traditions were taking form. He raised the questions which are still unresolved. This excellent translation of a fundamental work is an appropriate tribute to N., whose sudden death has left all OT scholars poorer.

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Vogels wishes to define a genre made up of three elements: (1) a cry for help amid adversity, (2) a promise of salvation, and (3) a demand for submission. If the suffering behind the call for help is seen as a punishment for sin, this element will include an act of contrition. The connection among the elements is not one of cause and effect. The promise is simply occasioned by the cry, and the submission demanded is actually made possible by the help offered, not produced by it.

Obviously these ideas of human need and divine intervention, God’s gift and man’s response, fit neatly into the OT scheme of things. Hence it is not surprising to find examples of the proposed royal promise in all strata of the OT: JE, P, D, and the prophets. It is natural, too, to connect it with a concept commonly considered to pervade OT theology: the covenant conceived after the model of a treaty. V. traces this connection especially through the rhet, the indictment of Israel for infidelity to the covenant which could turn into a call for repentance. In this case its natural sequel is contrition and petition, and this sets the scene for the promise. He also finds a parallel to the promise in the treaty literature, in the prologue of the treaty between Shuppiluliuma of Hatti and Mattiwa of Mitanni describing Mattiwa’s call for help, Shuppiluliuma’s promise to intervene, and Mattiwa’s offer to submit to his lord’s will.

The thesis is interesting, but some reservations are in order. Has it really been shown that the genre is an independent, relatively fixed form of expression? A number of the proposed examples show the three elements only when verses from different literary strata are taken as a unit. Perhaps the compilers combined their sources according to a set pattern, but for the supposition to be convincing the evidence of the structure imposed will have to stand out. In fact, it does not. Either another pattern can be discerned (e.g., in Ex 3, the revelation of the divine name, a basic exodus tradition) or there are too many disparate elements to fit into it (e.g., in Hos 2, a collection of oracles on a theme where the promise elements are just three among many). Even in the passages where the pattern is not constructed out of disjecta membra, it is often not clear. Even here the three elements are there only among
many others. Why concentrate on them and not the others? One does so legitimately only if the elements form the backbone of the passage so that other things depend on them, and this is hardly shown to be the case.

The difficulty in seeing the genre as an independent unit is compounded by the vocabulary. If the promise is connected with covenant, it belongs to the legal sphere, and in law the need for precision usually produces a technical vocabulary. V. does attempt a comparison with legal terminology, but he finds only general terms common to legal practice and to the promise, and they have no fixed role in the latter. Hence vocabulary does not help to define the genre. This lack does not disprove the existence of the genre, but it does not help prove it either.

Finally, one must ask what the precise connection between promise and covenant is. It is not a necessary one. The Hebrew seldom mentions b'rtt in relation to the royal promise, and never makes b'rtt the cause or underlying explanation of the promise. In the parallel from the treaty the promise precedes any covenant. In fact, V. proposes a scheme which proceeds from promise to covenant to new promise. This is logical enough, but it is just one possibility. Presently there is a tendency away from too much emphasis on covenant, and this is good. Other images of the Yahweh-Israel relationship need explanation. In connection with the promise, one might suggest the importance of simple benevolence, or of a divine noblesse oblige, or of a quasi-familial union, among others.

To conclude: it seems to me that in the case of the royal promise it is better not to speak of a genre. This does not mean that the promise is nothing. One might speak of themes which are variously expressed and variously combined while retaining a basic unity of meaning. These are worth study, and one should consider the variety in the use of the themes as well as the similarity. Further, this study should consider the variety of possible theological contexts for the themes, not stop with covenant.

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To judge from the brief title of the English version, one might suppose that it is another contribution to the new quest for the historical Jesus. However, only the second chapter is devoted to this topic. The title of the German original (1968) brings out more clearly the far-reaching theme of the author: “Jesus Christ in the Manifold Witness of the New Testament.” The book is, indeed, as the brief description on the jacket states, “Schweizer’s New Testament theology in a nutshell.”
The introductory chapter outlines S.'s purpose and takes up the problem of the "sources for the life of Jesus." Chap. 2 (the "historical Jesus" chapter) is entitled: "Jesus: The Man Who Fits No Formula." S. finds in the doubtful pre-Easter origin of virtually all the Christological titles a positive theological significance: "By his very act of avoiding all common labels, Jesus keeps free the heart of the man who encounters him" (p. 22). Chaps. 2 and 3 contrast the Jewish-Christian ("Jesus, Who Will Soon Return") and the Hellenistic ("The Heavenly Jesus") Christologies. The former, eschatologically oriented, saw in the Easter experience the beginning of the end, whereas the latter, with its high regard for the enthusiastic working of the spirit, viewed Pentecost as the realization of the coming end. Accordingly, Jesus' lordship was interpreted either cosmologically, i.e., His exaltation anticipated His future position as judge of all the world, or existentially, insofar as Jesus is lord of His community. These two views are not necessarily irreconcilable, but with the fading of apocalyptic expectations, an individualistic hope for eternal life came to predominate in Gentile communities.

Although "at first Easter overshadowed everything else and... the cross was understood basically as a passage to Jesus' exaltation" (p. 91), subsequent theological reflection, utilizing the OT theme of the Suffering Servant, brought out the redemptive significance of Jesus' death (chap. 5). This line of development reaches its culmination in Paul, for whom Christ's death meant "the end of the law" (Rom 10:4), which "was robbed of its power, (so that) man could once more stand face to face with God without the necessity of seeing God only through the law and its demands" (p. 105). The chapter also includes brief treatments of the Pauline understanding of life "in Christ" and of baptism and the Eucharist.

Chap. 6 traces the continuation of the theological development in the tradition before the writing of the Gospels and in the individual Evangelists. S., avoiding the usual denigration of the "early Catholicism" of Luke, acknowledges the positive theological contribution of the third Evangelist: "Far more consciously than Paul or the evangelists before him he sensed that he was living in a different age.... The chain whose links are the earthly Jesus, the twelve apostles, Paul and elders is not intended to guarantee the transmission of unaltered tradition... but the steady advance of God" (p. 150).

In the final chapter ("Innovations with the Dawn of Church History") S. deals with "new solutions without direct reference to Paul and John" (p. 178). In his brief treatment of James he acknowledges the problem with which the author of the epistle was confronted, "a Paulinism that has reduced living faith to a set of propositions" (p. 183), as in the
Pastorals, and also the value of the work as a “beneficial exhortation to live the life of faith in all its practical consequences” (p. 184), even though the express affirmation that a man will be justified by works (2:21, 24–25) can scarcely be reconciled with Paul.

S.’s insistence on the openness of the NT encourages the contemporary theologian to recognize the necessity of constantly rethinking the good news about Jesus Christ in the ever-changing context of new situations, new dangers, and a new manner of speaking about God. However, some individual positions can be questioned. Are the Matthean antitheses (Mt 5:21–48) really an expression of the consciousness of the historical Jesus (p. 14)? A comparison with their Lucan parallels suggests that they are rather the result of Matthean redaction. Although “Christ” and “Son of God” may be virtually synonymous in Mark, can we be so sure that the latter title “would have differed little from that of Messiah” (p. 16), particularly in view of its almost total absence in Jewish tradition? Is the significance of the present tense in the beatitude “Theirs is the kingdom of heaven” (Mt 5:3) that “The coming of the kingdom of God is . . . a foregone conclusion” (p. 22), or is the phrase rather to be taken as an expression of Jesus’ “realized eschatology”? Are the words “Jesus came and said to them” (Mt 28:18) sufficient reason for understanding the climactic scene of Matthew’s Gospel “as taking place on earth” (p. 47), instead of as “an appearance from on high” (Fuller)? How strong is the evidence that Jesus’ burial “had to be performed in great haste before the Sabbath began” (p. 48)?

The translation reads smoothly and generally conveys the sense of the original with reasonable accuracy, if not always with notable elegance.

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Undoubtedly the two most important essays in the collection are those on Paul's anthropology (chap. 1) and on justification and salvation history in Romans (chap. 3). The first takes as its starting point Bultmann's characterization of Pauline theology as an "anthropology" and his stress on Paul's understanding of man as an individual confronted with a challenge (along with its corollary that Pauline Christology is actually a soteriology). But K. insists that "it is not permissible to interpret man as an individual, resting with himself and fundamentally separable from the rest of the world" (p. 17); his "being is open towards all sides and is always set in a structure of solidarity" (p. 22). Hence "the terms used in Pauline anthropology [body, flesh, soul, spirit] all undoubtedly refer to the whole man in the varying bearings and capacities of his existence; but they do not apply to what we call the individual at all. Here existence is always fundamentally conceived from the angle of the world to which one belongs" (p. 26). In the long run this anthropology is a "crystallized cosmology" (p. 29), a "cosmology in concreto, even in the sphere of faith" (p. 27). Because man is freed in Christ Jesus from a concern for his own salvation, he then becomes free for other people; his life becomes, like the life of his Lord, vicarious service for all fallen, perverted, and subjugated creatures. With such a corrected view of anthropology, one might wonder how K. would react to K. Stendahl's thesis, "The Apostle Paul and Introspective Conscience of the West" (HTR 56 [1963] 199–215), which maintained that since Augustine and Luther a wrong emphasis had been put on Pauline theology, and on the Letter to the Romans in particular, in the view of it as a doctrine of justification of the individual sinner. Stendahl sought instead to stress "a concept of revelation based on salvation history" (p. 60). K. takes up this issue in his third chapter, and reaffirms the centrality of justification by faith as the key issue in Pauline theology (p. 74): "Paul's doctrine of justification, with the doctrine of the law that belongs to it, is ultimately his interpretation of Christology,...a Christology, indeed, won from Jesus' cross and hence an offensive Christology" (p. 73). But "it neither can nor may continue to be interpreted in exclusively individual terms," for "Stendahl and his friends..."
are right in protesting against the individualist curtailment of the Christian message; here the twentieth century must dissociate itself from the nineteenth” (p. 74). The result is that K. would retain both justification and salvation history, but emphasize the former. The reason for this is seen in another of these essays, that on the saving significance of the death of Jesus in Paul (chap. 2). In it K. reacts against the modern tendency to play down the role of the cross in Pauline theology and to emphasize Jesus’ resurrection. K. writes forcefully in defense of the Reformation principle *crux sola nostra theologia*. This essay needs to be read particularly by Roman Catholics of today who are caught up in the current vogue of emphasis on the so-called paschal mystery. K.’s words will restore some of the balance needed, even though he has over-stressed his own position. He loves to generalize, and at times he talks off the top of his head as badly as those whose theses he delights in tearing down. He says, e.g.: “Paul only spoke of the resurrection of Christ in connection with, and as the beginning of, the resurrection of the dead in general” (p. 55). But if he would turn to Rom 4:25, he would find Paul relating Christ’s resurrection explicitly to “our justification,” and precisely in a phrase parallel to His death “for our trespasses.” And this is not *Schwärmerei*.

The other essays are concerned with individual passages in Paul’s letters: Abraham’s faith in Romans 4 is analyzed; the cry of liberty in the worship of the Church is an exegetical study of Rom 8:26–27; the contrast of the spirit and the letter offers an interpretation of Rom 2:27–29; 7:6, and 2 Cor 3:6 (emphasizing the meaning of “letter” as the works-burden imposed by the Mosaic Law); and the theological problem presented by the motif of the Body of Christ (chap. 5) carries on earlier studies of the motif that K. had written elsewhere.

There are real insights into Pauline theology in this book, characteristic of K., as he is known to the modern NT world of scholarship. As he says, “Controversy is the breath of life to a German theologian” (p. 60), and those who have known him and his previous writings will not be disappointed here. But K. does not always write clearly, and one has to fight one’s way through jargon redolent of Heidegger, Kirkegaard, and Bultmann to get to the nuggets. In this regard the English title, *Perspectives on Paul*, is more apt to this collection of essays than its German counterpart, *Paulinische Perspektiven*; for the insights are those of K., who writes in some of the essays more as a systematic theologian (in the Evangelical-Lutheran sense) than as a NT interpreter. For the reader of these essays should realize that he is confronted by one who does not tolerate fools gladly and often says so. His attitude is summed up in a few sentences on p. 49: “It is not entirely by chance that
contemporary Protestantism feels itself more at home with Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism than with radical historical criticism and a demythologizing which I am convinced is the logical consequence and the admittedly rationalistic expression of a radical Reformed theology of the cross. This diagnosis will hardly find general acceptance, but that does not greatly concern me. Taboos against which argument is no avail are not only a reality and a power in primitive societies. The diagnosis can only be supported if we have a better understanding of the relationship of the cross to the resurrection than most Pauline interpretations display.” It is this controversial attitude that leads K. to indulge in generalities (“Christianity has always made even Christ unbelievable, and has discouraged as many people as it has attracted” [p. 53]; “where the Kyrios is turned into an example and a model, Pauline anthropology also becomes unbearably stunted and falsely orientated” [p. 25; but cf. 1 Cor 11:1]), and to make statements that are not always consistent (compare his statements about Bultmann’s anthropology beginning with the individual on pp. 2, 10, 65, in the last two cases referring to the same passages in Bultmann’s History and Eschatology and his Theology of the New Testament).

K.’s writings are provocative, and they are deliberately meant to stir up his contemporaries; the nuggets of interpretation of Pauline passages are embedded in them. The reader will have to decide for himself which he thinks are of more lasting value, the interpretations or the provocations.

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Theology today is conscious of the need to take seriously its dialogue with the world. Yet does not the Christian claim that a true realization of man in the world is possible only in Christ make any genuine dialogue with the world impossible? This is the problem to which Boers, professor at Emory University, addresses himself. Part 1, “The Teaching of Jesus,” is concerned with “the function of the parables in the ministry of Jesus” and “Jesus and the kingdom of God.” Boers believes that, contrary to what the Synoptics might lead us to think, “a pre-disposition (i.e. a faith commitment) was required neither for the understanding of the pictorial side of the parables nor for that of their material side” (p. 21). B. rejects the view that Jesus’ conduct or teaching implies a Christology unless “Christology can be understood as nothing other than a cypher for the hermeneutic of reality” (p. 25).
B. recognizes that in the Church a Christological exclusiveness soon established itself, combined at times with predestinarian overtones, e.g., “No one is capable of coming to me if the Father who sent me does not draw him” (Jn 6:44). However, he sees an expression of “Christianity as humanism” in Mt 25:31-46, where corporal works of mercy performed by Christians for the benefit of other Christians are taken as having been done to Christ, even though the persons who performed them did not have Jesus in mind at the time (v. 44).

Finally, B. sees Paul unconsciously breaking through the barriers of his Christological exclusiveness when he comes to write about the faith of Abraham in Rom 4. Whereas in Gal 3:6-29 the link between Abraham and the Christian is found in Christ (v. 16: “your seed”), in Rom 4 Paul makes Abraham’s faith the type of the faith of the Christian not because its object is Christ but because of the structural analogy between the two faiths (p. 99). Both Abraham and the Christian believe in God who raises the dead to life, but whereas in a Christian context this amounts to faith in the resurrection of Jesus (v. 24), for Abraham this faith was directed towards God’s ability to give him a son, Isaac, despite the condition of “his body which had died, being one hundred years old, and the dead state of the womb of Sarah” (v. 19). The book ends with an appendix on “The Recent History of the Interpretation of the Parable Chapter, Mark 4” and has text and subject indices.

B. has raised a real problem, but I am doubtful about the exegetical solidity of certain parts of the presentation. Thus, while it is clear that Jesus Himself did not use parables to conceal His teaching from the crowds (Mk 4:11) nor provide them with allegorical interpretations reserved for the disciples alone (Mk 4:34), it is far from clear that none of Jesus’ parables were intended to summon His hearers to faith in what was going on in His ministry. There would seem to be room for some middle ground between Jeremías’ position that all the parables are Christological and B.’s opinion that none of them are, i.e., that their original purpose lay “in interpreting or disclosing the truth about man’s situation in his world” (p. 22).

While reading the pages in which B. endeavors to establish that Jesus’ person was without significance for His own proclamation, I was reminded of recent efforts to show that Jesus was a Zealot or at least sympathetic to the Zealot cause. Though the hypothesis cannot be rejected as absolutely impossible, it can find no basis in an objective exegesis of the Gospels.

Concerning Mt 25:31-46, B. himself acknowledges: “This passage then does not seem to be as profitable for our inquiry as one may have hoped” (p. 71). Only in his consideration of Rom 4 (in which he is
largely dependent on Jülicher) does the problem of the book come through clearly and convincingly. But does this passage really suggest that Christianity should abandon its Christological exclusiveness? Such a step would seem to be not an emergence from the ghetto but a denial of what is most vital to Christian faith; for the uniqueness of Christ's saving role is central to the Christian faith experience and cannot be denied without denying the experience itself. Yet B.'s problem remains. That this experience may not be something of the purely subjective order, the Christian seems forced to universalize it: "There is salvation in no one else" (Acts 4:12). But how, then, is he to understand the non-Christian faith of Abraham or, for that matter, of the modern Jew? Is he forced to make crypto-Christians out of them despite all evidence to the contrary? This is the agonizing question which we must face if we are to extend ecumenism beyond merely inter-Christian dialogue.

The English of this work leaves much to be desired.

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SCHUYLER BROWN, S.J.


The first volume of Prof. Pelikan's projected five-volume history of Christian doctrine renews in spectacular fashion a genre that seems to have lost much of its appeal for an increasingly activistic generation of scholars and students. As the general title suggests, the work is not intended as a simple history of dogma, i.e., of those doctrines which have been defined and officially proclaimed as truths of faith by the Church; nor does it purport to be a full-scale history of theology, i.e., of the thought and private beliefs of individual theologians within the Church. Its precise subject matter is Christian doctrine, by which P. means what the Church of Jesus Christ believed, taught, and confessed (cf. Rom 10:8–10) on the basis of the word of God at various moments in its history—in short, the doctrinal rather than the ethical content of the Church's teaching as expressed in the writings of its leading spokesmen, its credal statements, its exegesis, its apologies, its preaching, its piety, and its liturgical life.

