
Dulles' aim is "simply to tell the story of the various ways in which thoughtful Christians, in different ages and cultures, have striven to 'give a reason for the hope that was in them' (cf. 1 Pet 3, 15)." His format follows six major chronological periods (NT, patristic, medieval, 16-18th centuries, 19th, 20th). He focuses on the main figures in these periods whose general aim was to make Christianity credible in the face of political persecution, or out of zeal for making converts, or to save Christian culture from surrounding indifference and scepticism, or, finally, to confront honestly the disbelief that lies at the heart of all belief. D.'s exposition and analysis are always clear, judicious, and kind; his summarizations avoid becoming capsule comments, even though a reader might want a more extended treatment of this or that author. Some might miss Przywara or Guardini or an apologetic gem like de Lubac's Drama of Atheist Humanism, but D. offers variety and depth. He seems to have his own favorites (Anselm, Thomas, Pascal, de Broglie) and the reader is brought into fascinating contact with less familiar apologists (Abu Qurrah, the Catalans, especially Raymond Martini and Raymond Sabundus). A helpful bibliography of classical apologetical works and of works on apologetics is included, as are notes and indices. The publication is handsome—though Bossuet (p. 128) gets to live 117 years.

The history D. recounts has its major trends and recurring polarities. The shift from intrinsic to extrinsic credibility is well marked. The alternating primacy of faith and reason throughout this history supports D.'s claim that "a careful reading of the old masters in the field reveals that the same basic problems continually recur and that it is almost impossible to say anything substantially new." He seems to have chosen not to classify his apologettes according to where they fall on some fixed scale running from scepticism to rationalism to fideism; this is probably closer to the truth, despite the vast amount of authors treated. One noteworthy trend is seen in twentieth-century apologettes (e.g., Bultmann) who seem to abandon the attempt to find correspondences between a self-standing gospel and man's interior humanistic needs, making instead the gospel to be a paradigmatic parallel version of man's constant effort to live in the world. Thus, importance is given not to whether it is credible that Jesus rose from the dead, but to whether my own existential situation is credibly optimistic. It seems that the old apologettes had the worthier question.

D. has difficulty in staying within the limits he imposes on himself in
this book. It is hard to present authors without communicating one’s own
time of apologetics, and D.’s own views seep through in appetizing
ways. He tells us that apologetics stands or falls with the question of
method. His present work is an excellent panorama of the apologetical
quest and, it is hoped, a prelude to his own synthesis of the question.

St. Peter’s College, N.J. \hspace{1cm} GEORGE C. McCauley, S.J.

CHRISTENDOM DIVIDED. By Hans J. Hillerbrand. New York: Corpus,

In his preface to Christendom Divided, H. notes that some justification
is needed for yet another history of the Protestant Reformation when such
histories are “almost as numerous as pebbles on a beach.” He justifies his
own contribution to an already vast (and largely repetitive) literature by
the twofold consideration that this will probably be the first history of the
Reformation written by a Protestant under Catholic auspices and that he
will present his own perspective on the events of the sixteenth century.

His great erudition, his awareness of the complexity of those events too
easily gathered under the one rubric of “the Reformation,” and his deter­
ned objectivity might provide further justification for this work. The
book is detailed but, because it is so carefully mapped out, never over­
whelmingly detailed. H. is, for his own stated reasons, relatively brief in
his treatment of Luther’s and Calvin’s theologies, but he is especially good
in sorting out the various strands which make up the “radical” or “left­
wing” reformation. (In a time of theological upheaval, his brief treatment
of the genesis and ambiguity of sixteenth-century anti-Trinitarianism is
both satisfying and suggestive of how theology can take odd and unex­
pected turns.) He devotes one brief but very fair chapter to the Catholic
reaction to the Reformation.

By far the largest part of the book is devoted to the “political” refor­
mation, which H. insistently distinguishes from the “religious” and “theolog­
cal” reformations with which the political soon became entwined. With­
out cynically denying all and every religious motivation to the secular
authorities who became involved in the division of the churches, he
stresses repeatedly that the success of the Reformation and its impact on
Western society depended on its adoption by ruling authorities whose
religious motivation was usually (and at best) secondary. This “success”
of the Reformation is, moreover, something like the success of an “acci­
dent.” For H., the Reformation begins not with a “tower experience” nor
with the indulgence controversy, but after 1521. Until that time the theo­
logical events in which Luther was involved were academic controversies,
possibly a matter of ecclesiastical politics or, as Leo X said (and H. con-
curs), "monkish squabbles." That the events between 1517 and 1521 led to a break with Rome which no one really intended is to be explained by the intense religious feeling which Luther precipitated and focused, by Rome's inability to give Luther a serious hearing, and always by the decision of secular authorities to intervene in religious affairs. Within this perspective Charles V and not Luther becomes the really central figure at the Diet of Worms.

It is impossible to deny that H. has the facts on his side. As he notes repeatedly, the people and even the rulers of Europe were perhaps moved by Luther's fervor but hardly taken up with the niceties of theological debate. This same perspective, however, limits the value of his work as a "theological resource." What is not evident in H.'s book is the passion with which theologians of the sixteenth century sought to write their "chapter in the ongoing quest for the message and the faith of the New Testament" (p. 306). Those efforts are of permanent significance even for the contemporary Church. In choosing to concentrate on the importance of the political reformation, H. succeeds in correcting theologians' somewhat narrow (and perhaps self-conscious) accounts of "what really happened," but the greatness of the Reformation as a "theological event" and tragedy seems unduly diminished.

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JOHN W. HEALEY, S.J.


Seventy-five years ago Gustav Krüger published his Was heisst und zu welchem Ende studiert man Dogmengeschichte? and P.'s study is a current, balanced, and informed search to state what the history of dogma is and why one studies it. P. prefers to use the term "history of Christian doctrine" rather than "history of dogma." By doctrine P. means "what the Church believes, teaches and confesses on the basis of the word of God" (p. 95). The major problem he discusses is doctrinal change, and it is the importance of appreciating the complexity of this problem for theology which makes historical theology worth studying. P. is quite clear about how one should do historical theology: the historical theologian is to study the history of doctrine and not analyze its theological or methodological assumptions. On this point he acknowledges his debt to Harnack. In fact, he admits that this volume could be called a long essay on Harnack. However, it is P.'s purpose to examine the theological and methodological assumptions of historical theology, while tracing the development of this discipline from its origins to the present day.
In the Introduction P. defines historical theology as the genetic study of Christian faith and doctrine. He immediately senses the problem of this discipline, since the historical deals with what is in flux, the realm of becoming, and theology appears to treat of the unchanging truth, of being itself. This problem is underscored with apt quotations from Möhler and Elert. P. then discusses the meaning of the five terms used to describe this discipline: historical theology, history of dogma, history of theology, history of Christian thought, and history of doctrine.

The first chapter studies the problem which doctrinal change causes for Christian orthodoxy. P. treats the Vincentian canon and Abelard's *Sic et Non* as examples of how Christian orthodoxy could admit growth but not change. As examples of change P. cites Eucharistic doctrine from Irenaeus to Trent, the admission of the validity of heretical baptism, and the condemnation of Origen. The chapter closes with a brief appreciation of St. Thomas' theological method, which was an advance over the Vincentian and Abelardian method but sought only to find new words to express the ancient faith about God.

In the second chapter P. traces the evolution of the historical as a way of understanding man and his world. P. shows how the category of the historical has itself developed and changed from Blondus and Valla through Gibbon and Münzscher to Baur, Newman, and Harnack.

The third chapter outlines the present task of the history of doctrine. P. sees much work to be done to adjust the overemphasis on Hellenization of doctrine and to incorporate into works of historical theology the immense body of Syriac doctrinal, exegetical, and devotional material. He sees this as helping ecumenism, since it would aid in showing that no one denomination is in possession of the pure and unchanging doctrine while the distinctive teachings of all others have been shaped by history. Rather it would point up that there are dimensions of the tradition that every denomination has neglected. P. envisions a rather broad scope and varied subject matter as proper to the history of doctrine. Besides dogmatic decrees and promulgations, the subject matter of historical theology would extend to preaching, instruction, exegesis, liturgy, and spirituality. Yet P. admits that the present state of the source material does not permit a fully satisfying account of the history of doctrine taken in the sense of what the Church believes, teaches, and confesses on the basis of the word of God. For this reason he praises Principe's work on the medieval understanding of the hypostatic union and Landgraf's volumes which deal with the same period and provide new material on the doctrine of grace and the sacraments.

In the fourth chapter P. delineates some of the problems which beset the historiography of doctrine. Some of these, of course, are inherent in the task of writing history, but they are compounded by the subject
matter and the cultural heterogeneity found in the expression of Christian doctrine. P. shows how the dialectical and dogmatic methods continue to the present day and how Ritschl's history of individual doctrines is continued in the Lund school by Nygren and Aulén. He believes that what historical theology must do is begin with the Church's professed dogma and, employing the historical method, show how this doctrine was present in what the piety and the liturgy of the Church were believing and in what the exegesis, proclamation, and instruction of the Church were teaching. To do this properly, historical theology must be attentive to the cultural and religious context of the doctrine. P. then proceeds to examine the problem of periodization in historical theology and offers five major divisions for the field based on the notion of cultural context.

P.'s last chapter treats of historical theology as a theological discipline in relation to biblical studies, Church history, and dogmatics. He sees historical theology as asking where and how, if at all, this discipline locates the continuity of what the Church has believed, taught, and confessed. "The question of truth and the question of continuity are, to be sure, not identical; but for a truly Catholic understanding of the history of Christian doctrine they are finally inseparable" (p. 155). P. concludes his study with this observation: "There is an ecumenicity in time as well as an ecumenicity in space, and this calls for a doctrine of the unity of the Church that will take up into itself both the fact of theological variety and the fact of doctrinal change. Historical theology does not have the vocation of producing such a doctrine, but it does raise the issues to which it must be addressed" (p. 161).

P. has produced a major work on the current state of the question concerning historical theology. With depth of learning and breadth of vision, he has explained the genesis of this discipline and its present task for the theological enterprise. It is a most useful and balanced contribution to the whole field of theology. If P. would care to revise the work, perhaps some treatment of the writings of Bernard Lonergan on theological method, Christology, and the Trinity would prove useful. One would also hope to see a judgment on the contribution of Petavius and the Bollandists to the genesis of historical theology, and the current contributions to the field by men of the caliber of Thils and Congar.

Woodstock College, N.Y.C. Herbert J. Ryan, S.J.
problems Pannenberg treats are such as would occur to a philosopher, so that this work is indeed fundamental or "basic." His purpose seems to be to provide a philosophically valid way of speaking about the universality and ultimacy of the revelation made through a unique historical event, the life of Jesus of Nazareth. He is therefore required to answer hermeneutical questions about the possibility of knowing and valuating past events in a way that is not purely subjective, relative, or "kerygmatic-confessional." This he can do only by introducing the question of universal history and a systematic theology which speaks about the whole of reality. Perhaps one lesson which P. teaches indirectly is that philosophical theology precedes biblical theology.

The first short essay, "The Crisis of the Scripture Principle," introduces most of the issues raised in the book and sometimes intimates the way to their solution. Three long essays elaborate and defend the main theses: "Redemptive Event and History," "Hermeneutic and Universal History," and "On Historical and Theological Hermeneutic." The last two essays, on dogmatic statements and analogy, lie somewhat to the side of P.'s main concern, though they are consistent with it, and add a number of insights which may particularly interest Catholic theologians.

P. reacts strongly against the kerygmatic theology of Barth and especially Bultmann. It will not do to separate fact from meaning, to despair of the historical Jesus and fasten on to the interpretation of Jesus supplied by the believing followers. If this is done, P. thinks, the game is up and Christianity sinks into mere enthusiasm. Nor is the biblical text an ultimate norm; rather one must go to the actual realities behind the text, to which the text witnesses fitfully and imperfectly. Nor is there a special "salvation history" different from the history studied, and perchance eroded away, by the scientific historian. If the meaning of Jesus is not contained in the thin and skimpy fact, it is contained nowhere. Dualism is forbidden. Next P. argues (also against Bultmann) that the intrinsic significance of Jesus Himself is inseparable from the historical and cultural context of the OT, especially late Jewish apocalypticism. Following Schweitzer (and in line with the terrible Martin Werner), P. reads Jesus' central message as apocalyptic. But far from finding in this a source of embarrassment, as other theologians do, he sees in apocalypticism precisely the clue to the ultimacy and universality of Christ.

It is the "basically apocalyptic characteristic of the ministry and destiny of Jesus that, by means of its anticipatory structure, can become the key to solving a fundamental question" of post-Hegelian philosophy of history (p. 181). It had been shown earlier (see below) that, contrary to Gadamer, some theory of universal history is necessary in order to ground historical knowledge. But the closed Hegelian theory and the positivistic
theory of strict cause-effect are insufficient, as these cannot allow for unique contingent events. History must be seen, rather, as promise-fulfillment. Universal history must be unified from the future backwards, i.e., what will happen gives meaning to what has happened, not vice versa. Thus Jesus' eschatological message, that the reign of God "does not remain a distant beyond, but rather becomes a power determining the present" (p. 178), is what makes his career "unsurpassable," since it answers the most pressing philosophical questions about history—and truth, says P., is essentially history, and "history is reality in its totality" (pp. 131, 21).

A theory of universal history was necessary in the first place because a unique historical event, such as the life of Jesus (or any other), could not be understood without it. Granting (and insisting upon) the possible incommensurability of a past historical context with that of its present interpreter, P. rejects both existentialist (Bultmannian) theories which can extract from the past only what concerns the life situation of the interpreter and typological theories which can see in past events only those universal patterns which are already familiar. He adopts Gadamer's theory of the fused horizons of text and interpreter, but pushes onward toward a total view of universal history laid out on a comprehensive horizon provided by the inclusion of the future, for "only in that way are the past and the present preserved in their historical uniqueness" (p. 129).

However encouraged one might feel by P.'s critique of Bultmann's "leap of faith" theology, his argument rests at least partially on a debatable philosophical position: that meaning inheres irreducibly in fact. It can be urged that a fact or event acquires "meaning" only when an interpreter or knower is introduced. At most, a fact can be said to ground meaning—but there may be more than one of these, perhaps as many as you wish. Even in the case of intelligently designed facts, such as a work of art or the life of a man, is it often the case that the author's intended meanings exhaust or coincide with the meanings which a sensitive critic or biographer can discover? A work of art may "contain" much more than its author intends. And this, strange to say, almost seems to be in keeping with another idea of P.'s, namely, that the present and past exist fully only when conjoined in some manner with the future. Thus our interpretations of the life of Jesus might actually contribute to, or help determine, what the "bare fact" of the life of Jesus "means." We require, therefore, that P. be more convincing on this crucial point before we surrender ourselves to his impressive construction.

Pine Mountain Valley, Ga.

Anselm Atkins

I enjoyed reading this insightful, well-written, and peaceful book dealing with the question of truth in the Church. Written prior to the controversy between Küng and Rahner, it covers the same ground but relies more than the European theologians on the actual experience of Catholics in the Church today. Dulles takes seriously and adopts as his starting point the change of spiritual perspective which to him is so evident in the Christian community.

Central to the entire book is the first essay, in which D. distinguishes between various "forms of faith." Since in different ages Christians have different problems and understand life in different concepts, God's gift of Himself in Jesus Christ is seen by them from different angles. Throughout history the gospel has assumed different forms. The change from one form to another is not a gradual process of logical or psychological derivation; it is more of a quantum leap created by new religious experience in the Church. D. applies this general principle, illustrated from past history, to account for the change taking place in the Church today. We are passing from one form of faith to another.

One form of faith, derived mainly from Scholasticism, is the acknowledgment of divine truths. This form, stressed in the Counter Reformation and intensified by the rationalism of modern times, came to a climax at Vatican I. Today, D. holds, the form of faith has changed for a vast number of Catholics. Faith has come to mean conviction, commitment, and trust. Christian revelation makes known the transcendent reality by which men are alive. It enables men to discover their own depth and be in touch with the ground on which they stand. This is personal conviction. But since this transcendent reality is present in all men and in fact moving all of them towards a glorious destiny, faith implies commitment to the brethren and hope in an as yet unfinished future. The new form of faith, then, is initiation into the power, meaning, and purpose of human life.

If the form of faith changes, D. holds, the entire Christian tradition is in need of being reinterpreted. The very idea of truth changes. D. applies this, e.g., to the topic of apologetics. Apologetics can no longer mean the construction of a rational foundation for a divinely revealed faith; it must become a logic of discovery by which men are enabled to discern, in their own experience and in history, the divine presence revealed in Jesus Christ.

While The Survival of Dogma is a collection of articles and lectures written independently of one another, they are closely held together by a common systematic understanding. The only regret the reader may have is that some aspects of this systematic view, in particular the chang-
ing concept of truth, do not get the attention they deserve. Because of this inattention, there are occasionally slight contradictions in the way D. speaks of truth in the Church.

