
This is an important book, not just for philosophy but for theology. Lane, a French Canadian currently teaching at the University of Quebec (Trois-Rivières), wrote it for the doctorat d'état in Paris under the patronage of Paul Ricoeur. He has also done a French translation, with commentary, of Austin's How to Do Things with Words, plus a volume on the philosophy of nature and one on the philosophy of science. But this book is chiefly about the affectivity of the mind, a search for the primitive meaning in the motivation which inspires scientific and philosophical research, an investigation into the personal or intersubjective value at the heart of the search for objectivity.

Convinced that much scientific research (and higher education) is alienating because the researcher is unaware of what he is really seeking and finding in his eurekas, L. tries to unmask the false assumptions about objectivity which dominate most research and so often lead to resignation, disappointment, a "sagesse de pis-aller." This is the negative, demythologizing part of the book, and it is both aggressive and fascinating—fascinating especially in the analyses of modern scientific culture's "reduction" of surprise, gratitude, admiration, congratulation, and finally interest. (For example: Can one really admire Einstein or congratulate anyone on a discovery? If we acted consistently with our view of reality, we would find it impossible to congratulate, etc., and yet the fact that we want to congratulate resists the reduction. What, then, are we doing when we congratulate someone for a discovery?) Prevailing theories of truth lead the enthusiastic researcher finally to the weary conclusion that reality "n'est que cela," is only banal after all.

But the book has mainly a positive side. This is not just another anti-technology book from the counterculture, written by a nonscientist. L. did undergraduate and graduate studies in mathematics and physics at the Universities of Montreal and Columbia, and has thorough respect for the scientist's fear of being "duped," his passion for preferring a verifiable unpleasant truth to a nonverifiable pleasant one. If the various reductions to the banal are followed out persistently (and there is no short-circuiting these reductions, even the reduction which results in the apparent impossibility of communication between persons), they reveal a startling positive core animating research which is almost mystical and which can be documented in the autobiographies of discoverers from Kepler to Einstein.

About L.'s method, Ricoeur has said that it is a remarkable combination of levelheaded Anglo-Saxon rigor and Continental willingness to
tackle the basic questions of life, to find, as L. puts it (p. 19), "a meaning to our life in the world, and this before dying." It is also provocative, or better, deliberately and engagingly provoking, setting up a series of experiences which provoke or surprise the affective dynamisms which really animate our voyage of discovery but lie beneath our awareness. These "obscure needs" are more ecstatic than we think. Some sort of "destin" (fate-destiny) calls our minds in all our efforts toward objectivity. To pry these motivations out, L. uses "a phenomenology of the Husserlian type" (p. 17), but with several qualifications. Owing much to Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Heidegger, the method is not your usual loose phenomenology. He relies heavily on eidetic variations, many of them literally fantastic. The style is one with the method—lucid, direct, personal, and, given the subtlety of the thought, easily readable.

The pivot of the book is chap. 1 of Part 3 (pp. 169–86), "La parole du destin, comme métaphore," containing eidetic variations on the "speech" of a parrot, a lecturer, things, and Being. L. engages in a confrontation with Heidegger (Unterwegs zur Sprache) and Merleau-Ponty as to whether Being and Language speak—metaphorically, really, or in some in-between sense. What is the source (or sources; L. finds two contradictory sources) of speaking?

I hesitate to spell out L.'s conclusions, not because he leaves us hanging at the end or merely tries to open up new problems, but because the path by which they are arrived at is so essential to their understanding that a summary statement of conclusions only distorts them. Suffice it to say that he gives a view of the universe which is thoroughly dialogal, giving full weight to an onto-logical view of reality as opposed to an ontic one (the ontic = the banal). He offers a worked-out interpersonal metaphysics, a theory of speaking as communication, carried through with more rigor than so much current "personalism," and descending more to cases than Schillebeeckx or Rahner. So many so-called intersubjective metaphysics are merely grafted onto what remains a basically cosmological substructure, without transforming it. But L. invites us to transform our categories of presence, thing, being, truth, and, eventually, person. Thomistic readers may balk at his depreciation of "Being," and others may find his view at first somewhat Berkeleyan. Readers interested in Loyola's "discernment of spirits" will find the conclusions uncannily Ignatian, though arrived at from a modern problematic. All readers will find the old topics like occasionalism, symbolism, concursus, and deism given a strange new actuality.

All in all, a significant book for theology, especially for its treatment of language, and deserving of translation.

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Robert Ochs, S.J.
BOOK REVIEWS


Another theologian with a gift for popular writing has joined the ranks of those forced to ask basic theological questions because of the secularist crisis of our times. Prof. Baltazar of the Federal City College in Washington, D.C., author of Teilhard and the Supernatural (1966), proposes in the present volume a reinterpretation of Christian theology in terms of a model he calls evolutionary that he has derived from Teilhard. The model is extraordinarily simple, about as sophisticated as Aristotle's rendition of the pre-Socratics. The evolutionary development is to be considered in terms of the sequence of stages, and relative within this, the past is correlated with nonbeing and mythical knowledge, the present with becoming, symbolic knowledge with belief, and the future with being, metaphysical knowledge, joy, security, and the eschaton.

The author argues, not only that everyone has belief, but that it is evolutionarily appropriate to this stage of development. Belief in God is reasonable, he tries to show by a variety of analogies with growing seeds and Ground (pun intended—in fact, the operative argument), despite the fact that God seems experientially to be absent. He tries to cope with the sticky problem for Teilhardians of the sense in which God is eternal with a doctrine of eternity as the fullness of time; he suggests this only as a tentative hypothesis.

Trained thinkers will find serious problems with this book. There is, for instance, a tendency to liken the course of evolution to the growth of an organism. Evolution, however, has to do with the origin and elimination of species-forms, not with the career of individual organisms. The misleading force of the analogy is revealed in the inference that evolution is progress toward higher forms. Evolutionary theory says only that forms develop with greater adaptability to environments, and would allow that if the environment for life on earth should radically change, for instance through the death of the sun, the course of evolution would turn to lower forms better adapted to a dissipating universe.

Baltazar also makes too much mileage out of villains, e.g., static and Hellenic concepts. He is also somewhat injudicious, it seems to me, in his historical assessments. Inferring, for example, that Platonic idealism can be rejected simply by accepting the world as real, he neglects not only his own stricture that the present is becoming, not yet being, but also the fact that Plato was getting at precisely that problem of becoming relative to ideal fulfillment. Dealing with non-Christian religions, Baltazar gives a fine, sensitive account of how they should not be treated as Christian in disguise, but he does not take the further step of considering whether they might be right instead of Christianity. Despite these reservations for
scholars, this book can serve the excellent purpose of raising questions at a fundamental level.

Fordham University


Theologians as well as exegetes will need to look at McKane's "new approach" to Proverbs. He has a theory about the literary history of the book which raises questions about its theology and about the history of the doctrine of retribution. I do not think he has proved his theory, but the questions he raises still need to be answered.

His main point is that Proverbs contains two types of literature: instruction (1:9; 22:17-24:22; 31:1-9) and wisdom sentences (10:1—22:16; 24:23—29:27). He rejects the old view that instruction is a late, literary development of the one-line proverb. It has, he says, a literary history of its own, developed from the Egyptian and Mesopotamian instruction of court officials, and changed in Israel to an instruction of the people, first in prudent living, and then in Yahwistic piety. Its characteristic form is the imperative: "Do this, for the following reasons."

The wisdom sayings, on the other hand, were originally popular one-line sayings; only under poetic and literary influence did they develop into parallel two-line sayings or multiline stanzas. Their characteristic form is the indicative, a statement which leaves the reader free to draw his own prudential or moral conclusions. Although we, and the last editor of Proverbs, call all these sayings "proverbs," the proverb or mashal should be distinguished from the maxims, riddles, and striking similes which resemble it.

McKane suggests a new definition of proverb. The proverb, he says, is characterized by "hermeneutic openness." That is, it is a statement of concrete fact which seems to describe only one situation but which, when understood, describes equally well many similar situations. For example, the modern Yiddish proverb "The girl who can't dance says the band can't play" describes a sour-grapes attitude to situations other than dancing. This definition is attractive, and would be acceptable if we were sure the Semitic wise men made such logical distinctions.

McKane divides the wisdom sentences into three groups: (1) those old sayings which in secular language instruct the individual about prudent living; (2) the sayings which warn the community about the consequences of antisocial behavior; (3) those sayings which in religious language instruct the individual about moral life in the Yahwistic community. His admittedly controversial theory is that the third group is late and that it represents a Yahwistic reinterpretation of old Israelite wisdom.
This would mean that Israel's pre-exilic wisdom taught that actions which by prudential standards were wise or foolish would bring on their own consequences as inexorably as fate, while the postexilic wise men taught that actions which by covenant standards were moral or immoral would provoke retribution from Yahweh. McKane has not convinced me that these views were chronologically separated, but it remains true that there are two types of sayings (see 17:8; 18:16; 21:14: on the prudent use of bribery; and 15:27; 17:23: on its condemnation). How and when were they harmonized? Unless they were, even in a loose Semitic way, there is no consistent theology of the book of Proverbs.

This is not a book for dipping into. Good ideas are scattered through it, sometimes in the introduction, sometimes in the commentary, but it is hard to find them again. The order of the biblical text is rearranged to fit the commentary, and there is no index. So the reader has to dig for what he gets; but despite the format, this is a useful study of Proverbs.

St. Columban's College, Oconomowoc, Wis. EAMONN O'DOHERTY


The author, who has held the chair of New Testament at the University of Uppsala, Sweden, for almost twenty-five years, is widely respected in scholarly circles. Yet, paradoxically, his considerable linguistic abilities have lessened the impact of his writings on a wider public interested in the Bible, for only those who read Swedish, French, German, and English can follow all his work. We are fortunate, then, to be presented with a collection of nine representative essays, only two of which appeared originally in English. It is important that this volume be widely read in the U.S., for it represents an interesting challenge to the German approach to the NT which is so dominant here. Of course, Riesenfeld is not unaware of the tools of German scholarship, nor does he fail to use them; but he approaches the origins of the Gospels with a type of serene common sense that makes one re-examine the more complicated hypotheses in which so little of the Gospels stems from Jesus.

