BOOK REVIEWS


Among the many works on theological method, this one is outstanding in that it presents an original and internally consistent theory, systematically constructed according to a fully articulated philosophy of human knowing. In the first four chapters Lonergan sets forth the presuppositions of theology: he describes the dynamism of the human mind, explores the nature of method in general, and analyzes faith as "the knowledge born of religious love" (p. 115). The fifth chapter, central to the book, sets forth the eight functional specialties that are said to comprise theology. Then in eight additional chapters the author gives fuller explanations of each of these functional specialties.

Transcendental method provides the basic framework. L. holds that the human mind is governed by an unrestricted dynamism toward the fulness of truth, reality, and goodness, and that from this dynamism one can distil the transcendental notions of the true, the real, and the good. These notions, taken in reference to L.'s four levels of intentionality (experience, insight, judgment, and decision), yield four transcendental precepts: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, and be responsible. The criteria used in transcendental method are thus rooted in the very nature of the human mind. By obeying the transcendental precepts man progressively expands his horizons and undergoes a series of conversions—intellectual, moral, and religious—culminating in the experience of the love of God.

By concentrating on the unrestricted dynamism of religion, L. makes ample provision for pluralism in the realms of doctrine, systematics, and communication. Repeatedly he protests against a "classicism" that would absolutize some one particular culture with its thought-forms and categories, but with equal vigor he rejects a relativism that would cut off man's access to the absolute. Divisive pluralisms, he argues, are those that result from an absence of religious conversion or, in other words, from a failure to observe the transcendental precepts.

L.'s treatment of transcendental method is, in my estimation, very lucid and helpful. I wish, however, that he had been able to give more emphasis to the notion of mystery and to bring out the positive value of symbols for clarifying and intensifying the experience of mystery. L. is perhaps too confident of man's power to conceptualize the transcendent, including revelation, in an objectifying way and thus to move beyond symbol—a term he regularly uses in a pejorative sense as if
to indicate a rather primitive form of knowledge.

Theology, for L., is an ongoing process of mediating between the absolute as grasped in religious faith and the various cultural matrices in which man lives. In a Christian context, theology focuses on the revelation externally given in Jesus Christ. The necessity of attending both to the inner word of grace and to the outer word of historical testimony introduces an inevitable complexity into the theological task.

Within theology as a dynamic whole L. therefore sees fit to single out various phases and operations. First he distinguishes two phases—a lower phase in which one harkens to the past, and a higher phase in which the theologian, enlightened by the past, confronts the problems of his own world. Then within each phase L. differentiates four specialties corresponding to the four levels of intentionality mentioned above. This gives him eight specializations. In the first, or mediating, phase he names research (the assembling of the data), interpretation (the understanding of the data), history (the judgment as to what occurred), and dialectic (the study of conflicting tendencies). In the second, or mediated, phase faith plays a more direct role. This phase is divided into foundations, which objectifies the processes of conversion; doctrines, which establishes affirmations and negations based on the conversions; systematics, which seeks to clarify the meaning of doctrine; and communications, which leads persons to share in the Christian fellowship.

Although L. does not advocate watertight barriers, the value of his schematization depends upon the ability of each specialty to proceed with relative autonomy and without notable dependence upon its successors in the series of disciplines. The tendency of L.'s system is therefore to set up separations. In my opinion his system labors under three unhealthy separations.

In the first place, his system tends to harden unduly the division between positive theology (as indirect discourse) and speculative theology (as direct discourse). His assignment of disciplines such as hermeneutics and history to the first phase deprives them of the benefit of the conversions assigned to the second phase. Thus his notions of exegesis and historiography tend to minimize or exclude any specifically theological or Christian consideration of the meaning of texts and events, as contemplated by the light of faith. In his subsequent treatment of doctrines and systematics L. makes little provision for theological hermeneutics and for salvation history.

Secondly, the division of each of the two phases into four functional specializations, corresponding to the four levels of intentionality, seems arbitrary and restrictive. For example, the discipline of history is matched, for some reason, not with experience or understanding or
decision but with judgment. I fail to see why history has any more affinity with judgment than do the other disciplines of the first phase. So too on the second level, it seems gratuitous to connect doctrines with judgment and systematics with understanding. I cannot conceive what doctrine could be without understanding or what systematics could be without judgment, or why systematics and doctrines should be split apart into two disciplines. Least satisfying of all, in my opinion, is the pairing of communications as a functional discipline with experience, or the apprehension of data, on the ground that it “produces data in the present and for the future” (p. 135). In his discussion of communications L. says wisely that the Christian message aims to “crystallize the hidden inner gift of love into overt Christian fellowship” and to “direct Christian service to human society to bring about the kingdom of God” (p. 362). Communications, so conceived, would resemble the familiar discipline of pastoral or practical theology. In terms of L.’s scheme, this would most naturally be matched with the fourth intentional level, decision. But this level has already been preempted by the discipline known as foundations; thus communications has to be fitted into the still unfilled slot of “experience” or “data.” Or so it seems.

A third unfortunate separation pervading L.’s book is that of methodology from theology. He repeatedly avers that he writes not as a theologian but as a methodologist. On this ground he abstains from discussing the nature of revelation, the authority of Scripture, the Fathers, doctors, popes, councils, bishops, etc. While he evidently accepts conciliar pronouncements and staunchly adheres to the teaching of Vatican I, he provides no theory of the nature and limits of authority in theology. Granted that one’s views on authority will necessarily depend on one’s theory of revelation, Christology, and church, I am convinced that method in theology cannot be adequately treated without some attention to these questions. In theology as in other sciences, method and content are dialectically interdependent.

In summary, then, I believe that the theological community will greatly profit from L.’s presentation of transcendental method and from his treatment of points such as conversion, pluralism, culture, and society. His effort to distribute the work of theology into eight functional specialties will be studied with respect but will not, I think, win general acceptance. If used as an organizing principle for curricula and scholarly research, L.’s classifications would prove no less crippling than the current categories of field specialization and subject specialization.

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Avery Dulles, S.J.
CHRISTIANITY AND EVOLUTION. By Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. Trans­
lated from the French by René Hague. New York: Harcourt, Brace,

The nineteen essays which comprise this latest of English transla­
tions of T.'s collected writings are theological in accent and cover a
broad period running from 1920 to 1953. While many of the motifs which
recur in these pages will be familiar to readers of the numerous full-
scale studies of T.'s thought which appeared in the sixties, there none­
theless remains a sense of excitement and enthusiasm here which no
secondary source could hope to recover and communicate. So un-
shakably convinced is T. that he has seen something crucially important
both for the Church and for mankind at large that opposition to his
argument only stimulates him to intensify his efforts to make his point.
Strident at times, the essays still impress more for their conviction
and courage.

It is the apologetic note which sounds most consistently and insist­
ently throughout these largely tentative and exploratory papers. We
live in a new world today, a world defined by evolution, “neohumanism,”
and secularization, a world increasingly sensitive to the demands of
the human future and the responsibilities of man for the successful
outcome of that future. For Christians this means that a major over­
haul of inherited doctrine, tied as it is to an outmoded cosmology, is
long overdue. For T., three areas of theological reflection are pecu­
liarly in need of such reformulation: God, Christ, evil. While all three
come under scrutiny, the special fascination of this particular volume
lies in its treatment of the problem of evil as this comes to expression in
the Christian tradition in the doctrine of original sin and in the under­
standing of the cross.

The traditional representation of original sin proves antagonistic to
modern evolutionary thought both because of its monogenistic as­
sumptions and also because of its seeming supposition that the golden
age of mankind lay in the distant past. Furthermore, it tended to under­
mind human creativity and responsibility by encouraging a pessimistic
attitude towards human possibilities. For T., on the other hand, mono­
phyletic polygenism made a good deal more sense scientifically, as he
notes brashly enough in a short piece written just after the appearance
of Humani generis. Moreover, the golden age is, to his way of thinking,
better construed as an eschatological than a protological reality; indeed,
the great sin of mankind which the tradition placed at the beginning
is probably, he suggests several times, more accurately situated at the
end when ramification occurs for the last and decisive time. But how
overcome the pessimism associated with the doctrine? To accomplish
that, the Fall had to be contextualized within a much larger theological framework than was usual.

Repeatedly T. keeps returning to the insight that creation, fall, incarnation, and redemption are not separable acts only loosely conjoined; on the contrary, they are all to be understood as aspects of a single process of what he calls pleromization. God continually creates the world through a unifying process of ongoing self-immersion or self-incarnation; God is likewise everywhere redemptively present to this same creative process of evolution as it continually tends to fall back into the past of matter and multiplicity, thus resisting the upward climb towards the future of spirit and unity. Evil is the terrible price which inevitably has to be paid by a world undergoing spiritualization and unification, a world which is not finished from the start but whose task is to become complete in a drama of struggle, failure, growth, and ultimate victory. We have here a God at once involved and limited, a God who is united with His creatures in their struggle for completeness but who cannot simply remove the evil, suffering, and death which follow from the cosmogenetic character of the process itself. This universal process of pleromization becomes sacramentally focused in human history in Adam and in Christ, but it is at work everywhere, in nature as well as in history.

In such an approach the cross ceases to be meaningful as an act of reparatory atonement in the middle of history—God is, after all, everywhere at work to reconcile, the very activity of continuous unification is necessarily an activity of at-one-ment. As a result, T. keeps finding it impossible to incorporate the themes of reparation and expiation into his theology of the cross (as Christopher Mooney noted several years ago on the basis of these texts). For T. the cross is the great sacrament of suffering love as the key to the evolutionary process of unification. It is a sign of the tremendous struggle involved in growth and of the power of darkness in the journey to light; but what is more important, it is the great sign of victory and new life. The Crucified One for T., as for the Fathers, is the Christus victor. The whole of evolution is a way of the cross, as T. insists—a way of suffering love and victory, of loss and gain, of death and life.

Whatever the limitations of the man and his formulations (and his cavalier treatment here of other religious traditions in favor of the Catholic axis is really quite jarring today), T.'s unflagging dedication to the cause of the gospel in the modern world and his profound sense of the ever-active presence of the divine mystery in the whole of creaturely existence continue to impress as well as to influence our rethinking of Christian faith today. No other volume of his writings thus far pub-
lished, with the possible exception of *The Divine Milieu*, puts us into such direct touch with his specifically theological concerns as does this one.

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**Donald P. Gray**


There is often a special authority attached to the professional scientist’s views on religion. The reasons for this are not completely clear. But somehow people expect from the scientist a rigorous integrity and honesty of thought which will suffuse his convictions on subjects beyond his own specialty. This helps explain the appeal of contemporary writers like Ian Barbour and Charles Birch, scientists deeply involved in theology.

Peacocke, also a respected scientist, professor, and researcher, has made here an important and authoritative contribution to the question of science and Christianity. I think his work has a special weight and competence, if not originality, which deserves a respecting audition.

Insisting that his reflections have been formulated independently of Teilhard and process theologians, P.’s work exhibits a remarkable resemblance to the type of evolutionary Christology that one finds in Teilhard-inspired theology today, although the author seems completely unfamiliar with most of it. As a matter of fact, P.’s explicitly theological sources are limited largely to a few prominent British thinkers (predominantly Anglican) and to basic works on the Creed, Christian doctrine, and Christology. In neglecting the often nearly identical work of many other Catholic and Protestant theologians, P.’s work displays a distinct insularity from much Continental and American process theology. As a result, the reader may be tempted to say that P. is needlessly beginning from scratch in his solitary “rethinking” of the essentials of Christian faith in terms of modern science.

Nevertheless, it is not unrewarding to study such a foundational work. And its apparent isolation from similar studies now widely circulated does not altogether detract from its significance. In certain respects P.’s meticulous harmonization of his reflections with the rudiments of Christian confession deserves careful consideration. For example, there is a heavily Chalcedonian flavor throughout the theological sections of the book which in an unusually deliberate way delivers P.’s evolutionary theology from the typical apprehensions of the monophysitic or pantheistic on the one hand and the deistic or vitalistic alternatives on the other. The approach is thoroughly “or-
ganismic” but with specific emphasis on the diversity-in-unity of God and world epitomized in the Christological formulations of Chalcedon. A careful weaving of this Christology with Polanyi’s famous discussion of emergent evolution and with a somewhat novel treatment of the role of the Holy Spirit in the world process constitutes the distinctive solidity of P.’s moderate and urbane discussion.

The structure of this book is disconcertingly simple. The introduction is devoted to a comparison of the theological and scientific enterprises. The attempt to find parallels and methodological similarities between science and theology has been for some time the distinctive mark of other writers like the Oxford mathematician C. A. Coulson and the American physicist H. K. Schilling. Apparently P. considers such discussions as necessary preliminaries, but he wisely relativizes their importance. It seems, in any case, that the most such comparisons can accomplish is the demolition of naively drawn boundaries between science and religion. More attention to possible patterns of “functional complementarity” and less to isomorphic relations between the two might go further toward explaining their real unity.

The remainder of P.’s work is divided into two major parts, the first a summary of modern developments in the physical and life sciences, and the second an attempt to correlate this science with Christian faith. Stylistically this division weakens P.’s program. The scientific summary seems to be somewhat out of proportion, running some seventy-five pages without theological commentary. By the time the reader arrives at the second part, he is given the impression of having two books within one binding. This impression is augmented by the fact that the theological commentary can touch only superficially upon many of the problems implicit in the scientific section.

In spite of this diluting division, P.’s book is a successful study. While the listed price might curtail its circulation, it may prove to be a sound contribution to the general discussion of science and religion as well as to Christian theology.

**Georgetown University**

**JOHN F. HAUGHT**


This internationally best-selling monograph deals disproportionately with two concerns: first, to summarize the molecular theory of the genetic code which provides a purely physical explanation of heredity and thus the fundamental basis for biology; second, to read from the theory its implications for man’s situation in a universe governed by
chance and necessity, not by purpose. Modern science has been built on the postulate of objectivity, resolutely rejecting interpretations of reality in terms of final causes and purpose and relying instead on what M. typifies as the systematic confrontation of logic and experience. It is to this basis that we must return, he argues, and from which "scientifically warranted conclusions [must] be resolutely pursued to the point where their full meaning becomes clear" (p. xiii). The author's generalizing interest and astringent eloquence, together with his recognized stature in biochemistry, make his book compelling reading.

But it is also demanding. M. dismisses all "vitalisms" which imply a radical distinction between living beings and the inanimate world (Bergson, Elsässer, Polanyi) and condemns still more emphatically the "animisms" which espouse a universally oriented evolution culminating in man (Teilhard, dialectical materialism). He then devotes chaps. 3–5 to surveying the catalytic, regulatory, and constructive functions of proteins; all three functions are shown to depend upon the capacities of protein molecules for what is technically called stereospecific association. By subsequently explaining how stereospecific associative protein structures form and (in chaps. 6–8) the mechanisms by which they evolve, M. believes he has solved the paradox of apparently purposive functioning in nature: life does manifest teleology, or endowment with a project, but this consists most basically in the transmission from generation to generation of the invariance content characteristic of any given species; the primary essential of all living organisms is therefore their capacity for invariant self-reproduction. Whatever changes may be occasioned in species by random mutations, in other words, "all the properties of living beings rest on a fundamental mechanism of molecular invariance," and thus "for modern theory evolution is not a property of living beings, since it stems from the very imperfections of the conservative mechanism which indeed constitutes their unique privilege" (p. 116).