D. takes a firm stand on an important controverted issue in Catholic theology. He strongly affirms the historicity of truth. It is impossible, according to D., to define the essence of the gospel apart from its history. It is impossible to construct a set of truths, divinely revealed, that remain true throughout history and find different applications in the various ages of the Church. D. goes back to the first clear, nuanced, and yet powerful formulation of this view by Henri Bouillard, prior to the condemnation of la nouvelle théologie, and shows that this view has since been adopted by a large number of Catholic theologians. The passage from one form of faith to another is not produced by theologians who extract the essence of the gospel from one of its historical embodiments and then, after possessing it in a pure, ahistorical form, cast it into new terms and concepts proper to their age. The passage to a new form of faith takes place in life, through new Christian experience and new Christian reflection. Since the present reviewer agrees with this position, he finds himself in great sympathy with the entire book.

Despite this strong position, D. has written a peaceful book. The presence of various forms of faith in the Church does not produce chaos. The Church, he holds, is already adjusting her view of authority to the new situation. It is being recognized today that the various authorities in the Church—Scripture, councils, popes, bishops, theologians, etc.—are ministerial: they serve a truth that transcends them. For this reason they are relative. What counts, therefore, is the interplay of these authorities in the Church which prevents any one of them from becoming an absolute. The unity of faith is a vital rather than a conceptual unity. While at certain rare moments the Church as a whole excludes as unchristian an option of some of her members, usually it is the living dialogue that creates unity and qualifies understanding. The role of authority, in the contemporary form of faith, is not to supply definitive answers but to lead people and make them sensitive to the presence of God's self-communication revealed in Christ in life and history.

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Gregory Baum


What excites a philosopher about Leslie Dewart is his conviction that practical religious difficulties may be relieved by closer attention to epistemological and metaphysical issues. What aggravates one about the
attention he gives to these issues is its invariably polemical and heavy-handed manner. There is no sensitivity whatsoever to the situation of previous analyses, no feel for what the medievales styled "interpretation" and our contemporaries call "hermeneutic"; no feel, that is, for the enlightening continuity of the critical enterprise in religious studies. What results is D.'s brand of enlightenment, designed to bring our reflection into contact with our praxis, but preoccupied with scoring points against a wooden version of old-time teaching.

In philosophical reflection on religious questions, the style is everything. This is because one is ever preoccupied with therapy—with helping another to see through the inescapable inadequacy of any single formulation to grasp a skill, a way of understanding. There is no other escape from dogmatism. And there lies precisely my quarrel with Dewart. Viewing philosophy as proposing a "theory of reality," he must feel himself offering a more adequate theory. And of course he does feel that way. The result, however, is teaching in the pejorative sense which he reserves for the magisterium: a laying down of how it is that we must now understand man, the world, and God. One has no sense of working along with another to struggle to understand what has baffled men for centuries; one is in the presence rather of a new authoritative teaching.

Hence a reviewer is constantly tempted to take issue with the manner in which a question is set up and analyzed, for each such approach amounts to a kind of special pleading. This book is no exception; in fact, it represents a more synoptic and thus more wooden version of that approach, being an expanded series of lectures. The appendix on Lonergan tries valiantly but unsuccessfully to place him too within D.'s stereotype of the "classical-medieval" world view. This is managed by a logical cleft stick: either Lonergan is genuinely new or he has not faithfully "reproduced without essential change the doctrine of St. Thomas." The contention of those who have worked with Lonergan, of course, is that he has managed to move cleanly down the middle of the either/or, and that precisely because of his hermeneutic sophistication as well as his epistemological power. D.'s insensitivity to the hermeneutical approach together with his lack of familiarity with those fields which Lonergan employs as operating examples for his epistemology make of him a lame critic.

The most leading and responsible chapter of this book is "Truth and Reality," which is in effect a discussion of language and its inherent relation to what we call thinking. D. succeeds in evoking a sense for system and for the role of frameworks in structuring the meaning question. One feels that he writes off too summarily the work of generative grammars and ought not have coined the category "semantic concept of language" to
make his point. Nevertheless, within those limitations, the intrinsically linguistic character of thought is persuasively portrayed. One would only have hoped that his applications of this central point could have been more simply and less polemically illustrated.

University of Notre Dame

DAVID BURRELL, C.S.C.


Robert Wilken, a young Lutheran patrologist, here brings the resources of his discipline to bear on the uses of history in theology. In a sampling of historical theologies from Luke to Käsemann, he finds one pervasive error. "By idealizing the apostolic period, i.e. a particular historical epoch in the past, Christians have prized as values tradition, antiquity, apostolicity, uniformity, and permanence, and they have spurned change, innovation, novelty, and diversity" (p. 21). Eusebius in particular is blamed for his contention that the apostolic period was one of virginal purity and that godless error did not creep into the Church until "the generation of those privileged to listen with their own ears to the divine wisdom had passed on" (p. 71). The "myth of Christian beginnings," reflected in that quotation, has its roots, according to W., in man's instinctive tendency to sacralize the time of origins—a tendency amply documented by scholars in the history of religions. To the pagan Greeks and Romans it was a commonplace that the ancients stood nearer to the gods than we. Consequently it is not surprising that, as W. points out, the Christian apologists should have attempted to commend the Bible by reason of the antiquity of the patriarchs and Moses. In the course of Christian history, nearly every new movement has sought to justify itself on the ground of its fidelity to the apostolic faith. This W. illustrates by many examples, including the Magdeburg Centuries, Harnack, and Käsemann.

Rejecting this myth, W. contends that Christianity, like any historical phenomenon, cannot be fully understood by uncovering its origins; "we must also look at what became of it, what twists and turns it took in the course of its history, and what came from it. What it is can never be derived from what it has been; for what something is continually changes as the present and future unfolds before it" (p. 191). For W., the past is purely indicative: it can never provide an imperative for the present.

In exposing the myth of the "virginal Church" and its supposed fall from original innocence, W. calls attention to an aberration that has not been sufficiently noticed. Drawing upon a wide knowledge of the NT, the Greek Fathers, the Lutheran tradition, and modern German theology,
he is able to document his thesis in an interesting way. He writes in a clear, aphoristic style, and makes old controversies come alive by showing that the ancient problems were at root analogous to our own. For all these reasons this book is to be welcomed.

W. is somewhat too sweeping in his generalizations about the previous theologians. He exaggerates, I suspect, when he declares, in the footsteps of F. C. Baur, that the Eusebian construction of history “robs the present and future of meaning, for it will not allow historical experience to contribute anything to that which was given at the beginning” (p. 192). For Eusebius himself, the conversion of the Roman Empire and the Constantinian peace were events of breath-taking importance. Generally speaking, one might question whether Catholic theology fits well into W.’s schema. Skipping the Latin patristic tradition (not even Augustine is treated) and the entire Middle Ages (except for a brief reference to Abelard), W. deals with only two Catholic authors since the Reformation: Baronius and Newman. Of these two, Newman at least can hardly be reduced to the Eusebian model, since he emphatically makes room for development upward and forward from the origins. A similar progressive movement is possible in the perspectives of many Catholic theologians from Thomas and Bonaventure to Teilhard and Rahner. By ignoring this whole school of historical theology, W. seriously limits the value of his generalizations.

Traditional theology, both Catholic and Protestant, has canonized the period of origins, making it normative for all subsequent developments. W. rejects this apostolic norm and is apparently unwilling to look for any other. He denies that Christianity has an abiding essence or idea by which its actual manifestations are to be judged. “The only Christianity there is,” he writes, “is the Christianity of our historical experience” (p. 198). On the ground that there is no Christian ideal from which it is possible to deviate, W. goes so far as to deny that anti-Semitism is an aberration from authentic Christianity. He does not make it entirely clear why he himself repudiates anti-Semitism, as he evidently does.

W.’s antipathy to all norms leads him into what I regard as an unacceptable historical positivism. As an alternative, I should prefer to hold with Newman, Harnack, Küng, and many others that there is an abiding idea or essence more or less perfectly embodied in the various historical realizations of Christianity and the Church. I should hold, further, that this idea can be discovered with unusual freshness and power in the NT, which therefore remains normative for all developments within the Christian tradition. In taking this position, I should hope to avoid succumbing to the “myth of Christian beginnings” so ably exposed in this work.

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AVERY DULLES, S.J.

"My main purposes in this book," writes Mundle, "are to exhibit linguistic philosophy as an aberration, to show that its practitioners have often done very badly what they claim to be doing, and to advocate the return to the non-linguistic tasks which philosophers have been tackling for 2500 years" (p. 7). For the most part he is successful in his purposes. While much of the argument is not new, he brings together the major complaints against linguistic philosophy in one persuasive critique.

To analyze the diverse forms of linguistic philosophy, M. makes a useful distinction between "a priori linguistics," "legislative linguistics," and "descriptive linguistics." A priori linguistics consists in the adoption of certain a priori rules about language and the deduction from them of what can or cannot be said meaningfully. Wittgenstein's Tractatus and Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic are the clearest, and most notorious, examples of this approach. Legislative linguistics is not too different. It consists in making false assertions about what we do or can say, in the interests of some philosophical theory, but without stating any general rule about language from which these assertions would follow. M. finds Ryle guilty of this practice, and possibly of apriorism as well. Descriptive linguistics seeks to describe "the actual use of language" without trying to theorize or to explain. This program was advocated by Wittgenstein in the Investigations, but was carried out more successfully by J. L. Austin (though M. views Austin's work as more a contribution to grammar than to philosophy).

All three forms of linguistic philosophy, M. argues, are either arbitrary or incomplete. His basic point is that these inadequacies call for a return to the traditional task of philosophy, namely, to metaphysics. A point well taken. How indeed can one diagnose a "category-mistake," discern sense from nonsense, or determine "what we should say when" without some metaphysical point of reference? Of what help ultimately are "reminders" of the ordinary uses of everyday English? The linguistic philosopher's claim to a strictly neutral method remains unfounded. If he still aims at distinguishing legitimate and illegitimate uses of language, at separating the meaningful and meaningless, he will need some criteria, some general norms. In effect, this means a return to metaphysics. M. suggests that a little less reverence for Wittgenstein, "the first philosopher of the age" (Strawson), would hasten this return.

I should like to report that a final section of this book deals precisely with the metaphysical enterprise. Unfortunately, this is not so, as M. himself recognizes. Nevertheless, he does indicate some directions of possible development. In the past, linguistic philosophers have tended
to equate metaphysics with the assertion of an a priori theory which is designed to explain everything. M. justly rejects such an equation. Instead, he sees metaphysics as the exploration of possible categorical systems or schemes which are designed to fit and make intelligible the facts about the world and ourselves. One hopes that he will write further on the subject.

In providing this over-all view of linguistic philosophy, M. certainly casts doubt on the heralded "revolution in philosophy." His critique is relentless, but it highlights real difficulties and real problems. Whether he has shown linguistic philosophy to be an aberration tout court is another matter. Despite the soundness of his critique, it seems to me that he passes lightly over the positive contributions of linguistic philosophy, such as the performative-constative distinction drawn by Austin. Perhaps more seriously, he tends to underplay the importance and pervasive character of language itself. Nonetheless, he has written an informed and no-nonsense account of the major weaknesses of linguistic philosophy.

New York, N.Y. 

JOHN A. DINNEEN, S.J.


These recent books are inspired by contemporary science: God and Rationality by the revised notion of objectivity in atomic and nuclear science, Grenzfragen by the expansive vistas of the Weltbild emerging from indeterministic, relativistic scientific theories. However, their authors have different goals: Torrance encourages the development of a rational method of theological inquiry modeled after what he calls "pure science"; Spülbeck wishes to demonstrate the compatibility of conceptual frameworks of current science with Christian convictions. In what follows, the clarity and realization of these respective aims will be evaluated.

S.'s book is not a collection of various lectures on a single theme, as is T.'s, but one treatise. I will confine myself to S.'s considerations of physics and cosmology. He first lists and briefly elaborates major results and theoretical claims of modern physics and astronomy, then attempts to weave these scientific threads into the fabric of Christian belief. The reader unversed in today's scientific lore should find S.'s compilation instructive, but initiates would quibble with his comments on light and radiation pressure, and with his unqualified citation of Von Neumann's proof of the incompatibility of quantum theory and the existence of "hidden parameters." Yet, on the whole, S.'s list is adequate and terse.
However, his striving for a new Christian culture, in which knowledge of the world is continuous with faith, is subject to at least two cautions. One concerns the obscurity of his linkage of current concepts with traditional articles of faith: e.g., that the indeterminacy of quantum theory vitiates determinists’ objection to free will is not obvious, because the predictable behavior of macroscopic entities is consistent with the uncertainty principle. The brevity of his treatment of these and other theologico-scientific relationships makes them appear arbitrary. The second warning is more fundamental—in fact, essential for clarifying the nature of S.’s whole enterprise. It concerns the dangers of confusing the scientific method with fundamental religious attitudes. On the one hand, the drive to unify one’s psychic life is natural; on the other, a patchwork quilt of ideas is inimical to intellectual integrity. The widespread philosophical investigation of the epistemological status of scientific explanations is quite understandable in view of their historical plurality: Aristotelian, Newtonian, Einsteinian, and quantum mechanical. Insofar as they are viewed as part of a method which also entails rather well defined verificational techniques, the acceptability of the ordered complex of theoretical constructs is always tentative. On the other hand, when hermeneutical questions about the content of fundamental Christian convictions are suspended, that content abides and functions in the mind of the believer in a fashion unsuitable for a scientific theory. Until the philosophy of science is more advanced in its task, undertakings like S.’s appear more aesthetic than epistemological; however, such an assessment of their character is hardly meant to undermine them. With the dearth of pastoral symbols in urban culture, religious rites could certainly employ new images.

T.’s work is harder to appraise than S.’s for two reasons. The first is the latitude and disparate developments of his theme; the second is his style. If S. is too brief, T. is so comprehensive that his points become obscure. Once again, this review will focus on aspects within my competence.

T.’s dissatisfaction with what he considers the subjective character of the work of theologians like Bultmann and Robinson recurs in several of his lectures. His counterproposal is not a return to medieval summae, but adaptations of the modified objectivity of atomic and subatomic physics, which is maintained despite the necessary obtrusion of observers in elementary events, to theological investigations. To appreciate his suggestion, the reader must grasp, at least in outline, one widely-known epistemological evaluation of quantum theory, that of Niels Bohr. Bohr insists that science is a public venture, i.e., the theories and results of science must be communicable. Bohr further asserts that the language of science is the vernacular, suitably refined by classical physicists. Now the objects of scientific vernacular are accessible to ordinary sense perceptions (or
to sense perceptions aided by devices whose operation is subject to
description by classical physics) and behave according to the determinis­
tic laws of classical mechanics and electrodynamics. In order to make
repeatable and communicable observations of microscopic physical
systems to which the uncertainty principle immediately applies, we must
permit such systems to interact with another system, the observing instru­
ment, which we describe by classical laws. The dividing line between in­
strument and system is quite arbitrary; the completion of an observation
is a matter of choice. In practice, however, the decision is made by con­
vention, i.e., a pointer wiggles or a photographic plate is blackened.
Nonetheless, on this interpretation, statements about atomic systems are
not simply statements about the states of instruments, but are supposed
to convey information about the systems themselves.

T. does not develop a detailed program for revising theological
methodology according to the above paradigm, but he does illustrate the
thrust of his intentions by comparing Luther’s understanding of the phrase
“Christus pro me” with Bultmann’s. Bultmann’s construing of the phrase,
T. claims, is the theological equivalent of reducing statements about
extramental reality to descriptions of subjective states or, at best, of
ignoring any objective correlative to these states. Luther’s original mean­
ing of the phrase, however, is purported to refer both to the subjective
experience of the one graced and to the saving activity of God.

T. can hardly be faulted for the incompleteness of his introduction of
modified objectivity into theological method in public lectures; his lengthy
development of the implications of such an introduction suffices. None­
theless, it is difficult for me to ascertain precisely T.’s understanding of
his main topic: rationality. Narrowly understood, rational discourse in­
volves the presentation of a body of knowledge as axiomatized or axio­
matizable, i.e., presentation in a manner which highlights the key prinici­
ples of the argument, which employs basic terms consistently, and which
deduces consequences from the key principles according to generally
accepted logical canons. But since any body of knowledge is more than its
formal organization, rational presentation of it must also offer perceptible
and somehow testable connections between the elements of discourse and
their objective referents. T., however, seems to accord greater extension
to “rationality,” to treat the notion analogously, as the Scholastics do
“being.” First he equates rationality with human knowing. Then, on the
one hand, he stresses the unity of knowledge; on the other, he readily
admits difference in both the objects and mode of knowing. Thus his
prized distinctions between formal discourse, aesthetics, and sheer mani­
festations of subjective states blur.

Finally, it should be said that God and Rationality demands a greater
theological background than this reviewer possesses. Familiarity with numerous historical-theological positions is presupposed; there are a number of esoteric references and allusions. Particularly fascinating to the properly prepared reader, though, should be the chapter "The Epistemological Relevance of the Holy Spirit."

While most philosophers concede that vital dimensions of human experience are not amenable to formulation in clear and distinct ideas, the present authors convey the impression that such expression is more potent than many post-Cartesian thinkers would admit—in fact, is sufficiently powerful to continue successful "raids on the inarticulate."