The first essay, "The Gospel Tradition and Its Beginnings" (original, 1959), collides head-on with the frequently encountered hypothesis that Mark invented the literary genre of gospel. R. insists that the pre-Gospel tradition(s) already had the characteristic traits of the class of literature we describe as "gospel." He denies that missionary preaching was the Sitz im Leben in which the pre-Gospel tradition was formed by expansion from kerygmatic fragments. Nor was the Sitz im Leben communal religious instruction in the early Church, for in those times Christian
preachers presumed a knowledge of the words of Jesus and taught in their own words. Rather there was a carefully controlled handing on of a tradition of Jesus' words and deeds that stemmed from the apostles; this process constituted the "ministry of the word" (Acts 6:4) and those who engaged in it were "ministers of the word" (Lk 1:2). "The very smallest knowledge of religious life in Palestine forces the conclusion that the words and deeds of Jesus were not just improvised, that there was no question of freely narrating or of inventing, even when the speaker was possessed by the Spirit. On the contrary, the strict laws relating to holy tradition will have prevailed from the outset and determined both what was uttered and what was transmitted" (p. 20). This tradition was recited as the sacred word of the 

This first essay is the most important in the book and represents in summary form a Scandinavian approach to the Gospels developed more fully in Memory and Manuscript (1961) by Birger Gerhardsson, R.'s student and now NT professor at Lund. Other essays are in harmony with its thesis. In a study of the composition of Mark, R. has some excellent material on Jesus as a teacher; this is a concept that agrees with the recent scholarly rediscovery that there is a strong current of wisdom in the oldest traditions about Jesus. Another essay analyzes why Jesus exercised such freedom in regard to the laws of the Sabbath; R.'s interpretation is that in Jesus' ministry the eschatological expectations associated with the Sabbath were becoming a reality. Thus Jesus' actions reflected His Messianic consciousness about His own ministry. In "The Messianic Character of the Temptation in the Wilderness," R. maintains that from the time of the baptism Jesus understood and accepted the fact that the kingdom of God could be realized only through the suffering and death of the Messiah.

By way of evaluation, it should be emphasized that many critical NT scholars would not agree with R. in positing Jesus' consciousness of Himself as the Messiah or that Jesus taught in such a strictly rabbinical fashion. However, precisely in such examples as his conduct on the Sabbath, Jesus does emerge as one who acts confidently with sovereign authority. And such authority lends plausibility to the thesis that a considerable body of His words would have been preserved and that there would have been a sensitivity about the freedom with which His words were transmitted.
Some of the remaining essays are less directly related to the main theme. A study of the Adulterous Woman story, preserved in John, treats it as an authentic tradition which did not become part of the public Church collection until the severe penitential attitudes toward adultery in the early centuries were relaxed. A study of the parables insists that some allegory was part of Jesus’ own style. An interesting relationship is established between Paul’s use of the imagery of a grain of wheat (1 Cor 15:37 ff.) and the passage in Jn 12:24. The origins of Sunday as the Lord’s Day are traced, not to a commemoration of the day of the Resurrection, but to the Jewish-Christian communal celebration held upon the terminus of the Sabbath observance. Throughout all these studies there is evident a rare combination of meticulous scholarship and deep Christian feeling.

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RAYMOND E. BROWN, S.S.


Richard Hiers continues, in this hard-hitting monograph, the attacks on realized eschatology for which he is already known through two articles and a book. Chap. 1, “Eschatology and Methodology,” is (save for a few accommodations) verbatim the article of that same title which he published in the June 1966 issue of the Journal of Biblical Literature; chap. 2, a scrutiny of the “kingdom of God is in the midst of you” phrase in Lk 17:21b, had been previously published in the Journal of the American Academy of Religion in 1967. The rest of the monograph is new to us, though I suspect much of it stems from his doctoral study on the topic at Yale. It is composed of studies of the seven passages in the NT (Lk 17:21b, Mt 12:28/Lk 11:20, Mt 11:12, Mk 3:27/Mt 12:29, Lk 10:18, Mt 11:11/Lk 7:28, Mt 10:23) which H. might otherwise grant to C. H. Dodd and his followers, except that H. snatches even these from them, or at least denies them to them to any significant degree.

H.’s thesis is that most NT scholarship, including the work and school of Bultmann, has simply not taken Albert Schweitzer and Johannes Weiss seriously. It nods to them, he says, but goes on and adapts Jesus’ teachings to non-eschatological systems, or modernizes what the Gospels report he had to say as though Schweitzer had been wrong. H. argues his case rather vigorously and, on the face of it, appears to be quite right. But what H. fails to take note of is (a) that it is the nature of canon to be contemporized no matter how eschatological it originally was; (b) that modern scholarship is in this sense a part of Church history rather than the radical new “departure toward the truth” we wish it were; and (c)
that the *NT* does to the *OT*, by all the midrashic techniques known to
early Judaism, plus a few borrowed from the non-Jewish Hellenistic
world, exactly what H. regrets modern *NT* scholarship has done to the
Gospels: it denied the original historical meaning of the *OT* in its quest
for its meaning in the first century.

The book H. wrote, referred to above, is *Jesus and Ethics* (1968). In it
H. did what he had to do. He took his thesis to its logical conclusion:
Jesus was eschatological in everything He thought, said, and did; there­
fore, Jesus is unavailable for ethics.

But while H. is absolutely right, given his presuppositions about how
the Bible is or is not relevant to generations subsequent to the first, I fear
that he overlooks the nature of canonical material. It is the nature of
canon, not only to be contemporized generation after generation by the
believing community which finds its identity in its reading of it, but also
to answer the question, what am I to do? It is the job description of
canonical materials, no matter how eschatological, whether in the *OT*
or the *NT*, to answer two questions: Who am I and what am I to do? The
answers it gives vary according to the dialogue, i.e., according to the prob­
lems faced as well as according to what we can honestly read in the text.
Canon addresses itself to identity and life-style questions; that is what it
is supposed to do and what it will continue to do. Objective scholarship,
which determines and clarifies the one focus of the ongoing dialogue,
cannot and will not stop the dialogue. Far from stopping it, scholars find
themselves of necessity contributing to it—as witnessed by all those schol­
ars since Schweitzer whom H. castigates.

What H.'s work emphasizes is the need for serious work in what I call,
in *Torah and Canon* (forthcoming fall 1971, Fortress Press), canonical
criticism. The emerging discipline called Comparative Midrash also
emphasizes it. To stress one of the two foci of canon to the exclusion of the
other is either to engage in eisegesis or to lock the Bible into the past.
What we need to know from H. is what kind of dialogue he would pro­
pose between his eschatological Jesus and the Church in its situation to­
day. I think H. is right about the first-century gospel (I am working now
When he begins to try to answer that question, he may become a little
uncomfortable over these rather acerbic charges against the *NT* scholars
of the past three generations.

Union Theological Seminary

James A. Sanders

*Wisdom, Christology, and Law in Matthew's Gospel*. By M. Jack
Although contemporary Synoptic criticism emphasizes methodological approaches such as form criticism and redaction criticism and as a consequence relegates source criticism to a secondary position, it still must predicate itself on a workable solution with respect to the underlying sources of the Gospels. Almost every critical NT scholar today recognizes Q as a hypothetical source upon which Matthew and Luke depended for their common material. Nevertheless, the approximately 235 verses that would comprise this source is still, at best, a controversial component of the Two-Source Hypothesis. Because it no longer exists independently of Mt and Lk, the exact delineation of its content and the original form of certain logia provide a challenge for those who desire to reconstruct its development.

S. has attempted a brief yet intensive study of the Q material, with special reference to the Matthean theological and editorial development of Q. He considers Q to be an example of the Gattung of the logoi of the sages, which must be placed in the line of development between the gnosticizing Judaism of, e.g., the Wisdom of Solomon, and the more developed logoi collection of the Gnostic Gospel of Thomas. Lk 11:49-51/Mt 23:34-36 S. posits as having a literary history in a lost wisdom apocalypse which was an oracle of doom spoken by Sophia. S. then traces the development that such pre-Christian material underwent within the confines of Christianity. Q, for S., moved the wisdom apocalypse into a Christological focus by emphasizing Jesus as one of Wisdom's envoys. Mt (11:2-19; 23:34-36), on the other hand, alters the direction of Q by bringing the Q tradition into the context of a Passion-centered Gospel form and identifying Jesus as Wisdom. Therefore, S. would see Q and Mt within the context of an early Christian controversy centered in wisdom speculation. For S., Mt has avoided the possible Gnostic tendency of Q, which was certainly a direction that such logoi collections possessed, as can be seen in the case of the Gospel of Thomas.

Finally, S. considers the important Matthean concept of law as an important correction to the wisdom speculation of Q. To the presentation of Jesus as one of Wisdom's children and mediator of divine revelation is contrasted the Matthean portrait of Jesus as Wisdom and the embodiment of the Torah.

S. has already recognized the major difficulty of his study, since he is aware that the whole Christology of Mt must be examined to substantiate the significance of the proposed Matthean corrective of Q. The question that still must be answered is this: Is wisdom speculation so central to the Christology of Mt that it determines the conception of Jesus as the new interpreter of the law, or is the latter concept the central thrust of the Matthean Christology, which in turn demands the Matthean correctives
in Q? S. recognizes that this aspect must be thoroughly treated before a final determination is made with respect to the entire Gospel. S.'s premise that a controversy over wisdom speculation is an important situation in the life of the Church of Mt's period will be debated. S.'s work is an important contribution to the study of Q, as well as being a thought-provoking consideration of the theology of Mt. It may well explain not only the development of Q but also explain why such a document was not preserved within Christian orthodox communities as an independent document.

Fordham University

William J. Brogan


The present work, completed over a ten-year period under the direction of Oscar Cullmann and Bo Reicke and accepted by them as a dissertation at Basle in 1967, contains four studies which aim to show "the background of the Christian attitude toward the fall of Jerusalem as this was expressed by Jesus and the first generation of the church before the event" (p. 2). The methodology is to study by tradition-history analysis the setting of anti-Jerusalem sayings in the life of the historical Jesus and the early Church. The theme of the rejection of Israel is seen as arising only in connection with the destruction of the Temple and the separation of Church and synagogue, and represents an attempt of Christians to come to terms with this destruction. This rejection has no basis in the teaching of Jesus or in Church tradition prior to A.D. 65-70. Thus the larger aim of the work is ecumenical and irenic in attempting to qualify and give an accurate historical setting to the anti-Semitism of parts of the Synoptic tradition.

In his first study, on Mk 13 (pp. 8-64), G. rejects attempts to isolate a pre-Christian Jewish apocalyptic core of the discourse. In fact, the name "apocalypse" is misleading. In form it is best understood as a farewell discourse, much like Jn 14-17 or Lk 22:21-38. Its setting in the life of Jesus is that of a postresurrection discourse. In content the discourse is an "eschatological paraclesis, grounded in apocalyptic instruction" (p. 15). The core of the discourse is Mk 13:14-19, which is a combination of a saying of Jesus, handed on by early Christian prophets, and of the adaptation of Jesus' words to the prophets' own time. The saying of Jesus is contained in vv. 15-16 as a midrash of Jesus on the story of Lot in the form of an eschatological warning. This is then expanded by early Christian prophets as a warning to their community in the face of the threatened desecration of the Temple by Caligula in A.D. 39-40. There is nothing in
the content of the discourse which refers to the destruction of the Temple. This only arises from the Marcan preface to the discourse (13:1–4) and the saying of 13:2. Jesus gave general warnings about times of stress; the early Church applied this to the threatened desecration of the Temple; only by the time of Mark was there mention of its destruction.

