likelihood a fair portion of it will never be seen again. The tight trim rules that held the immigrant Catholics and their descendants together in this country as a religious
body up to about a decade ago have gone and will probably not return. That community has had forced on it with a shattering suddenness the necessity to live with mystery and to move on without benefit of the familiar guideposts once unquestioningly accepted as they came from pope, bishops, and priests. And when this unprecedented situation within the American Church has been aggravated and enlarged by the equally unprecedented revolutionary forces that have toppled almost every sustaining moral support in the secular milieu within which the Church leads her life, the general effect on sensitive minds can scarcely be other than one of doubt and distress.

There are two elements, however, that I miss in W.'s somber picture without which, it seems to me, the thoughtful Catholic must feel nigh to lost and without hope. One is history, the other is faith. They operate on different levels, the former on the natural level, the latter on the level of the supernatural. For example, certain happenings described here as having taken place at Woodstock College were surely not calculated to strengthen one's confidence in the ability of what many used to regard as the Church's elite corps to lead the rest of us out of the encircling darkness. Presuming that the facts related were accurately stated, I too would deplore certain episodes, but where the author is at fault is in leaving his somewhat startling exposé without a sequel. Nothing is said of Woodstock's positive achievements through all the anguish and turmoil of the last decade—to mention only one, the editing of the American Catholics' most scholarly theological journal. Nor is the description of the bizarre antics of a few extremists in the Woodstock student body necessarily the final verdict on all the Jesuit candidates for the priesthood on Morningside Heights. Moreover, Jesuits elsewhere in the country might well maintain that Woodstock College, howsoever one may judge the present scene, should not be the sole medium through which the Society of Jesus in the United States is viewed and interpreted.

And here, I think, is where history can be helpful in liberating all of us from the tyranny of our own current and circumscribed thinking. Bleak as the prospect may have appeared to Mr. Wills after his visit in 1971 to Woodstock College, it was no worse, surely, than the one that confronted St. Peter Canisius and his confreres in the first years of their apostolate in the German lands so recently disrupted in their traditional Catholic life by the Lutheran break with Rome. In an attempt to assess the situation for the ministers of the Duke of Bavaria who had requested the Jesuits' services, Canisius confessed his doubts that the proper goals of the Society could be attained if, as he expressed it in a letter of November 27, 1555, "they must devote their labours to
the education of the very few theological students of Ingolstadt, seeing that they are a doubtful quantity, unfitted for sacred studies, and so apathetic as auditors that teaching them is like singing to the deaf’ (James Brodrick, S.J., *Saint Peter Canisius, 1521–1597* [New York, 1935] p. 263). Had Canisius and his associates let matters stand at that point, the result would have been far different insofar as reform and revival of Catholicism among the Germans was concerned. Disheartened as they undoubtedly felt at times, nonetheless they not only continued to work in Ingolstadt but moved on energetically into other cities as well, with the result that by 1600, three years after Canisius’ death, the Society had more than a dozen flourishing colleges in the lands north of the Alps. Several of these had 1,000 students each, among whom were not only many future members of the Jesuit order but also an increasing number of candidates for the diocesan priesthood, which when Saint Peter arrived on the northern scene he found thoroughly decimated and demoralized. Thus—and other examples could easily be cited—was a check put to Protestantism’s triumphant sweep, large sections of south Germany were won back to the old faith, and the Catholics of this troubled and discouraged generation were given fresh hope. W.’s picturization of the New York Jesuits, as of other phases of current Catholicism, is often acute, but I for one miss the more sanguine and long-range view that history affords as it is found, for example, in David J. O’Brien’s *The Renewal of American Catholicism*, a volume that came out at the same time as *Bare Ruined Choirs*.

So much for history. As for faith, I wish to make it clear that I am not impugning W.’s faith in the Catholic Church. A writer may treat religious themes in a critical and caustic spirit without offering proof that he has forsworn his personal belief. If W.’s closing sentence, “It is time to join the underground,” leaves me perplexed, as it has others, it would be a non sequitur to conclude that he has departed from the company of practicing Catholics. What has happened, if I have judged correctly, is that the “instinct of faith,” to borrow a recent expression of Karl Rahner’s, does not inform what the author has written in the latter part of his latest book as it did in *Politics and Catholic Reform*—or, for that matter, in as recent an essay as “Memories of a Catholic Boyhood,” which appeared in *Esquire* in 1971 and is reprinted as the first chapter of the present book.

Humanly speaking, the positions taken by some Catholics both here and abroad on biblical and theological questions that up to a decade ago had been regarded as fundamental teaching within the Catholic Church, plus certain actions by these same people or by their followers in the
“new morality,” may well have given rise to disillusionment on W.’s part as they have on the part of other thoughtful persons. Yet is not this situation, which gives no immediate signs of an approaching calm, the test perhaps to which the faith of believing Catholics, and indeed in some particulars the faith of believing Christians in general, may not have to continue to submit for the foreseeable future? In a time such as the present, when a triumphant secularism, with all that is associated with that term, is seemingly sweeping everything before it, it would be unreal not to recognize that countless men and women have undergone an experience akin to that once described by the famous historian of civilization Jacob Burckhardt, who was then twenty years of age and a student at the University of Basle. He confessed to a friend that his faith had been destroyed by the lectures of Wilhelm De Wette, since, as he said, “every day a part of our traditional Doctrine melts away under his hand,” to which he added: “Today, finally, I realized that he regards the birth of Christ simply as a myth—and that I do too. . . . For the moment I cannot look the ruins of my convictions in the face” (Burckhardt to Johannes Riggenbach, Basle, Aug. 28, 1838, Alexander Dru (ed. and tr.), The Letters of Jacob Burckhardt [New York, 1955] p. 56). Doubtless today there are many for whom Burckhardt’s words have a ring that is painfully personal.

Yet, has the man or woman who has given serious consideration to what from the beginning has been implied by the gift of faith in Jesus Christ ever found warrant for anticipating that his or her faith will not on occasion be subjected to severe trial? Nothing in the New Testament gives reason for anticipating that it will ever be otherwise, and nearly twenty centuries of human involvement in the Christian dispensation more than confirm this fact. When, then, every factor has been weighed, every circumstance of humankind’s religious and secular experience been duly analyzed, one is forced to the same sober conclusion once expressed by Pope John: “It is the same today as it was yesterday and always will be: we shall have to fight, and to remain solid in faith and charity” (Tablet [London] 216 [April 15, 1961] 369).

As I read W.’s description of serving Mass on early winter mornings—and what a superb evocation of the past it is—a description that moves swiftly through hilarious details and touching incidents that will ring the bell for every former Mass server, and on toward the slightly nostalgic note on which the chapter closes: “It was a ghetto, undeniably. But not a bad ghetto to grow up in” (p. 37), I was carried back in memory to early winter mornings long ago in old St. Patrick’s Church in Seneca, Illinois. But more important, I was reminded of another account of early-morning Mass and the thoughts that the experience evoked in
François Mauriac, who then wrote as an old man of seventy-seven. To be sure, the situations were by no means parallel, and yet the words of that venerable figure may not be an inappropriate way in which to bring this review to a close, since they touch upon the subject about which I have been writing here, words that convey something of the mystery of faith and the mystery of life itself. Mauriac declared:

I believe I am forgiven. It is not the easiest to believe in from among all the things I have believed in. And yet that is the one about which I should be the most convinced, since I am now at the moment of my decline and have assumed the habits which were my mother's when she had reached the age I am today. I am once again at the same Mass she attended in the black dawn of winter or in the light of a summer morning. I am once again overcome with the same silence that should be enough to free us from all worry and give over our past life to that mercy living in us and which is You, O Bread of Life! (What I Believe [New York, 1963] pp. 128-29).

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**JOHN TRACY ELLIS**


The Senior Lecturer in Bible at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem enters the controversial field of Deuteronomic studies with a broadly conceived and elaborately executed work which opens new avenues to our understanding of this distinctive literature. This is scholarship of the first class. We know that in the seventh century B.C. there began to appear in Israelite literature a very specific, highly individualized style of writing reflecting the crises and hopes of a people which interpreted their history as the fulfilment in time of the divine and efficacious word.

W. describes the evolution of this new current of biblical literature in three stages: (1) the Book of Deuteronomy (D), composed in the latter half of the seventh century B.C.; (2) the Deuteronomic edition of Joshua-Kings (Dtr), redacted definitively in the first half of the sixth century B.C.; (3) the Deuteronomic prose sermons in Jeremiah (Jer), probably composed in the second half of the sixth century B.C. He admits that there may be different editorial strands in both D and Dtr, but claims that no adequate criteria exist for distinguishing between any presumed stages in their editing. Common to all three stages is a highly rhetorical, fluent style which enunciates certain basic theological views. Of course there is development here; phrases and ideas appear in one and not the other, attesting a linguistic and ideological dynamism within the Deuteronomic circle.
The big question arises immediately: Who is responsible for these compositions which dominated Israelite literature for a century and a half (650–500 B.C.)? What is the *Sitz im Leben* of the Deuteronomic corpus? Our author's thesis is that Deuteronomic literature is the creation of scribal circles at the royal court and that they began their work prior to the time of Josiah and were still active after the fall of Jerusalem in 587 B.C. Against the common view that this material arose from some definite historical situation (e.g., instruction by Levites or cultic homilies), W. sees the Deuteronomic rhetoric as programmatic writings composed by scribes in the Kingdom of Judah. To cite an analogy, the Greek oratorical pieces imbedded in Herodotus and Thucydides, though spoken by this or that hero, really express the ideas of the historian. Applied to Deuteronomic circles, “these authors put into the mouths of such natural leaders as Moses, Joshua, Samuel, David, Solomon, in addition to priestly (Dt 20) and prophetic personages (in Kings and Jer), that which conformed with their own ideology” (p. 52).

The thesis is argued in three parts. The first, and by far the longest, studies the typology of Deuteronomic composition, analyzing major literary forms with special attention to the close relationship between D and treaty formulas of the Ancient Near East. W. sees the contemporary treaty between Esarhaddon and his Eastern vassals (672 B.C.) as the most likely model for the covenant in D. Less significant parallels between the treaty form and Dtr and Jer are noted. I find less cogent W.’s association of the composition with the scribal class designated as soferim-hakamim, using Jer 8:8 as his point of departure. What impresses me in this Jeremian polemic is the condemnation of wise men. They falsified Torah and rejected the word of Yahweh. Undoubtedly there were good scribes but as a class they come off badly here.

Parts 2 and 3 examine the ideology, basic theological positions, and spirit of the Deuteronomic literature, with special attention to its sapiential orientation. Comparison is often made between this circle and the Priestly school, which, in W.’s opinion, stems from priests of the central sanctuary in Jerusalem and is essentially pre-exilic in its thought and atmosphere. The dependence of Deuteronomic writing upon Wisdom, and thus upon the scribal class which sponsored wisdom literature, is expounded at length, and it must be admitted that W. has made a strong case. All subsequent study of biblical wisdom must take into account the arguments proposed here. An appendix entitled “Deuteronomic Phraseology” is an extraordinarily valuable compilation, not only essential to the author’s argument but indispensable for anyone dealing with Deuteronomic literature. For this alone he has earned the gratitude of all scholars. A select bibliography (in which the absence of
E. Nicholson's *Deuteronomy and Tradition* is a glaring omission), glossaries which list words and phrases in eight languages, an index of primary nonbiblical sources, a scriptural index, and a subject index bring to this study a serviceability which its inherent worth fully merits. The debate on Deuteronomic literature and its origin will continue; W. has brought to the discussion a point of view and evidence which no one can ignore.

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FREDERICK L. MORIARTY, S.J.


With the publication of the eighth volume of *TDNT* the English version has almost caught up with the German original, *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, popularly known as Kittel-Friedrich. The ninth volume of the German *TWNT* has already appeared in nine fascicles, even though it has only reached the beginning of the article on *chronos*, "time." It bids fair to be a stout final volume, despite the fact that the final volume as originally planned, the eighth, had to be divided into two because of the length to which the articles in the post-World-War-II volumes had grown in contrast to the earlier ones. The eighth volume, here under review, is slender by contrast with others in the set. As in the case of former volumes of the English translation (see *TS* 25 [1964] 424–27; 26 [1965] 509–10; 28 [1967] 179–90, 873–74; 30 [1969] 158–59, 743–44; 33 [1972] 172–73), the same excellent, dependable work has come from the pen of the translator, G. W. Bromiley, to whom all students of the Bible in the English-speaking world are indebted.

In this eighth volume of *TDNT* students will find the important articles on *telos* (and related words), *telōnēs* (which now needs to be qualified by the article of J. R. Donahue, "Tax Collectors and Sinners: An Attempt at Identification," *CBQ* 33 [1971] 39–61), *teras*, *typos*, *typhlos*, *hydōr*, *huios*, *ho huios tou anthrōpou*, *huios Dauid*, *hymnos*, *hypokrinomai*, *hypostasis*, *hysteros*, and *hypsos*. Undoubtedly, the most important part of the volume is found in the pages devoted to "Son, sonship," "Son of Man," and "Son of David." The amount of literature devoted to these NT subjects in recent years is enormous, and some of it has been in dialogue with the original German articles of *TWNT* 8 (e.g., C. Colpe's contribution to the Son of Man debate). It is good to have such material in English dress.

If the over-all excellence of the English translation has to be com-
mended once again, that does not mean that traces of the German original have in all instances been eliminated. My impression is that I have found more Germanicisms in the English of this volume than in earlier ones (e.g., n. 12 on p. 402, or “Achaemenidian” [p. 402] instead of Achaemenian; p. 420, lines 16–18). In one instance the translator has missed the nuance of a German paraphrase of an Aramaic text (p. 402: “In the event br ’ns (‘someone’) dies, thou hast broken the treaty” [Sefire 3.16]; it should read “In whatever way a man shall die…”).

A great amount of broken type has not been caught by proofreaders; broken and missing letters abound, and there are many more errors in the Greek and Hebrew texts quoted (e.g., p. 402, n. 12 [Aramaic br is given as rb]; p. 420, line 25 [“nãne” instead of “nâney”; etc.]).

As in the case of former volumes, one must conclude by recommending *TDNT* wholeheartedly. Even if one must disagree with specific interpretations given in the articles (and there are many that one would dispute, especially in Colpe’s article on the Son of Man), the over-all detail and wealth of information are what make of Kittel-Friedrich the gold mine that it is for the NT student.

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The Catholic Church, in its early encounters with dissident groups, discovered that Scripture could be used to support heterodox as well as orthodox positions. The realization that Scripture was not self-explanatory led Tertullian to subordinate it to “the rule of faith,” from which the interpretation of Scripture must never deviate. This cardinal principle of Catholic hermeneutics received classical formulation in St. Augustine’s affirmation: “I would not believe the gospel unless the authority of the Church moved me to do so.”