Le Moyne College, Syracuse

Gerrit Smith, S.J.


"Science is made by man... science is rooted in conversation... science is quite inseparable from these [human, philosophical, or political] more general questions." With such characteristic declarations in the Preface, Heisenberg wishes to stress the singularly important humanistic message of this book. Readers of his other philosophical works are well aware of his humanistic concern. This book is unique in that it is a documentation of lived experience which encompasses the entire adult life of the writer. The great creators of atomic physics (Einstein, Planck, Bohr...) express in dialogue with the author the spirit that animates their work: their ideals and worries, their philosophical attitudes, their religious and ethical concerns.

To read this book with profit, one should constantly keep in mind the unitary message it tries to convey. Why does man start to do science in the first place? Where does science lead man to, if he allows himself to be fully molded by his scientific endeavor? In brief, what sort of man is the scientist and what humanistic perspectives does science disclose to man as such? Following this thread, the reader can easily come to realize why science is widely seen by the best of its practitioners as humanistic and even humanizing. It is so because, as H. documents, genuine science bears the traits of authentic human ideal. A person dedicates himself to science not out of curiosity or greed but out of enraptured and passionate dedication, toward the attainment of the ideal
that first moved him. H. likes to compare the scientific endeavor to Columbus' enterprise: both demand truly human greatness.

Readers of TS will find it particularly significant that creative science bears directly on religion and ethics. Against a widespread view, H. shows that great scientists are not satisfied with a separation between science and religion; much less do they accept an alleged incompatibility of the two. Especially do Bohr's reflections show that a separation cannot be accepted. And this he rightly sees as a conclusion to be drawn from the epistemological lessons taught by quantum physics; for this new physics has shown that nature is indeed intelligible, but its intelligibility exceeds the comprehension of man. Hence the genuine scientist sees no reason for opposing religion—just the contrary. "The fact that religions through the ages have spoken in images, parables and paradoxes means simply that there are no other ways of grasping the reality to which they refer. But that does not mean that it is not a genuine reality" (p. 88). But, of course, the scientist insists on the experiential nature of religion itself. In an outstanding passage (pp. 215 f.) H. relates his experience of God as a personal encounter mediated by reflectively interiorized science. On the basis of his conviction, H. wants religion to be taken seriously up to the point of re-expressing its basic statements in a language that fits better the more profound experience of reality man has come to acquire through science (p. 212).

As regards ethics, H. notes that the spirit of science strengthens the ethical attitude of man by recalling the objectivity of ethical standards (esp. pp. 214 f.). But in this book he does far more than discuss the ethical significance of science theoretically. In a detailed documentation (chaps. 12, 14, and 15) he explains the reasons why he decided not to migrate from Nazi Germany despite his disgust for the regime in power. The basic motivation was suggested to him by Planck, an uncompromising anti-Nazi: "Think of the time after the catastrophe." H. remained so as not to betray the German youth, which desperately needed leaders to help it survive so as to be capable of rebuilding the nation after the war and the defeat which H. always considered unavertible. He also remained to stave off, as far as possible, the production of a German atom bomb. H. presents his account with the simplicity of a personal report. Readers should ponder his words, and they will detect in them the convincing ring of sincerity. Above all, they will learn to know science as a humanizing factor. The scientist who is humanly consistent with his science feels moved to an all-demanding sense of coresponsibility. He knows that he has been given his expertise only to be a cocreator of reality, no matter what sacrifices this situation may entail.

Obviously, it is not possible to do justice to such a rich book within the
short compass of a review. Perhaps it will be possible to revert to it with
greater leisure in the future. As a general judgment, this reviewer, who
has long been acquainted with this work (even before its publication in
German), can only say a word of personal conviction. I do not know of any
other book which can compare to it in the field of the relationships be­
tween science, philosophy, and religion except Galileo's immortal Dia­
logue on the Two Chief World Systems. Undoubtedly, the two works
are different, but their similarities are striking. Both are due to the pen
of uniquely great scientists. Both are literary masterpieces which can be
read with joy as well as profit. Both are accessible to everyone who cares
to read them with attention. Both are, above all, consoling. Genuine
genius proves that the many splits which afflict modern man in the area
of science, religion, and the humanities in general have really no right
to exist, for they are just due to our lack of humanity. His work summons
us to be more human, now that the polemics attending Galileo's position
can be realized for what they really were: a tragic misunderstanding of a
genius who was ahead of his times.

Only one critical note should be appended here; it concerns the English-
language edition. The translation is good, but not good enough for the
book. It too frequently smooths over the originality, efficacy, and consist­
ency of H.'s thought. Furthermore, one sadly misses the presence of an
index. Since this book is clearly to become a classic, one can expect a sec­
ond and permanent edition more faithful to the original and more service­
able to the reader.

Fordham University

THE PATIENT AS PERSON: EXPLORATIONS IN MEDICAL ETHICS. By Paul

Rarely does the New York Times Book Review Section consider a seri­
new book was reviewed in this prestigious format by Michael Novak. The
review was exceedingly laudatory of book and author. Since both Ramsey
and Novak are Eastern-establishment ethicians and partners in several
commissions and committees and often funded or seeking funds from the
same sources, one might question the objectiveness of the review. How­
ever, having been present at many of the discussions which were aimed at
delineating the problems handled, and knowing Ramsey and his scholarly
and human approach, and having carefully read Patient as Person, I am
happy to reinforce much of Novak's praise. Since this review is aimed at
a far more sophisticated audience than the average Times reader, I will
attempt a more specific review than his.
R. has donated an impressive array of books and original articles to the ethical field. Among the list there does not exist even one which an author might be happy to omit from his bibliography or which he might secretly hope no one will ever look up. The Ramsey corpus is scholarly and creative, carefully thought out and philosophically consistent. One can safely predict that future theses will be written on R.'s ethics. Many do not agree with the Ramsey approach or the presuppositions on which his ethics is based; many do not agree with his solutions. Nevertheless, he cannot be ignored by any serious ethicist.

To prepare this book and to polish the series of lectures which were published under the title Fabricated Man (New Haven, 1970), R. spent two six-month periods as a Kennedy-supported visiting professor in the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at Georgetown University School of Medicine. His title was Professor of Genetic Ethics. A wide experience was arranged in the various disciplines. R. worked in the center of a large teaching hospital and experienced modern medicine at first hand. He spent long hours in discussions with specialists in each of the critical areas. His questions were deep and probing, and all who were privileged to present material and discuss implications were amazed at his grasp of the problems and his insight into their ramifications. The Medical School faculty profited greatly from his presence.

The book which resulted from this and other experiences is a must for anyone interested in medical ethics. The most sensitive areas of medical practice are handled clearly; traditional approaches from Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish viewpoints are presented in a critical manner and applied to modern situations. Contemporary law and medical practice and the writings of medical experts are examined and the Ramsey approach and solution are offered. The book is pure Ramsey: thoughtful, searching, carefully logical, filled with a deep reverence for life and man, and unashamedly Christian.

R.'s starting point is the biblical norm of fidelity to covenant. Relying on Karl Barth, he states that covenant fidelity is the inner meaning and purpose of our creation as human beings. Canons of loyalty govern every man's relations with his fellow man. A covenant exists between men which is specialized according to the relationship: a covenant between patient and physician, well and ill, living and dying, researcher and "subject." For R., an examination of how one is faithful to this covenant is the basic ethical question. Modern science and medicine seem to have overawed most men—worst yet, many scientists and physicians. Since what can be done, probably will be done, since valuable knowledge seems attainable only by questionable experimentation, many so-called ethicists seem to be rushing to canonize what will be or already is. Not R.; he is willing to
defend each man's sanctity and privacy, to demand fidelity in the face of scientific pressure.

The first chapter deals with consent and is perhaps the best in the book. There is no problem in general medical practice which is more often met, and in medical experimentation using human "volunteers" the problem is of constant concern. The medical profession has demanded that in all patient-physician relationships there be a "reasonably free and adequately informed consent" to any procedure or examination performed. In the normal doctor-patient relationship this free and informed consent is present by the fact of the contract entered into. You will be my doctor and I will be your patient. All actions will be taken on behalf of the patient; anything done which is not aimed at helping this patient violates the contract (covenant) and redress may be attained by legal suit (malpractice). The truly difficult problems of consent are those which deal with experimentation.

Early in the chapter the contribution of situation ethics is presented and discussed. Ramsey is one of the chief opponents of situation ethics and will generally excoriate the approach and its proponents whenever the chance arises.

Ramsey then approaches consent as a covenant between men. Informed consent is the cardinal canon of loyalty joining men together in medical practice and investigation. Paraphrasing Reinhold Niebuhr's defense of democracy, Ramsey says: "Man's capacity to become joint adventurers in a common cause makes the consensual relationship possible; man's propensity to overreach his joint adventurer even in a good cause makes consent necessary." This covenant between doctor and patient is emphasized to an even greater degree by the belief that no man is good enough to experiment on another without his consent and no man is good enough to cure another without his consent. The requirement of consent is essential so that no man shall be degraded and treated as a thing or as an animal in order that good medical knowledge may come of it.

The drive toward research and the good to be obtained from it are pushing medical researchers toward an emphasis on the ultimate good, advancement of knowledge and benefit to many in the future. This push on many levels causes the covenant between investigator and subject to be disregarded. In a very small word-of-mouth survey which I took among first- and second-year medical students, the basic ideas of informed consent were praised, but in cases the drive was generally toward obtaining the result. The ultimate purpose was to serve mankind better in the future, but the use of the subject as solely that was frightening.

After a general discussion of consent R. presents several cases mainly concerned with experimentation with the young. Most of the case material
is factual, although some hypothetical cases are used as illustrative material. In the chapter on consent, cases are used of experimentation on aborted fetal material. Such cases are of extreme importance in the present abortion controversy, which is not treated as such in the book. The most telling case and the one best suited for sharpening the principles and solutions needed is the true case involving the use of institutionalized retarded children in a New England resident-care facility. Again the pros and cons of such a situation are put forward fairly. Clearly and with great precision of thought, R. finally develops his own ethical position and solution.

Chapters on determining death, on (only) caring for the dying, on transplant (living and cadaver donors), on kidney and heart, and on triage (delivery of medical services) follow. Besides the chapter on consent, those on care of the dying and on the delivery of sparse medical resources are in my estimation the best; but there are nuggets not to be missed in the other chapters.

I am obviously enthusiastic about R.'s book and hope that medical men will take the time to ponder the principles presented. It is an absolute necessity for anyone interested in medical ethics, regardless of his position. R.'s style is sometimes difficult, and the cases presented, while they add greatly to the interest and basic understanding of the work, will probably date the presentation. No doubt, lesser ethicists will update the cases; hopefully, they will not lose the Ramsey spirit.

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Robert C. Baumiller, S.J.


Three long essays by Ramsey, two of which have been published previously, on the timely topic of genetic control combine various elements we have come to expect from him. First, he has sufficient control of the scientific matters, factual, theoretical, and speculative, to give a sense of confidence in his work. Second, there are sections of rigorous argument interspersed with descriptive materials and with passages of high moral and polemical passion. Third, there is a persistent plea for adherence to ethical principles which make it clear that certain means of action are morally wrong, regardless of the consequences that are sought.

All three essays are exercises in practical moral theology, the first dealing with more general religious and moral implications of the new biology and focusing primarily on the work of H. J. Muller. The second is a polemic directed against Joshua Lederberg and the proposal that at some
time scientists ought to use the cloning procedure on human tissue. The
third lifts out the theme of parenthood, which functions centrally in the
other two, and develops its significance with reference to AID and some
other issues. The first essay is of greatest importance for those concerned
with the relation of theology to ethics. The three together constitute the
most significant Protestant contribution to the discussion of the ethics of
genetic control thus far available.

Pages 22–32 contain R.’s argument for the occupation of Christian
ethics with means. The Christian “will always have in mind the premise
that there may be a number of things that might succeed better but would
be intrinsically wrong means for him to adopt. Therefore, he has a larger
place for an ethics of means that is not wholly dependent on the ends of
action” (p. 30). This note, sounded persistently by R. over the past dec­
ade, requires more substantial theological justification than it gets here.
Why does Christian ethics, for R., concentrate so heavily on means? What
theology supports this view? R. seems to make the notion of the “canon
of loyalty” serve as the principle of ethics that has particular theological
grounding.

The canon of loyalty imbedded in marital sexual union becomes the
material norm to which R. returns again and again as a grounding for his
critical comments about cloning, AID, and other technical practices and
proposals. Against those who would mechanize reproduction, it enables
R. to appeal to personhood. “Limitless dominion over procreation means
the boundless servility of man-womanhood. The conquest of evolution by
setting sexual love and precreation [sic] radically asunder entails deper­
sonalization in the extreme” (p. 89). Against what R. judges to be the ex­
cessive personalism and “anti-physicalism” of some Catholics, it enables
him to say: “The parameters of human life, which science and medicine
should serve and not violate, are grounded in the man of flesh and in the
nature of human parenthood” (p. 131). Parenthood has an ethical justi­
fication as well as a theological one for Ramsey; not only is it the way or­
dained by God but it is also the morally right way to procreate, and re­
tention of it is less likely to lead to blundering consequences than is the
excessive self-confidence of scientists working at asexual reproduction.

R.’s particular polemics are always worthy of attention. Those against
Promethean proposals are well placed, sharp, and sometimes witty. His
polemics, sometimes veiled and sometimes explicit, against Catholic re­
forming theologians and moralists, such as Teilhard, Rahner, and others
unnamed, need fuller development in order to be persuasive. He does
not take into account the reasons for their reforming efforts. His general
point that Christian ethics does not fulfil its vocation by finding excuses
to bless the technical developments of modernity is certainly well taken
and persuasively established.
Book reviews do not provide sufficient space for a multifaceted and thorough critique of R.'s formal and material moral theology. His essentially polemical approach makes it easier to see what he objects to than to see all the reasons why he objects. His concentration on practical problems and the issues of practical moral reasoning in the recent writings makes more fundamental philosophical and theological issues increasingly opaque. There seem to be appeals to natural law, but there is no account of the epistemological and metaphysical presuppositions of such appeals. There are brief and sometimes cryptic appeals to explicitly Christian theology, but sometimes one gets the impression that these function more as rationalizations for an ethical point of view (both formally and materially) than as sources for ethical understanding. Of course, no writer can cover all the bases equally well. Without R.'s work, Christian ethics in America would be considerably poorer both in the quantity and quality of its publication.

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JAMES M. GUSTAFSON


In this collection of essays Milhaven stakes out a claim for a new Catholic morality. To do this, he makes a number of distinctions between the "new" and the "old" morality. One summary of the new, Mentality B, is found on p. 81: "The modern mind, therefore, sees man and his life, human good and evil, by focusing principally upon: (1) what is revealed in his experience in this world; (2) as the experience would be even if there were no God; (3) as it is shaped, or can be shaped, by man's technological power; (4) as it occurs in the lives of ordinary men and (5) as it is created by the unique self of the man, by his ongoing self-creation or freedom that is 'I,' by the creative interaction with 'Thou.'" The essays range widely in their content, some dealing with specific moral questions such as homosexuality and abortion, and others dealing with basic postures of ethics and with historical subjects. From a scholarly point of view, the inclusion of the essay on exceptions to the moral law in St. Thomas shows M.'s capacity for careful analytical work in a way that the other essays do not. By incidental reference, he indicates his identification with the work of Robert Johann, Charles Curran, and Joseph Fletcher; among others, he seems to find inspiration from the works of Bonhoeffer and H. R. Niebuhr. His foils could be pointed to by mentioning the names of Frs. F. J. Connell, John Ford, and Gerald Kelly, and while he does not engage him in this work, by implication Paul Ramsey.

In fairness, I should point out a deep aversion to all books which build polemics on two "types," the "old" way and the "new" way, the "clas-
sical" mentality and the "modern" mentality. One reason for this is a technical quibble: classical use of typologies used them as bases of insight into the complexities of particular historical individualities, and not as slogans. Another is that such high generalizations radically oversimplify the data that they seek to comprehend, and do injustices to the thought of many particular persons who become associated in a type. The third is the most important; it is that the serious issues of ethical thought are too complex to be resolved in the normative use of typologies, and thus while they are exciting, they solve almost nothing. In M.'s case they seem to represent psychological predispositions more than anything else. "In the lively discussion among Christians on innumerable questions, two biases consistently emerge: an a priori inclination to look for a new answer (not totally discontinuous with the old) and an a priori inclination to look for an old answer (appropriately modernized)" (p. 11). As is the case in Fletcher's writing, the rhetoric gives us more the sense of novelty than M. in the end really proposes. He is simply not as "far out" as he sounds.

Mentality B is oriented toward experience; this seems to be M.'s main positive thrust. It judges the morality of things by their consequences in experience; thus it buys heavily into a relatively uncritical utilitarianism. It also is open to the behavioral and social and other sciences for its understanding of experience. (In a sense, M.'s intellectual biography accounts for his polemic: he became frustrated by the insufficiency of the use of experience in traditional moral theology, and now finds a new openness to it. My own, if any reader cares, has been almost opposite: coming to ethics from earlier immersion in the social sciences led me to make a similar polemic against some forms of Protestant ethics, but has increasingly led me to more critical uses of "experience" and the human sciences in ethical discussion.)

