BOOK REVIEWS


It is at once a cultural and a theological necessity: somehow, if we are not to go mad, we must find our way back (or forward) into what Thomas Fawcett calls “symbolism” and I call “mythic consciousness.” What is at stake is whether, as Wallace Stevens put it, man is “a native in this world.” Theology and Western culture have tended to say “No.” The result is alienation so severe as to disintegrate both culture and theology.

As I write these words, two earthlings are prowling the surface of the moon in an electric car. As on previous voyages, the astronauts carry with them not only their scientific instructions but also a prepackaged ceremony to lend a certain ritual to their otherwise scientific visit. In the present instance, Col. Scott takes along a virgin, new-issue postage stamp, which he proceeds to frank while standing upon the distant space-shore of our silent satellite. On a previous occasion, as I remember, the principal rite was the whacking of a golf ball, though I do not forget that at still another time part of the Book of Genesis was read to us from a spaceship.

Philately, sport, religion. It is not that the domains are wrong but that none of them, not even the latter, is able, in our use of it, to overcome the banality into which our language nowadays falls on occasions we know in our hearts might move us, were we more human, to rapture and awe.

The failing does not, of course, belong to our language as such, though one might think so from the plethora of contemporary writing that goes in for titles such as Prof. Fawcett’s The Symbolic Language of Religion. Overconcern with language, to the point where it comes to be regarded as a cause (rather than a symptom) of spiritual states, is a legacy from positivism, which could not, on principle, enter the human psyche by the front door and so attempted to come in by the back. There, in the portals of language analysis, it got stuck. While many latter-day analytic revisionists have succeeded in loosening themselves a trifle from the jam(b), it is in fact not possible ever to get into the house of the human psyche by the back door unless you have somebody or something that entered by the front door to pull you in.

The front door of the human psyche is called “intersubjectivity.” It is wide open, but it is also, to certain people and certain cultures (like our own for at least the past two and a half centuries), more than a little frightening; for it requires, in order to be crossed, a blatant (not to say naive) affirmation of one’s own subjectivity, plus an unaccountable trust that one’s own subjectivity is waiting to be received on its own terms by
the subject in the house. The frightening part is that there is no way to demonstrate the validity of the assumption either before or after the event, save by recourse to that very subjectivity which is the hypothesis to be tested in the first place. In short, subjectivity (and its correlate, intersubjectivity) is either an absolute premise or a chimera. Language analysis (and indeed, as Fawcett shows, a good part of Western philosophy altogether) tends to temporize about this, which is why it gets stuck and can go neither in nor out.

All the while, there is some (subjective) information that is hard to dismiss. As Heinrich Ott asks in a recent essay, what is the source of that conviction we have upon meeting a person who speaks an unknown language that communication is possible if only we will stick at it? (Cf. The Future of Philosophical Theology, ed. Robert A. Evans [Philadelphia, 1971] p. 166.) Indeed, what is the very possibility of that communication? The existence of language tends to obscure this unanswerable question, which is in principle the same even if it be my twin brother whom I encounter. I wonder if he will ever understand me, yet I risk the hope that he may. In “deep” matters we often fail, yet the miracle of rapport occurs often enough and carries such an immediate reward of bliss that I refuse to be deprived of it against all odds, and against all systems of logic.

The matter of subject (subjectivity) here raised is frequently allowed to pass even the censors of neopositivism, because it refers only to human intersubjectivity, which can, so some think, be bracketed as a special case. The easiest, and for some purposes the most useful, device is to regard mankind as a peculiar wart on the skin of existence. But what if it be held, à la Martin Buber for instance, that intersubjectivity is a phenomenon that may occur not only among humans but also between humans and things—or even from thing to thing? Ah, then we are said to have passed from philosophy to poetry, a noncognitive order of discourse that serves the amused delectation and personal comfort of those whose fancies are strong.

Is that so? The argument now becomes “curioser and curioser.” The embattled subjectivist now appeals to all the “great poetry” (some of which he wishes he could compose on the spot) as well as to “the religious traditions of mankind,” including animism, witchcraft, and superstition. He denies that mankind is an evolutionary wart and attempts to turn the argument full around by maintaining that man is the index of nature, not vice versa; that whatever is manifest in man is at least latent in nature; and that to restrict intersubjectivity to mankind is to render nature forever opaque except in the terms of that greatest fancy of all, which is mathematics.
To this the mind of objectivity replies with a yawn. It has heard all this before and desired nothing in the first place so much as to be rid of these pseudo arguments based on appeal to mere feeling and what is known in the trade as "experience," fickle experience.

But the issue is now, in fact, joined; for the question that looms is as old as Pythagoras and as young as the astronauts drifting their way on accurate trajectories toward the moon and wondering what to say. The question is: What has mathematics to do with subjective feeling?

Knowing that this is the question to which they would come, the subjectivist was prepared with an expert witness. He summoned Mozart. The latter was, at the time, engaged in the nonverbal entertainment of Karl Barth, who in his turn was pondering the possible relation between this celestial sound, which he had already heard on earth, and the Eternal Word, which he had also heard—or was it touched?—earthly on earth.

So Mozart arrived to give testimony. But he had missed out on all the recent developments in the controversy, not to mention the earlier ones, and it turned out that all he was prepared to do was to play music, which both our antagonists enjoyed but of which neither found himself able to give an explanation.

The only one disappointed by this lack of clarity was Mozart, who removed himself again wistfully to heaven, uncertain as to whether that place was already the perfection of perfections of whether its lingering questions were yet to be answered in the eschaton—or in the divine coda, as he, in his Greek illiteracy, put this matter to himself.

The telling of this fable is about as far as I can go in describing the impasse that has been reached by objectivity and subjectivity in our time. I have digressed considerably from Fawcett's book, yet I should claim that these musings are quite germane to its topic and treatment.

When I received the book, I turned, as I often do, first to its conclusion. There, after a page of mild prose, I read that the death of God "has taken place because the angels have been destroyed" (p. 273). "Oh dear," I thought, "the man has been reading John Macquarrie and thinks we can put angels back into our cosmology by casual affirmation." I prepared myself for the worst.

It is true that Macquarrie is cited several times in the book, but never on angels. In fact, F. has a precise and most meaningful sense of what an angel is—namely, any agent or agency that succeeds in communicating awareness of divine presence. The principal motif of the book is such awareness, together with its reflection in various linguistic and iconographic forms, especially symbols, allegories, parables, similes, metaphors, analogies, models, and myths. These are the topics of the first part of the book, where F. is concerned to distinguish and compare them.
Perhaps this does not sound exciting, but I suggest you have a look. In nothing that I have read are these forms of expression more clearly expounded than here. F. shares Macquarrie's (Scottish?) gift for simple lucidity in matters that most writers make obscure in the vain hope of profundity.

The second part of the book discusses several major "mythological models" that have characterized societies devoted to the sacred. The third part examines the transition from early mythological religion to the great major religions: Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, and Islam. The fourth part rehearses the familiar "erosion of symbolism in Western thought." Philosophy and mechanism are, as one expects, the principal causes of the erosion; yet F. is careful to show how the great religions helped prepare for their own wastage by turning their own symbols into literal statements and by overemphasizing transcendence.

This latter fault F. may himself unwittingly perpetuate through what he says about polytheism. He seems to regard the polytheism of ancient myths as only "apparent." Strictly speaking, he says, there can "be no pantheon of gods because each one is merely a symbol standing for one aspect of the one deity" (p. 106). This is, I believe, to read history, philosophy, and religious psychology backward. The giveaway is the phrase "merely a symbol," which is surely, in the context of this book, an unfortunate slip. The gods of mythology are neither more nor less symbolic than "the one deity." The moment they are denigrated, "the one deity," known as Yahweh, Allah, or God, begins to lose his reality. For if divinity cannot appear in the concrete particular, which is the essence of polytheism and angelology alike, then it cannot appear in experience at all and becomes, in time, an irrelevance. The death of God comes not only by destruction of the angels but also by neglect of the gods.

Far from monotheism's being the hidden implication of polytheism, the transition to belief in one God never takes place without a struggle. Whenever and wherever the struggle ceases, religion is dead. The way is then open for a rebirth of "mythic consciousness," which comes by immediate, intersubjective encounter between man and the world. This is what may be occurring in our time, though F. does not say so. However, I read his book, on the whole, as an encouragement of the process.

Occasionally F.'s insights are nothing short of beautiful. Commenting on the Reformation's "justified revolt against symbols which had become signs," he suggests the pathos of Protestantism is that it ran out of time. "Protestantism had chosen the hard road of almost total rediscovery. It had begun again and needed time. History, however, was speeding up and the basis of a non-religious appropriation of the world being rapidly laid. Before a new sacralization could take place, modern man under
Protestantism was left with a natural world devoid of any clear means of being the revelation of the sacred" (p. 263).

This fine book argues that religious symbolism and faith are the expression of experience in which man encounters God simultaneously with his grasp of the world and of particulars within it. The encounter is essentially intersubjective. It therefore tends to disappear when the subjective is either objectified in mechanical models of thought or undercut by philosophical reason. "The God of encounter and the absolute of philosophy are not the same. Invariably one is destroyed by the other" (p. 260). I used to think, with Tillich, that the genius of Christianity was to behold these two as one—a view I no longer share.

Although F. does not remark upon it, today's counterculture is also an "encounter culture." The (ontological?) primacy of "meeting" over "reflection" is today being asserted in many popular ways. Theology should take note, and avoid the temptation to align itself, out of habit, with those who trust speculation more than the data of immediate presence.

F., who teaches at Chester, England, and was previously unknown to me, deserves to have his book read by every student of theology.

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TOM F. DRIVER


MacKinnon's short book is a lucid and important contribution to the postpositivist discussion of religious epistemology and the meaning of religious language that stems from the influential anthology of Antony Flew and Alastair MacIntyre, New Essays in Philosophical Theology (1955). In the course of this discussion, which was considerably more nuanced and careful than the abrupt positivistic dismissal of all religious claims but which remained under the general influence of empiricist theories of meaning, two charges were made against religious statements: (1) religious claims are unfalsifiable and therefore vacuous; (2) the foundations of religious belief are undemonstrated and indemonstrable. It is these two charges that M., professor of philosophy at McGill University, sets out to answer. It is his contention that the charges ignore the actual functioning of religious utterances and reflect "restrictive dogmas" (p. 20) of the empiricist philosophical tradition in the analysis of language.

M.'s strategy in replying to these charges is to point out their similarity to charges leveled against the scientific enterprise by Hume and other empiricists and then to propound a threefold analysis of the basic scientific claim that the world has an order, which then serves as a model for his analysis of basic religious claims. The three senses of the scientific claim are (1) assertional, making a factual claim that a determinate order
is found in nature; (2) self-instructional, enjoining the scientist to con­
tinue in his search for order; (3) ontological-linguistic, stating a basic and
necessary fact about the world, namely, that it has an order, even though
this order is not known in its determinateness. Both the second and third
uses “understand ‘order’ in its heuristic sense” (p. 30); and utterances
involving these uses are not falsifiable. In the self-instructional use they
are not statements that can be true or false, but expressions of resolve; in
the ontological-linguistic use they state a necessary truth. This necessary
truth, that the world has an order, serves as the foundation of science as
an interpretative activity and is not itself in need of demonstration.

In the two following chapters M. applies his analysis of this basic sci­
entific utterance to two basic religious utterances: “God is love” and “I
believe in the existence of God.” Like the assertional claims about sci­
centific order in the world, these religious utterances are inadequate to the
reality they point to and can be falsified. But more characteristic of re­
ligious belief is the believer’s adherence to the second and third uses, in
which he commits himself to revising his conception of God’s love in the
light of God’s activity in the world and to affirming the existence of a
necessarily existent being beyond all our conceptions.

M.’s analysis thus allows for the falsification and revision of assertional
utterances about God as part of the progress of faith and for the believer’s
persistent commitment to the truth of God’s existence despite the falsifi­
cation of these utterances. M.’s account of this commitment is much
more satisfactory than Hare’s proposal that it is a prerational “blick”; and
it may be said that his analysis of the uses of key religious utter­
ances catches much of the difficult union of “reason and risk” (p. 102),
which religious belief involves. M.’s analysis also provides a framework
within which we can appreciate both the decisive importance of nega­
tive theology and the dangers of an idolatrous use of theological asser­
tions, and in which there is room for development on the part of the be­
lieving individual and on the part of the religious community (though
M. is not specific about the latter point).

There are some major difficulties in M.’s work. First, he emphatically
rejects the view that the existence of God is a merely contingent matter of
fact. His attribution of this view to Aquinas is a historical anachronism,
since the notion of fact seems to be an essentially empiricist one, and is
also a distortion of Aquinas’ thought, since it suggests that for him it is
somewhere possible that there might be a world without God. Second, it
is not clear what M.’s position on the ontological argument is. At one
point (p. 85) he uses a line of argument which seems to be a restatement
of the ontological argument in one of its Anselmian forms. But he also re­
marks that the basic religious claim about the existence of God does not
admit of demonstration (p. 81). Third, in his treatment of the basic scientific and religious claims, M. clearly wants to defend the unfashionable view that synthetic a priori knowledge is possible; but he does not give any general account of the extent and limits of such knowledge, though he does give us numerous polemical warnings against empiricist theories of meaning and knowledge.

Fourth, in his discussion of the religious claim that God is love, M. treats “love” as a variable which is determined in its meaning by God’s action, so that nothing that happens can ultimately count against the claim when it is taken in its ontological-linguistic sense. In doing this, he gives to “love” the same indeterminateness of meaning that he gives to “order” in his scientific model; but it is doubtful that this can be done without weakening and distorting the religious uses of this claim. While it is true that the believer treats “every event as revealing, however darkly, something more of the nature of God’s love” (p. 79), it seems to me that the primary use of the claim that God is love is an assertional one and that this claim points to a determinate quality in God’s dealings with us, a quality which is discernible in the life of Jesus but which in many events is simply not discernible by us in our present condition. The point here is not that we do not know what meaning to give to “love” so that we can eventually resolve the problem of evil by redefining “love,” but that we do not have the perspective to see how certain events can be manifestations of what we know love to be. Fifth, M. gives an ambiguous account of the attitude of the believer. On the one hand, he speaks of the believer’s recognition of the necessary and indubitable truth that God exists; on the other, he continues to speak of belief in such voluntaristic terms as “commitment” and “resolve” (p. 97). Presumably, if it is a necessary truth that God exists, there is no need of any special commitment or resolve to maintain this claim, any more than there is need of special commitment to assert the truths of mathematics.

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This collection of six essays, beginning with “Die Sprache” (1950), ending with “Der Weg zur Sprache” (1959), was first published in 1959 as Unterwegs zur Sprache. A translation was certainly overdue, since this work has greater import than Being and Time as regards theology and even perhaps Anglo-American linguistic philosophy. Hertz could not include, however, the first essay; and, oddly enough, he has changed the original, and chronological, order to 2, 3, 5, 4, 1. Quite unfortunate, because H. carefully spelled out his thought over this period; along the
way, terms gather rich connotations, unretainable without their order, certainly in translation. This fact has often obliged H. to make a more consciously interpretative translation. Still, he has done remarkable work: it is readable English with no strict contresens in the eighty-five pages I studied phrase by phrase—a rare experience with English translations of H. Furthermore, the text is devoid of hyphenated construction and contortions; nor are there any German parentheses or footnotes. This procedure, however, has its limitations: a unity of expression is lost as it unfolds its manifold dimensions (thus, Wesen is translated as nature, essence, essential nature, being, essential being, reality, and presence). I shall point out only two significant cases of particular interest to our readers: “relation” and “appropriation.” In so doing, I cannot avoid giving some personal philosophy.

The new order, however, has the advantage of starting off with “A Dialogue on Language.” This eminently readable piece between H. and a Japanese scholar introduces the reader to hermeneutical phenomenology and into the midst of today’s usually misplaced quest for “relevant language.” If the initial question centers on how two people of different cultures can communicate, what is then really communicated, or better, what is being revealed? For, if language is the House of Being and we live in different houses (p. 5), then what? Another advantage of this essay consists in its biographical data, whose most important remark—ironically, as concerns the possibility of H.’s philosophical thought—is his admission that “without this theological background I should never have come upon the path of thinking” (p. 10). One should recall that “thinking” has become for H. the authentic path of inquiry, if not of humility. It is precisely because of its neutral—or neutralized—language that his thought lends itself so readily as a theological tool, or at least as an invitation to theological thinking.

On the other hand, a great deal is lost by not concluding with the original essay, since it closes at the apogee of the élan of H.’s “public thought”—this qualification admits the difficulty of knowing how much is really going on, e.g., H.’s scriptural exegesis, his study of the Spanish mystics. It is this essay, “Der Weg zur Sprache,” which explicitly harks back over thirty years of published thought. Let us examine a few phrases from its last part: “All language is historical…” (p. 133). “Thus our saying—always an answering—remains forever relational. Relation is thought of here always in terms of the appropriation, and no longer conceived in the form of a mere reference” (p. 135). “We might perhaps prepare a little for the change in our relation to language”; saying is “thought as thanks” (p. 136).

A good translation, but the repetitious terms leave too much behind in
order to pick up the trace of the path, of the questioning still going on. The first "relation" is *Verhältnis*, suggesting some active role on man’s part (*sich verhalten*); the second usage, "relation to language," is *Bezug*, a more "metaphysical" notion concerning a relation that already is but must still be accomplished (cf. *vollziehen*: to realize but never quite accomplish as long as Time is). "Thus our saying" implies fundamental questions: How much is any saying really "our own" (cf. "von uns vollzogenen")? For "Every spoken word is already an answer" (p. 129) and thinking is a "thanks." But "thanks" presupposes a Gift (cf. p. 127) and thus Being has the initiative. How, then, do we come to stand in "relation to" language and Being? Or better, perhaps, to Logos, which is the name for both Being and Saying (p. 80)? In expectation and "trust" (pp. 33, 127)? In interpreting the silent dimension of language’s pointing (pp. 65, 131)? But this must be the language of, in, and through *Ereignis*!

The phrase "*in terms of appropriation*" is misleading. Lost is "*aus dem Ereignis gedacht." This *aus* is used to mark what is *proceeding from Being*. Elsewhere H. speaks of the "Verhältnis zum Sein" as the "Wesen des Denkens." This is possible in that as thinking proceeds from man, it also proceeds from Being—the latter aspect is the emphasis of this volume. It proceeds from both, as out of (*aus*) the relation (*Bezug*, realizing itself, we dare add, as *Verhältnis*). But how does this relation come about historically? It is *Ereignis*: "appropriation," yes, but we must add, as *within* an event understood as *both* e-vent and ad-vent: what comes forth out of the relation and what come to it simultaneously to "realize" it as revealing-concealing. Thus language points to, comes out of, and belongs to the *Ereignis*, the event which is, but is still coming, and is still to come. Without keeping *Ereignis* in mind, the reader could scarcely understand the Appropriating business dominating this book, especially the culminating essay. It is this that gives the background to such men as Ebeling, Fuchs, and Ott. Without *Ereignis* so understood, "encounter" (p. 129) is senseless.

This is the central point for H. "Appropriation... cannot be represented either as an occurrence or a happening"; yet Hertz employs these very terms (pp. 45 and 47) to translate *Ereignis*. Omitting the nuances of *Ereignis* leads him to miss a crucial point about man’s role: "To speak about speech *qua* speech" (pp. 112, 130) renders "Die Sprache als die Sprache zur Sprache bringen." *Bringen* has dropped out; no room for it is had when one does not see the reciprocity involved in *Ereignis*. It is due to the explicitation of language "as" *Ereignis* that *Unterwegs* ends up with a unity of question in an endless quest, now more explicitly oriented and positively open than H.'s earlier and, to date, better-known works. We are tempted to explicate this saying of bringing language to language...
and link it with the insight into temporality: man as a "poetic" wayfarer. Better to let it stand as H.'s invitation to take up, not so much his thought as one's own, as experience to be explicated as both philosophical and theological tasks. Clearly, this translation is very good for such an invitation; more clearly, it cannot be used to study H.'s thought as such. But then, the study of another's thought "as such" is not the crucial issue.

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The catchwords of yesterday do not always become the tombstone lines of today; for sometimes they not only express a passing mood but also raise a difficult question, thus serving as a research imperative for some discerning minds. Such is the case with such fashionable phrases of yesteryear as "God-seeking atheist" and "godless piety." They pointed toward some steady cultural phenomena and influential thinkers, for whom atheism was a positive response and a kind of religious existence. These phrases indicated the presence of mystery in the recent developments of atheism having a strong human allure. Among the research responses were three useful studies: Cornelio Fabro's exhaustive historical analysis of God in Exile: Modern Atheism; Luijpen and Koren's phenomenological interpretation of Religion and Atheism; and Henri de Lubac's pioneer and sympathetic report of The Drama of Atheist Humanism.

Now we can add Fr. Miceli's The Gods of Atheism to this select company for the distinctive openings it makes upon the question. Its historical scope is more restricted than Fabro's, since it concentrates upon the nineteenth- and twentieth-century forms of atheism. It makes some use of descriptive phenomenology, but mainly in the broader spirit of Marcel. Luijpen's Phenomenology and Atheism is criticized for stressing the shortcomings of Catholic life as an impetus for atheism, and the immanent orientation of phenomenological method is viewed as weakening the constructive study of the human tendencies to transcendence. M. remains closest to Lubac in stressing both the biodoctrinal aspects and the theological implications of atheism, while including the more recent phases and those writers who are most interesting to American philosophers and theologians.