Now a good many biologists will question whether it is so clear that invariance is more crucial than teleonomy; a reciprocal relationship between the two would seem to be better warranted by a more cautious and less tendentious reading of the evidence. But M. insists on the priority of invariance, and so he roots purpose in necessity and every project in an object susceptible of quantitative analysis. The law of life is: "Randomness caught on the wing, preserved, reproduced by the machinery of invariance and thus converted into order, rule, necessity" (p. 98). It need scarcely be added that M. considers this law applicable as well to the human species, which is understood as another
unique and unpredictable product of selection. We bring with us to the biosphere a new kingdom of knowledge and culture, but we are indistinguishable from anything else in being the chance products which invariant mechanisms have so skillfully preserved.

If the logic which gives the primacy to necessitarian reproduction is not entirely satisfactory—the existence and effect of prolific mutations as the rule rather than the exception in large populations is simply taken as given by M.—it is not here but in the pursuit of his second concern that the Nobel laureate most disappoints us. Against what he considers a continued, hopeless compromise of scientific objectivity and mythological religiosity, he proposes his own alternative, an "ethic of knowledge." It is opposed to an understanding of religious experience which is as superficial as the author's analysis of chance. But its exact meaning, more importantly, is suggested to us prophetically rather than scientifically. Barring ethics, "in essence nonobjective" (p. 174), from the sphere of knowledge, M. tells us, on the one hand, that discourse or action can only be considered "meaningful, authentic" (the emphasis is his) when it clarifies and preserves the distinction between the two categories of knowledge and value; but, on the other, that the logical link which binds knowledge and values together is itself an ethical choice and not a judgment arrived at from knowledge. As a result, in a universe that can only be scientifically known in terms of objectivity, subjectivity is in fact what must ultimately guide us!

It serves little to label this recognition as authenticity. For the root principle of a new ethic one would hope for something more carefully and seriously defined. Here the logical thread woven throughout M.'s presentation will bear but a fraction of the weight put upon it, and whatever immense respect one may have for the biologist, one is strongly disinclined as yet to consider him a scientist of the human. It is thus his faith in science which is at once least original and least satisfying to a reader in the eighth decade of this century.

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Leo J. O'Donovan, S.J.


"The present volume is composed, with Heidegger's consent, of writings from various works, chosen because they fit together to bring out the main drift of his thinking that relates poetry, art, thought, and language to Being and to man's existing as the mortal he is" (p. xxiii). An accurate account. We need only point out the intrinsic relationship: poetry is the essence of language, while thought is Being's
coming to language; hence man should dwell "poetically" on this earth. The translator has done, in general, very careful work; he has also done all the poetry—probably with little choice, since H. comments on the words themselves.

After a group of H.'s own poems entitled "The Thinker as Poet" (Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens), we have the first, rather famous essay "The Origin of the Work of Art," not from Holzwege but in its modified version, printed separately by Reclam, with an introduction by Gadamer. It is unfortunate that Gadamer's article was not appended, especially since H. calls it a "crucial indication for the reader of my later writings." The essay begins: "Origin here means that from and by which something [Sache] is what it is and as it is." One would expect a thesis of abstract metaphysics; it may be metaphysical, it certainly is mystical and deceptively abstract. Though we shall, of course, end up with H.'s favorite poet Hölderlin, we first enter the interrelations of artist and work as within a greater whole called art. We enter the existential circle existing outside ordinary logic. An art work is a thing (Ding), and the nature of a thing is a theme throughout this volume. The work is symbol, it is language. Why so? In art, Truth is at work. "To let a being be as it is" (p. 31) is a theme often misunderstood, but now it is exquisitely worked out through a pair of peasant shoes of a van Gogh canvas.

The following essay, "What Are Poets for?", has special contemporary theological interest. Through the imagery of Hölderlin, we have the background for a better understanding of Nietzsche and for H.'s waiting for the naming of the holy as leading back to the Godhead: "The default [Fehl, cf. p. 184] of God means that no god any longer gathers men and things unto himself, visibly and unequivocally.... Not only have the gods and the god fled, but the divine radiance has become extinguished in the world's history" (p. 91). Much is clarified through Rilke: "The time remains destitute not only because God is dead, but because mortals are hardly aware and capable even of their own mortality.... Death withdraws into the enigmatic" (p. 96).

The next two essays, "Building Dwelling Thinking" and "The Thing," are complementary language approaches that provide one of the best accesses to H.'s thought. The first is an etymologico-cultural procedure. The title is without commas to reinforce sense unity. The link between build and dwell is to be, out of which come some favorite notions (cherish, protect, preserve, care for, cultivate) and finally the Fourfold (earth and sky, divinities and mortals). H. poetically defines the Fourfold, then clarifies it through the image of a bridge which
“gathers to itself in its own way” the Fourfold. Such a function is, etymologically (for H.), a “thing.” The bridge as “thing” says location that begins a presencing process; technē is “solely a letting appear.” And what is a “thing”? We have the next essay given over to one of the finest examples of phenomenological description. With only a “jug,” H. redoes all the foregoing on another level opening up to ultimate horizons. Though a good translation, one must keep in mind that “When we speak of the divinities...” (p. 178) renders nennen, the poet’s privilege. “When and in what way do things appear as things?” (p. 181)—“appear” here and in the next two sentences renders kommen. This term relates to “thinging” as “the nearing of world” (ibid.) and connotes H.’s “zu Wort/zur Sprache kommen” which links with “nennen” (p. 198).

In the essay “Language” (pp. 189 ff.) H. asks “What is to speak?” Out of a Trakl poem he brings together his previous thinking in terms of what he calls “world.” “Things be-thing—i.e., condition—mortals.” But this world is “now no longer used in the metaphysical sense. It designates neither the universe of nature and history in its secular representation nor the theologically conceived creation (mundus), nor does it mean simply the whole of entities present (kosmos).” We move now into the heart of the “late” H.: the difference “disclosingly appropriates [ereignet] world into the granting of things” (p. 203). But the difference is called by being left unspoken. Yet it commands us in “the old sense of ‘Commit thy way unto the Lord’”—“command” renders both Befehlen (p. 206) and Geheiss (p. 207). And language is the ongoing happening of “the difference for world and things.” Mortal speech corresponds to a call out of the difference. Hence, “what is important is learning to live in the speaking of language.” So ends the essay, apophatically, if not prophetically.

What does it mean? We have a hint in ordinary German: “everyday language is a forgotten and therefore used-up poem, from which there hardly resounds a call any longer” (p. 208). And Hölderlin, friend of Hegel, would seem to be another. One of his lines is the title for the last essay: “... Poetically Man Dwells...,” sc., on this earth. Dwelling, building, and man’s existence copenetrate one another when man learns “to respect language’s own nature” (p. 215). In this way we learn to think authentically as “Language beckons us...” sc., winkt uns: it points out to us... what? The way, we would imagine, the same one of the essays entitled “On the Way to Language.”

No doubt, this essay steps down from the heights of the previous; its theme comes from a 1936 lecture: “Poetry does not fly above and surmount the earth in order to escape it and hover over it. Poetry is
what first brings man onto the earth, making him belong to it, and thus brings him into dwelling” (p. 218). For the reader who persevered through the prior essay, something comes out: the poet overcomes alienation from the familiar, the trusted, and the far so that “God” is revealed in the near. But what existentiel weight we should give to this entire process remains the signifying, unspoken—or is it “unsaid”?—word of Heidegger.

St. Peter’s College, N.J. R. H. Cousineau, S.J.


This first book by MacKinnon sets forth a stimulating and interesting program for the possible development of Christian theology along lines suggested by current analytic work in epistemology and the philosophy of science. In this approach to the reformulation of theology, M. is a somewhat lonely pioneer, since very few people have professional training in and sympathy with both analytic philosophy of science and the Catholic theological tradition. His enterprise is bound to be a difficult one; for much recent Catholic theology has been antimeta-physical and antiscientific in spirit, and much recent analytic philosophy has adopted empiricist and materialistic views which seem to preclude the possibility of construing theological claims on lines parallel to scientific claims. Nonetheless, “no group within the Christian tradition has ever laid as much stress on the truth of propositions as Roman Catholicism” (p. 132). So M.’s central theme, the analysis of the notion of truth, is of vital importance to any Catholic effort to reinterpret the traditional claims of theology.

M.’s exposition of this central theme is worked out in four lectures, originally given in 1968 as the Hecker Lectures at the Wayne State University Newman Center in 1968 but now considerably expanded. The first provides a clear and useful general introduction to the problem of truth in the history of science and in theology. The second puts forward an analysis of truth for which M. claims the label “ontological pragmatism” (p. 55) and which aims to be “a synthesis (of sorts) of Bernard Lonergan’s theory of judgment, a pragmatic theory of acceptance, derived chiefly from Quine and Sellars, and Dewey’s stress on the role of inquiry” (p. 53). This lecture also includes an interesting appendix on truth in Aquinas and Heidegger. The third deals with the problem of truth in science and is an effort to combine the recently increased sensitivity of philosophers of science to the epistemological problems presented by revolutions in science and by
changes in conceptual frameworks with Sellars’ criticisms of the “myth of the given” and with a critical realism about the status of theoretical entities. The last lecture, of most direct interest to theologians, takes up the problem of truth in theology. Theologians should, however, find M.’s general treatment of philosophical problems in the first three lectures both informative and enlightening, since these provide a good overview of some specialized but important recent discussions in analytic philosophy which go beyond both logical positivism and the later Wittgenstein. This overview, however, is marred by a certain carelessness about matters of detail. Thus, contrary to M.’s suggestion, the positivists made verification a criterion of meaning, not of truth (p. 14). There are similar misstatements in M.’s comments on Quine (p. 16) and Strawson (p. 46).

In the beginning of his fourth lecture, M. dismisses the earlier analytic discussion of the meaningfulness of religious language; but his comments on John Wisdom’s “Gods” (p. 130) show an almost complete misreading of that important essay. But M. rightly wants to raise the theologically more interesting question of the analysis of “what is involved in accepting theological propositions as true” (p. 133). The central feature of his analysis is a qualified parallelism between factual claims and scriptural claims, between empirical generalizations and creedal or conciliar affirmations, and between theoretical statements in science and in theology. The working out of this parallelism and its application to claims about the divinity of Jesus give M. an excellent opportunity to expound the difficulties involved in any serious rethinking of theology which attempts to preserve “covariance under conceptual transformation” and “consistency with other aspects of the Christian tradition” (p. 156). Here M. shows admirable sensitivity to the complexity of the issues involved and commendable honesty in facing difficulties.

More than this he cannot do at present; for, in the absence of an account of faith and revelation, the parallelism between truth in science and truth in theology is bound to seem forced and misleading; and the notions of mystery and of acceptance of theological propositions remain obscure. Furthermore, in the absence of a program for metaphysics, it is not clear whether any sort of Christian theology on the lines M. envisions is possible. M. needs to make clear what, if any, a priori restrictions he wants to place on possible theological statements and what procedures he will propose for adjudicating conflicts between the claims of theological tradition and those of scientific realism in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. Nonetheless, M. has
opened up an important set of questions and has made a clearly im-
portant contribution to dialogue between analytic philosophy and
Catholic theology.

University of Michigan

JOHN P. LANGAN, S.J.

BASIC QUESTIONS IN THEOLOGY 2. By Wolfhart Pannenberg. Translated

This second volume of P.'s collected essays on fundamental the­
ology is in every way as good as the first (TS 32 [1971] 504–6). The
future continues to be the key to his thought as he explores the re­
lation of faith to reason, the history of religions, and the question of
God. He handles the Western philosophical and theological heritage
with facility and maturity. One might, however, be willing to trade a
small amount of this scholarly breadth for more sense of the immediacy
and texture of contemporary life.

P.’s first essay compares the Greek and Hebrew notions of truth.
The latter is shown to include the former, which offers only an “abridged
view of reality.” Western man has gradually moved toward the He­
brew notion because it allows more fully for subjectivity and his­
toricity. Hegel came closer than others to the nature of truth, but
failed to see that the future, which is never closed, is finally regulative
of truth. The second and third essays argue that faith must be some­
how grounded on fact and reason. This in no way eliminates God’s role
in faith, since what is believed in comes from God. Rather, P. regards
any arbitrary leap of faith as a form of self-salvation, inasmuch as it
grounds faith in itself, putting the emphasis on one’s own act rather
than on “being won over by the truth of the message.” “The con­
vincingness of the Christian message can stem only from its contents”
(p. 35). Finally, faith and reason are both futural in character—the
former especially so.

The fourth essay is a prolegomenon to a Christian approach to world
religions. A strictly kerygmatic and a purely phenomenological
methodology are equally ruled out as inadequate: the former because
it permits no self-questioning, the latter because it tends to replace
history with atemporal typologies. The unity of the history of religions
is to be sought not in their origins, which are diverse, but in their end
(the future). The central problem is the competition between total
views of reality. What is the truth-content of varying religious exper­
iences? “Absolute truth can only belong to a specific religion, if to any
at all” (p. 97, n. 41). The only way around the Feuerbachian critique
of religious experience as illusion is to show that the divine “proves
itself powerful” in terms relevant for contemporary human experience. Since the divine appearance is necessarily always historic, there is a history of appearances. A history of anything will involve change, transformations. The strength of Christianity lies in its ability to remain open to the future of its own transformations. Religions oriented toward their own past, toward the primordial and archetypal, have difficulty understanding their own transformations, and hence can miss the divine manifested precisely in those transformations.

The last four chapters deal with the problem of God. Chap. 5 is a long discussion of the patristic appropriation and critique of Hellenistic philosophy. Against Harnack and others, P. feels that it was altogether fitting—in view of the universalistic claims of Christianity—for theologians to assimilate philosophical speculations about God. But Greek ideas, notably the quest for the “true form of the divine,” were never accepted uncritically by the Fathers, even if their critique was not radical enough. It was necessary to shift the emphasis from God as origin of things to God as “creative source of the ever new and unforeseen.” The task remains today of understanding God’s “immutability” in a qualified way so as to allow more fully for His freedom and continuing creativity. Among the Fathers, P. gives first place (above the Alexandrians) to Irenaeus for stressing God’s relation to history as well as His incomprehensibility.