My hope is that M. will be more critical in future writings in his basic utilitarianism and in his use of the human sciences. While his emendment of the *Commonweal* article (pp. 53 ff.) in this book is an improvement over his previously unexamined assertion that good medicine is good morality, the whole matter deserves much more attention. One is reminded of seventy years of Anglo-American philosophical refinement and debate about the issues involved in the use of the adjective "good." If M. wishes to assert that there are no disputes of any seriousness about what consequences are good, then he has to explore the epistemological and metaphysical consequences of this, and he might find himself back with an "old" philosophy. If there are disputes (and there are), then M. has to help us see how we should go about trying to settle them; for the answer to their settlement will not come from an appeal to "experience" as a single entity.
My hope also is that in future writings M. will take seriously the differences among social scientists. While there is no doubt that these sciences can assist the practical moralist in many ways, the moralist has to make choices among the social scientific options. M. suggests that the ethicist accept "the contemporary scientific understanding of man" (p. 118). But there is no one such thing. "The Christian ethic learns its practical principles from Carl Rogers and Hans Morgenthau, Lester Kirkendall and Margaret Mead, Rollo May and Theodore Roszak" (pp. 120–21). Why Rogers and May rather than B. F. Skinner? Why Morgenthau rather than Robert Dahl? Why Mead rather than Robert Redfield? Why Roszak rather than Talcott Parsons? Even "scientific" understandings of man are selective in their data from experience, and surely there are powerful interpretations of the data which shape them in any significant writer. How does the ethicist decide which interpretation is most adequate? Indeed, in these interpretations there are normative presuppositions. Is it not necessary to analyze critically what these are?

Finally, if everything in the "new morality" hangs on "love," that term needs the most intensive scrutiny, and its uses in particular places need to have very careful specification. M. does some of this in the chapter on homosexuality, but more is required. And, to return to an old saw of mine, why is the Christian bound to a love monism in ethics? Love may be primary in Christian ethics, but no one has satisfied me on any grounds—religious, philosophical, or any others—that it is the one principle or attitude. As H. R. Niebuhr pointed out in 1951, the proposition "God is love" is not reversible.

The lively polemic, the engaging style, the well-chosen illustrations, and the quiet passion of this book all make it attractive. There is nothing in M.'s most fundamental outlook that I find shocking, or even very alien. If one's battle is still that of finding a way from a relatively closed morality to greater openness to experience, M. will help to win it. If, however, as the battle of Protestant ethics has been, one is concerned with how to find where to go in the openness, something more is required.

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JAMES M. GUSTAFSON


In September 1967 an international conference on abortion, sponsored by the Harvard Divinity School and the Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr., Foundation, was held in Washington, D.C. This book is an outgrowth of that conference. While the book is not the conference proceedings and many topics
considered at the conference are omitted, most of the book is based on papers prepared for it.

In a brief Introduction, Prof. Noonan indicates the factors which tend toward social and legal acceptance of abortion. Nevertheless, the fundamental issue is the value of human life before birth, and the volume tries to consider this issue. N.'s own contribution, "An Almost Absolute Value in History," is a fifty-nine-page history of the condemnation of abortion in the Christian (specifically, Roman Catholic) tradition. (This history is substantially the same as that presented by N. in the 1967 *Natural Law Forum.*) His survey contains many valuable references. Moreover, he seems to be right in his chief conclusion: the dignity of every human life is the ground on which the tradition rejected abortion. Still, N.'s history is in many respects incomplete, especially in isolating the Catholic teaching from its context in the Indo-European religious tradition. Also, he reduces the distinction between direct and indirect abortion to a form of "line drawing" or "balancing of values," and thus mistakenly concludes that the allowance of indirect abortion makes the value of the unborn's life only "almost absolute."

Paul Ramsey has contributed a forty-one-page essay, "Reference Points in Deciding about Abortion." He clarifies a number of important points, e.g., the relationship between law and conscience formed by religion, the relevance of biological evidence regarding the status of the unborn, the difficulty of distinguishing in principle between abortion and infanticide, and the very important distinction between killing and permitting to die.

James M. Gustafson proposes a situationist view in his twenty-two-page essay, "A Protestant Ethical Approach." He believes that traditional Catholic arguments about abortion are made by an external judge, on a basically juridical model, with a limitation of relevant data to the physical, with an almost exclusive concern with the physician and patient, in a rationalistic mode, and based on natural law. G. proposes instead the approach of a responsible, situationist, moral advisor. In the course of his essay he describes a case and decides that abortion in the case described would be permissible. I think he confuses the issues of methodology and those of principle, however, since his moral judgment is really upon a type of case, which might occur in an indefinite series of particular instances.

Bernard Häring, C.SS.R., contributes a twenty-two-page essay, "A Theological Evaluation," in which he does not deny the traditional teaching regarding the morality of abortion, but does discuss various questions which might lead to a "refinement" of that teaching. E.g., he locates the malice of abortion not in the very destruction of human life
itself, but in the attack on the right of the fetus to live. He then suggests that in some cases this right is void, and thus abortion can be justified. Problems of pastoral counseling and also of legislation are treated more from the viewpoint of formation of consciences than from the objective value of human life. In my judgment, H.'s essay is the least useful item in this volume. Relying on muddled notions, such as a distinction between biological life and human life, he confuses issues that are neatly clarified elsewhere in the volume.

Some of these clarifications are in the twenty-six-page essay by George H. Williams, "The Sacred Condominium." (It is the second part of a larger essay published in TS in March 1970.) W. approaches the problem of legality of abortion in difficult cases by proposing the notion of condominium or shared sovereignty—the progenitor and the state being co-rulers over the unborn. In effect, W. is trying to articulate a theoretical basis for resolving conflicts of legal rights between mother and unborn child. The problem he does not face is how the concept of condominium can be squared with the Fourteenth Amendment. The unborn either is or is not a "person" in the sense of the Amendment. If it is, W.'s theory concedes it too little; if it is not, his theory concedes it too much.

John M. Finnis contributes one of the most helpful essays, forty-eight pages including appendices, "Three Schemes of Regulation." The three schemes are (1) prohibition of abortion except to save the life of the mother, (2) permission of abortion when officially authorized under specified conditions, and (3) permission of abortion except when done by technically unqualified operators. F. clarifies the presuppositions and legal implications of each scheme and confronts the three with available data regarding their effects. He points out the inherent instability of legislation modeled after the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, answers jurisprudential objections to more restrictive legislation, and focuses attention on the central issues at stake in permissive legislation. I would disagree with F. on only one point—an important one. He states that there is no legal-logical absurdity if the law protects the unborn's rights in some other cases but does not protect its right to life. I think F. has failed to note that legal inconsistency with regard to what is or is not designated a legal person is a special case, quite different in its logic from inconsistency in any other designation.

David W. Louisell joins Noonan in the last essay, a forty-one-page study, "Constitutional Balance." They examine the related issues: Is it constitutional for the state to regulate abortion? Is it constitutional for the state not to regulate abortion? Legal precedents and jurisprudential analyses are brought together in an argument which implicitly assumes the point that Finnis had denied: that the law should be consistent in what it re-
gards as a person. This essay clearly shows how radical are the jurisprudential implications of the legalization of abortion: "The American Constitutional guarantee of the equal protection of the law is rooted in the dignity of the individual and the inviolability of innocent human life" (p. 260). Legal abortion is held by N. and L. to negate this guarantee.

This valuable material deserves careful attention; the volume carries its own antidote for its poorer content.

*Georgetown University*

GERMAIN G. GRIZEZ


This is an analysis of the theological discussion during 1957-67 on the morality of contraception. Valsecchi indicates how the birth-control debate emerged and developed, always pointing up the key issues and fresh emphases. His method of grouping writers according to their nations of origin casts into relief the significant differences between the climates of opinion prevailing in various countries. The documentation is impressive, although lacunae are inevitable in such a study and, e.g., G. Egner's important *Birth Regulation and Catholic Belief* constitutes a curious omission.

In an interesting and important chapter on the teaching of Vatican II, V. leads the reader from the earlier drafts, via the debates on the Council floor and the work done between the sessions of 1964 and 1965, to the statement that was finally approved as a section of *Gaudium et spes*. No study of the conciliar doctrine on marriage can afford to prescind from this piece of history, and V. has traced it in painstaking fashion.

Since this work appeared first in 1967 as *Regolazione delle nascite*, one has to look elsewhere for a treatment of the reports from the Papal Commission, the Encyclical *Humanae vitae*, or its aftermath in the statements of national hierarchies and the reactions of theologians and the Catholic world generally. The editors of this French edition have simply added a postscript from the author entitled "L'Encyclique *Humanae vitae*, un an après." Any criticism of this book will surely settle in large measure upon this concluding essay, which is basically an attempt to explain the intentions and meaning of the Encyclical in the light of the ensuing responses from national episcopal bodies (a dubious endeavor at best, unless one supposes that Paul VI expected and intended such responses). According to V. (p. 187), these declarations from groups of bishops show that the Pope's decision still allowed a margin of liberty to the individual conscience. Or, again, reading the Encyclical in the light of those episcopal
statements (especially that of the Italian hierarchy) which tended to present the Pope's norm as a moral ideal rather than a moral imperative, he sees in the mildness of Paul's language an indication that the Pope regards as concretely grave fault only that contraceptive behavior which is an expression of a quite gratuitous and egoistic refusal of fecundity (p. 193).

However, it is one thing to say (with the Italian episcopate) that the Pope's thought constitutes but one of the essential elements for the responsible formation of conscience. It is quite another thing to say that Paul intended his teaching to be so regarded. His language may not be "massively" condemnatory (and certainly it is mild enough when compared to the terms in which *Casti connubii* outlawed contraception), but given the whole background to the issuance of *Humanae vitae*, is there real basis for believing that the Pope regards individual contraceptive acts or contraception practised under the pressure of family and social needs as light fault only? The theologian ought to explain the Encyclical, together with the manner in which and the degree to which it is or is not normative. He should not, I submit, attempt to explain it away. He may well believe the papal teaching to be wrong. He should say so.

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NICHOLAS CROTTY, C.P.


This book is a compilation of the proceedings of a conference on the impact of family planning held at the University of Notre Dame. Participants included specialists in business management, religion, sociology, psychology, anthropology, philosophy, welfare, education, science, and communications. This should have made for a scholarly and enlightening interchange, but the book is very much on the light side. The talks therein recorded and the taped discussions are undocumented and in most cases unoriginal. Although the jacket promises "a keen grasp of the relationship between man and woman," the result is a hazy airing of opinions and prejudices. Despite the inclusion of the Masters and Johnson team, who repeat what they have said elsewhere about female sexuality, the atmosphere of the discussions is in many places reminiscent of the Christian Family Movement of the fifties.

The quality of the addresses varies greatly. The best is that of theologian Herbert Richardson, a clever, insightful critique of the limitations of role-playing. The worst is that of Edgar F. Berman, who tastelessly and compassionlessly sets forth his credo: "woman is by nature neither free,
equal, nor responsible.” It is awesome to ponder that Dr. Berman is identified as “chief health consultant for Latin America.” Actually, though, B. is singular among the conferees only in forthrightness. In obtuseness on the oppression of women, there is some serious competition from other contributors. Kermit Krantz, gynecologist, makes “the assumption right from the beginning that you women are better than we are”—indicative enough of his level of discourse. In the same paragraph he offers the information that “not only are men and women biologically different, but in the evolutionary scale she is one step ahead.” As evidence of this, he offers only one piece of information: “during the menstrual cycle, a vasal dilation and constriction of the blood vessels show up in a woman’s eye, something you just will not see in a man.”

Rivaling Berman and Krantz for incongruity is the contribution of Joseph W. Bird and Lois F. Bird. In their piece, “Anatomy of a Good Marriage,” Mr. Bird affirms that they very much subscribe to the concept of headship of the family. He observes: “I have not yet met the woman who has convinced me that she wants to be the head of a family.” Clearly, he never will.

The confusion of the book is perhaps best summarized in a statement by Jacqueline Grennan: “The religion that should have produced Freud fought him.” This statement could only evoke impatience from those aware of the critique of Freud which has developed vis-à-vis women’s liberation. The “religion” to which she refers of course fought Freud—for all the wrong reasons. Women aware of the sexual bias of that religion, however, might well be inclined amusedly to chalk up to its credit the fact that at least it was not responsible for the antifeminine excesses of that gentleman.

Perhaps the most revealing thing about the book is the fact that it represents an extensive and expensive conference held recently on the campus of a major Catholic university in this country. It might be taken as a symbol of the response of institutions of Catholic higher education thus far to the cry for justice raised by the women’s liberation movement. Little was done intellectually or practically to help women emerge from their oppressed situation. People eager for information on women’s liberation will not find much help here. To such persons I recommend Sexual Politics by Kate Millett (Doubleday), Voices of the New Feminism, edited by Mary Lou Thompson (Beacon), or Sisterhood Is Powerful, edited by Robin Morgan (Random House). There is much to be learned from hundreds of booklets, articles, monographs, and journals being put out by young women in the movement who have learned to turn to their own rich resources.

Boston College  
Mary Daly

The author understands the theology of the subtitle in a practical sense. It is concerned with the realities of man's life "devant Dieu, avec Dieu et en Dieu" as they are revealed in the Book of Job. This understanding brings certain advantages compared with the standard form of commentary. L. need not study everything in the book just because it is there. He can concentrate on the passages which have something important to say about the divine-human relationship. As a result, we get a very full discussion of key passages like the "redeemer" section (19:25-27) and the concluding theophany (38:1—42:6). Opinions and possibilities are presented at length. One can understand them and weigh them with a feeling that he knows what it is all about. In addition, the book becomes a valuable compendium of information about important texts. Happy results of this concentration are the extended discussions of key words. The book is fully indexed and so it becomes a kind of theological vocabulary for one who knows Hebrew.

However, there is a drawback to all this accumulation of material: the book as a whole leaves an impression of disjointedness. It takes so long to thrash out the various possibilities regarding each point that it becomes very difficult to see the point in itself or in its relations to other elements in the theology of Job. I must also confess to finding the conclusions rather flat. This is not because of disagreement with their validity. I would take exception to the view that the theology of Job is a covenantal theology. This claim is really based on the occurrence of hesed, "loving kindness," which does in fact often characterize the covenant relationship. However, it can also be connected with other relationships as well, so that it is scarcely correct to refer it to covenant in a book like Job, which does not make extensive or explicit use of the word or idea of covenant itself. However, apart from this, the problem is not so much disagreement with L.'s conclusions. It is rather a certain disappointment. A dozen rather generalizing pages offer a very satisfactory summary of the theology of Job. Is there no more than this to be said after six hundred pages?

To be sure, this feeling of disappointment is commonly my experience with books on Job. This is probably due in part to the fact that there is no satisfying intellectual answer to the problem of Job, the problem of suffering. Neither does Job offer the chance to construct a rich and variegated theological system apart from this problem. It offers facts and all one can do with facts is confront them. The richness of Job lies in the wonderful language and imagery it uses to develop the emotional resonances of the facts of God and man and the experience of suffering. It is because of this verbal and emotional richness that Job is a masterpiece. Ultimately the book is valuable not for this or that more or less abstract answer to a prob-
lem which our minds can see presented in it, but for its total expression. We can capture this, experience and use it, only by going back to the book and making it our own. L. does not offer the definitive way for us to do this, but he does offer a useful one.

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Dennis J. McCarthy, S.J.


Chêvenert's study of Origen's commentaries on the Song of Songs contributes to our growing understanding of Origen the mystic and spiritual teacher. The Commentary on the Song of Songs translated by Rufinus and the two Homilies on the Song of Songs translated by Jerome are the chief sources. These two works have exercised a peculiar fascination for students of Origen because they comprise, alongside Hippolytus' commentary on the same book, one of the first extensive commentaries on the Song of Songs; but they are also important because Origen appears here in a guise so unlike the author of Contra Celsum, De principiis, and even his "scientific" commentaries. C. has done a careful job of gathering together all the material from these works on the problem of the Church and organized and interpreted it in light of topics such as the following: pre-existent Church, Church in the OT, the Church among the Gentiles, the Church and the Incarnate Word, the Church and the body of Christ. Since Origen himself says that the Church is the proper subject of the Song of Songs and discusses the Church at great length, C. has a great deal of material to draw on.

Origen's conception of the Church as revealed in these commentaries is almost wholly spiritual. Whereas other Christian writers in this period and earlier were concerned with establishing the continuity of episcopal succession back to the apostles, demonstrating the authenticity of the apostolic tradition present among the churches, and contending for "visible" marks of the Church, Origen pictures the Church as a spiritual reality existing before time and almost wholly divorced from the empirical and historical world of space and time. At the center of the Church's life is the Incarnate Word of God, who draws men into fellowship with Him. For Origen, the Church becomes another way of talking about the spiritual quest of the believer as he moves from one stage to another on the path to perfection. In fact, C. shows that the eschatological dimension of ecclesiology is almost wholly identified with the perfection toward which the spiritual life aims. Eschatology is not viewed historically but mystically.