The book opens with an introductory chapter ("Praeparatio Evangelica") which explores the relation of Christianity to Judaism, out of which it arose, and to Greek philosophic thought, with which it eventually came into contact. There follows a discussion of early heterodox or heretical Christian movements (Marcionism, Gnosticism, Montanism),
after which P. turns to the major theological developments of the first six centuries in the realms of soteriology, ecclesiology and sacramental doctrine, Trinitarian speculation, Christology, and Christian anthropology. The last chapter is devoted appropriately to a brief account of the attempts to arrive at an orthodox consensus on the part of the authors of late antiquity, both in the West and in the East, who sum up or sift out the work of their predecessors and serve as a direct link between the early Church and the Middle Ages. The discussion avoids the danger of superficiality or randomness by focusing, whenever possible, on specific texts in which the problems at hand may be thought to have achieved their classic expression, or else by concentrating on certain key concepts and using them as pegs on which to hang considerations of a broader nature. A carefully selected and briefly annotated bibliography of some five hundred items in at least six different languages accompanies the text. One should also note the original and highly attractive format, which does away with the usual infantry boots of scholarship by placing the essential references in the wide margins of the page.

P. is a master craftsman, who excels at weaving a plethora of pullulating theological detail into a series of coherent and well-delineated patterns. To the qualities of the writer are joined those of the historian who is aware of the limitations of his discipline, who never confuses vagueness with heresy or an underdeveloped doctrine with a false one, who knows that alternatives are not always clear to those who face them for the first time and that heresy is often a matter of "poor timing" (p. 70), who can draw clean lines of demarcation without sacrificing the penumbra that separates orthodoxy from heterodoxy (p. 122), and who is sensitive to the positive contribution occasionally made by heretics themselves to the settlement of a controverted issue or the hammering out of a victorious doctrine (p. 81).

There are, as might be expected, numerous questions of selection, interpretation, or emphasis that could easily lend themselves to debate. It is surprising, e.g., that Augustine's highly original and influential views hardly receive any mention at all in the thematic discussion of the evolution of Trinitarian doctrine. Over and beyond these points of detail, however, lies the deeper issue of the nature of historical theology, which, as P. understands it, has to satisfy both the demands of scientific objectivity and the rightful claims of orthodox belief and must therefore be attentive to the elements of continuity and permanence as well as of change, novelty, and growth in the transmission of the Christian message. The methodological assumptions underlying the author's position have been set forth in two companion volumes to which the reader is referred in the bibliography: Development of Christian

Broadly speaking, P.'s approach may be described as an effort to break out of the dilemma in which historical theology has been caught up since the days of Harnack and Troeltsch, a dilemma perhaps best defined by the two poles of late-nineteenth-century thought, positivism and historicism. The evolution of Christian doctrine is viewed, not as a disastrous historical accident or a fatal compromise with contemporary secular thought (Harnack), but rather as a matter of theological necessity, motivated among other factors by a legitimate desire to preserve the integrity of the Catholic teaching from the encroachments of philosophy. Unlike Troeltsch, on the other hand, P. carefully steers clear of the relativism that threatens any attempt to interpret specific Christian teachings in terms of the social and political conditions of the period to which they belong. His own chief concern is with the inner dynamics and logical validity of the doctrines under scrutiny.

The only question in this reviewer's mind is not whether P. is justified in breaking with the tradition of his predecessors, but whether the break is radical enough. P. observes rightly that orthodox theology was characterized throughout the early centuries by the tension between biblical and philosophic doctrine (p. 50), and he records faithfully several remarks made by the Christian writers themselves which suggest that their most explicit teaching did not always correspond to their most profound teaching (cf. pp. 46, 115, 349, et passim). Yet not much attention is paid to the possible conclusions to be drawn from such remarks. There is ample reason to suspect that the Church Fathers not only made the most of the alliance between the Christian faith and pagan philosophy but in many instances deliberately and shrewdly postulated a greater alliance than actually existed (cf. p. 42). A classic example of that method of procedure is to be found in Basil's Letter to Young Men on Reading Greek Literature, a text replete with quotations from the classical authors, virtually all of which have been distorted to suit the requirements of the case.

The same failure to take into account the element of accommodation in the works of the Fathers may be partly responsible for other conspicuous omissions. The first chapter includes an interesting discussion of the closing of the School of Athens by Justinian, which is described with some justification as the act of a coroner rather than of an executioner (p. 41). Not a word is said on the other hand about the School of Alexandria, which managed to avert a similar fate by coming to terms with the ecclesiastical authorities. It is significant that the leader of the
school, Ammonius, was never baptized but, by baptizing Aristotle, did something which, directly or indirectly, was to prove far more important for the future development of Christian doctrine in the West. Analogous considerations would apply from a slightly different point of view to such writers as the Pseudo-Dionysius and particularly Boethius, who, as Courcelle has shown, had probably been a student of Ammonius in Alexandria and whose works reflect some of the same general preoccupations.

Whatever else may be said about it, the book as a whole bears out P.'s claim that there is more to be learned about what the early Christian believed and taught than was recognized by the older history of dogma. As such, it fully deserves the lively interest with which it has been greeted not only by theologians and Church historians but students of intellectual history as well. The fact that it is the first book by a non-Catholic to have earned the Shea prize awarded by the American Catholic Historical Association bears eloquent witness to the thoroughly ecumenical spirit in which it was written. More than most endeavors of its kind, it is capable of providing a much-needed antidote to what P. himself once described as "the murky subjectivities of a religious solipsism that cannot see beyond the borders of its own century."

Boston College

Ernest L. Fortin


The publication of Crouzel's latest work will not be a disappointment to those who have come to appreciate the depth of scholarship associated with his contributions to patristics. This study of the divorce-remarriage problematic in the first five centuries of Christianity is concise and abundant in cross references and bibliographical sources. In spite of the great number of texts treated and the four hundred years of Church life examined, C.'s exegeses are carefully presented and precisely worded. Where textual problems exist, they are discussed and a scholarly judgment is offered. If a reference to remarriage is made in these centuries and is extant today, it is virtually sure to be found and discussed in this study. Without doubt, this will for some time be the work to be consulted by any theologian seeking to do serious work on divorce-remarriage during those centuries.

Certain questions, however, about C.'s principles of interpretation need to be asked. I first came to this conclusion when I read his book, after having independently worked through these texts myself shortly before reading it and having come to somewhat of a different under-
standing of what the Fathers were saying. The question of method arose and grew as I saw excellent exposition and control of data but was left wondering just how he was able to draw the conclusions he did from the raw data he had amassed.

The questions I am asking have obvious application far beyond Crouzel. Determining an author's meaning, especially one of many centuries ago, goes beyond the plain sense of the words and is an inquiry which is occupying much time and space in theological journals and monographs. C.'s book is an excellent model for examination; it is scholarly and well reasoned and is authored by one of the finest patrologists alive. For sake of control, my inquiry will involve several small sections of the work. I have chosen to remain within his discussion of the pre-Nicene Fathers, because I am convinced we have less evidence for certainties in that period of the Church's life than we have in later centuries.

In a preliminary chapter, C. discusses the biblical background of divorce-remarriage. Mt 19:3–9 is expressed in the context of the famed Hillel-Shammai debate; the failure of certain Fathers to employ the exceptive phrase of Mt 5:32 and 19:9 is due to their citation from memory and to the fact that the phrase at that moment does not interest them; and the eunuch section of Mt 19:10–12 is a panicked reaction on the part of the disciples to Jesus' absolute prohibition of remarriage after divorce even for adultery.

While C.'s understanding of the NT evidence might be correct, it is not necessarily so and, to my mind, a more than plausible case can be made to the contrary. His taking the biblical evidence as an absolute prohibition of remarriage, which is highly debatable, leaves him with the presumption that the earliest Fathers will read Mt as he does and will therefore be working in the context of indissolubility.

The first major figure taken by C. is Hermas, in whose penitential theme a man is to put away an adulterous wife in order that she might repent and return. He must not remarry lest he become himself an adulterer, because he must be prepared to receive her back when she repents. There is, however, only one repentance for a Christian.

C.'s reading of Hermas is accurate; the questions about interpretation arise when he asks what Hermas meant. He concludes that while adultery (according to Hermas) does in one sense rupture the conjugal bond in that the community life of marriage is broken, the marital bond actually continues to exist, thus making any second marriage in the case of divorce into adultery. Several distinctions, I believe, must be made: (1) Hermas, in prohibiting remarriage after divorce on account of adultery, offers repentance as reason for the prohibition. If, according
to Hermas, there is only one repentance, this reason ceases to be valid in the case of a recidivist adulteress, and no other reason is given to prevent remarriage to the innocent husband. (2) To retroject later Church practice in forbidding remarriage to the innocent husband would be poor methodology—as would be retrojection of a later awareness of the normative nature of the NT. We cannot adduce what we have no evidence for. (3) If Hermas lived in a world where it was common practice in case of infidelity for an innocent husband to divorce an adulteress and in divorcing her to have the right to remarry, it would seem that if he opposed this he would make his opposition quite clear. And indeed he does oppose such a practice. Why? Because that repentance which is central to his work is prevented in case of remarriage. But an integral part of his repentance theme is a single repentance. His own opposition to remarriage is occasioned, by his own words, by the theme of repentance, which happens to be allowable only once. Does Hermas envision the case of the innocent husband with a wife who has been repeatedly adulterous? Does he have a clear notion of what we now call “marital indissolubility”? These two questions are vital: what is not envisioned can hardly be forbidden. Of course, the converse of this is not necessarily true—Hermas may well have opposed remarriage, even forbidden it, for the husband of a recidivist adulteress, but if he did so we simply have no such evidence. In fact, if for a moment we put aside later developments in Christian theology, we could be led to conclude that, by not mentioning remarriage for the innocent spouse after divorcing a repeatedly unfaithful wife, Hermas infers toleration. Hermas is not hesitant to condemn and to tell why he does so as regards a single fall from fidelity; why does he not take the equally probable case in which she never returns? We must keep in mind that Hermas is the earliest discussion we have of divorce-remarriage outside Scripture. Only if we accept C.’s understanding of the NT marriage-divorce pericopes can we presume the innocent husband bound in all cases.

In discussing the First Apology of Justin Martyr, C. judges that Justin deliberately suppresses part of Mt 5:32. At this early date is it possible for us to know whether (1) Justin is suppressing or changing part of a verse, or whether (2) this is the text with which he is familiar? To say he “suppresses” before we can be sure of a fixed text is to presume an unprovable interpretation of Mt on the part of Justin.

It could be noted that this same section of the First Apology treats Christian patience and swearing (chap. 16) and civil obedience (chap. 17) in exactly the same manner in which it speaks of Christians not divorcing except for adultery. In other words, Justin is putting the Church’s best face forward for his “pagan” readers and not offering a
manual of pastoral theology. Cannot the question be raised whether or not Justin is painting the ideal picture—the way it should be for Christians—without ever intending to reflect the oftentimes painful reality of a very human Christian community?

Athenagoras is seen by C. as forbidding any second marriages after divorce. That he does this is indisputable; however, a problem remains in that Athenagoras appears to forbid remarriage to a widow as well and in the same breath and for the same reason. C. opts for an interpretation which would limit Athenagoras’ prohibition to the case of divorce, but fails to answer the plain sense of the text or the context in which it is expressed; marriage is only for childbearing, and one marriage is itself a concession for that purpose. Whether or not the rigidity we see throughout Athenagoras is an antecedent to Montanism, it does appear that his rigidity is atypical and hardly characteristic of the Church. It surely did not take root within orthodox Christianity. Is Athenagoras a fair witness for “Church practice”? Or is he not, rather, a witness for a minority view which eventually was led into heterodoxy?

Surprisingly, C. gives only slightly more than a page to Theophilus of Antioch. This bishop was the first Father to state clearly the inspiration of the NT, the first to call the Gospel accounts a “holy, divine word.” As well, he was the first to use clearly the exceptive phrase of Mt 5:32. While C. does not suggest that Theophilus pronounced on the situation of the innocent husband, he takes no note of the fact that the only “man” mentioned in Theophilus relative to divorce-remarriage is the one who marries a divorced woman. Why, since Theophilus knows and accepts Mt 5:32 with the exceptive phrase as a “holy, divine word,” does he not comment on the innocent husband’s right or denial of remarriage? Perhaps everyone in the Church knew what was to be done in such a case? Perhaps innocent husbands never wanted to remarry? The second century world allowed such a remarriage, with only Athenagoras (a contemporary in Egypt, quite unlike Theophilus) forbidding it. If we must assume anything, it should be that the husband could remarry.

C. concludes that Clement of Alexandria clearly forbids remarriage after any separation. This has been often suggested and indeed is quite plausible; however, let us see what Clement says: (1) Marriage is to be permanent (Mt: 5:32 or 19:9 with a version of the exceptive phrase is used); (2) the marriage of those separated while a spouse is alive is adultery; (3) he who marries a woman who has been put away commits adultery; (4) anyone putting aside his wife makes her an adulteress. At first glance this appears to confirm C.’s interpretation rather clearly. However, Clement had employed the exceptive phrase in this passage, which is clearly exceptive in the Greek text. “Those separated” seems to include him “putting aside his wife,” but what then of those who have
put aside an adulteress? C. assumes that “those separated” includes the man putting aside an adulterous wife—which assumption is unproved. There appears to be some real doubt as to whether or not Clement considers the case of the innocent husband with a repeatedly unfaithful wife.

I believe enough questions have been raised to demonstrate the ongoing need for re-examining our methodology in reading the Fathers, especially as we seek to synthesize their thought-world on particular issues. Several difficult questions have to be measured and answered:

1) While we admit the parenetic, apologetical, legal or polemical nature of various patristic authors’ works, what weight should be given this factor in asking what they mean?

2) Should we not be more attentive to those cases in which we can logically expect some discussion but fail to find it, especially when there is some consistency in this over a great period of time? For example, does the deafening silence of the early Church (with Athenagoras and Tertullian as Montanist the pre-Nicene exceptions) relative to the innocent husband’s status vis à vis remarriage say something? Many lines are spent in the Fathers discussing the evil of the wife’s remarriage and the evil of a man’s marrying her; why is virtually nothing said of the innocent spouse?

3) In connection with the second question just raised, is this an argument e silentio, as some would suggest, or is this not a valid hermeneutical technique?

4) What role does Scripture play for the pre-Nicene Fathers? Is it normative or is it more often a proof text for their ascetical ideals? Do we carefully enough differentiate between what we consider excellent biblical exegesis and the interpretation found in some Fathers? Can we be certain at very early dates that the Fathers had the same texts we have today, that variants are due to a Father’s changing the text?

5) Do we distinguish adequately between the Christian ideal the Fathers present and the flesh-and-blood world in which they lived? In other words, does the picture they present as what should be always reflect what they demanded as a minimum or even the practice current in their churches?

6) As we take into consideration what an individual Father was saying, do we also take into account what his stated or presumed audience was hearing, their presuppositions, the world in which they lived, etc.?

7) In the area treated by Crouzel, the divorce-remarriage problematic, should we not take greater note of the reason given for prohibition where it exists: possible repentance of the sinful spouse, the NT, ascetical ideals, etc.?

8) Could we not be more careful in checking ourselves against retro-
jecting later views and interpretations into earlier authors dealing with quite different problematics? For example, are we asking the right question when we ask Hermas about indissolubility?

In conclusion, the excellence of C.’s work cannot be denied; it is a contribution worthy of him. It raises more fundamental questions, however, concerning the way we view texts and interpret them. Until we seriously struggle with these and other questions, we may often find ourselves in close kinship with biblical fundamentalism: taking the words as they stand without adequately evaluating context, culture, audience, and purpose.

Marquette University J. Alex Sherlock


This work makes a valuable contribution to the understanding of ecclesiology and its relation to sacramentology in the African tradition as reflected in the times and thought of Cyprian and Augustine. Although Simonis takes a critical stance towards the well-known works of Wilhelm Kamlah and Josef Ratzinger, he really brings nothing new to the controversy about the Church, since the views he holds have already had a thorough exposition in Johannes Quasten’s interpretation of Cyprian’s ecclesiology (Patrology 2) and in Stanislaus J. Grabowski’s The Church: An Introduction to the Theology of St. Augustine (1957). Only S.’s exposition of the ecclesiology of Optatus of Mileve appears to be an original interpretation. However, his evaluation from source material and his restatement of the Cyprian and Augustinian thesis, with its relation to the Donatist heretical controversy, has real value. He reaffirms the expressed views of several theologians and historians, placing them in a proper perspective as attested by reliable sources. S.’s logical analysis of the problem and his insight into its various ramifications are helpful for understanding ecclesiology in an ecumenical perspective. Especially welcome is the demonstration of how many modern ecclesiological connotations encompass the traditional ecclesiology of the African tradition.