The source thinkers are arranged under four thematic headings. Part 1 ("Gods as Adventures of the Mind") deals with four nineteenth-century atheists: Feuerbach and Nietzsche, Marx and Comte. M.'s use of biographical materials is most effective in the case of Comte, since it
forces us to think of how to translate into overt act and social form the ideals of religious humanism. How can their expression avoid both Comte's fantastic symbolization of Clotilde de Vaux and his oppressive social regimen? The long chapter on Marx moves restlessly on to a treatment of twentieth-century communist policies toward God and organized religion. Perhaps due to this broadened canvas, the specific problems in Marx's own development are not considered in detail and in their own right.

With Part 2 ("Gods as Passions of the Heart") we move into the present scene of existential thought on God. M. teaches me more about the men whose ambiguity arouses his sympathy (Camus and Merleau-Ponty) than about those who lead him to a negative judgment (Satre and Heidegger). In two 1957 interviews Camus stated: "I do not believe in God; that is true. But I am not an atheist for all that... I am aware of the sacred, of the mystery in man. And I do not see why I should not confess the emotion I experience before Christ and his teaching." Camus was not as fearful as Merleau-Ponty that our sense of wonder and our moral conscience might shrivel up in the presence of the meaning of God. Still, M. finds in Merleau-Ponty's morality of freedom, self-realization, and community concern "a very high goal of moral goodness," one which could only be intensified by being related to our religious community with God. Unfortunately, Heidegger is treated as a philosopher of nihilism, so that his problems on naming the gods never come here to a sharp philosophical focus.

In Parts 3 and 4 ("Gods as Myths of the Modern Mentality" and "Gods as Victims of Man") M. concentrates on leading present theologians. There are drawbacks in making definitive statements about men whose thinking about God is still in progress. M. would probably want to modify his stern judgment that Harvey Cox "refuses to respect the rich complexity of reality, natural and supernatural, because he will not listen to the diverse needs of the orders of being." There are snapshot views of "Vahanian: God's Cultural Pallbearer" and "Altizer: Mortician of a Mystic God," which set out some difficulties that are also recognized and wrestled with by the respective subjects of these chapters in their subsequent writings.

But these problems in any present-tense study of God and religion only indicate how vigorously, diversely, and developmentally the whole theme of transcendence is being reconsidered. M. captures many aspects of these discussions in his well-researched book, which seeks a balance between recognition of the values incorporated in these many views of God and criticism of their total effect upon human potentialities. Each reader can reap some good fruit from this effort to work out a specifically modern
meaning for Pascal's "Atheism is an indication of spiritual vigor but only to a certain degree."

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JAMES COLLINS


With this impressive book the author of Una mystica persona, a comprehensive systematic treatise on the Holy Spirit in the Church, has proved once again his ability to investigate a current theological topic at great depth. Mühlen presents a philosophical and theological study of modern man's notion of the sacred by tracing its biblical and later ecclesial development, in order to lead to a projection of the meaning of the sacred in the new epoch in which modern man already has begun to live. M.'s theme is that modern man must undertake the work of desacralizing many of his notions of the world and of the Church in order to avoid absolutizing the sacredness of anything apart from the sacredness of God Himself; but this very process of desacralization leads man to rediscover the truly sacred aspects of his experience, so that there results a more balanced resacralization which corresponds to man's continual search for the sacred in all the facets of his life in the world. After stating the nature of the problem of desacralization (chap. 1) and after developing a theological framework with which to discuss the problem (chap. 2), M. takes up some concrete examples of desacralization both of the world precisely as political power (chap. 3) and of the Church in the much-discussed areas of priestly service (chap. 4) and of marriage and celibacy (chap. 5). The book thus offers the reader an excellent in-depth theological reflection on desacralization, and then applies the insights to some central problems which face the twentieth-century Church.

The most useful and provocative sections are the first two, which provide a phenomenological description of modern man's continual search for that which fascinates him, and the theological ground of that fascination. An investigation of man's present concern for what is always more amazing in the areas of technology, sports, and the cult of the person leads M. to conclude that man is continually enticed by what is more and more new (das je und je Neue), but that this fascination is always frustrated, for in all his search for the more and more new man really is longing for the totally new (das ganz Neue). In the area of the profane, i.e., in the world as world, man experiences the sacred as a characteristic of his worldly life (das welthafte Sakrale); his search for what is more and more new in the world, however, is marked primarily by frustration.
In contrast, the experience of grace reveals to man an area of the sacred (das gnadenhafte Sakrale) where he discovers the totally new, and where his contact with the revelation of the communal life of the Trinity is marked primarily by enticement (Anziehung). This analysis leads M. to the realization that every experience of human existence has as its ground the dimension of the holy. By means of transcendental and interpersonal philosophical reflection, M. concludes, in opposition to R. Otto, that “the experience of the overpowering, of the incomprehensible, and of the unlimited is the fundamental ground (Grunddimension) of human existence and is thus ineradicably at work in every man. Every man is a ‘homo religiosus’” (p. 14). M., however, does maintain a distinction between the sacred and the profane, but in such a way as to point out the constitutive sacredness of the profane, which is rooted in its drive towards the holy God. Through the revelation of Jesus Christ the glory of God has become evident in the profane, and through the totally new experience of the sacred in grace the relatively sacred character of all creation is affirmed as the locus where grace is experienced and through which it is mediated to man.

M. strongly asserts that the Church through word, sacrament, and office embodies and concretizes the a priori spiritual experience of grace. Though there is the danger of absolutizing the particulars of the embodiments of grace to the point where the holiness of God’s action through them is obscured, there is the equal danger that without definite forms through which the totally new of grace is communicated to man, the Christian faith would become mere ethics or politics.

In the remaining sections M. carries out a careful, extensive historical study of how the Church has absolutized certain definite expressions of its interior faith on the one hand, and has failed to make the sacred character of its external forms evident to man on the other. The Church must desacralize many of its own political aspects and help the people of the world at large to be critical of those political forms which do not in some way make evident the experience of God’s Trinitarian or communal presence among them. The Church must rid itself of pre-Trinitarian and monarchical forms of thinking and acting so that it enters into a partnership with the world and gives witness to all human communities of the essential “we-ness” (Wirheit) of human society, which the Church grounds in the mystery of the Trinity itself. Though the Church represents the “totally new” of grace, it experiences the totally new through the “continually new” of its history in the world. It already experiences the presence of God’s kingdom, but has not yet fully reached its goal. It should serve the function of helping human society to be critical of itself and to make those changes which would more perfectly reflect the
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Trinitarian love of God which grounds and penetrates all of human society and history.

Priestly service, marriage, and celibacy must also be desacralized so that these forms of Christian life are freed from fear, are personalized and spiritualized to the degree that in all of their human aspects they give witness to the historical orientation of the profane towards the holiness of God. Because of the power of grace which is present in the Church in a particular way, all these forms of Christian life and service should represent to the world the basic orientation of all human sexuality, love, and service towards the mystery of salvation and reconciliation revealed in the personal life and mutual love of the Trinity.

M. once again has done a great service to modern Catholicism by bringing together under one basic theme a deeply reflective consideration of the Church's role in the world. Though some of the less important and slightly polemical subjects which M. touches on might disturb some readers, the general theme would challenge all contemporary Christians; for M. provides a framework in which to understand at a profound level the challenge which faces the Christian Church to make ever more explicit the implicit religious experience of man in the world. He shows clearly how desacralization is the catchword which represents for modern Christians the task of making the fascinating and timeless newness of Christianity understandable to men who live in the continually new experience of history.

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PHILIP J. ROSATO, S.J.


One of the few justifications for considering these two books in one review is that they are both concerned with (forgive the flaccid word) relevancy. It is a testimony to the dangers of being relevant that one book accomplishes its task rather well while the other manages the patina of modernity without really addressing itself to substantive contemporary issues.

Killinger, professor of preaching and literature at Vanderbilt University Divinity School, is concerned about the vapid structure of church worship, especially in the nonliturgical, American Protestant tradition. He feels that church worship is out of tune with contemporary secular modes of expression. He wants a worship that is spontaneous, involved, tactile, emotive, and holistic. To point out the urgency of the problem, he contrasts modern dance, art, literature, electronic media, architec-
ture, etc. with the stylized, almost quaint rituals of the Sunday-morning service in the U.S. Quite correctly, and predictably enough, there are abundant references to Sam Keen, Robert Neale, Harvey Cox, Johan Huizinga, et al. With all this there is little to quibble about, even though the reader may raise an eyebrow or two about the manner in which the evidence is marshaled at times (one could start with the little excursion into pop-Freudianism on pp. 62 ff.).

On a far more substantive level, K.'s book is unsatisfactory because he either raises fundamental questions that are left unanswered or accepts assumptions that are not easily defended. If, e.g., dance, theater, or aesthetic experiences in themselves are sources of the experience of the transcendent for some, does it not follow that for that some the dance etc. is worship and Sunday-morning church is not only redundant but dishonest? In other words, does worship (understood as church on Sunday) have an integrity of its own that is normative for all of us or only for some? Again, K. contrasts the holistic nature of Black worship with the essentially cerebral rituals of white Protestantism. Many have done so. The question is (and K. never addresses himself to it), are Black forms of worship so characteristic of that culture that attempts to emulate their style would be false and sterile? What is the relationship between culture experience and cultic expression? To put the question in the concrete, what should a creative liturgy look like that arises from the middle-class WASP experience? K., in short, is dealing with an important subject in an essentially trivial way. He never quite comes to grips with the fundamental questions of the nature of worship, its limitations, its demands, and its relation to cultural expression. Without such clarifications, attempts at liturgical modernization will be, as experience so vividly shows, aleatory and superficial.

My response to Novak's new work is one of enthusiasm, if for no other reason than that it contains a wealth of genuine insights useful for one who teaches undergraduate religion courses in a state school. The subtitle indicates the true nature of the book: An Invitation to Religious Studies. The subtitle should be taken quite seriously, so as not to misinterpret what N. is setting out to accomplish. He is writing both an apologia and an introduction to a methodology for those interested in the serious study of religion as a disciplined inquiry. Hence it is not a textbook for an introductory course in religion in the same way that Winston King's Introduction to Religion or Frederick Streng's Understanding Religious Man is. Yet it cannot be too highly recommended for those who either teach or study religion in an academic setting, for it provides a well-thought-out framework within which religious phenomena can be studied more specifically.
Those familiar with N.'s writings will find many of his favorite themes taken up and enlarged in this work. He anchors his definition of religion in the dynamic structure of man both as individual and as social animal: "I understand by 'religion' a root intention, an ultimate drive. Religion is the acting out of a vision of personal identity and human community" (p. 2). This ultimate drive, rooted in the dynamic of one's person, permits one to choose the possibilities, the viewpoints, and the perspectives of his life; it also permits alteration or expansions of horizons. How the dynamic self is alert to the dialectic of the sacred as one orders his life in the matrix of his culture, his institutions, and organizations makes up the subsequent chapters.

N. is also at pains to point out that religious reflection is influenced by variables such as social base, inherited categories, etc. Thus the standpoints from which religious reflection can begin are multiple. Because of the flexible and mobile nature of American culture, there is, in a real sense, the possibility of "doing" religion in a characteristically American way. N.'s conviction, one I fully share, is not to be construed as theological jingoism; it is rather a challenge to the creative minds of America to root their reflection in the very experience of their own culture in order to contribute to the ongoing dialogue of theology. N. correctly observes that "theology is reflection upon lived experience. If that symbiotic cord is broken, theology becomes reflection upon reflection—pale, anemic, fruitless" (p. 186).

N. has written an immensely readable book, unmarred by the hastiness of some of his earlier efforts (notably *A Theology For Radical Politics*), that is valuable both for the fecundity of its insights and the verve of its style. It is most highly recommended to those who labor seriously to bring some degree of clarity to the protean field of religious studies.

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Jungmann needs no introduction. What is astounding is that he is still so active and creative. The recipient of *Festschriften* on his sixtieth and seventieth birthdays, at eighty years the modest Austrian scholar declined this honor and chose instead to delight his friends and readers with new masterpieces of his own.

The immediate occasion for *Messe im Gottesvolk* was an offer from
Corpus Publications to write a monograph on the Mass for the Theological Resources Series. Ironically, the current malaise in theological publishing may prevent the appearance of the originally planned English edition. The subtitle well describes the contents: a postconciliar look at *Missarum sollemnia*, J.’s classic work, since 1962 in its fifth German edition.

The work has three parts: theological, liturgical, and pastoral. The opening theological section is substantially a reprint of an article in *ZKT* 92 (1970) 342–50. Basing himself on liturgical and patristic sources, J. competently describes how the Mass is a sacrifice: an objective *repraesentare, commemorare* of the true sacrifice of the cross, well summed up in Leo the Great’s *sacri­ficii oblatio*. Disappointing, however, is J.’s deprecation of the meal character of the Eucharist (p. 23): the basic liturgical shape of the Mass is the prayer of thanksgiving over bread and wine in which is implied the sacrifice of the Church. In my opinion, much of the present confusion in Eucharistic theology stems from a one-sided approach which fails to consider the multiple dimensions of the Mass—a sacrifice, a meal, and a thanksgiving (Eucharist)—all of which must be maintained in any viable theological treatment.

J. devotes the greater part of *Messe* to a genetic explanation of the liturgical structure of the new Order of Mass promulgated in 1969. This is his home ground and he remains unsurpassed. Especially interesting is his consideration of those parts of the Mass which have received the greatest revision: the introductory rites, including the place of the penitential act; the simplified preparation of gifts (offertory); the variety of Eucharistic prayers; the rite of Communion. He emphasizes that the general norm of celebration is no longer the post-Tridentine *missa privata*, but a Mass with a congregation—hence the name of this book. While praising the tendency towards decentralization and liturgical adaptation, in one of his rare personal reflections upon the future of the liturgy J. ambiguously states that new fixed regulations will soon be laid down to safeguard the liturgy from the excesses of spontaneity and arbitrariness (p. 110).

In the concluding pastoral section on the Mass in the life of the Church, J. stresses the importance of Sunday Mass as the assembly for worship of the local parish community. His presupposition that the faithful should know one another (p. 119) rings idealistically true, but is impractical for many larger congregations today. J. is positive towards the phenomenon of Masses for special groups, but wisely cautions against the identification of the whole of liturgy with Eucharistic liturgy, a development which could lead to an inflation and a devaluation of our appreciation of the Mass.

The volume merits reading, but its lasting value is already limited
as a result of the subsequent publication of the new Lectionary and revised Missale Romanum.

There can be no doubt, however, that Christliches Beten, best rendered “Christian Prayer through the Ages,” will endure as a classic of the Jungmann corpus, comparable to The Early Liturgy. J.’s aim is a historical investigation of extraliturgical prayer (p. 7); his material, replete with extensive documentation, is drawn from primary sources and individual studies which he arranges in chronological perspective.

In an opening methodological chapter, J. poses questions such as these: How has prayer been understood: as an ascent to God, or as the fulfilment of an obligation, or as a surety of salvation? How has Christian prayer been nourished by the sources of revelation, especially Scripture? To what extent has private prayer been formulated in word and gesture? What is the relationship between prayer and Christian living? What influence has the refined prayer-culture of monks and clerics exercised upon the laity? Does prayer have the capacity to withstand the process of secularization? J. is asking the right questions, yet readily admits that the brevity of his study can only allow an outline of such a vast topic.

J. then embarks upon a historical overview, beginning with the prayer life of the early Church. Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, and Hippolytus attest to the tradition of times of prayer in the morning and evening, at the third, sixth, and ninth hours, as well as at midnight. The Psalms, often in Christological interpretation, provided a popular subject for prayer; the Lord’s Prayer and the Creed were the Christian prayers par excellence. J. asserts that for the early Christians personal individual prayer predominated over liturgical prayer, although the two were co-ordinated (p. 27). He shows that the origin of the Divine Office is traceable to the cathedral services at Lauds and Vespers, which in the fourth century were more a prayer of the local church than a clerical prerogative.

Particularly insightful is J.’s application to personal prayer of a thesis well known to readers of an earlier volume, The Place of Christ in Liturgical Prayer, namely, the repercussions of the anti-Arian reaction which have plagued Christian piety to this day. J. considers this phenomenon in two phases. Already in the fourth and fifth centuries the reaction to the Arian heresy led to an inordinate stress on the divinity of Christ, to the neglect of His role as mediator between God and man. This loss of a per Christum spirituality explains the excessive Carolingian consciousness of poverty and sinfulness before God and the creation of prayer forms addressed indiscriminately to the three divine Persons or to the Trinity itself.

A second phase of this development began in the eleventh century,
when the image of the risen Christ virtually disappeared from the Christian world of faith. The result was a yearning for secondary forms of mediation, e.g., Mary, and a concentration upon the events of the Lord's earthly life, e.g., contemplation of Christ's passion. As the spheres of liturgical prayer and personal individual prayer drifted farther apart, the Volksfrömmigkeit turned to a myriad of devotional practices, the cult of Eucharistic worship, processions, litanies. The fulness of the paschal mystery became obscured. This situation for the most part obtained until the liturgical movement of the twentieth century.

This timely study on personal prayer by a man generally regarded as the greatest liturgical scholar of our day deserves an English translation.

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A fascinating chapter of Reformation history is the story of the "colloquies" held between 1530 and 1541 at which Protestants and Catholics attempted to clarify and negotiate their doctrinal differences. From our vantage point, these meetings (1530 at Augsburg, 1534 and 1539 at Leipzig, 1540 at Hagenau and Worms, 1541 at Regensburg) appear as oases of calm and fruitful discussion amid the barrenness of polemical pamphleteering found in the controversial writings of these years. Many find it astounding that on crucial disputed questions, such as original sin, free will, "faith alone," and justification, the face-to-face negotiations at the pre-Tridentine colloquies led to wide-ranging agreement. The present book, by a junior associate of Erwin Iserloh in Münster's Catholic theology faculty, narrates in great detail the discussion on justification at the Imperial Diet of 1530 and the subsequent return to unprofitable polemics in the time immediately after the Augsburg conversations.

Pfnür's subtitle indicates the focus of his interest: the doctrine of justification in the Augsburg Confession of 1530 and in the response of Catholic controversial theology down to 1535. His historical work offers help to the ecumenical efforts of our day by throwing considerable light on the Confession composed by Melanchthon and espoused by Lutherans as a normative standard of belief down to our own time.

P. is well aware of traveling in choppy waters as he discusses Melanchthon and the Augsburg Confession. Both Lutheran and Catholic historians have voiced their dissatisfaction with Melanchthon's formulations and with his conduct in the ensuing negotiations. The lapidary articles of the Confession are judged to be mediocre formulae that
soft-pedal central themes of Luther's work. Some critics are merely reacting to the difference between Luther's vigorous prose and the reticence and precision of a public confession. But there is some justice to the criticism that the Confession makes no mention of the Reformers' attack on the papal Antichrist (a criticism first raised by Luther) and that Melanchthon concluded the doctrinal section with a patent falsehood: "Tota dissentio est de paucis quibusdam abusibus" (Art. 21).

The book falls into three main sections. P. first shows the precise adversaries envisaged by Melanchthon in the articles on justification in the Confession and in the Apologia confessionis of 1532. The adversaries turn out to be adherents of the Ockham-Biel wing of the via modera. Second, P. offers a detailed exegesis of Melanchthon's statements in the Confession on grace, justification, imputation, good works, and "faith alone." Third, he narrates the Catholic reactions in the meetings at Augsburg and in published responses of six controversialists. Along the way, he sustains two principal arguments with convincing cogency.

P. rejects the judgment that the Augsburg Confession is an ad hoc exercise in false irenicism. Although Melanchthon longed for peace and religious unity, he did not compromise the doctrine on justification being taught in Wittenberg between 1527 and 1535. The Augsburg Confession of 1530 is a moderate document, but in this it agrees with the contemporaneous works of Luther and Melanchthon. Modern criticism of the Confession rests on an a priori choice of 1520-22 as the period of normative articulation of the Lutheran Reformation. This approach discounts the self-corrective process that set in after 1525 as Luther and Melanchthon defended the Eucharistic real presence against Zwingli, contested antinomian views emerging in their own camp, and sought to regulate popular preaching and religious practice by supervisory visitations in the Saxon territories. Melanchthon's commentary on Colossians (1527) is a clear index that Wittenberg theology was pulling back from the excesses of 1520-22, when, e.g., predestination had been formulated as determinism, the life of the righteous was depicted as filled with serious sin, and good works were scored as religiously irrelevant. The Augsburg Confession's doctrine of justification is an authentic statement of the self-corrective reaction of the late 1520's.