As a summary of the material in the two works of Origen C.'s work is useful and valuable, but for the understanding of the "historical Origen"
it is not too helpful. That is, I think the book will be of greater interest to contemporary theologians and spiritual writers who wish to draw on the richness of the tradition of Christian spirituality than it will be to those who are interested in understanding the third century. For example, since this is one of the first commentaries on the Song of Songs, what prompted Origen to write such a work, what are the precedents, and why did he give it an ecclesiological interpretation? What is the relation between Origen's commentary and that of Hippolytus? How does this work fit into the over-all scheme of Origen's thought? C. has chosen to side with the French interpreters of Origen who stress his mystical and spiritual work, but he does not take up the continuing challenge to this view, recently renewed by Kettler's study of *De principiis*.

Scholarship on Origen faces a problem in interpreting him similar to that faced by Origen in interpreting the Bible. Origen struggled with the question, what is the relation between the events recorded in the Scriptures—events removed from the present by hundreds of years—and the meanings Christians assign to them in the present? Students of Origen struggle with the question, what is the relation between the Origen who lived in the third century of the Christian era, wrote in Greek, thought like a third-century intellectual, and the several Origens who live on in later Christian tradition and in the minds of contemporary interpreters? C. gives us some new raw material for answering these questions, but he does not himself discuss them. In this sense the book is unhistorical in its conception, though not without its value as a resource for further work.

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ROBERT L. WILKEN


As the Preface indicates, the motivation of this inquiry lies in the antithesis between the history-of-religions school (including Bultmann and his pupils), which postulates a pre-Christian Gnostic redeemer myth that has provided the conceptual framework of the formulation of NT Christology, and its opponents who assert that the alleged evidence for the pre-Christian Gnostic redeemer myth is exclusively post-NT.

Assuming that, whatever their origin, the concepts in question are pre-Christian, S. takes as his point of entry the Christological hymns of the NT, as these have been established by form-critical study: Phil 2:6–11; Col 1:15–20; Eph 2:14–16; 1 Tim 3:16; 1 Pt 3:16–22; Hb 1:3; and the Johannine Prologue.

Parts 1 and 2 consist of a Forschungsbericht, the former dealing with the formal analysis of the hymns, the latter with representative positions
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on the history-of-religions background adopted by those who accept the hymnic structure of the passages in question.

The conclusion of Part 1 is that there emerges an eightfold mythic pattern in which the pre-existent redeemer is (1) equal with God, (2) the agent of creation and (3) its sustainer, (4) he descends from heaven to earth, (5) he dies and (6) is made alive again, thereby (7) effecting a reconciliation, he is (8) exalted and enthroned over the cosmic powers. The conclusion of Part 2 is that the sources of this pattern are to be found in pre-Christian Judaism, and that it is the product of two converging tendencies, the hypostatization of divine qualities into various redeemer- or revealer-figures, and the development of a mythical pattern of activity on the part of these figures.

In Part 3, S. investigates this hypostatized-mythical drama pattern as it is found in the Odes of Solomon, the Evangelium veritatis and Apocalypse of Adam from Nag Hammadi, and the thanksgivings of the biblical wisdom literature. Here the conclusion is reached that it was the wisdom circles of Judaism that provided the point at which the redeemer myths entered from other religions into Judaism, that the NT Christological hymns reflect a relatively early stage of this process, the Nag Hammadi documents an advanced stage, and the Odes of Solomon an intermediate stage between the NT and Nag Hammadi. A final chapter discusses the NT hymns as "language" in terms of the new "hermeneutic."

Some readers may feel that the formal analysis is settled too quickly and that insufficient attention is paid to alternative analyses or to those who reject completely such hymnic reconstructions. It is true, the Forschungsbericht is by no means exhaustive (e.g., no attention is paid to the recent analysis of Phil 2:6-11 by Talbert, which, if sustained, also raises problems for the history-of-religions background). Part 2 is highly selective (nothing, e.g., of my colleague James Sanders' attempt to find the background of Phil 2:6-11 in the dissenting deities of contemporary Jewish apocalyptic and sectarian literature). Also open to question is the eightfold reconstruction of the basic Christological myth, which, as S. admits, never appears in its entirety in any of the hymns (cf. Dodd's reconstructed kerygma). Such objections, however, do not invalidate the thesis. S. is clearly looking in the right place for the origins of the NT Christological myth, viz., in Judaism, and specifically in its developing doctrine of wisdom. It is questionable, however, whether one can speak of a redeemer myth in the strictest sense, viz., of a hypostatization who becomes historically incarnate and dies a redemptive death. This can be found, mutatis mutandis, in the post-NT documents discussed by S., but not in the pre-Christian wisdom literature. There the impression in the pass-
ages cited by S. is rather of a revelation myth—a revelation which has indeed redemptive efficacy—but not, strictly speaking, a redeemer. It still appears that the "historical" incarnation and the redemptive death are not parts of this pre-Christian myth, but are rather due to inner-Christian development under the impact of the history of Jesus.

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Reginald H. Fuller


The author, professor of NT in the theological faculty of Toulouse, sets out to examine the place of the child (pais, paidion) in the Synoptic Gospels. There is not, properly speaking, a "child" theme in these Gospels, but certain characteristics of children have been put to theological use by Jesus and the Evangelists on their respective levels of the Gospel tradition. Relative to these theological usages and easily confused with them are the uses made of the concepts "little ones" (mikroi) and "simple" (népioi: literally, "babes"), each of which contributes to the basic evangelical teaching highlighted in this volume.

L. begins with a literary study of the principal texts: (1) Mk 9:33-37 (Lk 9:46-48; Mt 18:1-5); (2) Mk 10:13-16 (Lk 18:15-17; Mt 19:13-15); (3) Mt 21:14-16. L. concludes (1) that Mk 9:33-37 has two parts: (a) a call for humility addressed to church leaders (33-35) and (b) an exhortation to receive missionaries as one would receive Christ Himself, who is sent by God (36-37). Lk 9:46-48 combines these elements into a new thought, that the least in the kingdom of God is nevertheless great and should be received, because he is a disciple of Christ, the emissary of God. Mt 18:1-5 answers the question "Who is greater?" by having Jesus instruct His disciples on the necessity for humility in the kingdom (= Christian life) and on how the child (= little one) should be received by the community. (2) Mk 10:15 is an insert belonging to the stage of kerygma, because in it the kingdom is the Christian message. One must be like a child to receive the kingdom of heaven. (3) Mt 21:14-16 is an authentic saying of Jesus (but edited by Mt) which speaks of children's praise replacing that of the Temple after its destruction.

L. then examines the concepts mikroi and népioi for their teaching. Mikros and paidion are not interchangeable terms, but their uses sometimes coincide theologically. In examining mikroi, L. studies the communitarian use of the term by a detailed exegesis of Mt 18:6 par., Mk 18:12-14, and Mt 18:10, concluding that the "little ones" are the weak and easily scandalized, toward whom the community bears the responsibility of sustaining them lest they fall. Lk 9:46-48 notes that the littlest (=
poor) is great, because what is done to him is done to Christ. Christians should not forget this.

In a missionary context (Mk 10:42) the mikroi are inept missionaries, who are nevertheless Christian disciples and as such are to be received by the brethren. This is true also of the elachistoi in the parable of the Last Judgment (Mt 25:31–46). Mk 9:36–37 speaks of receiving children in Christ's name, thus making “children” the equivalent of “little ones” or missionaries. In Jesus' speech, “little ones” are the poor, the afflicted, the simple, who are misled by their spiritual leaders (= the Pharisees). Jesus teaches His followers not to be “superior” to these little ones.

Next L. analyzes Mt 11:25–30 (par. Lk 10:21–22) into its component parts: (1) vv. 25–26 are Jesus' words; (2) v. 27 (Lk 10:22) was combined with the preceding verses in the source used by Mt and Lk; (3) vv. 28–30 belong to the Evangelist. L. also studies Mk 4:11–12 (and par.) here for background. The nêploi of Mt 11:25–26 are those of Jesus' hearers who can benefit from His revelation, because they have the requisite spiritual disposition, which is not so much humility as ignorance in contrast to the sophism of the wise and learned.

L. then moves to the Evangelists' uses of “child,” returning to the texts studied earlier in his work. In Mk 10:15, the child held up as model for the faithful is one who has confidence in those greater than he, in the adults, the parents, who represent to him power, knowledge, and help. Mk insists on a general disposition to receive the gospel. Lk's nêploi are the humble as contrasted with the proud. In an aside, L. notes that Mk 10:13–16 and par. do not directly envisage the baptism of children in the Evangelist's mind. Two other texts, Mt 18:1–4, and 19:13–15, also note that to receive the kingdom of heaven as a child is to receive it with the open, confident sentiments of a child dealing with a trusted adult. In Mt 11:25–30, the promised “rest” follows from the lightness of Jesus' yoke, which is light because Jesus is merciful. For Mt (21:15–16), the cleansing of the Temple is a prophetic act of restoration of the cult in the messianic age, Jesus stigmatizing cult as it exists in His own day. This act is also a foretaste of what is to come, the Temple's destruction. In this passage the children represent those who are properly disposed, as contrasted with the scribes and chief priests.

Before attempting to depict Jesus' own attitude towards children, L. surveys briefly the attitude of Jesus' contemporaries toward children. The Greco-Roman world admired certain qualities in the child, particularly his innocence and candor. Christian idealization of the child, particularly his innocence, owes much to this viewpoint. In the Bible and Jewish wisdom, however, the child, while a blessing of marriage, is not particularly idealized and has no special interest while he is a child. In fact, childhood
generally connotes infirmity of one kind or another. A lengthy study of the parable of the children in the market place provides further information on Jesus’ views (Mt 11:16-17; Lk 7:31-35). The parable shows children at play who mime and who cry out that other children have not understood their pantomime. The ignorance is thus a type of the spiritual incomprehension of the scribes and the Pharisees. All of this indicates that Jesus does not particularly idealize children and so reflects the views of His Jewish contemporaries. If one were to sum up His attitude as revealed in the texts, the summary would include His quite humanitarian love for children and His use of children’s characteristics as examples in His ministry. This usage points to the weakness of children as that which makes them the object of divine benevolence and leads Jesus to counsel their reception.

Excluded by L. from consideration in his work are the infancy narratives, non-doctrinal uses of “child,” and passages in which pais, paidion express only filiation without specifying age.

L.’s book, as he himself admits (p. 7), can easily give the reader the impression of a scattered sampling of texts. Yet L. has done what all must do who would evaluate Gospel texts. He has attempted to distinguish critically the various levels of the Gospel material so as to assign theological assertions to the appropriate stages of the Gospel’s transmission: to Jesus, to the early Church, or to the Evangelists themselves. Because of this, L. is sometimes prolix and often repetitious, but his positions and his reasons for them are clearly set forth. Theologians may weary of the critical task which must precede any interpretation of Gospel materials, but they cannot dispense themselves entirely from it. L. has done them a service in illustrating this theological process for at least one small part of NT teaching.


In view of the rapid spread of the neopentecostal experience within the Catholic Church, Prof. Bruner’s book comes at an exceedingly opportune time. B. examines the classical pentecostal theology of the Holy Spirit. In his first part he discusses without criticism the characteristics of this phenomenon (“‘power,’ the individual, the Spirit experience, the corporate and contemporaneity”), its world-wide expansion, its background from the OT to the twentieth century, and the religious, social, and cultural conditions which gave rise to it. He gives considerable space to the
“baptism in the Holy Spirit,” which appears to be the powerful descent of the Spirit accompanied by glossolalia. It is an experience distinct from conversion and the sacrament of baptism and can be obtained if certain conditions are fulfilled. Pentecostals base their doctrine on seven texts: Acts 2:38; 8:4–25; 9:17; 10–11; 19:1–7; Mk 1:9–11 and par. In the rest of his book B. seeks to show that these doctrines are not consonant with scholarly exegesis.

From p. 155, B. gives a critical and very good exegetical analysis of these and other pertinent texts. This is the most valuable portion of the book. He notes that in Acts 1:4–5 the Greek for promise is epaggelia, not hyposchesis, i.e., it is a gift, not a negotiable pledge. He notes also that the NT has no record of the Holy Spirit failing to come upon anyone. B. discovers the power of the Holy Spirit not in glossolalia but in His ability to join men to the risen Christ, so that they are able to be His representatives. He regards this as the highest blessing (pp. 160–61). He shows that at each critical point in the development of the Church God gives an extraordinary sign to instruct the Church concerning its missionary development, i.e., the Jerusalem Pentecost, the Samaritan Pentecost, the Gentile Pentecost, and the Ephesian Pentecost. In Luke’s account of Pentecost, B. sees no indication that glossolalia would be a normative Church experience, and he avers that Acts 2:49 shows clearly that baptism comprises both the forgiveness of sins and the reception of the Spirit (Acts 2:38b). Discussing the enigmatic text of the Samaritan Pentecost (Acts 8:4–24), he observes that this is the only record of persons who believed and were baptized and did not receive the Holy Spirit. God did not desire the Samaritan Church to begin without contact with the apostles and He wished to give a clear manifestation that the Holy Spirit had descended. God withheld the gift until they came. Nevertheless, this text is witness to the fact that baptism without the Holy Spirit was regarded as abnormal. Glossolalia is not mentioned in the text.

When B. considers Acts 10:44–48, the Gentile Pentecost, once again he sees tongues as an extraordinary sign, “unexpected, unrequired, and unusual.” Thus he concludes: “speaking in tongues in Acts is on all three occasions a corporate, church-founding, group-conversion phenomenon, and never the subsequent Spirit-experience of an individual.” The phrase “baptized in the Spirit” is only used at Pentecost and Caesarea. Indeed, the phrase is an appropriate one only for sacramental baptism as seen from Tit 3:5–6, Jn 3:5, etc.

Turning to Acts 19:1–7, the Ephesian Pentecost, B. naturally concludes that here the manifestation of the Spirit was given through tongues and prophecy to show the difference between the baptism of John and of Jesus. From p. 225, B. discusses the relationship between the law
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and the Spirit. He comments on the strange combination of legalism and spiritualism often to be found in such groups as pentecostalism. Discussing the Pentecostal endeavor to get rid of all known sin, he suggests perspicaciously that this might bring a belief in one's own righteousness with concomitant blindness. He feels that most important for the life of the Spirit are faith and love, and observes: "to date—and this is to us significant—we have not discovered the command of love on the list of Pentecostal conditions for the Spirit" (p. 278). From p. 285, B. discusses the problems at Corinth and sees an inclination for these people to go to extremes. In the Corinthian problem he finds an anticipated pentecostalism.

B. has set his mind to prove a point rather than beginning with an open question; nevertheless, his work is done in a scholarly and persuasive way. The importance of this book cannot be underestimated and should be a sine qua non for any pastor or neopentecostal leader who wishes to assist the movement within the Catholic Church. Already many of the doctrines and unscholarly views of Scripture obtaining in pentecostalism are circulating in neopentecostal circles, as may be seen, e.g., from the teaching of a dedicated man in one of the leading Catholic pentecostal communities. In a book entitled Baptized in a Spirit, he claims that the Holy Spirit comes subsequently to the sacrament of baptism, that the life of the Spirit consists in the extraordinary gifts rather than the fruits of the Spirit, and he appears to suggest that the Christian community is not the Church but the pentecostal community. It is only such books as B.'s which can enable us to bring out all that is good within the movement and to combine scholarship with spirituality.

Univ. of Notre Dame

J. MASSINGBERD FORD


After the two book-length monographs on the Paraclete in 1963 by Betz and Miguëns and the recent unusually long commentary treatment of Brown, Prof. Johnston's work merits considerable praise for offering new and often very provocative insights. Especially interesting and valuable is his informed and critical dialogue with earlier contributions, especially that of Betz. Betz had used mainly Qumran material to argue that the author of the fourth Gospel combined the figures of Israel's protecting archangel Michael, the spirit of truth, and the holy spirit of earlier Christian tradition in the one figure of the Paraclete. J. grants to Betz the importance of the connection between Michael and the spirit of truth, but argues that the creative hand of the Evangelist worked in a quite different way from that envisaged by Betz.
J.'s most fundamental criticism of Betz (cf. pp. 82–83) is that he insufficiently anchors his work in a broad understanding of John's theology. A major thematic concern of J. is that the paraclete sayings be treated only in the wider context of John's theology of spirit and over-all Christology. This concern has led him to devote the five chapters of a (somewhat shorter) first of two parts of his book to a rather uninspiring general survey of the "spirit" in the fourth Gospel.

An opening chapter of Part 1 studies the broad and diversified usage of "spirit" in the OT, in intertestamental (especially Qumran) literature, and in the fourth Gospel in its reference to divine and human, to angelic and demonic activity. Two sections of a second chapter study the texts where "spirit" is predicated of God (3:34 and 4:24) and of Jesus Christ (esp. 1:32 and 6:63). A third chapter, presenting an overview of the spirit-paraclete passages of chaps. 14–16, is largely devoted to a justification of text-critical decisions. In a fourth chapter the use of "spirit" as applied to Jesus' disciples (3:5–6; 4:23 f.; 7:37–39; 20:22 f.) is studied. The concluding chapter argues that "spirit" is used Christologically by John to show Jesus' power as messianic leader and teacher, a power with which his followers too are equipped.