The first part deals with ecclesiology before Augustine, while the second half treats the fundamental structure of the Church and sacraments after Augustine. Part 1 is subdivided into (a) Cyprian’s concept of the Church, (b) the Donatist concept, and (c) the ecclesiastical view as expressed by Optatus of Mileve. To defend ecclesiastical unity against
the threat of schism, Cyprian wrote his *De unitate ecclesiae* and many of his letters, basing it, so far as the members of the Church are concerned, on adherence to the bishop. "You should understand that the bishop is in the Church and the Church in the bishop, and that whoever is not with the bishop is not in the Church." The solidarity of the universal Church rests in turn on that of the bishops, who act as a type of senate. One's membership in the Church is confirmed not only by baptism of water but also by baptism of blood, through which, according to Tertullian and Cyprian, salvation is assured even to catechumens, although both held baptism conferred by heretics to be invalid. This does not agree with Donatist ecclesiology. The Donatist thesis on the sanctity of the Church is reaffirmed by Optatus' insistence that "sacramenta se sancta, non per homines." There were two different Donatist tenets which gave rise to Augustine's statements including sinners in the Church on the one hand and excluding them from the Church on the other.

It was the Donatists' erroneous teaching on baptism and the minister of baptism that gave rise to a whole series of Augustine's refutations and affirmations bearing on the Church as the Body of Christ. Ultimately, the question of the administration of baptism resolves itself into the ecclesiological question, who is a member of the Church? The Donatist requirement for sanctity in the minister of baptism is precisely what makes Augustine bring the Church's sanctity into consideration. Her sanctity resolves itself ultimately in Christ, whose Body the Church is, and in the Holy Spirit, the Soul of the Body. Augustine is the interpreter of Scripture in his inclusion of sinners as members of the Church; he is very much the theologian in his exclusion of sinners from the life of the Body. Hence his *Ecclesia visibilis et invisibilis*.

The reader can rely on S.'s competence, clearly delineated in his logical thought and abundant documentation of those areas pertinent to his study. Included also is a detailed outline of primary and secondary sources.

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LUDWIG NEMEC


Most of the barbarians who ruled former Roman lands in Europe had once been confederates or even subjects of the Empire. Their conversion to Christianity took place in a basically Roman framework, and familiarity with Roman ways made the conversion permanent. Unlike these peoples, the Anglo-Saxons who occupied much of Britain were almost
free of Roman influences; the papal missionaries of 597 and their successors had to convert the English culturally as well as religiously. This is the focus of B.'s work: to tell the story of the Romanized church in Britain from its precarious beginnings to the death of the Venerable Bede (735), concentrating on "what has seemed to me the most interesting aspect of Bede's time—the transition from illiterate paganism to the kind of world which enabled him to indulge to the full his delight in learning, teaching and writing" (p. vii).

There were numerous Christians in Britain before the arrival of Augustine of Canterbury—Romano-Britons in the south and the Scotti from Ireland in the north—but "in those parts of Britain which had been settled by the English before 597, Christianity was totally obliterated and was replaced by Germanic paganism" (p. 42). The Roman mission started de novo as an idea of Gregory the Great. Gaulish contacts first brought the English to the Pope's notice, and B. rightly credits Gregory's foresight and determination for the success of the mission. His continued pastoral concern for the new church guaranteed its loyalty to the Holy See and gave it a powerful if distant patron in its dealings with the local authorities. This mutually beneficial relationship between England and Rome continued throughout the seventh and eighth centuries.

The Synod of Whitby (664) assured the unity of the English Church. Benedict Biscop journeyed six times to Rome (ca. 652–686) for badly needed books. Pope Vitalian consecrated Theodore of Tarsus as Archbishop of Canterbury (668) and the study of Greek flourished alongside that of Latin in English schools. An anonymous monk of Whitby compiled the oldest vita of Gregory the Great (ca. 704). Tatwine, Archbishop of Canterbury, wrote a treatise on Latin grammar (ca. 730). Most important of all, by 716 Northumbrian monks at Wearmouth and Jarrow produced the oldest extant manuscript of the complete Vulgate, the celebrated Codex Amiatinus. By the time of Bede's death, events had come full cycle; Anglo-Saxon monks and scholars were exporting religion and learning to the Continent.

B. has told this story in a solid, readable study based on extensive research in primary source material and paleography. He supplements the basic historical narrative with chapters on monastic life, hagiography, secular literature, the Northumbrian Bible, education, and psalmody. The emphasis throughout is on the interrelation of cultural and religious life.

One wishes B. had not limited his scope. More is needed on the Irish influences. Although the controversies concerning tonsure and the date of Easter caused some antipathy between the English and Irish, the
asceticism and learning of the Irish greatly impressed the English, especially Bede, and Celtic attitudes persisted for a long time in Romanized areas. B. should also have been less hesitant in treating the theological and spiritual literature because of their significant place in English Christian culture. The appended bibliography is excellent; in view of the many geographical references in the text, maps of the British Isles and Gaul would have helped.

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JOSEPH F. KELLY


Interest in the life and thought of Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) is understandably as many-sided as were his own interests. The current Cusanus bibliographies published with some regularity by the Cusanus-Gesellschaft could without much difficulty be arranged according to the same classifications as those used by J. Marx in his 1905 catalog of Nicholas' remarkable library at Bernkastel-Kues. Perhaps this is testimony enough that Nicholas' interests were truly modern and proof that Ernst Cassirer was right in calling him "the first modern thinker" (*Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance*, Leipzig, 1927). In the same year in which Cassirer published his study, the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences decided to undertake a critical edition of Cusanus' works, and the following year commissioned Gerhard Kallen to edit the *De Concordantia Catholica*. With its long-awaited completion the most important contributions of Cusanus are available in the critical texts of this series and we may expect a more vigorous discussion not only of the philosophic import of the Cusan world view but of the much broader questions surrounding the historical genesis of his ideas and their function as religious symbols in his own life and in that of his age.

Nicholas presented the *De Concordantia Catholica* to the Council of Basel in late 1433 or early 1434. He originally intended simply to treat the question whether the general council was superior to the pope, and at this stage of his life he could still answer the question in the affirmative, albeit moderately and sometimes ambiguously. Had the work remained in its earliest recension (*Libellus de ecclesiastica concordantia*, represented by the Basel MS), it would, according to the judgement of its present editor, have fallen into oblivion along with much other con-
religious dialogue between learned representatives of the major faiths. Such discussion would surely conclude, as he himself already had, that the plurality of religions was a manifestation of their unity. Religion, of its very nature, can only be one, even though its external forms may be (even must be) many—"religio una in rituum varietate," in Cusanus’ formula (p. 7). That Cusanus, then a cardinal and in close association with ecclesiastical power structures, should seek an amelioration of the world’s religious situation without once referring to the papacy or the ecclesiastical authority is a fact of special interest to students of Renaissance or pre-Reformation religion, perhaps even to contemporary ecumenists.

The present edition of the De pace fidei, which also contains a letter of Cusanus to John of Segovia, is a reprint of the 1959 edition and was first published in 1956 in Medieval and Renaissance Studies of the Warburg Institute. Its renewed availability is evidence of the growing interest in Cusanus research, which could profit immensely were it to receive more serious attention from American scholars. These superb volumes of the Heidelberg Opera omnia, with their several indices, tables, editorial prefaces, and notes, meet the highest standards of scholarship and can be recommended without reserve.

La Salle College, Phila. James E. Biechler


Calvin is more commonly depicted as a humanist, theologian, exegete, or Church organizer, but G. describes another notable facet, his concern for the secular, which G. regards as no less important than his theology. As leader of a revolution, C. desired to uproot evil and usher in a new age based on the old and without destroying society. This was his constructive revolutionism. Geneva, however, was not all that eager to move behind its chief pastor to build a new world. This meant success as well as failure, and G. "counts the positive results of Calvin’s views and actions on Geneva’s community of saints far more important than the failures" (p. 174). As Calvin had influenced the Western society of his day both in the area of religion and in the total spectrum of human thought and action, it is G.’s pointed proposition that “Calvin’s thought is still capable of direct reformative power in contemporary society” (p. 25). He substantiates his view of Calvin as a Christian secularist by frequent quotations from his writings and sermons, where his socio-economic thought was directed to the people of Geneva.

G.’s book has three parts. Parts 1 and 2, “Setting the Scene” and
“Calvin’s Influence on Genevan Life,” can be treated together. Because of man’s unity in Christ, the name “neighbor” extends to all men. This solidarity in Christ does not put an end to all inequalities; in Christ there can be authority without oppression, subordination without shame. For C., poverty was not a sign of divine disfavor, nor was prosperity a sign of blessings for personal merit. Both poverty and wealth were channels of divine grace and ways of evidencing faith on the part of man. It was God who distributed unequally in order to investigate man’s good will. Wealth, then, is God’s gift for the relief of the community, to be shared with the brethren. Though C. preached an equitable distribution of goods among men, this is not to say that he favored communism. Nor did he keep these opinions in the realm of words alone. With the influx of religious refugees into Geneva, the number of poor in the city skyrocketed. To struggle with the poverty problem, he initiated the order of deacon, whose concern was the poor and the sick in the city’s two hospitals. The money disbursed by them was supplied partially by the city, partially by fines collected for “misbehaviour” and donations. The doctors and surgeons were paid at the city’s expense.

In the matter of wages, C. maintained that before God man has no right to expect to be remunerated for his labor. The pay he receives is a sign of the unmerited grace of God. However, for the employer to withhold from the laborer what he owes is really to withhold from him what God pays him. Thus, in the payment of just wages, it is a spiritual problem, because we are dealing with the grace of God which goes from person to person. The key, then, to any management-labor relationship is our human solidarity in Christ. The question of quantitative measurement or legal minimum wage should have no place in a Christian employer; the rule should be equity before God and the principle “do unto others . . . .” In economics the rule of love is the norm.

C.’s influence on education and family was more in the line of modernizing the traditional than in its revolution. From his earliest years in Geneva, C. insisted on free compulsory education for the poor. The education offered was Christian and humanist, and within the range of all. Today’s University of Geneva is the descendant of C.’s early Academy.

In a city which lived solely by commerce, it would be difficult to see how Calvin could condemn moneylending as did many others of his day. Commerce was a natural way for men to commune with one another, and necessary for the spread of God’s bounty throughout society. How could anyone say it was an evil? C. was practically standing alone when he defended moneylending in the sixteenth century.

In evaluating his success and failure, G. notes that C. was neither by
profession nor interest a scientific student of economy; nevertheless, he was in tune with the direction of European progress. C.'s views on moneylending were realistic, but probably repressive in practice. His influence promoted woe as well as weal; Christian discipline degenerated into pettiness. Nevertheless, Geneva was a better city for Calvin's presence. G. notes further: "If we can ascribe the benefits of the Calvinist regime to a theology grounded in God's justice and love, then it may be possible to find the defects have their roots in theology as well" (p. 178). G. sees this defect to be in C.'s Christology: "there is in Calvin's Christology a lack of divine involvement in the sin and despair of humanity which is curiously like the lack of rapport with sinful man seen in Calvin's Geneva" (p. 179). Without our digressing on whether C.'s Christology is Chalcedonian or Nestorian, C. concludes: "Because Calvin saw God as withdrawn from man at man's worst moments, Calvin could also be withdrawn, unsympathetic at the sight of men in 'the stink of filthy flesh' failing in their response to the love of God in Jesus Christ" (p. 182).

In the last part, "Postmortem: The Influence of Calvin," G. briefly reinvestigates the Weber thesis on Calvinism and capitalism, and offers his opinion that many of Weber's arguments are wrong or badly in need of modification.

It may be a surprise to some to say that C. was an almost thoroughgoing secularist. In G.'s understanding of the term, this is to say that C. understood the gospel to be irrevocably concerned with the world. In this sense G. is eminently correct in saying that C. had a world-affirming theology. C. was a secular revolutionary only because he was primarily a religious revolutionary. By treating Calvin's socio-economic impact on Geneva, G. has once again underlined Calvin's chief concern in always putting God first.

Rome

Joseph N. Tylenda, S.J.


The thoughts and actions of the Puritans of Massachusetts Bay have influenced American society in varying ways, many of which have combined with other forces in perplexing and surprising patterns. As contemporary perspectives shift amid the intense pressures of twentieth-century life, we keep looking back with fascination at the way these ingenious early builders of American society handled their problems. Foster has steeped himself in both primary and secondary sources
in this study of the Puritan social ethic, focused primarily on Massachusetts. The ground he covers is familiar to students of colonial America, but he moves over it competently. His interpretations are informed by various scholarly controversies, but he is not bound by any particular school. He is more sensitively aware than many who have preceded him of the tensions and ambiguities in Puritan theory and practice. “The Puritan social ethic in America,” he explains, “does not ‘develop’ toward anything; rather, it increasingly dissolves into unrelated, often irreconcilable parts” (p. xiv).

The book is brief, well organized, and has useful appendices, bibliography, and index. Part 1 deals with foundations: order and love. The hierarchical nature of Puritan society has been often described; F. sees both the similarities with and the differences from the English context. He calls attention to the “strong radical streak” of the New England Puritans that called order into question even as it was strenuously upheld. The Puritan was called by the rule of love to seek unity, but he often defined the terms of unity so precisely as to be drawn into exclusivism and tribalism.

Part 2 discusses the details of government, wealth, and poverty. The government was a mixed aristocracy that proved to be remarkably tenacious: “It would take a revolution to change it” (p. 98). One of the taproots of the dynamism of colonial Puritanism is laid bare: the doctrine of the calling urged each person to adhere diligently to his place and duties—and yet virtually forced him to strive to get beyond that place. “The same ethic that assigned a calling according to some objectively determined social order made the calling an instrument for the continuous disruption of established order” (p. 114). As for poverty, F. rightly sees that the Puritans did not “teach that the godly would invariably prosper and that the poor were innately vicious” (p. 127).

Part 3 deals with the mixed legacy of Puritanism and democracy. The Puritan awareness of human depravity led them to hedge authority about with laws and with numbers—yet the democratic seed had to be nourished by many streams before it bloomed into a tree of democracy.

These essays are not for the beginner; they assume considerable knowledge of the background and of the sources. They are stimulating, but they neglect too much the scriptural roots of the Puritan social ethic. It was an ethic developed in continual dialogue with the Bible. From that interplay came much of its strength, and many of those elements that appear so inconsistent when viewed apart from the scriptural setting. It was when the ethic got more and more separated
from its background that it dissolved into unrelated, irreconcilable parts. There is more work to be done on the Puritan social ethic, but this is a stimulating contribution to an unfinished task.

Union Theological Seminary, N.Y.C.  ROBERT T. HANDY


The fundamental question this book is concerned with is: what is faith to religious man? Faith is defined as "a complex dialectical relation of the mind to reality." The wide span of this definition allows Dupré to discuss and unify a great variety of topics and issues in the study of religion.

He first discusses faith as a dynamic attitude integrating the whole of reality and indicates the differences between the traditional and secular forms this essential attitude has assumed (chap. 1). Faith is not a merely subjective experience nor can it be reduced to objective factors; it rather aims at overcoming the subject-object dichotomy (chap. 2). For the more professional reader, a chapter (3) is inserted on the relationship between faith and philosophical reflection; in it D. describes the mythico-religious origins of philosophy, discusses the problem of the relationship between the absolute of metaphysics and the God of religion (Hegel, Rahner, Duméry), and indicates the need for a philosophical and critical reflection on the religious act and its contents. The religious symbol expresses the integration of subject and object in a higher reality (chap. 4). Some very informative chapters are devoted to linguistic symbolism (5), to the myth (6) and the contemporary problems of God-talk and demythologizing. This prepares the reader for a discussion of the crucial concept of revelation, which is neither subjective projection nor merely objective information but disclosure of that which transcends both subject and object (chap. 7): God, who is not a metaphysical concept but an exclusively religious reality. A philosophical reflection on "the Name of God," however, is possible and necessary: it offers a certain justification to religion which gives meaning to this name (chap. 8). After D. has thus investigated the two poles of the religious movement, faith and the transcendent reality it intends, he studies several fundamental dimensions in this relationship. The mystery of creation, especially of created freedom, and the problem of evil are the object of chap. 9. This introduces the drama of religious alienation or sin. The problems of original sin and death are discussed, as well as the idea of expia-
tion (chap. 10). Man is freed from this religious alienation through faith, hope, and love (chap. 11). This salvation reaches its climax in the varieties of the mystical experience, especially in unifying love (chap. 12).

This brief survey of the contents does no justice to the book's richness and depth. But the reader can easily gather from it that this study deals with a great variety of topics. Moreover, D. has collected an immense wealth of material from several fields: philosophy, phenomenology and psychology of religion, theology. He dialogues with a large number of philosophers and theologians, and one will find clear and concise presentations of authors such as Plato, Plotinus, Hegel, Heidegger, St. John of the Cross, St. Ignatius, Freud, Jung, Scheler, Otto, Eliade, and a great many others. The book is a treasure of information and reflection and excellently suited for consultation.

This strength of the book is also its weakness: it does not provide a synthetic view. There are excellent analyses of various problems in the field of religion. D. clearly presents the positions of many other thinkers and scholars and gives at times incisive critiques of their views. But through all this it is often difficult to see the forest for the trees, i.e., to discover the coherent position of the author himself.

This problem is aggravated by the fact that D.'s methodology leaves the reader confused. In the introduction the work is presented as a philosophical and critical reflection on the relationship of religious man to "the other dimension." This relationship is described phenomenologically, and in chapter 3, section 4, the limits of such a description are clearly recognized and the need for an ontological reflection is affirmed. However, the relationship between phenomenological description and philosophical reflection remains unclear due to the fact that the nature and scope of the latter is not sufficiently elaborated. In the realm of religion this seems to present a problem more urgent than in any other field. In the introduction D. states that "the task of the philosopher is to understand what is, not to instruct about what ought to be." The "what is" obviously goes beyond the phenomenological "eidos," but then, it seems to me, the "is" necessarily implies an "ought," in function of which the phenomenon is evaluated. D. seems to assign this "ought" to theology.