The subordination of Scripture to ecclesiastical tradition remained virtually unquestioned until the Reformation. When Luther found the Fathers of the Church arrayed against him, as, e.g., in his thesis on the servitude of the human will, he did not appeal to a charismatic understanding of Scripture, such as was used by his opponents, the Anabaptists. Rather, he insisted on Scripture’s “objective clarity,” which made any norm for interpretation superfluous.

Despite the enormous progress of scriptural studies in the period since the Reformation and the present co-operation between Catholic and Protestant biblical scholars, the division concerning the basic her-
meneutical principle still remains: sola scriptura or "Scripture and tradition"?

If the validity of a principle is to be judged by the results produced through its application, then it must be acknowledged that neither the Catholic nor the Protestant hermeneutical principle has solved the basic problem of biblical interpretation. The term "tradition" has many meanings, and during the period when the papal magisterium had become the predominant instrument of "official" Roman Catholic teaching, the latest papal pronouncement could be assumed, a priori, to be an expression of authentic ecclesiastical tradition. In Munificentissimus Deus (1950) a doctrine was proclaimed to be "divinely revealed" which appears clearly for the first time in an orthodox source in the sixth century. Theologians were forced to suggest various ways in which later teaching could be contained "implicitly" in Scripture or in the early Fathers, and some went so far as to speak of the Church's "unconscious," in which dogmas defined in modern times were always secretly present.

At Vatican II the danger of magisterial positivism seems implicitly to have been recognized. In Dei verbum 10 we read the unparalleled acknowledgment: "This teaching office [i.e., of the Church] is not above the word of God, but serves it, teaching only what has been handed on, listening to it devoutly, guarding it scrupulously, and explaining it faithfully by divine commission and with the help of the Holy Spirit." And yet the Council did not really clarify the relationship between Scripture and tradition, nor did it respond to the crucial Reformation position that the Church always stands under the judgment of Scripture.

On the Protestant side, the history of the sola scriptura principle has been no less problematical. The "objective clarity" of Scripture was, in fact, evident only to someone who, like Luther, had discovered, through personal religious experience, a key to the understanding of the Bible. In Luther's case this key was the doctrine of justification by faith alone. This private norm replaced the norm of ecclesiastical tradition. New Testament books which did not preach justification were treated as of secondary importance and placed in an appendix at the end of Luther's NT. Thus the principle of "the canon within the canon" was established, a principle whose use in contemporary Protestant scholarship is truly alarming. Whole sections of the NT are rejected as examples of "early Catholicism," simply because they do not correspond to the theological preferences of the individual exegete.

The present collection of essays, all previously published in theological journals, does not attempt to solve the hermeneutical problem. The individual contributions simply show, as the editor observes, "how a
group of exegetes tries to deal with the new questions, questions which are also old and yet never cease to be raised" (p. 7). Five of the essays are concerned with hermeneutic in the NT, i.e., the understanding of the OT and Jewish tradition by NT writers. Three essays deal, respectively, with Tertullian, Luther and Erasmus, and Rudolf Bultmann. The collection is prefaced by a survey of the hermeneutical problem written by the editor and concludes with a contribution by O. Kuss entitled "Exegesis and Theology of the New Testament as the Basis and Scandal of Every Post-New Testament Theology." The "new hermeneutic" is non treated except in five pages of E.'s survey. All the contributors are Roman Catholics.

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This book seeks to revive a nineteenth-century approach to Galatians, obviously with new reasons. In 1850 Bruno Bauer published his Kritik der paulinischen Briefe (Berlin), in the first part of which, "Der Ursprung des Galaterbriefs," he concluded that Galatians was only a clumsy compilation of ideas and phrases drawn from Romans and the Corinthian letters and that the author of it was not Paul but an anonymous compiler. In various ways and with differing nuances this sort of criticism continued in vogue throughout the nineteenth century. Toward the end of that century C. H. Weisse proposed a modification of it: that Galatians had a straightforward apostolic basis, on which some interpolator subsequently set to work. Now O’Neill seeks to revive this approach to Galatians.

After an introduction in which he sketches a history of the interpretation of Galatians in modern times, and a three-page select bibliography on Galatians from the time of F. C. Baur to the present, O’Neill devotes the bulk of this small book to “notes on passages” of the letter that he considers to be either added glosses or some commentator’s interpolations. These notes are followed by a “summary of the epistle” (pp. 73–83), in which he presents Paul’s message in paraphrase, commenting in parenthetical paragraphs on the omitted glosses and interpolations. Finally, a conclusion seeks to justify the approach adopted.

O’Neill begins with a thesis from John Locke’s Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St Paul to the Galatians, I & II Corinthians, Romans, and Ephesians, that Paul must have been “a coherent, argumentative, pertinent Writer; and Care, I think should be taken, in expounding of him, to show that he is so.” As O’Neill paraphrases it, “the biblical
writers must have had a clear message, and they must have known how to convey that message” (p. 2), and he returns to this conviction a number of times in the course of his discussion. As he begins his summary of the epistle, he states: “The consistency of the picture of Paul’s theology that emerges will be one test of the likelihood of the thesis” (p. 73) that the exegetical problems and difficulties have been caused by glosses and interpolations.

Guided by such a principle, O’Neill proceeds to go through the Greek text of Galatians, excising from it what he considers “comments by later writers that have been incorporated into the original text” (p. 84) either as glosses on individual words or phrases or as interpolated verses or paragraphs. Consequently, he would omit from the text of Galatians such things as the following: “nor through man” (1:1); “evil” (1:4); “of Christ” (1:6); “who called you in grace” (1:6); “another” (1:7); “of God” (1:10); vv. 13, 14, 22–24 in chap. 1; “them” (2:2); “Titus” (2:3); the de of 2:4; “to them” (2:5); “that the truth of the gospel might be preserved for you” (2:5); “And” (2:6); “just as Peter [had been entrusted with the gospel] to the circumcised” (2:7); “Peter” (2:8); “certain men” (2:12 [this would make Peter the subject of the infinitive]); “they came” (read instead “he [James] came,” 2:12); “like a Gentile and not” (2:14); v. 17 in chap. 2; “it is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me” (2:20); “the Son” (2:20); “hearing with” (3:2, 5); vv. 3–4 of chap. 3; “thus Abraham ‘believed God, and it was reckoned to him as righteousness’” (3:6); “no one annuls even a man’s will, or adds to it, once it has been ratified” (3:15); “Now” (3:16); “It does not say, ‘And to offsprings,’ referring to many; but, referring to one, ‘And to your offsprings,’ which is Christ” (3:16); “it was ordained by angels through an intermediary. Now an intermediary implies more than one; but God is one” (3:19–20); “in Jesus Christ” (3:22); vv. 23–25 in chap. 3; “of God” (3:26); “in Christ Jesus” (3:26); v. 28 in chap. 3; “offspring” (3:29); vv. 1–3, 8–10, and possibly 4–5 in chap. 4; “of his Son” (4:6); “as Christ Jesus” (4:14); v. 17 in chap. 4; “until Christ be formed in you” (4:19); vv. 24b (“these women . . .”) to 27, 30; “still” (first one, 5:11); entire passage, 5:13–6:10; “upon the Israel of God” (6:11).

A rapid survey of these suggested omissions reveals that they are for the most part the cruces interpretum of Galatians. But one cannot help but be suspicious of a theory that handles “exegetical puzzles” by excising them. O’Neill has little patience for the learned attempts in modern commentaries to wrestle with these problems, and prefers “to wield the scalpel” instead, convinced that “the patient’s condition is more serious than has been supposed” (p. 84). Apart from the thesis
of Locke with which he began, O'Neill often appeals to variant readings in the mss.; and there are, indeed, variants at times on some of the verses that he considers problematic. As I count them—and there would be other ways of reckoning—O'Neill would excise roughly 84 verses or parts of verses (sometimes only one word in the verse). Of these about a dozen only have textual variants in the manuscript and version traditions; and only about half that number have variants in patristic citations. The rest of the excisions are based mainly on an appeal to “Paul’s logic and clarity” (p. 36). And this is a dangerously subjective criterion. O'Neill rejects the charge (p. 84) that his approach is arbitrary, and he tries to distance himself from the vogue of “conjectural changes” of yesteryear. But does he really succeed? Though he has tried hard to argue his case convincingly, he has at times completely disregarded plausible solutions to the cruces that he tries to handle. His book presents a convenient listing of many of the major problems of Galatians, but I am not sure that he has found the proper way to handle them.

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These are the first two volumes of a new commentary series that will include both Testaments as well as Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha. In a language where we have relatively few up-to-date biblical commentaries of substance the appearance of a new series is a major event. The ambitions of the editors are delineated in a full-page description: interconfessional and international; meant for serious students; no arbitrary limit of size; employing the full range of modern philological and historical tools; “on occasion” volumes translated from other languages. Some of these goals will be realized (the quality of the board of editors guarantees that), but a little too much is claimed. The fact that the first two volumes, as well as several others immediately projected, are translations suggests that “on occasion” is an understatement; and indeed “modern German Lutheran” will probably be a more accurate designation of much of the NT series than “international and interconfessional.”

Like all other series, it has good points and bad points. The very fact
that a good part of the NT series consists of translations means that the series will be saved from the uneven patterns that inevitably appear in a totally new series. The editors can choose the best or the very good and do not have to wonder what will come from hitherto untried pens. The range of choice available is suggested by the fact that the Colossians volume is taken from the Meyer Kommentar series, while the Pastorals volume is from the Handbuch zum Neuen Testament. The weakness of this procedure is that the reader is getting volumes written some years before; Colossians, e.g., represents a 1968 edition, while the Pastorals is a 1966 one. An attempt has been made to update bibliography, but this is of limited success. The Pastorals volume could make no real use of two important commentaries that appeared in 1969, one by N. Brox in the Regensburger Neues Testament, the other a major revision of C. Spicq's older work, even though both are cited in the bibliography.

The biblical books themselves are newly translated from the original languages, although in these two volumes the translations had to be adapted to fit the translations presupposed by the German commentators. All illustrative quotations from the Greek and Latin are given in the original language and also translated (a very happy decision). The commentary itself is ample and extremely well documented with footnotes. There are also long and short excursuses on individual points. (As regards misprints, a more careful proofreading has been done on the Pastorals than on Colossians.) The printing style of double columns on a page (both of commentary and of footnote) with uneven right margins will be distracting to many. Indeed, in Colossians on some pages we have a bizarre sandwich effect of three layers: the commentary in double columns on top of the page; an excursus in smaller print in double columns in the middle of the page; and footnotes in double columns on the bottom of the page. As one turns the page, one tends to forget which layer one was reading! This arrangement seems to have been abandoned in the second volume. The introductions are brief—in Colossians very brief, because Lohse chooses to discuss authorship only after he has finished the commentary. (If this is a ploy designed to emphasize the a posteriori method, it is only partially successful: only a dense reader would fail to guess the outcome of this whodunit, namely, it was not Paul.)

I have concentrated this review on the series precisely because the two volumes have been in the public domain for several years (in fact, the main Conzelmann-revision of Dibelius was done in 1955) and were reviewed by scholars when they first appeared in German. They both take critical stances on non-Pauline authorship but leave unanswered all the nagging little questions created by such a position, plausible as it may be. If the unknown author of Colossians copied the local information in
chap. 4 from the genuinely Pauline Philemon, why did he introduce facts that are not in Philemon? Did still another author write Ephesians, giving us a double stage of non-Paulinity, where one non-Pauline author (Ephesians) copies another non-Pauline author (Colossians) in order to produce a Pauline message? If the elaborate local information of the Pastorals is not genuinely from Paul but comes from Acts, why could the author not get the information in Acts straight? And why did he go to the trouble of writing a second pseudonymous epistle to Timothy which does not say that much more than the first?

But then there are questions to be asked of any commentary. The ultimate evaluation of the wisdom of the Hermeneia board in choosing to translate these two commentaries is probably best attested by the fact that were I to teach either Colossians or the Pastorals to students who read only English, I would have to recommend these as the best commentaries available.

**Union Theological Seminary and Woodstock College, N.Y.C.**

**RAYMOND E. BROWN, S.S.**


If Hans Küng's book *Justification* (London, 1966) was regarded as a break-through in the theological debate between Protestants and Roman Catholics over the nature of justification, it may very well be that this book will be so hailed in the exegetical debate. Ziesler presents a solution worked out in great detail, that is fascinating in its proposal and that may well put an end to a long-standing controversy. But even if the book's contention were not to hold up in the long run—and it will take hours of study to assess it in detail—it will still be of great importance for the way in which it will undoubtedly shape the debate of the future.

The book is devoted to a fresh study of *dikaioun* and its cognate nouns, adjectives, and adverbs, and to their Hebrew and Aramaic counterparts in support of a new exegetical insight. Z. devotes his introduction to a description of the current state of the question: how the verb *dikaioun*, "justify," is understood in the writings of prominent Roman Catholic and Protestant commentators, and how the adjective *dikaios*, "righteous," the noun *dikaisynē*, "righteousness," and the classic Pauline phrase *dikaisynē theou*, "the righteousness of God," have been interpreted by them. Allowing for slight individual variations, Z. shows that "the Protestant tradition tends to interpret the noun by the verb,
i.e. make it purely relational, while the Catholic tradition tends to do the reverse,” to interpret the verb by the noun and the adjective, “i.e. speak of a ‘real’ justification,” and that “there is a widely held belief that dikaiosynê theou holds the key to the meaning of justification...” (p. 14). Given this situation, Z. proposes to study anew the biblical and extrabiblical data bearing on the problem.

In the course of eight chapters, Z. examines in painstaking detail the occurrences of the verb, the noun, and the adjective in different bodies of literature: in chap. 1, the verb ἱδαίον, the nouns ἱδαίος and ἱδαί, and the adjective ἱδαί in the Hebrew of the OT; in chap. 2, their counterparts in Greek literature; in chap. 3, the same in the Greek of the Septuagint; in chap. 4, the Greek and Hebrew usages in the intertestamental writings of later Judaism (e.g., Sirach and Qumran literature [Hebrew]; Pss. of Solomon, Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs [Greek]); in chap. 5, their use in Philo and Josephus; in chap. 6, the use of these words and the doctrine of merits in rabbinic writings; in chap. 7, their use in the NT apart from the Pauline corpus; in chap. 8, their use in Philippians, Colossians, Thessalonians, Ephesians, the Pastorals, and Corinthians (i.e., in the Pauline letters apart from Galatians and Romans, the two wherein most of the exegetical problems occur). Chap. 9 is crucial, being entitled “Righteousness in Christ,” and setting forth a view of justification in the “corporate Christ” and the book’s “basic contention.” Chaps. 10-11 test the hypothesis by applying the “contention” to the passages of Galatians and Romans. Z.’s methodology is sound, his coverage of secondary literature is good, and his approach to the whole problem is admirable.