Chap. 6 explores the typical features of three forms of modern atheism. Behind Feuerbach, Nietzsche, and Fichte lies the atheism of human freedom, “man as an absolutely self-empowered being.” But, thinks P., atheism’s thrust is only against the traditional concepts of God; a new sense of the “hiddenness of God,” God revealed as unknown, will help theology find a way around its problems. The next chapter considers the question of God with reference to existentialism and nihilism. The “so-called proofs” for the existence of God are to be taken only as “elaborations of the questionableness of finite being,” but to that extent they are indeed useful. The last chapter, “The God of Hope,” continues these trains of thought and stresses again the role of the future in theology. The coming kingdom of God is hidden and unknown precisely because of its futurity: and this future is dependent on God’s freedom, not on the causal conditions of the present. The message of Jesus, as Weiss and Schweitzer have reminded us, is eschatological, and turns us away from “a thinking oriented toward the mythical origins of the primordial age.” Linked with God’s power over the future is His personal character. Against Feuerbach, P. holds that our notion of person and human dignity is derived from our religious experience of God, not vice versa.
P. inspires confidence because he constantly shows his awareness of the difficulties for theology and theism raised by modern thought. If one must criticize his fine effort, perhaps the place to begin is with the all-important concept of the "future." I would like to call attention to the discussion of time, near the end of Nabokov's novel Ada, which tries to cast doubt on the whole notion of "future." For Nabokov, only the past and the present have reality; the future is a chimera. Nabokov might not, in the end, be right; but the theologian should at least be aware that one highly sensitive critique of the "future" has been given.

Atlanta, Ga.  

Anselm Atkins


Burkle, Hick, and Owen share a common concern and their recent books raise a common question. The common concern is for the present state of the philosophy of religion and Christian theology, while the common question raised implicitly by both B. and O. and rather more explicitly by H. is the relationship of technical philosophical thought to Christian religious belief. In spite of these similarities, which make it appropriate to consider all three books together, there remain considerable dissimilarities. B.'s book is a study of the idea of God in the thought of Hegel, Sartre, and Henry Duméry. He sees all three sharing a common antitheistic point of view which is specified in their denial of existence to God. This denial of existence takes place in quite different ways. Hegel's denial is found in his position that God's actuality is as a product of human consciousness. Sartre's denial is discovered not in his professed atheism but rather in seeing Sartre's concept of the Pour soi (as contentless nonactual freedom), something which holds in Sartre's system a position similar to the concept of God in traditional theist systems. Duméry's denial of God's existence is found in his insistence that God has nothing whatsoever in common with creation. B. believes this denial of existence is based upon an incorrect understanding of existence, particularly in the area of divine omnipotence and human freedom. His response is to re-establish a traditional meaning of existence (involving actuality, substantiality,
P. inspires confidence because he constantly shows his awareness of the difficulties for theology and theism raised by modern thought. If one must criticize his fine effort, perhaps the place to begin is with the all-important concept of the "future." I would like to call attention to the discussion of time, near the end of Nabokov's novel *Ada*, which tries to cast doubt on the whole notion of "future." For Nabokov, only the past and the present have reality; the future is a chimera. Nabokov might not, in the end, be right; but the theologian should at least be aware that one highly sensitive critique of the "future" has been given.

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experienceability, etc.) and then to understand that God's relationship to the world is not that of an antagonistic, all-powerful external agent but rather that of a transcendent principle of being who has created the world and continues to act immanently as "persuader."

The works by H. and O. are companion volumes in Herder and Herder's Philosophy of Religion series. H.'s book examines the principal arguments put forth to prove the existence of the God of ethical monotheism, while O. examines concepts of God found in classical Christian theism as well as those found in Neoplatonism, pantheism, and process theology. O. is easily the most traditionally oriented of the three authors under discussion here, taking the line that classical Christian theism is still the system best able to provide an understanding of God and His relationship to creation. While O. would agree with B. that divine existence is one of the areas in which contemporary thinkers disagree, he does not see it as a crucial factor. For him the questions of immutability, impassibility, and personality are the critical problem areas, as well as the very areas where classical Christian theism is the least inadequate and the least illogical. H., in covering the arguments from design, the moral arguments, and the cosmological and ontological arguments, concludes that none of the traditional arguments for the existence of God is logically conclusive, and retreats to a defense of Christian belief in the existence of God as something that is reasonable even though strict proofs cannot be adduced.

It is H.'s book that raises the question of the relationship of technical philosophical thought to Christian belief, although this question is implied (or begged) by the others. In reading both B. and O., it is difficult, if not impossible, to avoid asking if a correct understanding of existence (divine or other) or the internal logic of the concept of God are the critical areas for investigation. H.'s view is that religious belief does not require a demonstration, but that such belief (e.g., belief in the existence of God) can be considered reasonable provided that it arises from an experience that has a voluntary and compelling quality and that by living on the basis of the belief further experiences confirm that one is living in relation to reality rather than to illusion. H. thus sees religious belief as analogous to our common (but undemonstrable) conviction that there is a real world external to and independent of ourselves. The question for the philosopher of religion is one of the verifiability and falsifiability of religious beliefs, but, as H. has contended elsewhere, religious beliefs are open only to eschatological verification. What one must settle for is the recognition that religious beliefs are in principle verifiable and falsifiable (eschatologically) and
that any religious belief is reasonable provided it meets the double test mentioned above. Other philosophical pursuits, such as those which B. and O. engage in, are, however interesting as logical exercises, not only attempts to prove the unprovable but rather beside the point religiously in so far as they assume that the present state of religious thought can be improved by better concepts. It is precisely the reference of "better" here which is questionable, since the concepts are in service of the experience and thus cannot be judged by some presently obtainable universal norm. If one hopes to change another thinker's concepts or to reveal their inadequacy, one must first look to change his experience.

Religious experience thus obtains primacy over philosophico-theological concepts. If this view is correct, it would seem that Christian theological thought would be well advised to become less argumentative and more persuasive, even more rhetorical in the style of Augustine, Luther, or Teilhard de Chardin. It might also judge new concepts in terms of their consequences in ongoing experience. For the present time at least, somewhat less intellectual argument about the concept of God and considerably more effort to evoke the experience of the presence of God is in order.

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G. Michael McCrossin


This is a quasi-popular synthesis of biblical, patristic, and Thomistic ecclesiology, with particular reference and application to the four notes of the Church. Congar did most of the book between 1963 and 1965 while also considerably engaged in the business of Vatican II. He revised portions of the material in the winter of 1969-70 in order to take some of the conciliar documentation into account, but he admits that a thorough revision was impossible because the German translation had been completed by that time.

Some of the material has already been published elsewhere (see p. 9, n. 1) and a few of the topics have received fuller treatment in several of C.'s other books and articles (e.g., La Tradition et les traditions [2 vols.; Paris, 1960 and 1963] and various essays in the DTC). Consequently, the final product, although characteristically solid in historical scholarship, is not one of C.'s stronger works.

C.'s approach to three of the notes is consistent with his usual theological method. He traces the history of the notions of holiness, catholicity, and apostolicity from their NT origins, through the
Fathers and St. Thomas, into recent and contemporary theological discussion. Helpful syntheses occur at several points, but one gains the impression here and there that the book has been put together from assorted pieces of various sizes rather than as a single, coherent project. More than forty percent of the book, e.g., is devoted to unity, another thirty percent to apostolicity, and the rest is sparingly divided among holiness, catholicity, and a concluding chapter on the apologetical value of the notes themselves.

The discussion of unity concentrates largely upon the theology of communion (pp. 49–62). C. speaks here of the mutual presence of the local church in the Church universal, and vice versa. However, it is not simply a matter of the whole in the part or the part in the whole. C. rejects two extreme solutions to the problem of ecclesial unity: the Eucharistic ecclesiology of the local church as proposed by N. Afanesieff and A. Schmemann, and the apologetically-oriented ecclesiology of Bellarmine and those other Catholic theologians who have tended to exaggerate the function of the papacy (sub uno capite) as the basis of unity.

Holiness and sinfulness, C. insists, are both structural and personal. Reform must reach not only the life of the Church's members but ecclesiastical forms as well. Here we find echoes of C.'s earlier, courageous work Vraie et fausse réforme dans l'église (Paris, 1950; new ed., 1969). Catholicity, on the other hand, is not simply an extension of unity but concerns the assimilation of particularities without their concurrent or consequent destruction. Apostolicity he links with catholicity, proposing that fidelity to the apostolic mission is signified by the accord which a local church has with the other churches. While C. adopts a fairly conservative apologetical approach to the primacy and Petrine succession (pp. 224–53), he nevertheless rejects the apologetic of those who, following Cajetan and Bellarmine, divorce the pope from the episcopal college and make him into a monarch (pp. 264 ff.).

The four notes, C. concludes, exist in one another by a kind of circumcession (pp. 261–2).

C.'s arguments are occasionally oversimplified: the Church is one because God is one (p. 14), the Church is holy insofar as it is of God (p. 129), etc. He suggests here and there (e.g., pp. 13, 15, 65) that the notes are to be understood eschatologically, but the eschatological horizon never really functions as a consistent influence on the separate discussions. Where it does enter the scene, the concept of eschatology seems unduly limited (especially in the fifth and weakest chapter, pp. 255–67).

C.'s approach to the problem of heresy is primarily historical
(pp. 85–121). He does not seem to take into sufficient account some of the more recent discussion on doctrinal pluralism and the relationship between faith and the formulations of faith (except pp. 115–20). Nevertheless, he does reject the relatively modern application of the distinction between formal and material heresy to Protestants: they are not even material heretics (p. 102). C. prefers the term "dissidents" and suggests that Vatican II includes them in the Church (p. 104).

The book contains a representative French-language bibliography, but there is no index.

Apparently there will be no English translation of this work. Herder and Herder had to abandon its translation and publication of the Mysterium salutis series. Only three volumes had appeared by the time the project was aborted. This is unfortunate, because C.'s book, its minor deficiencies notwithstanding, would be useful for introductory courses in ecclesiology.

Boston College

Richard P. McBrien


Is religious faith definable in empirical terms that can be observed, measured, and tested by the tools of the behavioral sciences? Is there an observable and definable development in the religious capacity of man such as there is in his biological and intellectual capabilities? These and related questions have stimulated thousands of research studies in the Judeo-Christian tradition over the past seventy-five years. Research is the product of the first major attempt in the field of the social scientific study of religion to comprehensively and systematically locate these researches and critically evaluate them so as to provide an authoritative assessment of past achievements and a trustworthy basis for further research.

Edited by Strommen, Research is sponsored by the Religious Education Association and is the result of consistent interaction and cooperation over a two-year period among 50 scholars, 23 of whom have authored the 22 chapters. Although the organizing theme of the volume is religious development, each author has been given the freedom to define both religion and development in his own way. This fact in itself illustrates the complex and difficult nature of research in this area. It is as yet impossible for authorities in the field to agree on the empirical definitions of the most basic terms.

The contributors are primarily psychologists whose training is in the field of research and who are open to the faith dimension of religion.
The task of each "was to sift through what he found, discard the worthless, evaluate the validity of the best, and then organize the bits and pieces into a meaningful mosaic." In response to this task, some authors have done critical reviews, others have attempted to supply "a theoretical framework for more systematic and finely differentiated research," and still others have "tried to acquaint investigators with the range of research in a given field, with less attention given to criticism of the studies." Some have made a serious attempt to deal with the concept of religious development, others have merely used it as an heuristic device to initiate their reviews.

The task of compiling a comprehensive research handbook is immense. It would seem that this volume is morally comprehensive in terms of what is now possible. One might ask, however, if research from non-English-speaking areas of the world is as thin as this volume seems to indicate. One might ask, further, about the coverage of research done on Jewish religious development. Although the volume by no means omits non-English-speaking, Catholic, or Jewish research, its profile is decidedly American and Protestant. Perhaps the American Protestant community has been more research-minded than others.

The six-part volume covers a vast range of topics: (1) Religion and Research; (2) Personal and Religious Factors in Religious Development; (3) Religion, Personality, and Psychological Health; (4) Dimensions of Religious Development; (5) Religious Development by Age Grouping; (6) Research in Religious Education. The range of observations runs from reports of "peak experiences" and of transcendent contacts with forces and beings beyond the everyday sensory world at one extreme, to counting the frequency of church attendance or checking off agreement or disagreement with questionnaire items about God, Christ, miracles, etc. at the other. Strommen has written a concise and frank evaluative introduction to the volume, as well as an introduction to each of the separate sections. These, together with his introductory abstracts before each chapter and the many cross references he provides, enhance the volume's unity and usefulness.

Space does not permit a chapter-by-chapter review, but several of the chapters bear special mention. Dittes has two chapters of significance. Although this volume does not center around a unified definition of religion, Dittes (chap. 3) develops an empirical case for distinguishing two types of believers: consensual and committed. This distinction helps place much of the discussion in the remaining chapters in perspective. In a companion chapter (9) Dittes analyzes the connection between his two types of believers and prejudice. He brings
needed refinement into this perplexing area. Fairchild’s analysis of delayed gratification from a psychological and religious point of view (chap. 5) is provocative at this time when many are concerned with immediate experience and fulfilment in religious culture and secular. To the critical question of faith and belief Spilka (chap. 13) brings a comprehensive and critical review of what social science holds as certain. He concludes that it holds very little, because research methodology and theory have been so poorly developed. Elkind (chap. 17) provides a helpful framework for understanding the research that has been conducted by men like Goldman and Piaget on the development of religious understanding in children and adolescents.

Research is primarily a reference handbook for professional researchers in the psychology of religious development. Theologians will find a sympathetic yet critical review of the problems involved in trying to arrive at a “fit” between theologically defined concepts of religion and empirically defined concepts. Professional religious educators will find few readily usable conclusions for the classroom, but a thorough introduction to the difficulties and complexities involved in trying to provide a solid empirical basis for programs in religious education.

Teachers College, N.Y.C. DONALD C. HORRIGAN


Suspect Tenderness is a lively, readable reflection on the ethics of resistance centering around the events leading up to and following the capture of Daniel Berrigan, S.J., on Block Island in 1970. Stringfellow and Towne provided sanctuary for the fugitive priest and were subsequently indicted by the Federal Government for harboring a criminal. The book is a collage of transcripts, sermons, documents, impressions, and thoughtful reminiscences. It opens with a preface by Berrigan himself “speaking from the Underground,” a taped sermon which he sent to the Chaplain of Smith College for a service he could not attend. The rest of the book is divided into four sections: a fascinating flesh-and-blood narrative of the events leading to the capture; an anthology of four pieces on the Berrigan witness as theology; an exploration of the
meaning of hope and the exercise of conscience in the context of resistance, in that collective which Dan Berrigan referred to as the "community of risk"; an appendix of statements and legal documents surrounding the indictment of Stringfellow and Towne and the subsequent dismissal of the case.

_Suspect Tenderness_ is no formal ethical treatise. Yet, it is a personal account that says much about the ethics of commitment which puts the believer in a position of personal jeopardy. The tension between the ethics and action is really the underlying theme. Both Towne and Stringfellow found that their association with the fugitive priest led them to a deeper commitment to the values which the Berrigans professed and lived out. The book provides an interesting insight into that community of risk of which the authors by their complicity had become a part.

_Civil Disobedience and Political Obligation_ is the other side of ethics which is not the substance nor the intent of _Suspect Tenderness_. It is a scholarly work complete with footnotes and the tight reasoning of a young and accomplished theologian, the outgrowth of a dissertation completed at Yale in 1968.