And here we touch on the delicate problem of the relationship between theology and philosophy. When D. speaks about the faith of religious man, the meaning of which he wants to explore, he mostly limits his attention to the faith of the Christian believer. In other words, he presents a "philosophie du fait chrétien" (Duméry, van Luyk) with all the methodological problems it involves. The solutions offered to
these problems remain rather sketchy. D. seems to seek the basic difference between a philosophical and a theological reflection on the Christian faith in the professional commitment of the philosopher and theologian. But it is not quite clear that this commitment enters as an intrinsic element either into the matter reflected upon or into the reflective act itself, be the latter theological or philosophical. To put it simply: the theologian believes in what he reflects upon, the philosopher not necessarily, but they reflect critically on the same matter. In fact, many chapters of the book could fit equally well in a theological study. What D. says, e.g., about the sacraments, revelation, evolution of revelation, creation, original sin, the relation between sin and death, and salvation can be and has been said by theologians equally well and at times better (e.g., D. does not seem aware of the many studies about the problem of the evolution of revelation that appeared after Newman and Marin-Sola).

However, these remarks should not detract from the great merits of this rich book with its many penetrating analyses, refreshing intuitions, and thought-provoking arguments. D. presents it as an introduction and promises us more detailed studies in the future. We look forward to them.

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BERNARD A. NACHBAHR


Prof. Zaehner delivered the Gifford Lectures on natural religion during the years 1967-69 and now he has published the contents of these lectures. The scope of his book is vast, taking in the mystical traditions of India, China, Islam, and Christianity; and Z. exhibits a breadth of learning that few modern scholars could equal. He writes from the standpoint of a Catholic greatly influenced by Teilhard de Chardin; and he claims that, theoretically at any rate, the great traditions could meet in Catholic Christianity. In confronting various religions, however, we should not expect to arrive at a harmony of religions but rather at a concordant discord.

The major religions of the world are divided into two categories: prophetical and mystical. The Jewish and Islamic religions fall into the prophetical group, whereas the remaining come under the heading of the mystical, with the exception of Christianity, which must be considered in a class by itself, as it is both prophetical and mystical. In describing the prophetic religions, Z. calls them religions of prophecy and law, since God chooses prophets through whom He reveals both
Himself and a detailed system of law. In the light of today's understanding of the cultural milieus of biblical times his statements are sometimes oversimplified. The portrait of the God of the Jews, Christians, Islamics, and its daughter faiths as a jealous God is pointed out as appearing deplorable. However, an interesting point is made here when Z. says that the Jews will accept prophecy outside of their own religion. It is further remarked that the God of the Koran is the same God who speaks through the OT. The discussion of the OT ends on a rather disturbing note, in which Z. underlines the loss of appeal of the text to contemporary man, man today being unable to accept the barbaric God of the OT world.

We are able at this point to enter into a discussion of how the West became interested in the religions of the East. Z. feels that it stems from the problem of justice and grace. One wonders if Augustine is guilty of all that is ascribed to him. Somehow or other he seems to take the brunt for the Reformation and many of the other events of religious import on the Continent. However, the actual interest in the Eastern religions stems from the Enlightenment and the development of the spirit of free inquiry. Europe, torn apart by the prophetic vein and the notion of a jealous God, a great part of this strife being attributed to Augustine, looks to the East for the vision of a gentler life. From Confucianism, Hinduism, and the Buddhist texts Western man was to learn that under all of the myths was a belief that man in the depths of his being is beyond the span of time. Realizing that, he knows that there is no salvation for him until he reaches his true immortal state.

Using Aldous Huxley as an example of Western man's search for God, Z. touches on the problem of drugs and the use of them as a catalyst to mystical experience. Through their use Huxley was able to experience the truth that All is One and One is All. From this vantage point the discussion of the passing from self-consciousness to cosmic consciousness is opened. Z. points out the fundamental split in the world-wide mystical tradition by using two mystics who represent the opposite poles of mystical experience. At one end we have Walt Whitman, who tries to see all existing beings within himself and the unity in diversity and diversity in unity in material things. At the opposite extreme we have Gautama the Buddha, who transcends the microcosmos and macrocosmos and leaves the entire universe behind with an air of disgust. Whitman sees the divine in the human; Buddha transcends this wretched world in his compassion for men.

However, it is precisely this point which causes so much anguish in the realm of mysticism. If one completely transcends this universe and nothing in it matters, one can then begin to question the validity of
moral codes and even their necessity. If one passes beyond this temporal world while still living, then one cannot be influenced by whatever one does but passes beyond good and evil and thus is free from all moral law. Then there is the problem of the cessation of becoming or Nirvana and the resurrection of Christ and the transformation of the transient. At the base of this we come across the cleavage between spirit and matter. Even in the East the goal is seen differently by various groups. For some, the goal of life is to attain a state of peace hardly distinguishable from death, in which the oneness attained surpasses even God. Among those sects who part ways are the Buddhists, who consider it of no avail to define the indefinable, and the sect of Sankhya-Yoga, which sees the basic unity in a single soul beyond all multiplicity.

As the various mystical traditions emerge, detachment is seen as a necessity. While some of the Eastern traditions end with the idea of detachment, others develop this and include an element of the love of God, as is seen in the dialogue between Krishna and Arjuna in the Gita. With the development of the concept of a personal God, the supreme object of love, the idea of detachment concedes to both attachment and commitment to this God. The Gita in the Hindu tradition constitutes the dividing line between the atheistic mystical tendency of early Buddhism and the theistic mysticism of the early Semitic religions. In the Gita the transcendent God and the immanent God meet in man. Perhaps it is only here that the bridge between the immanence of the East and the transcendence of the West will begin. "It is the eastern end of the great religious bridge, the building of which should be our ideal; the western end is Catholic Christianity—and both ends are built on the foundation of God made man" (p. 150). It might be well to recall here that in the Gita the love of God by no means excludes the love of one's neighbor.

Now Z. turns to China; the innate ability of the Chinese to synthesize is brought out clearly. Perhaps what is so intriguing is the similarity between the notion of the Fall as seen by the Taoist and the Confucians and then to note the likeness to the Fall as presented in Genesis. The whole idea of the Chinese is centered around the harmony which existed in the beginning and the return to this original state. For the Taoist, the Fall consisted in man differentiating himself from the rest of creation, and, once he returns to the realization of the infinite Tao within himself, nothing can affect him. Confucianism is concerned with returning to the same original harmony—not, however, through unconcern but through man's observance of the moral law. Deserving of respect are the neo-Confucianists for facing the problem of evil, which they claimed was a deviation from the mean, that is, man failing
to follow the good endowment that he receives from Heaven. Their belief that the Way to Heaven and the Way of Man were two facets of the same Perfection remained unfortunately in the realm of the theoretical and was destroyed because it stayed there.

While Confucianism tried to unite individuals around a divine center, Buddhism taught that it had to be a religion of solitary salvation. Zen, which is derived from Mahayana Buddhism, teaches that after Nirvana there is a state of complete vision, which belongs to the Buddha, but which all can share since the Buddha-nature indwells all. The problem of exactly what occurs in enlightenment again presents itself. Is the experience of the All the same as the experience of the Christian mystic? Z. takes both Merton and Lassalle to task for their rash and overly simplified bridging of the gap between the two. Using the Gita and making various comparisons with the writings of Francis de Sales, Hugh of St. Victor, and Richard of St. Victor, he shows how the state of enlightenment is like one standing on a peak. Here such a one experiences the one and supreme unchangeableness, the point of the deep dreamless sleep in which the soul, though one with God, is unaware of it. The gap must be bridged by love; it is then that the soul can meet God and then return to earth in compassion. We must also be aware that at no point in the Christian tradition is the soul free from the temptation to pride.

A fascinating analogy is drawn here of the original sin, which is concerned with the state of self-consciousness, and its place in the Taoist, Confucian, and Jewish traditions. This serves to introduce the topic of Jewish understanding of the concept of the image of God as it is seen in the different accounts of Genesis. It is unfortunate that this concept was not pursued more deeply in the Jewish tradition, since it was given more than adequate treatment in some of the other religions.

Lastly, Christianity is treated and its position, mainly in terms of the story of Job in the OT. Z. sees Christ as the answer to Job, Buddha, Krishna, and Yudhishthira. Christ, in becoming man for our sake, enabled us to see the true nature of God incarnate in human flesh. With the notion of the sanctification of matter we see Christianity promising nothing less than eternal life.

The original work was not intended as a book but as a series of lectures, which later took the form of a book. The style is interesting but rather cyclic: rather than set forth the major beliefs one at a time, Z. chose to treat several religions at a time, drawing similarities and contrasting differences, while always dropping one of the terms in the consideration and adding a new one. Perhaps this is an effective way of dealing with the subject, but it makes for a more difficult approach to
an already complicated area. Z. carries the reader along by his energetic command of English. But his wit and sarcasm may detract from the power of his message and may even irritate. He is sometimes very negative. Augustine fares poorly throughout, as does the Church in her historical development. And there are some highly questionable statements.

Z. has done a great work. It should be read by theologians if they wish to situate Christianity within the context of the great religions of the world. This is surely one of the main tasks confronting theology today.

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WILLIAM JOHNSTON


A growing body of literature deals with the present encounter of religions and with the fact and function of religious pluralism in our time. Whitson's study has advanced this literature more than any other single book in recent years. The development of his thought, especially his contributions to the Gallahue Conference on World Religions in 1964 and 1966, is a tribute to methodical and exploratory scholarship. In the same way the term "convergence" has grown in precision and clarity. W. uses convergence to signify the unitive character of religions which are open to each other and consequently find significant meaning in their relationships to each other. Convergence which takes place within a processual understanding of development is not a forced syncretism, because it retains individuality within the over-all unity. A pluralism remains wherein differences are found to be complementary and not divisive or divergent. Convergence thus is a structure of religious development in the modern world.

Although this book is written for the theologian, W. is both a theologian and an anthropologist. The result is a theological anthropology of religious convergence set within a cultural and structural context. The first three chapters comprise a cultural anthropology of religious convergence. Basing his notion of convergence upon the cultural dynamic which takes place between civilizations, W. establishes that a meaningful interrelationship is brought about by shared experiences. This is true in the convergence of cultures and religions. In fact, the experience of sharing experiences determines the manner of experiencing within a convergent situation (p. 29). As a unitive cultural matrix emerges in the world in which the separate cultural components are significant only in relationship to each other, so too among religious traditions a particular tradition finds meaning only in relationship to
others. Moreover, the real differences among the traditions, which have meaning now only together, become markedly complementary. The body of W.'s book broadly outlines a theology which would formulate this new situation.

W. places the work of theology firmly in the human order through an exposition of classical Confucianism—an ideology relating man to man—as the typical context for religious experience. In subsequent chapters he explores structural responses to fundamental theological questions. Whether discussing the dynamics of theology, the formulation of theology, the historical development, or the revelational in theology, W. sets forth the structural differences in both the experiences and the conceptualizations of the world's religions. He draws out a definition of theology from the experience-expression processes of the various historical traditions: "the systematization of man's experience of definitive relationship" (p. 113). But W. is really searching for a new instrument of theological language. He proposes complementarity, following the lead of the early American thinker Horace Bushnell (1802–1876). As Aristotelianism was used as an instrument of systematization for theological pluralism in the past, a cultural and structural complementarity, a more empirical tool, may be an instrument for a theology of religious convergence today.

Although religious convergence is bound to the actual convergent development of modern cultures and civilizations, the principle of unitive convergence is operative within every high religion. W. focuses the present methodological task upon the understanding of specific religious commitment, in order that the move towards convergence may come from within one's own tradition. Consequently, the meaning of convergent processes within the Christian tradition is the special theological task today. Previously, the fact of religious pluralism was the prime theological concern, but W. has advanced the task to the theological understanding of the function of pluralism in the experience of man. When pluralism is experienced positively, it effects a unity which can best be articulated in terms of complementarity.

Until now, the greatest contribution to the "encounter" literature has been made by historians of religions who have adopted generally the phenomenological method of situating themselves in religion. Winston King, e.g., speaks of the religionist situating himself in religion but detached from specific commitment. Mircea Eliade, moreover, has especially summoned his fellow historians of religions to bring about a creative hermeneutic which could positively contribute to the meeting of the world religions and a religious renaissance. W.'s work is singularly important because he views this encounter as the
special task of theology and a committed theologian who has experienced and continues to experience within his own tradition. The moving and opening out to another religion, for W., is always from a position well situated within a confessional commitment. It is for this reason that his notion of convergence while moving toward a significant unity retains an equally meaningful variety. The problem, however, which must be explored in some empirical manner is whether contemporary man who is deeply bound to and involved within actual cultural convergence is still significantly "within" confessional commitment. Must not religious transformation be just as deep and significant as cultural transformation, since the former is inseparable from the latter? An appendix containing the brilliant article on theological models by Ewert H. Cousins (Continuum, 1969) contends that at the level of experience the cultural context may be transcended. One must attest to the inseparability of experience from culture and the futility of search for a level of pure experience unconditioned by culture. What both Cousins and W. seek theologically may be possible only through the phenomenological method.

W.'s concern is both the encounter of religions and their convergence, although he does not distinguish the two. However, religions as systems or traditions do not necessarily encounter each other. Men of different traditions meet; particular religious communities may meet each other; a particular dimension of a religion may be contrasted with its counterpart within another tradition by a trained scholar. Religious people alone meet, share, experience, move towards real unity. What W. may have accomplished is the result of particular theologians or religionists meeting, experiencing, and now attempting to articulate systematically and retrospectively that experience. W. has called for a more empirical theology in the future to handle the convergent situation. Empirical research should try to determine the aspect of a tradition which has entered into encounter and further into convergence. W. has done an exciting theological investigation with an obvious anthropological orientation with remarkable success. This book is evidence that no theologizing is relevant that does not respond in some way to the consistent plurality of religions.

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These two volumes, undoubtedly conceived as one work, avoid overt polemics, cause-pushing, and insights extrapolated into the groundless—refreshing reading; they are near jargon-free, poetically meditative, and hardly technical—relaxing reading; with no a priori limits, they invite us to appreciate and deepen simple, basic data, philosophic and religious—rewarding reading, for both the general and professional reader.

The first volume \( (HH) \) looks upon man as a subject in the world, as a source of meaning formed and communicated by his language and gestures. It seeks to describe basic, universal categories that are communicative because they are human. These categories will shape the approach of the second volume \( (HD) \); nonetheless, "the autonomy of philosophical research remains \( [in \ H H ] \) complete." \( HH \) is a series of descriptive, often phenomenological vignettes of human attitudes and behavior as signification and communication. Pascal clearly pre-empts Descartes; the thought is enriched by the unobtrusive presence or influence of Nédoncelle, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Mouroux, Lévi-Strauss, \( et \ al., \) in order to develop a plethora of symbols: tree, desert, window, door, day, shadow, mask, territory . . . . A summary of this work would destroy its principal worth: descriptions that invite one to think. Here, however, are the three parts of \( HH \): (1) "the measures of incarnated existence": lived space and time; (2) discovering man through his main means of expression and communication: word (parole), hand, face, and look; (3) two forms of interpersonal activity where communication should come through with the strong meaning of communion: visit and meal.

\( HD \) is symmetrical to \( HH \): (1) Christian revelation is inscribed in space and time, which measure all aspects of human existence. Bible language uses spatial and temporal categories to speak precisely of that world which man experiences. The constant interplay of meaning between man and the world underpins a transcendent meaning. (2) With the prophets God employs all the human ways of expression and communication. Christ assumes personally all these functions to signify the divine intention. A transcendent meaning ceaselessly circulates from word to hand, from face to look; meaning shines out from a unity of presence. The inexhaustible interiority of human presence lets an infinite depth be "pressenti." (3) Christ comes as the perfect partner for a meeting, event, dialogue, as a "companion," lit. "bread sharer." "Visit" and "meal" hold a privileged place in daily interpersonal experience and in the Bible: the man Jesus approaches man as one to be saved in place, time, and act—in a complexus of relations full of meaning. The divine will to share comes through with éclat.
The main value of *HD* stems from B.'s prior groundwork: an explicitation, rather than a mere application, of the significance of human categories when viewed in the faith context, especially through reflections on biblical texts (which are indexed). B. lets the text speak, again through a series of vignettes. A special value, or warning, to the theologian comes from the simple restating of fundamental data which he must preserve. In this vein B. handles many a touchy problem: Jesus' self-awareness is related to the "I" as oriented in time; the Eucharist's symbolism from the entire context of gestures and words is forceful by reference to *HH*; the validation of mythic and poetic language through their actual usage rather than theoretical discussion. I believe this last point exemplifies the main thesis: authentically anthropomorphic language is already transcendent philosophically and becomes the effective means of revelation. This thesis becomes clear upon reading a nearly hidden note at the very end: "Our undertaking therefore is the reverse of what J. A. T. Robinson proposes...." Inconspicuously, B. has done serious theologizing.

Left unsaid is a central question: What is the relation between the two volumes, i.e., between philosophy and theology, the natural and "supernatural," the poetic and the sacred? Evidently, the *HH* selection is governed by *HD*, but some levels of meaning would seem not to fall within philosophy's "autonomy" (time-eternity, p. 110; food and future, p. 296) and some meanings go begging too positively ("spokesman," p. 145; "hand" accomplishing what it signifies, p. 192; "face," p. 218). If a philosopher may wonder about an ancillary treatment of his field, within it are surprises: phenomenological steps are jumped (place-symbol, pp. 37 ff.) as well as analytical (structure of orientation, p. 55). I believe the internal coherence of the vignettes rests on "intentionality," which in *HD* becomes Christological. Even here problems remain. Rather than take up negative space, I must stress that a rather easygoing work is rich in multiple levels of meaning: an invitation to meditate, to philosophize, to theologize without any preconceived system.