The “basic contention” of chap. 9 is this (risking a summary of an intricate thesis): Paul has a doctrine of justification by faith, expressed mainly by the verb ἱδαίοβ, and viewed entirely forensically or relationally; God “justifies” or “acquits” us, declaring our status before Him despite our lack of deserving it. He also has a doctrine of righteousness through faith and in Christ, expressed mainly by the noun and the adjective and viewing the believer not just in a private relationship to Jesus, but as part of a new humanity in which he becomes a new man; he is ethically “righteous,” and his behavior is such because he now shares in the corporate Christ’s righteousness or risen life. In effect, Z. admits that the Protestant tradition has been right in the interpretation of the verb ἱδαίοβ, that “justification” is basically relational, and in most cases forensic; but that the Roman Catholic tradition has been right in its insistence on a real, behavioral uprightness of man made new in Christ. The tendency in the past was to confuse Pauline teaching on justification and righteousness, whereas they should really be kept distinct. In
other words, the relational or forensic declaratory act of acquittal of the man who stands before God's tribunal is as valid a Pauline view as the ethical, behavioral righteousness of the Christian through faith. Z., however, is careful to stress that the latter is not really possessed by man, except insofar as through faith and baptism he shares in the righteousness of the risen Christ. It is his only insofar as he shares in the new life of the corporate Christ.

The thesis is well presented, and the detailed work of interpretation is relieved by convenient summaries. The validity of Z.'s interpretations of the different bodies of data will have to be worked over in detail at leisure; but spot checks that I have made so far indicate that his work is largely convincing.

However, I am not sure that I would agree with all that he says about the phrase dikaiosynē theou. He has rightly seen that the occurrences of this phrase in Phil 3:9, 1 Cor 1:30, and 2 Cor 5:21 refer to something that the Christian shares in as he shares in Christ ("we are taken up into and share the covenant loyalty which hitherto has been God's alone," p. 160) and that these are different from the occurrences in Rom 1:17, 3:20-26, and 10:3, where it describes not exactly an "attribute" of God ("a description of God as he is in himself," p. 186), but God's powerful activity in maintaining the covenant relationship and in restoring man to right relationship. This distinction of the phrase in Romans from the use of it in other Pauline letters is convincing. But I am not sure about his reluctance to call the phrase a "formula" ("a formula is only present when there is a clear tendency to express an idea by a set phrase," p. 10, n. 3). As such it is never found in the OT. But over against that the Pauline phrase sounds stereotyped; because it turns up in Qumran literature, not only as sidqat 'El in 1QS 11:12, but more significantly as a slogan, sedeq 'El, which is to be inscribed on the banners in preparation for the eschatological battle of the Qumran community along with other labels such as "met 'El, "fidelity of God," k*bôd 'El, "glory of God," and mišpat 'El, "judgment of God," it also certainly has a formulaic character. Indeed, Z. recognizes it as a "title" on p. 88.

Criticism of a more serious nature concerns his handling of the rabbinic writings in chap. 6. Z. recognizes the difficulty of dating this material; but he says that he is limiting his analysis to two samples, Genesis Rabbah and the Targum Onqelos. Yet a number of the examples are in fact taken from Talmudic passages. Moreover, in this discussion of the doctrine of merits and of Gn 15:6 (Abraham's righteousness) he would have been well advised to consult some of the other Targums, which have a significant insert to explain Abraham's merit on Gn 15:1 (so Targum Pseudo-Jonathan, Targum Neofiti I) and may well represent an
even earlier Targumic tradition than the rather literal translation of Gn 15:6 in Onqelos, which he uses.

Another minor criticism may be leveled against his title. To speak of a "linguistic" enquiry in this day and age, and to mean by it what he has actually done, is somewhat questionable. His enquiry is not "linguistic" in the modern sense of "linguistics." It is out-and-out philological in the classic sense, and the sooner our colleagues in the United Kingdom and its commonwealths return to the classic use of this word, the better it will be for all concerned, for sweet clarity's sake.

All in all, this is a very significant book, one that is calculated to rouse much discussion. It may seem at first sight to be a return to the "two distinct soteriologies" in Pauline theology, as espoused of yesteryear; but it is not. It presents a distinction that all students of Pauline theology will have to consider and reckon with in the future.

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Prof. Giblin has provided a useful textbook on Paul and his message, concentrating on the seven Hauptbriefe in their historical sequence and stressing the Apostle's "personal mission and his pastoral concern" (p. xi), designed for the student willing to work through the volume with an RSV at his side (a translation which G. sometimes corrects). Use of this book with Protestant seminarians and a class of religious at a Catholic college, and re-examination of it in India, have convinced me of many excellences in it, even for the advanced student, but some of its features can prove liabilities. Student reactions have varied from negative to enthusiastic. Teachers doing Paul ought to examine it, especially as an aid for covering epistle content exegetically.

There is wisdom in concentrating on 1 and 2 Th, Gal, Phil, 1 and 2 Cor, and Rom as "the heart and substance of Paul's personally formulated theology." The Pastorals, as is stated, "can seriously be questioned" (p. xi), but G. never really commits himself on Col-Eph (or Philemon). The last is accepted as Paul's, Eph is his seemingly, Col goes unmentioned (save for p. 94). It thus remains unclear whether the Deutero-Paulines are omitted for pedagogical reasons (or lack of space) or out of critical convictions. Acts rates more frequent reference, but usually to show that Luke "overpaints" (a favorite term) for theological purposes. Phil and 2 Cor are taken as composites from two or more letters, but with no conclusion on whether 2 Cor 10-13 is the "letter of tears" and was written before or after 1-7.
The most striking feature of the book is perhaps its sequence of presentation. Forswearing "Paul in light of speeches in Acts" or "reconstruction of Paul's background"—hence OT or history-of-religions influences are often bypassed—G. seeks to "'catch' the mind" of Paul "as we read him," by working through the seven letters in Part 1 section by section—all of them, i.e., except Rom 1-11. This "meat" is saved for Part 2, where, after a chapter on Paul's apostolic consciousness, rooting in his "mystical" conversion, Rom 9-11 is treated under "Paul's Theological Perspectives," and Rom 1-8 as the pièce de résistance, headed "Paul's Gospel." Advantageous as this sequence is, it has some unhappy effects. Gal must be treated prior to discussion of Paul's conversion and his relations with Jerusalem. Rom 12:19-21, one of half a dozen places where G. proposes "rather new insights," must introduce the topic of God's judgment and mercy without the advantage of prior discussion of predestination in Rom 8-11. And Rom 9-11 is treated before "Paul's Gospel" in 1-8. Further, the four themes presented in Part 2, chap. 2, as a "synthesis of preceding observations," seem less than adequate to bear the heading "Paul's Theological Perspectives"; it is unclear whether they are meant to sum up the major themes in Pauline theology or to highlight emphases in Rom 9-11. Indeed, the prominent use of 2 Th 2 and its apocalyptic (in light of G.'s own interpretation in The Threat to Faith [1967]) and of Rom 9-11 and its salvation-history pattern may be said to force Rom 1-8 into a mold before these chapters ever speak for themselves.

The style deliberately eschews notes, but a select bibliography for each chapter lists periodical and other literature reflected. Good use is made of such material, e.g., Baltensweiler's analysis of 1 Th 4:3-8, and McNamara's conclusion from Targum material that 2 Cor 3:17 f. does not identify Christ with the Spirit. Frequently a Pauline passage is set in "poetic" lines, schematically structured. Slogans from the Corinthians are sometimes noted, but not "sentences of 'holy law.'" Pre-Pauline formulas are too infrequently pointed out ("Abba" is). 1 Cor 15 is regarded as part of an earlier letter on the resurrection and freedom from the law (though the possibility of 1 Cor 13 as a separate entity is not mentioned), while 2 Cor 6:14-7:1 is regarded as "probably a later insertion" (though both sections are commented on in their canonical sequence). Rom 13:1-7 is declared "appended," "not . . . from Paul himself"—in spite of verbal links in vv. 7 and 8—but no criteria are given for this decision, nor is secondary literature cited. Rom 16:25-27 is said to be "added from another letter," but presumably by Paul, perhaps since its reference to "the mystery" and "God's glory" fits G.'s particular emphases in Paul.
In so big a study, where hundreds of judgments must be ventured, while the majority of them seem to me right, some may not be advanced cautiously enough, or with the notation that other options exist (e.g., 2 Th 2). Thus one cannot be sure Paul’s “death sentence” (2 Cor 1:9) was “a grave illness” (p. 204) rather than some other (court) experience. It is unclear at 1 Cor 2:3b what G.’s phrase means, “the situation may have been deliberately edited,” and how he finally wishes to translate 1 Th 2:16, eis telos, is not stated. A repeated criticism must be that Paul’s opponents are not very sharply delineated, e.g., in Galatia; or in 2 Cor 10–13, to say “doctrinal differences do not seem to have appeared” (p. 203) will not do, in the face of studies on the concepts of apostleship at stake (Georgi, Guttgemanns) or possible influence from Cephas in Corinth (C. K. Barrett). For all the emphasis on eschatology, I find strangely absent the likely explanation that behind 1 Cor 15 is the fact that the opponents had adopted the view that their resurrection has occurred already and that thus an “overrealized eschatology” stands behind the Christological, ethical, and sacramental problems in earlier chapters of that letter.

Finally, taking the title seriously: the necessary futuristic side (the “not yet”) of Pauline thought is well brought out, stressing the theo-ultimate aspect of Paul’s Christocentric thinking, with a key term, doxa. The subtitle describes both what the book seeks to provide through textual analysis and where it seems weakest if not supplemented in the classroom with further synthesis of Pauline theology and a restructuring which makes Paul’s message the basis for interpreting letters and sections, and not just a conclusion.

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John Reumann


Reinhardt’s ambitious Habilitationsschrift (Freiburg, 1968) portends an exhaustive survey of the conflict between exegesis and dogmatic theology in German theology from the beginnings of the historical approach to the Bible in the late eighteenth century. The technical apparatus is impressive: 372 bibliographical entries, 73 pages of notes, and extensive person, subject, and biblical-citation indices. R.’s purpose is to establish practical canons for avoiding the pitfalls of dogmatic commitments on the way to a veritable tutelage of Scripture in theology. “Nothing is more dangerous than for dogmatic conceptions to escape uncontrolled under the guise of pure Gospel” (p. 384).
R.'s historical analysis refrains from a conventional approach to concepts and principles, and focuses instead on some 45 individual Protestant and Catholic theologians in four periods from 1760 to 1920 (Part 1, pp. 8-220). Biographical data and major publications are listed before brief articles explore each one's Christology, his actual use of biblical evidence, and the theological foundations of this usage in his dogmatic commitments. Part 2 (pp. 221-345) analyzes in greater detail these same factors for the major figures of this century: K. Barth, R. Bultmann, the "Bultmann School" (E. Käsemann, H. Braun, G. Ebeling), E. Brunner and F. Gogarten, F. Buri, W. Pannenberg, and (last and least) recent Catholic Christology (K. Adam, M. Schmaus).

The systematic part summarizes the historical findings according to the biblical themes and the systematic (philosophical) motifs operative in dogmatic Christology (Part 3, pp. 347-405). Particular attention is given the doctrine of Christ's two natures and the hypostatic union (pp. 384-405). Part 4 (pp. 408-23) lists the main scriptural citations used in systematic Christologies, how they function, and the relationship of exegesis and dogmatics in their exposition. A concluding chapter (pp. 425-44) summarizes the systematic findings. With respect to function, Scripture is seen as the source and norm for Christology and the symbol of revelation, but the structure and method of dogmatic Scripture usage is fraught with problems, insights, and unfinished tasks.

The question of "accordance with Scripture" must be raised not only for the philosophical categories but as well for the biblical motifs used in dogmatic assertions. Various usages are found: the direct and naive transferral of a biblical theme into a dogmatic context, a superficial combination of themes, and the speculative development and reinterpretation of biblical motifs. Historical Scripture research indicates that none of these can be adopted unreservedly. Nevertheless, general interpretive canons do emerge. The concrete delineation of a particular motif often specifies the direction of further reflection and excludes other directions. Thus, historical explication of a tradition is indispensable, particularly its relationship to Jesus' self-understanding and the resurrection preaching. A second requisite is the comprehensive interpretive horizon or ontological explication. This relates the original biblical motif to the integral reality of Jesus Christ; the origin of Christology is less its historical beginning than its substantial basis. The application or transmission of the biblical motif into contemporary perspective is the third interpretive moment. A plurality of systems is probably the only way to articulate the gospel message about the one person Jesus Christ in the heterogeneous situations of a pluriform world. But the conjunction of all three interpretive moments in a unified and comprehensive dogmatic
Scripture interpretation will ensure that the ponderous weight of the contemporary horizon not vanquish the universal import of the biblical assertion and the unity of its ground.

R.’s research abundantly documents both the problems and the contestants and defines critical dogmatic perspectives. As a historical-survey handbook, this is an important contribution. However, it falters on an exclusive systematic commitment to conventional dogma and neglects badly the eschatological dimension in modern Christology. Behind the all-too-facile rejection of existentialist and speculative Christological alternatives one senses an only slightly veiled defense of the classical model of Chalcedonian vintage. Four objections to this schema (390–92) are summarily dispatched, the dogma stands vindicated as “unsurpassed by newer conceptions” (p. 403), and the Christological impasse issuing from Chalcedon’s “terminological solution, not a real solution” (P. Schoonenberg) is once again swept under a magisterial carpet.

Although R.’s orientation on the classical two-nature dogma is both useful and timely, one cannot but query if he might not have furthered more the authentic process of Christological renewal by earnestly evaluating other of the many interpretive models attempted in the Christian tradition: he himself mentions as alternatives the two states of Christ, His threefold ministry, and the relationship of Christ-idea and Christ-person. In this exemplary fashion he might have demonstrated the genuine pluriformity of systematic concepts and their legitimacy, thus conserving their insights even while exposing their shortcomings. It is also regrettable that twentieth-century Catholic Christology receives such short shrift: J: Geiselmann, E. Gutwenger, O. Semmelroth, R. Guardini, but particularly K. Rahner are only mentioned in passing, H. Urs von Balthasar only in scattered notes.

Tübingen

ROBERT C. WARE

DÉCALOGUE ET MORALE CHRÉTIENNE: ENQUÊTE PATRISTIQUE SUR L’UTILISATION ET L’INTERPRÉTATION CHRÉTIENNE DU DÉCALOGUE DE C. 60 À C. 220.