Childress is careful about definitions and distinctions. He defines civil disobedience as "a public, non-violent submission of law as a form of protest." In chap. 1, "The Concept of Civil Disobedience," he states clearly that the civil disobedience should not be confused with revolution or should not be construed as only one facet of a larger reality which is revolution. Although the two phenomena have much in common, they are different. Both should be seen as species of political resistance. Revolution raises a somewhat different question of justification.

In chap. 2, "Bases of Political Obligation: Natural Law and the Ends of the State," C. begins to weave an analytic framework for the evaluation of civil disobedience. He contends that "nothing is gained in theoretical clarity, moral guidance or psychological support for criticism and resistance by defending natural law as a theory of law," although he admits that his own position could be construed as one form of natural law. Nor does he find much help in some Protestant alternatives to natural law, theories which concentrate on the ends and functions of the state and do not adequately distinguish between "the reasons for government in general and the reasons for my obedience to the laws of this particular state."

C. finds that an element in political obligation in a constitutional democracy which might be of some use in discussing political obligation is the duty of fair play. Fairness is a fundamental moral notion which prompts the individual to recognize the other person as a person. It is
justice expressed in competitive and co-operative practices. "Fairness sets the limits on the ways we attempt to achieve ends in social and political activities." The duty of fair play may be essential for understanding of political obligation in a relatively just order, although it alone is not sufficient for decisions about obedience, since other obligations may conflict with it. For civil disobedience to be justified, certain aspects must be considered: the legitimacy of the cause, the means used, the consequences of the action on other people, the expectations or probability of success. Does it really communicate as a symbolic act? Some of the categories applied to civil disobedience are similar to the norms enunciated in the traditional just-war doctrine. C. suggests that the demands of fairness require submission to the law once the law has been violated, although he is quick to add that "this requirement, like that of obedience itself, is not absolute." He sees the resistance of the Berrigans to arrest and punishment as "more symbolic than actual."

Civil Disobedience is not a handbook for the practitioner. It does, however, offer a framework for serious analysis of a defined problem area, civil disobedience, in relatively just constitutional democracies. Caesar and God is also a book about the sacred and the secular by a man who has had one foot in each during most of his clerical life. Vekemans, a Belgian-born Jesuit sociologist and theologian, has founded and directed a number of social research and action centers in Latin America. He draws upon men like Rahner, Schillebeeckx, and Metz to weave his own sociopolitical theology. The book is mostly a development of his view of Church and state which leads up to a discussion of the priest and politics in a final, rather brief chapter.

According to V., the priest must tread a delicate path in order to engage realistically in the political order while remaining authentic to his priestly vocation. "A priest engaged in politics will never become leaven, nor will the priest who stands aloof from it." Life style is an important factor for the successful integration of both the priestly and the political. The priest must avoid the pitfalls of both clericalism and angelism in order to establish a true solidarity with the human community in all of its aspects, including its political life.

Center for the Study of Power and Peace  PATRICK P. McDERMOTT
Washington, D.C.


For the past several years a team specializing in orienting North American missionaries destined for Latin America has been conducting
courses at the Instituto Boliviano de Estudio y Acción Social (IBEAS) in La Paz, Bolivia. Employing an interdisciplinary approach, this team conducted sessions relating to the history, sociology, political science, economics, and sociocultural anthropology of Latin America. Because of the great success of these courses as well as the encouraging feedback they received from experienced missionaries, the authors decided to publish this second edition of *An Orientation to Latin America*.

Since the book's point of view is always that of a North American coming for the first time to the Latin American culture, the authors' efforts are geared more to facilitating healthy adjustment to life and work than to communicating almanac-type statistics. Hence the book is more a manual for adaptation than a scholar's *vade mecum* on Latin America. The authors approach their subject by dividing it into six parts, and in each they have sought to provide a sharp schematic overview of Latin America.

In the section on "Cultural Considerations," C. H. Geraets devotes two chapters to sociocultural values. Because these two sections go so far in aiding the North American's psychosocial adjustment to Latin America, they alone make it worth investing in the book. North Americans especially have to be ever conscious that the Latin American way of life is more personal than purposeful. Keeping this insight in mind can assist them in fathoming why so much is made of a native's name, background, and personality, and so little is made of his productivity, achievements, and training.

In the section on the Church in Latin America, Jordan Bishop gives a descriptive analysis of the Church's emergence from colonial times to the present, post-Medellin generation. Missionaries who envision themselves as agents of social change would do well to assimilate what he has written. One hopes that B.'s analysis can somehow prevent missionaries from adding to the membership of the vanquished clergy in Latin America. One idea of B.'s that deserves mention is his insistence (and here he echoes the thesis of the sociologist Ivan Vallier) that "any true social transformation of Latin American society is conditioned on the religious renewal of the Roman Catholic Church" (p. 269).

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**FRANCIS GILLESPIE, S.J.**


Houtart is convinced that Christianity does contain a message which is valid for the whole of mankind in its search for liberation. It is precisely this conviction which brings him to concern himself with the basic ques-
tion of the book: Why is it that Christianity historically finds itself in opposition to the movements which attempt to give concrete expression to this liberation and almost always identifies itself with the forces of oppression? By analyzing the role of the Church during the French Revolution of 1789 and then during the Paris riot of 1968, its role in pre-Castro Cuba and in the Colombia of Camilo Torres, as well as its role in Angola and now in the Vietnamese war, Houtart and Rousseau seek to throw critical light on this question.

The Church referred to in The Church and Revolution is the Roman Catholic Church, and some of the main reasons listed for her traditional resistance towards movements for social change are: lack of an objective critique of the human condition; concern not to antagonize its conservative members; its lack of a theology of political involvement; its traditional function as guarantor of the social system legitimized by religion (an order willed by God); fear for the survival of pastoral institutions; horror before the ambiguity of the revolutionary process and the violence it almost always entails.

The method employed is basically a sociological description that relates religion to six movements of social action. It is the authors' conclusion that the Church suffers from a blind spot: she has traditionally lacked a scientific reading of the physical, social, and psychological universe. They submit that in the future she has to concern herself much more with compiling and interpreting hard sociopolitical data. Again and again they call attention to a fundamental weakness stemming from the abstractions of so many hierarchical statements: these so often confine themselves to an analysis of the spiritual shortcomings of society and seldom furnish a sociopolitical analysis that digs at the root causes of prevailing unrest. Rarely do such documents issue a challenge to the system; they seem content to place the blame on a "crisis of civilization." They seem myopic in the face of the internal contradictions pervading the economic and social system—so much so that in one instance the authors imply that the overwhelmingly ideological interpretation placed on events tended to alleviate the anxiety of Christians, thus dispensing them from action (p. 291). H.-R. insist that only by critically investigating sociopolitical reality can the Church make out a credible plea for its goals, values, and norms, and overcome Christians' "incorrigible lack of any real analytic thought" (p. 300). They feel especially strong about the need for sociological input into the theologian's theory of social change—lest it become nothing more than "a system of concepts which, recognizing no scientific criterion other than semantic coherence, takes itself as the yardstick rather than measuring itself against facts" (p. 310).
If more positive attitudes within the Church towards movements of liberation are to be fostered, H.-R. insist that the Church (1) equip herself with a political theology (theory and praxis) and (2) acquire an expertise in scientific (sociopolitical) methodology.

Woodstock College, N.Y.C. FRANCIS GILLESPIE, S.J.


These fascicles conclude Vol. 7 of DS. As usual, hardly any contribution is without some significance, but a handful of major articles call for specific mention. God’s indwelling (cols. 1735–67), as the aspect of the Christian mystery which touches spiritual perfection more intimately than any other, is seen in its scriptural sources and given theological reflection (complex problematic, main opinions of theologians, Aquinas) by Roberto Moretti, while Guy-M. Bertrand illustrates the doctrine from the experience of mystics, specifically Teresa of Avila and Marie Guyard (Marie de l’Incarnation). Today’s Christian will find suggestive material in François Bussini’s treatment of inquiétude (1776–91), “a kind of interior instability caused by dissatisfaction, deception, uncertainty, or threat.” Heinz-Joachim Fischer’s treatment of “intention” (1838–58) omits the philosophical aspects (e.g., Husserl, Scheler, Hartmann) and the sacramental, to focus on practical applications (e.g., offering of good works) and on the theoretical question of intention as factor of moral value in a given act, its intimate relation to Christian existence. Maurice Nédoncelle deals masterfully with interiority (1877–1903), asking of Scripture the “place” of spiritual encounter with God, then studying interiority as a method and as a state. The article on “spiritual intoxication” (2312–37) by Aimé Solignac traces this rich expression from the Fathers to the eighteenth century—no further because thenceforth it would be little more than a useful metaphor.

There is a fascinating article by Jean Gribomont on the place and meaning of the patriarch Isaac in the early history of spirituality (1987–2005), as well as a useful treatment of the Book of Isaiah by Luis Alonso-Schökel (2060–79). The long article on Irenaeus of Lyons (1923–69) analyzes with scrupulous care the data for his life and writings, with precious information on the manuscript tradition and editions of Adversus haereses (Louis Doutreleau); his spiritual doctrine (Lucien Regnault) is treated under the rubrics of the economy of salvation (creation, OT revelation, Incarnation and recapitulation, New Eve) and the spiritual and perfect man (initial perfection, spiritual progress, completion of
salvation). Regnault sees Irenaeus offering the laity "an optimistic spirituality which does not flee the world or scorn the goods of earth, a spirituality of incarnation which sees in the body not a barrier to salvation but a masterpiece of divine artistry, a broad and all-embracing spirituality because it flows from the very substance of Christian revelation and so is as fresh and as young as the living faith of the Church" (1969). The article on Isidore of Seville (2104–16) comes from the authoritative hand of Jacques Fontaine, with a useful catalog of Isidore's works and recent bibliography. Instructive especially for Westerners is Roger Arnaldez' treatment of Islam (2116–38), particularly the detailed summary of the Mussulmanic mystique as grounded in the Koran.

By far the longest article is on Italy (2141–2311). Nineteen scholars try to convey a global and yet precise idea of Italian spirituality (better, spirituality in Italy) by opening up the five broad eras from Christian antiquity to the present, discussing the most active currents or directions, and presenting the most representative personalities. For the nonspecialist this article is eye-opening: wealth of information, remarkable organization, insights into spiritual trends and movements, rich bibliographies—all of these add up to an uncommon picture of "Italian" spirituality through the centuries.

In the article on the famous spiritual work *Imitatio Christi* (2338–68), Albert Ampe spends sixteen columns on author and date (apparently the Gersonites and the Kempists are still stubbornly attached to their theses), suggests a new trail in the fact that three manuscripts mention Conrad of Fritzlar (Carthusian?) as the work's addressee, and with Denifle urges all researchers *ad codices!*—in the conviction that the archives and manuscripts have not yet yielded all their secrets. Bernard Spaapen discusses genre, sources, and major themes, then analyzes each of the four books, ending with some precious comments on the work's stress on interiority as the locus of life's profound meaning.

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WALTER J. BURGHARDT, S.J.


This commentary has good points. The authors rightly characterize Matthew's theology as a "characteristic conjunction of community interest with eschatology" (p. lxxxi), and note in the bibliography that they are sympathetic with Bornkamm's views as expressed in *Tradition and Interpretation in Matthew*. Correctly, too, they subordinate Mt's concern for the law to his soteriology. They speak with expertise on
such matters as the Jewish environment and Semitic names (utilizing here the neglected evidence of the Syriac NT). Many individual points of interpretation command assent, e.g., the criticism of the unpardonable continuance in modern translations of the KJV rendering of Christos by "Christ" rather than "Messiah"; the translation of the final petition of the Lord's Prayer as "deliver us from the evil one" (ICET, please note); the interpretation of "rock" in Mt 16:17-19 as Peter's person rather than his faith.

On the other side we have to set the following considerations: (1) the rejection on quite inadequately defined methodological grounds of the methods of source and form criticism which have yielded highly significant results in redaction criticism. The editors reject any literary relationship between Mk and Mt and the use of a common source by Mt-Lk, and view Mt as a collector of "carefully preserved traditions," unlike Mk, who is a preserver of eyewitness records (the cushion of Mk 4:38 and other vivid features of the Marcan narrative, beloved of conservative British scholars in the last generation, are brought forward once again). The careful work done by the form critics on the successive Sitze im Leben on the gospel traditions is rejected out of hand, as, e.g., "hazardous at best" (a remark on Tödt's designation of Mk Son of Man predictions as vicinia ex eventu) or as "Hegelian" (so on Tödt, p. xcv, and on Jeremías, p. cxxxix), leaving one to wonder whether that necessarily means that they are wrong, or whether the senior editor has been prejudiced by his British colleague to reject anything "made in Germany" simply because of its origin. The authors use their knowledge of the OT, of Judaica, and especially Qumran, as a cudgel to beat the "critics," the "scholars," or the "commentators," though rarely explaining how specifically their views have been made untenable thereby (e.g., p. 52).

2) Yet, along with this conservative rejection of critical methods, the editors indulge in radical criticism of their own. Their favorite technique is that of critical emendation of the text. The most notable example is the theory that the second and third Passion predictions are post-Mt redactional interpolations from Mk. In their opinion, Mt had no theology of a suffering Son of Man. Other examples of textual emendation, some of them attractive but all purely conjectural, occur at 5:42, 7:22, and 10:34 f. Such critical procedures may be necessary in the case of Aeschylus, but rarely with the NT, given the abundance of textual evidence we have. Another equally surprising, though different type of radical criticism is the rejection as unauthentic to Jesus of the logion Mt 11:12-15 par., a saying which has recently played a prominent role in the so-called new quest. Probably precisely because the editors
reject it, it has a high claim to authenticity, since its exalted estimate of the Baptist runs counter to the view of the early community.

There is a great need for a commentary on Mt which will take up and build upon the recent work of redaction criticism. Such a commentary would interpret the Gospel material at three different levels: the Jesus level, the oral tradition, and the Evangelist's redaction. If the present commentary had followed this procedure, we might have been able to welcome it enthusiastically. We particularly regret that we cannot, since the senior editor was the leading biblical archeologist of his generation. And we would have liked to observe the rule, *de mortuis nil nisi bonum*. But this has proven impossible.

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Reginald H. Fuller


Aside from two books written by Heinz Conzelmann, *Die Mitte der Zeit* (Tübingen, 1954; Engl., *The Theology of St. Luke*, New York, 1960) and *Die Apostelgeschichte* (Tübingen, 1963), no book has so influenced the study of Acts in recent decades as Haenchen's massive commentary *Die Apostelgeschichte*, in the well-known Meyerkommentar series. Editions 1-4 of the commentary on Acts in that series were published by H. A. W. Meyer, the man whose name the series popularly bears; editions 5-9 were revisions prepared by H. H. Wendt. But the 10th edition, modestly said to have been "durchgesehen und erweitert" by E. Haenchen, was practically a newly written commentary. The 14th edition of 1965 has now been translated into English, revised by R. McL. Wilson, and brought up to date. The author's preface to the English translation notes that the German now exists in the 15th edition (1968), and that "the English translation also contains many new insights" (p. vii). This volume thus makes available to the English-speaking world one of the great NT commentaries of the third quarter of this century; no one who would study Acts can do without it.