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The central issue in *Man Becoming* is the notion of God. Baum approaches this issue with three interrelated but distinguishable preoccupations: pastoral, methodological, and doctrinal.

His pastoral preoccupation is to help free Christians from a deistic
notion of God, a notion that presents God as an object, separate from man and extrinsic to his efforts at self-becoming. B.'s method can be described as empirical, and this in two senses. First, he insists that the theologian must take seriously the experience of Christians (in this case, the experience of the absence of God so common among many Christians today) as one of the data for his theological reflection. Secondly, he uses a “psychologically-oriented phenomenology” to clarify the Christian experience of today. Using this method, B. proceeds to redefine the Christian doctrine of God and then, in the light of this redefinition, to reinterpret some of the central doctrines of Christianity.

Baum presents Maurice Blondel as “the initiator, in the Catholic Church, of a new style of thinking about that transcendent, redemptive mystery in human history which we call God” (p. 1). In the light of this “Blondelian shift,” B. formulates two principles for re-interpreting the doctrine of God. First, “there is no human standpoint from which God is simply man’s over-against” (p. 171). Secondly, “every sentence about God can be translated into a declaration about human life” (p. 181). God can be understood, therefore, as that mysterious factor in human communication and communion that calls man to transcend himself and gives him the strength to do so. B. concludes that “the locus of the divine is the interpersonal” (p. 58), “the human” (p. 137); that “God is the mystery of man’s humanization” (p. 58); that “God is the Good News that humanity is possible” (p. 285). Abstaining from a philosophical discussion of the doctrine of God because all philosophy necessarily has historical and axiological presuppositions and also because philosophical language tends to make an object out of God, B. says that we cannot correctly say that God is first cause or person (although he is personal); nor can we say that God has intellect and will, that he is a being superior to man, or even that he exists.

Not surprisingly, B. concludes that his book shows that “it is possible to proclaim the Gospel without mentioning God by name” (p. 284). Indeed, this is eminently helpful, since “people do not know anymore what the word ‘God’ means” (p. 283). There are times, however, when we must use the word “God,” or else people will forget about the transcendence of the mystery involved in human becoming.

Although B.’s book has many genuine theological and pastoral insights, it leaves us with several rather serious difficulties. First, there is a problem with his redefinition of the central doctrine of God. B. himself concedes that the question of divine transcendence is “the most difficult question” (p. 233); and there can be no doubt that he
wants to affirm God's transcendence. However, one wonders what transcendence means when B. has finished reinterpreting it. Indeed, if God is not first cause or person, if he neither has intellect and will, nor is a being superior to man, nor exists—analogously or otherwise (nowhere in the book does B. seriously discuss the doctrine of analogy)—then we must ask, is God in any sense real? B. minimizes the cosmological-metaphysical question of God as creator on exegetical grounds and then drops the question (pp. 199–209, 218). This is unfortunate, because in dealing with that question B. almost necessarily would have clarified his distinction between God and the world. As it is, we are left with a series of metaphors whose precise meaning it is hard to determine.

This central doctrinal difficulty stems from his use of the empirical method. Even though he concedes, in the last paragraph of the book, that other, more intellectual methods can be used to explore the doctrine of God, he seems to consider his empirical method to be a complete method. Here is the problem; for while the empirical method proposed by B. is helpful and even necessary as a partial method, it alone can never arrive at an adequate notion of God. It is precisely man's historical, "worldly" character that makes him a being of experience; and if man is to be able to affirm a God who transcends and is distinct from (though not separate from) history, the world, then he must somehow transcend his experience (again, without being separate from his experience). This, in turn, is possible only if the human intellect is somehow able to transcend its axiological and historical presuppositions and reach reality-in-itself—a possibility that B. too lightly dismisses.

Finally, there is a pastoral difficulty. B.'s suggestion that we can efficaciously preach the Christian message without mentioning God is to ignore the many idols in the world and in oneself that man almost inevitably sets up, unless he constantly and consciously refers himself to God who is, in some real sense, Other. That B. would suggest this style of Christian preaching is in line with the development of the whole book. Thus, his admission that there are times when we must mention God explicitly seems to be a case of "too little too late."

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The vision of the man was to see everything converging to a single point, yet the lacunae in his exposition of some fundamental, creative insights and the fragmentary and eclectic nature of translations have made synthesis and unity for the reader of Teilhard a difficult enterprise. These companion volumes service the need of focusing and elaborating some of T.'s most perceptive work. They are representative of that exclusive core of T.'s oeuvres that are not simply repetitive, for these thirty-four essays are refreshing, pertinent, hopeful, balanced, new, and worth while.

Human Energy is a collection of six significant essays written during the 1930's. They are T. at his intuitive and prophetic best, dealing with much of what eventually became the most controversial matter of his evolutionary theory. These areas are treated with such critical acumen and poetic precision that one suspects that many of the conventional and clichéd arguments on evil, spirituality, and suffering, as well as the relation of biological to moral values and that of religion to science would never have taken place if these works were so handily accessible to the general (and especially to the English) reading public.

These early essays explore T.'s fresh ideas on human sexuality (we are, he explains, evolving towards a "virginal universe") and the mysticism of science ("religion is the soul biologically necessary for the future of science"); they are vigorous and challenging. More importantly, they set the ground rules for the dialogue between religion and science—two forces which T. sees as capable of integration and not of conflict. This international, intercultural, and continuously sustained dialogue is one which invites the unique combination of gifts of the scientist-theologian, and T. does not disappoint.

The phenomenological approach to spirituality ("The Phenomenon of Spirituality") is arresting. There is, to be sure, only one God for T., but his vision is comprehensive enough to include a universal God to be realized by effort, and yet a personal God to be submitted to in love. These are not mutually exclusive conditions, and this understanding of the confluence of spirituality and morality is rich and fascinating.

The shortest essay, "The Significance and Positive Value of Suffering," confronts a spiritual and psychological crisis of our time, and it exacts some superb creative moments from T.'s evolutionary or process perspective. Illness, T. explains, naturally tends to give sufferers the feeling that they are useless or even a burden on the earth, yet Christian resignation to suffering is just the opposite of
giving up. The problem of evil and suffering is also met in the “Sketch of a Personalistic Universe,” where T. reminds us that his eschatological vision of a world on the way to concentration of consciousness is the most natural and necessary seat of suffering. “Nothing is more beatific than union attained; nothing more laborious than pursuit of that union.”

Activation of Energy collects twenty-eight essays written in the period between 1939 and 1955, three months before his death in New York on Easter Sunday. (“I should like to die on the day of the Resurrection,” he wrote some time earlier). This second volume is a compilation of tight, well-chiseled, carefully nuanced refinements of his thought.

“The Moment of Choice” rests as a sensitive, reflective, and somewhat prophetic eight-page essay which accurately calls itself in a subheading “A Possible Interpretation of War.” The peace movement might well profit from T.’s understanding of the displacement of energy; at the very least, his remarks would spur an invigorating reassessment of the values of pacifism. Similarly, the eight pages devoted to “The Evolution of Responsibility in the World” give probing testimony to the moral evolution of man in view of planetary compression. And the six pages set aside for “A Major Problem for Anthropology” squarely frame the question for interdisciplinary researchers: “Is there or is there not, in man, a continuation and transformation of the biological process of evolution?”

One of the most original pieces, “On Looking at a Cyclotron,” is a poetic meditation on the cyclotrons at the Radiation Laboratory at the University of California at Berkeley. It is also the occasion for some serious reflection on the folding-back upon itself of human energy. “A Clarification: Reflections on Two Converse Forms of Spirit” examines with clarity the whole body of our inner religious experience, which has been confused by philosophers as well as by mystics and has been termed either the Hindu mysticism of fusion or the juridical type of Christian mysticism. T. passionately calls for a new mysticism, at once fully human and fully Christian, which must emerge at the opposite pole from an outworn orientalism: at the road of the West.

These volumes are greatly enhanced by gifted translations which preserve the essential Teilhard—man of letters and man of science. In view of the current deluge of theologies of oppression, anxiety, and neuroses, T.’s optimism may seem anachronistic to some, yet is never naive and it is always reverently real. And Christian.

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Doris K. Donnelly

Most of us, in grappling with the question of faith, have come into contact with the thought of Sigmund Freud. We found out (too often through secondary sources) that Freud reduced religion to infantile, unconscious needs which projected a stern father-God into the firmament. If one accepted Freud's view, he would understandably be expected to give up his religion. If he did not find the psychoanalytic thesis credible, one most probably relegated Freud to the mistakes of nineteenth-century materialism and passed on.

Some investigators, however, have involved themselves in Freud's work to see if some other reaction was possible. Something rings true in both religious experience and in the psychoanalytic description of it. The question is, then, not whether to accept Freud's views, but how to accept them. Homans' study is an attempt to allow a third way to Freud, to formulate a new method of response for theology.

H. proposes an iconic style of interpreting and reading Freud and theology. In his effort to develop this style, he examines the theologies of Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich, finding in them a "style of the gaps" which allows a discontinuity between belief and psychic processes. He goes on to show that this approach is carried out in the face of theological existentialism's own unwitting psychological infrastructure. Because Protestant theology in the person of these two theologians has not come to terms with this infrastructure, its work has become not only a failure to confront Freud but a prime example of what he was talking about, i.e., superego phenomena. This is what comes of reading Freud in a mechanistic-reductionist way or even in a dynamic (neo-Freudian and ego-psychological) way.

In an effort to forge a higher reading of Freud, H. analyzes the work of Norman O. Brown, David Bakan, and Philip Rieff. He sees each of these men as trying to experiment with Freud in an effort to solve the theological problem that theological existentialism could not solve. All three men pose differing solutions to the superego phenomenon and at the same time escape both mechanistic and dynamic readings of Freud. Yet they do not solve the theological problem and thus are one more steppingstone to an iconic reading.

The last two chapters are an analysis of "distance" and "nostalgia" on both a personal and social-cultural level. Distance, along with Protestant theology and transcendence, has collapsed, i.e., no longer is there a superego God before whom modern man feels worthless and nakedly ashamed. Freud has triumphed. However, man yearns for some recovery of distance, for some recovery of being grounded. This is his nostalgia. An iconic reading of Freud and religious images is an attempt to answer this nostalgia, to recover a needed distance.
To suggest what this iconic reading may be, H. takes up the work of Eliade, Ricoeur, and Jung. He explores their ideas of images and religious symbols as a prelude to his final statement. When that statement comes, however, one does not get the central explanation of what exactly constitutes the iconic reading that he was expecting. Rather he realizes that H. has really been after a way of suggesting what that iconic approach may be. One can only note the yearning for distance in man and his culture, see the carry-over here from Protestant spirituality, and note the possibility of returning to the religious symbols with the dilemma unsolved.

But the return to theologizing is no simple one. "A new series of considerations appear; transcendence is neither simply lost, nor can it be found again in any simple way" (p. 230). An iconic reading, one which has seen and gone beyond the dialogue between theology and the reductionist-dynamic readings, has let one see the problems and the new possibilities. Thus a new style of analysis is demanded of theology, but no new content is given it, nor is there even a decision for or against psychoanalysis. Theology is left with the same problem it had at the beginning of H.'s study, but now has a new hermeneutical awareness.

H. is open to criticisms from many sides. One may seriously question his understanding of some aspects of Freud, especially of the clinical-dynamic meanings of his writings. One may also suspect that H. has not really said what his own theological position is, that it may be lurking on the sideline waiting for a more correct moment. Also, stylistically H.'s book is difficult to read, far too full of jargon (e.g., "introcathect") and dense expressions (e.g., "paradigmatic synthesis"). Structurally the book is not always convincing about why many subjects are considered where they are. Finally, there is a certain looseness about some central terms that proves discomforting. For instance, "transcendence," a central term in the book, is satisfactorily defined only on p. 166. Both before and after that the term is used in an equivocating way in some contexts, so that one is not quite sure whether it is God's transcendence or the self's ability to transcend itself that is discussed.

Nevertheless, H.'s work is recommended. His is the kind of systematic encounter with Freud's thought that has been lacking for too long. The breadth of H.'s analysis and the strength of the insight this brings should make his book important for all of theology. Freud is important because he has so influenced contemporary culture and because he thus reflects the attitude many have towards faith and religion. Theology must confront Freud's thought, lest religion eventually dissolve from the inside. H. has convincingly presented one avenue, an approach that honestly ends up with a problem. It is hoped that both H. and others (including those in the Roman tradition) will investigate the

The two men whose thought undergirds the twentieth century, Sigmund Freud and Søren Kierkegaard, need to be seen against a background broader and deeper than the individual disciplines with which they are ordinarily identified—in Freud's case, medical psychology, and in Kierkegaard's case, theology. Cole's book, which examines comprehensively the thought of each under the rubrics of created, fallen, and restored existence, fulfils this need; for he brings theological perspectives to bear on Freud's thought and psychoanalytic perspectives to bear on Kierkegaard's anthropology, with the result that both are illuminated in the light of the other.

His central thesis is that despite the differences between them, arising from divergent ontological presuppositions, Freud's naturalistic ontology and Kierkegaard's historical ontology share a fundamental ground of agreement. F.'s view of man is a naturalistic rendition of K.'s view of man as spirit. Their views supplement rather than contradict each other. F.'s naturalistic ontology, resulting in a deterministic view of man, Cole argues, is insufficient to encompass man's historical reality. It requires K.'s understanding of man as spirit, as the possibility of freedom, to break through the categories of nature. On the other hand, K.'s views are supplemented by the empirical investigation and clinical elaboration which F.'s work affords. Although he does not propose a third alternative, Cole believes that the double vision both perspectives afford when interpolated gives us a new depth of self-understanding.

In the first of the three sections, Cole examines the structure of the self founded on the doctrine of Spirit, in Kierkegaard's thought, parallel with an examination of the construct of the ego, grounded in the concept of libido, in Freud's work. These are complementary aspects of a central truth, for libido is a naturalistic interpretation of spirit and spirit is a historicized version of libido. Furthermore, Cole points out that K.'s self and F.'s ego are both relational concepts. The self is contingent upon the reality to which it relates itself. He correlates three aspects of the self as determined by its relation: F.'s naturalistic self is seen in comparison with K.'s "aesthetic" existence; the historical self, determined by its relation to social reality, is for F. incorporated in the superego and corresponds to K.'s ethical level of existence; finally, the
third possibility of the self, which exists only for K., is the "theological self," in which the relation of the self is to a transcendent reality.

In the second section, Cole compares Kierkegaard's and Freud's understanding of "fallen existence." In this, he analyzes K.'s view of the self's "sickness unto death" or the despair of nonbeing, and his concept of dread, which is the presupposition of the self's fall from innocence into guilt. In dread of the possibility of freedom, the self's freedom is lost. Sin is this flight from the freedom which is the self. The comparison is made with F.'s understanding of the sickness of the self, his concept of neurosis as the result of individual repression, of which anxiety is the presupposition. In neurosis, the self has fallen into nonbeing: the anxious ego, retreating from danger, regresses to an earlier mode of being, suffers from a failure of the will, and finds itself helpless to order its life. Anxiety for F. corresponds to dread for K., in that it precedes and is the ground for the flight from the self.

An analysis of Kierkegaard's and Freud's response to this loss of the self, their respective theories of therapy, constitutes the last portion of the book. Cole refers back to the Socratic doctrine of recollection, in which it is understood that truth, therefore self-knowledge, is immanent, a forgotten knowledge which must be recollected in the search for the self. "Know thyself" is the therapeutic dictum. For F., this is accomplished by way of an existential re-experience of the forgotten knowledge. It is enacted in the therapeutic situation, in which the repetition compulsion is used as a therapeutic tool to reveal the self to itself. This is compared with K.'s analysis of the Christian therapeutic, consisting of a double movement of the spirit, resignation and repetition. The first, involving renunciation of the self's absolute relation to the relative, is analogous to F.'s therapeutic process. But the second, K.'s concept of repetition, involves the theological self, the dimension of spirit, denied by F. Psychoanalysis, Cole tells us, attempts to free the self from bondage to an illusory reality, but K.'s therapy attempts to relate the self to an ultimate reality. For this, the movement of faith is necessary.

But that is something that the self cannot accomplish by itself. It is a matter of grace. Faith, and hence the self, for Kierkegaard is an almost impossible venture, which recalls Freud's pessimism in respect to cure. In fact, both emphasize that the self is a mode of being which evades becoming. Although Cole touches on this, he underestimates especially K.'s appreciation of the "bondage of the will." Nor does he give F. sufficient credit for historicity. F., if anyone did, saw the self in its historical reality, although he looked to its roots, whereas K. looked to its fruits.

Despite these minor points, this study in double vision is an excellent
analysis of the thought of both Kierkegaard and Freud. K.’s pioneer exploration of the self offers us an extraordinary analysis of the paths leading into the meaning of existence and our avoidance of them. To read K. is to be prepared for the insights of F., who as a result of his inward journey expressed our present experience of twentieth-century life and the condition of men. Cole’s interpolation of their views makes it clear that nature and history are not really dichotomous and that K. and F., in the depths of their insights, participate in a wisdom broader and deeper than that of any single discipline. Their work seen jointly points to the ultimate unity of knowledge, to the perspectival nature of reality and therefore of the self.

Drew University, Madison, N.J.

SHIRLEY SUGERMAN


If one were to pick up this book with the expectation that it deals directly with the phenomenon of motion or with the God that philosophers have in one way or another inferred from the fact of motion, that expectation would soon evaporate. Strictly speaking, this is a book concerned with philosophical method—the method, it is true, of thinkers who are convinced that philosophical thinking which stops short of God is simply not adequately philosophical, but nevertheless the concern is method, not doctrine.