In his second and major study (pp. 65–243) G. examines the attitude of Jesus and the early Church toward the Temple and Jerusalem. In so doing, he puts together a full-scale discussion of the theme of the New Temple and the relation of Temple and community in Qumran and early Christianity. Concretely, the bulk of the discussion centers on Mk 14:58: “I will destroy this Temple that is made with hands and in three days I will build another not made with hands.” He develops a clear and cogent argument against those who would interpret Mk 14:58 in light of the supposed Jewish expectation that the Messiah was to destroy the Temple and build a new one. He shows that such an expectation is a conflation by scholars of various motifs: (a) opposition to a defiled Temple, (b) the hope for a new Jerusalem, (c) Messianic expectation; and he notes that no text prior to A.D. 70 joins the Messiah with the rebuilding of the Temple. Following Lohmeyer’s suggestion (*Das Evangelium Markus* [Göttingen, 1967] p. 326), he shows that 14:58 was originally a two-part saying. The negative attitude toward the Temple in the first part of the saying has a twofold origin. On the one hand, there is a definite early Christian indifference among Jewish Christians to the cult and Temple, rooted in Jesus’ own indifference. On the other, there is a group within early Christianity, represented by Stephen, definitely hostile to the Temple. In the pre-Marcan tradition the first part of the saying was taken over by Jewish groups to attack the loyalty of Jewish Christians to the Temple and found its way into the Gospel tradition in this context. The second half of the saying mirrors an authentic utterance of Jesus in which Jesus saw Himself as the founder and embodiment of the new eschatological community. Therefore, in his analysis of 14:58, G. supports his thesis that in the teaching of Jesus and in the early Church there was no opposition to the Temple or to Jerusalem. It should be noted that G. never satisfactorily shows why the two parts of the saying come together in Mark and what role the combined saying plays in Mark’s theology.

In the third study (pp. 244–369) G. concentrates on the traditions about the destruction of Jerusalem in the Lucan writings. He builds his case here on the theology of Proto-Luke, which, for him, includes along with L (the Lucan special material) and Q, the Infancy narratives, the bulk of the Passion narrative, and major sections from Acts 1–15. Though he professes nondependence on the literary validity of the Proto-Luke hypothesis, everything he says in the chapter presupposes its existence. Once he has set so much of Luke in a tradition prior to the final redaction,
and limited the work of the Evangelist to a few incidental comments, he has, in effect, accepted Proto-Luke. For G., Proto-Luke arose around the year 50 and represents the theology of the Jerusalem Church in its missionary activity to Jerusalem. The theme of this activity is that while the people are exhorted to repent their share in the death of Jesus, the prime responsibility for his death is on the leaders of the people. Thus the statements on the destruction of Jerusalem in the Proto-Lucan writings are not predictions, but prophetic threats urging the people to repent.

In his final study (pp. 370–487) G. attempts to draw the lines of his argument together by showing why, in the Gospel tradition, the fall of Jerusalem is associated with the end of an age. If neither Jesus nor the early Church was opposed to Jerusalem, how does the anti-Jerusalem material gain such importance in the Gospel of Mark? He begins with an analysis of the Son of Man sayings as an index of Jesus’ attitude. Following T. W. Manson, he interprets Son of Man in the corporate sense. The future Son of Man sayings are authentic and in them Jesus refers to the community which He founds. Thus in the teaching of Jesus they have an ecclesiological meaning. The early Church interprets the resurrection of Jesus as the founding of the new community and the vindication of Jesus, so that Son of Man acquires in the Church a Christological meaning. Since the passion of Jesus is prelude to the founding of the new community, a pattern of suffering, vindication, and new community develops. This pattern provides the key to the understanding of the attitude of Christians forty years after the death of Jesus and ultimately explains the anti-Jerusalem motif. G. finds that in the first century there was a common apocalyptic motif that suffering and persecution precede the coming of a new age, and that the apocalyptic time-reckoning placed this age around the year 70. For the Marcan community, the suffering they experience is that surrounding the Neronian persecution and the Jewish revolt. The community then expects that their suffering will be vindicated with the coming of the Son of Man (Jesus, the new community, the kingdom), so that they connect the destruction of Jerusalem with the Parousia. It is only at this time that the destruction of Jerusalem and the rejection of Israel become important in the Christian tradition.

If exposition of such a detailed and scholarly work is inadequate, criticism in such a short compass is more inadequate. The main criticism is in terms of an unvalidated methodology regarding G.’s ability to assign a certain saying to the historical Jesus. He never explains what his criteria for authenticity are, and relies too much on what Jesus could have said. Also, while being very exact in locating early Church traditions, G. does not give sufficient attention to the Evangelists’ use of these traditions. He also seems unwilling to take definite stands and attempts to straddle the
fence at crucial times. For example, while agreeing with the pessimism of the new questers concerning Jesus' Messianic consciousness, G. does not hesitate to write: "Indeed it is perhaps possible to say that the most surprised person on Easter morning was Jesus himself" (p. 419). G. seems to know much more about Jesus than the new questers would grant. He holds to the Roman provenance of Mark and a predestruction date, when the logic of his views on the anti-Jerusalem element in Mark would suggest a provenance closer to Palestine and a post-70 date. A major problem of the work is the sheer size and breadth of discussion. Instead of simply building on the work of previous scholars, he gives exhaustive treatments of accepted positions. The detail is impressive but unnecessary and detracts from his major theses. He also tends to build rather impressive arguments on theories which are at best problematic today, such as Proto-Luke and the corporate meaning of Son of Man.

Despite these qualifications G.'s work is a most impressive and at times brilliant piece of scholarship. In many areas he has broken new ground (e.g., the form of Mk 13, the background to Mk 14:58). The great detail of tradition-history research he has done will be an indispensable prelude to further redaction-critical studies. Anyone working in the area of the relation of Judaism and Christianity will find his work invaluable. The work contains a twenty-two-page bibliography, a fine index of authors and biblical and extrabiblical citations.

Divinity School, Univ. of Chicago     JOHN R. DONAHUE, S.J.


One of the most useful series of German commentaries for the non-specialist is Das Neue Testament Deutsch, and the publication in English translation of a recent contribution to this series is therefore a significant event. There is a particular appropriateness in the selection of Eduard Schweizer's Das Evangelium nach Markus (1967) for translation, since the distinguished author has been visiting professor both in the United States and in other English-speaking countries, and several other works of his have already appeared in English.

This commentary on Mark is the successor in the German series to that of J. Schniewind, a work of such outstanding value that it places a heavy burden on any scholar who would attempt to perform an equivalent service for today's reader. (S. retained for the most part Schniewind's German translation of the Gospel text. In the English edition we have Good News for Modern Man: The New Testament in Today's English Version
used in its place.) Those reading S.’s commentary in English will not be tempted to make odious comparisons with its predecessor and will certainly welcome the new insights which S.’s use of the redaction-critical method contributes to an understanding of the first Gospel. For it is the theological accomplishment of the Evangelist with which S. is primarily concerned: “the particular message which Mark is endeavoring to express will be found, for the most part, in this very ‘framework’ and in the special arrangement of his Gospel. These are the things to which we must give careful attention” (p. 13).

The commentary includes sixteen excursuses (e.g., on “The Kingdom of God,” “The Messianic Secret,” “The Son of Man”), which provide the reader with convenient, incisive treatments of topics of crucial importance for an understanding of the Gospel, and it concludes with a brief epilogue on “Mark’s Theological Achievement,” an abbreviation of an article which appeared in EvTheol 24 (1964) 337–55. Gotthold Holzberg’s “Index of Names and Subjects” is included in the English edition of the commentary.

Some of S.’s positions will not command general consent, especially in the light of work done between the appearance of the German original and of the English translation. Examples of views which run counter to current thinking are found in S.’s assertion that “there is no reference [in Mark’s Gospel] to the destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70” (p. 25) and that “It is necessary to assume that the conclusion of the Gospel has been lost” (p. 366). On the other hand, his statement that “Discipleship is the only form in which faith can exist” (p. 386) brings out the dominant concern of Mark’s Gospel (cf. Leander Keck, “The Introduction to Mark’s Gospel,” NTS 12 [1965–66] 352–70). In the light of this concern, the “Messianic secret,” which Wrede in 1901 thought to be the key to an understanding of the Gospel, becomes a subordinate and ancillary motif.

The English translation reads smoothly enough, but when one checks it against the German original, one notices certain inaccuracies which obscure the sense. To take some examples from the second excursus, on the kingdom of God: “oder dann ist sie [die Herrschaft Gottes] als blosses Widerfahrnis gedacht, das wie ein Naturereignis über uns kommt” is rendered “it [God’s rule] was seen as something which happens in the normal course of events.” “Aber Jesu Sprachgebrauch unterscheidet sich von dem des Judentums seiner Zeit” comes out “Jesus’ manner of speaking distinguishes him (sic) from the Judaism of his day.” Sometimes this lack of precision may cause the English reader some bewilderment. When he reads “this [italics mine] saying of Jesus placed his disciples and their duties in the midst of the world” (p. 24), he may well ask: what saying? He will find no answer in the text, since the German has simply
“Jesu Wort.” Furthermore, “ihre Aufgaben” refers not to the duties of the disciples but to the tasks of this world.

Despite such blemishes, we welcome the appearance of this up-to-date commentary in English and hope that it may receive a wide circulation.

Woodstock College

SCHUYLER BROWN, S.J.


This book owes its existence to Rudolph Schnackenburg’s observation (made in his survey of NT theology some six years ago) that no adequate treatment of John’s concept of sin existed. Stemberger adds that he is aware of only one article of recent date dealing with sin in the fourth Gospel. He sees the reason for this dearth of material in the particular quality of Johannine language, its symbolic and dualistic character. There can be no facile tabulation of John’s references to sin; in fact, there can be no question of a Johannine theology of sin as such, but only of a theology of good and evil. In Part 1, S. sets forth and analyzes John’s contrasting symbols: light and darkness; life and death; liberty and slavery; above and below; truth and falsity; hate and love. He correctly interprets this language as a many-faceted way of talking about basic attitudes, negative or positive, toward the word of Jesus. For some curious reason, however, he nowhere actually says that the negative attitude, the attitude of closed-mindedness and complacency, of self-satisfaction and contempt of others, is sin in John’s view; in fact, this reviewer was never entirely able to free himself of the uneasy feeling that, despite S.’s sensitive appreciation of Johannine language and imagery, “sin” remains, even in John, a violation of law.

In Part 2, S. goes on to consider the symbolism of water, and of such terms as judgment, health, and victory, through which John theologizes about the conquest of sin and death. In terms of expert exegesis and depth of insight, this is certainly the better part of the book. S.’s presentation of Jesus as Lamb of God in Jn (pp. 172–79), his handling of the foot-washing episode at the Supper (pp. 152–62), and his interpretation of Jesus as Paraclete in 1 Jn (pp. 227–31) are especially rewarding. Excellent, too, is his resolution of the problem posed by John’s use of the words “judge” and “judgment” in relation to salvation (pp. 218–23).

S. makes use of 1 Jn as well as the fourth Gospel throughout the book. I think this is justifiable (though I have been criticized for doing so in my own work), but surely the author’s practice requires him to give some justification, however brief. There is not even a footnote to acknowledge the disputes which are current regarding the authorship of the
epistle (is it the work of the Evangelist, etc.?). Perhaps a more serious defect is S.'s compulsion to find a Jewish, biblical source or parallel for all John's ideas. John is not really allowed to speak for himself, and the realization that he can use religious language in his own way is something that S. barely concedes.