Haenchen notes that his work on Acts really began in 1944, when he went to Switzerland for a period of convalescence, at a time when the only book that he was allowed to take with him from Germany was a thin-paper Nestle, *Novum Testamentum Graece*. As a result he sought to penetrate deeply into the text of Acts itself, uninfluenced by secondary literature on the book which at the time was preoccupied with the question of Lucan sources. He thus concentrated on the question
“what the author of Acts had wanted to say to his readers through the varied scenes of his book” (ibid.). Eventually, H.’s work on Acts in this commentary and Conzelmann’s study of Lucan theology led to a new vogue in Lucan studies. The emphasis given to “Luke the historian” in early commentaries in this century, by such writers as Eduard Meyer, William M. Ramsay, and in a sense even by Henry J. Cadbury, shifted to that of “Luke the theologian” and “Luke the writer and edifier.” Luke-Acts has consequently come to be “a storm center in contemporary scholarship” (W. C. van Unnik, Studies in Luke-Acts [eds. J. L. Martyn and L. E. Keck; Nashville, 1966] p. 15). Others such as M. Dibelius, E. Käsemann, P. Vielhauer, and P. Schubert have likewise contributed in various ways to the shift in emphasis. The pendulum has swung from Acts as the history-book of the early Christian Church to Luke-Acts as a presentation of Early Catholicism, and its author has become “the villain of the play on the New Testament stage” (van Unnik, ibid., p. 16). Not all of these writers share to the same degree such a pejorative view of the Lucan writings; nor has H.’s commentary been the main exponent of it. But his study of Acts has certainly contributed to the shift and has to be understood in terms of it.

An introduction of 132 pages opens the commentary, treating of the Church’s oldest witness for Acts and its author, a survey of historical and critical research into Acts, an account of the text of Acts, the chronology of Acts, the language and style of the book, the question of its sources, the view of Luke as theologian, historian, and writer, his relation to Paul, and the ongoing debate among Lucan scholars. The rest of the book, some 600 pages, is given over to a detailed verse-by-verse and pericope-by-pericope commentary on the successive chapters of Acts. It is well organized, for the main problems of the phrases are handled first, with the technicalities and debates relegated to footnotes, and each section ends with several pages that discuss the overall meaning of the passage.

H. sees Luke’s main preoccupation in Acts as the story of the spread of “the Word of God,” a favorite Lucan term for “the message concerning Jesus, belief in whom brings forgiveness of sins and deliverance in the judgement” (p. 98). In this he has hit upon a better characterization of Acts than the often-used account of what Jesus accomplished through His Spirit in the apostles (von Harnack et al.). Further, he rightly sees Acts 1:8 as containing “the groundplan of Acts” (p. 143). But he really sees “Luke the historian” wrestling with the problem of “the mission to the Gentiles without the law” (his italics, p. 100). “His entire presentation is influenced by this. It is a problem with two aspects: a theological and a political. By forsaking observance of the
Jewish law Christianity parts company with Judaism; does this not break the continuity of the history of salvation? That is the theological aspect. But in cutting adrift from Judaism Christianity also loses the toleration which the Jewish religion enjoys. Denounced by the Jews as hostile to the state, it becomes the object of suspicion to Rome. That is the political aspect. Acts takes both constantly into account" (ibid.). Luke's solution: the "leaders of the Christian mission, far from falling away from their Jewish faith, in fact held fast to it, but...God unmistakably and irresistibly steered them into the mission of the Gentiles" (ibid.). This, according to H., dominates the story of the spread of the Word. But it is a simplification of the course of history; "for thus mastering the problem of the mission, Luke the historian was obliged to pay a heavy price—one heavier than he suspected" (p. 102).

While there is much to be said in favor of the Haenchen thesis, one has the impression at times that it is all too pat. When one reads the preface to this commentary, the nagging question is constantly: But what does Haenchen think of what Luke says in the prologue to the Gospel (Lk 1:1-4)? I do not mean this in the sense in which that prologue is often naively understood: that Luke professes to be writing with the four qualities of a historian (accuracy, completeness, from the beginning, and in order)! That is a protestation which may not measure up to the reality. But what of the purpose expressed in 1:4 itself, that Theophilus might find in the Lucan writings assurance (asphaleia) for the things in which he has been instructed—that what the Church of Luke's day was teaching was rooted in the Period of Jesus? How does this purpose color the description of Luke's preoccupation in Acts as given by Haenchen? His answer is tucked away in a footnote: "The prologue to Luke applies only to the third gospel" (p. 136). This is, of course, quite convenient, but suppose Cadbury and others are right, that it is the prologue to the two books? H. has tried to relate Acts to the Lucan Gospel, but has he succeeded? His view of Acts, though it has much to be said for it, has not sufficiently coped with the two-volume nature of these writings or with the relation of the prologue to them. H. should undertake to write a commentary on the Gospel.

When it comes to comments on individual passages or phrases, one is struck by their over-all excellence. There are some, however, that will not please everyone. For instance, that the phrase heôs eschatou tês gês (1:8) means "to the ends of the earth" (p. 134) and is related to the LXX eschata, meaning "distant lands." For there is no plural in the LXX of Is 49:6, to which H. refers (nor in Acts 13:47, where it is quoted). H. refers to Ps. Sol. 8:15, where the singular has precisely the meaning needed in Acts, i.e., Rome (where Luke's book actually
ends), but he does not exploit it. In Acts 1:23 estēsan refers to the apostles or the brethren who proposed Joseph and Matthias as candidates for Judas' post. The Western Text, however, reads the singular estēsen, making Peter the subject, and H. comments: "a glimpse of the monarchic episcopate of later times" (p. 162). Is it really? Is it not just possible that a scribe shifted to the singular because Peter was the subject of the preceding verses? Again, one would wish that H. had paid a little more attention to the interpretation of the Matthias episode proposed by H. Rengstorff (listed in his bibliography, p. 158). Unconvincing is his explanation of the oath sworn by God to David that one of his descendants would sit upon his throne (Acts 2:30), in the sense of "God's" throne (p. 182). See J. Dupont, Etudes sur les Actes des apôtres (Paris, 1967) p. 233, n. 28. One could go on like this indefinitely.

I have checked the English translation against the original in many places, and it is well done. Wilson has noted that when foreign books are known to be available in English, the fact has been noted, but no attempt has been made to identify every reference. This is certainly a defect, since many of the essays or articles to which H. refers are now available in English, and it would have been a service to younger students to change the references to them. In any case, we are indebted to Wilson and his collaborators for making this rich commentary available to the English-speaking world.

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Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J.


This second major venture into the NT field by the well-known Oxford patristic scholar manifests a competence equal to or perhaps greater than that seen in his earlier commentary on the Pastoral Epistles. Good introductions, a painstakingly accurate and highly readable translation, and thorough, well-balanced, up-to-date commentary combine to make a work that should be of great service to exegesis and theologians as well as to a wider audience. K. maintains that 1 Pt is not a baptismal homily or liturgy but a genuine, integral letter. It was probably written by Peter, with the help of Silvanus; but pseudonymity cannot be ruled out. The tribulations referred to throughout the letter reflect a situation of persecutions of the Christian communities by the unbelievers among whom they live, but not by official government agencies. Parallels to other NT writings, numerous in 1 Pt, are due not to literary dependence but to a common store of tradition in the early Church. Pseudonymity is asserted as probable for Jude, certain for 2
Pt, and the latter is dated ca. 100–110 A.D. "We are...probably justified in overhearing in these letters [Jude and 2 Pt] the opening shots in the fateful struggle between the Church and Gnosticism..." (p. 231).

In the commentary proper, textual and philological questions are given rather generous treatment, particularly in function of K.'s own translation of the text. Niceties of translation are often illustrated by reference to variant translations in RSV, NEB, RV, AV. Abundant parallel materials are cited or referred to, from the NT, the Hebrew and Greek OT, as well as from Jewish and Hellenistic sources. Qumran materials are used extensively and judiciously. A particular strength of the commentary is in the area of form criticism, the application of which to NT epistles is less developed than in the case of the Synoptic Gospels. Among forms he points out are early Christian catenae of OT texts (1 Pt 2:6–8); ethical codes for particular classes of people (2:13–3:12)—found elsewhere in NT epistles, in other early Christian documents, and in Hellenistic Judaism, probably being derived from Stoic morality; credal formulae (1 Pt 2:21); hymns (1 Pt 2:22–24); and valedictory message (2 Pt 1:12–15).

In his treatment of the knotty problems of the "proclamation to the spirits in prison" (1 Pt 3:19) and the preaching to the dead (4:6), K. accepts the solutions of Dalton's *Christ's Proclamation to the Spirits*. Referring to 1 Pt in the Preface, he states: "The single study which has helped me most is W. J. Dalton's brilliant monograph on I Pet. iii. 18–iv. 6." Accordingly, the "spirits in prison," rather than being the spirits of dead human beings, are the wicked angels of Gn 6:1–4. Their prison is not in an underworld to which Christ descended, but is thought of as a lower heaven traversed by Christ in His ascension. His proclamation to them is "His triumphant announcement that their power had been finally broken." The mysterious "preaching to the dead" of 4:6 has no connection with this event, but refers simply to those now dead, to whom Christ was preached when they were still alive.

In 1 Pt 2:9 K. accepts, with modifications, J. H. Elliott's rejection (in *The Elect and the Holy*) of the widely-held interpretation which sees in this verse a declaration of priestly functions on the part of all individual believers. On the other hand, K.'s treatment of *presbyteroi* and *neōteroi* in 1 Pt 5:1–5 should now be supplemented by Elliott's "Ministry and Church Order in the NT" (*CBQ* 1970). Another possible area of improvement could be a more explicit taking up of Käsemann's detailed and trenchant case for the *Frühkatholizismus* of 2 Pt ("An Apologia for Primitive Christian Eschatology," *Essays on NT Themes*). All in all, an excellent work.

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*THOMAS W. LEAHY, S.J.*

This is a book to be valued for many reasons. The essays are, in general, of exceptionally high quality; included among the authors are some of the most influential theologians and biblical scholars of the past quarter century; the translation from the original German is most readable; and, last and least, the volume is to be treasured because its 372 pages cost $18.95.

The articles are English translations of fifteen essays selected from Zeit und Geschichte (Tübingen; Mohr, 1964), the Festschrift presented to Rudolf Bultmann on the occasion of his eightieth birthday, Aug. 20, 1964, by "the Old Marburgers" as an expression of their gratitude. In the selecting process priority was given, according to editor Robinson, "to the New Testament and the Contemporary Theology/Philosophy contributions, in view of the envisaged reading public" (p. 2). This criterion is reflected in the twofold division of the book into articles related to NT studies and those related to philosophy and theology.

The list of contributors reads like a Who's Who of distinguished biblical scholars and theologians: Käsemann, Bornkamm, Conzelmann, Ebeling, Fuchs, Gogarten, Jonas, etc. Even Martin Heidegger is present. His essay, however, will not be among those that most readers will go to first, or at all. Entitled "From the Last Marburg Lecture Course," it is taken, in revised form, from Heidegger's 1928 summer course intending a discussion with Leibniz and his interpretation of the substantiality of substance. The other articles, however, will almost universally not disappoint the reader's expectations. (Robinson's own essay, "Logoi Sophon: On the Gattung of Q," has already appeared in English in his recent Trajectories through Early Christianity.)

The Future of Our Religious Past is strikingly apt for naming the contents of the collection. Article after article in one way or another mirrors the process that is suggested by the title and is a constitutively necessary element in every faith community that survives—the ever-continuing process of the present successfully interpreting its past meaningfully to its future. For example, N. A. Dahl's article "Eschatology and History in the Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls" concludes among other things that the central theme of biblical eschatology is not so much the end of the world and the end of history as it is the fulfilment of past promises concerning the future, and points out "the high degree to which fulfilment always includes within itself a re-interpretation of the promise; in no other way can it be understood as fulfilment" (p. 27). Similarly, Erich Dinkler's "Peter's Confession and the 'Satan' Saying:
The Problem of Jesus' Messiahship," which sees Mk 8:27-33 to be the result of a post-Easter present interpreting a pre-Easter past that contains a misunderstanding of Jesus and His mission, exemplifies well the phenomenon of the present successfully interpreting its past meaningfully to its future. Likewise Gunther Bornkamm's "The Risen Lord and the Earthly Jesus: Matthew 28:16-20" deals with the results of a latter-day community interpreting older traditions of Galilean appearances for the sake of a present community and its future.

In the theology and philosophy section this same process of man in the present interpretively mediating his past to his future is repeatedly touched upon. Gerhard Ebeling, in "Time and Word," points out the linguisticality of this process. "Only through language do the past and the future become present and the present gain the depth-dimension of past and future" (p. 264). Ernst Fuchs, in "The Hermeneutical Problems," more directly focusses on the linguistic aspect of the phenomenon: "language unites us in understanding beyond time and death. And yet what is understood is precisely that which at one time did find words and at a given time presses towards finding words again" (p. 276).

That which is coming to expression in the dialectic questioning and being questioned that constitutes human existence is "only the one inescapable Word of God which does what it says" (Fuchs, p. 278). The present translation of these earlier essays will aid man's future understanding and appreciation of this mystery.

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EDWARD GLYNN, S.J.


When the editor of this volume first approached Bultmann with the idea of publishing his correspondence with Barth, Bultmann lowered his pipe and commented dryly: "Why? What good will it bring?" For anyone who has read the 55 letters and 43 postcards which Barth and Bultmann exchanged (11 of Barth's letters and cards are lost) there can be no doubt as to their interest and value. Before all else, they present a living, behind-the-scenes view into the central problem which these two thinkers posed, to which they offered entirely different solutions, and which has shaken and is still shaking twentieth-century theology: the hermeneutical question of how we are to understand God's Word and make it meaningful—the role of "the human" (philosophy and historicity) in the interpretation of revelation.
The letters clearly reveal the development of both theologians’ confrontation with the problem. Bultmann’s first letter, May 1922, refers to his quite favorable review of Barth’s historic Römerbrief; but privately he chides Barth for a lack of “clarity of concept” (p. 4). In December he spells out his complaint: “It has become clearer to me that you have no inner relationship to the science of history” (p. 9). The following year, Barth admits that the misunderstanding between them is “nothing else but the problem of revelation” and that his method of responding to this problem offends “my historical friends” (p. 17). In July 1924 Bultmann mentions for the first time the name of his newly-found friend Martin Heidegger, and the rift between him and Barth grows wider. His critique of Barth’s Dogmatik im Entwurf (June 1928) shows Heidegger’s influence: “You have neglected a real encounter with modern philosophy.... Since faith is always faith of a believer, i.e., of an existing person, dogmatic theology can speak only in existential-ontological concepts, which are prepared for her by philosophy” (p. 81). On the defensive, Barth answers that Bultmann is asking too much of him. Like a “tree grown crooked” he cannot change. Besides, “I have not been infected by any philosophy as you by Heidegger’s...” (p. 84). Thus, he says, his chief concern is not to analyze concepts but to let God’s Word speak for itself. He asks Bultmann to have patience with him.