It could, of course, be said that no one should pick up the book with any other expectations, since the assemblage of such strange bedfellows as Aristotle, Cicero, Newton, and Hegel should have forewarned the prospective reader that the thematic unity of the book will not be provided by either motion or God, but only by the mode of connecting them in thought. The over-all theme, as Buckley himself states it on p. 268, is: “Can one prove the existence of God from motion?” More pointedly put, however, the question might rather be: “Can one think motion and not think God?” This latter becomes a rather significant question, since one obviously cannot think motion. When the question is put this way, the continuity of theme is made somewhat more manifest. “The selection of Aristotle, Cicero, Newton, and Hegel was dictated by the distinct method which each employed and by their collective exhaustion of the four possible methods within the semantic schema through which they were examined—philosophic methods either particularized for each problem encountered or universalized for every question posed or constructed to resolve wholes into components or systematized to assimilate all movement into their infinite truth” (p. 270).
It is true, of course, that there is little more than superficial similarity between the gods of Aristotle, Cicero, Newton, and Hegel, and that the lack of similarity is due to a great extent to the differences in what these gods are called upon to explain. Although Aristotle found an adequate principle of motion in his concept of nature, he could not find a final significance to the whole cosmos short of a "thought utterly commensurate with itself" (p. 273). Cicero was concerned with the actions of men in political society and saw the gods as indispensable if the actions of men were to be orderly; the social order of justice and law is itself divine, and its "ultimate principle is the single community of gods and men" (p. 156). Newton found that the system of the world both in its origin and in its mathematical constitution was unintelligible without a divine author who was identifiable with infinite force. Hegel, who was not concerned with "motion" at all but with the "movement" of thought, was convinced that the very infinity of thought revealed the infinite source of both thought and reality—a far cry from the God (or gods) who would "explain" the workings of the universe or of society.

What is significant, then, in this book is the elucidation of four methods of philosophical argumentation. It is not so much four methods of approaching the being of God as it is four types of thinking which cannot stop short before affirming the being of the divine. In each case the analysis of the argumentation is brilliant; only in the last case, that of Hegel, does the result in any way resemble what a Christian would call the affirmation of God.

*Fordham University*  
*QUENTIN LAUER, S.J.*


Ignatius Lepp made the observation many years ago that the moral level of an individual is more generally proportioned to the degree of his psychic maturity than it is to his religious beliefs. Consequently, those who point to the superior moral commitment of many atheists and the relative lack of moral concern of the part of many believers as a refutation of the influence of belief on man's moral life miss the point. The only valid comparison would be between the believer and the unbeliever who share identical moral maturity. However, the problem immediately presents itself: why the greater immaturity of so many believers? Has the traditional overemphasis within the Church on extrinsic authority and the exclusive patterning of authority on a paternalistic model produced an atmosphere conducive to immaturity on the part of the believer?

The answer to these questions can be found in this masterful work
Meissner brings a professional awareness of two fields, sociology and psychology, to bear in seeking an understanding of the crisis of authority in today's society. The unusual quality of the book is due to M.'s ability to correct the individualism of psychology with the insights of sociology, while at the same time rooting the external insights of sociology in the internal laws of psychic growth of the individual.

His primary concern is with the full understanding and effective exercise of authority and subjectship in an ecclesial context: the churches, the parish, the religious order and community. The result is a book which ought to be studied by anyone holding authority in a religious body and by anyone struggling to understand the changes occurring within religious institutions. M.'s work helps confirm the opinion of many that what we are witnessing in the Church and in society in general is a crisis of growth and maturation. The changes in the structure of the authority-subject relation represent mankind's effort to grow out of the immature structures of paternalism and creatively structure new styles of adult religious community wherein, in the words of St. Paul, one can realize "the perfect man, the mature measure of the fulness of Christ".

My major reservation concerning this book has to do with the several passages where M. insists that he intends to deal with the sociological and psychological implications of authority to the exclusion of any philosophical or theological implication. One wonders a priori how any such amputation of implications is possible in dealing with such vital human realities. One has no legitimate quarrel with M.'s choice of a specific perspective. But he seems to justify such a division of labor by assuming that philosophical and theological concerns are limited to some form of abstract concept based in a static essence, while the dynamic and practical workings of authority and obedience are left exclusively to the sociologist and the psychologist. If one were to grant this position, then the philosopher and theologian would be left with unreal conceptual entities, while the real workings of community would become the exclusive concern of the empirical human sciences. A process philosopher or theologian, e.g., would find it impossible to define their task in M.'s terms.

Nonetheless, despite any misconceptions M. labors under concerning the nature of philosophy or theology, his work does provide us with the type of evidence which calls into question traditional concepts of authority and community and opens the way to a fundamental rethinking of the nature and role of authority in human society in general and in a religious community in particular.

Woodstock College, N.Y.C.  
John J. McNeill, S.J.

Were this book translated into dramatic form, its protagonist might well be Pontius Pilate—symbolically, any civil magistrate summoned to render judgment upon the demands of the socially disruptive prophet. And Pilate, like the portrayal of Judas in the rock opera "Jesus Christ Superstar," might appear to have the advantage over the defendant so far as political wisdom is concerned. In any event, if the role of prophet is not an easy one, neither is that of the judge or legislator who must decide how far the law can accommodate dissent without undermining the civil polity. The question is doubly perplexing precisely insofar as the prophet has challenged the state's legitimacy in claiming to be "civil." Rohr's study of selective conscientious objection comes directly at the issues raised by the confrontation of prophet and magistrate. Against the inevitably intruding backdrop of the Indochina war, it is timely, a model of clarity in posing the right questions, thoroughly stimulating, and saddening. I recommend it highly for classroom use and for anyone concerned with the issue of civil dissent. It will provoke the reader wherever he stands personally on the particular issue of selective objection; the arguments on both sides of the question are presented lucidly and fairly; and if R.'s critical edge cuts deeper into the arguments favoring legal exemption of SCO's, it is welcome correction to the fallacies of advocates who poorly serve a popular cause.

A political realist undeceived by Gnostic optimism regarding the common level of political maturity in our country, R.'s own judgment of the public-policy issue involved in SCO is painful: the common good, he thinks, would be better served by refusing to grant what in this instance our dissenting prophets want. Considering the difficulty of limiting the principle of countenancing civil disobedience and preventing its reactionary use, it is the lesser evil, the hard but wiser choice.

R. divides his monograph into two parts, the first dealing with the constitutional issue, the second with the public policy question, to what extent the state should accommodate the man who finds his government's war policy unjust and refuses to obey. The first question is more easily disposed of than the second—though perhaps not so handily as R. concludes. Given the political complexities into which the principles of just-war theory must be inserted, it is no lighthearted or fuzzy-minded matter to discover applicability and therefore obligation. R. underscores the difficulty, but says little that speaks to the agony, both personal and social, that must ensue if the facts do warrant application of just-war principle, the fit being tight and imperative. In view of the Vietnam war, the situation, once seemingly remote, is no
longer farfetched. The law of the land, as now declared (subsequent to this book’s publication) in the Negre and Gilette cases, declines to honor the imperative. Does this posture respect the constitutional right to “free exercise” of religion? Only, I think, if “religion” is construed as exclusively private and confined to the sanctuary, law and gospel holding no field in common.

R. fails to confront this state of affairs with the thoroughness it deserves—and which his concern for the dilemma of the legislator would lead us to expect from him. That is, he does not weigh the harm done the “national interest” by a policy which demands unqualified submission of those who, in Judge Wyzanski’s words, may “reflect a more discriminating study of the problem, a more sensitive conscience, and a deeper spiritual understanding.” Does the need for a ready supply of manpower to serve in far-flung counterinsurgency wars constitute a “compelling state interest” that justifies this limitation on the rights of individual conscience? R.’s geopolitical assumptions on such questions control his understanding of the national interest, as they must—and do for us all. But though such assumptions clearly surface here and there throughout the study, they remain unexamined, and insofar as that is the case, the injection of presumptions favoring “national interest” leaves us with a shibboleth rather than an illuminating political category. And so I would judge that until the national interest is cast within the parameters of geopolitics and critically assessed in such terms, R.’s conclusion that we must settle for “stoning the prophets” is at least premature.

On the other hand, R.’s path to his own painful judgment in the case is made easier by the weaknesses in the arguments of SCO proponents who persist in adopting the perspective of the dissenter and pose the question in terms of an exclusively conflict model. More seriously, the defense frequently reflects an individualistic philosophy, understandably an administrator’s anarchic nightmare. None of this is designed to speak to the legislator’s moral concern for the public weal. If the argument in favor of SCO is to recommend itself to such legitimate legislative concern, then, as R. points out, the proponents must show that individual interest here does not simply clash, but at some deeper level harmonizes, with the national interest. “The most permanent fate of God’s word,” said Luther, “is that for its sake the world is put in an uproar. For the word of God comes in order to change and revive the whole earth to the extent it reaches it.” Selective conscientious objection will probably become enshrined in our law only when it becomes manifest, in lives more than arguments, that it embodies not simply social uproar but revival.

Canisius College, Buffalo

David Toolan, S.J.

Finn has brought together a series of essays and interviews on military justice that is both informative and timely. Informative because of the factual, disciplined approach to a topic that is notoriously vulnerable to mindless generalities; timely because of the American practice of revising the military code at the end of a major war.

The book is divided into two parts: critical essays on the implementation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and probing interviews with military personnel who have suffered alleged injustices before military tribunals. The interviews provide abundant empirical data for the arguments developed in the essays. Especially interesting are the interviews with two nationally known figures, Howard Levy and Roger Priest. The former was the army doctor who refused to train medics attached to the Green Berets; the latter a seaman who published an antiwar newsletter. The essays include an introduction by the editor, a historical account of the development of UCMJ, an attempt to contrast the First Amendment freedoms of civilians and military personnel, a psychiatrist’s evaluation of basic training, and a recounting of examples of “command influence” by a retired judge advocate.

The most helpful essay was Edward F. Sherman’s historical narrative. Sherman pinpointed the areas of military justice that are most in need of reform. He gives the UCMJ high marks for the procedural rights of the accused but criticizes the vague description of certain offenses—e.g., “conduct of a nature to bring discredit on the Armed Forces” (Article 134). He is most concerned about “command influence” over the proceedings of courts martial. This concern goes to the heart of the problem of military justice, since a court martial is both in principle and in fact an instrument of military discipline.

Somewhat disappointing is the failure of the essayists to respond to Finn’s call for an argument showing that increased civil liberties would benefit the military establishment as well as the individual. There are passing references to the authors’ belief that such liberties would strengthen the military, but these are more acts of faith than solid argument. The problems of “conscience and command” are merely the legal manifestations of the more fundamental problem of the role of the conscripted citizen-soldier in a democratic regime. “More democracy” may be the cure for the ills of democracy, but it does not follow that the same cure can be prescribed for what ails an institution opposed in principle to many democratic values. The failure of the essayists to rise to Finn’s challenge is no ground for complaint; it is rather a measure of the seriousness of the challenge. Finn is undoubtedly on the right track
in calling for an argument that emphasizes the *harmony* between personal rights and military needs. At the very least, such an approach would provide a rhetorical stance more acceptable to those who must be convinced. I hope this approach will also lead to a substantive reconciliation of the rights of the citizen-soldier and the demands of military discipline. For further reflections along these lines, one might supplement the arguments of *Conscience and Command* with Morris Janowitz’ characterization of the military authority from “domination” to “manipulation.”

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*Park Forest South, Ill.*  


These studies were commissioned for a symposium entitled “Unity and Subsidiarity in the Church” sponsored jointly by the Canon Law Society of America, the University of Dayton, and the John XXIII Center for Renewal, and held in September, 1969, just prior to the meeting of the Synod of Bishops that year. It is not surprising, then, that (with the exception of the first article) the preoccupation of the volume is with the legal and juridical aspects of the topic.

Richard P. McBrien, in a survey of the present state of the discussion on collegiality, sees the ultimate theological basis for collegiality in the “idea and practice of *communio*,” which is a mystery and does not admit of precise juridical formulation (pp. 16, 21, 23). This is followed by three valuable historical contributions. Francis Dvornik shows that episcopal synods are not an innovation in the Roman Catholic Church but have their origins at least prior to the fourth century and became common practice in Persia, Armenia, Africa, Spain, Gaul, and in the Roman church itself. This system of episcopal synodical government began to decline in the eighth and ninth centuries and gradually disappeared “in the Middle Ages in proportion to the growth of Roman centralization of administration,” and, Dovornik concludes, this “has not been of advantage to the Church as the present crisis in the Roman Catholic Church manifests” (p. 56).

John E. Lynch, in a very readable and interesting article, traces the history of the process of centralization from the almost independent regional churches based on the Roman provincial system of the first 250 years to the almost complete centralization achieved in the age of Pope John XXII (1316–34). This was attained gradually, of course, “by concentrating a number of administrative, legislative, and judicial func-
philosophical work. A by-product, gratefully recognized in some quarters, was the lesson in method it provided throughout to the practicing theologian. For, without going so far as to say that every theologian must become his own Husserl, it must yet be admitted that theology has always done its work best when its procedure has been one of analytic description, when it has in whatever rudimentary way brought to light the conditions that have to be satisfied if its affirmations are to be true, when it has been patient in the face of phenomena and refused the easy escape into principle. That same highly salutary lesson, now more simply stated and more widely documented, is discoverable in this college text which only a theologian whose hubris has long ago got out of control would be expected to ignore. Intended as "a relatively simple introduction to some of the problems surrounding religion and atheism," it examines successively five forms in which atheism presents itself today ("scientific," psychological, social moral, anthropological) while attending throughout to the ways it manifests itself among those who actually affirm the existence of God. The coauthors are speaking the plain truth when they say "The purifying influence of atheism becomes evident in these discussions."

Elmer O'Brien, S.J.

DE L'ABSENCE ET DE L'INCONNAISSANCE DE DIEU D'APRÈS LES ÉCRITS ARÉOPAGITIQUES ET MARTIN HEIDEGGER.

The author, a Greek theologian, discovered Heidegger's thought while studying at Bonn 1964-67; after publishing the original Greek, he undertook in 1968 philosophical studies in Paris. The text, in somewhat large print with breezy spread, runs only from pp. 45 to 122. (It would be a pleasanter task to review the excellent thirty-page introduction by Olivier Clément on the "Situation de la parole théologique selon la tradition orthodoxe.") We have two sources: the first is essentially De nominibus divinis with Maximus' commentary, both abundantly quoted; the second consists mainly of H. on Nietzsche, quoted disparately throughout, and in desperate italics giving the impression of a forward thrust to Y.'s thought. Actually, H. is truncated and the relationship between Eastern and Western thought is undigested, not so much from the power of insight as from Y.'s presumably novel acquaintance with "Western" thought. It is difficult to judge the intended audience. Parts 1 and 2 of "Le nihilisme" consist of large blocks of survey material on Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Fichte, and Nietzsche (with the astounding absence of Kierkegaard), material generally found in a very brief history of philosophy and presumably intended for a Greek audience. For the general reader, there is interest in Y.'s Greek florilegium, but if one is really interested, these texts are otherwise available.

Having expected much from the title, we are perhaps overcritical. The fact is, there is no sustained reflection on the intrinsic linking of the many H. quotes, nor with their relationship to the East. We do not encounter H.'s thought on the apophatic and poetic dimensions, the use and abuse of language, the nature of language. Yet all this is central, if anything is, to Y.'s thesis. Furthermore, there is nothing from On the Way to Language, not even its dialogue between East and West; worse, there is nothing from the now famous writings on Hölderlin, nor anything from What is Metaphysics on its famous treatment of Nothing and on the silent voice that urges man on to seek
the "signs"—famous, we say, at least for anyone who claims knowledge of H. and the apophatic tradition while purporting to write "according to the writings of... Heidegger."

R. H. Cousineau, S.J.


R.'s metaphysical theologian is a cartographer, rationally constructing a vision of the world as a whole, penetrating beyond appearances to ultimate reality. In many ways R. himself is a cartographer of other people's efforts to dismiss or to pursue the problem of natural theology. He traces the antitemataphysical biases of Continental thinkers, both rationalist and fideist. He describes the fate of natural theology in Anglo-Saxon circles, especially in Hume and Ayer. He borrows from Wittgenstein an analysis of "seeing-as"; by this analysis, especially as practiced by J. Wisdom, we are allowed to make equally true but aspectually different reference to the same factual data. Meaningful questions are those which open up new aspects of factual data, and metaphysical questions are meaningful because they inquire about aspects of the totality of reality. How subjective are these "aspects"? How can nonempirical truth-claims pass a factual knowledge? R. questions whether empirical facts are ever "seen" apart from a seeing-as process. Unfortunately, traditional standards for factual knowledge demand room for future conceivable empirical tests—a standard which metaphysics cannot meet in full.

R. explores the writings of Basil Mitchell and J. Hick in order to expand the base on which a theistic conclusion is built. The complexity of data, the movement of history, affect the way we see the world as grounded in God. The ambiguity of the given demands interpretation, but interpretation is not so subjective that we forget that we are experiencing the world as ambiguous and as converging toward some transcendent reality. The theistic evidences are reviewed under the broad rubric of "contingent experiences"; they are drawn from man's consciousness of something impinging upon his total experience, from moral commitment, from history's demand for interpretation, from existential longing, from the almost-intelligibility of physical nature. But the theistic conclusion is best supported by a negative argument: the inability of the empiricist to explain personal consciousness and interpersonal discovery; here R. borrows much from I. Crombie, J. Smith, I. Ramsey, C. B. Daly, and again J. Wisdom.