Like a number of other contemporary NT scholars, S. appears to be mesmerized by Qumran, in whose literature he finds a tiresome number of parallels with Johannine texts. On the other hand, Gnostic and Hermetic parallels are completely ignored, and the extent to which this impoverishes his treatment of certain passages may best be seen in his handling of 1 Jn 3:4–10 (pp. 198–205). This syndrome is frequent enough to deserve specific designation, and I would like to call it the JAR (John the Apostle redivivus) syndrome because it most often occurs in scholars engaged in Johannine studies and because I see it as an unacknowledged (perhaps unconscious) conviction that demonstrating the Palestinian Jewish character of the fourth Gospel is as good as rehabilitating it for use as "eyewitness" testimony. And that, I suggest, is to put Johannine studies back where they were seventy-five years ago. The fourth Gospel is not the gospel of the Gnostic nor the gospel of the Jewish-Christian, because, as its extraordinary originality attests, it is not the gospel of any ghetto.

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J. EDGAR BRUNS


L'Évangile et les Pères was the area of the 1968 meeting. Msgr. G. Philips, a principal architect of chap. 8 of Lumen gentium, presents the conciliar perspective on Mary and the Holy Spirit. In answer to the charge that Mary has replaced the Spirit in Roman Catholic theology, he shows that however weak our pneumatology, neither authentic tradition nor current Catholic opinion puts Mary in place of the Spirit. After general conciliar statements on the Spirit, he traces through chap. 8 the Mary-Holy Spirit relationship—from the initial "became flesh by the Holy
Spirit of the Virgin Mary” (no. 52), through Mary's spiritual motherhood inspired by the Spirit of love (cf. St. Augustine in no. 53), to the Church, in imitation of Mary, bringing Christ to birth in the faithful through the sanctifying Spirit (nos. 64, 65).

Within the community Mary is the orant (no. 59, also Ad gentes, no. 4): she awaits the pentecostal outpouring of the Spirit who had already come to her at the Annunciation, indeed who had fashioned her as predestined mother of Life (no. 59). She is the sacrarium of the Holy Spirit (no. 53), a word used in preference to “spouse,” as better conveying the virgin birth. And the note of the Spirit as sealing Mary’s virginity, exemplar to the Church of fidelity, is in no. 63. The Spirit makes Mary “new Eve,” “new mother of the living,” true too of the Church. The Spirit brings about the bond between Mary and the Church; Isaac of the Star is cited to this effect (note to no. 64).

Under “Voies apparemment sans issue” Philips poses questions which recur in other articles of these Etudes: (a) Espousals with a particular divine Person—so Berulle on Mary, as spouse of the Holy Spirit, though some disciples, as Gibieuf and Olier, were less sober here. (b) Femininity of the ruach—towards a similarity between the Spirit and human femininity, a theme Evdokimov applied to our Lady (“difficult for Western rationality to follow,” says Philips). Orthodox theologian Evdokimov spoke on the same subject at the Society’s meeting of September 1970. His “Panagion et Panagia” will be in Vol. 27 of Etudes mariales; the author died a few days after reading it. (c) “Infecundity of the Holy Spirit”—completed by Mary (Berulle, Grignion de Montfort)—about which Philips is understandably unenthusiastic.

M. Jourjon and J.-P. Bouhot enrich their survey of “Lk 1, 35 in the Greek Fathers” with a dossier of texts, a development that shows an early application to the work and person of Christ, but only tardy allusions to Mary’s involvement.

Th. Strotmann, O.S.B., has “The Holy Spirit and the Theotokos in Eastern tradition.” The Western mind finds Eastern legends (as the presentation, Nov. 21) hard to grasp, though Eastern liturgy shows the deeper sense of Mary as the “new paradise planted by God,” “the source and principle of the freedom of the whole human race” (Gregory Palamas). When Gabriel arrives at the Annunciation, he finds the Holy Spirit who sent him already there in Mary (Theophane of Nicaea, 14th c.). For the “gate facing the East” (Ez 44), Strotmann illustrates the sense of definitive belonging to the temple of the Lord, total sanctification by the divine presence. Mary is the temple of God, par excellence shrine of the Spirit; the Church too is the new temple of the presence of God. Both are open to the Lord, closed to all else, virginal.
The paper of medievalist H. Barré, C.S.Sp., is posthumous (d. 1968): “Mary and the Holy Spirit in Western Tradition to St. Thomas.” Some remarkable prayers show the bond between Mary and the Spirit, e.g., Ildefonse of Toledo (d. 667): “Oro te, oro te, sancta Virgo, ut de illo Spiritu habeam Iesum, de quo tu genuisti Iesum...”; and a distant echo of Ildefonse in Eckert of Schoenau (d. 1184) to Mary filled with joy by the Spirit: “ut michi ancille tue inpetres, a dilecto Filio tuo, gratiam Spiritus sancti....”

Barré traces across the authors who reflected on Lk 1:35 a movement from virginal conception to the sanctification/consécration of Mary. When this was thought of in terms of Mary's nativity, it was an easy next step to sanctification in ipsa conceptione. Eadmer’s (d. 1124) De conceptione is an instance: “hoc enim habitaculum illud sanctus Spiritus sacrarium esse fatemur, in quo et per quod eadem Sapientia Dei humanae naturae coniungi voluit et incorporari....” A Cistercian example is Isaac of the Star (d. 1169): “Parum...ut Dei Filius nobis donaretur... nisi etiam Spiritus Sanctus nobis donaretur.... Ille per Spiritum filium de Maria Virgine; nos, per eundem Spiritum Dei filii de Ecclesia virgine.” That ecclesial note is as old as Leo the Great.

Thomas Aquinas uses Lk 1:35 to comment on Mary’s sanctification (3, q. 27); see the Latin-English edition by T. R. Heath, O.P., Summa theologiae 51 (3a, 27-30): Our Lady (New York, 1969); he is strong on the role of the Holy Spirit. But when he comes to write of the “active principle in the conception of Christ”—the Spirit is the active, Mary the passive principle—Thomas, like the other Scholastics, passes over Hugh of St. Victor’s (d. 1141) insights about prius mente quam ventre concepit: “in corde, quo amor Spiritus sancti singulariter ardebat, ideo in carne eius virtus Spiritus sancti mirabilia faciebat.”

The volumes under review contain two biblical studies: A. Feuillet in Vol. 25: “L’Esprit Saint et la Mère du Christ,” and H. Cazelles in Vol. 26: “L’Esprit Saint et l’Incarnation d’après le développement de la révélation biblique.” Feuillet works with Mt 1:18-25 and Lk 1:26-38: “historical attestations of the virginal conception of Jesus taken in the strict sense... indeed, to say that they mean only that Mary is a virgin spiritually, not biologically, is an abuse of language.” Matthew’s “book of the genesis of Jesus Christ” has the sense of both genealogy and history. The “new creation” by the Spirit is Matthew’s emphasis, with the virginal conception, work of the Spirit, directed towards the appearance of the new people of God, the Church, even as of old the Spirit brought about the new life of the messianic land and messianic people (Is 32:15; Ez 37; etc.)

There are likenesses between Lk 1 and Acts 1, the birth of Christ
and the birth of His Church. "The Holy Spirit will come upon you" is Lucan vocabulary (1:35), reflected in Acts 1:8: "You will receive power when the Holy Spirit comes upon you." Luke, like Matthew, regards the virginal conception as a sign of the creation of the new era of grace, though he stresses more than Matthew Mary's consent, an emphasis beyond any OT annunciation. Mary is consenting to the coming of the new people of God. "The Holy Spirit will come upon you," with the further Lucan allusion to the "power of the Most High" (Is 32:15, "the spirit from on high is poured out"), herald the eschatological fulfilment of the messianic reign. "Until you are clothed with power from on high" (Lk 24:49) is the final mandate of the Lord.

"The child will be holy" (Lk 1:35) has a counterpart in Acts 10:38: "Jesus of Nazareth... God anointed Him with the Holy Spirit and with power." For Luke, power and Spirit are inseparable; Jesus’ power consists in possessing the Spirit. The Spirit plays His OT role of "spirit of prophecy" for Zechariah and old Simeon, but for Mary the Spirit is the creating Spirit, source of the new economy, who will then intervene in the ministry of Jesus and at Pentecost.

Finally, Feuillet relates these insights to the Gospel of John, translating in the Nicodemus story "being born from on high" (3:3) as a reference to Isaiah, hence to the birth of the new people of God under the Spirit's action. In Jn 19:30, "giving up the Spirit" is the sending of the Spirit, as also in 1 Jn 5:6. John, like Matthew and Luke, is concerned with messianic maternity—the Church’s surely, but also Mary’s which precedes and prepares for the Church and which is proclaimed before the origin of the Church at Christ’s death. Here Feuillet takes a position on Jn 19:25 in sharp dissent from A. Dauer and van den Bussche; he feels that in rejecting Mary’s spiritual maternity in Jn 19 they overlook the bond between Cana and Calvary.

On Cazelles, "L’Esprit Saint et l’Incarnation d’après le développement de la révélation biblique": in both Matthew and Luke the Holy Spirit has a preponderant role in the incarnation of Christ in Mary. Cazelles traces out in four subdivisions the OT key to the sense of the Spirit’s action: (a) spirit as ruah, power of life in the world; (b) spirit and salvation through the "anointed" king; (c) spirit acting on the Saviour before His birth; (d) temple of God, liturgy, and Spirit.

Ruah was both "spirit" and "wind" (also Jn 3:5-8), an ambiguous though life-bringing reality, like the empty atmosphere we breathe. The ruah is at Yahweh’s disposition (Gn 6:3: my Spirit...). Anointing Saul, Samuel invokes the Spirit of the Lord (1 S 10:6); in the power of the same Spirit Saul defeats Ammon. The outpouring of the Spirit occurs not at birth but on accession (2 S 7:14; Ps 2:6-7; Is 11). The prophets, men of
the word, become men of the Spirit also, e.g., the double spirit Elijah bequeathed to Elisha; and Ezechiel is handled, somewhat brusquely, by the Spirit, echoed in Acts 2:17-21 via Jl 3:1-2. The action of the Spirit on the Saviour is foreshadowed by the consecration of Jeremiah and 2 Is (49:1 and 52:1), and Jesus Himself takes up Is 59:19. Beyond his OT sources is Luke’s insistence on the descent of the Spirit not only on the unborn Christ but also on Mary, and Luke is original too in extending the OT “overshadowing” to Mary.