P.'s second argument is a proposed explanation of why the agreements reached in the oral discussions of August 1530 were nullified in Melanchthon's Apologia and in the printed Catholic responses. In Augsburg a general agreement on original sin and justification gave way to an impasse over restoration of episcopal jurisdiction in lands then becoming Lutheran. After Augsburg, the leaders on both sides went back to attacking positions the opponents had already disavowed. Mel-
anchthon's *Apologia* polemicizes against an alleged Catholic position derived from Biel, i.e., teaching congruous merit of grace by actions *ex puris naturalibus* and admitting a valid satisfaction for sin by certain wholly external works. But no one had defended these views in the Augsburg colloquy. Similarly, Catholic controversialists went back to attacking what they saw as patent errors in the 1520–22 works of the Lutherans. Most refused to take the Augsburg Confession seriously, some attacked Melanchthon's cunning in presenting such a misleading document, others railed against the preaching of *sola fide* for opening the door to libertine movements. Thus, after 1530 both sides were justifiably incensed over a twisted form of Christianity; but both were wrong in attributing this form to the opponents against whom they were writing.

In addition to these two main arguments, P. brings out a series of interesting points that could well be noted in future histories of the Reformation. (1) In the late 1520's the Lutherans were seeing the need for a concise *summa dogmatum*, so that the people could have a clear notion of the obligatory tenets of Christian belief. Whatever the implications of fiducial faith, it did not make dogmatic formulations of belief superfluous. (2) The phrase *opus operatum* played a fateful role in Reformation controversy less as an expression of the objective character of sacramental efficacy (Luther agrees with this) than as a formula expressing the value of certain good works done to satisfy for sins committed. (3) Although Catholic controversialists of the early 1530's were opposing a primitive Lutheranism already out of date, they did at times hit on engaging formulations of their own views, e.g., as when Cardinal Cajetan (in *De fide et operibus*) explained that merit in the righteous man is only a *ius attenuatum*, because it is due more to Christ's work in him and to God's free decision to reward than to the objective quality of what the man does.

Thus, serious students of the Reformation will be grateful on many counts for P.'s painstaking research.

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JARED WICKS, S.J.


This work is the outgrowth of an inaugural dissertation, *Die Antwort des Catechismus Romanus auf die Reformation*, presented to the Faculty of Catholic Theology of the University of Münster in 1966, the fourth centenary of the appearance of the Tridentine Catechism. Revised
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and re-edited, it now appears under the auspices of the Johann Adam Möhler Institut. The central theme is the catechism inspired by the Council of Trent (1545–63) and generally known as the *Catechismus Romanus* because of the important role which Pope Pius V (1566–72) played in its completion and issuance. In the whole history of the Church no catechism has enjoyed the great authority and prestige of this one. It was the product of many minds working over many years; it epitomized Trent’s definitive answer to the Reformation and its catechisms; and it was intended to reach down to and influence, as it did indeed, the mass of Catholics in the age of the Counter Reformation. Translated into every modern language, it has gone through countless editions over the past four centuries. It was greatly admired by John Henry Newman and has been designated by Michael Gatterer “das Religionsbuch der Kirche.”

This study of the *CR*, which is evaluated in the context of the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century, poses and answers three principal questions: (1) How in the historical origins of the *CR* does the idea of responding to the Reformation emerge? (2) To what questions raised by the Reformers and their catechisms did the *CR* address itself? (3) To what extent did the answers provided by the *CR* prove successful? Thus the book as a whole falls into three parts corresponding to these questions: historico-biographical, material-systematic, and formal-catechetical. Its professed aim, to discover and express parallels and relations between the *CR* and the catechisms of both Protestants (Luther, 1529; Calvin, 1542; and Heidelberg, 1563) and Catholics (the Jesuits: Peter Canisius, 1555-66; and Edmund Augerius, 1563–68) of the sixteenth century, provides valuable insight into the religious mentality of the Tridentine Church.

B.’s conception of the problem is comprehensive, ample, and reasonable. His research is methodologically sound, his approach historico-theological, and he is complete in his selection of the underlying source material. In his undertaking, therefore, B. has succeeded admirably. He has given us a readable book, highly informative, and well researched, a significant study of an important moment in the history and theology of catechetical literature. It should be further noted that this work is of considerable relevance to the history of the first stirrings of ecumenism in the Christian community. The book is provided with lists of sources, commentaries, and literature; it contains serviceable indices and thirteen illustrations.

As a handbook for teachers, pastors, and preachers the *CR* systematically presented the principal articles of the Christian faith: anthropology, eschatology, sacraments, moral, and ascetica. Of special
interest to the ecclesiologist are the chapters of the CR which explicitly
deal with the Church, an aspect of Catholic doctrine on which the
Council of Trent unfortunately had very little, if anything, to say. In
view of the fact that the treatise De ecclesia Christi was traditionally
affiliated more with canon law than with theology, certainly not with
biblical theology, it is significant that “the Roman Catechism seeks to
explain the essence of the Church through the well-known biblical
metaphors” (p. 112): people of God, God’s house, flock of Christ,
bride of Christ, body of Christ, Christ’s vine, and kingdom of God. It
is indeed unfortunate that the biblical tradition which the CR here re­
sumed and expressed did not take firm roots in Catholic ecclesiology
in the centuries after Trent.

It is the thesis of this book that “the Tridentine Catechism in its ex­
position and in its form left open the possibility of dialogue between the
confessions” (p. 287). Trent promulgated no personal condemnations
against the Reformers (Luther, Calvin, Zwingli); neither did its Cate­
chism. This was at least a grand gesture; perhaps more than that, it was
a heraldic sign that the rupture between the confessions need not be
definitive. Further, face to face with the delicate problem of the
schism, the Catechism tried to work on common ground, i.e., from
the “Christian” more than from the “Catholic” factor. This attitude
was congenial to all parties involved in the confessional dispute. Thus,
“the heretics” are not simply placed “outside the Church.” Because
there is only one baptism and one faith, they belong in a sense to the
whole body of the Christian faithful. Their error is not “against the faith”
but “within the faith.” The reality of this line of thought is revealed
in the claim of the post-Tridentine Church that all validly baptized are
subject to it, because they are all baptized “in the one Church.” Ex­
ceptional at this time is the Catechism’s instruction to pray for those
separated from communion with the whole Church. Whereas the earlier
catechisms of Canisius and Augerius tended to exclude the possibility
of open dialogue with “the heretics,” the CR by certain basic attitudes
which it adopted set the foundation for what might have proved in one
way or another programmatic to the development of an ecumenical
attitude to the schism. This is indeed remarkable in view of the fact
that the CR stemmed from Trent and was issued with the authority of
the Holy See at a time which is not generally considered open-minded.

As a detailed study of one aspect of sixteenth-century Church life,
this book demonstrates the complexity of the Tridentine age and the
sheer futility of judging it apart from its historical context. Without
saying so explicitly, it affirms the necessity of search and research as a
propaedeutic to grasping the meaning of this influential phase of our
historical past and evaluating it in terms of the current condition of the Christian Church.

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Erasmus is known as a humanist, classical and patristic scholar, and the first editor of the Greek NT, but rarely, if ever, is he referred to as a theologian. He has been the subject of countless monographs; nevertheless, Payne is the first to present his thought on all the sacraments—an enormous task, since he had to gather the material from E.'s widely scattered statements. This labor is evident in the 105 pages given to notes; the book's first 97 pages deal with introductory background material, e.g., E.'s anthropology, hermeneutics, Christology, and soteriology. Of the entire volume, only 132 pages deal with the sacraments.

E. was primarily interested in "practical theology," i.e., the transformation of life, the imitation of Christ in the Christian's living, the close relationship between theology and piety. In writing on the seven sacraments, his emphasis is always on the manner in which they should be lived, on the effect (res) of the sacrament rather than the sacrament itself. Due to this emphasis, some theological points concerning the sacraments are never touched upon.

E. must have had very little to say about orders as a sacrament, since what P. offers is E.'s thoughts on priestly duties and the priestly life, and E. is depicted as a proponent of marriage over against sacerdotal celibacy. Marriage is the superior state and the "most saintly kind of life" (p. 110). E. doubts whether the Ephesian text could be used to demonstrate that marriage is properly a sacrament (p. 113); in fact, P. thinks it is debatable whether E. actually did consider marriage a sacrament in the narrow sense of the word (p. 112). Because of the unfortunate conditions resulting from clandestine marriages in his day, E. proposed divorce as the solution. What about the NT prohibition? As virginity applied to apostolic times, so also did the prohibition of divorce (p. 123).

The Eucharist, for E., stands next to baptism as the most important sacrament, for in it we have represented the death of Christ. When he says that the Mass renews the unique sacrifice of the cross, P. reads this renewal as "undoubtedly in the sense of 'renew in mind' or 'recall'" (p. 134). Though E. maintained belief in the Real Presence, he was somewhat skeptical about transubstantiation (p. 144).

On baptism, E. is a faithful representative of the tradition, but again, his emphasis is on the inner appropriation of the gifts of baptism in the
exercise of the moral life. To achieve this, he insists on catechetical instruction prior to baptism and even suggests a postbaptismal (nonsacramental) ceremony wherein youth can dedicate themselves to Christ. On the relationship of baptism and original sin, E. says that "in infants there is no real sin but only the privation of grace, the inclination to sin and the calamity of human life" (p. 42); "all sin, whether original or personal, is washed away" (p. 164). But P. understands these texts, as a result of his study of E.'s anthropology, as saying that "original sin" is to be identified with the "inclination to sin" (pp. 164, 177, 223) and is not eradicated by baptism. Could not E. be interpreted to read that baptism removes that "privation of grace" which is original sin, while the consequences of that sin, i.e., "inclination to sin," remain?

Connected with baptism is the question of the causality of the sacraments. Here E. follows the Franciscan school, "which regarded the causa existing in the sacraments as merely sine qua non" (p. 98). This opinion is more commonly termed "occasional" causality (cf. B. Leeming, Principles of Sacramental Theology [New York, 1956] pp. 290 ff.). Referring to baptism, P. says (p. 163) that "grace does not come through but with the water. The water is not a causa instrumentalis but a causa sine qua non." P. seems to be uneasy with causa instrumentalis; perhaps he reads this as attributing "magical" powers to the sacrament. P.'s judgment is (cf. p. 275, n. 5) that even though Erasmus at times does say "grace is infused through the sacramental signs... this is not his characteristic thought." If E. or P. is unwilling to call sacraments instrumental causes of grace, John Calvin surely was not; for in his Antidote to Trent, (Session 7, canon 5: Corpus reformatorum 7, 494) he does not hesitate to call them by that term.

Confirmation is accepted according to the traditional teaching; so is extreme unction. P. attributes to E. the opinion that extreme unction imprints an indelible character (pp. 157, 179).

Occasionally before an audience of conservative theologians E. over-stretched his view on the divine institution of the sacrament of penance, but P. feels that E. generally doubted its institution de iure divino on the basis of his philological and historical study (p. 190). But out of obedience to an ecclesiastical institution E. recommends the use of the sacrament. Since contrition necessarily precedes confession, sin has already been forgiven and absolution can only have a declarative, not a sacramental, meaning (p. 210).

I regret having to register disappointment. In this volume we have E.'s thoughts, reflections, and opinions on the sacraments as well as his ascetical admonitions on how the Christian should live the life of the sacraments. The disappointment may be due to Erasmus himself; it could
be that the humanist has no (systematic) theology of the sacraments. Payne, who is associate prof. of history at Bradley University, Peoria, has meticulously collected the texts and, as one reviewer has said, “his study is of great historical and more than historical interest” (p. 343). Perhaps there still remains the possibility of a theological interpretation of the Erasmian writings.

Rome

JOSEPH N. TYLENDA, S.J.


Paradoxically, the absolute gratuity of revelation is characterized by historical contingency. Revelation is an event which can be neither foreseen nor influenced, but at the same time it establishes a new historical reality and defines the future. The thought of Teilhard de Chardin simultaneously recognizes the ineluctable character of revelation and witnesses to the new conditions of salvation. For Teilhard, this new situation demands of man a conversion of heart and decision of faith which in turn lead to a knowledge of the intrinsic historicity of man.

In this fascinating study, Bravo proposes that T. was aware, even if not consciously, of contemporary understandings of history. The unique Teilhardian vision of history, however, is not so much concerned with a theology of salvation history as it is anxious to provide a framework for a theology of earthly realities. T. roots his theology in the Incarnation and offers cosmogenesis as the universal historical event by which the law of complexity-consciousness and the effect of radial energy (love) can move the world to its completion in Omega. At all times T. understands that finding God in all things means that God is the beginning as well as the end of creative discovery. History for T., therefore, is the promise of the birth of a new man and in turn the birth of a new world which recognizes itself in the presence of its Creator.

Fundamentally, it is B.'s responsibility to contend with three contemporary theories of history and to show how T. accepts, assimilates, or rejects each. He undertakes the task with the dual talents of historian and theologian, and focuses on the meaning of history especially according to Hegel, the historical methodology of Dilthey, and man's historicity as understood by Heidegger.

T. does not systematically turn his attention to history as a problem, although his works embrace a universal history. Nevertheless, it is B.'s contention that T.'s thought contains sufficient elements to enable him to understand the points of view and the principal problems that history poses for these thinkers. Thus, the Teilhardian optic offers a theory of complexity-consciousness to further the thought of Hegel,
be that the humanist has no (systematic) theology of the sacraments. Payne, who is associate prof. of history at Bradley University, Peoria, has meticulously collected the texts and, as one reviewer has said, "his study is of great historical and more than historical interest" (p. 343). Perhaps there still remains the possibility of a theological interpretation of the Erasmian writings.

Joseph N. Tylenda, S.J.


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an objective appreciation of the dynamism of history which presumes critical familiarity with the methods of research to give cohesiveness to Dilthey's position, and an enthusiastic understanding of evolution which enables man to accept the conditionality of the temporal world in answer to Heidegger.

Hegel's interpretation of history as the manifestation of the spirit coming to comprehend itself partially parallels the thrust and energy of T.'s view of cosmogenesis. In Hegel's view, both individuals and nations are self-explications of the spirit as such. The focus is on the self-realization of the world-spirit, and although the individual has value, it is more as a merging and merged movement of totality than as an independent organism. For Hegel, this is a necessary process of freedom and results in the freedom of the individual passing into the freedom of the universal. This Hegelian heuristic search is not the same as an understanding of evolution leading toward a unity in diversity centered on the cosmic Christ and the individualization such a view after all maintains, but Hegel and Teilhard do share something of the same philosophical feel for history.

The complexity of T.'s thought can be unraveled not only by observing parallels in his and Hegel's historical approaches but also where they differ. T. may relate to Hegel's metaphysic of the "spirit," but where Hegel fails to take account of the historical method, T. appreciates Dilthey's interest in the problem of historicism.

In the *Critique of the Historical Reason* Dilthey proposes an immanent interpretation of social and historical research by focusing both on historical events and the interconnectedness of life and on history as an unlimited continuum of a general history of the spirit. Similarly, T. grapples with history as a chronicle of consciously human events and as the process of salvation and offers a theology of history in which human events play a cosmically salvific role.

Lastly, it is with the phenomenology of Heidegger that we are able to glean perhaps the most perceptive and far-reaching of T.'s insights. Man defined as *Dasein* is a changing, developing being existing in a concrete historical world. Heidegger sees man required to decide, act, and respond in time to the possibilities of his altering environment. Man is caught in the circumference of history, but he creates his own ontological story. This dynamic can exist because of the openness of the encounter between man and man and man and the world, and this theme of creative openness coupled with Heidegger's insistence on presentness highlight aspects of T.'s thought. Certainly, in the first pages of *The Divine Milieu* T. presents himself as a man who, in a phenomenological context, passionately believes in his time.
B.'s study carefully separates T.'s work into three parts. The first considers T.'s historical conscience, which, for B., reveals not an abstract problem in the fashion of Heidegger but a concrete phenomenology. Parts 2 and 3 consider the possibility of historical knowledge in general and take into account an evolutionary history, which seem to form not only a viable but a perceptive exposition of the backbone of T.'s theory of a converging universe.

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DORIS K. DONNELLY


Phillips wishes to challenge the traditional theistic account that immortality is logically connected with survival after death—indeed, finds the latter concept unintelligible. He utilizes the standard Flewian challenges against the notion of personal survival, and expresses agreement with the Wittgensteinian remark that "death is not an event in life." To be sure, if death marks the end, then it terminates all my experiences, but P. fails to argue for such a thesis about death as eventful. Perhaps if he had paid sufficient heed to the sundry arguments of Broad, Chisholm, Ducasse, Price, etc., he might have come to appreciate the illogic of much of Flew's case against immortality. Instead, he rejects the privacy-thesis, and fails to even consider the claims of intentionality, or investigate the data of parapsychology (e.g., psychokinesis, retrocognition, telepathy, etc.). Accordingly, he disregards the heuristic Paulian simile of a planted seed that grows into corn, as employed by Geach (cf. Price's "astral body"), and accepts instead the Humean explanation that "there is no such process which makes talk of buried corpses leading to new bodies rising from the dead intelligible to us" (p. 14).

By rejecting the privacy-thesis wherein the spectre of ghostlike inner performances arises, P. commits himself to a linguistic framework wherein meanings are associated with performances of certain language games in a shared way of life. Talk of life after death then becomes very tenuous, inasmuch as characteristic human relationships are temporal processes, thereby making it difficult to form a picture of eternal life. Oddly enough, P.'s peculiar form of theism allows for "religious pictures" (not to be confused with Braithwaitean psychological tools) in which the believer shares in the life of God. This is a form of immortality, but questions of truth and evidence are not applicable to such picture preferences, for they themselves ultimately prove the very measure of assessment. Hence, for P., belief in immortality, when associated with belief in the existence of some disembodied entity, rests on a mistake.
P. also considers the Geachian notion of “vindicating” the idea of survival after death—the point being that immortality as guaranteed by divine providence serves as a sufficient condition for the reasonableness of being virtuous in this life. Quite contrary to P., I find Geach’s thesis of vindication plausible, and I decidedly do not read his version of providential power-worship as maintaining that it is not love of virtue that creates a person’s need for virtue, but only that independently of what virtue means, a person needs virtue. Indeed, Geach writes (God and The Soul, p. 123): “You cannot decide at the outset to act virtuously only when it is not too awkward or dangerous or unpleasant—that is deciding not to have the habit of virtue at all.” Nonetheless, P. maintains that “what is needed is the recognition that moral considerations cannot be accounted for purely in terms of purposive action. . . . They have to do with the character which action may or may not have” (p. 33). Ironically, Geach could agree with such a view, inasmuch as a certain action (e.g., adultery) is intrinsically evil for the reason that it counters the divine purpose. Perhaps Geach had P. in mind when he remarked: “A moral philosopher once said to me: ‘I don’t think I am morally obliged to obey God unless God is good.’ I naturally asked him how he understood the proposition that God is good; he replied: ‘Well . . . I’d say it meant something like this: God is the sort of God whom I’d choose to be God if it were up to me to make the choice.’ I fear he has never understood why I found the answer funny” (God and The Soul, p. 127). I am not arguing for Geach’s version of religious descriptivism as much as I am questioning P.’s reading of Geach’s position.

Throughout, P. argues that questions about whether a man has a soul or not are not empirical, but rather “questions about the kind of life he is living” (p. 44). He has in mind the notion of purification described in Plato’s Phaedo, as well as the Kierkegaard of Purity of Heart who speaks of eternal life as the reality of goodness in terms of which a person’s life is assessed. “Eternity is not an extension of this present life, but a mode of judging it. Eternity is not more life, but this life seen under certain moral and religious modes of thought” (p. 49). The purport of this noncognitivist interpretation of immortality is that dying to the self or self-renunciation, wherein the believer participates in the life of God, is the crux of immortality. Death lies in alienation from God, immortality in union with God.

Indeed, P. suggests that the reality of God is just a matter of our intentional attitudes, therein conflating propositions in sensu diviso with propositions in sensu composito. “In learning by contemplation, attention, renunciation, what forgiving, thinking, loving, etc. mean in these contexts, the believer is participating in the reality of God; this is what
"we mean by God’s reality" (p. 55). Moreover, given his analysis of immortality, it would seem senseless to continue to speak of "prayers of the dead," or any "activity of the dead" (p. 58), yet P. commits such a howler. It may be that the traditional doctrine of survival after death rests on a mistake; it is beset with conceptual difficulties; but given P.'s own analysis of the doctrine, it seems safer to apply Prichard's expression to such an account.

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JOHN DONNELLY


This volume is a good example of the interdisciplinary approach. Theology, philosophy, psychiatry, psychology, sociology, law, history, Scripture, political science, all bring their gifts to the symposium. Only the fair muse of literature was not invited. The guests are highly qualified each in his respective field, and most are competent in more than one. From such a happy gathering there emerges, predictably, more than just theory about conscience in itself. The book ranges through most of the crucial problems of conscience, conscientious objection, dissent and change in the Church, civil disobedience, student protest, the sociopath, scrupulosity, superego and conscience, anomy, the conscientious decisions facing political leaders, civil servants, educators, bishops, religious, and confessors.

This volume assembles the papers presented at the 1969 Pastoral Psychology Institute of Fordham University, the latest in a series dating back to 1955. The editor early recognized the importance of the behavioral sciences for theology. This is perhaps the best of the series to date. Though all the contributions merit comment, only a few can be cited here.