This second volume in Recherches, directed by the Jesuit faculties of Montreal, is not a study in exegesis or biblical theology; it is not, strictly speaking, a thesis in patrology; nor is it a systematic study of moral theology, although it succeeds in clarifying the place of the natural law in Christian morality. Rather, it makes an impressive contribution to the history of moral theology by studying the use and interpretation of the Ten Commandments in the early Fathers.
Starting with the catechetical parts of the *Didache*, the *Letter of Barnabas*, the *Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs*, and the *Pastor of Hermas*, B. shows what an important place the Decalogue occupied in the primitive Church's theology of the Two Ways, which seemed to grow out of a long catechetical experience of Israel. Clement of Rome, with his morality rooted in the dogmas of creation and redemption, Christianizes the Decalogue by making the commandment of God equivalently the precept of Christ, interiorized through the Spirit. The theology of Ignatius of Antioch, not pure mysticism but oriented to action, aimed to establish the Christian in all his activity in conformity with the divine will revealed in the teachings and precepts of Christ, lived out in Christ according to the spirit of the prologue to the Ten Commandments, a response to God's salvific act. Similarly in Polycarp, it is by the union of the Christian with Christ that the norm of the divine will is interiorized and becomes charity, assuring the accomplishment of all justice. Early Christian preaching, reflected in the apocalyptic sections of the *Pastor of Hermas*, the Second Homily of Clement, and the apologetic part of the *Letter of Barnabas*, stems from a particular inspiration derived from the Decalogue, often but not always directly cited, and a fidelity to the theology of the Decalogue characterized by the grounding of morality in the dogma succinctly expressed in the prologue and by the insertion of the Law in the Covenant, which alone can give it liberating significance.

In the second part, B. shows how the Christian apologetic tradition of the second century has as its primary value the purity of a monotheistic faith, corresponding to the First Commandment, which does not falter in face of persecution or the contagion of paganism. On the purity and sincerity of this faith depend all Christian moral values, which find a lasting and privileged expression in the Ten Commandments, conceived as written in the nature and heart of man (natural law) before being written on tablets of stone at Sinai, thus preparing hearts for the acceptance of the fulness of revelation in Christ Jesus (law of Christ). These conclusions are drawn from the *Preaching of Peter* and the apologetic writings of Aristides, Justin, Tatian, Miltiades, Apollinaris, Melito, Athenagoras, Theophilus of Antioch, Clement of Alexandria, and Tertullian.

In the third part, B. examines the antiheretical writings of Irenaeus and Tertullian. Against Ptolemaeus and Marcion, Irenaeus reaffirms the full validity of the First Commandment and the dogma of divine unicity, which he reconciles with the difference between the Old and New Testament, while developing his concept of a unique salvation, revealed and effected through different but coherently ordered economies. He distinguishes universal (or natural) commandments from commandments par-
ticular to the Mosaic Law valid only temporarily and for Israel, and ex-
plains that the superiority of the Christian Decalogue comes from its
summary in the double commandment of love of God and love of neighbor
which renews the heart of man and transforms the law of servitude into
a law of liberty. Throughout the works of Tertullian, the Decalogue is a
privileged expression of divine will which the revelation of Christ has not
repudiated but condensed. In the course of human history, the one and
only God has made His will known by a pedagogy which took into ac-
count the hardness of heart of a rebellious people and educated them
patiently to a refinement of conscience that permitted them to grasp in-
teriorly, in the Spirit, the moral demands of a life according to God. The
views of Clement of Alexandria are found to be in harmony with the syn-
theses of Irenaeus and Tertullian.

Except for those who minimize the value of the past and would rather
"let the dead bury their dead," B.'s inquiry into the use and interpreta-
tion of the Decalogue in the early Church opens a door to the theologian
of today who wants to be authentically faithful to his tradition.

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Francis T. Gignac, S.J.

FROM LUTHER TO CHEMNITZ: ON SCRIPTURE AND THE WORD. By E. F.

A book about the two Martins who were really one in thought, doctrine,
and understanding of the Scriptures. Dr. Klug demonstrates this unity
by first giving a résumé of Luther on Scripture, in a series of seven chap-
ters, then a résumé of Chemnitz (1522-86) on Scripture in seven chapters.
These chapters discuss inspiration, Scripture as the Word of God, its
Christological emphasis, authority, efficacy, perspicuity, and truthful-
ness (inerrancy). By comparing both Martins, K. arrives at a perfect
balance; in fact, Chemnitz is the image of Luther.

K. maintains that no one in the German Reformation stood so close to
Luther as did Chemnitz. Though C. was not the sole important figure in
the generation following the master, nevertheless he served as the
"bridge" passing to the third-generation Lutherans (the dogmaticians of
the seventeenth century) L.'s theological content and method. In the
years succeeding L.'s death (1546), C. became the pre-eminent figure in
Lutheran theology and church life. Melanchthon failed to give the church
decisive leadership (p. 116); where Melanchthon hedged on doctrine,
C. followed L. strictly (p. 118), and unlike the "vacillating Melanch-
thon," he "provided the effective leadership and the necessary formula-
tions which rallied the befuddled followers of Luther to a truly Confes-
sional unity and purity" (p. 138). Some (e.g., Reinhard Mumm) may feel
that history has credited Chemnitz with accomplishments beyond his deserts, but K. thinks he has been neglected in the past and not accorded the praise he truly deserves.

Luther’s basic teaching on Scripture and the Word has been successfully outlined and discussed by other authors, as does K. in the first half of his book. L.’s position is so well known that it need not be summarized or reviewed here. In affirming that Chemnitz faithfully echoes L., we become aware of L.’s position as well. This may be doing justice to C., but not to the author. The substance of the volume is in the latter half, where K. treats C. in detail. K. is not satisfied with merely saying that C. “stands directly in line after Luther” (p. 182); he demonstrates it. Up to now, very little has appeared on this second Martin in English, and so we welcome this résumé of his teaching.

Chemnitz spent his ecclesiastical career not among academicians but among pastors: he was superintendent at Braunschweig. As pastor, he was dedicated to preserving and transmitting rather than creating; nevertheless he did publish several notable theological works. In elucidating C.’s thought, K. has scrutinized three of them: Examen Concilii Tridentini (1573), which serves as the main source; to a lesser degree De duabus naturis in Christo (1570); and the Enchiridion (1574). By ample quotations and generous paraphrases K. brings to light his subject’s understanding of, and opinions on, the seven topics mentioned earlier.

Though I praise K. for making available in English what was heretofore unavailable, nevertheless I was irritated by several “itches.” Let two, on style and method, suffice. (1) K. obviously feels very close to Chemnitz and admires him greatly; this sympathy and nearness to his subject, however, makes him bubble over into too generous a use of superlatives and modifiers. Such overenthusiasm for one’s hero cannot but create in the reader a certain hesitation to trust the author’s objectivity. As K. never tires of affirming C.’s objectivity, even in polemical writing (e.g., p. 148), he would have served his cause better if he were as objective as his subject. (2) C.’s Examen, the primary source in this study, is a polemic against the Council of Trent. In several places K. discusses and passes judgment on the Council, but one wishes he had done so with the historian’s scholarly care. K.’s information on the Council of Trent, as revealed in his footnotes, derives from P. Schaff’s History of the Christian Church (which first appeared in 1892) and W. Pauck’s popular Heritage of the Reformation (Glencoe, Ill., 1961). In vain will the reader find a single work by a Catholic author on the Council, either quoted or mentioned in the notes. Surely, H. Jedin’s History of the Council of Trent should have been put to good use; perhaps it could even have been quoted to confirm some of Chemnitz’ opinions. This lack of
familiarity with Catholic scholarship and with the Catholic understanding of the issues at Trent creates such an imbalance in the presentation that it only increases the reader's wariness and hinders him from placing the confidence in K. he would like.

It can be said, finally, that K. is conservative in his theology and in his interpretation of Luther and Chemnitz. He favors C.'s "conservative stance" (p. 244) and sees him as "the prototype of all truly great dogmaticians" (p. 145). He judges that because both Martins were far in advance of their time in their biblical knowledge, they are very much relevant to the Lutheran Church of today, and asserts that modern biblical critics stand in need of and would benefit from their approach to Scripture (p. 248). Their use and understanding of Scripture helps today's Church to remember that "to depart from the base of Holy Scripture is to invite all the ills of theological subjectivism.... It is to this base that conservative Christian voices and theologians continue to call the church back" (p. 9). It is K.'s sincere hope that his volume may serve unity in bringing the liberalizing brethren back to the conservative circle.

Rome

Joseph N. Tylenda


An awareness of history as the "fourth dimension" of human life has tended to produce in modern man a new attitude toward truth. Truth is a processive reality, subject to change and development. Within ecclesiastical circles, particularly within the Roman Catholic Church, this philosophical premise has in turn led to a sharp debate between conservatives and liberals over such questions as the development of dogma, the nature of Church authority, etc. Geisser, currently professor of systematic theology at the University of Zurich, Switzerland, investigates the contribution of Möhler to these controversial issues. M. was a distinguished member of the "Tübingen School" of Roman Catholic theology in the early nineteenth century. G. limits himself to an analysis of two major works: the Einheit in der Kirche oder das Prinzip des Katholizismus and the Symbolik oder Darstellung der dogmatischen Gegensätze der Katholiken und Protestanten nach ihren öffentlichen Bekenntnisschriften. Both works were recently republished with introduction and commentary by J. R. Geiselmann, and G. shows his dependence on Geiselmann's research and scholarship at frequent intervals through the book.

In the Einheit, first published in 1825, Möhler by his own admission
is heavily in debt to the concept of the Church which he found (or believed he found) in the early Fathers. The Church, on this interpretation, is a living organism with the Holy Spirit as its life principle. Emphasis is laid, therefore, more upon the Church as a community of believers who are led by the Holy Spirit to a new life-style than upon the Church as a juridical institution with a hierarchy of authority, carefully defined articles of belief, etc. Dogma and Church authority are indeed not completely lacking in this concept of the Church, since tradition in M.'s opinion is the only true basis for the ongoing interpretation of Scripture. Yet the tradition in question here is the living tradition of the entire community and not simply of its ecclesiastical teaching authority as such. Within this organic concept of the Church, heresy has significance only as a dialectical counterpoint to the true historical development of the Church as a faith community under the inspiration of the Spirit.

In the Symbolik, on the other hand, which was published seven years later (1832), M. significantly modified his stance toward the Church and, above all, toward authority within the Church. In this work he represented the Church, not so much as the community of believers under the guidance of the Spirit, but rather as the corporate extension in space and time of Jesus Christ the God-man. Accordingly, just as Christ once lived in the world as the visible representative of the Father and acted with the fulness of the Father's authority, so the Church, above all the hierarchical authority within the Church, is now the visible representative of Christ to the world and possesses the authority of Christ to carry on the work of redemption. The notion of the Church as a historical institution in process of development is therefore still present in M.'s thinking, but he is much more conscious in this later work of the need for control over the Church's historical development in and through the exercise of legitimate ecclesiastical authority.

While G. counsels against overemphasizing this change of direction in Möhler's theology, his analysis of these two works nevertheless presents an interesting case study in the use of different models for the construction of theological systems. That is, M.'s ecclesiology is significantly different in the two works, because he emphasizes in the one work the reality of the Church as a faith community, and in the other the equally valid reality of the Church as a juridical institution. This change itself, however, is dictated by his special attention to the Spirit as the life principle of the community in the first book, and to Christ as the visible representative of the Father in the second. Furthermore, since the Symbolik enjoyed a wide influence in Roman Catholic circles before Vatican I, this shift of emphasis in Möhler's thinking is histori-
cally significant as a prelude to the eventual definition of papal infalli-
ibility at Vatican I.

*St. Mary of the Lake Seminary*  
*Joseph A. Bracken, S.J.*  
*Mundelein, Ill.*


This book is a disappointment. The topic is a matter of abiding ec-
clesiological interest, and the author is a theologian of major academic
achievement and even eminence. What we have here, instead of a sig-
nificant contribution to the field, is an often plaintively polemical tract
of the ecclesiastical *status quo*.

The material is divided into four sections: an introduction, which seri-
ally deplores modern agitation, worldliness, priestly infidelity, disdain
of tradition, theological arrogance, intimidation of bishops, the insid-
ious campaign against the papacy, pseudoprophetic pretensions, and
moral laxity; a much larger segment on the problem posed by the book's
title, wherein L. defends the prerogatives of official pastoral leadership
over against what he considers a dangerous tendency within the Catholic
Church toward a "démocratisation de mode collectiviste" and a con-
comitant surrender to secularism; an equally lengthy third section on
the maternity of the Church and the paternity of pope and bishops; and
an appendix which reproduces an October 1971 interview on the priest-
hood published in *France catholique*.

L.'s central concern seems to be that structural reform poses a serious
danger to the Church and that the continued pressure for such reform is
simply an "alibi trop commode" for avoiding true spiritual renewal.
His chapter on episcopal conferences is dominated by the fear that
such groups will become too independent of papal and curial authority.
He curiously implies that these conferences are only tenuous expres-
sions of the collegial nature of the Church, and he approvingly cites one
cardinal's judgment that this recent emphasis on national episcopal
conferences might yet give rise to a new religious nationalism. L.'s idea
of collegiality appears to exaggerate the vertical (the relationship of the
individual bishop and of the local church with the pope, and through
him with the universal Church) at the expense of the horizontal (the
relationship of the bishops and of the local churches among themselves,
with the pope as their principle of unity and fellowship).

L.'s discussion of the pastoral ministry concentrates too much on the
security and protection which these various offices, particularly the
pope's, can provide (e.g., pp. 115, 138). He expresses grave reserva-
tions about proposals for widening the papal selection process. Indeed, it is at this point alone that L. even mentions the work of Hans Küng, and then only to criticize him for advancing such an idea. L. suggests that if the selection process were changed, it would make the pope a mere representative or delegate of his electors. “Was Peter elected by the Eleven?” he asks.

While L. acknowledges that the principle of subsidiarity conforms with Christian tradition, he concludes nevertheless that its general application will lead to a democratization of a collectivist sort and will tend to undermine the essential Petrine prerogatives.

Whatever good there is in this book is already available in the writings of Rahner, Congar, Ratzinger, Küng, and others. Les églises particulières, though heavily laden with footnotes and generously, though not helpfully, interspersed with quotations, ascends too rarely above the level of an elaborate brief against the liberalization of the Catholic Church. The Catholic theological community and the Church at large remain in L.’s debt for such earlier works as Corpus mysticum, Le mystère du surnaturel, and Exégèse médiévale. Unfortunately, this latest volume does not enhance his heretofore excellent reputation.

Boston College


This is a selective study of six historical marriage cases heard by the Roman tribunals between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries. In each case one title of nullity is examined in detail, viz., coercion, conditions contrary to the substance of marriage, mental incapacity, exclusion of children, exclusion of perpetuity, and invalid dispensation of a diriment impediment. A seventh chapter deals with the exercise of the papal authority to dissolve marriages and concludes with a list of what are called “classes of carnal marriage,” supposedly summarizing the forms of Catholic marriage currently distinguishable as a result of an evolution in the theory and practice of the courts.

The title of the book is misleading, since the vast majority of its content is concerned with judgments of nullity and not at all with the Church’s “power to dissolve” marriages, a point which is formally considered only in chap. 7. Noonan, of course, is not unaware of this. He writes: “Although the system styles some terminations ‘annulments’ and others ‘dissolutions,’ the result for the marriage is the same, and the kind of power exercised is functionally difficult to distinguish”
(p. xvi). Of course, an author is free to profess that he himself does not perceive a significant difference between (1) concluding from the evidence that a real marriage never existed, and (2) disposing that a marriage which has existed shall not exist for the future. But this distinction is crucial to any real understanding of what the ecclesiastical courts and lawyers are all about, or ever have been about, in the matter of marriage, since it is, and has been, the elementary supposition of their function that they are competent only to find for or against the existence of a bond in questionable cases, and not to dissolve bonds the existence of which is not in dispute.