Other papers in Vol. 26 include B. Przybylski, O.P., “La Vierge et l’Esprit selon les sources médiévales polonaises,” a careful study of a world unknown to many of us, with modest conclusions. M. Dupuy, S.S., begins his study on “L’Esprit Saint et Marie dans l’école française” with an appeal to the reader for courage in this difficult enterprise. Good advice, for the seventeenth-century paths are tortuous to today’s mentality; then Mary’s privileges were paramount, now we prefer to consider Mary as one of ourselves; our orientation is biblical, then abstractions were popular (“for God is a spirit”). Dupuy’s divisions are: Mary and the hypostatic order (the French school took this from Suarez), Mary as an “order on her own” (proper to French school), finally Mary’s interior life and the Holy Spirit (also a Jesuit heritage). Dupuy struggles manfully with the thought of Berulle and his disciples, especially Gibieuf, then St. John Eudes, Olier, finally St. Grignion de Montfort, who was sensitive to the drawbacks of the concepts he had inherited.

The “exemplarism” embodied in the approach to Mary as “an order apart” had the value of respecting divine transcendence and meeting the difficulty of opera ad extra communia sunt; it offered a surer approach to Mary’s relationship to the Holy Spirit than an analysis of causes, for we learn things more through likenesses and resemblances, in religion as in nature, than through chains of causes.

“La Vierge et l’Esprit Saint chez Newman et Faber” by J. Stern, M.S., has special interest for English readers and complements Dupuy’s study. Stern shows how Newman answered the question “Is theocentrism consistent with authentic devotion to our Lady, with prayer to Mary?” and how he coped with the difficulties of some Continental forms of Marian piety. He traces Newman’s position from Anglican into Catholic days, and appraises his problem with Montfort’s words as they had been quoted from Faber’s recent translation in objection by Dr. Pusey criticizing the definition of the Immaculate Conception. Strangely, Newman had not read Montfort directly, hence his guarded comment that he found it hard to believe the offending phrases could sound the same in context as Pusey thought; indeed Newman said: “as the writers doubtless did not use them” (emphasis added).
From their evangelical background both Newman and Manning brought a great interest in the Holy Spirit; Faber shared this enthusiasm. Yet even Faber at first found such authors as Berulle and Montfort prolix and painful, although he would finally call Montfort “the Elias-like missionary of the Holy Ghost and of Mary.” Stern is critical of Faber’s principles, e.g., that a probable opinion suffices to found a devotion, though he concludes with a laudatory final paragraph on him (son lyrisme... d’allure platonicienne...).

Canon Mouroux spoke on “the Virgin’s role in the apostolic Church today”: our Lady is spiritual teacher of the Church in this time of crisis and growth. Mary who taught Jesus to pray (echoes of Père Lagrange) seeks for us the grace of prayer and the sense of it. The Assumption shows that Mary continues what she did on earth, caught up now in the everlasting intercession of Christ (Hb 7:25 and Rom 8:34). She alerts us to the word of God, warning us against false prophets, when “on n’a jamais tant parlé de la Parole de Dieu qu’aujourd’hui, mais l’écoute personnelle, humble et profonde de la Parole est bien moins fréquente.” Mary heard the word with joy, with wonder, with adoration, with sorrow. She teaches us to be “servants in obedience,” again meeting the current need, when there is so much empty talk of a servant Church. In all of this Mary exemplifies charity even to the point of sacrifice.

In the current volumes, as in so many of their predecessors (most volumes since World War II are still in print), the French Society of Marian Studies has been a big step ahead of sister societies in other countries. The announcement of their 1971 theme as “woman” is further evidence of their leadership.

*Catholic Univ. of America*  
EAMON R. CARROLL, O.CARM.


Egeria, that mysterious pilgrim of holy places of the early part of the fifth century, has over the centuries presented a prime source of information to scholars with an interest in Church history, liturgy, archeology, and philology. The fact that within the last thirty years there have appeared six new editions of the basic eleventh-century text discovered by G. F. Gamurrini in 1884 indicates the amount of scholarship still concentrating on the diary of this mysterious traveler to the East.

Prof. George E. Gingras of the Catholic University of America has seen the need for an English translation (the only other translations were done in 1891 and in 1919 by J. H. Bernard and M. L. McClure-C. L. Feltoe respectively) that would also bring together the latest scholarship.
He has succeeded admirably in a superior translation of flowing English that recaptures the style of Egeria’s travelogue Latinisms.

G. would hardly be expected to have put to rest definitively all the questions that have bothered readers of Egeria’s diary. But he does assemble the history of such questions as who the author of the diary was and when she made her pilgrimages. He prefers the spelling Egeria to Aetheria and shows that this work was probably written no later than 448 and not before 404.

The first section recounts Egeria’s various pious pilgrimages to Mt. Sinai and her return to Jerusalem, to Mt. Nebo to visit the burial place of Moses, to Idumea, the land of Job, and to Mesopotamia, and her return to Constantinople. The editor would have aided the reader greatly if he had furnished a map of these four journeys. Many of these holy places as described by Egeria add a precious element of oral tradition to the geography and history recorded in the Bible. We pick up valuable details about the state of Christianity at the beginning of the fifth century, while chaps. 17–23 give us confirmation of what Palladius in his Lausiac History wrote of the high development of monasticism in those regions of the Near East.

The second section (chaps. 24–49), according to the pilgrim, is an attempt to inform her readers in Galicia, Spain, of the “ritual observed day by day in the holy places.” Comparative liturgists will find a great source of details concerning the Divine Offices and main liturgical feasts celebrated in Jerusalem, with descriptions of the six main churches of Jerusalem. Details also concerning fasts, catechesis, the ecclesiastical hierarchy, and monks allow the reader to step back into a period of intense Christian liturgy. Again, a map of Jerusalem with perhaps a diagram of Constantine’s main church, the Anastasis, with the various stationes of the ante crucem, crux, post crucem, and martyrium would have been helpful.

A most helpful bibliography of editions, translations, studies on language, authorship, etc. rounds off an excellent work of scholarship, adding another valuable volume to ACW.

Fordham University GEORGE A. MALONEY, S.J.


One might be antecedently suspicious of a work of this kind, which proposes a theological and historical synthesis of fifteen centuries in fifteen chapters, were it not for the fact that its author is one of the most competent historians of theology in our time and the Church’s most distinguished ecclesiologist. While serious religious publication has suffered some recent
decline in the U.S., Congar continues his scholarly production at what seems an accelerated pace. This volume, e.g., follows closely upon his *L’Ecclesiologie du haut Moyen âge* (Paris, 1968) and has been released almost simultaneously with his *L’Eglise: Une, sainte, catholique et apostolique* (Paris, 1970). Meanwhile, C. writes the twice-yearly bulletins in ecclesiology for the *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* and generates a steady flow of scholarly and popular articles. The present volume is the French edition of C.’s *Die Lehre von der Kirche von Augustinus bis zur Gegenwart* in the *Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte*.

As its title indicates, this book is a history of the Church’s self-understanding as it has developed over the last fifteen hundred years. Fully sixty percent of the study, however, is devoted to just six centuries, the eleventh through the sixteenth, which tends to confirm the impression that the book (at least from chap. 5 to the end) is more directly a history of the theology of ecclesiastical jurisdiction and structure, with particular reference to the papacy, than a comprehensive synthesis of all the major ecclesiological themes.

The material is bracketed on the one side by a compressed discussion of Augustinian ecclesiology and on the other side by a similarly compressed commentary on the conciliar ecclesiology of Vatican II. In between there are remarkably controlled and substantially annotated discussions of some of the other Latin Fathers, the False Decretals, the Photian Schism, the Cluniac Reform, Peter Damian, Gregory VII, Bernard, Gratian, Innocent III, Joachim of Flora, Boniface VIII, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, the question of the *plenitude potestatis*, Marsiglio of Padua, the Great Western Schism, the rise of conciliarism, the Council of Constance and its central decree *Haec sancta*, the restoration of papal ecclesiology (John of Torquemada, Cajetan, Bellarmine, *et al.*), Gallicanism, the renewal in the nineteenth century (Newman, Möhler, the Roman school, Vatican I, *et c.*), the self-understanding of the popes from Pius IX to Pius XII, *Mystici corporis*, and some of the recent ecclesiological developments which finally emerged at Vatican II. Such personalities, topics, and issues (and I have provided only a partial listing) are obviously of interest not only to ecclesiologists but also to ecclesiastical historians and canon lawyers. There is ample material and insight here to justify the time and attention of practitioners in each of these disciplines.

Of course, even the work of a master is not without its defects. First, there is little material on the twentieth century, despite C.’s characterization of this as “the century of the Church.” Indeed, the book is concluded much too abruptly, with a single paragraph of but sixteen lines on post-conciliar developments. Most of C.’s effort, quantitatively at least, is expended at the point where his major interest and competence lie: the medieval period. And here C. simply excels.
Second, most of the book seems preoccupied with structural and jurisdictional ecclesiology and almost not at all with the fundamental question of the Church's mission (notwithstanding the glancing comment on p. 457, n. 10, and the references on pp. 466-67). We could change its title from L'Eglise to La papauté without necessarily distorting or misrepresenting, in any substantial way, the promise and content of the study.

Third, the book lacks any significant ecumenical dimension. This is truly ironic in view of C.'s own indisputably solid credentials in that field. Nevertheless, there is almost no meaningful, not to say extensive, discussion of Protestant, Anglican, or Orthodox ecclesiology. The Reformation, e.g., is treated in about eight pages. Recent or contemporary ecclesiology as it has been constructed outside the Roman Catholic Church is, for all practical purposes, ignored. Is it because the focal points of this study, i.e., papacy and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, are of peculiar interest to the Roman Catholic tradition?

Fourth, it is reasonable to assume that a work of this scope will be stronger on exposition than on criticism. Occasionally, however, such critical restraint functions as a liability, as in C.'s discussion of the Council of Constance and the decree Haec sancta (pp. 320-27). While he cites Francis Oakley's recent study Council over Pope? Towards a Provisional Ecclesiology (New York, 1969), C. does not seem really to address himself to that book's central challenge: if Haec sancta is not a dogmatically binding decree, then Martin V's title to the papacy (and that of all his successors, including Pope Paul VI) is subject to challenge, and so is the procedure whereby Constance deposed the Pisan Pope John XXIII. (On the whole, of course, C. is both fair and judicious. See, e.g., his balanced discussion of Aquinas, pp. 232-41.)

The book has no index. This is an extraordinary omission in view of the hundreds of proper names throughout the volume: in the text, in the excellent bibliographies, and in the footnotes.

A final judgment on this book cannot be written, of course, until historians and canonists, as well as theologians, are able to test C.'s interpretations against the data. I should predict, however, that C.'s work will endure the scrutiny of such review. It is certainly one of the most useful items in C.'s entire bibliographical production—which is to say that it is recommended with much enthusiasm.