Civil disobedience is treated from the viewpoint of law and political science. Richard Regan points out the newness of current disobedience, the violating of just law to protest against another, unjust law. He sets down the border limits within which both parties must act: "Individuals cannot appeal to the rights of conscience as a formula of absolution from their obligations as citizens" (p. 33) and "society cannot simply appeal to citizens' general obligations to obey legal prescriptions without weighing the actuality and degree of the injustice alleged by the civil disobedients" (p. 34). Lawyer William Cunningham gives a firsthand account of the trial of the Catonsville Nine, where the second norm above was not observed.

Political scientist John Rohr shows the naïvete of defenders of selective conscientious objection (SCO) who make the "leap of faith": be-
cause one must follow his conscience, therefore public policy should recognize SCO. This is to confuse an argument for civil disobedience, following one's conscience, with an argument for a specific governmental response, SCO. No legislator could follow a principle that would justify refusing to send one's children to an integrated school. R. also finds an unmistakable tendency in SCO literature to separate politics and morality. Such a tendency would be self-defeating.

On a deeper theoretical level, psychiatrist William Meissner addresses himself to the question of the freedom of conscience. Not from philosophy but from the data of psychiatry, he presents the best case for man's psychological freedom, limited though it be, that this reviewer has seen. His argument should not only give pause to those psychiatrists who admit only theoretical freedom. He reassures the layman that "man lives with his unconscious, not by it" (p. 139), and indicates the importance of superego functions even in adult life.

John McNeill also treats freedom of conscience but from a philosophico-theological view. From a theology of Vatican II and the philosophy of Blondel he lays a strong foundation for greater freedom of conscience. The risk of freedom, man's grandeur, is his theme. One regrets not having been present to hear the discussants draw out the implications of this paper.

One section is devoted to *Humanae vitae*. Paul Palmer surveys the pastoral letters of the national conferences of bishops and concludes: "No pastoral statement of the various hierarchies brands contraceptive intercourse as a serious sin" (p. 301). Historian that he is, P. points out the change in doctrine this represents as contrasted with the severity of *Casti connubii*.

John Connery treats the same topic from the viewpoint of the confessor dealing with contraception. With his usual clarity and consistency, C. tells how the confessor might respond to the penitent practicing contraception in good faith, in doubtful faith, and with a perplexed conscience. His guidelines, however, are based on a dubious premise, the duty of the confessor to follow the position of the "Church," though he allows expression of a contrary opinion. Unfortunate is the pre-Vatican II concept of the Church C. uses, identifying it with the hierarchy. His position also ignores the biblical datum of the sharing in the teaching function by others in the Church. C.'s otherwise helpful guidelines are not based on a viable ecclesiology.

Other contributions supply the deficit. Avery Dulles makes a solid and forthright re-examination of the role of the magisterium vis-à-vis freedom of conscience. His realistic theory of official teaching concludes that certain errors of the past should be acknowledged, certain condemnations
lifted. His idea of freedom of conscience courageously admits freedom to leave the Church.

Frederick Crowe sees the search for truth in the Church as a dialectical process, of which he gives a penetrating philosophical analysis. A dialectic necessarily involves dissent, or progress by opposition, leading through dialogue to ultimate grasp of truth. So reasonably does he expound the necessity of dialectic from the nature of human thought and the history of dogma that the reader can accept with understanding his approval of the theologians' dissent to *Humanae vitae* and the need of a certain violence in the Church to discover the truth.

Gordon Zahn, in "Conscience and the Soldier," goes far beyond draft boards and conscientious objection into the complex workings of military judicial procedure. Its sometimes cavalier treatment of the soldier violates respect for conscience which would not be tolerated in a civilian context. William O'Brien unearths overlooked ethical aspects of the political scene, e.g., the functions and goals of the president and congressional leaders. His broad spectrum of moral issues facing the politician goes beyond what the professional ethicist could conceive. But maybe we should consider O'B. a political ethicist. Lastly, Howard White breaks new ground in "Conscience and the Civil Servant." He develops the divided and sometimes conflicting loyalty of the civil servant to the civil service, to the country (one thinks of Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers), to the administration.

The usefulness of this volume would be enhanced by an index. The Institute would render a greater service if future volumes included selections from the discussions of the participants. A concluding chapter, perhaps the work of a team, should synthesize the deliberations of the Institute.

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ROBERT H. SPRINGER, S.J.


Theology pays the price of self-mutilation if it tries "to offer a world without salvation a salvation without the world and a reality without God a God without reality," remarks Moltmann (p. 204). M. acknowledges
that theology has its own subject matter but “can only understand and develop this subject matter when it enters into current problems and, in this way, shares the difficulties as well as the opportunities of its contemporaries” (p. vii).

Coste, in *Quel système économique?*, says it is an “essential characteristic” of the theologian to keep his “windows wide open on the world” and to observe carefully human experience (p. 9). His other title, *Eglise et vie économique*, argues against employment of categorical statements to represent “official” Church teaching on economic matters. If it is to relate properly to the nuances of evolving economic life, Church teaching in this area must itself evolve and change. C., professor of social and political theology at the Institut Catholique de Toulouse, presents a scholarly analysis of evolving Christian social thought set in a context of evolving social systems.

Philip Land edits a set of essays on development—economic, social, cultural, and political—viewed from a theological perspective.

Curiously, the German edition of Moltmann’s *Hope and Planning* (a collection of articles written between 1960 and 1968) is titled *Theological Perspectives*, thus providing us with a conceptual link for all four books: they attempt to discover relevant aspects of the Christian faith in the changing conditions of time. Further, as M. suggests, theological perspectives “seek to discover theological dimensions within present reality” and to bring this into public discussion (p. viii).

What Paulo Tufari, one of the contributors to *Theology Meets Progress*, sees as a possible description of the Second Vatican Council might well be applied to the volume in which his observation appears: “Vatican II refers to [a] number of documents containing in embryo a plurality of theologies enmeshed in a far-from-coherent series of callings to action” (p. 269). This volume offers eight essays, authored by professors at the Gregorian, together with a bibliography on the theology of development. The absence of biographical notes on the authors is unfortunate, since some are not well known outside Rome and most are completely unknown to a significant audience this book could serve—development economists, anthropologists, sociologists, and others not trained in theological disciplines. As the editor acknowledges, the book does not go into the development–vs.–liberation debate. The omission results in an inadequate discussion of the issues and avoids dealing with the critique of capitalism implied in the vocabulary of a theology of liberation.

Land’s volume contains essays on the history of the idea of progress (Peter Henrici), on a Christian basis for commitment to the world (Trutz Rendtorff), on the methodology of a theology of development (Zoltan Alszeghy and Maurizio Flick), on moral aspects of human progress

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(Josef Fuchs), on progress through violence (an excellent analysis by José Diez-Alegria), a case study of religion against development in China (Joseph Shih), and Tufari’s reflections on “The Church between Ideology and Utopia,” where the “thread” of an ethic is isolated and a difficult two-pronged question is raised: whether a theology of development emanating from a cultural fixture like the Church can in fact transform the existing order, and whether a theology of development might not be an ideology useful in changing symbols but ineffective in changing social structures.

After remarking that theology meets development first at the ethical level, Alszeghy and Flick ask a question (p. 108) to which an answer can be drawn from Moltmann’s book: “What is the relationship between hope as a Christian characteristic, and hope which leads men along the path of technological and cultural development?” M.’s answer, I suggest, is contained in the following passage: “History can be made, planned and predicted, but this planning and making is subordinate to a higher insight into the general tendency of nature [which M. would call providence].

“The next step will now be the drawing together into a dialectic of this dualism between the tendency of nature and the history of man. There is always a reciprocal relationship between the supposed and postulated outline of meaning and the corresponding planning and making. What is presupposed as providence or the intention of nature always has an effect on the making of history by prospective investigation. These presuppositions can also be understood actively as ordinances of the spirit which brings forth history according to its own designs. Planning and acting are then not only equivalent in value but also value-producing. Only in this way does the knowledge of history emerge from theoria, so that it is no longer insight into fundamentals but, rather, the production of new things. Knowledge no longer looks into something that is there but rather produces something which is not yet there. It produces by prospecting. It does not bring to light facts or intentions, but rather sets in motion human action. Prognostication is then no longer an anticipation of fate but rather an anticipation of human practice” (p. 190).

“Planning must be aware of its origin in hope and of the projection of hope. If it puts itself in place of hope, it looses the transcendent impetus of hope and finally also loses itself” (p. 194).

None of these books cuts deeply enough into the questions of right and obligation. Is there a right to development? What corresponding obligations are generated and where do they reside? How should human action toward development begin? Why should it begin? M. does not meet these questions adequately. For him, “the dilemma of Christian social ethics
is decisively attached to the fact that theology dares to give man hope for himself but not for the conditions in which he works and suffers, in which love requires that he sacrifice himself” (p. 125). M. says that “the people of God who travel in Hope” can provide a directive for the larger society which “sinks into the trauma of resignation in the face of meaningless determinism” (p. 124). He says this, but his arguments for Christian directives or activities aimed at improving the conditions in which man works and suffers are neither clear nor persuasive.

Land inspires little confidence when he discusses (in his essay on “Social and Economic Processes of Development”) whether the “disquieting consequences” of modern industrial society do not in fact call for the repudiation of the whole system as “completely de-humanizing.” His reply: “We are not prepared to give an answer here. Our task is only to point out that along the continuum of industrial development, automation becomes an inevitable ‘set’ of society. We cannot undo it. We must comprehend it and live with it” (p. 27). This carries the depressing tone of fatalism, the least Christian of the basic models of social change. Whether reform is possible or revolution necessary are the real issues.

Fuchs inquires whether progress, understood as “being a person in the world,” is not “the real moral norm of man,” hence eliminating the “need to search for moral norms for progress—the development of the ‘man in the world’” (p. 152). He replies affirmatively and thus states that “it is immoral to remain indifferent to—true—progress, not to concern oneself with it” (p. 153). Progress, taken as an affirmative precept, is always valid but does not have to be carried out on every occasion, writes Fuchs, as he places the issue in a traditional moral context. So, while leaving aside the question of precisely when man must act for progress (admittedly too complicated and concrete for this essay), F. asserts that man, “in building the man-world reality, is bound constantly to build for the betterment of the world, that is, to progress.” The practitioners will be pardoned for seeking further guidance; the moralists will be encouraged to continue the refinement of their principles.

No one should blame a theologian for posing a question he cannot answer. Coste, therefore, need not apologize for not offering a blueprint-reply to the question-title of his book Quel système économique? His reply is general; “la création collective” is the label he puts on the needed system. It would be a form of economic organization that is a participatory process engaging the creative contributions of technicians, artists, workers, and the young. The practical interplay of power groups in such a system is not discussed. As for the Church, C. says it cannot afford not to participate. The outcome of the process will be a system
that protects the *joie de vivre*. The best economic system, therefore, the one most likely to produce progress and development, would be the one that can engage the widest possible participation in planning for development. In discussing "imperative" and "indicative" planning for development (pp. 68 ff.), C. sketches an opening for alternative ways. Purely imperative planning sins by excess; it is paternalistic and authoritarian. Purely indicative planning sins by default. Rather than flatly order or simply indicate, the system should stimulate or incite men to engage in the process of development.

From his familiarity with the recent French experience of noncoercive, indicative planning, C. seems to be calling for a further refinement of the indicative process through broader-based and theologically-inspired participation in the operation of the system. The theology involves a reconciliation of Christian responsibility for the world with the notion that if God does not build the house, he who builds it labors in vain. C. refers to the concluding sentence of John F. Kennedy’s inaugural address as illustrative of an authentically Christian statement: after asking "His blessing and His help," the Christian proceeds "knowing that here on earth God’s work must truly be our own."

But the question remains: Will C.’s suggested system, or any other for that matter, work? Adam Smith saw self-interest as the factor that holds society together and thus the most likely centerpiece for any system of economic organization. Moltmann affirms that the "hope of salvation and fear of condemnation are the ultimate impulses behind human activity" (p. 205). Neither he nor the other authors represented in these books probe into this notion of self-interested hope and fear as a possible basis for a moral impulse to sustain development activity. More attention to the refinement of the notion of obligation may bring all these writers into closer range of the target they seek in common: a form of social organization that will enhance the development of man-in-the-world. Entering in this way into current problems, and sharing the difficulties of man’s struggle to be free to develop in this world, Christian theologians will perhaps come to a new understanding of the fact that "to overcome the world" the Christian must be willing to act in a way that requires him to move beyond self-interest.

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*THEOLOGICAL STUDIES*


Within the past decade Ivan Illich has emerged as a leading social critic speaking and writing from the vantage point of Christian faith. His home base is the influential Center for Intercultural Documentation (CIDOC) in Cuernavaca, Mexico, where he has energized a continuing searching review, among a host of inquirers, on social, cultural, and theological issues of the day, most recently in the field of education. From that center he goes out to the corners of the earth to bring his message and to issue his revolutionary challenge to a whole range of established orders that he believes have become sources of injustice in the modern world.

Until the publication of these three volumes, I.'s pronouncements were available only in informally circulated documents, in reports of interviews or speeches, or in separate articles, most of which had caused widespread discussion and a growing clamor for an ampler and more accessible statement of his views. The present volumes meet that demand, giving for the first time a reasonably full presentation of his position. The first two are collections of articles and speeches on a variety of occasions from 1956 to 1970, dealing with a wide range of social and religious issues such as the nature of Christian missions, the role of the clergy, the problem of family planning, and the bases for intercultural understanding. Deschooling Society consists of material on education published for the first time (except for three chapters), based on memoranda submitted for discussion in a 1970 CIDOC seminar.

Like all collections of occasional pieces, these Illich composites have a somewhat episodic quality that one would not find in more systematic works. The same ground is traversed in a variety of different contexts, and the perspective shifts from one situation to the next. Nevertheless, what would ordinarily be a disadvantage in this mode of presentation may be meritorious in I.'s case. First, the nonsystematic quality maintains the sense of vitality so characteristic of him. He thinks concretely, in terms of living contexts of decision, rather than in abstract categories. Second, within any particular context, I. grapples with his problem from a comprehensive perspective, ranging far and wide over history, theology, and the social sciences to support his claims. Hence, in his treatment, particular situations never appear as separate and isolated but as having universal moment. Finally, no matter what the occasion or subject, I. has certain common themes that shine through, giving unity of perspective to what might otherwise be disparate concerns. Consequently, one comes from a reading of these variegated works with an integral sense of I.'s message.

Illich is a man with a message. Though widely read and highly compe-
tent as a scholar, he does not write primarily as a theologian, philosopher, or social scientist. His mode is that of the prophet. The dominant impulse in all he says is a consuming zeal for social justice and implacable wrath directed against the agencies that imprison and warp the human spirit. His speeches and writings are thus not primarily pieces for intellectual stimulation or aesthetic delight (though these may be by-products) but for persuasion, conviction of wrongdoing, and conversion of life. They are apodictic and proclamatory in manner and frequently aphoristic in form. The urgency of the message leaves little occasion for deliberating the pros and cons of his propositions or for exploring the complexities of his proposals.

Yet I. is a great believer in dialogue. All his writings have grown out of interchanges with students and associates at CIDOC and elsewhere. How, then, can one explain the categorical quality of his declarations? I think they must be seen as intentions to project convictions into the arena of dialogue, by one who sees truth emerging only from the confrontation of beliefs passionately held, bluntly stated, and profoundly tested by the reality of contemporary experience.

The ground on which I. stands and from which he launches his prophetic proclamations for dialogue is the Christian faith. He sees himself as one who responds to the grace of the God who humbled Himself to become man and who continually dwells with His people, inspiring them with hope, convicting them of sin, accepting their repentance and reformation, and establishing them in community. His harsh criticisms of existing social arrangements spring not from cynicism or despair but from a fundamental persuasion of the creative possibilities in the world, to which the celebration of the faith through the liturgy of the Church bears the most eloquent witness.

The Christian God whom I. would proclaim and serve is immanent in His incarnation in the world where life is to be accepted and enjoyed as a precious gift, and transcendent in the mystery of unique creative possibilities and in the denial of ultimacy to any institutional structures that would limit the divine-human creative energy. Accordingly, his message contains both powerful negative judgments on existing social and cultural forms and suggestions of man's potentialities that are little short of utopian.

The dominant target in I.'s prophetic proclamation is the ethos of middle-class Western industrial democracy. He says that its fortune-favored advocates, a minority of the world's people, self-righteously regard it as the ultimate and the indubitable good, which they seek to impose on all the world by economic, military, and educational means. This threefold effort, through money, troops, and teachers, is the way in
which Americans express their “benevolence” to marginal peoples both at home and abroad—e.g., in the war on poverty, the war in Vietnam, and the Latin American Alliance for Progress. Each, I. claims, fails because it presupposes as an ultimate norm for all peoples a standard of competitive enterprise, high production and consumption, and liberal political process that is specific to a few rich nations in a particular epoch, but quite impossible and undesirable for the great majority of the world’s inhabitants.

The institutional Church, he says, has lent itself to this idolatry, and in such ill-conceived programs as that of the Papal Volunteers for Latin America in effect gave sacramental sanction to the Yankee imperialist thrust. But of all the institutions that serve the American idol, I. thinks none is so destructive as that of compulsory schooling. Not only does he regard the school as singularly ineffective in educating—that could be done far better by a variety of other agencies, the nature of which he suggests in Deschooling Society—but the effect of the present system is to increase the injustices of society, benefiting those who already have much, condemning to inferiority those who have little, and by its credentialing function forcing everyone into the middle-class consumption-oriented framework.

An important key to I.’s thought is the distinction he makes between political revolution and cultural or institutional revolution. No change in the ruling power alone will suffice to humanize the nation. What is required is a revolution in institutional arrangements that will free persons for creative realization. Among the needed changes is the generation of much more flexible alternatives for education and the abandonment of the present system of politically controlled compulsory schooling.

In this revolution the Church can play a central role, I. thinks, but only if as an institution she remains free of political involvement. The Church is a fellowship of witnesses to the divine presence, and as such must provide for a variety of ideological positions. Only within such a varied fellowship of mutually trusting believers can the dialogue necessary for constructive revolutionary change take place. The symbol of the Church is the Cross, which points to the essential powerlessness of the divine presence among men. When the Church as institution allies itself with particular political programs, it lends itself to idolatry and loses the treasure of holy poverty out of which strength comes for the individual Christian, in his own chosen secular political and ideological affiliations, to take effective action for reconstructing the institutions by which men live.

One may differ with Illich, as I do, on many of his particular judgments and recommendations. He may be charged with excessive negativism about American culture and with being too sketchy about the new forms
of culture he would propose. In his case I think such criticisms are quibbles that do not touch the core of his message, which I regard as a clear and consistent application of a prophetic Catholic faith. I see him as following closely in the tradition of One who came to proclaim good news to the poor, who rejoiced over the flowers of the field and loved little children, who turned the water into wine at the wedding feast, who unspiringly damned the righteous do-gooder Pharisees, who wept over Jerusalem, and who, though His kingdom was not of this world, turned the world upside down.

Teachers College, Columbia University

Philip H. Phenix


Sanctions for Evil derives basically from the proceedings of a public symposium on “The Legitimation of Evil” conducted under the auspices of the Wright Institute at Berkeley. Reflecting Wright’s thrust (a center for interdisciplinary research and social action), this volume draws upon the expertise of scholars from many fields, especially the social and behavioral sciences, calling in the end for countermeasures to social destructiveness and therefore for that positive vision of man and human society without which countermeasures cannot be effective. The destructiveness of which the authors write is not necessarily physical violence nor need it be aggressive in intent. It is any policy or pattern of behavior that in whatever way or for whatever motive leads to dehumanization of others. It is “social” in that its victims are not materials or property or labor but persons, its agents receive sanction from other people for what they do (hence the book’s title), it usually involves a negative value judgment passed by one group upon another (indeed, sometimes a denial of the other group’s very humanity), and its deleterious effects can be felt not merely by the immediate victims but by the whole of society. In the authors’ view, these are characteristics typifying a general process of social destructiveness that has surfaced or is surfacing in historical phenomena such as the Indian massacres, anti-Semitism, racism, or Nazi- or My Lai-type atrocities. Sanctions attempts to present this process “through its social forms, through its psychological background, and through its cultural matrix” (p. 8). Fol-
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*Teachers College, Columbia University*  

**PHILIP H. PHEND**


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following on all this is a section dealing with resistance to social destructiveness, and an epilogue in which the editors focus upon institutional sanctions for evil, the dehumanization which is at once the cause and the effect of evil, and destructiveness as a “psychological disposition.”

*Crimes of War* is a collection of documents and essays bearing upon war crimes in general and those of the Vietnam War in particular. First, it sets up a legal framework by offering the reader formal material relating to criminal responsibility in both recourse to war and the conduct of warfare. There is, second, a compilation of firsthand accounts of wartime destruction and atrocity (a section called, a little curiously, “The Political Setting”). Finally, in “The Psychological and Ethical Context,” seventeen essayists point up in different ways the roots of the evil perpetrated in war and the guilt in which we all collectively share and which we should but may not experience. These three sections are prefaced by essays from each of the editors. “The Question of War Crimes: A Statement of Perspective” comes from Falk, a professor of international law and practice. Kolko is a historian at York University, Toronto, and his “On the Avoidance of Reality” underlines the “liberal myopia” that “immunizes most Americans to the dominant political facts, experiences, and trends of our age—to war, repression, and war crimes everywhere” (p. 13). Lifton’s field is psychiatry. Having lived and worked in Hiroshima in order to study the human effects of the first atomic bomb, he is able to draw upon his personal experience in “Beyond Atrocity” to speak with authority of such things as “death immersion,” “psychic numbing,” “residual guilt,” or “apocalyptic imagination.” Each of these editors has also contributed an article to one of the three sections.