R.'s work is closely argued but clear; his paragraph numeration makes cross reference easy. He gathers together and interprets well several natural theology "parables" (the Garden, the Partisan, the Journey) which not only make enjoyable theological party-games but point up the hermeneutical function of storytelling. Like P. Berger's signals of transcendence, R.'s theistic evidences are drawn from a wider range of experience than classical natural theology provided. Yet, as in many natural theologies, the impression is inevitably given that, if we are perceptive, we ought to "experience" God. This is what infuriates both the nonbeliever and the believer who affirms God mightily despite the fragile evidence. Perhaps there ought to be an argument from infuriation too.

George McCauley, S.J.


For this addition to the Harper
Forum Books series, G. has selected fourteen essays from religionists and men of letters who in the past several decades have distinguished themselves in sketching the interrelationships of literature and religion. Though persons interested in the correlative investigation of literature and religion now face a period of scholastic argumentation concerning the relative merits of various approaches to the enterprise, G. intelligently avoids such argumentation by included seminal essays which over-all are of impressive quality. His selection includes essays by theologians of culture such as Amos Wilder, Preston Roberts, Nathan A. Scott, and Stanley Romaine Hopper. Also represented are some of the finest students of the art of interpretation such as Walter J. Ong, S.J., R. W. B. Lewis, Erich Auerbach, Louis L. Martz, Vincent Buckley, Richard P. Blackmur, Erich Heller, J. Hillis Miller, and Paul Ricoeur.

The essays serve to illustrate what G. isolates as the three facets of the study of the interrelations between literature and religion: (1) an attempt to account in theoretical terms for the points of contact, convergence, or coincidence between literature and religious experience; (2) an attempt to interpret concrete literary materials in order to reveal the manner in which religious visions have informed or been informed by literary and cultural experience; (3) an attempt to assess the effect literature and religion have upon one another in the abstract and the concrete. The value of the book is enhanced by G.'s introductory essay, which is intended to provide a perspective on the entire subject rather than merely serve as an introduction to the volume itself. The essay surveys the field by using M. H. Abram's four approaches to literature: mimetic, expressive, pragmatic, and semantic. To these he adds the hypothetical approach and wisely argues for a critical response "in the direction of a principled eclecticism in all questions of theory and method."

This volume, while it consists largely of essays or portions of books already available, is valuable in its attention to both theoretical and practical issues involved in literature and religion studies. It should be of interest to both religionists and literary scholars.

Ted L. Estess


In the first part M. discusses various authors and movements that have contributed to a leveling of Christianity with other secular and religious projects. Embarrassment over the pressure from historical criticism, guilt over having restored some sense to our hermeneutical quandaries by an extrinsicist fiat, excessive assimilation to the forms and moods of secular striving, efforts to transform the future by underplaying the past—all these currents have contributed to facing the unique, identifiable character of Christianity. The Catholic tradition, says M. in the second part, has within it a configuration which, while preserving a common bond with humanity, at the same time remains unique. It considers the work of God to be literally that: a work which is human history. It is not afraid of the tension which occurs when divine initiative and human event are considered together. In fact, history hints at transcendence, since anything that happens is irreducible to anything else; hence its newness must come "from elsewhere." M. borrows from Pannenberg the thought that full historical intelligibility demands a total perspective which is unavailable to men,
except to those men who believe that the totality resides in one historical happening, in Jesus of Nazareth. Efforts (like Harnack's) to isolate a truth of Christianity which stands above Jesus' history have in fact led to the dehistoricization of God's work and the dechristianization of religion.

The novelty of Jesus as God's own work in history is continued in the lives of believers. Their conversion is God's incarnation in them; the sequel of conversion is a pursuit in time of what Jesus Himself passed through. Their faith enables them to situate themselves in history rather than to understand the ensemble. The sacraments, by being assumed into a historical gesture of Jesus, enable them to enter and to live out a historical tradition. Their scriptures and dogma are unifying confessional professions which not only found and point to the continuity of the tradition but address particular stages of the tradition as well. Their hierarchy is supposed to be a sign not only of unity but of openness, since the hierarchical office calls all Christians to a universal sharing. The presence of such an authority is a reminder of the need for a regrouping at the base of all human decisions across the customary moral, political, or religious boundaries. The Christian is different even at the level of experience, since his desire, his sense of absence, his search, are all directed at someone who has come and will come. This is a worth-while book. George McCauley, S.J.


The Dutch original of this volume was well reviewed in TS 31 (1970) 351-54. The first of the two essays it contains was S.'s inaugural lecture some years ago at the Catholic University of Nijmegen; it argues well the point also made by Karl Rahner and others that the divine does not compete with the human. The second essay is probably the most daring serious attempt by a Roman Catholic theologian today to break out of the Chalcedonian dogma. Its argument proceeds from an insistence on the unity of Jesus Christ through a strong affirmation of human personhood to a denial of dual (and hence of divine) personhood and a refusal to predicate distinct divine Sonship apart from the Incarnation. The other principal Christological questions are treated congruously with this basic understanding of the mystery of Christ. The essay deserves lengthy analysis, but only two questions are possible in this brief notice: (1) Given its exploratory and at times unclear and technical character, would it not have found a more appropriate locus of expression in a scholarly journal? (2) Does the principal thesis not imply an abandonment of the basic principle enunciated in the first essay? Would it not be ironic if S.'s development has led him to lose hold on the insight with which he began? Is his quarrel not so much with Chalcedon as with the prologue of John, i.e., with the very possibility of a genuine Incarnation as the primary and incomprehensible instance of the compatibility of the human and the divine?

Thomas E. Clarke, S.J.


Urgent problems, just because they are urgent, are always in danger of losing contact with the history out of which they developed. This holds true especially with regard to the meaning of Christ, His reality and demand as historical person and His interpretation throughout the centuries of
Christendom. We should therefore be grateful for a book where an attempt has been made to shed light upon fundamental questions by connecting them with their proper history.

To show why and how Christian theology is focused on the one question Cur Deus homo, H. proceeds as follows: In a first section (pp. 11–43) he discusses the basic question together with its implications and presuppositions. He specifies the anthropological context in which the question arises and then transfers to its hermeneutical situation where it becomes theologially significant. After these preliminary explications, H. analyzes in a second section (pp. 44–96) the soteriological motive of the Incarnation. It is continued by a third section (pp. 97–127) which deals with the ontological foundation of the soteriological situation and the “meaningful reasons for an absolute predestination of Christ” (p. 97). In the final section (pp. 178–213) an attempt is made at synthesizing in the light of an analysis of biblical passages the traditional position of the previous chapters with the dogmatic questions of our present consciousness. As a result, Thomism and Scotism can no longer be considered as polarizations of various positions but as “complementary accentuations” of a reality which is not exhausted by either one.

Special emphasis is paid to Nicholas of Cusa, whose full philosophical and theological significance has been ignored or neglected by traditional theology, though many of the problems which are ours have been treated by him quite thoroughly. No one who is really interested in the question about Christ should miss this book.

Wilh. Dupré


The first volume in this series dealt with William of Auxerre (cf. TS 26 [1965] 167), the second with Alexander of Hales (cf. TS 30 [1969] 376–77); the last will cover Philip the Chancellor. The present work is the second recent study of Hugh of St. Cher, following W. Breuning’s Die hypostatische Union in der Theologie Wilhelms von Auxerre, Hugos von St. Cher und Rolands von Cremona (Trier, 1962). P. contends that Breuning ignored or misinterpreted aspects of Hugh’s thought and that Hugh merits a more comprehensive study, one taking account of his minor works, including exegesis. Although Breuning is better able to show the relationships among Hugh and the other two theologians, P. provides a more detailed, documented study of Hugh himself. This French Dominican (ca. 1190–1263) was a conservative theologian who usually followed the lead of William of Auxerre in Christology, but who refined elements of William’s thought and occasionally pointed the way for future developments. For both, Christ as man was aliquid but the humanity was a habitus for the divine person. The incarnate Son of God was a persona composita by being united to a composite human nature; nothing was added to the divine person. No destruction of human personality was involved, because the perfection of human personality consists in privation, i.e., the human nature’s not being assumed by a nobler person. Hugh maintained that Christ had one esse, not two. Although a creaturely being and a divine being could be mentally distinguished in Christ, they are not distinct in actual existence. Here Hugh anticipated la-
ter discussions by putting the problem of Christ's unity or duality in terms of esse, a slight variation from Alexander of Hales, who used the term essentia. For Hugh, Christus is the name most expressive of the totality of the divine person in two natures; Christus was destroyed during the triduum when the separation of body and soul impaired this harmonious totality.

P. has appended an edition of Distinctions 2, 5-7, 10-12, 21-22, of Hugh's Scriptum super 3 Sententiarum. Breuning had also produced an edition which P. considers inadequate, relying on only four MSS and based on an inferior codex, Vat. lat. 1098. P. has relied on nine thirteenth-century MSS, basing his text on Florence, Bib. Naz. Centrale Conv. Sopr. I. VI. 32.

Joseph F. Kelly


When did moral theology become an independent discipline? T. offers no simple answer. It was a developmental process, spurred on by the Council of Trent's decree on seminaries, and especially by the Jesuits' answer to this decree in the process of forming the Ratio studiorum superiorum. A major part of the book (277 pages of text and 76 pages of documents in the appendix) is devoted to tracing this development from the first casus conscientiae sessions for "short-course" seminarians to a regular course in moral theology with its own theology professor for all candidates for the priesthood. The content and methodology of the textbooks written for this course, as well as its inclusion of many canonical questions, is traceable to the aim of this course to train future priests for hearing confessions. T.'s style is simple and easily readable by anyone with a moderate knowledge of German. It is perhaps too detailed to hold the interest of many readers other than those especially interested in this phase of Jesuit history. For readers who would like a shorter account, the four Zusammenfassungen placed at intervals in the book, or even just the conclusion (pp. 343-59), might well suffice.

Joseph J. Farraher, S.J.


Citing Joseph Comblin, "One continues to speak of 'renewal' of moral theology, but it is still a matter more of desire than reality," D. expresses the hope that his work "will give to this desire a beginning of reality." Most readers will grant that, within the modest limits he sets himself, D. has at least gathered materials useful for the beginning. Disavowing any originality of thought, he speaks simply as one teacher of morale to others, and composes his synthesis mainly by letting a variety of thinkers present their positions on the questions that he takes up, especially Ricoeur, Beinart, Mounier, Lacroix, Gaston Berger, Oraison, J. Jeremias, Max Weber, and Bonhoeffer. His aim is to fit together these differing modern perspectives into a unified intellectual articulation and language, while "sweeping away the litter of decayed concepts and schematizations" which presently imprisons the moral life of the Christian "in fatal and fallacious dilemmas."

D. synthesizes dialectically, endeavoring to clarify important irreducible tensions of Christian moral life, such as those between secular humanism and Christian gospel and grace, between Christian contrition
and the guilt feelings pinpointed by modern psychology, between traditional Christian confession of sin and the direction for renewal of the sacrament, between good intention and efficacious action, between the idealism of conviction and the realism of responsibility, between the ethics of violence and that of nonviolence, between utopianism and realism, between psychoanalytic and moral perspectives on sexuality. A leitmotiv threading throughout D.'s synthesis is the theme of "reciprocity," i.e., the genuine interpersonal relationship.

How valuable in present-day education is so generic a fundamental moral theology depends on the truth of D.'s last paragraph, where he takes a position on what is currently a subject of growing debate. Although his "fundamental moral" can and should be developed into basic positions and moral strategies on contemporary problems, still "the complexity of life today is such that a moralist can no longer adventure into the domain of the doctor, economist, psychologist, politician, jurist or engineer, without making himself ridiculous by his simplicity and ignorance. Only the specialist of these domains can construct from within the particular deontology. The moralist has a more fundamental task. After it, he should pass on the baton and step aside."

John Giles Milhaven


M. aims his treatment not at the professional ethicist but at the college student, who, he feels, has been "turned off" by traditional morality. To be made relevant to him, it must be rethought. The orientation of the book is basically Thomistic, but an attempt has been made to acknowledge and adopt anything of value in more recent approaches.

M. covers general ethics rather than any more specific problem. The first part is given over to the subjective aspects of morality, the problem of free will, and the traditional impediments to freedom. Then the norm of morality occupies a large section. Here M. analyzes the position taken, from the hedonistic approaches of antiquity to the idealistic approach of a Bergson or a Von Hildebrand. He offers a brief critique of each, opts for Thomas' recta ratio in conjunction with Suarez' natura humana adequate spectata as his own norm. In this section, as elsewhere, M. shows wide acquaintance with the work done in his field; his treatment of other ethicists is necessarily brief but generally competent.

In his chapter on the natural law, M. takes up situation ethics. Given the importance and popularity of this subject and the whole question of absolutes and the immutability of the natural law, this section would have to be expanded considerably by the teacher in an ethics course. So much has been written in this area during the past two or three years by Catholic authors that updating is called for. But this is the hazard which any author in ethics must contend with today.

The last two chapters consider conscience, the principle of the double effect, and the relationship between law and morality. The present reviewer found the book both interesting and informative.

John R. Connery S.J.

“Not so many years ago such customs as ‘eating no meat on Friday’ and ‘attending Mass on Sundays and holydays’ played a very important role in making a judgement about the moral goodness of a person. Today we judge the moral value of a person more on the basis of his involvement in the human community than on his church attendance.” This structure of “how it was... how it is today” typifies the basic approach of this book, the specific point of comparison being the general themes of fundamental moral theology. Each specific question is broadened and modified in terms of a Vatican II anthropology. The orientation is toward the dynamic, historical, person alist, community dimensions. Integration is favored over dualistic visions of man. Thus the classic questions, freedom, conscience, sin, virtue, law, means-end, are newly situated. Along the way the author manages to incorporate some commonplaces of psychology (Freud, Erikson, Fromm, May). One has the impression that the book is simply updating the traditional questions. For someone whose problem is how to evolve out of the moral theology he received in illo tempore, this book might have some value. This reviewer did not detect any originality or creativity, and doubts its value for those not raised on seminary manuals.

Phillip Berryman


This tightly written book focuses on the union of subjective and objective factors in value judgments and decisions in general and in the specific areas of life, sex, knowledge, property, and associations. The theoretical sections come to grips with the weaknesses of both traditional scholastic theory and contemporary situationalism. The best insights of both are then united into a theory which is a workable analytic tool. D. is particularly to be praised for his insistence that we look for the objective component hidden in even such strongly subjective factors as love.

Though the theory is workable, D.’s application leaves much to be desired on several key areas. In his treatment of premarital sex, e.g., he does not face the situations experienced by many young people and reads in facts or consequences. A consideration of cases like the following might indicate how society creates situations which may justify sexual intercourse before a marriage ceremony though not before a marital commitment. John, an orphan twenty years old, considers himself married to Mary but will not “marry her” in a legal ceremony until he is finished school, since this would cause him to lose his social-security payments. D. should also beware of reading into the premarital situation such consequences as promiscuity, harm from gossip, and added danger of infidelity after “marriage,” though all of these are possible. Such consequences are in part a result of a cultural situation which appears to be changing rapidly. Indeed, it is the objective changes in this area which cast serious doubts upon D.’s idea that the consensus of the community is a summary of experienced wisdom. The experienced wisdom of the community may be the wisdom of the past reality and not of the contemporary world.

Despite the reservations, D. makes a valuable contribution in distinguishing and outlining the differing norms which have been brought to bear on the problems he has chosen for study.

Thomas M. Garrett

VOR- UND AUSSEREHELICHER GE- SCHLECHTSVERKEHR: DIE STELLUNG
and for each a brief biographical and bibliographical note is given. Then follow the incipits classified into four categories: sermones de tempore, de sanctis, de communi sanctorum, de quadragesima, with each entry assigned its liturgical place, scriptural source, theme, and protheme. Finally, the manuscripts and printed editions are listed. Because the present repertorium is limited to the above period, indispensable is also Schneyer's Wegweiser zu lateinischen Predigt­reihen des Mittelalters (Munich, 1965), which provides a guide to sermon collections from the twelfth to the early sixteenth century. These three volumes take us down to the letter J.

C. H. Lohr, S.J.


This volume belongs to a new series of translations of the critical editions of classical Cistercian writers. A teacher at the cathedral school of Tournai in the second decade of the twelfth century, Guerric was one of the many secular clerics attracted to the monastic life by the activities of Bernard of Clairvaux and the early Cistercians. Chosen second abbot of Clairvaux's daughter house of Igny, he led the new foundation throughout its period of growth and flowering and died in 1157. The collection of Liturgical Sermons is Guerric's only extant work. Probably corrected versions of homilies he gave to his subjects, the sermons follow the liturgical year. The present volume covers feasts from Advent to the second week of Lent. On these occasions Guerric's sermons touched on the practice of the religious vows, the penitential spirit, and the life of union with God. (His doctrine on the formation of Christ within us has been the subject of a study by Déodat de Wilde.) In forcefulness of rhetoric and use of imagery he sometimes matched Bernard: "Be a lamp then in heart, in hand, in lips. The lamp in your heart will shine for you; the lamp in your hand or on your lips will shine out for your neighbors. The lamp in the heart is loving faith; the lamp in the hand is the example of good works; the lamp on the lips is edifying speech" (pp. 102-3). In these sermons there are echoes of the early Cistercians' joyful acceptance of poor accommodations, meager fare, and harsh winters for the love of the Lord. As such, the sermons constitute another historical source for the study of the early Cistercian movement.

In the Introduction the Cistercian authors of the critical edition, John Morson and Hilary Costello, gather the known data on Guerric's early life and his monastic milieu and summarize the fruits of the last century of research on his ascetical teaching.

Fernando Picó, S.J.