Boston College

Richard P. McBrien

The history of the enormous influence of the teaching of Ramon Llull (+1315) in the later Middle Ages and Renaissance remains to be written. The Mallorcan Doctor illuminatus, whose life extended over eighty years of restless activity and prolific writing, represents in many ways the beginning of the modern philosophical problematic. Drawing on Christian, Muslim, and Jewish sources, reflecting the concerns of the newly awakened bourgeoisie, he composed—not only in Latin but also in his own vernacular Catalan, and even in Arabic—hundreds of treatises in which he probed ever more deeply into the foundations for his art, a mathesis universalis which would culminate in a mystical knowledge of God. Already in the fourteenth century, groups of disciples formed in centers like Valencia, Marseilles, and Paris. But Llull’s teaching seems to have been associated with spiritual Franciscan and Joachimite ideas, and was as such condemned by the Dominican Inquisitor Nicholas Eymerich in 1376. Nevertheless, centers of Lullistic studies continued to spring up in the fifteenth century, in Spain at Barcelona, Mallorca, and Valencia, and in Italy at Padua. In Paris, too, Lull’s ideas seem to have been gaining adherents, but they were opposed strongly by the nominalist chancellor of the University, John Gerson (1425). In the High Renaissance, Neoplatonists like Pico della Mirandola in Italy, Bernard de Lavineta and Alonso de Proaza in Spain, Lefèvre d’Étapes, Charles de Bouvelles, and Josse Bade in Paris, found themselves attracted by Lull’s mystical and philosophical ideas and either published his works or wrote others incorporating his teaching. In the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries other currents—already implicit in Llull and his sources, but developed only in the later Renaissance—gave Lullism a medico-alchemical or logico-encyclopedic character, and even—in men like Agrippa von Nettesheim and Giordano Bruno—a turn to magic and the occult.

One of the most important representatives of this tradition in the fifteenth century was Nicholas of Cusa (1401–64). Cusanus, a man of prodigious learning and intense activity, took up in the course of his insatiable studies elements from Dionysius and Proclus, Chartres and Eckhart, and transformed them into a system which prepared the way for the modern philosophy of language and knowledge and for a new mathematics and vision of the universe. The extent of his early dependence on Ramon Llull has recently come to be realized, but some disagreement concerning Cusanus’ contacts with the Lullistic tradition has arisen. M. Batllori (“El Lulismo en Italia: Ensayo de síntesis,” Revista de filosofía 2 [1943] 253–313, 479–537, at 486) suggested that Cusanus’ knowledge of Lull’s doctrine derived from the time of his studies for the doctorate in canon law in Padua (1417–23), when he could have come into contact with a Lullistic circle around Fantini Dandolo (to 1421 professor in Padua,
then active in Church affairs, 1448–59 Bishop of Padua). It is certain that Dandolo was later a good friend of Cusanus and that he collected Lullian manuscripts, some no doubt from Llull's own legacy of manuscripts in Genoa, others brought from Spain by the Catalan Lullists whom Dandolo had gathered around himself. E. Colomer (Nikolaus von Kues und Raimund Lull [Berlin, 1961] 6) pointed out, however, that there is no historical proof of Cusanus' association with Dandolo's circle, and that the first sure date for a sojourn of a Spanish Lullist in Padua occurs in 1433, ten years after Cusanus' departure. Colomer proposed that Nicholas' interest arose through the mediation of Heimeric de Campo (1395–1460), who taught in Cologne during the two years (1425–26) that Cusanus studied theology there. Heimeric had studied at Paris from 1410–20 and came to Cologne as professor in 1422. It is certain that Heimeric knew Llull's Art and took up much of his teaching in his later philosophical and theological works. It is also certain that Cusanus made extensive excerpts from Llull's works about the year 1428, during the time when he was active as a canon lawyer and in pastoral work in the vicinity of Coblenz (1427–32). These excerpts are now preserved in Kues, cod. 83, and have been edited by Colomer (op. cit., 125–86).

Two important series of publications, Raimundi Lulli opera Latina (Palma de Mallorca, 1959 ff.) and Nicolai de Cusa opera omnia (Hamburg, 1959 ff.), make possible several precisions in this question. The publication in Vols. 3–5 of the former edition of Llull's Liber praedicatione, Ars mystica, and Liber de perversione entis removenda makes available critical texts of three of the most important works excerpted by Nicholas in the period mentioned. The publication in the volume of the latter edition here under review of Cusanus' sermons from the years 1430–31 provides—due to the careful source-critical work of the editors—an example of how Nicholas combined Llull's ideas into an original and coherent system which clearly foreshadows his De docta ignorantia of 1440. With these materials at hand, several notes may be made. First, the text of Cusanus' excerpts from the Liber de praedicatione and Ars mystica appears to be related to Italian manuscript-families (ROL III 68; V 281). Secondly, the text of Llull's important Logica nova in Cusanus' library (Kues, cod. 88) is also related to an Italian manuscript-family. Thirdly, the manuscript San Candido VIII.C.3 which contains the Ars mystica was copied at Venice in the year 1423 (ROL V 245) and is related in the stemma to a manuscript from Sevilla (ibid. 277). These facts would seem to justify the conclusion that the beginnings of Paduan interest in Llull and possibly also the connection with Iberian Lullism would date at least from the last years of Cusanus' stay in Padua and that the young student's earliest contact with Llull took place there. Moreover, in connection with Nicholas' relation to Heimeric de Campo, it should be noted, first, that
the latter was not professor of theology during the two years that Cusanus was in Cologne, but was from 1422–29 professor in the arts faculty and only later from 1429–35 professor of theology. Secondly, none of Heimeric’s works before 1432–35 show any knowledge of specifically Llullian ideas. Although he may have become acquainted with Lullian thought in Paris, Heimeric was and remained basically an Aristotelian, strongly influenced by Albertist Neoplatonism.

It would seem most likely, therefore, that Heimeric—who was in fact only six years older than Nicholas—was not the latter’s teacher for theology, that he gained the admiration for Llull that his later works show from Cusanus, and that both men worked contemporaneously and perhaps together to penetrate the intricacies of the Mallorcan’s thought. The studies of both seem to have been given a certain urgency by the Council of Basel (1432) and both looked for solutions to the Church’s problems in Lull’s ideas, Nicholas in his De concordantia catholica (1433) and Heimeric in his Disputatio de potestate ecclesiastica (1432–35). Heimeric would accordingly have learned of Lull’s philosophical ideas from Cusanus, whose excerpts derive significantly not from the elaborate Artes with which Llull’s name is usually associated, but from the latest treatises which Ramon dedicated to examining ever more profoundly the foundations of his own thought. And it is quite possible that Nicholas, on the other hand, learned something of the mystical direction of Llull’s thought from Heimeric. Parisian Lullism had a mystical tendency even down to the times of Lefèvre, and it is a fact that Cusanus’ excerpts from the Liber contemplationis were based on a Paris manuscript. It was perhaps due to Heimeric’s influence that Nicholas’ investigations turned at this time to other sources as well. The elaborate source analysis of the sermons of 1430–31 shows that Cusanus, in addition to the ordinary Scholastic sources, was engaged particularly with William of Auvergne’s De fide et legibus and Hugo of Strassburg’s Compendium theologicae veritatis. And later he undertook the systematic study of Neoplatonist sources, beginning in 1438 with Dionysius.

Although there are here many details of which we cannot be certain, the present edition provides tangible evidence on almost every page of the profound influence of the thought of Ramon Llull on Nicholas of Cusa. Thanks to the painstaking work of the editors, we are afforded an insight into the way in which the young Cusanus molded the materials he had derived from the eccentric but genial Mallorcan doctor into a system which begins with a dynamic and fecund, but incomprehensible, triune God, moves through a universe created in the image of the Trinity, to culminate in Christ, the concordance and union of God and man, that the world might attain its purpose.

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THEOLOGICAL STUDIES


The reform of educational structures in accordance with the needs of a new class of students—well-situated bourgeois rather than clerics—exercised many minds in the sixteenth century. Because Aristotle's works formed the backbone of the feudal curriculum, the attack was concentrated here, although it came from different quarters in different countries: in Italy from the humanists and Platonists, in the north from the religious reformers. In Paris the assault was led by Pierre de la Ramée (1515–72), Regius professor of philosophy. In association with his lifelong friend Omer Talon (ca. 1510–62), Ramus produced textbooks for almost all the parts of the old Aristotelian encyclopedia, translations and commentaries on classical authors, orations and epistles, and a posthumously published Zwinglian theological treatise. Elements in Ramus' ideas for curriculum reform were the study of the Greek language, Byzantine Aristotle-commentaries, Hellenistic mathematical treatises, and most importantly an attempted transformation of Aristotelian logic in accordance with the Renaissance association of rhetoric and wisdom into a universal method of invention and judgment which Ramus interpreted as the Platonic dialectic.

Ramism had considerable success in the Netherlands, in Puritan England, and in the newly founded gymnasias of the Zwinglian or Calvinist cities of Switzerland and western Germany. Opposition came, however, not only from the Sorbonne establishment but also from philologically interested Aristotelians who wished to free the Philosopher from the clerical ideology of the Scholastics. This movement had begun in the medically oriented universities of Italy and was turned against Ramus in Paris by men concerned especially with the reform of jurisprudence. In Germany this Aristotelian movement contributed to the transformation of the medieval universities—Tübingen, Heidelberg, Leipzig, Wittenberg—and to the structuring of the new Lutheran ones—Altdorf, Helmstedt, Marburg, Jena—in accordance with the needs of the ruling princes. Melanchthon had given the impetus to this institutionalization of Luther's gospel, but although attempts were made to synthesize his logical treatises with those of Ramus, the movement to an Aristotle interpreted on the basis of the Greek text and the early Greek commentators had gained all of the German Lutheran universities by the end of the century.

Leaders in the formation of a Lutheran Scholasticism were: in Altdorf, Philip Scherb; in Helmstedt, Owen Günther; in Heidelberg, Julius Pacius, whose great edition of Aristotle's Greek text appeared in 1597; in Tübingen, Jacob Schegk (1511–87), who was professor of philosophy
and medicine and composed works especially on Aristotle’s logic. Among Schegk’s pupils were Andreas Planer (1546-1607), who introduced Kepler to Aristotle’s natural philosophy in Tübingen, and Nikolaus Taurellus (1547-1606), whose works on metaphysics contributed to the climate in which Leibniz grew up.

The present volume collects the prefaces, epistles, and orations with which Ramus and Talon attempted to propagate their ideas. These literary forms reflect not only classical influences but also the wider audience which the medium of print was meant to serve and the new economic conditions had made literate. They reflect, moreover, a time of intellectual change when more systematic treatment was impossible. The orations often refer to the new economic and social situation, and to the consequently necessary curriculum reform. The epistles are addressed, among others, to Georg Joachim Rheticus (1514-76), professor of the new astronomy at Wittenberg, Giacomo Acontius (1492-ca. 1566), an apostle of religious toleration who had emigrated to England, and especially to Schegk concerning the interpretation of Aristotle’s logic. This reprint contains a valuable introduction by Walter Ong of St. Louis University.