At the time of this writing, Lt. Calley has been convicted of murder at My Lai and the *New York Times* has just hit the streets with its publication of the Pentagon Papers. My Lai looms large in each of these books. They see it as “an emblem of the larger destructiveness to which our country was contributing in Vietnam” (*Sanctions*, p. 1), as an example of “the profound alienation—the lost bearings and unconnectedness” (*ibid.*, p. 40), the “apocalyptic absurdities and dislocations” (*Crimes*, p. 22) which emerge in such atrocities, and as “a product of our self-deception” that allows us to base our policy in Vietnam on myths (*ibid*, pp. 426–27). Moreover, the sensational disclosures in the newspapers are giving sharp emphasis to K.’s claims that “to fully comprehend American war crimes in Vietnam, therefore, is to understand the war, the reasons why the U.S. became involved in Vietnam in the first place, and the sources and objectives of American power in the world today” (p. 14), and that “the U.S. effort in Vietnam is grounded on former Secretary of Defense
McNamara's concepts of cost effectiveness, which weighs firepower and available resources against political-military needs and objectives" (p. 15).

In all this the writers have had plenty to work on: the attitudes at all levels to the Indochina wars over the years; the evidence regarding My Lai and similar atrocities; the "police riot" in Chicago at the 1968 Democratic National Convention; the Cambodian invasion; the killings at Kent State, Augusta, and Jackson State, etc.; and, very importantly, the public response to such events. Now they can add the Calley verdict and the publication of the Pentagon Papers; for the public reaction to these bears out many of their claims, e.g., that there are psychic and social pressures at work that legitimize, authorize, mobilize for, and rationalize evil, that subtly, perhaps imperceptibly, the U.S. has developed all the conditions for guilt-free massacre, that "groupthink" among our policy makers has enabled them to take little or no account of some of the major consequences of their actions, including the moral and humanitarian implications, and that most Americans are incapable of making the searing reappraisal of the cherished assumptions and their vision of society which a confrontation with the realities of the situation calls for so urgently.

Not everyone will accept fully the analyses, interpretations, and conclusions of the many writers represented in these two volumes. Some may want to challenge even some of the data out of which they work. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that these are extraordinarily important collections. Called as Christians to be ministers of reconciliation, peacemakers in a world of violence and destructiveness (indeed, in the case of most readers of TS, called to be leaders and catalysts at one level or another in the lives of Christians), we cannot afford to be ignorant of the political, social and psychological realities to which both books forthrightly call our attention. These realities constitute our "situation" and, as Paul Lehmann has put it in his Ethics in a Christian Context, any analysis of Christian ethics involves "a kind of running conversation between the New Testament, on the one hand, and our situation, as heirs of the New Testament, on the other." We must, first, read that situation. This can only mean that, if we are to make an intelligent, effective, and Christian response to the challenges of our violence-ridden and war-torn world, paving the way to peace by creating the will to peace and the conditions for peace, the wealth of information and reflection contained in these and similar writings constitutes a necessary starting point and an essential background. Without it we cannot even approach our task, which is "to confront atrocity in order to move beyond it" (Crimes, p. 27).

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NICHOLAS CROTTY, C.P.
BOOK REVIEWS


The potential threat of the new biology is revealed in these two works. They present a panoramic view of genetic engineering, an expanding evolutionary theme, and resulting infringements upon vitalism.

Dobzhansky, with 1260 references, outlines the processes of mutation, natural selection, and species formation. But contrary to jacket statements, his terminology is far too complex for the layman. The irony is that this book describes tools that will become very influential upon social and ethical developments; and yet those most likely to control said developments might not comprehend D. The reader becomes aware of the strides of modern geneticists: producing desired kinds of fruit flies, changing mutation rates at random, transforming cells into other kinds of cells. Evolution can be witnessed and quantified, genes can be traced from generation to generation. Geneticists have even devised their own vocabulary: Darwinian fitness, synthetic species, genetic death. Some men are called "translocation heterozygotes"; Mongoloids are said to have a Darwinian fitness of nearly zero; a species is a "supraindividual biological system."

One hopes that sociologists and moralists will come to balance the process of human improvement. A graph on page 192 frightens this reviewer: the cost of maintaining genetically inferior lives is plotted as a function of their contribution to society. But D. admittedly presents the genetic, not the social, picture.

Rensch is not as specific as D. In fact, disregarding all his other works, one wonders how he could be so inaccurate and speculative. Although it is more easily read and is a valiant attempt to reconcile biology and philosophy, he may fall short of his goal due to a lack of solidarity in this work's conclusions. His thesis is: there is a design in nature, but a purely materialistic design. He talks of an "unbroken chain of causal events"; "biological rules or laws, like all chemical and almost all physical and astronomical ones, fall within the scope of a universal causal law acting without interruption." To show cause for events, he writes of instincts, hormones, moods, cell activities, and bird flight. He shows a correspondence between consciousness and the nervous system. But perhaps no one would disagree with the causal explanations he so outlines.

If the reader is decidedly a vitalist, R. will not change his mind. He attempts to prove complete causality, but can never do so. "[It is] likely that every life process is causally conditioned. The only 'exceptions' occur when the context is so complex...." "All evolution is ultimately
based upon causal laws, though it is difficult to grasp their complicated interactions." "We are only beginning to understand...." What weakens his effort most perhaps is the list of one hundred rules of evolution, to show causality. Several are incomplete, some are misleading, many are irrelevant to his cause. He denies free will, but says: "in most human thought processes the interplay of determinant factors is so complex that an adequate analysis is not possible." To deny free will, he states that a spontaneous thought would disrupt the law of conservation of energy; but he never elaborates upon this most basic premise. He likewise shrugs off Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, whereas it is crucial to his thesis: if there is no subatomic causality, everything built of atoms could retain an element of uncertainty in it.

R. and D. differ markedly on some issues. R. believes in a natural design; D., as an evolutionist, believes that evolution is random. As a consequence of R.'s chemical and physical design, he personifies natural selection throughout the book, going counter to all biological thinking. "The relations of living organisms to their habitat are...purposefully developed." Natural selection does not cause organisms to adapt, but selects those that have adapted. Natural selection "is a strictly biological phenomenon, in the sense that it is a sequel to life," but R. says it "also operates...when atoms and molecules form chemical compounds...."

The only major error in D.'s work is his confusion re modern vitalism and creationism. However, R. is in biological error in the following statements, among others: (1) "natural selection has prevented the origin of structural and functional disorder"; (2) "The causal method in research has stood every test without exception...."; (3) "ribosomes [are] where specific nucleic acids are synthesized"; (4) "Man differs from [chimpanzees and gorillas] only in the relative size and particular shape of certain parts of the body and, in some cases, in their relative positions." He is also wrong in saying "The Christian conception of the creation...has proved inconsistent with the idea that man has gradually evolved from animal ancestors."

If only D. were correct when he says "evolution as a process that has occurred in the history of the earth is no longer questioned either by scientists or by the informed public." And if only R. were incorrect when he says "In the past decades, too many philosophers have...sacrificed exactitude and clarity in favor of brilliant phrases."

Both books are recommended highly, subject to the above restrictions. Anyone who does not read D., or the equivalent, cannot fully know evolution—at least not enough to refute it or to build a philosophical system upon it.

Stonehill College, Mass.  PAUL R. GASTONGUAY


"The degree and kind of a man's sexuality reach up into the ultimate pinnacle of his spirit," wrote Nietzsche. In Richardson, Nietzsche finds a successor willing to search out the historical interplay between sexuality and spirituality, in the understanding that the voluntary control of sexual impulse is a primary condition of personalization in Western culture. R. does more, however, than give the history of sex and the spirit. He applies Erikson's theories of the life cycle and, in particular, of intimacy to sexual morality, and he discloses the spiritual resources of American sexual behavior with a warmhearted confidence rare in Christian moralists.

The history of sex is a story of man's progressive emancipation, from the drive for instinctual release to the nuanced control of the body for expression of intimate personal communion. R. presents a speculative theory of this evolution in five stages. These sexual developments correspond to five states of consciousness, with attendant social and theological perspectives. R. lists these types of consciousness as mimetic, ego, rational, self-conscious, and polyconscious. Mimetic consciousness is characterized by participation in and imitation of rhythms of nature. Socially mimetic consciousness expresses itself in the tribal village. Theologically, its god is the mother goddess; its cult, ritual copulation. Ego consciousness issues in and is advanced by urban warrior societies. The "lord" of battles, the "king," displaces the mother goddess; ritual enthronement takes the place of the fertility cult. Ego consciousness is replaced, in turn, by the rational consciousness of Karl Jaspers' axial period with an ideal of a universal community. The god of this period is eternal reason, word. Contemplation is the characteristic practice of this rational religion.

Penultimately comes self-consciousness with "the new image of man as a being who can unify within himself the voluntary and the instinctual. . . ." The chief social fact of this period (1300-1700) is courtly love. The courtier and his lady sought to make sex an expression of love, and in the process they changed the nature of sex itself from a biological-social reality to a personal one. Accordingly, the theology of the period is marked by the rediscovery of the personal God and the greater dignity given our Lady: the cult, personal devotion to Jesus and Mary. Self-conscious also includes, it seems, the romantic-democratic marital pattern of contemporary America with its protracted preparation in an extended adolescence. R. attributes the origins of romantic (personal) marriage (vs. the courtly parallel of arranged marriage and personal courtship) to American Puritans and Quakers. Romantic marriage, however,
is also giving way under the transformation of self-consciousness into a polyconsciousness whose social forms we only vaguely suspect. In his con­cluding chapter, "Sex without Sex?", R. suggests that the sexual prac­tice of such nineteenth-century utopian sects as the Oneida community and the Shakers may suggest means for socialization of the three long­range tendencies: the moralization of sex (displacement of instinctual agression by voluntary shared love), individuation of men and women (including identification with the feelings of the other sex), and the eroticization of society.

One regrettable aspect of R.'s treatment is the loss of theological per­spective after the treatment of the Marian cult. In particular, he fails to discuss the relation of Puritan and Quaker personalism to their religious belief. Oddly, the Trinity never appears as a theological model for marital behavior. A Trinitarian vision would, it seems, widen the I-thou inti­macy of romantic love to include generation (a factor R. sees as sec­ondary under the conditions of romantic personalism). Generativity, with its care for the young, is an important and lengthy stage in the life cycle. Though longevity, extended youth, and other changing physical and so­cial patterns may decrease the proportional time devoted to child rear­ing, personal growth in the foreseeable future will still require passing from intimacy through the crises of generativity to care for a wider family. A person cannot leap from love à deux to the kingdom of brotherly love without joining intermediate communities, and especially without care for the next generation.

The history of sex is largely a history of its control toward the expres­sion of love between persons. The latest social institution R. sees fostering personalization in sex is the American practice of petting. It is the last in a series of social arrangements which have led to the moralization of sex. Male virginity among the Hebrews, for example, fostered a high le­gal and ethical culture by segmentalization of sexual feeling from people and situations which were sexually arousing, and Christian monasticism cultivated agapic love by renunciation. The modern American grows by degrees toward expression of personal intimacy through sex by the whole range of practices called "petting." Graduated experimental initiation to sex among peers of both sexes has three effects. There is (1) a loosening of fixed sexual roles leading (2) to equality between the sexes. Further (3), the prolongation of sexual initiation means that sexual responsiveness is reconstructed along a set of freely chosen "invisible lines," correlative to degrees of intimacy.

The social fact of "line drawing" has a weighty, personalizing effect on morality. First, "line drawing" sustained by free choice demands the ability to endure the tension of contrary feelings and questions, while
bearing the anxiety that such openness involves resisting the urge to closure. Second, in the context of freely determined intimacy institutional legitimations of morals naturally give way to personal ones. Lastly, affection becomes the accustomed goal and norm of sexual intimacy.

Though he acknowledges the difficulty of the adolescent’s incorporating a long phylogenesis within his own epigenetic development, R. does not mention the problems created by this development: the lifelong binds and compromises it forces upon persons of low ego strength, little education, or low social status, who are incapable of sustaining the tensions which moralize petting. He omits a whole range of social factors in modern American life which depersonalize men and women such that sexual activity becomes a surrogate for genuine personal growth, but a surrogate defended by the rhetoric of personalism. He romanticizes the “romantic marriage,” without advertting to the overinvestment of expectation in this institution which has so often yielded only spiritual bankruptcy. If any charge can be laid to R., then, it is that he has failed to elucidate the counterfeits of the sexual ideal he proclaims as the Americanization of sex. Nonetheless, this is a welcome book for its positive insight into American morality and behavior, as well as for its speculative contribution (on the relation of sexuality and spirituality) to Christian anthropology.

Like Richardson, James Walker of Berkeley’s GTU explores the bodily springs of religious experience. Unlike R., he does not single out one set of bodily experiences, but examines the whole range of bodily energy and organization as it is known in Gestalt therapy. An exploration of the religious elements and potentials of Gestalt therapy is a project which has needed doing, since Gestalt shares a common tradition with religious disciplines in the West. Its aims are a positive “indifference” whereby the subject is free from rigid attachments to make unconstrained and willing commitments, and full awareness and presence to the world and other persons. The contact between the therapy, by Fritz Perls, and the disciplines of the spiritual life are all the more needed because each has resources to share with the other. Perls’s legacy is a connoisseur’s knowledge of the body, its energies and organization as they express and affect the psyche. Christian asceticism and mysticism, for their part, know a variety of routes to indifference and presence, especially through prayer, and of the effects of this heightened awareness. In addition, the historical study of these disciplines offers a rich vein of understanding as to the social and psychological conditions under which these complementary goals arise, are effected, in turn affect a society, and then fade into rigid ritual routines. Unfortunately, W. does not provide us with such an encounter of complementary insights. Instead he offers a sketchy but
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valid comparison of the OT notion of soul with that of the ego in Gestalt therapy. This discussion is followed by a presentation of the therapy’s methods for the lay reader and an interpretation of the therapy as religious. W. invokes the humanistic litany, “excitement, movement, process, energy... ecstasy, transcendence, mystic absorption,” to validate the religious element in the therapy.

What is Gestalt therapy? It is a method which concerns itself with the “wholes” in the continuum of experience. Its interest is the transpiring of full and complete experiences where each element of experience receives its due expression and diverse experiences are had in their proper time. Pathology from this point of view consists in failing to come to closure of an experience, in the unresolved tensions of premature closure, and in fixed attention when the subject cannot shift interest to a new realm of experience. The therapist works by noting the body of the client for signs of tension and constraint: the tone of voice and its projection; the depth and rhythm of breathing; gestures, posture, facial expression; verbal qualifications, hesitancies, and omissions. He interprets neither this nonverbal communication nor verbal statements of the patient. Rather he directs the patient to accentuate what he is doing: to breathe more heavily, to clench a fist more tightly, to tap fingers more vigorously. Such physical accentuation makes a person aware of his tensions, blockages, and avoidances. Given this recognition, the therapist instructs the patient to act out his situation: to give voice to his tensions, to act out a daydream, to pantomime a fear. The purpose of this vigorous repetition and dramatization is to break down the blockage or burst through the avoidance, to live out the experience, to complete the whole. The body is central to this process of experience. Its flow of energy, of active interested attention, is the symptom and source of health. Lack of energy, boredom, and tedium are the signs and enforcers of illness. Health, then, is the function of the person’s engaged attention to his environment. Since that environment has an infinity of facets, health is also the free flow of attention from one experience to another. Thus the dual aims of therapy: awareness, or engaged attention, and indifference, the free flow of attention in a many-faceted world.

The twin goals of presence and indifference make Gestalt therapy and Christian spirituality pertinent to one another. Gestalt enhances presence by breaking open suppressed levels and items of consciousness and by developing a sense that the experience is one’s own. Basic Christian doctrines, creation, Incarnation, love of neighbor, etc., long ago established a groundwork for awareness which developed into a rich tradition of presence in the Augustinian memoria Dei and the Ignatian contemplatio ad amorem and contemplativus in actione. The symbolic struc-
tures which supported these approaches are not to be understood as alienating, but rather as necessary for extended presence beyond the sphere of immediate, gratifying awareness. Perls himself saw the need for prolonged and extended forms of presence, and on this basis he founded a therapeutic community.

With respect to indifference, the Gestalt method offers positive and dynamic exercises whereby indifference arises from felt consciousness that all possibilities are one’s own, rather than by denial of some values or willed reduction of all values to some common affective chill. Each value exercises its attraction. Because this manifold of interest arouses energy, eventual commitment to a specific value is made with wholehearted strength. Faintheartedness is no longer a problem—in the face of vital interests, commitments cannot be kept simply for the sake of sustaining them. Heightened awareness, moreover, prevents decision on the basis of an unexperienced hierarchy of values. Most of all, this form of therapy is a bulwark against reissment, that suppressed regret for lost opportunities which denigrates values once “freely” renounced, and in the guise of virtue seeks to draw all values into the mud of its own malaise. Cumulatively, Gestalt therapy is a lively help to “purity of heart.”

Christian spirituality also has much to share in the matter of freely committed presence. Indifference and openness traditionally are the effects of prayer. There is a release of inhibition, and a flow of energy for making contact with others and for achieving high purposes. The difference is that Christian indifference arises from a long-and-wide-range intentionality and is achieved in an intensive presence. As Gordon Allport wrote, “It [religious sentiment] is the portion of personality that arises at the core of the life and is directed toward the infinite. It . . . has the longest range intentions, and for this reason is capable of conferring marked integration upon personality, engendering meaning and peace in the face of the tragedy and confusion of life.” The awareness of wider communities to which he belongs motivates a Christian to a care for the world and men even when the more immediate excitement of Gestalt has faded away. Religion is “individuality in community.” Between therapy and spirituality the difference is the range of community to which they adhere. The person, however, belongs to them all. Theoretically, it seems that Whiteheadian philosophy, as Perls himself indicated (Walker, Appendix C, p. 188), with its foundation in the notions of order and energy and its understanding of the soul as prehensive activity, offers conceptual ground for rapprochement of therapy and spirituality.

There is another place of contact between these two approaches, the exodus experience. W. sees this, and devotes his third chapter to “death and rebirth.” But he misses the opportunity for another encounter of
Christian symbols and ritual with therapeutic exercises. He acknowledges that symbols must correspond to experiences which give them life, but he regards Christian symbols as sterile. "Sacrosanct symbols and icons prevent fresh symbols and icons, based upon present experience, from coming into being." Two oversights with respect to symbolism of death and rebirth make W.'s treatment a hollow encomium of therapy. First, he ignores the historic plasticity of Christian rites and symbols; second, he overlooks the need of the shared strength of archetypal symbols by modern man. These oversights mark the weaknesses of Gestalt therapy and as such might have been a source of fruitful encounter. With its focus on personal history, therapy ignores a wider context of knowledge, and in creating the conditions of personal integration encourages a private imagery which excludes shared meaning.

The worth of W.'s book is that it points up the disparity between public symbols and personal experience in the lives of contemporary Christians. It suggests that humanistic psychology has become a religion for many because of this disparity, and that for this same reason devotees within the humanistic movement turn to Eastern religion in search of the transcendent. W., like Sam Keen, provides an important service for Christians in whose tradition spirituality is forgotten. But for Catholic Christians with multifarious experiences of religious development he should offer a challenge to join with others to share knowledge of body and soul.

Woodstock College, N.Y.C. ANDREW CHRISTIANSEN, S.J.


Utopian Motherhood is a deeply disturbing and controversial book. Francoeur's subject is the new social and technological revolution in human sexuality and reproduction. Relentlessly he confronts the reader with such capabilities and possibilities as artificial insemination, surrogate mothers, human sperm and egg banks, artificial wombs, embryo transplants, genetic engineering, parthenogenesis, and asexual cloning. As he develops his subject, the real meaning emerges behind the movement into an era of profound control over human reproductive processes, and the tremendous psychological, emotional, and religious impacts of this control. Already, F. argues, our legal apparatus cannot cope with some of our existing medical advances. Even our vocabulary dealing with human sexuality is becoming unintelligible. The traditional meaning of words like incest, adultery, infidelity, even parent, mother, father, son, etc., are inadequate to deal with our new technological capabilities.
Others have said these things, but F. makes them personally relevant through a rare combination of scientific competence, capacity for integration of complex ideas, lively imagination, warm humor, and deep humanism.

His concerns are clear. (1) We must recognize the power of this revolution. (2) We must seek new images of human sexuality as we discard old beliefs about male and female and their interrelationships. (3) We must pose provocative questions about our use of new reproductive techniques and their human implications before we make naive and perhaps disastrous decisions. (4) We must find new forums for dialogue at all levels of society, particularly among professionals, who have a special responsibility to be catalytic agents in creating this dialogue.