In Feb. 1930, however, after a private meeting with Bultmann, Barth feels there is no more time for patience. He sees Bultmann, together with Gogarten and Brunner, returning to “the flesh pots of Egypt,” “once again considering faith as a human possibility,” and thus “delivering theology into the hands of philosophy.” He concludes: “Our ships were such as met only in the night” (pp. 100 f.). Bultmann feels they can still “work out our difficulties” (p. 124). Barth answers (June 1931) that what separates them is “not a different theology but, like Catholicism, a different faith...a different life-style (Lebensgefühl)” (p. 129).

The differences in both men’s resistance to National Socialism (based on “our differences concerning the relation between Christology and anthropology,” Barth, p. 165) make up one of the most interesting parts of the book. On June 21, 1935 Barth was relieved of his professorship in Bonn and moved to the University of Basel. Their correspondence, silenced by the war years, was resumed in 1950—with swords drawn more staunchly than ever. In Nov. 1952 Bultmann sends a 24-page reply to Barth’s Rudolf Bultmann: Ein Versuch, ihn zu verstehen. He argues: “I can grasp the Word of the NT...only if I understand it as
spoken into my existence." And to do this, this Word must be freed from all "objectivizing thinking" (pp. 174 f.), i.e., "from the mythological picture of the world." To effect this liberation, we must realize "the extraordinary meaning" which the modern "philosophy of existence" has for the theologian (pp. 170 f.). Again Bultmann accuses Barth of not having studied his philosophy, of not having "a feel for the historicity of existence" (p. 184). Barth replies in December that Bultmann's existentialism puts the NT "in a straightjacket." For his part, Barth's chief concern is to assert the objectivity of the NT, and only then will he make "subjective" conclusions (pp. 197 f.). In his last letter to Bultmann, Dec. 1963, Barth sees their drastic differences underlined once again in their contrasting reactions to Bishop Robinson's Honest to God. For Barth, Robinson can be compared "to a man who scoops off the foam of three beer glasses—each inscribed R. B. (Bultmann), P. T. (Tillich) and D. B. (Bonhoeffer)—and then tries to sell his brew as a theological miracle drink" (p. 205). He feels that "we won't be able to solve our differences in this life" (p. 203).

Throughout the clash of ideas, the personalities of the two men shine forth clearly. Striking in the prewar correspondence are Bultmann's repeated requests for dialogue. He was constantly inviting Barth to Marburg for discussions with himself and colleagues. Such personal encounters were a "pressing necessity" for both to clarify their positions and resolve their difficulties. Yet, although Barth frequently met with Bultmann, he almost as frequently tried to avoid such encounters. The motives are not clear. Perhaps in the early years after Barth was called to a Göttingen professorship without having a doctorate, there was a certain insecurity. "I look at you all [esp. Bultmann and Heidegger] with real fear. You are all so much more clever than I...I'm not a glib debater" (pp. 38 f.). Other times Barth felt he was "not wanted" in Marburg (p. 32) or that he was being summoned only to be "intentionally misunderstood" or attacked (p. 117).

Yet, throughout the encounter, even when theological temperatures ran high, the two showed the openness and warm humor of deep friendship. "We can meet in that little tavern [close to Barth's home in Basel], after which we'll listen to a few Mozart records" (p. 201). One particular bond of friendship seemed to be their pipes. Barth: "Don't forget your Bremer Import" (p. 59). Bultmann: "If you come, the best Oldenburg tobacco will be available" (p. 104). When Barth sent his scathing "Attempt to Understand R. Bultmann," he inscribed it with a quote from Mozart's Figaro: "O Angel, forgive me!" Bultmann prefaced his equally sharp reply with a line from Don Giovanni: "Komthur (K. Barth): 'Repent!'—Don Giovanni (R. Bultmann): 'No!'" (p. 169).
Editor Jaspert, who with his wife lives with and cares for Prof. and Mrs. Bultmann, was in a unique position to search out and clarify his sources. Abundant footnotes provide the compositio loci for each letter and explain names, places, and works. Missing, however, is a sketch of events to help bridge the gap in correspondence between 1935 and 1950. An appendix of documents, which somewhat surprisingly comprises one third of the book, provides further elucidating and interesting historical background (e.g., Bultmann's report to the faculty of Marburg on his 1951 trip to the U.S.A.). Some of the documents, however, might have easily been dispensed with.

The reader closes this book with a more personal acquaintance not only with two theological giants of this century but also with the issues they struggled for. One can only hope that the book will soon be available in English.

University of Marburg

Paul Knitter, S.V.D.


This is a difficult book to assess. In format and terminology it resembles a work of statistical research; but though it contains much information, some of it tabulated scientifically, and is in large part well written, the over-all impression of clear organization and logical coherence is wanting. Perhaps this is due to the avowedly experimental nature of the work, which has its genesis in a Harvard dissertation (1966) reworked by the author in 1969. Adams claims that his basic contribution is methodological (p. 121), and he illustrates his method in Appendix B ("Content-Analysis Tables for Populus in The City of God and for Gens in Books XV-XVIII"), which evidently consists of a careful, conceptually-oriented reading of the original texts and an elaborate classification of the results thereof. His purpose is to "examine the range of meanings carried by the word populus in the Vulgate Bible and in the writings of Augustine and Jerome, or perhaps more precisely, to report the findings of such an examination" (p. 1). His work differs from earlier studies of Augustine's social and political terminology in that he employs a method of selective induction. Indeed, Adams contends that the social doctrine of Augustine cannot be understood without an accurate knowledge of its basic terminology. In Appendix B he lists the various attributes he has isolated as belonging to Augustine's concept of populus, including (1) attributes normally associated with the word: social totality or multiclass character, adequate size, simple
unity, rational assent (or moral character), policy (political or religious aspects of a group's action), law (political or religious), destiny; (2) attributes of less frequent occurrence or logically inconsistent: genetic association (physical descent), linguistic association, territorial association, lower-class status, accidental contiguity (whereas Augustine rarely uses populus to describe a group united by mere physical proximity, Isidore of Seville does so frequently, giving the word a meaning close to Spanish pueblo and English "people").

By his method Adams tries to refute Josef Ratzinger's conclusion about the difference in meaning between populus and populi or plebes in Augustine. Similarly, he offers a new interpretation of the two definitions of civil society in books 2 and 19 of De civitate Dei. On the basis of the usage of the word populus elsewhere in this work, he attempts to reconcile the two definitions: since the designation populus is normally applied to Roman and other Gentile societies, they seem to have some inherent legitimacy. Adams acknowledges that his long-range goal is to illuminate the nature of the patristic "sense of community." He has succeeded in providing a linguistic skeleton, on which it will be possible for future scholars to fashion the whole mystical body of the patristic community.

Boston College

Margaret Schatkin


There are probably few scholars who have not dreamt of writing a revisionistic book on a matter of some importance in their chosen field. Attempts to fulfil the dream are only rarely successful. When such an attempt not merely succeeds but is enhanced by the fact that a work of scholarship which has been years in the making happens to appear at the very moment when the question it treats is the subject of a major controversy, the author has scaled a pinnacle of scholarly achievement which must make him at once the object of his colleagues' admiration and (for we live, alas, in a fallen world) of their envy. Such is the achievement of Brian Tierney, author of the work under review. A native Englishman, trained in medieval history at the University of Cambridge, T.'s teaching career has been spent largely in the United States, first at the Catholic University of America and now for some years at Cornell. His publications in the history of Christian institutions and doctrine in the Middle Ages have won him world-wide recognition as one of the foremost medievalists of our day. His numerous friends
and admirers know him as a practicing Roman Catholic of a peculiarly English type, occupying a position somewhat to the right of what remains of the moderate center.

The book originated largely in research carried on by T. in 1966-67, some years before the present debate over infallibility. It appears not quite two years after the publication of Hans Küng's celebrated polemic on the question, and gives massive historical support to the position which Küng has expounded. In view of the many and grievous historical errors which mar Küng's rhetorically brilliant but substantively unsatisfying book, many (but not all) of which have been pointed out by Walter Brandmüller and Joseph Ratzinger in their contributions to the collective work Zum Problem Unfehlbarkeit edited by Karl Rahner (Freiburg: Herder, 1971), it may well be felt that this assistance comes none too soon. Press reports have already told of Küng's understandably jubilant response to the publication of a summary of T.'s arguments in an article in the fall 1971 issue of the Journal of Ecumenical Studies.

Although this is a historical work through and through (and a model of how intellectual history should be written: clear, exact, never losing sight of the wood for the trees), T.'s argument begins with an important logical consideration. Infallibility, far from enhancing the sovereign power of the popes, actually limits that sovereignty; for infallible pronouncements are necessarily irrevocable—this is explicitly stated in the Vatican I definition. Hence each successive pope is bound not merely to the Church's deposit of faith but to the irrevocable formulations of that faith by all his predecessors. A noninfallible pope would be far freer: he could change or abandon statements of his predecessors which he considered unhelpful, misleading, or simply erroneous.

T. begins by showing that the canonists of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, though they made sweeping claims for papal jurisdiction which provided a basis for later theories of papal infallibility, never taught such a doctrine themselves. It was not merely that they passed it over in silence as something which could be taken for granted: in their frequent discussions of how the unerring faith of the Church could be maintained, they "invariably came to the conclusion that the pope alone could not provide an adequate guarantee for the stability of that faith... The canonists did not argue that an infallible head was necessary to sustain the faith of the church. Rather they maintained that, however much the head might err, divine providence would always prevent the whole church from being led astray" (pp. 32 f.). Christ's promise to Peter that his faith should not fail (Lk 22:32) "was taken to mean simply that the church would always survive; it meant that the true faith would always live on, at least in some tiny remnant in an age
of mass apostasy” (p. 35). This is precisely Küng’s conception of the Church’s indefectibility, and T. documents his case with abundant citations from the sources.

Even Bonaventure (d. 1274), a transitional figure in the history of papal infallibility who is often cited in support of the doctrine, did not raise the question of whether the pope was infallible in his judgments, though he reiterated in an extreme form the old doctrine that the pope was a supreme judge. The first theologian to formulate the new doctrine was another Franciscan, the eccentric but brilliant theologian Pietro Olivi (d. 1298). Warmly welcoming the strongly pro-Franciscan doctrine of poverty expounded in the Bull Exiit of Pope Nicholas III in August 1279, Olivi claimed that since it was the magisterial pronouncement of the head of the Church, it was irrevocable. Any future pope who should attempt to alter Nicholas III’s doctrine would err magisterially in exercising his office and would thereupon cease to be the true pope. Behind this theory lay Olivi’s obsession with the apocalyptic idea that a future pope would arise who would seek to pervert the Church’s faith. Olivi’s formulation of papal infallibility was thus designed to limit the power of future popes, not to extend it.

Due in part to this and other eccentricities in Olivi’s thought, his novel theory of papal infallibility was largely ignored after his death. In the first decades of the fourteenth century “the idea of papal infallibility was blankly unacceptable even to the most ardent defenders of the Roman see. . . . The idea was too novel, too radical, too sharply opposed to the juridical conception of papal sovereignty, too alien to the theological tradition of the church, to command support among respectable theologians” (p. 159). Controversy over the matter broke out in earnest, however, in the 1320’s. In 1323 Pope John XXII, a sharp-witted canonist but no theologian, did precisely what Olivi had feared and predicted. Reacting allergically to excessive claims by Franciscans that the true tradition of Christ’s poverty was maintained by themselves and by no one else in the Church, John XXII opted for his sovereign freedom over Olivi’s doctrine of infallibility (with its corollary of irrevocability) and denounced as heretical the teaching of his predecessor, Nicholas III’s Bull Exiit. This put the fat into the fire at its hottest point. We cannot trace here the increasingly far-fetched claims of Franciscan theologians, making a matter of life and death out of what seems at this distance in time to have been a very subsidiary issue indeed. It is enough to know that in insisting ever more fiercely on an extreme theory of papal infallibility, they were defending not the papacy but their own parochial interests. Papal theologians resisted manfully in the name of the pope’s freedom. Not until the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, when the historical origins of the doctrine of papal infallibility had been forgotten, did the theory find favor with papal spokesmen, who saw in it a useful weapon against Protestantism and Gallicanism.

T.'s conclusion: the doctrine of papal infallibility was not the gradual unfolding of a truth always held in the Church but the sudden creation, for complex historical reasons, of a novel doctrine at the end of the thirteenth century. The subsequent growth "was a growth in the understanding of the papacy that, given the circumstances of the times, the advantages of the doctrine for polemical purposes on the whole slightly outweighed the disadvantages" (p. 273). With Küng, T. maintains that "the church can err; but this same erring church has never ceased to preserve and proclaim the Gospel of Christ" (p. 277). T. views the influence of papal infallibility today as wholly baneful: "it encourages Catholic scholars to suppose that their proper task is to reconcile all the more solemn past pronouncements of the church with one another by ever more ingenious displays of hermeneutical dexterity; whereas the real task is to distinguish between the unfailing faith of the church... and the human errors which, in every age, the church has associated and does associate with the proclamation of that truth" (p. 279). The papacy finally adopted the doctrine of the pope's infallibility out of weakness, T. maintains. And in the book's final sentence he expresses the hope that "perhaps one day the church will feel strong enough to renounce it."

He makes a very strong case. It has at least one fairly obvious answer: that the theory of infallibility T. is attacking is not the very limited, nuanced infallibility defined at Vatican I, which is the only doctrine that most Catholic dogmatic theologians today are interested in defending. T. is fully aware of this riposte, however, and his strictures on the increasingly involved and convoluted attempts of contemporary theologians to save at least some remnants of a dogma which has clearly become embarrassing even to the dogmaticians themselves are severe. Dogmatic theologians who take T.'s argument seriously—and it is now clearly incumbent on them to do so—will not find the task of constructing a credible reply an easy one.

Another possible retort is indicated by T. himself when he points out that in the day-to-day life of the Church the Vatican I definition has actually weakened the authority of the pope's "ordinary" (non-infallible) pronouncements on faith and morals. The rank-and-file, unsophisticated Catholic tends to feel that such statements need not be taken too seriously. Humanae vitae is the most obvious case in point. T. will certainly not lack critics who are quick to point out that this
state of affairs is not such a bad thing, and that since it is a direct con­sequence of the Vatican I definition, there must be some good in the
dogma after all.

Space precludes further development of these considerations. One
thing, however, is certain: T. has written a book of major importance.
His contribution to the current debate is far weightier than Küng's
(which is not to denigrate the latter's achievement within its self-set
limitations). The ball is now clearly on the dogmatic theologians' side
of the net. Their credibility has been seriously impaired. Let us hope
that their response is as clear and as constructive as this challenge.

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JOHN JAY HUGHES

SHORTER NOTICES

TRADITION HISTORY AND THE OLD
$2.50.