It is easy to see, however, how N.'s mode of interpreting the mental processes behind the judgments of the courts could lead him to confuse the function of judgment with the power to dissolve. He tends to view the decisions, sometimes even the doctrines themselves on which the decisions are based, as voluntary choices of the judges or lawyers made with a view to the promotion of some deliberate curial policy, rather than conclusions resulting objectively from a continuing process of reflection and experience and from openness to the evolving theology and psychology of marriage. The following are a few examples of his approach. “In effect [the curial theologians] made a policy decision to attribute a Catholic intent to the rest of the world in order not to have to hold invalid the marriages of most of the world” (p. 268). “The elasticity of ‘implicit’ gave the theologians and the Curia a wide latitude in determining when they would or would not uphold a sacrament. Everything in the end depended on what state of mind the Curia was willing to attribute to the person whose intention was at issue” (pp. 270-71). “In the end the option favorable to the Americans was made easy by finding at hand an old and settled maxim: dispensations were presumed to be validly given unless the contrary were established. This principle... took much of the snap out of the game of ‘Dispensation’: the court could end the game at any point by assuming what was necessary to make the dispensation turn out validly.... Faced with a choice between preserving the celebrated technical traps of the law of dispensation and the public policy favoring the reliability of official acts and the stability of marriage, the Rota now chose reliability and stability” (pp. 338-38). Cf. also p. 266: “Curial conservatism...”; p. 271: “That sacramental intent...”; p. 327: “One not implausible explanation...”; p. 337: “The American Bishops...”; p. 398: “Hospitaleness to litigation...”; and passim. This gratuitous attribution of extrinsic motives as the basis for their decisions, whether in statements of principle or in particular cases, inevitably creates a subjective and bi-
ased picture of the working of the tribunals, whether the Rota or any other.

But N.'s voluntaristic interpretation of the judicial process of the Roman matrimonial courts emerges most flagrantly in the so-called "classes of carnal marriage" which are said to have been established by the second part of the twentieth century, partly by papal dispensations and partly by the Roman Curia's exercise of the "power to confirm or to dissolve" (p. 402). Having already separated "virginal" and "sexual" marriage as two distinct classes by dismissing as "nonsense" a well-known (though not uncontroverted) distinction of the Rota between the will to assume an obligation and the will to fulfil it (cf. p. 87), N. now makes several other distinctions within the class of "sexual" marriages, notably the following: "Class IV. Sexual, but limited or negative in procreative intent; contracted by two baptized persons; consummated by sexual intercourse; indissoluble or invalid at the option of the courts. Class V. Impermanent by intention, custom, or assumption; contracted by two baptized persons; consummated by sexual intercourse; indissoluble or invalid at the option of the courts" (p. 403). To assign the decision between "indissoluble" and "invalid," in cases involving "procreative intent" or intention of permanence, to the "option" of the courts is comparable to affirming that the defendant in a criminal trial is a murderer or innocent at the option of the jury. One would like to think that this is merely a violent misuse of the word "option"; but against the background of other texts (e.g., supra) and the immediate context, it seems clear that it is intended in the usual sense of a voluntary choice, as opposed to a conviction induced by the evidence. In consequence, it implies either a misunderstanding of the judicial process itself, as practiced by the Roman courts, or a denial of their adherence to the norms prescribed for them by Church law and professed by them in the decisions they render—which would be a rather ambitious indictment, whether of their intelligence or of their integrity. It is difficult to see how anyone having a basic familiarity with the canon law of marriage and impartially reading any representative number of the Rota's (or other tribunals') cases could come to the conclusion that their decisions were the exercise of an "option" in any ordinary sense of the word.

It is not clear what sort of readership N. had in mind. The didactic tone, the occasional flights of flowery prose (e.g., pp. 159, 239, 302), the mingling of fact and imagination in the manner of historical novels (e.g., pp. 186, 244), the selective choice of a few historically interesting, if not always doctrinally significant, cases, and the journalistic flair for dramatic organization of material, for headlining apparent conflicts between the courts, and for smart, not to say flippant, phraseology
("dispensationmanship" [p. 324]; "the unintended intention" [p. 291]; "to press the levers of control and spring him free" [p. 237]; "...can the Pope change squares into circles?" [p. xvi]; "Like the licensing of dogs or automobiles [dispensations] had the effect of producing a modest revenue" [p. 325]; and much more of the same)—all these elements would suggest that the intent was a popularization of the theme of nullity trials, with a distinctly anticurial direction, rather than a scholarly study. But this view is not consistent with the detailed documentation of substantive facts, the accumulation of minute distinctions and details from the writings of occasional theologians or canonists (e.g., pp. 31 ff.), or the elaboration of N.'s own views on a few of the more subtle features of Rota jurisprudence or on the "system" as a whole (cf. pp. 87, 208, 267, 279, 393 ff.).

On the other hand, for anyone already moderately versed in the jurisprudence of the courts or the canonical literature on matrimonial problems, or for one seeking a reliable introduction to the meaning, principles, and practice of the ecclesiastical marriage courts, this work leaves much to be desired. In addition to its basic bias regarding the real function and accomplishment of the courts, related above, it is, by reason of its selectivity, far from representative of the total range of problems, variations of cases, and jurisprudential attitudes of the Rota, whose annual Decisiones seu sententiae currently number fifty-four volumes. It devotes only part of a footnote (p. 401) to what is perhaps the most significant development in modern tribunal activity, the recognition and elucidation of the concept of moral or psychological incapacity, whether absolute or relative, to assume the responsibilities of marriage. It attempts to treat in one crowded and confusing chapter (7) the massive historical and theological question of the papal authority really to dissolve marriages. (On the same page on which it is said that "The Code knew nothing of a class of marriages dissoluble by papal action alone" [p. 372], canon 1119 is quoted to the effect that "An unconsummated marriage between the baptized or between a baptized party and an unbaptized party is dissolved...by dispensation from the Apostolic See....") It represents courts as diverging in matters of doctrine (or "policy") when actually the conflicting decisions are due to the fact that different aspects of a complicated doctrine are applicable in different cases (e.g., simple error and contrary intent in the matter of indissolubility [cf. pp. 283-84] or the influence of local custom of divorce [cf. pp. 277-78]), or to the fact that successive courts disagree on the credibility of the alleged facts (e.g., the Gould case). It dismisses much too facilely, I think, certain concepts of frequent occurrence and general acceptance in the jurisprudence of the Rota, as the difference between simple
error and contrary intent with relation to indissolubility ("the im­plicable difference between 'belief' and 'intent'" [p. 283]), the notion of the implicit content of an intention (pp. 267 ff.), and the distinction be­tween accepting an obligation inherent in a desired state of life without the intent of fulfilling it ("nonsense") or the mutual conveyance of a right without the intention of using it (cf. pp. 87, 208 ff.). As a result, the book would be more prejudicial than informative for the reader seek­ing an initiation into the subject, while its subjectivity, as well as its nar­row scope and relatively sparse coverage, will very much limit its value to the already initiated.

Unfortunately, too, N. has not demonstrated that familiarity with the field of canon law as a whole which would be essential to any reliable evaluation of the Church’s matrimonial system. For example, he applies the Third Baltimore Council’s censure for attempting marriage after di­vorce to the defendant in the divorce case (pp. 310–11), whereas the terminology of the law itself applies it only to the plaintiff ("qui post­quam divortium civile obtinuerint...") [III Balt., no. 124]). Again, with reference to the invalidity of marriage resulting from an invalid disp­ensation of a diriment impediment, N.’s explanation of this effect as a “device” to make the impediment effective (p. 327) or to allow the Curia more discretion in the granting of annulments (ibid.) ignores the meaning either of an invalid dispensation or of a diriment impediment. If the dispensation is invalid, i.e., ineffective, the impediment is not dispensed and consequently operates its proper effect, which, in the case of a diriment impediment, is to impede the validity of marriage. The effect of invalidity, in other words, is not a special “sanction” or “overkill,” but a simple application of the canonical principles at issue. And in attempting to argue that such a dispensation could still have been valid on the ground of supplied jurisdiction (p. 327), he misrep­resents the institution of common error in three respects: first, all that is supplied in common error is jurisdiction, whereas in the case at issue the invalidity is not attributed to lack of jurisdiction in the agent but to alleged defect of known cause for dispensation; secondly, in the circum­stances there was question of a single dispensation, whereas the im­plication in common error is that the validity of a plurality of acts is at least potentially imperiled; and thirdly, in the illustration from sacra­mental absolution, it is not true that the Church simply does not “treat” the absolution as invalid in spite of the “requirements for legal validity” not being satisfied: the whole meaning of supplied jurisdiction is that the absolutions (in general, the juridical acts) are valid, because the requirement for validity (in this case, jurisdiction) is present. It is “sup­plied” by the law itself, in the circumstances specified in the law, to
someone who does not already have it from another source. In the case of supplied jurisdiction, therefore, the validity of the juridical effect is not a "legal fiction."

At a time when the question of second marriage, whether on the basis of nullity or of dissolution, is under very active consideration at all levels and from every point of view (biblical, historical, theological, ethical, and canonical), it is a dubious contribution, to theology, to canon law, or to history, to propose that the ecclesiastical courts, under the guise of evaluating the validity of unions, have really been engaged in an exercise of arbitrary power, "dissolving" valid marriages under the title of nullity when it suited their policy, or, when it suited a different policy, alleging the unbreakable character of the marriage bond. In any critical examination of the doctrinal issues involved in second marriage the judgments of the Church's courts, under the influence of her lawyers, theologians, and magisterium, must play an important part; and any study of their contribution, if it is to be fruitful, must be serious, objective, and competent. That, in my opinion, cannot be said of Power to Dissolve.

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John J. Reed, S.J.


This is a competent, important book. Prof. Chodorow has presented a series of stimulating hypotheses about law and politics in the first half of the twelfth century, as well as reviews (plus good bibliographies) of current scholarship on the legal condition of Latin Christendom at that time. His main task concerns the Concordia discordantium canonum (or Decretum) of Gratian. This work, in all probability completed about 1140, superseded previous collections of canon law. It was a source book of the ius antiquum, in the traditional sense of offering texts of canons; but it also marked the beginning of the age of ius novum, for Gratian intersperses the canons chosen with his own commentary, the dicta Gratiani. The practice of offering various sorts of analyses for assembled canonical materials is a defining factor in the so-called "science of canon law," of which Gratian is the founder.

With the exception, however, of the treatment by Rudolf Sohm earlier in this century (which C. reviews in his Introduction), no one has investigated the Decretum as a unit, apart from its organizational scheme. That is what the present work sets as its goal: "to assess the historical
significance of the Decretum in the year 1140 or thereabouts" (p. 6). This task is complicated by the fact that almost nothing is known about Gratian’s life. Through a careful collation of what is known (although it is difficult to see how Gratian can be placed at Innocent II’s 1131 Council of Reims [p. 47] on the basis of Stephan of Rouen’s Draco Normannicus), plus a minute analysis of passages in the Decretum, C. concludes that there is more to Gratian’s work than an attempt to innovate the study of canon law methodologically by establishing it as a new science parallel to the recently invigorated Roman law. Gratian’s ideas were shaped by the actual ecclesiastical-political situation in Western Europe during the 1120’s and 1130’s. Hence his treatment of Church law is seen as deeply involved with the political faction led by Chancellor Haimeric—the party which emerges as that of Pope Innocent II in the schism of 1130. Gratian becomes a participant in the movement, brilliantly described by Klewitz nearly forty years ago, marking the end of the reform papacy.

The central portion of this work is a detailed analysis of the texts Gratian incorporates into the Decretum, and the dicta surrounding them. Prior to this discussion, which begins in chap. 3, are over fifty pages of introduction about Gratian, modern theories concerning his work, and certain important aspects of Church history in the early decades of the twelfth century. The information given there is a valuable digest of opinion (cf. also the appendices on the date of the Decretum, and St. Bernard and law) and could serve as a solid introduction, in English, for students beginning to study Gratian and his time. In fact, books such as this can do much to encourage the serious study of medieval canon law, not only in its technical aspects but also in historical context.

The discussion offered surrounding specific points in Gratian centers on: The Church as a Juridical Community (chap. 3); Human Authority and the Hierarchy of Law (4); Human Authority and Divine Law (5); Human Authority and Its Own Law: The Theory of Legislative Power (6); Sacerdotal Power and the Hierarchy of the Church (7); The Source of Legitimate Authority in the Church (8); The Division of Governmental Responsibilities between Regnum and Sacerdotium: The Ecclesiastical Community and Other Communities (9). In each section the presentation is grounded firmly in primary sources. Even if, at times, the texts could equally bear a different interpretation, and the conclusions about Gratian’s aims and associations emerge as hypothetical, the discussion is stimulating and points the way to future studies. For example, the twelfth-century pontificates (Paschal II to Innocent II) could profitably be investigated in terms of papal correspondence and conciliar legislation. This would be an important way to try to discern the shifts in papal policy that would seem necessary, if it makes sense to talk of the
end of the reform papacy in connection with the rise to power of Haimeric's party.

One final point, which in no sense should detract from the favorable impression this book conveys. It is not possible to argue that Gratian uses material from Ivo of Chartres' Panormia simply on the basis of common rubrics for canons in both collections (p. 55, n. 55; p. 217, n. 9). The sixteenth-century editor of Ivo, Melchior de Vosmédian, probably extracted from Gratian and printed in his edition rubrics for similar texts in the Panormia (see J. Ramband-Buhot in Traditio 23 [1967] 534-36).

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Robert Somerville


The increasing number of books which treat glossolalia from the psychological viewpoint shed much-needed light upon this often esoteric phenomenon. This relatively short volume is an outgrowth of a study sponsored by the American Lutheran Church and later endowed by the Behavioral Sciences and Research Branch of the Mental Health Institute, and its clinical nature is nowhere more apparent than in the very method of information gathering. For example, firsthand observation of glossolalics, the distribution of detailed questionnaires, correspondence with tongue-speakers, and interviews with a number of linguists and anthropologists were methods employed by the researchers. Prof. Kildahl met with a wide variety of church groups committed to the practice of glossolalia so that firsthand information could be gathered. Extensive use was made of tape recordings of actual samples of tongue-speech, and the researchers also carried on dialogue with nontongue-speaking prayer groups which otherwise were similar in nature to the glossolalists.

A brief initial chapter deals with a description of glossolalia, while the second answers eighteen frequently-asked questions concerning tongue-speech. Chap. 3 gives a brief historical overview of the phenomenon beginning with the biblical references and proceeding through the early Church Fathers and the Middle Ages down to the twentieth century. Chap. 4 discusses briefly the theories of seven scholars who have written extensively in the field. Chaps. 5-8 are strictly psychological, dealing with such diverse subjects as egopsychology, personality types, regression, and anxiety over light crises.