The urgency behind F.’s concerns flows from three trends he forecasts. First, sexual intercourse and procreation will increasingly become distinct human activities. Sexual intercourse, therefore, will open up new meanings for interpersonal communication, and reproduction will increasingly become a deliberate human choice. Second, the exclusivity of the conjugal family will be modified by more pluralistic forms of male/female relationships and parenthood. Third, moral dictates of the past will become increasingly difficult to apply to the new issues surrounding human sexuality and reproduction. An evolution in fundamental human values and sexual morality must therefore emerge within a deep historical Judeo-Christian perspective. We must move from a fixed cosmology with an emphasis on genital sex to a process view which sees man as a constantly evolving sexual person.

F.’s probing, incisive questions overwhelm and bludgeon the mind. Many will be deeply upset by some of his proposals. He has few answers to offer, because many of his questions deal with issues without precedent in human history and morality. However, a lack of answers does not detract from the importance of his message: we must face these kinds of questions individually and collectively and direct our scientific capabilities to the advancement of mankind. Otherwise we must accept a mindless wandering into the future—or worse, the utter dehumanization of man. This book is a must for any thoughtful, concerned person who wants to be part of the dialogue demanded to invent a truly human future for mankind.

Syracuse, N.Y.

ROBERT F. BUNDY

Ever since P. Vielhauer's article "Zum 'Paulinismus' der Apostelgeschichte," *EvTheol* 10 (1950–51) 1–15, there has been a growing recognition of the difference between the Lucan presentation of Paul in Acts and the picture of the Apostle that we find in the authentic Pauline letters. Furthermore, the studies of M. Dibelius, *Aufsätze zur Apostelgeschichte* (Göttingen, 1951), and the commentary of E. Haenchen (MeyerK 3) have led to an appreciation of Luke's role, both as author and theologian, in the composition of Acts and to the abandonment of earlier source-critical approaches to the book. These developments, however, have resulted in certain exaggerations and distortions, e.g.,

1. the view that Luke was so free in his use of traditional material that the historical value of Acts is practically nil,
2. the thesis of G. Klein, *Die zwölf Apostel* (Göttingen, 1961), that the Lucan representation of Paul is designed to place the Apostle in a position of subordination with respect to "the apostles," who, for Luke, are exclusively the Twelve.

It is against such views that the present volume by a distinguished student of J. Jeremías takes position. Although Luke does not accord Paul the title "apostle," Acts 14:4, 14 notwithstanding, he does assign him the function of a "witness" (Acts 22:15; 26:16), the very function which, according to the words of the risen Lord, characterizes the activity of the Twelve (Lk 24:48; cf. Acts 1:22). Luke's interest in representing Paul as the witness par excellence (and not simply as a "delegate" of the Twelve) is indicated by the fact that Paul alone actually fulfils the promise of the risen Lord that "the apostles" will be His witnesses to the end of the earth (=Rome? Acts 1:8).

As for Luke's use of traditional material regarding Paul, Acts 9 serves as an illuminating example. Luke retains a traditional portrayal of the Damascus event (vv. 3–19), with only modest redactional changes, although this depiction of Paul's "conversion" contrasts with the Lucan understanding of the event as a "vocation" (cf. Acts 26:16–18), an understanding similar to that of Paul himself (cf. Gal 1:15–16).

The fact that Luke represents Paul as preaching in Damascus immediately after his conversion (Acts 9:20) and in Jerusalem together with "the apostles" (Acts 9:28), but in no way in dependence upon them, shows how serious a distortion it is to maintain that Luke wishes to downgrade "the thirteenth witness."

The pre-Lucan tradition for the Damascus event in Acts 9 (upon which the versions in Acts 22 and 26 are based) shows clear form-critical connections with the Jewish novel *Joseph and Aseneth*, which was the subject of an earlier study of B. (The detailed comparison of this Jewish novel with pagan parallels seems to strain the unity of the present volume).
This work represents a welcome corrective to certain dominant trends in recent Lucan studies. However, not all the positions maintained by B. are equally well grounded. How can it be maintained that Luke represents the devil as a tempter (p. 115), in view of the fact that the epithet *ho peirazōn* is missing in the Lucan version of the temptation story (4:3; cf. Mt 4:3) and that the use of *peirazō/peirasmos* to designate the temptation of the faithful is totally absent in Acts?

B. believes that for Luke *metanoia* is simply the passage from polytheistic to monotheistic faith (p. 116). But if “conversion” is “not primarily a moral matter,” the “forgiveness of sins” imparted in baptism seems almost superfluous. Rather, the forgiveness of sins comes precisely “through faith in me,” i.e., Jesus (Acts 26:18, contrary to B.’s interpretation on p. 118), and hence is intimately connected with conversion (cf. also Lk 5:20).

B.’s position that all “the apostles,” and not just Matthias, were chosen by the *risen* Lord (p. 130) dismisses the conferral of the apostolic title by the earthly Jesus in Lk 6:13, ignores the close parallelism between the Gospel text and the text in Acts (1:24) concerning the election of Matthias (cf. my *Apostasy and Perseverance in the Theology of Luke* [Rome, 1969] pp. 94-96), and introduces an artificial distinction between “Auswahl” and “Erwählung” with no basis in the Greek, which uses the same verb *eklegesthai* in both places.

B.’s rejection (p. 167) of the common view that Acts represents the passage of salvation from the Jews to the Gentiles is also unconvincing. It must downplay the importance of the Cornelius episode (Acts 10) and interpret *tōn ethnōn* (Acts 26:17) in Paul’s missionary mandate as including the Jewish people, who, however, are mentioned separately in the foregoing phrase *tou laou*.

Finally, concerning the content of the witness borne by “the apostles” and by Paul, B. minimizes the importance of Acts 10:39, where Peter affirms: “We are witnesses to all that (Jesus) did both in the country of the Jews and in Jerusalem.” Does this really mean nothing more than that “the risen Lord led an earthly life, which was certified by God” (p. 135)? B. has not convinced me that Conzelmann’s distinction between “the Age of Jesus” and “the Age of the Church” is invalid. Rather, this distinction provides the most simple explanation of why Luke, despite the primary importance he assigns Paul in Acts, distinguishes him from (without subordinating him to) “the apostles,” who were witnesses of the *vita Jesu* as well as of the Resurrection.

Woodstock College, N.Y.C. Schuyler Brown, S.J.

KYRIAKON: FESTSCHRIFT JOHANNES QUASTEN. Edited by Patrick
Kyriakon offers the tribute of eighty-one authors from thirteen countries (six languages) to Johannes Quasten on his seventieth birthday, in recognition of his productivity in patrology and archaeology, in early Church history, and in Christian worship. The title was chosen to suggest that Quasten's life as scholar, professor, and priest has reflected the sentiments of Paul: "Whether we live or whether we die, we are the Lord's" (tou kyriou; Rom 14:8). Having studied under him as teacher, collaborated with him as scholar, related to him as friend, I know that the title is appropriate, and I am happy to say that the tribute is uncommonly rich. Since Festschrift articles are usually lost in libraries, I think it most useful to summarize the contents.

The first of two main groupings contains Studies in Ancient Church History and Patristic Literature, in nine sections. (1) Articles on the pre-Constantinian Church deal with care and concern for the conversion of pagans (Congar), criminal accusations against Christians (R. M. Grant, Heinrichs), nonviolence (Spanneut), political doctrine (Ziegler), relationship between baptism and ethical living (Bakhuisen van den Brink). (2) Patristic exegesis offers notes for a new edition of Hippolytus' On Daniel (Richard), traditions on the names of nameless NT figures (Metzger), interpretations of Jn 19:23–24 (Aubineau), the authenticity of Ephrem's Exposition of the Gospel (G. A. Egan), Marcion and the oldest prologues to Paul (Schäfer), Jn 14:28 in the Arian controversy (Simonetti), the different speakers in Mk 2:18 par. (Cremer). (3) On the Apostolic Fathers and Greek apologists, we have Ignatius' ideas of history (Meinhold), a defense of Ps.-Pionius' account of Polycarp's martyrdom against von Campenhausen (Barnard), the beginning of the dialogue between Christianity and Greek philosophy (van Winden), Athenagoras on the poets and philosophers (Malherbe), the difficult passage 30:1 of Tatian's Oratio ad Graecos (Bolgiani), a reconstruction and interpretation of Melito's Peripascha 1 and 2 (S. G. Hall), stylistic device (Halton) and typology of the Passion (Perler) in the same work.

4) On Christian theology and Gnosticism, we have reflections on the Odes of Solomon (H. Chadwick), the origins, in Judaism, of the Gnostic Demiurge (Quispel), the expression "wise fire" in the recently discovered Gnostic Writing without Title (van Unnik). (5) The section on writers of Christian Egypt provides judgments on Clement of Alexandria before the first printed editions of the sixteenth century (Knauber), the dart and wound of love in Origen (Crouzel), the Fall in Philo and Origen (Laporte), Origen's interpretation of Rom 8:19–22 (Lebeau), composition of Arius' Thalia (Kannengiesser), manuscript tradition of
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Didymus’ *De Spiritu sancto* (Doutreleau), Armenian homilies attributed to Theophilus (Der Nersessian), Synesius’ Letter 4 in German translation (Vogt). (6) Writers of Cappadocia and Syria contain the significance of Gregory of Nazianzus’ Epiphany homily (Dörrie) and a disputed reading in his Letter 154 (Rudberg), Theodore of Mopsuestia’s doctrine of ecclesiastical penance (Oñatibia), Chrysostom on Christ’s divinity (Harkins), Chrysostom’s *Homilies on Matthew* and the version of Annianus (Musurillo), “Divus Alexander—Divus Christus” (Straub), the authenticity of Chrysostom’s *De sancto Babyla* (Schatkin), Ps.-Chrysostom on sinful marriage (Crehan). (7) Studies on Latin patristic writers investigate four passages in Minucius Felix (G. W. Clarke), conjectures on passages in Tertullian’s *De pat. 12, 9 and De pud. 4, 3* (Bauer), exegesis of Tertullian on Mt 19:6 (Quacquarelli), image of the Church in Lactantius’ *De mort. persec.* (W. J. Walsh), “orders” received by Ambrose the week between baptism and episcopal ordination (B. Fischer), Rufinus and Jerome on translation theory and method (Winkelman), Jerome’s first letter to Damasus and its qualified support of the papacy in doctrine (T. C. Lawler), Augustine on religious knowledge (Ratzinger), Paulinus of Nola and ideological conflicts in the fourth century (P. G. Walsh), Adelard of Bath and Boethius’ *Consolatio* (Courcelle). (8) On spirituality and monasticism, we are given a previously unedited legend of the apostle Archippus (Halkin), *Lectio divina* in Palladius (R. T. Meyer), an effort to identify the “Macarian” problem (Meyendorff), Diadochus of Photike and Messalianism (des Places), a textual problem (“et fit missa ad tertia”) in *Itin. Egeriae* 46, 4 (Gingras), the Reichenauer glosses on the *Regula Benedicti* (Hanslik), the spiritual director in Symeon the New Theologian (Graef).

9) The section on patristic research in modern times has only one article, a fascinating presentation by Kurt Aland on Hans Lietzmann and the Catholic patristic scholars of his time—mostly the reproduction of correspondence with Mercati, Ehrle, Casel, J. Bidez, Ernst Stein, J. Sickenberger, Loisy, and F. M. Braun.

The second main grouping, Archaeological and Liturgical Studies, contains articles on the liturgical edifice (Kitzinger, J. M. C. Toynbee), on liturgical feasts and colors (Sauser, Daniélon, R. E. McNally, Jungmann, A. C. Rush), liturgy of baptism (Neunheuser, Camelot, Harl), liturgy of the word (Olivar, Heiming, Chavasse, Martimort), liturgy of the Eucharist (Hamman, Rodopoulos, Massey Shepherd, Dürig, Pascher, Lengeling). Of widest interest here, perhaps, are McNally on the Magi in early Irish Latin writing, Rush on the colors of red and black in the liturgy of the dead, Neunheuser on the oldest baptismal liturgy, Olivar on preparation and improvisation in patristic preaching, Marti-
mort on the origin and meaning of the Alleluia of the Roman Mass, Dürig on the Scholastics and Communion under one species, Lengeling on the bishop as principal celebrant of the Mass of his ordination.

An Epilogue offers personal tributes (Burghardt, Pelikan), a bibliographical essay (P. Granfield), and a bibliography of Q.'s writings (Granfield; 15 pages, 274 items). A highly appropriate compliment to the master is the extraordinary editorial care that permeates each page of these handsome volumes—though I suspect Q. might have insisted on expanding and nuancing a basically adequate Subject Index.

Woodstock College, N.Y.C. WALTER J. BURGHARDT, S.J.

SHORTER NOTICES


Many of his peers consider S. the greatest living Jewish scholar. His combination of meticulous philological scrutiny, painstaking historical examination, and broad humanistic concerns provides a worthy model for contemporary Jewish scholarship. Hence any of his books, even a collection of previously published papers (as this book is), attracts great attention. That is particularly true because in his more general essays S. permits himself observations on religion or Judaism in general which he would consider inappropriate in his technical studies. This volume is replete with such far-ranging papers and their rewarding comments. It is hardly about the Messianic idea in Judaism. Rather, the papers are spin-offs of S.'s studies on the background and effects of the extraordinary seventeenth-century messianic movement centered about Sabbetai Zevi. Because such intense folk feeling was aroused and, surprisingly, there was a strong antinomian aspect to the movement, S. has seen it as the forerunner of Jewish modernity. His treatment of the numerous themes involved in the movement and its successor mysticisms is fascinating. Many of the papers are of intrinsic interest to the student of religion, even as they will open new vistas to his perception of the authentic varieties of Judaism. Not the least interesting aspect of this volume is the way S. reveals how the battles of his German youth against Orthodoxy and liberal-ethicism have served as the continuing value-context of his scholarship.

Eugene B. Borowitz


A highly competent, thorough discussion of a major theme in Buber's thought. Indeed, the idea is so basic to Buber's thinking about God that it is difficult to isolate one aspect of Buber's treatment of it from another. S. manages this nicely by laying down a foundation of what may be called, with some license, Buber's epistemology and only then applying it to God. That in turn is treated first in timeless perspective and only then as God makes Himself known in biblical times. Throughout, S.'s understanding of Buber is keen and his insight into Buber's spirit deep. One could only
wish S. had gone further, in two respects. First, the contrast with other thinkers is relegated to footnotes citing intriguing quotations. Elaboration of these rejected alternatives might have taken S. far afield, but would have added great richness to his study. Second, S. is never finally at ease with Buber's absolute dichotomy between the I-it and the I-thou. He would like to restore a measure of I-it control or rationality to the I-thou. But though he hints at this problem regularly, he never fully confronts it. On either score one can only look forward with anticipation to S.'s future work.

Eugene B. Borowitz


A volume on modern biblical scholarship, here understood as roughly that of the twentieth century, is a welcome contribution to a series on modern theology. For as the editor, R. P. C. Hanson, points out in his introduction, biblical scholarship is a contribution to theology, not merely to history. Yet the most distinctive feature of modern biblical scholarship is the triumph of rigorous historical criticism, aided by new archeological, historical, linguistic, and literary methods. Davidson presents the OT section, beginning with a fine survey of archeology, which is a good way to introduce the reader to many current issues in OT studies. The survey is up to date and quite comprehensive; in fact, its very tendency to include so many items may bewilder the nonspecialist. The remainder of the OT section discusses literary criticism, text, the religion of Israel, and OT theology. It is a good introduction, by no means just a listing of which scholar says what. In the NT part, Leaney also begins with archeology, especially the Dead Sea Scrolls, and goes on to deal with backgrounds, language, text, and the various books or categories of books. The NT has its own methods and problems, perhaps necessitating a somewhat more complicated approach, but L. seems less successful in guiding the reader through the maze of issues. He too tries to avoid merely mentioning one scholar after another. Perhaps generalizations are inherent in this particular literary genre, but still one feels uncomfortable at the frequent characterization of, e.g., American or German or Roman Catholic NT scholarship. In Johannine studies, e.g., where the last of these is mentioned explicitly, there is as much variety among Catholics as anywhere else, but the survey mentions only one work. On the whole, however, this is a very readable and useful introduction for the novice to whom it is directed.

George MacRae


In 1954 G. von Rad asked his colleague Klaus Koch whether he "could write a small guide to form criticism for our students." The present book was K.'s response: a clear, orderly presentation of the history, objective, and methodology of form criticism with a balanced judgment of its limitations and of the need to supplement it by a sound literary and historical criticism. Part 1, "The Methods," comprises two sections. Section 1, "Fundamentals," treats of literary types and formulas. Taking the Beatitudes as an NT example and the Decalogue as an OT example, K. illustrates the basic form-critical concept of \textit{Sitz im Leben} and
the changes a given literary form undergoes in the course of its transmission. A study of redaction history concludes this section. Section 2, “A Wider View,” discusses the relation of literary criticism to form criticism and the debate about oral transmission. K. treats of the relation between oral and written transmission in the OT and in the early Christian environment. After a brief description of the characteristics of Hebrew poetry, this section concludes with a discussion of the relevance of transmission history for the Church.

Part 2, “Selected Examples,” illustrates the use of the form-critical method when accompanied by a sound literary criticism, redaction history, and transmission history. All the examples are from the OT: Section 1 from the narrative books, Section 2 from the Songs, Section 3 from the prophetic writings. A select bibliography introduces each of the divisions of the book. This book should be required reading in all seminary introductions to the Bible.

Richard Kugelman, C.P.

The thesis of this small paperback is that the writings of St. John have been powerfully influenced by the thought of Nāgārjuna, chief exponent of Mādhyamika Buddhist philosophy and reputed founder of the Mahāyāna school of Buddhism. B. supports his argument by calling attention to the opinion of some scholars that the Last Supper discourses were originally postresurrectional instruction, representing a “hidden” teaching similar to that claimed by Nāgārjuna for the Mahāyāna scriptures in regard to Buddha’s teaching. More important, John’s “horizontal Christology” is best understood when related to the Buddhist experience of Prajñā (perfect wisdom) through Sūnyatā (the Void). The God who is present, in a hidden way, in the love men show for one another becomes fully revealed in Jesus Christ. Reality, including the reality of God, is not to be sought beyond the phenomenal. B. finds here a parallel with Mahāyāna Buddhist thinking. To conceal this heterodox teaching and save John for the Church, B. conjectures, someone—probably the other John he thinks wrote Apocalypse—repositioned the Supper discourses and made other editorial changes.

Much depends on the date of Nāgārjuna. B. places it in the first century or earlier and quotes authorities, but neglects Heinrich Zimmer’s guess that it is ca. 200 A.D. (Philosophies of India, 1951) and Etienne Lamotte’s that it is early third century (Towards the Meeting with Buddhism, 1970). As Gregory Baum states in his foreword, “Even if B.’s hypothesis should not be accepted by biblical scholars... or remain ultimately unverifiable, his analysis of Johannine thought stands on its own terms. It offers a scriptural foundation for a horizontal Christology and a theology that discerns God as present in the thoughts and actions of men.”

John Moffitt


The fourth volume in the highly successful series Themes of Theology, which presents fundamental theological questions to a cultivated but not necessarily professional public. The aim is to provide the best possible information from the results of current
research, unencumbered by scientific apparatus and controversial detail, in the hope of making the tradition accessible to today’s interested reader.

W. presents first the resurrection in the NT—the sources and their history: the preaching of the resurrection in Paul’s epistles, the report of resurrection in the Gospels (especially Mk 16: 1–8: the empty-tomb account), which he considers the concluding segment of the Passion narratives, and the reports of appearances. These latter are primarily authentication narratives which establish in a vision of the risen Jesus the legitimacy of the apostles’ calling and mission. Part 2, the most original and for the theologian most interesting part, examines the meaning of the conceptions of resurrection in the Jewish context(s) of life and death in the OT and the expectation of a future resurrection of the dead, but especially in the popular belief of a future raising up of Henoch and of Elijah. Thus W. carefully delineates the extent to which the Christian conception of resurrection is heir to Jewish tradition and faith, but at the same time goes beyond it radically in professing the actual occurrence of resurrection in the history of Jesus. Part 3 concludes to the origin and meaning of the NT preaching of Jesus’ resurrection as the divine confirmation of His earthly work, whereby God’s saving act in and on Jesus becomes the source of a new (Christian) relation to God: “who raised Jesus from the dead” has revealed Himself in the life and work, and in the death and destiny, of this Jesus.

The book is an exceptionally readable and scientifically balanced account based on contemporary exegetical research into the resurrection, particularly from the perspective of the history of the transmission of traditions. W. brings to resurrection interpretation a sense of the historical perspective and textual development in the NT itself which has long been missed in the more narrowly conceived existentialist interpretations of form-critical research. He succeeds admirably in making the reader aware of unresolved issues without confusing him in a morass of conflicting interpretations. Thereby he fulfills his stated purpose of providing “exact and thorough information about what the earliest Christians really meant when they spoke about the resurrection of Jesus.” However, the information remains basically an interpretative paraphrase of biblical texts; one misses any critical suggestion regarding the relevance of this Christian witness beyond its purely informational value.