Third in a series of concise intro­ductions, edited by J. Coert Rylaars­dam, to three distinct but interre­lated methods of studying the forma­tion and transmission of the OT. The
other two are literary criticism and
form criticism, both of which emerged
prior to the method described here.
The first chapter is a brief historical
survey of the persons and factors
which contributed to the rise of trad­i­tion criticism as an indispensable
hermeneutical tool for realistic study
of OT traditions. Literary criticism,
associated with the documentary
analysis of Wellhausen, and form
criticism, whose dynamics in oral
tradition were established once for
all by Gunkel, led eventually to the
problem of the circles or "tradition­ists" responsible for the formation
and transmission of the OT material.
Finally, of course, there was the de­finitive redaction of the text as we
have it now.

Thanks to tradition history, we see
that the OT is more than a collection
of books; it is a process. Succeeding
generations, in continuously changing
situations, have taken up its com­ponent traditions, oral as well as
written, and interpreted them in fresh
and creative ways. The historian
of tradition is saying as emphatically
as possible: "Learn all you can about
the people from whom this literature
came!" Tradition criticism, therefore,
examines a dynamic process which,
coupled with a people's profound faith
in Yahweh's sustaining presence,
eventually arrived at a fixed canonical
form. At this point the tradition his­tory of the OT has reached its term.

Every method calls for illustration
and R. supplies two succinct, clear
applications of tradition criticism,
one from the Jacob traditions in Gn,
the other from the rich and complex
prophetic material in Is 40–55. In
both cases, due attention being paid
to the specific problems of each, R.
has successfully disengaged the in­dividual traditions and themes which
were finally synthesized into the
vaster theological statements of their
present canonical form. We catch
something of the liveliness and adapt­ability of these community-oriented
traditions moving through history. It
seems to me that this relatively new
method not only opens up new pos­sibilities for interpreting the relation­ship between OT and NT, as R. ob­server, but also warns us against any
rigidity or fixism in our contemporary understanding of revelation. The petrification of a tradition is the ultimate betrayal.

Frederick L. Moriarty, S.J.


Has biblical criticism so relativized the NT that it can no longer serve as the Church’s normative book? M. draws attention to the fact that his title is followed by a period, not by question mark; and so his answer is ultimately positive, although by traditional Catholic standards many would find him quite negative. Indeed, in Germany he has been the target of the more conservative Lutheran factions, and his book was something of an apologia.

Although there is a cumulative impact of M.’s theses, they are not smoothly worked together, and so it may be best almost to list them. The normative value of the NT is affected by the fact that there was a Church before there was a canon. Since in authoritatively drawing up a canon the Church was seeking books that contained apostolic testimony (and made historical mistakes in its choices), what is normative for the Church is not really the NT but the apostolic testimony contained in it. And even then there is no unanimity of testimony, since some of the earlier formulations are rejected by later authors. The central import of the NT stems from the experience of those who encountered Jesus and proclaimed to the world that in Jesus God and His action had been brought near to men. The earliest kerygma (Jesus-kerygma) describes this actualization of God in Jesus; later kerygma (Christ-kerygma) seeks to evaluate the person responsible for the event by giving titles to Jesus. Are these evaluations normative? Only to the degree that they make the event existential again. The difficulty in the history of Christian thought is that NT (and later Church) evaluations have been thought to express the event definitively and thus have become norms of belief (dogmas), so that those who gave a different evaluation were considered heretics. However, for M., very diverse evaluations, e.g., Jesus is the adopted Son of God and Jesus is the natural Son of God, can, if properly understood, make it possible to experience God’s action in Jesus and thus are interchangeable.

Conservative Protestants and Roman Catholics are only now beginning to come to grips with this problem of normative scriptural and dogmatic evaluations, and M.’s book can be a powerful catalyst in the discussion. Unfortunately, granted that Catholics have a very limited familiarity with hard-nosed biblical criticism, many will not be able to distinguish the theses of M. which have wide acceptance (e.g., the historical development of NT Christology) from those that should be seriously questioned (e.g., the almost complete interchangeability of formulations and the highly existentialist approach to dogma).

Raymond E. Brown, S.S.


N., whose father and uncle are famous in American theology, tries to study the Christian faith by presenting a phenomenology of believing. He wants to render a faithful description of what it means to believe, to doubt, to be faithful, to suffer, and to hope, and so to lay hold of what Christianity means today. He does not reject Christianity of the tradi-
tional formulations, as some modern theologians do who want to speak of the gospel in contemporary terms. What he does is to analyze what happened to people in the past when the old formulations worked for them, when they were moved, strengthened, and transformed by them, and by doing so he finds that the ground in personal experience, necessary for the Christian gospel to make sense, is still present in men today. To speak to people about the gospel, N. holds with most contemporary theologians, we have to know how these people experience themselves and their world. Only then are we able to talk about Jesus in such a way that He clarifies the present situation and that His power becomes operative in our lives.

Crucial to N.'s book, therefore, is the analysis of where we are at this time. He holds that man experiences himself as exposed to many powers, coercing him from all sides, beating him down and elevating him. At times man gains power himself to shape his life. This "radial man" lives in "a radial world," a world of multiple power packages, bombarding him, pushing him, destroying him, and sometimes healing him. To this reviewer the analysis of contemporary consciousness is the least convincing part of the book, even though the main theme depends on it. There are nonetheless many beautiful pages. The chapter on fear and gladness is deeply moving. It is in these powerful passages clarifying personal Christian experience that the book achieves its purpose.

Gregory Baum


Convinced that the divine characteristic of mysteriousness offers the most effective approach to God today, W. works out a position that asserts the strict and insuperable unknowableness of God and, after a lengthy analysis, rejects Rahner's teaching, according to which God is incomprehensible but not unknowable. This little book warrants attention, in my opinion, only in so far as it presents an interesting critique of a central aspect of Rahner's theology. W. maintains that Rahner's establishment of the infinity of the horizon of human consciousness fails to do justice to the absolute "greaterness" of God; for man is then made equivalent to a "thwarted god, or a god who has arrived too late" (p. 76). Overlooking the crucial fact that only a self-conscious being, like man, can even begin to question its horizon, W. argues that "no cognitional subject will every be able to establish that its horizon is finite" (p. 51). Hence "every horizon appears to itself to be infinite" (p. 57). Regardless of the weakness of such a refutation, W. has nonetheless succeeded in pointing out a cardinal inadequacy in Rahner's interpretation of the divine nature in correspondence to the human knower. The notion of infinity in Rahner's thought clearly needs to be more differentiated.

W. also brings in the argument, already proposed, e.g., by E. Simons and A. Gerken, that Rahner neglects persons as such in his transcendental analysis. It is to miss the whole point of transcendental theology, however, if one believes that the experience of another person can render conscious the condition for the possibility of that experience. Much confusion could be avoided in discussions of Rahner's theology by keeping the difference clearly in view between God's (ontological) transcendality in the order of being and man's (subjective) transcendality in the order of consciousness as such.

William J. Hoye
The realization that in the future twentieth-century theology will be regarded as the age of ecclesiology, and that ecclesiology necessarily has its roots in pneumatology, is the unifying theme of this collection of essays and discussion by prominent European scholars of Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant traditions. The role of the Spirit in the Church is considered from biblical, liturgical, historical, and dogmatic points of view in the individual papers, whereas the discussions which follow tend to integrate a particular point of view into a larger theological and ecumenical context. Thus the discussions between the participants after each of the nine talks lend the book a degree of explicit scholarly interchange which many collections of essays lack.

Furthermore, a surprising unity can be found in the essays from a particular point of view. The biblical papers on Acts and on Paul, by Etienne Trocmé and Eduard Schweizer respectively, center on the theme of mission. The coming of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost is seen not so much as constitutive of the Church as rather the gift of Christ to the existing community which enabled it to inaugurate its missionary activity as proclaimer of the gospel to the ends of the earth; in Paul’s letters the various charisms of the Spirit are means by which individuals can engage themselves further in the mission of the whole Church to serve men.

The historical essays, too, by Paul Evdokimov, André Benoit, Henri Rondet, S.J., and M.-J. Le Guillou, O.P., center around the insight that in the first four centuries the Fathers regarded the Spirit as an integral factor in the ecclesial community.

The later shift from the Spirit dans l’église to the Spirit en face de l’église has directed modern theology from considering the Spirit in the Church to attempting to unite theologically the Spirit and the Church.

Stanislas Dockx, O.P., Thomas F. Torrance, and B.-D. Dupuy, O.P., the dogmatic contributors, all stress the Church as the sphere where Christ is continually united to men through the action of the Spirit. The book thus closes with a common appeal from all sides to investigate more deeply the ontological relationship between Christ and His Church which is the unique work of the Spirit.

Philip J. Rosato, S.J.


Perhaps the most influential of the Church’s Christian adversaries in the second century, Marcion initiated a world-wide, durable, ascetic, uncompromising movement. His rejection of the OT Demiurge in favor of the loving God embodied in Jesus, his repudiation of the OT as lacking Christian significance, his “authentic” canon (Luke re-edited and ascribed to Christ, and ten Pauline epistles), his docetic Christ, his concern with the problem of evil—all this and more made an attractive theological package and forced early theologians like Tertullian to pay him serious attention.

E.’s Introduction summarizes Marcion’s doctrine (of necessity, mostly from his adversaries) and influence, the contents of Tertullian’s refutation, its various editions and sources, T.’s OT text, the manuscripts (twelve extant) and editions. E.’s edition retains Oehler’s text “except where it is unintelligible or where subsequent critics have made suggestions which are manifestly preferable” (p. xxi);
his own contribution "consists largely of improved punctuation," with a few conjectures (p. xxii). E.'s long familiarity with Tertullian serves him well in translating a writer whose language has often been the despair of patristic scholars and Latinists. Much of the English version is gratifyingly contemporary; some of it gets complicated by T.'s complexities. I wish E. had found it possible to incorporate a richer commentary on the contents.

Walter J. Burghardt, S.J.


Any publication on Cyprian by the renowned British scholar Bévenot, since 1937 an expert in Cyprianic manuscript and theological studies, is always an occasion to be hailed. In this volume he offers Latin texts considerably improved over the Hartel CSEL edition (1868). The De unitate text has already appeared in his The Tradition of Manuscripts (1961); the De lapsis is taken from a forthcoming critical edition in the Corpus christianorum series. Here the critical apparatus is kept to a minimum; the notes, though few, are enlightening. His English translations are basically the same versions which appeared in 1957 in the out-of-print ACW 25. By using somewhat archaic translations for scriptural passages, he conveys the sense of "otherness" which both Tertullian and Cyprian respected in the biblical language.

Also provided are translations of Ep. 55 and Ep. 59, which contain useful historical and doctrinal background material for the two treatises. It is regrettable that B. has not extended his unusual ability for translating Cyprian's letters (far superior to Donna or even Bayard) to the whole corpus.

No major surprises emerge in the revision of De lapsis except a curious inversion in chap. 16. In Lap. 7 B. misses the exact sense of the word lex, which actually means the Torah, not "established law" (cf. also Un. 8; Dom. 28; Mort. 11; Epp. 1, 1; 2, 1; 8, 1; 59, 13; 67, 1; 73, 19). When he identifies as scriptural allusions even vague verbal echoes, he is adopting a slightly different principle for identifying Cyprian's use of the Bible from the one used in my work Cyprian and the Bible (1971). The reference, however, in De uniate 17 to Mk 13:23 is more correctly Mt 24:25, which had a special variant in Cyprian, as attested in Ad Fort. 11 (H. 335, 6) and Ep. 73, 16 (H. 790, 7). The reference to Mt 5:16 (pp. 98 and 124) should be prefixed with a "cf." to indicate an allusion.

B. has done a real service in providing a convenient text for students interested in investigating such historical themes as local church, episcopate, or reconciliation in the third century.

Michael A. Fahey, S.J.


M. states his purpose "to outline briefly the early history of Christian monasticism but not without first seeing some of the glorious prototypes such as the Buddhist Samgha and the Jewish monks of Qumran." The volume offers much interesting information but it is poorly presented both as to literary style and content. There is a confusing mixture of popularization with a liberal use of jargon and much unexplained, rather sophisticated technical terminology that presupposes considerable background on the reader's part. Some words are given rather unique and somewhat
misleading meanings, such as the use of the word "heresy" in the title. Broad generalizations from the first sentence of the Introduction right through to the Conclusion convey false impressions and lead to superficiality. M. certainly does not have a real feel for or understanding of where monasticism is today nor really where it has been in the past. Some of the most significant monastic studies of recent years and not so recent years, e.g., Veilleux on Pachomius, de Vogüé and Steidle on the Rule of Benedict, Guillaumont’s critical edition of Evagrius, etc., are missing from the bibliography, while such questionable authorities as Workman are uncritically cited and quoted. One gets the impression that the prejudices of the latter have done more to form M.’s mind than the reality lived in the Church. There are some slips, e.g., “Pope Athanasius” (p. 51).

I do not know to whom I could recommend the book: the competent monastic scholar would find nothing new; others are apt to be misled by the generalizations; all would find it poor reading. This is unfortunate, for I believe monasticism does have a real message for the Church and the world in this time of renewal.

M. Basil Pennington, O.C.S.O.


Benedict’s Rule, directions for the formation, government, and administration of a monastery and for the spiritual and daily life of its varied inmates (including children), has for fourteen centuries been one of the most influential and practical of life patterns, at once firm and humane, woven of warm wisdom, splendidly aware of human weakness. As David Knowles once put it, Benedict “is recognized as having given to the West the wisdom of the desert adapted to a fully cenobitical life and to the capabilities of normal Western men” (New Cath. Encycl. 2, 284).

SC’s monumental presentation of Benedict’s Rule appears in six volumes (SC 181–186). Vols. 1–2 offered an introduction, the text and French translation, tables and concordance—the work of A. de Vogüé and J. Neufville; Vol. 3 gave Neufville’s study of the manuscript tradition; Vol. 4 began de Vogüé’s three-volume commentary, now brought to completion in the two volumes under consideration here. The commentary in Vol. 5 deals with the Divine Office, with the dormitory and night silence, with the repression of faults; Vol. 6 handles renunciation, food and fasting, the monk’s and the monastery’s relations with the “outside world” (e.g., going out, hospitality, postulants). The indexes are rich: Scripture, ancient authors and collections, proper names, the two Rules, i.e., Master and Benedict (citations, manuscripts, words and expressions, themes).

The historical detail involved in this production staggers even the scholar accustomed to minute research. Continuing study will, of course, cast fresh light on individual issues, e.g., on textual problems or the relationship of Benedict’s Rule with the Regula magistri; but SC 181–186 is now the indispensable springboard for any such research.

Walter J. Burghardt, S.J.