In intellectual history the lives and works of minor figures often serve better to reveal trends and attitudes than those of the great men who stand above and mold their times. In the fourteenth century the institutional structures of most of the mendicant orders were coming to be cast in established forms in the service of the papacy, the institution for whose
domination over the old feudal clergy they had in the thirteenth century done so much. In Germany such forms may clearly be seen in the life and works of Herman of Schildesche, O.S.A. (ca. 1290–1357). After studies in the convent of the Order in Osnabrück, Herman was lector from ca. 1320–29 in various convents in central Germany. From 1330–35 he studied theology at Paris, then from 1337–39 was provincial of the Thuringian-Saxon province of the Order. From ca. 1340 to the end of his life he was professor of theology and vicar-general of the bishop in Würzburg. Most of his works were cast in the established literary forms: commentaries on the Sentences, on the Canticle, works on moral theology, liturgy, pastoral care, philosophy, sermons. To judge by manuscript diffusion, most important were two compilations, Speculum sacerdotum and Introductorium juris, which reflect respectively the state of priestly life and the introduction of Roman law in Germany.

The two works which are edited here are good examples of the service performed by the Augustinian Order for the papacy. The first, written about 1332 at the request of John XXII, is directed against Marsilius of Padua's Defensor pacis (1324) and provides an ecclesiological foundation for the bull of condemnation Licet iuxta doctrinam (1327). Part 1 (corresponding to prop. 3 and 5) argues for the immunity of the Church from temporal (imperial) control. Part 2 (prop. 2 and 4) argues that the pope is head of the Church and vicar of Christ by divine institution and that from him all jurisdiction, including temporal, proceeds. A third part, against Marsilius' individual theses, has been lost.

The second work, written in Würzburg about 1350, is the first Augustinian tract to defend, in extenso and against the teaching of earlier Augustinians, the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception. This work also concerns indirectly papal authority, because the teaching of Aquinas (who opposed the doctrine) had been approved in 1324 and because the introduction of the feast of the Immaculate Conception throughout Christendom represented a centralizing tendency. Herman defends the doctrine in Part 1 (dedicating only a brief note to Thomas' teaching) and the feast in Part 2 (probably against local clergy opposing its introduction in Würzburg). The two treatises are published here for the first time in full and in a critical edition.

C. H. Lohr, S.J.


S.'s work differs considerably from many treatments of Church history in that it studies the Church not as an isolated institution but as directly related to its social environment. He argues that historians too frequently treat Church history as a phenomenon independent of secular history. The Church, he contends, is always a captive of its social, political, and economic environment, even when it most vigorously opposes that environment. Because of S.'s approach, many of the spiritual and intellectual achievements of the medieval Church have not been stressed. The result is a "grimmer, more earthly church than that of scholastic theology or monastic contemplation."

S. divides the Middle Ages into three chronological periods, which he designates as the primitive age (700–1050), the age of growth (1050–1300), and the age of unrest (1300–1500). In the context of these periods he investigates four aspects of the medieval
Church: papacy, episcopacy, religious orders, and what he calls "fringe orders and anti-orders." In each case he shows how extensively these institutions were transformed by social, political, and economic factors. The growth and centralization of the papacy was due in no small degree to its adoption of classical and imperial notions of government. Episcopal authority was considerably weakened by its subordination to crown, papacy, and commune. The progress or decline of religious orders corresponded to their ability or inability to adapt to changing circumstances. Finally, the highly personalized and individualistic atmosphere of the late Middle Ages resulted in a trend away from institutional religion and the rise of less structured forms of religious life such as the Beguines and the Brethren of the Common Life.

While S.'s work is not the result of new research, it is a masterful synthesis which shows much original insight. The high quality of synthesis and style characteristic of this work is such as we have normally come to expect from one of our most outstanding medievalists.

_Louis B. Pascoe, S.J._


B. wants to serve Catholic ecumenism by clarifying Luther's central teaching. After five chapters on justification, single chapters treat sacraments and ecclesiology, leading to the concluding essay on "constructive ecumenism." The recurring thesis is that Luther's view of justification has two focal points, both diverging from the Catholic tradition: first, when God justifies a man, He does not transform interiorly but only imputes the righteousness of Christ; second, under justifying grace man does not love God nor start a new life of righteous actions, but simply and exclusively believes in a pardon promised because of Christ.

One serious problem stems from a series of Luther's works on justification which do not fit the neat scheme of B.'s book. The _Heidelberg Disputation_ (theses 25–29), the _Sermo de duplici iustitia_, and the _Against Latomus_ all depict an infused righteousness through which Christ is operative expelling sin and remaking the believer's life. Further, B. has not noted the interior, personal transformation Luther envisages under the term _fides_. Admittedly, righteousness is not an infused quality for Luther, nor is one's sinfulness treated as mere _reliquiae_ after forgiveness, but neither of these "concessions" leads to the denatured extrinsicism for which B. argues.

A more serious flaw is methodological. B.'s facile contrasts of Luther with Augustine and Aquinas proceed without reference to the monastic-devout and Ockhamist horizon of Luther's spiritual and intellectual world. B. cites doctrines excised from history, e.g., paying no heed to the impact on Luther of the spiritual themes of humble self-accusation and lifelong expulsion of sin. He does not note Luther's preoccupation with the nominalist's love of God _ex puris naturalibus_ and congruous merit of the first grace. Such concerns are essential both for understanding Luther and for meaningful comparisons of his work with thinkers of other eras. Only with extensive hermeneutical reflection, e.g., as practiced by O. H. Pesch, can Luther be placed in fruitful dialogue.

One must admire B.'s calm effort toward an objective reading of Luther. But his systematizing drive has led to the omission of far too much of Luther and Luther's world of thought from the final account.

_Jared Wicks, S.J._

"This is a book about the history of the Church in Europe with an eye especially on Britain and with little more than a glance at Eastern Orthodoxy and American Christianity" (p. 10). V., formerly fellow and dean of King's College, Cambridge, and author of several books on Church history, thus describes his own work in the Preface. True to his announced intentions, he describes in roughly half the book the history of the Church, Protestant and Roman Catholic, in England during the nineteenth century. Several chapters, however, are devoted to the same period of history in Germany and France. Only in the final pages does he turn his attention to the Church first in Russia and the Baltic countries, then in the United States. V.'s treatment of his topic in the various chapters is necessarily brief, but an adequate overview of this period of Church history is still provided. For a Roman Catholic, his judgment of the pontificate of Pius IX, Vatican I, and the Modernist heresy is quite illuminating. Says V., e.g.: "Pio Nono was peculiarly qualified to promote loyalty to the papacy as the centre of the Church.... His charm and spontaneity won him passionate affection, all the more so on account of his sufferings and political adversities which gave him the halo of a martyr.... It was Pio Nono who created and encouraged that intense veneration for the Vicar of Christ which has been until recently such a striking feature of modern Roman Catholicism" (p. 153).

The principal defect of the book lies in its sketchy treatment of recent decades in Church history. It might have been better to conclude with the end of World War II and dedicate a separate volume to the contemporary history of the churches in Europe and America.

Joseph A. Bracken, S.J.


The letters between Sir John (later Lord) Acton and Richard Simpson constitute one of the most important chapters in the history of the English Liberal Catholic movement. In fact, their partnership in editing the Rambler from 1858 to 1862 and its successor, the Home and Foreign Review, from 1862 to 1864 is the story of that movement in England.

Acton, one of the leading Catholic thinkers of his age, had been profoundly influenced by his studies under Döllinger in Munich and added the element of German theological inquiry, thereby giving to English Liberal Catholicism a tone different from its counterpart in France. Simpson, an early member of the Oxford Movement, was a convert to Roman Catholicism. In February 1858, these two men assumed joint proprietorship of the Rambler (founded in 1848) and their correspondence during this period reveals Acton's premonitions about eventual conflict with the Catholic hierarchy. The crisis developed in March 1859, and Newman, at the request of the bishops, reluctantly took over as editor of the Rambler. Ironically, his own piece "On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine" (July 1859) put him in bad light with Rome (after an inaccurate Latin summary of the article was delated to the Holy Office). He edited only the June and July issues before resigning.

The Acton-Simpson letters, which cover the period from 1858 to 1875, flesh out the background to Vatican I
and, in the context of Newman’s essay on the laity, foreshadow an issue that would come back to haunt the fathers of Vatican II: the role of the layman in the life of the Church. Writing to Acton in March 1859, Simpson—smarting under the bishops’ disapproval of a layman dealing with theological issues—quotes approvingly a friend who said: “If all Catholic literature is to be confined to Bps pastoraal & politics merely to be their echo let it be known to all whom it may concern. If the Cardinal’s alleged dictum, that ‘the only function of the laity is to pray’ be really the law of the land, let us know it, that we may get out of it into some more Xtian country.”

Philip C. Rule, S.J.


An excellent book on Germany in the time of the Kulturkampf. It shows the light that history can bring to the study of theology. Characters great and small pass through its pages. The interaction of parochial ecclesiastical quarrels and the greater raisons d’État is beautifully limned. A long section detailing the battle over seminary versus university education for aspiring clerics has some lessons for the present day. There are interesting bits on Jesuit influence, at Rome and elsewhere, and certain “types” familiar in other periods of the Church’s history recur. There are Bismarck, Kaiser Wilhelm I, Bishop Michael Felix Korum, Jesuit product, Alsatian, ultramontane protagonist. There is Prof. Reuss, “a man who knows no fatherland, but only the interests of the one, holy Church.” And there are those other clerics who seem to know too much of the Prussian fatherland.

Moving away from the Rhineland, there are fascinating footnotes on the Rome of Leo XIII, including his absolute insistence on seminaries “for the formation of the true ecclesiastical spirit.” All this and much more awaits the reader in the midst of a truly Teutonic profusion of scholarly notes and other apparatus. It is well worth reading.

James Hennesey, S.J.


The noteworthy series Gesellschaft und Theologie attempts to conceive the societal relationship of theology in its systematic, sociological, and ecclesiastical-practical dimensions. S. supplies the third volume, which seriously confronts the systematic theologian with revolutionary (better, radical) theology. The attractive title “Emancipation through Change” is conceptually and systematically undeveloped, but gives the keynote or sets the fashion which inspires and determines all the articles. For an American reader familiar with S., the long introduction may be of special interest: S. characterizes his endeavor as a “searching for new models and perspectives” in a time of transition. He rejects any claim of definitive outlook. Confronting himself with today’s students and their radical opinions, he realizes that one has to abandon the rationalistic and idealistic heritage as foundation of Christian social ethics. On the other hand, he also notices that Marxist analysis and interpretation are limited. The limitation consists in the fact that Marxist interpretative analysis as a method cannot transcend its own logic. In spite of its attractiveness to young people, Marxist doctrine fails to enlighten, as soon as new societal
realities are at stake or new events occur to which people have to react.

Nevertheless, S. confesses to radicalism, as it is, e.g., psychologically described by Ch. H. Turner in *Radical Man* (Cambridge, 1970): “a permanent openness for new ideas and experiences, for new relationships to men and to the world, by which we are challenged to review and to abandon our usual ways of thinking, living and acting.”

Looking at S.’s theological efforts in general, one realizes that he does not like to emphasize the “truth claim” of Christian faith. He believes and hopes that our Christian tradition is strong enough to make a contribution to the becoming of a new world. If we Christians are capable of changing our personal and social life, we will unavoidably ask for the origin of this capacity. But in order to achieve the “courage to change,” we need a sociological methodology which takes into account the sentence of Ernst Bloch: “What is, cannot be true.”

Whoever wants to address himself to revolutionary, radical, or socially relevant theology should not bypass S.’s double contribution: the connection of theory and praxis as a permanent challenge to the theoretical theologian, and the concept of change and renewal as a step towards emancipation.

Ferdinand Brüngel, S.J.


In two lectures (delivered in March 1970) R. presents his reflections on the notions of freedom and manipulation in regard to (1) society and (2) the Church. Human freedom, including religious and theological freedom, can be realized only in the matter of the world, of history, and consequently of society. The space-time categorical zone of freedom, which in today’s planable society can, and inevitably must, be greatly manipulated, functions as the condition for the possibility of religious freedom. Indeed, looked at in its definitive significance, “the concrete mode of the immediate possession of God [i.e., the beatific vision] is itself determined through the concreteness of our earthly life” (p. 14). In the Church, as in other societies, one finds manipulation that is institutional, sometimes legitimate and sometimes sinful. Whether justifiable or not, it represents a form of inherited concupiscence; “it is the given, which ought not to be, which ought to be altered and eliminated, even if in a never completed history; it is that which may always exist and be endured only in protest against it” (p. 20). Because manipulation of one man arises from the freedom of another, an absolute conquest in favor of earthly freedom and against every self-alienation must remain impossible. “The Christian will always be the sceptic, who does not wonder about a history that leads into the unplanned in spite of all modern planableness and leads time and again into restrictions as far as the point of fatal falls” (p. 28). Possessing, on the other hand, an absolute eschatological hope, he is able to fight for earthly freedom more courageously and more radically, “since such a fighter can really lose nothing that he really absolutely needs” (p. 29).

With poignancy and candidness, R. does not hesitate to draw from his abstract theological ascertainments concrete critical analyses of certain prevalent conditions in the Church today, especially in respect to conservatism and “democracy.” His differentiated reproaches are here, as always, well balanced and precisely grounded. And, as always with R.’s
concrete conclusions, the reader who may be either offended or captivated by them should take care to understand them in the exact sense legitimized by the author's argumentation and definitions.

William J. Hoye


Paraphrasing the papers presented at the SEDOS conference in Rome in March 1969, P. here conveys in simple and pleasing style the main orientations of Catholic missiology since Vatican II. Particularly successful are the opening chapters on Vatican II ecclesiology and on the missionary perspectives of the Bible. In the later chapters, which attempt to weave together the main ideas set forth at the SEDOS institute, there are bothersome discrepancies. Semmelroth's view, summarized early in the book, looks upon revelation as essentially identical with grace, and seems to imply that non-Christians who open themselves to God's love are recipients of revelation. But then P., following Daniélou, portrays the non-Christian religions as merely human constructions which are incapable of helping their adherents to attain salvation. This seems inconsistent with the Semmelroth position. Later P. summarizes an interesting paper by Fiolet to the effect that all material creation, being included in the economy of redemption, must be subjected to the lordship of Christ; but in the following chapter, relying on Grasso, he identifies the mission of the Church almost exclusively with proclamation. Because P. fails to develop a consistent theory that overcomes the apparent antinomies in the essays he summarizes, he does not make as vigorous a contribution to missiology as one might hope for.

Avery Dulles, S.J.


A welcome contribution to studies on Pentecostalism, theological, yet readable by the average lay person. G. discusses "divisive enthusiasm" in a historical perspective and concludes that contemporary Catholic Pentecostalism can avoid this if (1) it realizes the need for sacramental, historical, and institutional values, (2) if care is taken for the interpretation of religious experience, and (3) if the indispensability of theological competence is realized.

Chap. 2 deals with the charismatic experience especially from the scriptural point of view. It is a sensitive analysis and from this experience he does not exempt the baptism of suffering; G.'s theology is not purely resurrectional. He gives a needful emphasis to the sacramental aspect, baptismal and Eucharistic, with relationship to the charismatic experience. Both of these views are somewhat lacking in the teaching emanating from some of the strongest Pentecostal centers. Chap. 3 deals with pastoral problems. Again G. bases his observations on the scriptural text, e.g., chiliastic prophets at Thessalonica, exaggerated enthusiasm at Corinth, the exclusion of members as the last resort. Chap. 4 seeks to theologize the charismatic experience. G. does this from a brief historical survey starting with Gnosticism. He speaks about the obligation of the Catholic Pentecostal to "reflect on the significance, purpose, and cultivation of these and other spiritual gifts in the light of more traditional and institutional forms of Catholic belief and worship" (p. 129). Chap. 5 deals with special aspects of the Pentecostal experience: tongues, prophecy, visions, healing, charisms of service and faith. Here G. keeps a good balance
between the charisms in non-Pentecostal Christians and Pentecostals; he stresses the theological virtues and many of his points, if implemented, would prevent some of the incipient divisiveness, e.g., over tongues. Chap. 6 deals with the meaning of Spirit baptism; G. concludes that it is not a sacrament, does not have the efficacy of sacramental prayers by ordained ministers, yet is a valid prayer together with other Christians for charismatic gifts: these gifts are not acquired by practice but by the free gift of the Spirit. The chapter closes with a useful discussion of discernment.

This is one of the few books which has dared to give any critical analysis of Catholic Pentecostalism; it is gently and prudently done and should become a study book in concert with the Life of the Spirit seminars which are beginning to spread throughout the country but which, though good, lack theological reflection and precision.

J. Massingberd Ford


Page presents a reasonably good analysis of the Vatican II and postconciliar documents regarding diocesan pastoral councils. He divides his work systematically: the historical and theological background, the nature, the authority, the competence, and finally the structure of this new institution. The book will not prove very helpful for those looking for a description and an evaluation of possible organizational patterns for councils. P. begins by tracing the development of the key paragraph 27 of Christus dominus through its legal enactment in Ecclesiae sanctae (no. 16). The treatment of the theology of conciliarity does not go much beyond the Vatican II texts. Pastoral councils are identified as the institutions by means of which the mission of the people of God is expressed on the diocesan level (p. 49). The purely consultative function of the body is stressed so much, however, that P. almost rules out the possibility of truly open and discursive collaboration between the bishop and the other members of the council in the articulation of the mission of the Church people in the diocese. In fact, P. is somewhat ambiguous about the role of the bishop in the council (pp. 153-54).

The distinction drawn between the function of the DPC and the priests' senate is not as clear as it could be. P. insists that (preferably elected) priests, religious, and laity should constitute the membership, with the laity in the majority (pp. 146-47). He leaves the question of the council's competence quite unspecified, and rightly so. The life of the Church will spell this out. The second half of the book is repetitious and wordy, leaving the impression that it could have been shortened.

William J. La Due