Robert C. Ware


Well known as a Mandaean scholar through his publication of the Mandaeic incantation texts and through various articles, Y. deals in this monograph with a somewhat broader subject than the title implies. The book not only treats the impact of the Coptic Gnostic literature on the study of Mandaeism, in which the issue of ethics is prominent, but also presents a carefully argued position in the current debate about the origins of Mandaeism itself. There is first a useful listing of the published Mandaean literature and a discussion of its dates of composition, then a listing of published Coptic Gnostic literature. Since less than a third of the Nag Hammadi literature has been published, one is prompted to caution that arguments based on this material are necessarily provisional. The book then lists certain parallels between the two
bodies of writings and sets forth in more detail the ethics of Gnostics and of Mandaes, especially in sexual matters. In this respect Gnostics and Mandaes are in sharp contrast, since the latter positively affirm the duty of marriage and procreation. But again a caution: in assessing Gnostic attitudes here, we have to rely mostly on the patristic accounts, since the documents themselves are extremely sparing in references to actual Gnostic practices. The Fathers' indignation at Gnostic sexual attitudes is well known; it is less clear how well grounded it is. Y. does not believe an alleged Jewish origin of Mandaism can account for the Mandaean attitude toward sex; in fact, he opposes the trend of current Mandaean scholarship in rejecting a Jewish origin for the sect.

In an extensive final chapter Y. also takes a position against much current scholarship (Lady Drower, R. Macuch, and to some extent K. Rudolph) in remaining skeptical about a pre-Christian Mandaism, in suggesting that the theory of a Western origin may be exaggerated because there is simply more Western evidence, and in arguing that the cult and ethics of the Mandaes are far more important than the mythology. He envisions an origin in the penetration of Western Gnostic mythology into indigenous Mesopotamian cultic practices, ethics, and mythology. It is important to have a position like this so clearly argued at a time when the hypothesis of a pre-Christian Western origin of Mandaism risks becoming a dogma of the history of religions.

George MacRae, S.J.


An excellent survey of patristic and early medieval philosophy, by one of the best scholars in the field, Cornelia J. de Vogel, professor at the University of Utrecht, Netherlands, already well known in this country by her three-volume Greek Philosophy. The material is divided over six chapters: Greek Christian thought from the second till the beginning of the sixth century, the Latin West from the second century till the fall of the Roman Empire, the Greek Orient from the sixth till the eighth century, the Areopagita in the West, the Latin West at the beginning of the Middle Ages, the West till Anselm of Canterbury. The author concludes her book with some reflections on the character of early Christian thought and adds a rather useful twelve-page bibliography.

This little book, primarily written not for the specialist but for a larger audience, would be very helpful as an accompanying text in a course on the subject. Most schools and authors are briefly characterized; to only a few is a more extensive essay devoted: Origen, Augustine, John Scot Eriugena, Boethius, and Anselm of Canterbury. The author has a thorough knowledge of the Greek background of early Christian thought, which develops either in continuity with (Justin) or opposition to (Tertullian) the great masters of Greek philosophy. She clearly draws the various lines of this development, so that her study does not merely confine itself to mentioning names and trends. She gives us a harmonious picture designed in a style that is lucid but not always elegant.

Bernard A. Nachbahr

The new series *Oxford Early Christian Texts* (general editor, Henry Chadwick) presents a critical text and English translation of Athanasius' earliest work, a bipartite single composition. Whether written before 323 (the more common opinion) or in 335/336 (as T. argues), it features already the tireless Athanasian theme: man could not have been redeemed from sin and death if Christ were not God as the Father is God. T.'s text "is the first edition of this complete double work, indicating in full the differences between the two recensions" (p. v). He insists that the work "circulated in two forms. The revised form was edited by theologians of an Apollinarian tendency, and gained the favour of the Alexandrian school of thought. . . . In Monophysite circles the altered texts eventually caused Athanasius to be acclaimed as an anti-Chalcedonian champion rather than the anti-Arian hero" (pp. xxvii–xxix).

The translation (of the long, authentically Athanasian recension only) reads easily. If often it sounds pedestrian, it is simply recapturing the original, where the moving force stems from the ideas rather than the rhetoric. The notes, consistently crisp, are helpful, though at times their brevity is a betrayal of the reality. One example: "The Alexandrian interpretation of man in God's image refers to man's rationality" (p. 7). Yes, but to much else besides: e.g., freedom, incorruptibility, sonship (cf. my *The Image of God in Man according to Cyril of Alexandria* [Washington, D.C., 1957] pp. 43–44, 101–4, 124–25). And the Athanasian "rationality" whereby man images the Logos is quite nuanced. To be *kat' eikona* is to be *kata Logon*; to be *kata Logon* is to be *logikos*; and to be *logikos* is to be not simply rational in an Aristotelian-Scholastic sense, but contemplator of the divine, seeing in the Word the Father of the Word: God is reflected in the pure soul as in a mirror. To be *logikos* is to be, in the coinage of Roger Leys, "Verbified." In this area the stimulating study of Régis Bernard, *L'Image de Dieu d'après saint Athanase* (Paris, 1952), is indispensable.

Text and translation, however, more than compensate for the inadequacies in annotation.

Walter J. Burghardt, S.J.


Provides diplomatic descriptions of the most important scientific manuscripts in the Ambrosiana. The manuscripts included date from the tenth to the eighteenth century and include not only Latin texts, but also Italian, Greek, Arabic, and other languages. The works concerned derive from many of the most significant figures in Western intellectual history and represent the whole range of classical, medieval, and Renaissance science. Of Scholastic authors the catalogue includes Adam of Buckfield, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Petrus de Alvernia, Simon of Faversham, Gerardus de Brolio, Antonius Andreae, Walter Burley, and Marsilius of Inghen. Especially well represented are Italian Aristotelians of the sixteenth century like Pomponazzi, Nifo, Achilini, Marcantonio Genua, Piccolomini, Vicomercati, Zabarella, in addition to texts and translations of Greek Aristotle commentators, such as Simplicius, Themistius, and Philoponus.

C. H. Lohr

*IOHANNES BLUND, TRACTATUS DE ANIMA*. Edited by D. A. Callus, O.P.,

Among the naturalists and medical writers who played an important part in the diffusion of the new philosophical and scientific ideas around the beginning of the thirteenth century many Englishmen stand out—Adelard of Bath, Daniel of Morley, Alfredus Anglicus. The present treatise on the soul by John Blund (ca. 1175–1248) is a most important witness to the introduction of Aristotelian teaching at Oxford. Blund’s early career is uncertain, but he probably studied at Paris, became master of arts ca. 1200, and was regent in arts at Oxford ca. 1200–1210. After completing his theological studies, he was regent at Paris for twelve years. From 1227 he was a clerk in the service of Henry III of England; in 1232 he was elected archbishop of Canterbury but never consecrated; from 1234 he was chancellor of York. No other works certainly by him are known.

The *Tractatus de anima* seems to date from the time of his regency in arts (1200–1204). It was apparently used by Alexander Nequam (1157–1217) in his *De naturis rerum* (1197–1204) and *Speculum speculationum* (1213). The work is based on Aristotle’s *De anima* and Avicenna’s *Liber VI de naturalibus*, although occasionally Algazel’s *Summa philosophiae* and other works of Aristotle (*Metaph., Phys., CMund., GCorr., Meteor., SSens., MRem.*) are also used. It treats of the existence and essence of the soul, the place of the doctrine on the soul in philosophy, the powers of the vegetative, sensitive, and rational soul, immortality, and the nature of the intellect and free will. The work reveals some knowledge of Nemesius’ *De natura hominis* (translated by Burgundio of Pisa ca. 1155) and Plato’s *Timaeus* in the translation of Calcidius (particularly in connection with the nature of light and the *anima mundi*). In certain places it retains traces of earlier Latin speculation, like that of Augustine regarding memory, of Augustine, Anselm, and Peter Lombard on free will, of William of Conches on the firmament and light. There is also a brief reference to the distinction of *ratio* and *intellectus*. But in general the work is one of a naturalist, and stands closer to Salernitan medicine and Gundissalinus’ *De anima* than to twelfth-century theological works on the soul, like William of St. Thierry’s *De natura corporis et animae* or the pseudo-Augustinian *De spiritu et anima*, with their emphasis on Trinitarian vestiges, liberation from sin, image and similitude, memory, intellect, and will, wisdom, charity, and the ascent of the mind to God. The work has been edited on the basis of the three known MSS., with an analysis of sources and introduction.

C. H. Lohr


On Dec. 29, 1340 the arts faculty of the University of Paris promulgated a famous statute condemning “certain Ockhamist errors.” The six articles concern principles for the interpretation of standard texts and prescribe nominalist deviations from authorized teaching by means of an untraditional understanding of *suppositio personalis* (in connection with the phrase *in virtute sermonis*) and of scientific knowledge (as being not of things but of mental terms only). The present work maintains, against Boehner and Moody, that this statute, although prepared during the rectorship of John Buridan—probably the most significant figure in the intel-
lectual history of the fourteenth century and himself a nominalist—iss directed, not at Nicholas of Autrecourt, but at Ockham himself and perhaps also at certain other contemporary Ockhamists in Paris.

P. sees both Ockham and Buridan as representing the appearance of a new understanding of reality which is directed to the res singulares that are the only true things. Against the old realist approach which saw realities reflected in the peculiarities of language, these authors saw language simply as a system of signs or labels, subordinated completely to the free will of the sign maker. Accordingly, suppositio simplex traditionally understood as signifying the res universales, like genera and species, was referred by Ockham to the mental terms and abandoned completely by Buridan, who included the mental term along with the vox under suppositio materialis. Suppositio personalis, traditionally taken to refer, unsignificatively, to the individual supposites under the universals, they understood as the standing of a term for its only significate, the res singularis. According to P., it was the new understanding of language involved in this conception of supposition that enabled Buridan to condemn Ockham, while maintaining his own intellectual stance. Whereas Ockham had tried to maintain the relation of word and thing, Buridan abandoned the relation of language and reality. In thus delinguifying the approach to the world, Buridan made possible the modern scientific and technological approach in which hypotheses can be freely formulated like the signs of nominalistically understood language. The book is a step on the way to a positive appreciation of the nominalist achievement, free of theologically interested criticisms, but is unnecessarily burdened with speculation.

C. H. Lohr


132 dated specimens to illustrate the development of Latin bookhands (i.e., to the exclusion of curial and chancery hands) in France, Germany, Italy, Britain, and Iberia from 1100 to 1500. The plates are lithographically reproduced in original size. On the facing page the manuscript is identified by library and shelf mark, and a brief note of its contents and pertinent bibliography are provided. Then, in connection with a transcription of the colophon and about twenty lines of text, T. gives a detailed paleographical analysis, describing characteristic strokes, ductus, abbreviations, ligatures, letter style, and scribal practice. These analyses, which are made in terms clearly understandable to scholars who are not professional paleographers, provide a method of dating and ascribing to country of origin manuscripts of the later Middle Ages and will be of great value to all who work in the history of philosophy and theology.

C. H. Lohr


Provides a census of Western manuscripts up to the year 1500 which are housed in public and private collections throughout Australia. Entries are made by state, town, and repository, each arranged alphabetically. The descriptions include dating, number of folios, measurements, scripts, illumination, binding, an analysis and identification of contents, and bibliography. In addition to the Bible, sermons, liturgical tracts, classical and patristic authors, many Scholastic works are represented. Twelfth-century authors include
Anselm, Bernard of Clairvaux (34), Hugh of St. Victor (258), Petrus Comestor (205), and Alan of Lille (22). Materials on the Bible include the Glossa ordinaria (205, 215) and Nicholas of Lyra (99, 115). Sentence commentaries include those of Bonaventure (34), Hugo of Strasbourg (34), Francisca de Mayronis (180), and an anonymous author (47). Aristotelian works include the translation of the Ethics by Leonardo Bruni (122), Aegidius Romanus' De regimine principum (202), and an anonymous commentary (65). Canon law is well represented (25, 106, 110, 112, 114, 119, 124, 125, 130, 230). Renaissance materials include Petrarch (14), Boccaccio (120, 246), and Bruni (107, 113).

C. H. Lohr


Volumes in this series are designed for undergraduate use. Their distinctive characteristic lies in their approach to historical study. This approach utilizes primary sources together with selections from modern authorities. Each volume centers around a precise historical problem and is generally edited by a scholar who has demonstrated competence and originality with regard to the problem at issue.

R. has already established himself as a specialist in medieval heresy and dissent. The original sources he has chosen for this volume span the eighth to the sixteenth centuries. In his introduction he argues that this period constitutes a distinct unity; for before the eighth century, heresy was primarily theological and its proponents mainly clerical; after the eighth century, heresy became more moral in tenor and more espoused by the laity. R. regards the concept of dissent as broader than that of heresy. While including heresy, dissent also has sociological and psychological dimensions. R. discovers six categories of medieval religious dissent which he describes as reformist, reactionary, dualistic, intellectual and doctrinal, eccentric, and peripheral.

With regard to the sources, there is some difficulty in determining what principle is at work in their organization. Greater unity might have been achieved had the sources been arranged more in accordance with the six categories of dissent. As the work stands, some parts correspond to several varieties of dissent, others are chronological, and still others are related to the development of doctrine and to the interaction of authority and dissent. The last part deals with the sociological and psychological dimensions of dissent. While R. regards medieval dissent as essentially religious rather than social or economic in origin, he does well to incorporate the views of those historians who have adopted an interpretation different from his own.

Both in the choice of sources and in the selections from modern historians R. has chosen wisely. The sources selected give a comprehensive view of the major individuals and movements associated with medieval dissent. The modern historical analyses reflect the works of leading European historians on the subject. The book, then, should well serve the purpose for which it was designed.

Louis B. Pascoe, S.J.


Modern scholarship has grown in-
creasingly aware of the need to study the Late Middle Ages in order to place the Reformation in proper perspective. While late-medieval research has made considerable progress, there has been a lack of translated source material relating to late-medieval Germany. To correct this situation, S. has now edited and translated a considerable number of sources reflective of the widespread discontent and unrest in Germany on the eve of the Reformation. The sources presented are concerned with political, social, economic, and cultural life in Germany in the Late Middle Ages. Theological sources have been omitted because of their availability elsewhere. The documents chosen reveal the tensions created in Germany by the decline of the Holy Roman Empire, the growth of nationalism and its consequent anti-Romanism, the rise of capitalism, urban unrest, the peasant rebellions, and the plight of the imperial knights.

In an introductory analysis of the sources, S. suggests that while many grievances were genuine, some were generated by an inability to perceive the forces of change operative in late-medieval Germany. Society was frequently unable to cope with the complexities and ambiguities created by rising capitalism, increased manufacturing, higher prices, and the advent of new urban and laboring classes. These developments, therefore, were regarded as disruptions of the established order. The cause of these disorders, moreover, was frequently attributed to the growing weakness and disorganization of the Holy Roman Empire. Social, political, and physical evils, furthermore, were interpreted as a sign of the approaching end of society, when Germany would be judged guilty of having abandoned traditional values. Germanic nostalgia for the Hohenstaufen era, pride in the Germanic heritage, as well as a sense of Germanic superiority were compensatory reactions to the unrest of the times. In such circumstances reform was generally conceived as a return to an ideal past which can be described as biblical, Germanic, and classical. This primitive order was characterized by unity, simplicity, innocence of mind, and purity of heart.

In addition to his introduction, S. has added a brief preface to each selection which places the document in proper historical perspective. Because of its excellent choice of representative sources, this work will be especially appreciated by professors and students of the Late Middle Ages and the Reformation.

Louis B. Pascoe, S.J.


A broad, brief, sincere statement of the spirit and tradition of the Reformed Church written for church elders, students, and those interested in the Reformed Church. At the outset, O. acknowledges that his treatment is not intended for those with formal training in theology. With such self-imposed limitations, one then expects to find generalization and simplification. The Reformed tradition, for O., is neither a system of theology or doctrine, nor any particular type of church government, nor belief in the "five points of Calvinism." These elements are important and have their place, but they do not constitute that tradition, nor do they reveal its heart. Rather, it is a "consciousness of being in God's presence with a call to live unto him. The consecration of life, personally and in its social relationships, is the Christian's mandate and privilege" (p. 168). O. comes to this conclusion by first looking at the historical fact of the Refor-
nation, then at the Reformed Church as re-formed, or renewed according to the Word of God. The chapter “In the Presence of God” is central to this study; the fact that the Christian is *semper coram Deo* becomes the dynamic by which he lives his life and which brings him into fellowship with God. The effects of this dynamic are then detailed in two ethical chapters, “The Life of the Christian” and “The Christian and the Social Order.” This book is altogether introductory; e.g., many doctrinal tenets of Calvinism are given too brief a treatment to be of any great help (cf. providence [p. 91] and predestination [p. 101]).

*Joseph Tylenda, S.J.*


M.’s edition, complete with detailed and scholarly introduction, commentary, notes, and index, of John Donne’s five Prebend Sermons is a welcome addition to George R. Potter’s and Evelyn M. Simpson’s ten-volume *Sermons of John Donne*, which the University of California published 1953–62. M., of the University of Chicago, singles out these late sermons because she concludes sensibly that all of them, composed and delivered at intervals of from three to nine months, are the best of all his one hundred and fifty known sermons. A prebend was an officially appointed preacher at St. Paul’s Cathedral; there were then “thirty regular Canons, or Prebendaries” at St. Paul’s. Donne had been appointed Dean there in 1621. For five years, until his death in 1631, he was Lancelot Andrews’ prestigious pulpit-successor. For all of his prebends, Donne was “at the height of his [preaching] powers.” In *corso-ricorso* movement, all are centered on the Psalms, 62–66 in Authorized (King James) versions. All are majestic, with intricate composition, imagery, and both scriptural and patristic erudition: so subtly and intricately are Latin quotations and theological allusions to St. Paul, St. Augustine, St. Bernard, and St. Robert Bellarmine employed that Newman’s Anglican sermons sound simple. Even a university congregation would find trouble in following them today; their tone is exuberant but scarcely conversational. Donne, for all his earlier ironies at the expense of the Roman, Tridentine, Jesuitical, and papal Church, was a family descendent of St. Thomas More and a nephew of Jasper Heywood, Fr. Parsons’ successor as Jesuit superior of the clandestine Catholic mission to England. By the time of his Prebend Sermons, the polemical tone in *Ignatius: His Conclave* (1611; first entitled *Conclave Ignati*) had much mellowed. Without bitter or scurrilous asides, Donne here makes a sophisticated, prayerful ascription to the Thirty-nine Articles of the Anglican Communion and to the English Book of Common Prayer. A few of M.’s own comments, usually full, are incomplete or simply wrong, but never so as to impair the value of her just, telling, and scholarly book.

*William T. Noon, S.J.*


Isaac Williams, contemporary and close friend of Newman during the early years of the Oxford Movement, is best remembered from the brief chapter devoted to him in R. W. Church’s *The Oxford Movement* (1891; republished 1970, with an excellent introduction, by the University of Chicago Press). Jones’s purpose is “to correct the impression, which derives ultimately from Dean Church’s famous
history of the Oxford Movement, that Isaac Williams was little more than a shy and retiring disciple of John Keble.”

While Williams was certainly no man’s lackey, neither was he a luminary of the Movement. He was a member of “the Bisley School,” a group whose ecclesiology was static and whose concern for ritual and church building was punctuated by genuine social concern for the poor, the orphaned, and the imprisoned. His break with Newman (in ideology, not in friendship) was typical of other young contemporaries who felt Newman had gone too far. His popularity is attested by the fact that his sermons and devotional commentaries on Scripture were frequently reprinted until the end of the century. He clearly was not a fundamentalist but his exegesis was neither as profound nor as liberal as Jones suggests. And his poetry, to judge by the abundant selections cited, was not memorable.

Jones provides a more detailed picture than Dean Church, but he does little to inspire the belief that Williams was anything more than a sincere, dedicated clergyman. Jones notwithstanding, Dean Church, a contemporary and fellow Anglican, has perhaps best summed up Williams: “his was not a mind which realized great possibilities of change in the inherited ways of the English Church.”

Philip C. Rule, S.J.


To offset the tendency of publishing houses to avoid strictly scholarly publications, St. Michael’s has inaugurated a monograph series for which H.’s work stands as an excellent beginning. Tightly packed, it is professedly a Master’s dissertation. However, it is indispensable for the Catholic historian of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century. H. studies the foundation of the Thomist academy in Perugia (1859), “the launching-pad of Italian neo-scholasticism,” and the establishment of an academy in Naples (1846). The influence of the Collegio Alberoni (Lazarist), the Spanish Dominicans (Gonzalez), and the Roman Jesuits (Taparelli, Liberatore, Kleutgen, Billot) is well developed. The study ends with the publication of the “twenty-four theses,” the basic principles of St. Thomas (real distinction between act and potency, etc.) promulgated by the Sacred Congregation of Studies in 1914. Particularly valuable are the running insights into the very influential manual tradition. H. is thoroughly fair to the often brilliant, logical minds behind the manuals but concludes that they suffered from a dry formalism, abuse of the argument from authority, scanty knowledge of modern philosophy, cerebral bias, the failure to emphasize the mystery of things, and above all else a lack of historical sense.