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_C. H. LOHR, S.J._


_Historical Protestantism_ is intended to be an initial introduction to Protestantism from the viewpoint of a Roman Catholic, and a contribution to the developing dialogue between Protestantism and Roman Catholicism. The first half is quite different from the latter half. Its half-dozen chapters deal briefly with Luther, Calvin, Anabaptism, Anglicanism, Puritanism, and Methodism. The treatments are lean, basic, and informative, but not very colorful. They are fair and generally sympathetic, though not uncritical; the limitations stem from the inevitable oversimplifications that arise from the effort to picture in a few words the theological history of complex movements that were changing over time. Those versed in one or another of the subjects will quarrel with some of the nuances, such as S.’s contention that Calvin believed that “all the people of Geneva were to belong to the church...because they had come to the conviction of election” (p. 43), or his slighting of the *Nachfolge Christi* motif in Anabaptist groups. The most serious difficulty of interpretation emerges in the treatment of Puritanism. The inner complexity of that movement is not sufficiently probed, and the Presbyterian party is singled
out at the expense of the Episcopal, Independent, Baptist, and Sectarian Puritan elements, so that the larger significance of the whole movement, especially for Anglo-American Protestantism and the shaping of the denominational system, does not become apparent. The subordination of the impact of the Enlightenment on Protestantism to the reaction of Methodism to it does not bring out strongly enough the toughness of the problems struggled with by the thinkers considered in the latter half of the book.

The last six chapters focus on the theology of eight modern theologians. Chap. 7, “Nineteenth Century Liberal Protestantism,” deals cursorily with Schleiermacher, Strauss, and Ritschl. The remaining chapters provide useful introductory essays on the thought of Barth, Bonhoeffer, Bultmann, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Paul Tillich. In many ways the Bonhoeffer chapter is the most moving and the best documented. These essays avoid many of the traps of oversimplification into which such compact overviews often fall. They present their subjects as thinkers to be taken seriously, as Christians dealing sensitively with fundamental issues of faith, church, and world.

The author writes in an ecumenical vein, and understands and communicates the Protestant intention to bear witness to a Christianity that is discovered in the Word of God. “An insistence on the original apostolic faith as that faith is embodied in the Scriptures and an opposition to any form of Christianity which is a deformation of that faith, these, in that order of importance, are the two basic thrusts of Protestantism” (p. vii).

For individuals and groups which have had little or no acquaintance with the history of Protestantism or exposure to some of the leading twentieth-century theologians (especially the latter), this book can be useful. Such an introduction will hopefully be followed up by further attention to Protestant history and by direct encounter with selected texts of the theological giants. This is a book that, properly used with a college class or an adult study group, can provide basic information, invite exploration of important avenues of reflection, and stimulate theological thinking. A bibliography and an index complete the study.

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ROBERT T. HANDY


This fine study is the culmination of Coulson’s previous writings on Newman, which have appeared during the past ten years. His purpose here is to show that “to a much greater extent than is supposed, there
exists an idea of the Church common to the Anglican tradition of Cole­
ridge and F. D. Maurice and to the Roman tradition which is discovered
and re-expressed in the documents of the Second Vatican Council.” C.
does feel, however, that Newman provides “the fullest and most satis-
factory expression” of this idea. The book consists of four parts that ex-
plode this “common tradition,” Newman’s idea of the Church, Maurice’s
critique of Newman, and a conclusion that convincingly shows the mo-
dernity of these nineteenth-century thinkers.

In Part 1, C. sets forth the basic nineteenth-century conflict charac-
terized by Coleridge and Bentham. Efforts to “purify” the English
language, which began in the seventeenth century under the influence of
Puritanism and the new sciences—and which produced the “plain
style”—, culminated in the James Mill–Bentham rationalist tradition that
equated “word” with “thing.” Coleridge, reaching back to the long-
neglected tradition of the Elizabethan divines, reasserted the validity of
a middle ground between the literal and the metaphoric. There is a valid
“fiduciary” use of language that points to experiences and events that
have to be performed to be understood. This re-establishment of the
validity of symbol grows out of Coleridge’s organic theory of a lingua
communis, whereby words must be explained within the idiom in which
they occur. The Church, as a society, is a self-verifying language system;
i.e., it can verify its own insights. C. sees this theory of language and
society as similar to the later position of Wittgenstein, who relenting from
the uncompromising position of the Tractatus accepted as valid this
“fiduciary” use of language in the Philosophical Investigations. Thus
Coleridge is a common source for Newman and Maurice, whom C. sees
as differing but essentially compatible in their ideas on the Church.

Part 2 explores Newman’s idea of the Church as related to the Anglican
tradition reaffirmed by Coleridge and to the European tradition carried
on by Möhler, Blondel, and von Hügel. Because Newman’s quest for
certitude was largely personal, his writings express a more dramatic
development than Coleridge’s and gradually approximated the “method
of personisation” advocated by Maurice. For both Newman and Cole-
ridge, the way to certitude is not only linguistic (theological) but social
(ecclsesial). But, whereas Newman’s approach to doctrinal development
moves from ideas to persons and communities, for Coleridge it remains
focused on ideas.

Newman’s study of the Church was, of course, caught up in the context
of contemporary ecclesiastical ferment. His essay on doctrinal develop-
ment was not only a statement of personal conversion to Rome, but also a
major contribution towards a new understanding of revelation itself. It is
here, however, that Maurice’s criticism of Newman is most telling. Where
Newman sees revelation occurring almost exclusively within the Church, Maurice sees it taking place in all of history, a view similar to that of the recent secularization theologians.

Newman was deeply concerned about the relation between the Church and the world, and again his thought runs parallel to Coleridge, whose "clerisy" were the mediators between Church and nation. This is precisely the point of Newman's Lectures on University Education. He saw the Catholic university as a community where priests and laymen met to share ideas and values in order to give unified witness to the world. In the years prior to Vatican I, Newman grew increasingly concerned about the role of the layman (see Coulson's excellent introduction in his edition of *On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine*, 1961), a concern that brought down on him the disapproval of Rome and conservative English Catholics. A parallel concern was the question of intellectual freedom and ecclesiastical authority. His ultimate hope was that of von Hügel, who envisioned the Roman Catholic Church as "the greatest possible multiplicity in the deepest personal unity." Always conscious of the charge of Romanism leveled at him by Anglican contemporaries, Newman worked the best of the Anglican theory of Church and state into the Catholic tradition.

As a result, Vatican I came for Newman—and for the members of the 1863 Munich Congress held by Döllinger—"like thunder in a clear sky." Rather than being demanded, it was imposed. The Church universal had been called together, Newman felt, to solve the problems of the Church in Italy; and a principal result was a widening of the gap between the Church and secular society.

In Part 3, C. shows that this imposition of authority from above touches one of the principal differences—one of emphasis—between Newman and Maurice. Newman stressed the role of the Church, Maurice that of the nation. Both were concerned with the realization of the kingdom of Christ, but Maurice felt Newman was loyal to doctrines rather than persons. C. aptly points out that their methods are complementary. Maurice's dogged capacity for burrowing into particular questions is marred by his admitted diffuseness and inability, or unwillingness, to sacrifice detail to pattern. Newman's keenly analytic mind constantly sought the pattern of unity, constantly used logic to check the necessary and prior urgings of the heart. Both, however, agreed that a church that spoke only to itself was irrelevant and possessed perhaps only a part of the truth. Through the mediation of the layman—precisely at that juncture where Church and nation overlap—the Church realizes itself as the sacramental presence of Christ.

In Part 4, C. draws an interesting and important conclusion from this
study of Newman's theory of Church and society: "it requires an end be brought to that division of the Church into two cultures—clerical and lay—with their separate systems of education and ways of life, since the consequences of this argument are that, once we speak of the Church as the people of God, we are presupposing a Church as wide as that of the open society and common culture which constitutes its contemporary context" (p. 252), a view C. finds clearly expressed in Lumen gentium.

This is perhaps the best contribution to Newman scholarship since J.-H. Walgrave's Newman the Theologian (tr. 1960). It is at once historical ecumenism and creative theology in its own right. C. shows convincingly that this "common tradition" is confirmed and supported by Vatican II and that an open pluralistic concept of society still requires a sacramental conception of the Church proposed by Coleridge, Maurice, and Blondel.

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The attitude of the Society of Jesus to its l'enfant terrible Père Teilhard de Chardin was, and perhaps still is, a complex and ambiguous one. It would appear that as a distinguished man of science T. was genuinely respected at all levels of his religious community. However, in his role as apologist for the Christian faith in the new evolutionary environment of the twentieth century, he constituted for his confrères, particularly at the highest echelons of authority, a vexing problem of censorship for a period of over thirty years. On the other hand, this official attitude hardly tells the whole story; for we know that T. had many close friends in the Society who supported, defended, and encouraged his work, both as a scientist and as an apologist. René d'Ouince must certainly be numbered among this latter group.

In 1935, d'Ouince, fifteen years T.'s junior, became the Jesuit superior of the Etudes house in Paris. An admirer of T.'s, the new superior, sensing that he might now be in a position to be of some help to his friend, requested that T. be assigned to Etudes. Thus in 1937 d'Ouince became T.'s superior. Having for many years manned this rather favored observation post, he now undertakes to unravel the tangled skein of T.'s relations with religious authority. Actually, his undertaking is somewhat more comprehensive than it may sound; for it in fact seeks to encompass both the man and his thought, and for this purpose has been broken up into two volumes.

The prospective reader should be warned in advance against exag-
gerated expectations of startling revelations. The intensive and extensive examination of T. undertaken by his fellow Jesuits since 1962 has already established a well-elaborated context of interpretation which it is today difficult to surpass. One need only mention the substantive contributions of de Lubac, Smulders, Rideau, Mooney, Faricy, and North to be reminded of the significance of the work already completed. Even biographically, a great deal has already been pieced together through the voluminous correspondence available, as well as through the studies by Cuénot and Speaight. D'Ouince does not, then, significantly alter our over-all picture of T. either biographically or intellectually. He does, however, add a number of useful details to our understanding of the more controversial aspects of T.'s life.

The more unsympathetic of T.'s critics have tried to depict him as a disloyal religious whose apparent attachment to the Church was purely opportunistic. They have particularly stressed, as evidence of his bad faith, the underground distribution of his manuscripts during his lifetime and the willing of his literary remains into the hands of Mlle. Jeanne Mortier after his death. Needless to say, these same critics have relentlessly impugned T.'s orthodoxy and have repeatedly held up the *Monitum* of 1962 as the desired magisterial support for their argument. In the face of such widespread, no-holds-barred hostility, the Jesuits have necessarily been cast in the role of working out on T.'s behalf an *apologia pro vita*, although it was not until de Lubac's *La pensée religieuse du Père Teilhard de Chardin* (1962) that the Jesuits felt free to put on the gloves themselves. The great Jesuit commentators of the last decade have succeeded in demonstrating (not to everyone's satisfaction, however) the essential loyalty as well as the essential orthodoxy of the man and his work. While neither neglecting the novelty of T.'s position nor indulging in uncritical adulation of the entire Teilhardian corpus, they have attempted to expose the roots of this new synthesis in the biblical and theological traditions as well as in the traditions of spirituality. This work of defense has been of crucial importance and still has its utility, although one has the feeling that it has reached the point of diminishing returns. D'Ouince's work is solidly within this by now predictable mold and may even represent the fullest and most obvious example of it. Hopefully, the future of Teilhardian studies lies elsewhere.