Part 2 concentrates on the paraclete sayings. Chap. 6, however (the first of five chapters of Part 3), continues the methodological procedure of studying these sayings in their broader context by answering affirmatively the question "Are the spirit-paraclete sayings truly Johannine?" In contrast to Boismard, J. finds quite insufficient the various reasons adduced for suspecting the editorial hand of Luke behind these sayings. More positively, J. seeks to show a unity of idea between the paraclete sayings and the rest of the Gospel. Quite interestingly, e.g., he suggests (p. 69) "that the disciples in the Supper Room are being constituted as the Body of Christ and prepared for worship in spirit and truth" and that these ideas connect with those of Jesus' body, both "his own resurrection 'body' and at another level the 'body' of his Church," as being the new "Temple." Though it is often distressingly difficult to find unity, emphasis, and much coherence in J.'s chapters, it would seem that the major (hypothetical) conclusion of this chapter is that the paraclete sayings came from the same hand as that which earlier (in different circumstances and less complexly) had written 1 John.

Armed as he now is with the reasonable conviction that the paraclete sayings are not loose additions to the Gospel but integral expressions of its theology, specifically subordinated to its pneumatology and Christology, J. is ready in chap. 7 to cross swords with earlier scholars concerning the origin and function of the paraclete sayings. He has little difficulty in dismissing Bultmann's Mandaean theory. Barrett's and Brown's suggestions concerning the Paraclete as successor to Jesus (presence of the ab-
sent Jesus) are likewise competently criticized and dismissed. Greatest praise is bestowed on Mowinckel and Johannson for their pre-Qumran insight that the Hebrew métîits (intercessor) is the most likely candidate for explaining the background of the paraclete notion.

The thesis of chap. 8 reads (p. 119): “the author of the Fourth Gospel combined ‘spirit of truth’ with ‘paraclete’ in a deliberate rebuttal of heretical claims for an angel-intercessor as the spiritual guide and guardian of the Christian Church.” It can be seen how J. is here both depending on and reacting against Betz. I would like simply to state my fascination with the evidence assembled for this thesis and my suspicion that yet further and possibly even better evidence could be given. Hopefully, scholarship will react to J.’s hypothesis with as much critical insight as he gave to Betz’s.

The thesis of chap. 9 reads (p. 119): “the spirit-paraclete is the Spirit of God, which is also the Spirit of Christ, and thus an active divine power that becomes embodied in certain outstanding leaders within the catholic Church: the exegete, the teacher and evangelist, the prophet, the consoler out of sorrow, and the witness for the defence in times of persecution.” In seeking to establish this thesis, J. makes ample use of the major insight of Martyn concerning the two-level drama of the Gospel. A final chapter is devoted to an evaluation of Johannine spirituality. Here J. does battle with Käsemann’s recent claim that John is Docetic; unfortunately, he accepts many of Käsemann’s presuppositions. Accordingly, I found this chapter perhaps the weakest. The first of two appendices studies the structure of the Gospel; it is unfortunate that J. does not know the major monograph of Willemse (1965) on this topic. The second appendix studies the literary analysis of Jn 13–17. I did not find it very helpful.

J.’s book, especially Part 1, makes difficult reading. Such a variety of issues are treated, frequently in such a choppy, almost cryptic manner, that the reader must search with much good will for the valuable insights. Perhaps this difficulty is inherent in the presentation of such complex material; perhaps, however, J. would have produced a more convincing book had he chosen a more palatable organizational principle and used a more connected prose style.

Union Theological Seminary, N.Y.C. DONALD J. MURPHY, S.J.


This work is a dissertation written under the direction of Conleth Kearns of the Pontifical University of St. Thomas. The first part (Redak-
tionsgeschichte) begins with a consideration of the textual problems of the Gospel pericopes, followed by a redactional study of the four accounts. Part 2 (Sitz im Gemeindeleben) considers first the relationship of the empty-tomb tradition to the pre-Pauline kerygma in 1 Cor 15. The kerygmatic interest of the tradition is then elucidated, and the suggestion is made that the empty-tomb story is the basis for the practice, already attested by the end of the first century, of holding Christian liturgical assemblies on the first day of the week. This latter chronological notation, however modified, is a constant in all four accounts. It cannot be readily harmonized with the tradition of Jesus’ resurrection “on the third day,” as is often assumed. (The latter stems rather from the general OT notion, enforced by midrash and targum, that the third day is the day of salvation and deliverance.) Since no other convincing explanation has been offered for the Christian hallowing of the first day of the week, it is much more likely that this is due to the empty-tomb tradition than vice versa. Part 3, which bears the paradoxical title Sitz im Jesuleben, takes up the question of “The Reality of the Empty Tomb.”

There is much to be praised in this book. The widely-held view that the empty-tomb story represents a materialistic interpretation of the Easter appearances is convincingly refuted, and the historical evidence for holding that Jesus’ tomb was in fact empty is well presented. Moreover, although the proclamation of the Easter kerygma in the tomb by the angelus interpres is correctly shown to be legendary, B. points out the reasons for believing that a historical visit to the tomb by the women lies behind the present accounts.

B. exhibits an impressive familiarity with the relevant literature, although at times his cataloguing of opinions results in tedious reading and makes it difficult to determine to what extent his contribution goes beyond the findings of the studies which he so meticulously summarizes.

What most disappointed the present reviewer was the absence of any consideration of the hermeneutical problem of the empty tomb. Although B. speaks of the empty tomb as “the sign pointing to the attestation of the resurrection” (p. 167), he fails to distinguish adequately between the empty tomb as an objective fact (for which good historical evidence can be adduced) and the empty tomb as a sign of faith. In the latter way of viewing it, the empty tomb cannot be assumed to have the same significance for all generations of believers, since a sign inevitably involves a subjective or at least a culturally conditioned element.

B. repeats the oft-made observation that, in view of the Jewish understanding of “resurrection,” the resurrection of Jesus could not have been preached in Jerusalem if the tomb had been known to be occupied. At the same time he raises the question “whether all the descriptive details of Jewish thought on resurrection pertain to the dogma itself or whether
some of the details may be rightly considered as merely means, vehicles, used to express a viable doctrine” (p. 180). Having said this much, he really should have gone further.

The empty tomb is evidently required by Jewish anthropological and apocalyptic concepts: “a resurrected person implies an empty tomb, at least according to the Jewish mentality” (p. 174). This concession inevitably raises the question whether the understanding of resurrection implied by the empty-tomb tradition can be made a constitutive part of our present Easter faith, since to do so would be to canonize the Jewish apocalyptic conceptions which required the empty tomb for preaching the Easter kerygma in a Jewish milieu. The problem of distinguishing Christian eschatology from Jewish apocalyptic can scarcely be avoided in a consideration of the empty-tomb story, particularly since this problem bears intimately on the possibility of faith in the resurrection today. As one Catholic writer has put it (H. Ebert, “Die Krise des Osterglaubens,” Hochland, 1968-69, p. 325): “For us today the ‘miracle’ of the empty tomb is no sign of the resurrection but a strange phenomenon which burdens our faith rather than strengthening it. Putting it a bit strongly, we must believe not because of but in spite of the empty tomb.”

The truth emphasized by the Gospel apparition accounts that “the body of [the risen] Jesus... was real and identical with the body that died” (p. 163) retains its validity, but is Jesus’ corpse (which is not a “body” in any proper sense) a viable link between His mortal body and His resurrection body? Does “body” mean the same thing for us today that it meant for the NT writers?

B. might rejoin that such considerations lie beyond his concern as an exegete. However, in this particular question especially, the exegete must avoid the irresponsibility of thinking that “he is doing justice to scripture if he adapts himself to the period from which it comes; if, for example, he tries to realize early Christianity as a timeless ideal, instead of letting scripture encounter him where he really lives” (G. Ebeling, Word and Faith, p. 39). As G. Landes has remarked (UTQ 26, 277), “[the biblical exegete] is precisely the one most well-equipped to initiate the conversation with the systematic theologian, ethicist, or homiletician on what the guidelines and criteria may be for hearing the text as it speaks theologically to the contemporary scene without its ancient theological aspects being violated or distorted.” B.’s side-stepping of the hermeneutical problem is a real deficiency in his book. Nevertheless, it would be unfair to emphasize this lack to such an extent as to neglect the contribution that he has made in synthesizing and evaluating the enormous literature on the strictly exegetical and historical aspects of the problem.

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This book originated in a series of lectures given at the University of Münster during the winter semester of 1967-68 to members of all faculties. In a methodical manner Marxsen explains to a nontheological audience his understanding of the statement “Jesus is risen.”

An analysis of various traditions that precede the Gospels (1 Cor 15:5, Lk 24:34, Jn 21) leads to the more or less firm historical conclusion: after Good Friday, Simon was the first to come to faith in Jesus. Historical investigation can also establish that the Church claimed that Peter’s faith was grounded upon the “seeing” of Jesus. But we cannot affirm the actual reality of the “seeing” itself.

What was the nature of this alleged “seeing” of Peter and what was its relation to the credal assertion that “Jesus is risen”? M. concludes that this cannot be ascertained either from the indirect testimony to Peter’s “seeing” or from the direct testimony of Paul to his Damascus experience in 1 Cor 15:8, Gal 1:15–17, and 1 Cor 9:1–2.

However, the way in which Peter’s faith was enkindled after Good Friday is unimportant. The ways by which people come to faith are manifold. Faith itself is always the same. This faith of Peter and of all who come to faith after him does not differ in substance from the faith to which Jesus of Nazareth called men before Easter. The miracle of Easter is that Jesus evokes this faith even after His death. But this means that Jesus who was dead is alive. To express this, the first Christians made use of the current notion of the resurrection of the dead and acclaimed “He is risen.” This statement is an inference from, and an interpretation of, the reality of personal faith which was experienced as a miracle. Here God was at work endorsing Jesus as the person that He was. They therefore said “Jesus is risen.”

Today, when we experience our finding of faith as a miracle, we can express this miraculous character (i.e., the pre-eminent part of God or of Jesus in the birth of faith) by saying “Jesus is risen.” But because of the risk of being misunderstood today, M. suggests other ways of expressing this miraculous finding of faith. We may say (a) “the cause (or purpose) of Jesus continues” or (b) “He still comes today.” This re-expression is all the more justified because even in the NT we find other ways of expressing the reality of having come to faith, e.g., the image of exaltation. M. is of the opinion that we cannot totally dispense with the confession “Jesus is risen,” at least in our tradition. But we must know what we are confessing by it and what we are not. By it we confess that in finding faith we have experienced Jesus as living and acting. We
acknowledge the presence of Jesus’ past and the validity of the offer He made to rely on God in this life, etc.

M.’s analysis is guided by the premise that Christian faith cannot imply the acceptance of past events which cannot be positively verified by historical method. When the historian comes to the conclusion “I don’t know, I am no longer able to discover,” this answer must suffice for the believer too. Therefore he can be ruthless in eliminating from faith anything which cannot be positively verified by the historian, quick to discover possible discrepancies in testimony, and reluctant to look for unifying standpoints. By diluting and partially ignoring the normative kerygma of 1 Cor 15:3-5, by an untenable divide-and-conquer exegesis of the three passages in which Paul speaks of his Damascus experience (pp. 99-106), by an improbable exegesis of 1 Cor 15:14 (pp. 107-10), by an emphasis on faith as venture which opens the door to the charge of subjectivism, M. logically leads the reader step by step to his inevitable conclusion: “Jesus is risen” is only an interpretative statement concerning the miracle of present faith. It does not refer to an event which occurred in the past. If faith is always the same, as M. insists, it is difficult to see how the faith of Marxsen can be so different from the faith which Paul in 1 Cor 15:1-11 explicitly and solemnly affirms to be the faith of the entire apostolic Church.

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JOSEPH J. SMITH, S.J.


This book contains many ideas on the thought of Bonaventure, rather loosely strung together on the theme of a “theology of history.” The original German appeared ten years ago. In his foreword to the American edition Ratzinger says that, though he has not revised the book since its original publication, it still stands as a contribution to an appreciation of B.’s theology of history.

R. bases his treatment mainly on one work of Bonaventure, the Collationes in Hexaemeron, written in 1273, about fifteen years after B. had assumed the position of Minister General of the Franciscans. R. sees B. as having a twofold aim in the Collationes: the primary aim is to present a theology of history; the secondary, to heal the schism within the order caused by the rift between the Spirituals, who were influenced by the writings of Joachim of Fiore, and the less extreme party.

B.’s “theology of history” is based for the most part on analogy and parallelism. The initial structure is found in the division of the days of
creation; following upon this, there are parallels in the OT, then in the NT, and finally in the age of universal peace. The final age is an age of wisdom, contemplation, and peace that will exist here on earth. This age has already been prefigured in the life of St. Francis. When the final age comes completely, "the form of life of St. Francis will become the universal form of the Church—the *simplex et idiota* will triumph over the greatest scholars, and the Church of the final age will breathe the spirit of his spirit" (p. 162).

One can approach a critique of this work on three levels: by reflecting on the main thesis, or by looking at some of the author's subordinate asides, or by acting as referee for the running intramural debates with other Bonaventure scholars over some refinement of his thought. We shall limit ourselves to the first two levels.

The title of the book is not verified by the contents. There is not a developed theology of history in the *Collationes*, nor does R. present us with such a theology. However, we do find implications in his thought that could be used to build one. R. has assembled much data, but it is still in a largely unrefined form. It is difficult to trace the clue to the main theme through the labyrinthine ways of topics not directly connected with the main theme.

It seems, further, that a theology of history implies more than seeing history in terms of a series of parallel events, each of which succeeds the other, until one comes to the final state of spiritual peace on earth. How serious is B. in his presentation of the neat parallels? He sees the center as Christ, and the culmination as the age of peace, wisdom, and love, but does his conclusion depend on the fanciful parallels he constructs?

As for some of the asides, I think R. exaggerates the influence of Joachim of Fiore on subsequent thought, as well as Joachim's influence on Bonaventure. According to R., it was Joachim who gave us our contemporary Christian mentality toward history (p. 107). Again, he makes a great point out of the fact that up to the time of St. Francis "no boundary line [was] drawn between Scripture and the Fathers" (p. 79). By his evangelical life, according to R., Francis helped bring about this differentiation. To say the least, this could be contested.

It seems that, valuable as this contribution is (nearly one third of the book is footnotes and bibliography), Bonaventure's theology of history has still to be written. Whoever undertakes this task will find valuable source material in R.'s work.

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J. R. Sheets, S.J.

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A representative organized collection of the main teachings of the enigmatic Nicolaus of Cusa, the fifteenth-century forerunner of several typical principles of modern thought, on the notion of God as the non-other (non aliud), is offered by this work, which was originally written as a dissertation at the University of Münster in 1967. Schneider expands his proposed theme to include a general exposition of the metaphysics of Cusanus in order to locate the teaching on the non-other in the context of his whole philosophical-theological thought. This is carried out, with little direct reference to the book's explicit theme, in the first part, which comprises more than half the book. In four chapters S. treats (1) metaphysics as philosophy of thought, (2) the famous doctrine of learned ignorance, (3) the unity of opposites, and (4) the relation between God and the world.

In the first chapter S., following the popular thesis of S. Dangelmayr, K. H. Volkmann-Schluck, etc., presents Nicolaus of Cusa's metaphysics as one of transcendental subjectivity, i.e., the reflexive thinking of thought itself, whereby "the principles of reality can be apprehended and explained from the essence of our spirit" (p. 30). Here the capacity of human knowledge is assigned no bounds; indeed, man is, in this respect, himself "a second, a human God" (p. 38). "The human spirit's infinite possibility corresponds to the infinite reality of the divine spirit" (p. 38). Moreover, as all real entities flow from the divine Creator, so all intentional entities are to flow from man's creative intellect. If Nicolaus had written no more than what we read in this chapter, one would seem justified in considering him a typical modern idealist. This thesis, however, stands in contradiction to the main intent of S.'s study, although he quite ignores this fact and continues his treatment without any attempt to reconcile the arising discrepancies.

In the following chapter, the teaching on our docta ignorantia is depicted primarily in the Socratic sense as being knowledge of our own ignorance, although the deeper, more characteristic aspect as a positive ultimate achievement of critical reflection is not completely disregarded. Here, as in many other places in this book, the reader is unfortunately left wondering how the paradoxical views of Cusanus are to be amalgamated. For example, on p. 45 our ineluctable ignorance is established by means of the Aristotelian principle that a natural desire cannot be frustrated, while two pages further the same principle is employed to sustain the conclusion that our ignorance can indeed be overcome after all.

In his search for a primary and absolutely certain presupposition, Nicolaus appealed not to his own thought, as a truly subjective philosopher would do, but rather, as S. shows in his third chapter, to God, understood as the maximum absolutum and, especially, as the coincidentia oppositorum. In this context the (Barthian) notion of God as the
ganz Anderer is explained as standing in a relationship of simultaneity to the notion of non aliud.