This study is not about the Modernist crisis. But it touches upon that period and implicitly bolsters what recent research (H. Schapker) suggests: that the crisis was due in part to the clash between the mind-set arising from the manual tradition of Neo-Thomism and a not fully assimilated Augustinian mystical-wisdom tradition. *Pascendi* (more evidence for its authorship by Joseph Lemius, O.M.I., is presented) was incapable of coming to grips with the insights of, e.g., Tyrrell, who claimed to stand in the Augustinian tradition. H. does not discuss this point but he does recall how Bonaventurean Franciscans were warned by Rome in 1898 of the great danger of departing from St. Thomas (as Italian Neo-Scholasticism presented him). H.’s thin volume is a bit weighed down
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with 301 footnotes, many of them cited fully in English in the text. However, it makes available many inaccessible sources and is a fine contribution to the history of Neo-Thomism.

John J. Heaney


Five lectures, best read backwards. J. B. Hirschmann's sketch of modern theological efforts to relate to the phenomenon of revolution and radical social change is easily the most readable and informative. F. Lentzen-Deis’s "Resurrection Experience and Easter Faith" is actually a discussion of W. Marxsen's conception of the resurrection, with which he disagrees only in detail. It brings nothing new, and suffers from a too narrow conception of the question. The remaining three essays deal in more or less abstract speculative fashion with the God-question. E. Kunz posits the basis for speaking of God in the thanksgiving recognition (of and to God) within the concrete human experience of love and goodness—whence the necessity of referring all meaningful speaking about God to the concrete situation(s) in which speaking with God occurred. H. Ogiermann's rarified philosophic-anthropological proof of God's existence reaffirms his final comment that "philosophical reflection brings only little light." K. Rahner displays his usual brilliance and almost poetic sensitivity in describing the structure and specific character of "the experience of God today." But he leaves the radical questions untouched and speaks only of a rationally reflected faith, thus situating God "as the self-concealed, asymptotic directedness of the experience of an unlimited dynamic of the knowing mind and of freedom" (p. 13). This experience today is characterized by God's radical transcendence, mediated in personal existence but eluding every human effort to establish a personal (I-thou) relationship; it is most radically realized in Jesus' relationship to the Father.

All five essays share a concern to ground the reality of faith in contemporary experience. But all so presuppose the conventional language of faith that in practice they broach questions of today's experience—whether revolution or the quest for relatedness to ultimate reality (God)—in categories and according to canons of classical theological commitments ill equipped to deal with today's reality.

Robert C. Ware


The four chapters of this book were written on different occasions but are gathered together here as all dealing with the neglect of the theology of creation in Continental Protestant theology during the past thirty years. The first chapter reviews W.'s publications since 1939, in which the first article of faith occupied a place of special importance, in contrast to most other European theologians. The second surveys various forms of theology since World War I, most of which based their ethical viewpoint on Jesus, to the neglect of God the Creator. W. traces this to the influence largely of Kierkegaard. He notes one exception during the 1930's, when some German theologians used the doctrine of creation and its orders to support National Socialism; this also contributed to its subsequent neglect. The third chapter looks at the situation in Scandinavia (W. is professor of theology at the University of Lund in Sweden). He wishes to point the way to a theology (based on the doctrine of creation) which will give a total description of
Christianity while avoiding the excessive assertiveness of the older dogmatics and the partial views of most monographs. The final brief chapter is an exhortation to return to the Christian doctrine of creation to meet contemporary problems.

This little book is more a survey of a small part of the theological scene than a theological work in itself. It is of interest to those who wish to understand better some of the movements and influences that have been operative in Protestant European theology in the last three or four decades, especially in Germany and Scandinavia. It gives scarcely any positive insight into the doctrine of creation and its consequences.

John H. Wright, S.J.


A book knowingly at odds with itself. As such, it is a symbol for the state of theology on the threshold of a new perspective. A plea for an empirical theology, it proceeds from an interpretation of Luther's historic controversy with Erasmus on the bondage of the will. Rejecting scriptural, churchly, and specialized religious experience as true sources of religious knowledge, S. suggests that the "web of life" itself (or, communion) is the locus of God's word. Biblical or other restricted sources of religious knowledge, when compared with life, are oppressive to conscience. Thus he can write of Luther: "in battling for the authority of the Bible he was battling primarily for the right to be Martin Luther." This interpretation of Luther is justifiable as one historical perspective, but the evidence does not demand we take this for L.'s own evaluation of his struggle. L. was a pious man, for whom Christian symbols were still meaningful.

Aside from the discussion of Luther, I found S. stimulating in what he affirms, wrongheaded in what (and whom) he denies. He correctly locates the boundary of the human and divine, in listening, in communion, in "rising" to sin, in cruciform opposites, and in suffering-thinking. But each of these has a long history, in Christian consciousness and tradition. On the Greeks, as a source of rationalism, S. is impossible. He has not met the Socrates who pleads ignorance and yet trusts, nor does he know the Plato who writes myths because dialectic alone cannot grasp the truth, and who ironically entitled his most important work not "The Philosopher," but "The Sophist." Finally, S.'s use of Michael Polanyi's theories of personal knowl­edge are prejudicial to the role of community in developing "tacit knowledge" (for a complementary use of Polanyi, see Avery Dulles, The Survival of Dogma [New York, 1971] chaps. 2 and 3). S.'s direction is correct, his aim falls short. I look forward to the develop­ment of his positive insights in future works.

Andrew Christiansen, S.J.


This volume of readings contains reprints of fourteen previously published articles and book chapters: five on "The Mystery of Sin," five on "The Mystery of Forgiveness," four on a "New Approach to Original Sin." On the whole, the selections are modern in terminology and doctrine, without contradicting what traditionalists might consider Christian truths, especially in the first two parts. On the notion of original sin, the four chapters seem to agree somewhat on considering that being born in original sin means being
born into a situation where sin and enticements to sin abound. Just how this fits the traditional notion that original sin is removed by baptism is not clear. Perhaps there should be more of a tie-in with the notion of covenant, as was done for actual sin by the articles in the first part by Paul Tremblay and Kevin O'Shea, C.SS.R. In the first part, Robert O'Connell, S.J., reminds modern young people that they should not reject a notion just because someone else thought of it first. They should be able to adapt any truths to their own personal conscience. Bruce Vawter, C.M., is good on describing sin as found in the Bible and in distinguishing real sin from legal impurity. Tremblay suggests that a negative statement of morality or commandment can and often does indicate greater freedom allowed than would an affirmative command. O'Shea's attempt to describe a "serious sin" as somewhere between mortal and venial sin could perhaps fit an older distinction between a more serious and less serious venial sin, or describe a sin that is mortal in matter but done without full choice. In general, this volume offers little that is new or extraordinary, but does constitute a handy collection of readings for a college course on "Sin and Forgiveness."

Joseph J. Farraher, S.J.


*God in America* is at once more and less than a historical survey of ten years of Protestant theology in the U.S. (Individual Catholic theologians are mentioned in passing once or twice but never really drawn into the discussion.) It is more in that B., with all the acumen of his own existentialist systematic theology, enters into critical dialogue with the theologians he surveys. But his personal preoccupation with existential-ontological relevance and/or presuppositions and lacunae in this one respect are too narrow a focus for this type of study. Instead of situating, and evaluating, American theologies in terms first of their own context and how they function within it, B. consistently measures their importance on the extent to which they approach his own ontological dialectic of being and meaning (Sinn und Sein).

His primary interest is decidedly in philosophical and systematic theology. The prime discussants are J. Macquarrie (existential ontology) and S. Ogden ("new," Whiteheadian metaphysics). P. Van Buren runs a weak third with his attempt to make statements of dogmatic content toward a truly secular form of Christianity. This B. judges preferable to the "new questers" (J. M. Robinson, R. Funk, N. Perrin), who get bogged down in hermeneutical prolegomena. He has little use for the radical death-of-God people—Altizer he calls a "fanatical gnostic." More positive is his evaluation of C. Michelson's "worldly theology" as history. He describes in detail the developments in Christian ethics (J. Gustafson, J. Fletcher, P. Lehmann, H. R. Niebuhr) but is most sceptical of the very possibility of ethics on the basis of sociological evidence (G. Winter, H. Cox, M. Stackhouse). Ever again the ontological criticism is decisive for his evaluation.

Invariably B. begins his presentation insisting on the importance and representative character of a particular theologian, after which he amasses such a devastating critique that it becomes difficult to take the man's thought seriously any longer, or even to integrate positive contributions into some larger perspective. One misses constructive suggestions, and comes away feeling that American theology would be better off and on a more solid footing if only it would adopt the Bur-
ian ontology. Nevertheless, the final chapter, devoted to his own position, is not convincing, least of all in his repeated insistence on faith and the self-understanding of faith as "the-knowledge-of-being-called-to-being-in- unconditional-responsibility."

Notwithstanding the one-sidedness of B.'s critique, this is a valuable, perspicacious survey of the past decade of American theology. It does raise serious questions and in many respects presents a profound challenge to American theologians to renew the creative dynamism which characterized a new generation and "a new era in theology."

Robert C. Ware


The romantic movement in Germany at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century occasioned an unprecedented outpouring of creative works in literature, music, philosophy, and theology. In theology this meant a breaking away from the arid moral rationalism of the Enlightenment period and a new interest in Christianity as a historical religion. The deistic concept of God as the absentee landlord of the universe was replaced by the more dynamic understanding of God as the immanent principle of the historical process. J. B. Hirscher, a member of the celebrated Tübingen school of Roman Catholic theology at that time, sought to give new expression to the two central dogmas of Christianity, Trinity and Incarnation, within the philosophical framework provided by the Religions-philosophie of the German idealists, notably Schelling and Hegel. His interests were pastoral rather than speculative; hence his synthesis of Christian dogma has been sharply criticized by subsequent theologians as inexact or even heretical. F. seeks to exonerate Hirscher of these charges by making clear the historical background for his thought: the predominance of a basically deistic concept of God in the catechetical works of the day. In Part 2, F. sketches the dynamic Trinitarian concept of God which Hirscher employs in his writings on pastoral and moral theology. Further analysis of Hirscher's understanding of salvation history is given in Part 3, with special emphasis on the delicate interrelation of nature and grace. F. outlines in Part 4 the relevance of Hirscher’s Trinitarian theology for the contemporary scene. Throughout F. compares Hirscher with Karl Rahner in this century. Both men sought to achieve a new synthesis of nature and grace for their contemporaries.

Joseph A. Bracken, S.J.


In this reprint of a text first published by Duquesne University Press in 1968, B. discusses a difficult and decisive philosophical issue: what is philosophy? He approaches it from a carefully chosen, fundamental perspective: "an attempt to systematically re-think philosophy out of its original beginning and most fundamental perspective: the primordial phenomenon of wonder" (p. vii). The main context for B.’s development of this viewpoint is the existential thought of Heidegger and Marcel. He connects the experience of wonder with existentialism by arguing that "the primordial question of Being and the act of wonder constitute one and the same reality" (p. 27).
B. proceeds to describe those essential qualities of authentic philosophizing which manifest themselves within the all-encompassing question of Being. The three fundamental disciplines guiding the philosophical process are ontology, phenomenology, and dialectics. B. points out the similarities and differences between the scientific method of reasoning and the authentic method of philosophy, which for him is the source in which all other modes of thinking are grounded. This mode of philosophizing is then elucidated in its application to the esthetic and ethical dimensions of Being.

One central remark I would make. B. recognizes that the identification of the experience of wonder with the primordial question of Being is not self-evident and that "the passage... to the primordial situation still involves a leap" (p. 31). Granted that wonder is an authentic aspect of philosophy; the claim that wonder is only authentically manifested within the context of existential thinking seems a bit exaggerated. Indeed, B.'s extensive use of technical terms and his oversimplified reduction of other philosophies to absurdity tend to dissipate the sense of wonder which should permeate every philosophical reflection.

_Thomas V. Curley_


On April 23–24, 1970, McCormick Theological Seminary in Chicago sponsored a Consultation on the Future of Philosophical Theology, to which twenty-six theologians and philosophers, Protestant and Roman Catholic, were invited. Four programmatic essays were presented on separate occasions by Schubert Ogden (Univ. of Chicago Divinity School), David Burrell (Notre Dame), Van Harvey (Pennsylvania Univ.), and Heinrich Ott (Basel Univ., Switzerland). After each essay was delivered, the consultants met to criticize and discuss the position advanced by the author and thus hopefully to come to some consensus about the nature of philosophical theology and its proper contribution to the theological enterprise as a whole.

The present volume contains an introductory essay by Robert Evans (McCormick), organizer of the Consultation, the four essays, and a succinct summary of the subsequent discussion by Donald Mathers (Queen's College, Kingston, Ontario), one of the consultants. Evans advanced the thesis that philosophical theology "must be involved with a change in consciousness that does in fact alter one's life-style" (p. 23). This conviction that philosophical theology must be effective for Christian life and worship was evident in all the papers presented and in the subsequent discussion. There was not, however, general agreement about the way this goal is to be achieved. Some consultants, headed by Ogden, argued that the task of the philosophical theologian should be to present a systematic explanation of the faith in terms of some underlying philosophical model or thought-system (e.g., Aquinas, Whitehead, etc.). Others followed the hypothesis of Burrell that the era of philosophical and theological "systems" is over and that the philosophical theologian must play the role of the critic of contemporary theological language, religious practices, etc. in order to bring the ordinary Christian to a deeper understanding of his personal religious experience. This division between the consultants over the analytic vs. the constructive role of philosophical theology was not settled, but it succeeded as least in making clear the main lines of dis-
agreement as a basis for further discussion.

Joseph A. Bracken, S.J.

**FAITH AND PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY.**


Two basic theses link the thirteen essays in this collection. The first is that the criteria for meaning in religious language and concepts can be found only in religious discourse itself; the second is that philosophy and theology can deal with the problem of the meaning of religious language only if those disciplines are willing to examine the religious contexts from which such discourse actually derives its meaning. These theses are given positive development in the first six essays and are then employed, in the later essays, in a critical discussion of certain contemporary writings in the philosophy of religion and in an exploration of the issues of religious truth, the relation of moral judgment to religious assent, the Christian concept of love, and the relation between philosophy and faith. P.’s development of these theses seems one-sided: while it offers a corrective to a philosophical or theological position which would make the justification of religious language and beliefs stand or fall on grounds which are not religious, it does not offer a satisfactory explanation of how religious beliefs and language are to be justified on their own grounds.

Philip J. Rossi, S.J.


From the title, one expects S. to use his vast knowledge of the NT to suggest new forms for religious life in response to its current crisis. However, his unstated purpose seems to be to defend the traditional structural patterns by an outmoded harmonization of the different theologies of Paul and John. If he had employed the almost universally accepted tools of current biblical criticism, he could have drawn on Paul’s understanding of Christianity as freedom and the Apostle’s Corinthian experience to lead his audience of major superiors to new possibilities, consistent with early Christianity and yet appropriate for our age. He could have shown that the traditional structures, especially religious obedience, owe more to Ignatius of Antioch and later feudal forms than to any strata of the NT. After all, the exhortation to Christians to imitate Christ’s obedience to the Father by unilateral obedience to the bishop appears first, in extant writings, in Ignatius. Yet, only on the last four pages does S. acknowledge that the NT records no obedience to a human superior, but even then he presumes that Jesus’ obedience provides a fitting starting point for religious obedience. The studies of such diverse scholars as McKenzie, Käsemann, or even Alois Müller counsel a more critical approach.

Similarly, when discussing the charism of religious chastity, S. does not refer to Quesnell’s 1968 *CBQ* analysis of Mt 19:11, where Q. shows, I believe conclusively, that Jesus was speaking in this pericope not about virginal chastity but about fidelity in Christian marriage. And this is the traditional scriptural proof text for celibacy. If S. had come to terms with such break-throughs and then discussed religious chastity, all religious would have been really indebted to him.

- Finally, although S. eschews such phrases as “a higher calling,” there are evidences of triumphalism as he appropriates the best in Christian life without attempting to prove that re-
ligious life existentially deserves such accolades today in the face of deepening lay spirituality and the growing awareness of the nonsacral nature of the Christ-event.

Joan V. O'Brien


Marx may not have been the first to say it, but he said it well: religion is not simply a matter for the individual. The observation is not as self-evident as might at first seem, and Z. suggests, in his collection of lectures delivered in Delhi in 1969, that a significant distinction in the mysticism of Aurobindo and Teilhard is that it is concerned not only with individual salvation or “liberation” but also with the collective salvation of mankind.

Z. notes in passing the interest of both these mystics in Marxian socialism and their hope that the unity in diversity which the mystic finds in himself would be reflected in a free society in which, as Marx had prophesied, “the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.” Aurobindo and Teilhard, however, have more in common than a perceptive understanding of Marx. As representatives of Hindu and Christian schools of spirituality, each in his separate tradition produced his most significant works during and after World War I, and both shared the repeated personal experience of cosmic consciousness and a profound and enthusiastic belief in evolution, the goal which they saw to be the divinization of man.

As a Christian, Z.'s work encourages us to believe that it is not only possible but essential to theologize confessionally. His scholarship and sincerity as a believer prevent him from falling into the pseudo-ecumenical error of holding that all mysticism is alike, but rather enable us to share the purer vision of two men and two distinct traditions both of which indicate, in separate ways, a passionate fervor in extricating egoism (the “I”) from the religious experience so that the immortal “self” can live.

Doris K. Donnelly


This volume follows Engagement and Marriage (1959) and Sex and the Church (1961) in the Marriage and Family Research Series arranged by the Family Life Committee, Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod. Its purpose “is to help families identify, clarify and evaluate the many contributions to family structures, roles and relationships and use them constructively.” It is hoped that the book will help counselors, pastors, and educators in the service of families, congregations, and communities. It is admirably constructed. Three interacting factors relate to the family: the historical-cultural, the sociological-psychological-technological, and the ethical-theological. The first chapter poses ten questions relevant to these factors. The following eight chapters offer the results of research into these factors. In the last chapter the research results are gathered together as answers to the questions. Each chapter has a detailed summary and copious notes. The material is not new but is put together well.

Especially interesting to me were the two chapters on socioeconomic-technological changes and the changing patterns of roles and responsibilities within the home which the behavioral sciences have described. Some space in the NT and theological studies is devoted to the superordination-subordination sta-
tus of husband and wife. This concept has been in the Catholic and Protestant teaching and is vigorously preached even today. The writers here try to soften this teaching. But cannot it frankly be looked at as something culturally conditioned which the sacred writers simply accepted without prescribing as they sought to integrate marriage and the family into the mystery of salvation? I hoped to find also a realistic research study about the quality and effect of the religious experience in the family; but despite this omission, I share the over-all optimism of the book about what the Christian family can become and do.

Robert H. Dailey, S.J.


A broad survey of 137 hardware, biological, and social innovations. Ideas are presented in brief essays organized by areas such as power, chemistry, transport, communications, food, bioengineering, human ecology, economic reforms, etc. G.'s underlying assumptions are: (1) a serious mismatch exists between advanced technology and social institutions; (2) we must curb compulsiveness to technological innovation only, and direct innovation toward the quality of life; (3) we must stop the race to overcrowding, armaments, and growth addiction and create a turning point in quantitative growth or face devastating consequences. Throughout he expresses his viewpoints on the probability and desirability of the innovations described.

G. offers breadth but not depth. Occasionally some technical background knowledge is presumed. His technical knowledge and basic assumptions cannot be faulted, but unfortunately he demonstrates a Western, white intellectual elitism. He shows, e.g., no real understanding of the Movement, the purpose and direction of Black Power in the United States, nor the deeper needs of the Third World nations. The reader will find useful ideas and information but no important advances in (1) proposing radical imaginative alternatives for the future or (2) defining a new image of the future needed to provide the motive power to help mankind deal with its problems. Essentially the book is in the tradition of Western thinkers such as Kenneth Boulding and Robert Heilbroner (though he does not capture their depth or sweep of history), Olaf Helmer, Herman Kahn, and Anthony Weiner. He does not excite the imagination in the way Schillebeeckx, Teilhard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, or even Peter Drucker can.

In final analysis, an informative book for someone who wants a broad look at some of the important innovations of our age and some of the important problems an advanced technological society must cope with. It may motivate some creative people to exercise their inventive powers along the lines G. suggests, but it stops far short of providing any catharsis of the imagination needed to invent truly creative and humane alternatives for the future.

Robert F. Bundy
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[All books received are listed here whether they are reviewed or not]

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#### STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND CIRCULATION

<table>
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<th>Value</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Name of the publication: Theological Studies</td>
<td>Baltimore, Maryland 21202</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Location of known office of publication: 428 East Preston Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202</td>
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<td>3. Location of the principal office of the publisher: 428 East Preston Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202</td>
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<td>4. Location of the headquarters of the publisher: 428 East Preston Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202</td>
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<td>5. Dollar volume of sales of the various classes of publications sold during the 12 months period ending June 30, 19**</td>
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<td>6. Petition of circulation by publication, by classes of publications sold, in the 12 months period ending June 30, 19**</td>
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<td>7. Petition of circulation by publication, by classes of publications sold, in the 12 months period ending June 30, 19**</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Extent and nature of circulation</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Total no. of copies printed in this issue, and the preceding 11 issues</td>
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<td>10. Total no. of copies printed in the preceding 12 months</td>
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**Petition of circulation by publication, by classes of publications sold, in the 12 months period ending June 30, 19**

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