K. concludes that glossolalics are "neither more nor less emotionally
disturbed than equally religious non-tongue-speakers” (p. 65). He does, however, notice among those who speak in tongues a dependence upon an authority figure and desperate need for acceptance by a group or by God. Moreover, once the gift has been received, there is a feeling of relaxation and euphoria. Similar conclusions were reached by Lincoln Morse Van Eetdeldt Vivier in *Glossolalia*, his unpublished doctoral dissertation at the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in 1960.

Overall, K. is skeptical of the sociological and psychological aspect of tongue-speech as it occurs in public instances. He believes that too much of it has been harmful rather than helpful when measured by the criteria of edification with respect to the entire group. He falls back on the traditional yardstick suggested by St. Paul: does glossolalia “help to build up the community” (1 Cor 14:5)? He finally concludes that “tongue-speaking is a learned phenomenon” (p. 74). On the other hand, he suggests that the testimonies of the glossolaliacs are valid, honest statements of a subjective feeling and they do experience a sense of well-being after having received the gift.

The final two chapters deal with some “unanswered” questions and an excellent summary in which the question is raised: is glossolalia a spiritual gift? K. suggests that it is the use of glossolalia which determines finally whether or not it is a constructive phenomenon or one that damages and destroys. While it is not uniquely spiritual in K.’s view, whether or not it is a gift of God’s providential care depends ultimately upon the varying subjective interpretations of the nature of what is “a good gift for man” (p. 85). In an excellent twenty-page bibliography the material is classified into several categories: books, periodicals, reference, and unpublished material.

If Ronald Knox could have known the developments that have occurred in Pentecostalism and Neo-Pentecostalism in the last decade, he would not have rounded off his study of *Enthusiasm* the way he did; for in this 1950 work he quite naively speculated that “this chapter in the history of religion” should be “closed.”

Prof. Hollenweger provides a wealth of information about the most rapidly growing segment of Christendom. His experience and position afford him a unique vantage point from which to write. Himself a Pentecostal, he took graduate work and began a study of the Pentecostal tradition for his doctoral dissertation (*Handbuch der Pfingstbewegung*), the final form of which actually numbered several thousand pages and consisted of ten volumes. The purpose of the present work is to encourage and assist discussions between members of the World Council of Churches and the Pentecostals, who together with the Roman Catholics are representative of the major “nonmember churches.”
The first section contains a historical review of the important formative events and representative leaders in selected areas of the world, including a discussion of the origin of Pentecostalism in America (Los Angeles, 1906), as well as a definition of Pentecostalism: those groups who teach at least two postconversion crises in the life of the believer. The first is the baptism of the Holy Spirit, and the second is usually (though not always) characterized by glossolalia. H.’s basic interpretation of Pentecostalism is a functional one: he believes it has served in developing countries to bridge the gap between forms of magic and Western religions.

H. traces the spread of Pentecostalism from America to Europe, Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Australia. The narration is written in a lively journalistic style and is carefully documented. The section is indeed selective, perhaps even at points unbalanced, and could well be supplemented by a comprehensive history of Pentecostalism such as the work by Nils Bloch-Hoell.

The second part presents a theological analysis of Pentecostal thought. Here H. is content primarily to allow Pentecostals to speak for themselves, and only in the final two chapters does he move to the point of evaluation. In chaps. 31-32 (pp. 457-511) he attempts a brief sociological and psychological analysis. Only at this point does the weary reader discover the book’s central thesis. H. proposes that the intent of Pentecostalism has been “ecumenical awakening” with other Christians, a telos that has been sidetracked because sectarianism has been allowed to obscure this genuine role.

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Watson E. Mills


This work is a revision of a doctoral dissertation presented at the University of Wisconsin in 1970. Its central concern is the “second formulation” of the categorical imperative, particularly as it appears in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person, or in the person of another, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.” Contrary to the publisher’s jacket statement, it will be of interest mainly to Kant scholars, though in light of the attention which Rawls’s Theory of Justice is receiving, the evaluation of Kantian ethics against the background of utilitarianism may be of some wider interest.

It is a difficult book to summarize. The general procedure is to ex-
amine a text from the *Groundwork*, then to interpret the text with the definition of terms taken from ordinary language. The result of this procedure is, almost invariably, to show up inconsistencies and difficulties in Kant's exposition. Jones then goes on to show, or more often suggest, how a definition or distinction available within the critical philosophy dispels the problem. The value of this method is open to serious question, in that perhaps the greater part of the book is given to showing the difficulties with understandings which someone at all familiar with Kant's writings would never adopt to begin with. An example is the large section devoted to the question of what sorts of ends persons may share, and in the pursuit of which one may "use" another without "merely" using him. The answer comes: ends which are not arbitrary. Various possible understandings of what makes certain ends nonarbitrary and so capable of being shared are considered and rejected. Finally, Kant's distinction between *Wille* and *Willkür* is introduced to solve the problem: ends which a rational will (*Wille*) could seek are nonarbitrary. Especially since "arbitrary" usually translates *willkürlich* (as J. knows), and since we are dealing with a very basic distinction, that solution should have been available from the start.

In his preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant offered the following advice to critics: "If we take single passages, torn from their contexts, and compare them with one another, apparent contradictions are not likely to be lacking, especially in a work that is written with freedom of expression. In the eyes of those who rely on the judgment of others, such contradictions have the effect of placing the work in an unfavorable light; but they are easily resolved by those who have mastered the idea of the whole." One of the principal features of the present work is to demonstrate indirectly the importance of Kant's advice, though without dogmatically falling into the error he describes.

An author surely has the right to limit the scope of his inquiry, difficult as this is when dealing with a systematic philosopher. J. states at the outset that Kant's second formula "can be understood and explained only when one grasps its relation to certain central doctrines of his moral philosophy." This reviewer would agree, and perhaps suggest that a further consideration of the notion of a "kingdom of ends," of the "Typic of Pure Practical Judgment" in the second Critique, and of Mary Gregor's exposition of the *Metaphysics of Morals* in her *Laws of Freedom* would clarify and resolve many of the problems raised. But I would go further. A historical and methodological account of the critical enterprise itself and of the systematic interrelationships of the works of the critical period would have served as a much richer context within which to carry on the kind of close textual analysis at which J. is doubt-
less adept, and would have produced, I think, a more valuable book. The objection that such a project belongs to intellectual history and not to philosophy makes deeply questionable assumptions, a criticism of which is beyond the scope of this review.

More specifically, one looks for a fuller explanation of why, within the critical context, autonomy or self-legislation is central to Kant's concept of morality. Again, Kant's concern in the Principles of Pure Practical Reason of the second Critique is, though positive, limited and, in a sense, almost polemical: it is to show, contra Hume, that pure reason can be practical, that it can spontaneously lay down universally valid "objective" laws, "entirely a priori and independent of empirical principles." To take formulations from that section in abstraction from a consideration of the limits and purpose of that "synthetic" argument and in abstraction from the later sections on the Typic and the Incentives is dangerous procedure. In related fashion, it is no objection to the adequacy of a formulation of the moral law, especially drawn from an argument framed to demonstrate the "objective" validity of the categorical imperative, that a person may be accidentally conforming to it and still subjectively treating another as a means (though it is misleading to say, as J. does, that his action conforms to the formulation proposed, since that formulation does not form the maxim of his action).

More limited criticisms and warnings would include the following. One must be very wary whenever J. says that Kant "suggests" a position or "presumably" holds a view. Also, I must doubt that Jones's counterexamples, even granting the value of his procedure questioned above, really show what he expects them to (e.g., his examples of slavery and sexual relations). And to object to a moral theory such as Kant's that an ordinary moral man would not make exactly these distinctions is a bit unfair, in that (1) a good man will often make, in more intuitive fashion, analogous distinctions, and (2) moral theory may, through "abstract" argument, draw out commonly ignored consequences of generally accepted moral beliefs.

But the book does not deserve nothing but criticism. Its concerns are important and its own claims modest and may be a useful contribution to thought about the adequacy of Kant's moral philosophy.

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ROBERT P. BURNS, S.J.


Lundeen's major thesis is that Whitehead has something important to
say about the nature of language, and that what he says can be applied to the contemporary discussion of religious language. He does demonstrate that both parts of the thesis are true. Unfortunately, the form that the book has prevents him from making these two important points clearly and emphatically. It suffers from its relationship to its parent, spouse, or twin, his 1969 dissertation (Language about God: Some Implications of Whitehead's Philosophy for Religious Language) for Union Theological Seminary. This might explain why he felt it necessary to say nearly everything that Whitehead said about language rather than deciding what was of greater or lesser importance. It would also explain why through most of the book there is very little critical distance, or the development of an emphatically independent point of view, i.e., very little "risk."

On the positive side, L. does present the many ideas that Whitehead has about language. The most important seem to be that metaphysical assumptions and language are inseparable, and that analogical language is valid. For Whitehead, all language is an abstraction from the rich context of meaning which is generated in the organic universe. Those statements which appear to be the most precise are actually dependent upon their context and thus upon unavoidable metaphysical assumptions. The favored statements of linguistic positivists which refer to sense information, for instance, leave out of account the fact that a given datum has a history all its own, and a relationship to its own world that precise statements leave behind. Given Whitehead's metaphysics of process, the more precise a statement is, the further removed it is from its total context of meaning. Analogical language, on the other hand, can more fully symbolize the empirical context of relatedness out of which it comes. Religious statements, therefore (because they are analogical), can be more true to the so-called facts than quantitative scientific measurements.

L. is at his best when he discusses the approximate hypothetical character of religious statements (pp. 186-202). Their analogical nature implies that they "are not based on simple deduction or probability, nor are they reducible to the abstract precision of mathematical proportion" (p. 192). This means that a statement such as "God loves man" only asserts "that the generic coordination of experience is illuminated by this analogy, not that there is or can be conclusive evidence of its validity. . . . It is, in principle, an hypothesis put forward as the best interpretation of all available and anticipated evidence" (p. 193). According to L., the religious evaluation or option can change when "a more illuminating option" (p. 197) is discovered. The change from one religious option to another does not occur in a dramatic fashion. "The individual simply
discovers that he is not able to affirm the old assertions since he sees life in a different way” (p. 199). He then proceeds to develop an alternative religious understanding of reality.

The central section (chaps. 5–7) is an exposition of Whitehead’s theory of perception, of symbolic reference, and of religious language. L.’s treatment of religious language indicates that Whitehead’s observations are fruitful but unsystematized. Perhaps the author could have brought them together clearly for us into a coherent statement about religious language. Instead he lines up various statements and ideas of Whitehead, one after the other—which is standard dissertation fare. Another difficulty is that L. never confronts the contemporary linguistic discussion in any head-on fashion. The critical points of discussion are nowhere clearly specified; as a result, Whitehead’s entrance into the discussion is not dramatic. Whatever its demerits, however, the book is thorough and suggestive.

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JOSEPH M. HALLMAN

SHORTER NOTICES


A collection of nine essays, of which all but four have previously been published. The unpublished essays consist of an analysis of “The Dialectical Theology of St. John” (as exemplified in Jn 6) and three studies on Acts (“The Acts—of the Apostles,” “The Acts—of Paul,” and “The Acts and the Origins of Christianity”). B sees Jn 6 as “crucial to the understanding of the Gospel as a whole” and attempts to determine whether it is “a unity with a coherent and distinctive message.” He shows that the expression of differing points of view in Jn need not betray the hand of an interpolator (in healthy reaction against what seems to be the current trend to find different hands throughout the Gospel) and views Johannine theology as “neither bald historicism nor unbridled gnosis” but as “a creative and perceptive handling of the earlier tradition.”

B. places the composition of Acts at the end of the first century and suggests that the problems of Acts are, in the first instance, problems belonging to that period; nevertheless, they may also be seen as reflecting the problems of the middle of the century. Luke is not unfaithful to his sources, whatever they were, but he often no longer understands them (e.g., the original significance of the Seven). His writing, consequently, is determined by the historical and theological presuppositions he brings to his work as well as by the materials available to him. It is impossible to use the narrative of Acts to correct or even to check the data of the epistles. It is not actually clear what B. thinks of Luke’s theologizing. He is certain that Luke did not understand Pauline theology “at its full depth” but he is uncertain as to whether Luke’s theology is a corruption of Paul’s or “no more than a development and application of it to a new historical situation.”
As might be expected, all the essays give further testimony to B.'s balanced scholarship and gifts of lucid exposition.

*J. Edgar Bruns*


This volume, first published in England two years after Taylor's death in 1968, provides a good introduction to the work of the great British Methodist, whose contribution to NT scholarship is freely acknowledged even by those who have departed radically from his orientation. Ten selected essays by T. are supplemented by the funeral eulogy of A. R. George, a biographical essay by C. L. Mitton, and a complete list of T.'s published writings. The selection of essays is representative of T.'s interests, which continue to be shared by contemporary NT scholars. Such interests include the Sayings Source (Q), the "Son of Man" sayings, and the dominical origin and OT background of the Eucharist. Furthermore, T.'s first published work, as Mitton reminds us, was entitled *The Historical Evidence for the Virgin Birth*, a subject which has recently been treated from a Roman Catholic standpoint.

T. was one of the first English scholars to become familiar with the work of the German form critics and to make their contribution known to a wider audience. His response, though appreciative, was cautious and even conservative, judged by contemporary scholarship. In his address as president of the Society for New Testament Studies, in which office he succeeded Rudolf Bultmann, T. defended the basic authenticity of the Marcan Passion-sayings and attributed the reinterpretation of the "Son of Man" in terms of the "Suffering Servant" to Jesus Himself. In another essay T. even goes so far as to maintain that Jesus predicted His own resurrection (p. 46). T.'s reaction to radical viewpoints is equally evident in his criticism of A. Loisy, "whose main claim for consideration is a felicitous style and an ability to tell us what he thinks" (p. 82).

On the other hand, T.'s painstaking study of the order of Q still wins appreciative recognition by modern scholars whose work in this area has been stimulated by the recent finds at Nag Hammadi. His affirmation that "it is alien to his [Jesus'] teaching to suppose that he thinks of the elements as changed in substance" lends support to recent interpretations of the Eucharist in terms of transignification. The Proto-Luke hypothesis, which T. so ably defended, is far from dead. But perhaps T.'s most imposing accomplishment was his remarkable combination of piety and scholarship. He had no use for biblical criticism "conducted under the sound of 'church bells'" (p. 73). On the other hand, the person of Jesus and the mystery of the atonement were not simply the object of T.'s erudite study. They were the inspiration of his entire scholarly production. Perhaps this explains how even so formidable a work as his great commentary on Mark could be instrumental in a deathbed conversion (p. 3).