The introductory treatment of the basic tenets of Cusanus’ metaphysics is concluded, in the fourth chapter, with the doctrine of the world as the unfolding (explicatio) of what exists as enfolded (complicatio) in God. The basic characteristics of the world (i.e., everything exclusive of God) according to Cusanus are here summarily explained: incomprehensibility, "privative" boundlessness, contractedness, createdness, revelation of God, diversity.

The second part of the book, which takes up the theme properly speaking, has also been divided into four chapters: (1) “Directio speculantis”; (2) “God as ‘non aliud’”; (3) “The Relational Reference-Character of the Other to the Non-Other”; and (4) “Non aliud est non aliud quam non aliud” (i.e., the definition of non aliud). In the empirical sphere, explains S., to be non-other means to be self-identical. Every aliud is grounded in non aliud; furthermore, every instance of knowledge of an aliud presupposes an implicit knowledge of non aliud, “cum sit cogitationum cogitatio” (cited p. 146). The principle of identity as well as that of noncontradiction are contained in the non aliud. “Every something is the non-other of itself, or is nothing other than itself” (p. 112).

Transcending the metaphysical dichotomy between other and self, the notion of non aliud offers the most appropriate cipher for the hidden divine essence (coincidentia oppositorum) that lies beyond the “wall” of opposition as the oppositio oppositorum sine oppositione. “In the homogeneity of Cusanus’ attempt to view, without seeing, the hidden God, the name non aliud leads the viewer beyond every sense perception, every rational knowledge and every intellectual insight to a kind of mystical vision” (p. 122). God is thereby enigmatically denoted as the universal cause of all that is and, indeed, the very ground of the transcendental Being of all beings. Simultaneously, without any separation, a maximum of transcendence with a maximum of immanence is brought to expression. God is thus everything in everything and, nevertheless, nothing of anything or, in the terms of Pseudo-Dionysius, nothing in nothing. His substance, observes Cusanus, is “supersubstantial”; it is “substance without substance and insubstantial substance and nonsubstantial substance and substance before substance” (cited p. 134). Nothingness, Being, and even the Neoplatonic Unity are superseded by Him. “The non-other is in the negation of the negation the highest affirmation” (p. 137), subsuming in its own simplicity the logical dichotomy of negation and affirmation.

The value of this study lies, above all, in the abundance of texts S. has assembled and respectively interpreted. It serves thus as an excellent
introduction to the central notions of Cusanus' metaphysical theology. Unfortunately, though S. expressly affirms an intrinsic continuity in Cusanus' thought, he seldom attempts to show how its various apparent incompatibilities and (at least) verbal contradictions are to be reconciled. Instead, different doctrines are eclectically placed in a row next to one another as though complementary. If the book argues a thesis, it is that non aliud represents, in the opinion of Cusanus, the ultimate and most adequate possible notion of God that we can attain (cf., e.g., pp. 5, 129, 169). In this regard, S. tends to overlook the utterings on the notion of posse ipsum, which Nicolaus later developed and of which he also explicitly predicated the very same privilege.

Mainz

William J. Hoye


Out of a series of his articles in scholarly journals and out of his doctoral thesis, Weinstein has composed a first-rate book on the Savonarola movement at the close of the Florentine quattrocento. The study centers around S.'s prophetic and political ideas, their development and reception. After clearing the ground of fanatical eulogies of "the martyred friar" and of traditional caricatures of S. (largely stemming from Jacob Burckhardt's characterization of him as a self-deluded visionary who attempted to wreck Renaissance culture), W. updates Savonarola scholarship of the last hundred years by placing S.'s preaching within the triple context of Florence's civic tradition, S.'s Thomistic politics, and late-medieval apocalyptic expectations.

The crisis of the French invasion of Italy in the autumn of 1494 and the consequent fall of the Medici brought S., "the preacher of penance" and "prophet of doom," to the forefront of Florentine civic life. By his preaching he intervened decisively in the constitutional reform of December 1494, advocating the formation of the Florentine Great Council in imitation of a Venetian model. It is this intervention in Florentine political life that W. signals as the decisive transition in S.'s preaching from apocalyptic despair to millenarian hope. S. came to adopt traditional Florentine expectations on the role of their city in the Church and the world. Florence would be the new Jerusalem and the new Rome. Thus S.'s ascendency was based on the compatibility of his prophetic mission and Florentine needs.

W. follows Eugenio Garin's lead in showing how much S. came to have in common with contemporary Florentine intelligentsia. Among his fol-
lowers he counted Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and his nephew Gianfrancesco, the poet Benivieni and the politician Francesco Valori. The painter Sandro Botticelli was affected in his last years by the same penitential current, and the same millenarian expectations for Florence. An examination of the writings of several contemporary Florentine humanists yields expressions of civic concern parallel to the friar's. The generation that followed S.'s execution as a heretic and schismatic continued to link visions of Church renewal with dreams of civic liberty, and this is why the restored Medici discouraged pious memories of S.

For W., the Savonarola movement was no momentary aberration in the history of Florence but a symptomatic expression of urgent Florentine concerns. The same elements that made Florence the cradle of the Italian Renaissance—"the extensive development of a bourgeois, mercantile society, a lay culture, and an ardent republicanism" (p. 377)—combined to produce the Savonarola movement, a harbinger of the Reformation.

W.'s book is not a biography; he underscores the adequacy of Schnitzer's and Ridolfi's critical works. Yet, to his patient study of the ideas of the reforming friar and of his circle W. could well add a more thoroughgoing psychoanalytical account of S.'s entrance into the Dominicans than the one on p. 81, and perhaps an evaluation of Dominican ascetical practices in S.'s time. It would be interesting, too, to have some wider investigation of the composition of S.'s audiences and of the format and delivery of his sermons. These questions may not be entirely unrelated to W.'s underlying theme, prophecy and patriotism in the Renaissance.

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FERNANDO PICÓ, S.J.


"Post-Reformation Lutheranism" is Preus's term for the period of Lutheran orthodoxy, conventionally thought of as spanning the era from 1580 (the year in which Francis de Suarez began lecturing on St. Thomas' Summa in the Roman College) to 1713 (the year in which Unigenitus condemned Jansenism). The termini in the history of Lutheran theology are the publication of the Book of Concord and the death of David Hollazius the Elder. The theology of this period is of great importance for understanding subsequent Lutheran theology, particularly the theology of the Lutheran bodies in North America. The theological revival of the nine-
teenth century that shaped the thinking of American Lutheranism was as much a revival of the systematic theology of the era of orthodoxy as it was a return to the theology of the Lutheran symbolical books.

The theology of Lutheran orthodoxy has had a generally bad press in English; Gerald R. Cragg, The Church and the Age of Reason (Baltimore, 1960) is merely one recent instance in a long line of examples. But the last few decades have seen the beginnings of a reappraisal in both Europe and America, and the number both of primary sources in English translation and of careful monographic investigations into the theology of Lutheran orthodoxy has grown steadily if unspectacularly. The present volume belongs to the latter category. P.'s credentials are ample; he is a University of Edinburgh Ph.D. (his dissertation was on the doctrine of inspiration in the theologians of Lutheran orthodoxy), a Strasbourg Docteur de l'Université, and professor of systematic theology at Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, since 1957.

The book itself is the first volume of a projected two-volume work. In addition to background material on the era of Lutheran orthodoxy, it surveys the origin and development of theological prolegomena and dogmatics during this period. ("Prolegomena" is the Lutheran designation for the preliminary considerations with which Lutheran dogmaticians prefaced their systematic theologies; it covered such issues as the definition of theology, natural and revealed theology, the theologian's need of the Holy Spirit, true and false religion, revelation as the source of theology, the relation of revelation to reason and philosophy, Scripture, articles of faith, and the role of creeds and symbolical books.) P. is unabashed about his bias toward the theologians and the theology that are his subject. He writes with total sympathy for them. Their foes are his foes. At the same time he writes with an impressive firsthand command of the sources that calls for an attentive hearing. This work is an ecumenically important addition to the bibliography of its era; it is to be hoped that the second volume—a treatment of the positions that the theologians of Lutheran orthodoxy took on the individual articles of the faith—will soon become available.

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ARTHUR CARL PIEPKORN


Vargish has written a fine introduction to Newman's philosophy of mind. He shows that, before his conversion to Catholicism, N. had constructed a philosophy which informs the major writings of the Catholic period and looks forward to the more definitive treatment of the mind in
the Grammar of Assent. More specifically, he demonstrates the relevance of this philosophy to three areas: N.'s social criticism, his theories of education, and his novels and the Apologia. V. has not attempted a definitive treatment of N.'s epistemology, which would have entailed a rigorous examination of the Philosop hic Notebook and the Grammar of Assent. But he has caught the general spirit and tendency of N.'s philosophy, if he has not examined it in all its myriad details and nuances.

V. is familiar with both primary and secondary source material and fully aware of difficulties in interpreting N. By and large, he handles these problems with competence and reasonableness. The only differences this reviewer would have in interpretation occur in the section on N.'s theories of education. The assertion that "Newman excludes from his ideal university the teaching of practical secular knowledge, useful or 'utilitarian' training of any sort," is not accurate. N. only argued against making professional knowledge "the sufficient end of a University education. . . . In saying that Law or Medicine is not the end of a University course, I do not mean to imply that the University does not teach Law or Medicine. It teaches all knowledge by teaching all branches of knowledge, and in no other way."

The second problem is the relationship between secular knowledge and Christianity. V. begins his discussion with a quotation from Culler's The Imperial Intellect: "If we pursue liberal knowledge as a kind of mental gymnastic, a mere exercise of the mind, are we not in danger of sacrificing the power which knowledge has of placing us in communion with reality?" He goes on to affirm that Culler gives "what is certainly the right answer to his question, that liberal knowledge offers the intellect a perception of 'the rational character of reality' as well as providing a means to its own enlargement." But V. is uneasy with this answer, for he expresses certain misgivings. "The general effect of a careful reading of the work [i.e., the Discourses,] I think, is to reduce one's sense of the external importance of what is being taught. . . . For if the arts and sciences are viewed primarily as exercises for the development of the student's mental powers, then the importance within the university of their external reality, the objective truth of their discoveries, maxims, and principles, is lowered." Again, "it may be said of Newman that he regards knowledge as dangerous when it becomes utilitarian." On the other hand, "partly because Catholic doctrine must be viewed as a useful knowledge, or at least because to regard it primarily as an exercise for the enlargement of the mind approaches dangerously near to a merely subjective religion, Newman had real difficulty in finding the proper place for theology in his circle of sciences."

V. seems to be implying in these statements that N. subordinated truth or contact with reality to intellectual development, and that when one
studies a subject matter as a discipline or enlargement of mind, this lessens the mind's contact with objective truth. But N. never separated knowledge from truth. The development of a comprehensiveness of mind is precisely to put oneself in greater contact with the real, while the failure to include theology in the curriculum will lead to an unreal view or narrowness of mind. "The function of philosophy," N. affirms, "is to view all things in their mutual relations, and its object is truth." Mental enlargement or mental development, therefore, comes only from the contemplation of objective truth. Such enlargement of mind or liberal knowledge is not subjective, except insofar as it is the subjective possession of objective truth.

V. seems to have come to his position by some sort of reasoning such as Msgr. Davis attributed to Culler: "Knowledge is either for some purpose beyond the mind, or it is for the sake of mental refinement. If it is for a purpose beyond the mind, it is objective and utilitarian. If it is for the mind, it is subjective and liberal." But this is to misunderstand N. and to place a dichotomy where he did not. Religion need not necessarily be liberal nor need liberal knowledge be necessarily religious. If one studies any science, including theology, simply for the love of itself or for truth and not for some practical purpose, that knowledge N. calls liberal. If one studies theology for moral improvement or to prepare oneself for the ministry, that knowledge he calls utilitarian. To study it as liberal knowledge does not make it less truthful or less objective, no more than to study natural science for its own sake and not as a preparation for becoming a doctor or engineer makes that science less truthful or less objective. "Useful knowledge," says N., "is the possession of truth as powerful, Liberal knowledge is the apprehension of it as beautiful. Pursue it, either as beauty or as power, to its furthest extent and its true limit, and you are led by either road to the Eternal and Infinite, to the intimations of conscience and the announcements of the Church."

The relationship of knowledge to action is another point, and N. takes this up in the eighth Discourse, where he considers the relationship of liberal knowledge to religious duty. But duty implies conscience, not merely knowledge. And N. insists that knowledge is not virtue. Consequently, he can go on to affirm that liberal knowledge can exist in a Christian saint or in an apostate, it can help or it can hinder the development of a Christian. By itself, liberal knowledge has indirect religious or moral effects. Indeed, left to itself, the liberally educated mind, without a religious principle, will set up "a religion of civilization," by which N. meant simply a code of civilized social behavior. He spends the entire discourse showing how this resembles but yet differs from Christian behavior.

To make these points at some length is not to imply a major defect in
this book. It has many excellent things to say and it says them with urbanity and charm.

Fordham University

VINCENT FERRER BLEHL, S.J.


Through most of his life C. G. Jung considered himself an empirical psychologist, and more than once he has asked that his critics judge him on this basis. But whether one is a critic of Jung or an ardent disciple, it is evident that his writings contain much that is not empirical psychology. Jung has written interpretations of history, literary criticism, metaphysics, and theology; he read widely in religious and esoteric literature. It follows that anyone trying to evaluate Jung’s achievement must have a broad background and many skills—but even then he cannot be sure what critical standards are relevant.

Moreno, a Dominican priest on the faculty of the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley, is a philosopher, theologian, and scientist who demonstrates an easy familiarity with the texts of Jung. But in spite of these qualifications, the book has a number of limitations. At first appearance it seems to be an exposition and critical appraisal of Jung’s thought, but this is not always the case: e.g., in a chapter titled “Jung’s Ideas on Neurosis,” M. outlines a way of understanding neurosis in terms of scholastic philosophy. In the course of the chapter Jung and numerous other contemporary authors are quoted to illustrate the scholastic thesis. The thesis is not without merit and in his presentation M. demonstrates his wide familiarity with ancient and modern authors, but the reader is confused when a chapter titled “Jung’s Ideas on Neurosis” makes no systematic effort to determine what Jung meant by a neurosis.

Other chapters do offer an exposition of Jung, but the exposition often becomes unnecessarily difficult: Thus, on p. 76 M. writes: “myth is no more than a living religion.” This is an unfamiliar way of defining myth, but the difficulty is increased when myth and religion are linked in four more ways in the same paragraph: “myth is the religion of primitive man” (living religion is the religion of primitive man?), “the contents of religion in modern man are underlined by mythical contents,” “Myth is therefore the crux for understanding religion,” and “From myth to religion, Jung says, there is only one step.” I am not able to get a coherent picture of what is intended by these texts.

Jung spoke of God in many ambiguous ways during his long and productive career. He often spoke as though God were an archetype in the collective unconscious, or as if God were identified with psychic energy or psychic processes. But one suspects that many of Jung’s phrases sound
more unorthodox than they are. Christian theologians have spoken of God in psychic terms (Augustine and Thomas on the Trinity, John of the Cross, "The center of the soul is God," etc.). M. is obviously familiar with the writings of Jung, Augustine, Thomas, John of the Cross, etc., but he does not make the careful analysis called for. His treatment of this point is brief and his phrasing is loose. On p. 83 M. ends one paragraph: "What is, therefore, God? The soul’s deepest and closest intimacies is precisely what God is." This key statement is presented as an exposition of Jung; it is not footnoted. I am unable to relate it to my own understanding of Jung. The difficulty is increased when the following sentence begins: "If God lies in the deepest and closest intimacies of the soul . . . " It would seem that this sentence is intended to pick up what was said in the previous one, but a decisive difference has been overlooked: Are these intimacies "what God is" or wherein "God lies"? Here as elsewhere the phrasing is not sufficiently precise.

M.’s book has its advantages: it cites a number of passages from the writings of Christian mystics that show interesting parallels with the writings of Jung; it shows how insights from scholastic philosophy can be related to the work of a contemporary psychologist; it presents a critique of Jung’s constant preoccupation with the metaphysics of evil that is well done and to the point. But for a careful exposition of Jung and analysis of his religious writing, one would be better advised to read the studies by Victor White, O.P., or Raymond Hostie, S.J.

Georgetown University

THOMAS M. KING, S.J.


Work, Society and Culture is the fourth posthumous work of Yves Simon (+ 1959) to be published by Fordham University Press. Ably edited by Vukan Kuic, who has provided a brief introduction to Simon’s philosophic work, the text is essentially that of a course on “Work and the Workman” given by the author at the University of Chicago during the spring quarter of 1958. These lectures, which were taped and later edited by Simon himself, have been supplemented by some additional material available to the editor. Kuic has done a fine job of editing this material into a coherent whole which easily stands on its own in book form.