In the rank growth of medieval literature almost every exploration deserves attention. This circumscribed scrutiny of the Emmaus story in medi-
eval literature has demanded from G. much research, reading, and translating. The book’s four chapters examine the narrative of Luke as employed in (1) selected commentaries in Augustine, Gregory, and Bede, as well as some later writers; (2) medieval letters of Isidore, Anselm, Alcuin, etc.; (3) seven Latin Emmaus “Pilgrim” plays; (4) four English plays of the same genre. G. intends to locate and verify, especially in the plays, a “Gregorian pattern of pilgrimage.” This is an interesting journey, but he has failed in his main objective. Even the most general theme of a spiritual journey Godwards is not everywhere to be found—e.g., in the plays. Moreover, the contents of this Gregorian pattern seem to shift with each new chapter. Gregory describes benevolently the early emotional state of the two disciples as “amantes sed dubitantes.” Against this conception G. shallowly imputes to Augustine a description of this same emotional state as “moral death” (p. 29). The nucleus of the pattern in the letters quoted he finds to be “love, desire, words, and friends” (p. 69). The Latin plays are introduced by a hymn. From its second line he discovers the theme “amor et desiderium.” In the English plays this hymn is missing. So the central thought of these plays is “pilgrimage, walking, alone” (p. 133). At the book’s end there remains an impression of confusion and aimlessness.

John W. Larkin, S.J.


The literature in English on the Cluniac movement has never been abundant. H. gathers and translates ten significant articles on the Cluniacs published in recent years in Europe. She also contributes a fine introductory survey of the principal areas engaging the attention of Cluniac scholars. Of particular value, not only for Cluniac historiography but also as a methodological model, is Joachim Wollasch’s “A Cluniac Necrology from the Time of Abbot Hugh.” By establishing that the necrology in question was originally composed for the nuns of Marcigny-sur-Loire and that it matched entries for monks of Cluny in the necrologies of Moissac and Saint-Martial de Limoges, W. was able to show that nine thousand of the names in the necrology belonged to monks of Cluny. Thus he has come one step closer to answering the old question “who were the Cluniacs?” and to identifying the social milieus from which they came in the tenth and eleventh centuries. The necrology also provides a reliable list of Cluniac patrons and of seventy-six Cluniac monks who had become archbishops and bishops by 1100. W.’s break-through in identifying the Marcigny necrology has helped considerably in evaluating the Cluniac contribution to the Gregorian Reform.

E. Delaruelle’s essay “The Crusading Idea in Cluniac Literature of the Eleventh Century” is a rather partisan effort to clear Cluny and its affiliates from the textbook cliché statement that they sponsored crusading. In an article on “The Spiritual Life of Cluny in the Early Days,” Kassius Hallinger delineates the traits of Cluniac spirituality, disposing of the stereotype of Cluniac prayer as participation in long and ornate liturgical exercises. Also valuable is Anscari Mundó’s “Monastic Movements in the East Pyrenees,” which describes the opportunities and obstacles encountered by local monastic reformers before the influence of Saint-Victor de Marseilles was felt in the area.

Fernando Picó, S.J.

Robert of Melun (ca. 1100−1167), in an as yet unpublished part of his Sentences, discusses at length the relation between Old and New Testament. The present study has no other purpose than to present Robert’s views as completely and as exactly as possible. The German text provides a paraphrase of the Latin original. Copious quotations in the footnotes enable the reader to follow this process step by step. While the main portion of the study concerns the Sentences (pp. 14−90), it is preceded by a short review of Robert’s commentary on Romans (pp. 7−14). The second part (pp. 91−126) compares several contemporary authors, and the Summa aurea of William of Auxerre. A brief summary and an index of names conclude the work. Horst proves himself again very well qualified for this type of work. A discrepancy between the German and the Latin texts on p. 61 (n. 34) is so obvious that one must suspect that the printer has dropped a few words from the German text.

William VanderMarch


This title is somewhat misleading, since “the Reformation” essentially means Luther and/or Germany; Calvin and Zwingli are each mentioned only twice, the Anglicans and Anabaptists not at all. But within its limits this is an excellent work. O. acknowledges Joseph Lortz as “the most prominent intellectual historian to have assessed the late Middle Ages from its point of destination, the Protestant Reformation” (p. 3), and he hopes this volume will reverse this perspective “in each of the major areas emphasized by Lortz” (p. 8). O. has collected nine essays by eight scholars, ones both agreeing and differing with Lortz, and branched these writings under three headings: “On the Eve of the Reformation,” essays by Gerhard Ritter, Bernd Moeller, and Frantisek Graus; “Medieval Scholasticism and the Reformation,” essays by Paul Vignaux, Heiko Oberman, and O. himself; “Medieval Spirituality and the Reformation,” essays by R. R. Post, Alexander Koyré, and Oberman again. All these works were first published elsewhere, although six appear here for the first time in English. The collection is well balanced between older studies, such as Ritter’s “Romantic and Revolutionary Elements in German Theology on the Eve of the Reformation” (1927) and Koyré’s “Paracelsus” (1933), and more recent ones such as Post’s “The Windesheimers after c. 1485” (1968). The section dealing with Luther and Scholasticism is perhaps the most unified and coherent. Vignaux relates Luther to Occam, Oberman relates him to Robert Holcot, while O. demonstrates how Luther’s concept of homo viator differed from the whole medieval tradition. Only one real criticism can be made. Ritter made references in his text and notes to intended future studies, i.e., after 1927; it would be helpful to the reader if O. had updated Ritter’s notes to specify where, and if, these future studies appeared.

Joseph F. Kelly


This contribution to ecumenical
Theology, presented as a doctoral dissertation to the Catholic theological faculty of the University of Munich, is a historico-systematic study of the notion of Eucharist in the writings of the young Luther (1517–22). The work as a whole is divided into two parts: (1) the significance of the Eucharist for individual salvation, a theme which is elucidated under the following headings: late-medieval Eucharistic theology, Eucharist and crucifixion in pre-Reform theology, Eucharist and faith, Eucharist and Word, Eucharist as sacrament; (2) Eucharist and Church, which includes Eucharist and priesthood, and sacrifice. The thrust of the work is towards a Rekatholisierung of Luther and his theology, without however evaluating its dimensions. From the point of view of content and sources, this study is sound and well established. In an otherwise carefully structured bibliography I note the absence of Carl F. Wieland's Abendmahl und Messe, translated into German in 1969 and therefore accessible to the author.

Robert E. McNally, S.J.

The Humanness of John Calvin.

In three brief chapters S. depicts Calvin's humanness in three types of relationships: as husband and father, as friend, and as pastor. The initial chapter, on Calvin's wife, Idelette de Bure, is perhaps the best because of its unity of subject; the others are a concatenation of events and persons' names. All three chapters have their value, since they offer countless examples of Calvin's warmth and kindness in his dealings with those who were of the same mind. Whether it was finding an apprenticeship for a youth of his congregation or finding a suitable mate for a friend, Calvin put his heart into the search. S. notes that it would be a mistake to idealize Calvin, since he had his weaknesses, faults, and limitations (p. 94); nevertheless, S. has only treated three facets of Calvin's relationships. The Reformer's humanness would have been more completely portrayed if the grays were also added to the painting; there was a humanness even in Calvin's involvements with Westphal, Heshusius, Piglius, etc. Though S. corrects a few minuscule historical facts in T. H. L. Parker's Portrait of Calvin (London, 1954)—e.g., Calvin's stepson's name is not Jacques but is actually unknown—nevertheless, the portrait by Parker does give Calvin the whole man in his humanness, and the reader learns to appreciate the Reformer as does Parker. S.'s slim volume, minute in its choice of particulars, is but a detail of that complete portrait.

Joseph N. Tylenda, S.J.

A Case for Due Process in the Church: Father Eugene O'Callaghan, American Pioneer of Dissent.

To speak of proper canonical procedure in the contemporary church frequently and inaccurately brands one as a reactionary. Few American Catholics know that in the last century it was the liberal priests who called for the full implementation of canon law in the United States. C. recounts the story of one such priest, Eugene O'Callaghan of the Diocese of Cleveland, who anonymously wrote the classical Jus Letters in the New York Freeman's Journal between December 1868 and March 1870. O'Callaghan protested against the missionary status of American priests which enabled their bishops to transfer them at will with no recourse except to a disciplinary committee appointed by the bishop. He urged that
parishes and irremovable pastors be canonically established in the U.S. The missionary status, he argued, reduced priests to a position of servitude. At times his language was vehement, as when he wrote of the form of trial prescribed by the Second Plenary Council (1866): "it only seems to mock the helplessness of the priest by telling him that after being hanged (suspended), the bishop who played the triple role of judge, jury, and hangman may, if he choose, then grant him a trial!"

O'Callaghan had had personal experience of clerical discipline. He was removed from his parish for failing to raise the full amount of a seminary tax imposed on it by Bishop Amadeus Rappe, but with the Bishop's permission he did go to Rome in 1869 and win his case. In 1871 he was suspended for offering legal advice in the civil court against the diocese. Later on he disputed with Bishop Richard Gilmour, a strong opponent of priests' rights. But his fundamental motive in all his arguments was to provide better spiritual care for the people entrusted to American priests. In a very readable style, C. portrays a dedicated priest who was years ahead of his time. The book is principally valuable for its reproduction of the bulk of the Jus Letters.

Gerald P. Fogarty, S.J.


Neuhaus says the ecology movement is "a seductive diversion" from the political because "it shifts our attention from conflicts of power to an organic model of society in harmony with the imperatives of nature." In their concern for ecology, Americans are turning from the Judeo-Christian myth of concern for mankind as the center of all things toward an ecological myth which gives reverence and "rights" to nature. In this shift of values N. finds a bias against the poor, if not against people in general. Thus he writes "in defense of people."

Population control is surely biased against people, and frequently against poor people. N. deftly reveals the totalitarian tendencies among many of its champions. In dealing with other issues raised by the ecology movement, his book is often disappointing. Although man's alienation from nature is a principal concern of the ecology movement, N. avoids a discussion of the issue by flatly denying any "rights" for nature and dogmatically reasserting the political cosmology of the Judeo-Christian: "man has been given stage center by the decree of an Other." Too often he raises an issue and quickly closes off discussion with a final statement.

N. says the ecologists are opportunists moving into a vacuum created by the distrust we Americans feel about ourselves after Indochina. In his final chapter, therefore, he presents his own vision of American world involvement and calls for a "covenant with the [world's] poor." This covenant "could take dramatic political form in the proposal that the United States devote 2 percent (approximately 20 billion) of its annual Gross National Product in non-military assistance to underdeveloped countries." Only time will tell if politics and the American dollar are proper symbols for world development. Ecologists would likely say that an organic model of man in nature is a more realistic vision for this development.

Francis A. Lalley, S.J.


Oscar and Mary Handlin aim to
give an account of "the developing ways of leaving home" from 1600 to 1970. They consider this a neglected aspect of the American past and so want to show the interaction of parents, jobs, and schools on youth. However, with no grasp of psychology, sociology, or family studies, this book really becomes mainly a history of American education. This is "facing life" from the viewpoint of an academic historian.

Consequently, American youths (mostly nameless in order not "to load the text with a mass of identifying detail") struggle into adulthood in an unreal, abstract world. There is a weightless floating quality to the text, perhaps due to the absence of regionalism, small mention of women, and the fact that Blacks and other ethnic minorities hardly appear. Religion is also ignored as an intellectual force; in fact, the only ideas which are discussed are the different philosophies of education which waxed and waned over the decades. Indeed, the cataloguing of the confusions, uncertainties, and difficulties of American education is the only thing which keeps the reader from utter boredom and disappointment.

The worst is saved for last. In the final chapter the Handlins rise to new heights of banality. Every issue in the student rebellions of the 60's is dismissed as but a "pretext" on the part of spoiled, permissively raised children. Suddenly the Handlins, who have spent 257 pages criticizing American education and the universities, turn about and castigate the student rebels. These young people are but "Visigoths" led by adults "avid for popularity" who join in the "barbaric yawp" of criticism. Obviously, the Handlins see themselves defending civilization, culture, and rational scholarly discipline, but their own illogical ranting makes the reader wince.

It is distressing to see a good historian of the past become inept at facing life in the present.

Sidney Callahan


The sociology of a nation focused upon the lives of real, everyday people, their motivations and frustrations—this is the book's major achievement. It employs results of several polls to determine future trends in population growth and resulting social change. The thesis is that present contraceptive devices and education are grossly inadequate. One learns that contraception is used by 97% of American married couples, that one in every three first births is premaritally conceived, that 39% of Catholic women use the Pill, and that one half of U.S. priests hold contraception permissible.

But there are flaws. At times statistics shroud the clarity of presentation; and some crucial statements are unfounded, such as reference to the "100,000" illegal abortions in California each year. I further question the extensive use of comparison of "black" and "white" data. Such a categorization often combines all races, except black, into the "whites." There are many races, most in the process of diffusing, in this country—not two. There is an error of interpretation: the authors state that Protestants believe that the embryo is not a "living thing." They do not. The question is whether it is a "human living thing" or not yet ensouled, not yet "human."

In chap. 4 the authors assume an emotionalism characteristic of most abortion debates. They chide hospitals and physicians that refuse to perform
abortions, even if it is their constitutional right to do so. Their questions and answers are loaded; and even after admitting that 95% of women reject abortion-on-demand, they purposely slant the chapter along the opposite bias. Still, the book must be admired for its realism and personalization, and its attempt to scientify the social sciences.

Paul R. Gastonguay


It is ironical, if hardly surprising, that the most vital Christian painter of our century was totally neglected by the churches, and this just when the liturgical movement got under way. This was surely no fault of Fr. M. A. Couturier or the other stalwarts of L'Art sacré. Jacques and Raïssa Maritain, too, did their best to awaken the Catholic imagination to a giant, every one of whose works (even paintings of criminals and prostitutes) was suffused with Christianity. D.'s volume is a substantive addition to the growing Rouault bibliography. Indeed, apart from Lionello Venturi's Skira volume, and in some ways even surpassing it, this is the one major study easily available in this country.

D. situates Rouault in the wider context of the Catholic intellectual revival in early-twentieth-century France. Bloy, whom Rouault resembles in many ways, is shown to be a great influence on him as on many contemporaries. J.-K. Huysmans, of whom so little has been heard lately, here reappears as a vigorous presence, together with Claudel and his peers. Yet this becomes no mere nostalgic litany of giants. Rouault is the theme, more precisely his sense of suffering and salvation; for D. is a professional theologian aware of the tensions between art and religion, of Catholic and Protestant approaches to aesthetic value, and the like. I have some reservations about his choice of Claudel as spokesman for (or rather against) the baroque, with no reference to Wittkower, Schlosser, or Watkin, whose insights here are so much more perceptive. More disappointing was D.'s failure to mention the late André Girard, Rouault's unique student and an artist of real stature. Surely no one understood Rouault so well. Apart from these lacunae, one strongly recommends D.'s book to anyone interested in Rouault or in problems of religious art, or even simply in the human condition as experienced by an intense Christian.

C. J. McNaspy, S.J.

BOOKS RECEIVED

[All books received are listed here whether they are reviewed or not]

SCRIPTURAL STUDIES


Dauer, Anton. Die Passionsgeschichte


DOCTRINAL THEOLOGY


Coleman, Richard J. Issues of Theo-


HISTORICAL


**MORAL, LAW, LITURGY**


Neuhausler, E. *Exigence de Dieu et morale chrétienne: Études sur les


PASTORAL AND ASCETICAL


Saint Joseph durant les quinze premiers siècles (= Cahiers de José-
**PHILOSOPHY**


**SPECIAL QUESTIONS**