*Schuyler Brown, S.J.*


Although T. was unable to complete this before his death in 1968, it has been edited with only minor additions. At the end of his long career he was re-
turning to an earlier theme; for he wrote *Behind the Third Gospel* in 1926, when the proto-Luke hypothesis of B. H. Streeter was in vogue. This approach, which put emphasis on the formative character of the non-Marcan material in Luke, lost ground in British scholarship after the 1920's as J. M. Creed, R. H. Lightfoot, and A. R. C. Leaney stressed Luke's primary dependence on Mark. Yet, in German research of the 1950's J. Jeremías, H. Schürmann, and F. Rehkopf were arguing in detail for a non-Marcan source behind Luke, especially in the Passion Narrative, where the differences are notable. Building on their efforts, T. is making one final effort to re-establish this thesis in England. For him it is more than a minor issue in the Synoptic problem; it is "a matter of first importance since it enables us to reach back almost a generation to the accounts which the first Christians preserved of the death and resurrection of Jesus."

In the manner of his earlier book, T. studies the Lucan Passion scene by scene, examining in mathematical detail the elements of stylistic similarity to Mark. He identifies areas of clear dependence; but when they are removed, a consecutive non-Marcan account is left with its own unity of storyline and characterization. T. modifies his earlier view by acknowledging that this source was not composed by Luke.

T. did the work in this book ten years ago (1962–65), and the argument goes on. The latest and most detailed study is G. Schneider, *Verleugnung, Verspottung, und Verhör nach Lukas 22, 54–71* (1969). His nuanced evaluation of the complexities is that Luke copied the denials of Peter from Mark, the substance of the mockery of Jesus from a non-Marcan source, and part of the trial before the priests from each source. It is interesting that T.'s independent conclusions are almost exactly the same; he had lost none of his admirable scholarly precision.

*Raymond E. Brown, S.S.*


Theologians have been generally quite wary of any effort to mix Freud and religion. One had only to look at the results the analyst came up with himself: *Totem and Taboo* and *Future of an Illusion*. Psychoanalysis seemed inevitably to dissolve religion into castration anxiety or some other irrelevant (to theologians) neurosis. At best theology looked at the works of Freud, so seemingly antithetical to religion, to see wherein lay their error. Increasingly of late, however, more and more theologians have been taking a different attitude. This new openness is reflected in R.'s new book, perhaps the best treatment of psychoanalytic thought and religion I have seen. A Jew by origin and culture and well schooled in Jewish and Christian theology, R. sets out to note the *parallels* between Paul's thought and the needs and structures of man's psyche as seen by Freud. This is quite different from the *reduction* of religion to base fears *et al.* that we may be used to in similar studies.

R. sees Paul as believing that Christ had conquered death and that union with the Lord was the way to immortality. In overcoming death through Christ, Paul saw the Christian as partaking of divinity, being reunited to that from which he came. Baptism and the Eucharist are the great sacramental means to this end. R. points out the deep psychoanalytic similarities with Paul's thinking: the fear of annihilation, the desire for the omnipotence of the neonate and early childhood, the symbolic significance of water as womb
and tomb, and the meaning of eating as identification and participation.

R., with Freud, holds that in Paul these psychic functions surfaced from their repression in Judaism and formed Paul’s thinking. However, this does not lead R. to a knowing analytic smile, but rather to noting the depth of Paul’s insight and genius. It is at this point that there will appear a gap in the book for theology. Readers must for themselves push R.’s work further and find a theological context in which to view man’s psychic needs and mechanisms, especially as they form religious experience. It is not enough to look only to psychologies which are amenable to religion. Freud was a profound and insightful thinker about religion and must be listened to. R.’s book may become indispensable for that listening. It is most highly recommended.

Eugene A. Merlin


A religious book more than a theological one (but rewarding reading under both aspects). It focuses less on the intelligibility and consistency of ideas about God than on the reality of the presence (or absence) within contemporary history of the unseen, history-transcending mystery we call God. As the problems of theology are raised and resolved on the level of understanding, so religious problems are raised and resolved on the level of action, where persons individually or as a community acknowledge in faith the presence (or absence) of God in their midst and respond accordingly. Thus this book, consisting of essays written and in the case of most published over the last fifteen years, chronicles B.’s own faith response on the level of action (and theological reflections arising from this) to what he perceives to be the presence of God manifesting itself in specific events of recent American history. The book is consequently highly personal and at times deeply moving.

The title is meant to suggest that the mystery of God today is manifesting itself under other names and in unexpected events and places, “confronting us where we least anticipate his presence” (p. 8), e.g., political activity, the education scene, and such experiences as death, imprisonment, and civil disobedience. “I have come to believe very much in ‘the pseudonyms of God,’ the strange names he uses in the world to accomplish his purposes when his self-proclaimed servants let him down” (p. 35).

B. gives a threefold structure to his ordering of the originally disparate writings. Part 1, “Adventures in Theological Self-Awareness,” traces during the 1960’s his increasing awareness that the world has something to say to Christians. “The most important reason is simply because the world is God’s world” (p. 21). Part 2, “The Pseudonyms of God,” develops the theme of the book by essays revealing the more explicitly biblical and Christian overtones of God’s revealing Himself in unexpected ways. Part 3, “Discovering God’s Pseudonyms Today,” makes up more than half the book. In it B. presents specific examples of pseudonyms that he believes God is using in the contemporary world, e.g., opposition to the war in Southeast Asia.

Edward Glynn, S.J.


The context in which this book stands is that of a dialogue en profon-
deur between Hinduism and Christianity. P. would like to bring the ancient dialogue between Christianity and Hellenism beyond its limitations and establish it as a universal dialogue with all cultures and religions. His book points accordingly to new dimensions in ecumenism, however minimizing sometimes the deep differences within Christian ecumenism itself in matters of cult. His purpose is not only to contribute to the renewal of cult but also to show how cult could be more integrated in our contemporary culture and in the concrete life of men (p. 202). It is no small task (Part 1) to try to throw light on the meaning of cult against the complex background of the multiple views of reality brought under the generalizing term “Hinduism.” It is no less hazardous to retrace in few pages the historical phases which cult went through in India to support the analysis of the main manifestations of cult: sacrifice, prayer, adoration. P. shows great tact and knowledge throughout this analysis, which thereby becomes acceptable. This analysis is then (Part 2) related to aspects in the Christian cult which P. would like to see revalued: cult in general, myth, symbol, etc. To make himself understood by Western readers, he is compelled to some unsatisfying generalizations (e.g., the Western thought, the Hindu thought), and his presentation sometimes gives off a “flavor of eclecticism” which compromises his purpose. Still, the bringing together of Hindu and Christian views and practices is often very evocative and enlightening. The bearing of this study on indigenization cannot be missed. Above all, it could help to lead the interreligious dialogue to a new stage, where dialogue bears not only on religious ideas but also on concrete modes of religious realization and praxis in view of a mutual fulfilment. Gérard Vallée


An updating of an apologetical theme proposed by Vatican I: the Church itself as a sign lifted up among the nations (DS 3013–14), in the light of Vatican II’s nontriumphalistic ecclesiology. L. does not shrink from incisive criticism of the mentality expressed in Vatican I’s approach to this topic. He succeeds, moreover, to a remarkable degree in making a viable theme again out of the Church qua motivum credibilitatis. This he does by bringing out the paradoxes of the Church phenomenon: its unity in the midst of change and diversification; the conservation of its identity, always on the verge of being lost because of either excessive or insufficient engagement with the human societies in which it makes its way; and especially its holiness, shot through with sinfulness.

The book seems written for professors and practitioners of apologetics who may be a bit at a loss since Vatican II. It manages to make the Council’s leading ideas fruitful for an apologetics more in touch with our times. I wish L. had extended his insights on the role of signs back to the case of miracles (which, with prophecies, were one of the mainstays of the older apologetics). Recent investigations into the Sitz im Leben of the historical Jesus would point the way. In general, the Christological prelude does not measure up to the ecclesiological main section. Should not every theologian today who appeals to the historical Jesus be able to write in such a way as to utilize the helpful distinctions of biblical scholarship between Jesus, the history of the Jesus traditions in the early Church, and the creative theological work of the Evangelists themselves? L. does not do so, unfor-
fortunately. However, in the book as a whole there are signs that this "Roman" theologian is openly facing difficulties which stem from the Church's immersion in history. He thus contributes to the renewal of the theological category of "signs" in a way strictly consonant with pronouncements of the magisterium.

Paul Misner


This collection includes papers on faith and revelation by authors of known competence: Cardinal Koenig, Bishop Philbin, Piet Fransen, Hendrikus Berkhof, James Mackey, P. J. McGrath, and Donal Dorr. Among these essays two impressed this reviewer as being of special interest. Fransen's 35-page paper on divine revelation, in spite of its tortuous English style, is a brilliant exposition of the theology of revelation understood in the light of the primordial experience of grace. Fransen ably brings out the linguistic and communal, as well as the strictly personal and interior, aspects of revelation. Also valuable is Dorr's "Religious Experience and Christian Faith," an excellent summary of the views of Schleiermacher, the Modernists, and Otto, followed by a critique from Lonergan's point of view. In opposition to the Modernists, Dorr perhaps exaggerates the possibility of expressing religious truth in accurate, nonsymbolic speech.

Avery Dulles, S.J.


The essays in this collection, originally presented as lectures in the Department of Philosophy and Religion at Georgia, are, with one exception, shaped by the postpositivistic discussion of the meaning of religious discourse. The exception is Thomas Altizer's piece on negation in the Buddhist tradition and in Hegel, which points to an atheistic Hegelian Christology. In the analytic essays two main tendencies are at work, the sceptical and the constructive. Thus, Blackstone, in his lucid introductory overview of previous analytic discussion about the cognitive status of theological claims, reaches generally sceptical conclusions. Kai Nielsen argues for the rejection of religious belief on empiricist grounds and against claims that morality is in need of a religious basis. He also provides sound criticisms of the view that the atheist is really a covert believer. Ayers' examination of the relation of myth to religious discourse presupposes a noncognitivist view of traditional theological claims; but he offers an interesting set of criteria to be used in the justification of myths. David Broiles, on the other hand, in an essay critical of the sceptical tendency, sets forth some telling arguments against Hare's view of religious statements as nonassertive expressions of "bliks," which would be significant in the absence of religious knowledge.

The constructive tendency is exemplified in several essays by philosophers who regard the existence of God as a logically necessary truth. The most prominent recent defender of this view has been Charles Hartshorne, who here provides an interesting overview of various proofs for God's existence. Bowman Clarke, in his discussion of reason and revelation, bases natural theology on the ontological argument and argues that there is also a realm of claims about God's judgments, the truth-conditions of which can be known only by God but the content of which can be revealed to.
man. Frank Harrison, like Clarke, holds that we have a priori knowledge of God's existence but maintains that we also have a personal relationship of love to God which cannot be expressed in descriptive language and which exceeds our conceptual grasp. The merit of this collection lies, as so often in analytic work, in the details of the argument, especially in the pieces by Nielsen, Broiles, and Clarke.

John P. Langan, S.J.


An especially welcome book in our time of liturgical renewal and charismatic-Pentecostal movements, as well as of increasing interest among Western Christians in Syrian Christianity and the connection between baptism and confirmation. Simâî, Syrian-rite Christian himself, carefully analyzes the early liturgies and Fathers of the Syrian Church to conclude that the central fact of the Syrian Christian experience is Pentecost. The liturgies and Fathers conceive of the Church as the New People of God constantly being generated, formed, and "flowering" in a deeper and deeper incorporation into the immortal life of the risen Lord through the sacraments as the means of the actualization within the community of the event of Pentecost. The Church is charismatically enlivened by the Spirit as its life, its breath, its cleansing and life-giving water, its energizing fire. At the Eucharistic epi­clesis the Spirit comes to unite the risen Christ with the Church, rendering Him present for the nuptials with His bride the Church which the Eucharist is. In baptism it is the Spirit who breathes upon the waters to incorporate the old man into the Second Adam, and it is at the moment of immersion that the Spirit is given to en­gender new sons of God, actualizing in them the same "filiation to God" as was in Christ and imparting to the baptized the divine nature. S. shows that originally there was no postbap­tismal chrismation or equivalent of Western confirmation. The oldest rites of initiation have the unvarying order of an unction over the entire body, followed by baptism and then immediately by the Eucharist. Post-baptismal chrismation as a perfecting and sealing of the gift of the Spirit in baptism does not appear before the end of the fourth or beginning of the fifth century. Further, it is the Spirit who forms and renews the threefold hierarchy as well as the evangelical and liturgical priesthood common to all the baptized.

In short, the ancient Syrian liturgies conceive of the Church in terms of a charismatic community in which the sacraments are means of the Spirit's constancy actualizing the reality of Pentecost in the lives of the baptized. Thus it is a book which sheds light not only upon the faith and liturgy of the early Syrian Church but also upon the problems vexing our own Christian experience.

Paul B. Clayton, Jr.


The starting point of this investigation is the Rahnerian perception of the unity of the existential order as an "elevated" order. This being so, can we separate and reflect upon those elements of our experience which are divine? This is part of an effective ministry, M. contends: to seek out within ourselves and others the traces of God's presence. The technique of analysis suggested is psychological, though not in any overly technical sense. The central theses which M. presents in the central chapter are:
(1) if God appears in human experience, He does so without violating His own being or the characteristic operation of a man’s consciousness; (2) the best interpreter of a person’s experience of God is the person himself; (3) the ultimate interpreter of a peak experience is the one who gives the experience; (4) the real God seems to appear in the holes rather than in the filled spaces of human reality.

The style is clear and straightforward by and large; the development and coherence, however, are more impressive within the individual chapters than in the book as a whole. Undergraduates, seminarians, and educated laymen should be able to read it with ease, though I confess to being distracted by a quirky vocabulary that crops up in a few places—"enate," "cathect," "caducity," all of which are in larger dictionaries, and "brotan" (p. 102), which Webster’s Third and the OED both managed to overlook. In a day when a book can get slapped together without so much as a bare table of chapter headings, the bibliography and index in this volume are thoughtful and unexpected extras.

Thomas H. Stahel, S.J.


The report of a symposium, May 13–15, 1971, at Strasbourg, France, on the topic of small or informal groups in the Church. These groups include the formation of fellowships from the well-known Catholic Action cells on, through the CFM-type couples’ groups, to the radical political underground churches. The papers of sociologists, historians, and theologians presented at the symposium try to come to a better understanding of this growing trend within the Church. All participants regarded this trend, which has parallels in the past, as having great significance for the future of Christianity in the modern world.

The contributions are uneven. Disappointing are the biblical studies. Of greater interest are the studies of small groups in the Middle Ages, during the Reformation, and in nineteenth-century U.S. Protestantism. The principal papers were given by sociologists, treating the development of the present. While some sociologists still have confidence in the scientific method and hesitate to draw conclusions before the empirical research has been completed, others readily adopt a neo-Marxist, dialectical method for analyzing social change. Throughout the symposium, May of 1968 is mentioned as the significant date, the failed revolution, the watershed between the old and the new, which in the students’ uprising and defeat revealed the categories for understanding the social reality of the future. The participant sociologists, despite their differences, write with the conviction that a new society and a new Church is being born and that the small groups have an essential part in this process.