Few problems are of greater theoretic and practical importance in contemporary society and culture than that of work and its relatals. Almost from the beginning of his career, S. was concerned with them: his Trois leçons sur le travail was first published in 1938; it was followed by a number of articles on the same subject over the years. Work, Society and Culture is the mature fruit of a long and painstaking reflection by a phi-
philosopher nurtured in the tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas and deeply concerned with the social problems of our time.

S. begins with two masterful chapters on the concept of work and the relation of work and society. Both are essential to establish a definition, for "it is clear that 'work' cannot be defined in metaphysical terms alone and that the social component in its definition will in some sense be decisive." Work involves, in addition to social utility, activities of "legal fulfilment," i.e., activities subject to law in the broadest sense, which S. opposes to activities of free development; these latter, for S., are never work. Marxists and perhaps a good many others will disagree with him here, but the distinctions he makes allow for some surprising and eminently clarifying applications, particularly with regard to the nature of culture. Although much of the material here is fairly traditional, S. reinvigorates it with a number of fresh insights whose fecundity is borne out in the rest of the book.

S.'s carefully wrought definition established, the author-professor leads his readers-students (the direct and frank tone of the classroom has been maintained in the text, along with the methodical art, the homely examples, and the flashes of humor of a master pedagogue) to a progressive penetration of the nature of work understood in function of some of its fundamental concretizations: man at work, the working class, work and wealth, work and culture are the chapters which follow. Buttressed by an impressive but discreet erudition, S. deploys in these chapters a remarkable philosophic acuity in critically examining a number of difficult problems in the social psychology, sociology, history, and economics of work. Many of his insights deserve book-length development in their own right, as S. was doubtless aware. He is an inquirer here, occasionally a pioneer; suffice it to say that the issues he raises are important, profoundly grasped, and interestingly, often originally developed. Never does S. lose sight of the properly philosophic dimension of the subject he is treating and the need for rigorous conceptual analysis; but his concepts remain open to determinations which can only come from history, psychology, sociology, economics, etc., even as these fields are critically informed by the theoretic concepts of the philosopher. To be sure, there is matter here for ample debate, and there are inevitably other problems one would like to have seen developed. S. knew well the magnitude of his task; what he accomplishes here is destined to clarify and stimulate the thought of anyone willing to grapple with the problems he raises.

The lengthy final chapter on work and culture is the culmination of the preceding analyses; in it S. advances an original and profoundly integrated conception of work, culture, and society, where culture is based not on leisure but on work. The book concludes with some brief in-
indications on the theory of culture demanded by this conception. Its implications are far-reaching indeed.

There have been a number of excellent philosophical studies of the central problem of work in recent years. Work, Society and Culture deserves a place among the best of them. The book includes a complete bibliography of S.'s writings compiled by Anthony Simon.

Le Moyne College, Syracuse

Thomas Ewens


Comparisons are odious and sometimes, unfortunately, inevitable. The three studies on priesthood gathered into this volume are hardly of equal caliber. In my opinion, the second study, an essay on the NT basis of the priesthood by Heinrich Schlier, towers majestically above its two companion pieces. There is much to commend in S.'s work. He pinpoints with astonishing precision the stages of organic development starting in the priesthood of Christ Himself, on through the priestly ministry of the apostles, to a subsequent apostolic priesthood existing within the context of a priestly people. With a special nicety he discusses the priestly authority wielded by the apostles and their associates. From a sensitive reading of texts in Paul he can show the source of this authority to be Christ alone. It is S.’s contention—and this appears more and more convincing as he elaborates his thesis—that the premises of the priestly office are to be sought not in the priestly office as it materialized in NT times but rather in the principles that guided the establishment of that office at that point in time. These principles, he feels, have been normative within the Church since those days. Most of all one appreciates the clarity S. is able to bring to questions of priesthood origins that have too long been clouded over. The conclusions achieved in the body of the article are tidily pulled together in a double series at the end.

The first article in the book is a discussion of priesthood in the OT by Alfons Deissler. It is very minutely researched, is generally exact in its assertions, but its chief failure seems to be its inability to come to a point. The reader has the impression of being led through a maze of OT texts and theory that lead next to nowhere. An instance in point is D.'s extended discussion of the possible connection between the secular tribe of Levi and the later sacerdotal Levites. The views of Eichrodt, von Rad, DeVaux, and Gunnsweg on the issue are duly noted, but nothing much develops from all this; the matter is left pending. Also, D.'s attempt to derive kōhēn (priest) from kūn (to stand) has less to recommend it than he seems to believe. Further, he does not make sufficiently clear that in
the postexilic era the priest remained essentially what he had been in earlier times, the attendant of the sanctuary, even though his role had taken on considerable complexity with the passage of years. On the positive side, one might mention that D. argues convincingly to show that the OT priesthood is largely irrelevant for the NT.

The third paper is an attempted analysis by Jean-Paul Audet of the contemporary relationships between clergy and laity. A.'s scholarship is at its exciting best when he studies the self-consciousness and self-definition of the early Church. He shows that the Church of those times conceived of itself by preference as a brotherhood—before and more than it viewed itself as people of God. Fascinatingly and with flawless logic he traces this image back to the speech and thought habit of Jesus. It is when he comes to apply his sterling exegesis to the modern situation that A. appears to falter. His delineation of the modern scene and its urgencies inspires little confidence. For one thing, he credits today's youth and youth culture with more wisdom and virtue than the facts seem to warrant. His proposed solutions do not carry conviction; the result is that his plea for change comes off more strident than cogent.

_Darlington Seminary, Ramsey, N.J._


These three works add fresh material of varying quality to the mounting store of scriptural, historical, systematic, and pastoral studies of the Christian ministry. Mohler's work is a popular, modest-size, careful exposition of the origin and evolution of the priesthood during the first four Christian centuries. He is most helpful when he speaks of prophets and presbyters of the second century, and the development from presbyter to priest during the third and fourth centuries. For a treatment of the NT evidence, one would be better advised to consult Raymond E. Brown's recent _Priest and Bishop: Biblical Reflections_ (Paulist, 1970). The other two volumes, each a collection of studies prepared for a symposium on the priesthood, are similar in scope and purpose. They each bring Scripture scholars, historical and systematic theologians, and behavioral scientists to confront the identity crisis of today's priest. While the studies edited by Meagher
are of generally good quality and include an excellent article by Joseph Ratzinger on the nature of the Christian minister's mediatorship, the collection edited by Lash, in addition to being larger, is of uniformly high quality.

Despite the wealth of scriptural and historical studies on the ministry, much more work needs to be done. But the most pressing question facing us is, how do we use the evidence at hand in working toward a resolution of the identity crisis of the priest. The crisis is real: vocations to the priesthood are down, the rate of men leaving the active ministry is relatively high when compared to the years preceding Vatican II, and a significant number of those priests remaining active are seriously dissatisfied with the shape of their ministry and life style. The economic, educational, and social condition of the Catholic community in the U.S. has changed rapidly over the past thirty years, and the Church universal has undergone an equally rapid theological and political transition from the defensive Church of the post-Reformation to the open Church of our ecumenical age. Much of the glue that held the Catholic community together and which also located the priest within the community and served to give him an identity has melted away. Today's priest must find a way to serve the local church in a new cultural situation. What guidelines can he use? How can theology, history, and contemporary behavioral studies help him as he seeks to fashion a contemporary ministry consonant with the Church's ministerial tradition?

The continuing study of history is essential: it frees us from the tendency to absolutize any one cultural manifestation of the priestly ministry, whether of the first century or of the nineteenth. At the same time, a certain few fundamental identifying characteristics of the presbyter seem to emerge. Analogous to the way an individual person comes to a sense of his own identity as he passes from one growth stage to another, the presbyter has received an identification as he functioned in succeeding ages of the Church's history. To be specific, the presbyter, first of all, has always been an officially recognized servant of a community of faith, hope, and love. Secondly, whether as a counselor of a bishop or as a more independent pastor of a local parish, he has been involved in continuing the ministry of Jesus Christ, the ministry of preaching the kingdom and of unifying mankind. Yet, in the exercise of this service, he has been at one time a social misfit, at another an esteemed member of the social order, has been celibate, has been married, has been a common man among common men, has been a member of a high social caste. At times he has been a bishop's assistant, exercising very few functions, and over a longer period of time has been called upon to stand in the midst of a community as the representative of Christ, the priest, prophet, and king, to stand as a sacrament
of Christ, the head in the midst of His Body, exercising a full ministry of sanctification, preaching, and governance.

The presbyter has always been called to respond to his vocation and to his ordination to the official ministry by living the Word of God in his own life, by helping others hear the Word and respond generously to it, and, through most of the Church's history at least, by presiding at the sacramental celebrations of their life in Christ. He has always been called upon to discern how best to exercise this ministry. Today the same obligation of discernment rests with the priest. This is the way the priest will achieve a sense of identity. What is upsetting to priests and others in the Church today is that fidelity to the Spirit is sometimes calling into question long-accepted activities and ministerial life styles. What is needed, perhaps, is much more confidence in the Spirit and more serious attention to the discernment of spirits. In this context we find very helpful for study and prayer the Progress Report of the Subcommittee on the Systematic Theology of the Priesthood prepared for the American hierarchy under the direction of Carl J. Armbruster, S.J. The report contains a fine summary of current thinking on the priesthood and should help bishops and priests in the discerning process. Another significant help would be the papers of the ninth Downside symposium. They are informative, thought-provoking, consoling, and challenging. While it is difficult to recommend one article over another in this collection, I found the articles by J. Leclercq, J. Kent, R. P. McDermott, and S. Moore the most rewarding.

Woodstock College, N.Y.C. 

Lawrence J. Madden, S.J.


This work publishes the research and reaction papers delivered at the Feasibility Study on a National Pastoral Conference (NPC) conducted at Mundelein College, August 1970, and concludes with some specific reservations of some conservative American Catholics, notably the Catholics United for the Faith (CUF). The book does not contain the donnybrook overtones that this first assembly of post-Vatican II American Catholics portrayed. The inane interventions of youth; the telling and prophetic remarks of minority groups; the inspiring faith, love, and hope of many laity, religious, and priests; the massive anxiety and alienation of the right; the "taunting-the-bully" tactics of the extreme left—all made Mundelein '70 an experience landmark of the American Catholic Church. Exposed were the myths that the liturgy and Eucharist would create unity when we knew all the time the Lord was right and we had to reconcile ourselves with our brothers first; gone was the hope that the big-business practice of "happy hours" and "attitude adjustment" periods would ful-
fil the Psalmist's dream "Behold how good and pleasant it is when brothers dwell in unity" (Ps 133). This book gives us a bloodless, antiseptic version of the weekend when many learned how divided we are, how radically different our understanding of Church and mission is, how bonds of trust and forgiveness are our primary needs, and how truly Christian we must become to fill the virtue gap that we all have when operating in the context of "participatory structures." Since Mundelein '70, the NCCM in its monthly journal Parish Today (cf. Dec. 1970, Feb. 1971, April 1971) has sought to popularize the contents of this book and to seek the advice and reaction of parish councils. For those who wish to consult the original scholarly contributions, this work will be of great assistance.

The problems related to establishing a NPC are: (1) Is there biblical and theological support for it? (2) What lessons does history offer, particularly the American Catholic experience? (3) What form would the NPC take? (4) What would be the competence of the NPC?

Avery Dulles, S.J., a member of the USCC Advisory Board, begins with a paper that was not delivered at Mundelein but is a welcome addition to the discussion. He explains the conciliar traditions of the Church and describes the various conciliar organs established by Vatican II. He is vague in regard to the competence of the NPC; he refers to it as a "consultative organ" (p. 11), says it should give "prudent advice" (p. 14), but the strong basis he gives to the NPC theologically gives reason to believe he expects more. In the end he opts for a less legalistically conceived NPC and apparently places its authority in the wisdom of its decrees and the moral suasion engendered by its consensus.

Thomas O'Meara, O.P., establishes theological verification for a NPC in the "fundamentally communal nature of the Church" (p. 22). Actually he builds a better argument for the communio nature of the Church than he does for the NPC. He referred to this in a talk before the canon lawyers (Canon Law Proceedings 1970, p. 10) and claimed that only our thought forms and past ecclesiology prevent us from seeing this link. He concludes that new and significant ecclesial realizations are possible in the coming decades and places high hopes in the NPC.

James Hennesey, S.J., states that we are heirs to a substantial history of conciliar and collegial tradition in the American Church. After developing the conciliar history of the Councils of Baltimore, the paraconciliar tradition of Bishop John England of Charleston (1820-42), and other late-nineteenth-century movements, H. moves into the contemporary period of collegiality with great ease. His reactors thought he had gone too far. John Anderson of Holy Cross College recalls that for a century we have lived with centralized authority and have sought to minimize the distinctiveness of national churches; for him, the American conciliar traditions offer scant precedent for a NPC. Michael Gannon of the University of
Florida sees the historic precedent for a NPC not in the conciliar tradition but in the spirit of episcopal leadership that sparked the “inopportunist” posture at Vatican I and showed an ecumenical outreach in the late-nineteenth century. If the bishops want a NPC, they will have to lead the people to this end. This is a trenchant insight.

William LaDue of Milwaukee addressed himself to the ticklish problem of competence. In a superb article he distinguishes himself as the prototype “structural theologian” who decategorizes out of canon law and into the structural implications of post-Vatican II ecclesiology. He is the only one to raise the crucial question of the distinct shepherding prerogatives of the hierarchical priesthood. Other papers failed to linger on this distinction. Biblical scholars, theologians, and ecumenists know the Church could be vastly different in its “holy ordering,” and so their failure to wrestle with the theological value of history’s legacy to us as organized Church is counterproductive to their cause. If history and ecumenics prove flexibility in the ordering of Church life, they also prove that attempts to integrate priests and laity into the authority structures of the Church will fail if the distinctive character of office and leadership of pope and bishops is not carefully delineated. There must be a workable tertium between ignoring the question of office and making exaggerated claims for it. L.’s paper is a significant contribution here.

Arthur X. Deegan of Detroit addresses himself in a practical article to the problems of choosing members to a NPC: how it is organized, size, etc. These housekeeping details stretch the mind to better appreciate the enormity of the undertaking and the need to develop in the Church a sensitivity to the pastoral art of good government. Church government must return to a pastoral expertise, and D. does us a service in clarifying details of good Church administration and indirectly establishing criteria as to the type of leaders (bishops) who could function effectively in a collegial national enterprise.

CUF et al. conclude this book with some reservations re a NPC. Their crystal ball sees the ruin of papal authority, doctrinal dilution, and Agnewese fear of manipulation by media, etc. One wonders how and why they are so sure. Nothing happened at Mundelein ’70 to allay their fears, and the failure of the liberals to dialogue, and the moderates to resist polarization, insured the frustration and failure of the Consultation. Two cries in the wilderness were significant. First, Cynthia Wedel, President of the NCC, urged the Consultation to come up with something new, a new model of lay participation, and not to mimic the bicameral structures of American Protestantism. Another group, perhaps in response to Mrs. Wedel, proposed “a series of pastoral consultations on such crucial issues as war, race, youth, ecology, population, the aged, ecumenism, and women. . . . The conferences would have the authority of moral suasion.”
It has been said that the Roman Catholic Church must become a surrogate for all Christianity in its second great attempt at renewal. A NPC drawing from the diversity and pluriformity of the American experience must be able to heal divisions, break down barriers, and achieve unity by fostering trust, forgiveness, dialogue, sharing of hopes and fears, and molding a consensus by bold intercessions to the power of the Holy Spirit. *E pluribus unum* is a national motto offering us a type of unity worthy of a great democracy. This same motto sparks the American Church to create and build a unity that advances beyond the democratic and political, into the more rigorous personal investment of self, to build consensus where majority and minority blend into a total community of purpose which dares to call itself a *lumen gentium*. The Church in the past by its governmental procedures has enriched the political and legal history of the West. As our Anglo-American experience falters in doubt and soul-searching and prepares itself for the promised post-Vietnam period of recrimination, the American Catholic Church may find itself gospel-advised to create new structures mediating peace, fraternity, and common purpose. Such new structures would teach men how to live together in times of massive discontent, alienation, and tension. If Christianity is a unique way of being together in the risen Lord, we must be together in a national context (bishops, laity, religious, and priests; right, left, and middle) and forge ourselves into a national realization of Church enriched by and enriching the international experience of Church, linked to the Chief Shepherd. The structures we build to forge this new *e pluribus unum* will mean that we as the American Church will have a major contribution to make to the new “global village.” If this sense of Christian purpose and mission catches hold, must we debate the feasibility of a NPC any longer?

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**BOOKS RECEIVED**

[All books received are listed here whether they are reviewed or not]

**SCRIPTURAL STUDIES**


Wilder, Amos N. Early Christian Rhetoric: The Language of the
BOOKS RECEIVED


DOCTRINAL THEOLOGY


MORAL, LAW, LITURGY


Corriveau, Raymond, C.SS.R. The Liturgy of Life: A Study of the Ethni-


PASTORAL AND ASCETICAL


Foran, Donald J., S.J. Living with Ambiguity: Discerning God in a


HISTORICAL THEOLOGY


**PHILOSOPHY**


Mundle, C. W. K. *A Critique of Lin-


SPECIAL QUESTIONS