The concluding theological reflections of George Casalis, the Protestant political theologian from Paris, and of Yves Congar reveal the difference found among the sociological contributors. Congar evaluates the recent developments with sympathy, clarity, and openness to new and unexpected forms of Christian life. He writes calmly; he presupposes that he stands on secure ground and has available to him the principles by which to evaluate the new developments. Casalis writes out of an awareness that the ground on which he stands is shifting and that sure principles of evaluation are not accessible to him, unless he commits himself to action and participates in the historical movement.

Gregory Baum
**SHORTER NOTICES**


1975 will mark the tercentenary of German Pietism. In 1675 Philip Jacob Spener published his *Pia desideria*. The thesis of this winningly modest book is that three centuries later we are witnessing a re-emergence of Pietism in the demythologized and secular form of the "encounter culture." Free-church Protestantism and the human-potential movement share five functional similarities: (1) groups are small; (2) the zealous honesty and (3) here-and-now awareness practiced by the members of these groups (4) nurtures intimacy among them; (5) their (revival or marathon) meetings are scenes of prolonged and concentrated emotion directed toward a change in life orientation. Oden augments this functional analysis with a theological evaluation of group trust. The tacit ontological assumption at work in the encounter group is "that the ground of being itself is accepting. ... In an effective group, one experiences both interpersonal trust and the ontological ground upon which interpersonal trust is based."

Oden moves so effortlessly from directions for group happenings to informed theological reflection and back to the politics of implementation of encounter techniques in parish situations that even a reading of the book leaves one feeling whole. If our society and churches need a retrieval of the essential unity of experience and reflection, of deeds and words, then Oden is a theologian from whom we can expect much.

More than a year ago *(TS 32 [1971] 717–20)* I commented that a meeting between one school of humanistic psychology and Christian spirituality was a project which needed doing. While the book I reviewed then failed in its task, this one succeeds in every goal Oden set for himself (pp. 11–12). Further historical studies of sectarian groups (Donatists, twelfth-century *apostolici*, Beguines, etc.) will be helpful, especially in articulating the social conditions under which Pietism emerges. A more important and more urgent task will be to shift the religious energies of the encounter culture in a social direction, toward the everyman who is our neighbor. Intellectually, this will demand that theologians formulate the intrinsic unity of personal and social life. Practically, the recent adaptation of Paolo Freire's pedagogy by small communities of Christians offers real hope for the integration of community-centered identities with societal responsibilities. Christians struggling to create apostolic community will find *The Intensive Group Experience* an important companion volume to Freire's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed."

Andrew Christiansen


If we can speak of the prophet as the man singularly in touch with his times who senses the implications of certain trends and movements before they become obvious to others, the man with a vision not so much of the future as of the present, then Joseph Whelan is a prophet, and his *Benjamin* is a rare book in the field of spirituality. In the last two years, W. clearly and convincingly established himself as a rigorous scholar and theologian with his *Spirituality of Friedrich von Hügel* (1972) and as a man sensitive to his time and culture with his editing of *The God Experience* (1971). With *Benjamin*, W. combines his gifts and reveals his own profoundly rich, personal, penetrating, and radical spirituality.

The "radical" quality of this slender volume lies not in its novelty (after all,
who is there who can say anything "new" about prayer?) but in its insistence that the reader be honest with himself in choosing between evasion and invasion at the critical juncture of decision in prayer. The book's method, therefore, is both delicate and demanding—at all times respecting the individual's freedom but simultaneously forcing a tension that seeks out, wrestles with, and struggles for the harmony of contemplation.

Of course, this personal, intelligent confrontation is what most books in spirituality want to let happen, and the reason that Benjamin succeeds is unquestionably due to W.'s intense perception of spiritual reality, which allows his reflections on human experience to be acutely, surprisingly, consistently, and sometimes painfully precise. We find he is writing down our memories, our concerns, our language, our lives—under whatever terms of difference—and he makes us long for news of our own mystery and God's reality, for those authentic tidings of invisible things, as Wordsworth called them, that are worth the price and risk of prayer.

The book is divided into five chapters, each one coming to grips with the possibility or the fact of prayer. Yet the book's power lies as much with the minute as with its massive themes—with its detailed attention to God's personal presence in the world: in a child's capacity for wonder; in friends, our human loves, who "are the shadows, and may even be the sacraments, of contemplation"; and in Christ, who "is everything and the only thing the Father has to say." Benjamin is a service to freedom, a service which isolates choices and creatively situates them in the context of love.

Doris K. Donnelly


John of Naples, a Dominican scholastic, came to Paris ca. 1310 and was magister of theology in 1315. Avignon recognized his talents: in 1322 Pope John XXII requested his opinion on the poverty dispute; in 1323 he took part in the canonization process of the greatest Dominican scholastic as procurator negotii sancti Thomae. His name appears in official documents for the last time in 1336. S. offers an over-all study of John's Trinitarian doctrine, but his main concern is the relation of John's doctrine to that of Thomas. Thomas provided the intellectual framework for John to move in, even when the two disagreed on major questions. John acknowledged the indemonstrability of the Trinity by reason alone but argued that reason, i.e., the philosophy of Aristotle, could illumine some of the Trinitarian mystery. He accepted and defended the Thomistic position on such points as the constitution and distinction of the persons in the Trinity through relation, and the solely intellectual priority of the Father to the Son and Holy Spirit. Perhaps the most important point where John parted company with Thomas was John's rejection of the processions of the Son and Holy Spirit from the divine essence with all its perfection. This study is detailed and offers a good bibliography. S. has edited the Trinitarian quodlibeta and quaestiones disputatae from Tortosa MS Bibl. Capit. 244, which he feels is superior to the printed edition of D. Gravina, published in Naples in 1618.

Joseph F. Kelly

**Die theologische Methode des Oxforders Dominikanerlehrers Robert Holcot.** By Fritz Hoffmann. Bei-
The basic thrust of Hoffmann’s formidable work is that there has been a good deal of misunderstanding on what Holcot believed and taught. Hoffmann concentrates on two issues: (1) the questions to which Holcot addressed himself; (2) the methods and manner of attack he adopted in discussing the questions. Hoffmann concludes that Holcot was answering the same questions the scholastics had posed for generations; he was following in a long line of scholastic thought. Yet his reputation and that of his whole generation has suffered under the charge of being hostile to and destructive of the achievement of the scholastic tradition to which they were heirs. Hoffmann shows how Holcot could be true to the tradition as he saw it, critical when necessary, and speak to his times.

Hoffmann reveals the key to understanding what had happened. When Duns Scotus reacted to and criticized the Thomistic synthesis, he was still working from within the same frame of reference as Aquinas. By the time of Durandus this was beginning to shift, and with the generation of Ockham the tide had swung over and so Holcot was an example of the final stage. Thus Holcot went back to, analyzed, evaluated, and criticized as his predecessors had done, but no longer on the basis of a metaphysical analysis; his tools were logical analysis and the philosophy of language. Thus for Holcot the point of interest was not so much the content but the manner of expression and the way of arguing. This at times placed him in a difficult position, e.g., when he tried to hold a middle position between Aquinas and Ockham on the Eucharist; for he presented a logical analysis of the alternatives of annihilation or transubstantiation.

On these premises, then, Holcot cannot be accused of fideism when he argued that theology was not a true science, nor was natural logic applicable in theology, or when he questioned whether anything was demonstrable in the strict sense in theology. For Holcot, the point at issue was that the term “God” was not univocal, but meant one thing to the believer and something else to the pagan philosopher.

Hoffmann has shown how one man handled the theological issues of his day with the tools and concepts of his generation. He has illuminated a period that has remained obscure and misunderstood because too often men such as Holcot were ignored, or were criticized for not doing what they never intended to do. Studies such as this show that the scholasticism of the later Middle Ages was different and cannot simply be dismissed as decadent.

Thomas E. Morrissey


What ever happened to ecumenism? Increasingly this question has been posed. Often the disillusioned response has been, “Lost among the church bureaucrats.” Theologians in dialogue have published statements on doctrinal agreements, but there have been few public signs recently of grass-roots efforts for Church unity. Ecumenism, it seems, has become the private concern of “professional churchmen” who “plunge ahead heedless... of the people they ostensibly serve” (Murphy, p. 171).

This collection of Episcopalian-Roman Catholic conversations aims at returning ecumenism to the local
The participants in these conversations, sponsored by the Graymoor Ecumenical Institute in May 1972, are among the first to gather to ride a new wave of local ecumenical activity. The end of the theological dialogue which has occupied the churches during the last decade is the "union of quite visible congregations of very real people" (Ryan, p. 15). The first postulate of "true ecumenical development," writes Anglican Bishop Stephen F. Bayne, is that "nothing is real which is not local" (p. 21). The participants both lay out the theological foundations for organic union of the two communions on a local level and map strategies for pastoral research and activity to prepare the way for institutional unity. The last three articles especially, Richard Gary on "Regional Union: A Planning Approach," Eugene Schallert's "A Sociologist Looks at Ecumenism," and George Shipman's "Unifying Roman Catholic and Episcopal Parishes," suggest significant lines for future co-operation between Episcopal and Roman Catholic dioceses and parishes. The practical impediments to union—class differences, psychological intransigence, institutional self-interest—may prove more intractable than the doctrinal differences. For this reason, the proposals offered here for discovering the relative congruence and incongruence of Christians of both communions are important for the future.

Looking back on a history of doctrinal differences, Arthur Vogel suggests that a phenomenological distinction between the (one) world and our world will provide a model for understanding unity with plurality in the Church, and Avery Dulles proposes a "systematic pluralism" in theology. On the side of church practice, liturgist Thomas Talley notes that while there has been a convergence since Vatican II in "conformity to a central (liturgical) tradition" (p. 78), both communions are experimenting with the development of local liturgical patterns. The future of a united Church, then, seems to be unity of tradition without strict uniformity of practice and confession. Repeatedly the theological justification for this development is found in the patristic notion of typoi. More important, I believe, is the conviction of the participants that mission is the foundation of unity. Less static and cognitive than "tradition," mission includes the normative idea of an authoritative divine origin, but gives it a dynamic religious orientation, which treats the narrow concepts and social organization of a given culture plastically. Here are the elements of a genuine ecumenical awakening.

Andrew Christiansen, S.J.


A religious vocation (priesthood and religious life) is characterized by the fact and the primacy of God's invitation, the totality of the claim such an invitation lays upon a person, and the newness of the obligation specified by this claim. Central in the commitment to religious vocation is not the self-concept, as in secular vocations, but the self-ideal-in-situation, a psychodynamic combination of self-ideal and institutional ideal. This means that instrumental and terminal values are motivating factors in religious vocation—"vocational values are considered, by assumption, as always present in the members of the vocational group..." (p. 116).
"Perseverance and effectiveness of religious vocation correlate with the type, degree, and number of aware or unaware central consistencies and inconsistencies of the actual self with the vocational attitudes and/or vocational values" (p. 56). The beginnings of vocational crises are marked by the presence of central inconsistencies of the actual self with vocational attitudes, and more with crucial than with peripheral and preferential attitudes. Factors influential in beginning a religious vocation, therefore, are not necessarily equivalent to those that are influential in staying in and working effectively.

The fulfilment of personal needs, attitudes, and values by the vocational group happens (or does not) in varying degrees, giving rise to social and psychological consistencies and inconsistencies. Today, because of the many changes in vocational ideals, functions, and structures, subconscious psychodynamics are exerting a greater influence in the intrapersonal and interpersonal spheres of vocational life. In fact, therefore, attitudes coincide more with needs than with values, and a "myth of individuals in the name of 'holy personalism'" is replacing the previous "myth of institutions in the name of 'holy uniformity.'" Neither myth, however, helps to accomplish the process of internalizing values, and neither serves to integrate needs, attitudes, and values.

A sophisticated and thorough psychosocial theory of religious vocation is presented in this book, followed by applications of the theory to celibacy, leadership, and various facets of institutional life and community renewal. Rulla draws constantly and constructively from research data, and a major feature of his work is the amount of research and experimentation it is capable of generating in the future.

Joseph S. Dirr, S.J.


Eight essays which span 1923 to 1965, but the theme of the title aptly unites them. Although T. died seven years ago, his contemporary relevance is again vindicated. For example, in regard to the recent theology of hope, he anticipated not only one of Jürgen Moltmann's key insights, but also one of his phrases: "all utopias are negations of negation—the denial of what is negative in human existence" (p. 168, emphasis added; cf. p. 155). Another instance—the religious and political malaise of 1972 seems reflected in T.'s assessment of the situation in 1951: "But my own personal feeling is that today we live in a period in which the Kairos, the right time of realization, lies far ahead of us in the invisible future, and a void, an unfilled space, a vacuum surrounds us" (p. 180). I found T.'s essay "The Political Meaning of Utopia" especially stimulating. Although "utopian" is a bad word, people continue to write utopias, and perhaps many secretly harbor thoughts of one. T. accounts for this phenomenon when he points out: "to be man means to have utopia, for utopia is rooted in the being of man itself" (p. 167). Contemporary topics of interest such as power, the state, grace, religious socialism, and the Christian-Marxist dialogue are also treated.

Adams' introduction documents T.'s basic disagreement with three of his contemporaries: Heidegger, Bultmann, and Barth. The translation from T.'s difficult German is the work of
Adams, Victor Nuovo, and a team of collaborators; it is accurate and quite readable. In brief, the book does indeed “demonstrate the thesis that authentic ‘political expectation’ must be accompanied by a ‘political theology’ that is at the same time realistic, critical and boldly creative…” (p. xx).

Carl J. Armbruster


In this brief, breezy, how-to-do-it book K. gives a new twist to the old concern about Christian influence on the American movie industry. Not content with the old-style crusades, boycotts, and public censorship of films, he turns the other cheek and applies the balm of friendly persuasion. He reasons that the secular film is “a business enterprise ... exhibited commercially primarily to make a profit.” So, with a bow and a wink toward the capitalistic, profit motive, he thinks the best way to persuade the moviemen to produce the “better film” is to demonstrate at the box office that the preferable films can succeed as profitably as the quick-buck, low-standard flicks. To wield this persuasive box-office clout, the churches need to encourage their membership to patronize good movies as an organized body. K. advocates that this organization take the form of church-sponsored film-discussion groups. Their meeting place is the neighborhood theater, a new concept of encounter and sharing.

This slim volume will be of help to churchmen, educators, and other groups interested in rendering the film experience less individualistic and more a shared communal response. According to K., this could lead to a more positive, Christian influ-

Edward Welch, S.J.

BOOKS RECEIVED

[All books received are listed here whether they are reviewed or not]

SCRIPTURAL STUDIES


DOCTRINAL THEOLOGY


Thielicke, Helmut. Die geheime


HISTORICAL


MORAL, LAW, LITURGY


Shinn, Roger Lincoln. Wars and Rumors of Wars. Nashville: Abingdon,
198 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES

1972. Pp. 298. $5.95.


PASTORAL AND ASCETICAL


PHILOSOPHY


**SPECIAL QUESTIONS**