D'Ouince's biographical exploration of the man seeks to touch as many bases as possible, while highlighting the more controversial episodes. The childhood in Auvergne, the educational and religious background, the long years of Jesuit formation, the astounding intellectual and literary break-through of the World War I period, and the scientific work in Paris are all rehearsed once again, but somewhat in the nature of a prelude to
the dramatic events of the twenties which will lead to the "exile" to China in 1926. A very thorough but not essentially new presentation is provided of the roots of this traumatic experience in T.'s views on original sin. The subsequent inner anguish the whole affair caused T. is well delineated. D'Ouince is also careful to situate this event, and the whole of T.'s troubled career for that matter, within the larger ecclesiastical context of anti-Modernism which so dominates this whole period. The seemingly interminable obstacles to publication encountered by T. over the years, particularly with respect to *The Divine Milieu* and *The Phenomenon of Man*, are worked through at length, together with the "ethics" of the subterranean distribution of unpublished manuscripts. Especially enlightening is the exposition of the facts leading up to T.'s decision to will his manuscripts outside the Jesuit community.

The phenomenon of Teilhard really begins in a certain sense with his death in New York, and d'Ouince does not neglect to lead us through the following years of posthumous publication, adverse criticism within the Church, and the beginnings of the official Jesuit turnabout at the early stages of Vatican II. At the close of this first volume it becomes quite clear that d'Ouince is intent on raising through the T. affair a larger issue, what he calls the "politique du silence" which reigned throughout the anti-Modernist period. T. was only one victim among many, though an especially pathetic one. It is this whole era of repression that d'Ouince wishes to indict and it is a new era of free scholarship to which he is urging us. The point is well made but hardly original.

The second volume attempts a systematic presentation of T.'s thought around the themes of (1) man and the world and (2) Christ and the world. With regard to the anthropological side of the argument, d'Ouince takes us through T.'s evolutionary understanding of the world, underlining man's special responsibility for the future of the evolutionary process, and raising the question of the possible relationship between the building of the earth and the coming of God's kingdom. At every point T.'s understanding is contrasted with the classical theology, particularly as reflected in the manual tradition, in the effort to indicate how "authentically traditional" T.'s thought is "with regard to the things of faith and yet how revolutionary it is with regard to the commonly held theological positions" of a tradition determined by a static cosmology.

With regard to the Christological side of the argument, d'Ouince restricts the larger portion of his exposition to T.'s early writings (i.e., up to 1927) with a brief follow-up on several important Christological essays from the later period. The grand lines of T.'s view of original sin, redemption, Mystical Body, and Christogenesis are presented in relation to both the biblical witness and the classical theology. Christopher Mooney's
Teilhard de Chardin and the Mystery of Christ (1965) has already made these themes familiar to the interested English-speaking reader in a much more ample and thoroughgoing way. The whole of this second volume will probably leave many readers with a sense of déjà vu.

D'Ouince has put together an engaging chronicle of T.'s life within his order and the Church of the anti-Modernist period, together with a well-constructed and lucid exposition of the modern Christian's place within an evolving creation. No new directions are indicated, but new details are added to what has now become the familiar picture of T. worked out by the best Jesuit commentators of the last ten years: T. the loyal and obedient religious and priest who suffered much from the Church for the sake of the Church; T. the essentially orthodox thinker rediscovering lost insights of the tradition and developing these in a new cosmological perspective. It seems to this non-Jesuit reviewer that the defense has successfully pleaded its case, at least to those who are willing to listen to it with an open mind, and that the time has come to strike out towards new fields of Teilhardian study.

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DONALD P. GRAY


In a characteristically brilliant article presenting the minority at Vatican I as the forerunners of the majority at Vatican II, the Luxembourg Church historian Victor Conzemius, now a professor in Lucerne, has written that "the study of Vatican I is only just beginning" ("Die Minorität auf dem ersten Vatikanischen Konzil: Vorhut des zweiten Vatikanums," Theologie und Philosophie 45 [1970] 409-34, 413). That a full century has been required to achieve the detachment, objectivity, and scholarly perspective demanded by this study is due in no small part to the Modernist crisis which convulsed the Church in the first decade of this century. The shock waves of that convulsion could still be discerned as recently as twenty years ago in Pius XII's Encyclical Humani generis (1950) and the Draconic disciplinary measures it initiated especially in France.

The observance of the one hundredth anniversary of Vatican I in 1970 has called forth a spate of scholarly articles on the Council's work. With few exceptions they have concentrated on the definition of papal primacy and infallibility. Largely unnoticed and uncommented on was Vatican I's contribution to the nineteenth-century controversy between science and
religion in the Constitution *Dei Filius*, which deals with the relationship between faith and reason. Responsible at least in part for this neglect is the difficulty of the material, which did not go unnoticed at the time. Thus the American *peritus* James A. Corcoran wrote home on May 25, 1869, that in the meetings of the preparatory commission “a great deal of time has been lost... in debating and defining questions on the creation, Trinity, Incarnation, and other like matters, on which our Sunday school children know all that a council need define, or rather re-define. And why? Because some Prof. Scratchemback, in some German university, has written about them in a German philosophical jargon, which neither himself nor his readers understand!” (cited from James J. Hennesey, “James A. Corcoran’s Mission to Rome: 1868–69,” *Catholic Historical Review* 48 [1962] 157–81, at 173). And on April 24, 1870, the day that *Dei Filius* was finally passed by the Council, the redoubtable Bishop McQuaid of Rochester, N.Y., told a correspondent that the Constitution contained “some abstruse metaphysical points which few can fathom and certainly will never trouble the brains of any but a German Philosopher for whose especial benefit they seem to have been made” (cited from Henry J. Browne, “Letters of Bishop McQuaid from the Vatican Council,” *ibid.* 51 [1965] 408–41, at 423).

All the more credit, then, to Pottmeyer for giving us the first truly authoritative and clear analysis of Vatican I’s teaching on faith and reason. His book has both the interest and importance connected with all revisionistic works. It is sure to remain the definitive study of the subject for many years, perhaps decades, to come. And that this study does indeed revise the “received version” of what Vatican I said about the assumed conflict between religion and science is evident from P.’s conclusion (p. 460), which he himself terms “surprising”:

Contrary to a widely received view, the Constitution *Dei Filius*, despite its narrownesses, cannot be considered the document of a Church and a theology which are withdrawing into a ghetto to defend themselves against a hostile world. It is true that such an attitude did determine to a large extent the preparatory work on the Constitution, the conciliar negotiations, and even the Constitution’s subsequent reception. From the very beginning it was overshadowed by the predominant and polemically intensified defense against liberalism which was responsible for the strong emphasis of the Church’s teaching authority and of a certainty in matters of faith which admitted of no doubt. Allied with these emphases was the rejection of all theological attempts to mediate between the Church’s teaching and modern thought. This explains the comparative failure of the emerging attempts at the Council itself to win Church recognition for the just claims of science and scholarship, thus establishing—almost a century before Vatican II—a positive relationship between the Church and modern thought. Actually the Constitution was nothing
less than the solemn recognition of the elements of truth in the Enlightenment. That the revolutionary consequences of this step for the Church's teaching and practice remained unperceived was due to the predominantly restorative atmosphere which made it all but impossible to discern the real thrust of the Council's teaching.

Though it is nowhere explicitly stated, one implication of P.'s thesis is clear from the above quotation alone: had the Constitution been correctly understood, the Modernist crisis as well as much else which prevented the Church from entering into a true dialogue with the modern world prior to Vatican II need never have happened. The evidence P. offers for his revisionistic interpretation of this important Vatican I document is massively impressive. It includes a careful and detailed analysis of the debates in the preparatory commission and of the successive alterations in the schema presented to the Council. In addition, P. has made extensive use of the hitherto unpublished vota of two crucial members of the preparatory commission: the German Jesuit J. B. Franzelin and the Roman professor Joseph Pecci, brother of the later Pope Leo XIII. These two documents alone, which P. summarizes and analyzes before reproducing them in full in an appendix of 105 pages, make this book an indispensable aid for future research.

Admittedly this is a specialists' book, a communication from scholar to scholar. Though the number of those capable of reading it with profit, especially in the English-speaking world, is bound to be small, it is no exaggeration to claim that henceforth no teacher of dogma or of modern Church history can afford to be unfamiliar with the case so ably presented in these massively documented pages. It is the kind of seminal work which, read and digested by specialists and teachers, will be cited and referred to in their lectures and writings so that its ideas filter down to a whole generation of students, thus influencing the thought of thousands who will never read the book itself. The careful and painstaking scholarship displayed here makes their author, still in his mid-thirties and destined for a professorial chair in Germany, very much a man to watch for the future.

St. Louis University Divinity School

JOHN JAY HUGHES


This study of papal infallibility, prompted by the centenary of the First Vatican Council, is typical of the kind of product we have come to expect of Gustave Thils. It is a work of historical theology that is at once clear,
thorough, solid, synthetic, and safe. T. breaks no new ground, but he provides a service in gathering together a substantial amount of diverse documentary material, some of which had not been previously published or edited.

T. limits his study of papal infallibility to an analysis of the doctrine as proposed by Vatican I. This is not intended as a detailed monograph. T. seeks only to clarify the principal dimension of infallibility as defined by Vatican I and as that definition is illuminated by the various conciliar documents, preparatory _vota_, declarations, reports, observations of the fathers, and contemporary theological writings. The previously unedited and unpublished material to which I referred above is from the archives of St. Sulpice in Paris: the _Journal_ of M. Icard, the _Journal intime_ of Bishop Dupanloup, and the _Procès-verbaux_ of the French minority. Historians will have to judge the distinctive value of these items. On the surface, at least, they seem only to confirm rather than modify in any way our conventional theological assumptions about the Council in general and about the meaning and intent of its definition of papal infallibility in particular.

T. is sensitive to the ecumenical problem posed by the Catholic dogma of papal infallibility; he is equally aware of the general misinformation and misinterpretation that has surrounded the dogma ever since it was first formulated. Many Catholics, including those in episcopal office, have tended in the past to exaggerate and thereby distort the nature and extent of papal infallibility. We know, for example, that some Catholics have come to affirm a "practical infallibility": even on those occasions when a given papal statement does not conform to all the conditions and limitations established by Vatican I, the Catholic must respond to such teaching as if it were infallible, because for all practical purposes it must be received as infallible doctrine. This opinion emerged on occasion during the debate about _Humanae vitae_. T. rejects the argument of those who have extended infallibility even to the pope's exercise of his ordinary magisterium, arguing with Gasser that such a view is precluded by the phrase "solummodo...quando...definit."

T. insists that the source of infallibility is God in His Spirit and, indeed, that God alone is absolutely infallible. Papal infallibility is neither personal nor magical, and there are conditions for its exercise. T. restates the traditional indispensable conditions for ex-cathedra definitions and also points to certain moral conditions, such as the duty of the pope to inform himself before exercising his prerogative. Finally, there are limits to papal infallibility: by its end (to insure the integrity of revelation), by its norm (revelation itself), and by its object (the direct object is revelation; the
indirect object is any truth necessary for the safeguarding of revelation). T. believes it to be ecumenically important that we maintain this link between the papal magisterium and the revealed message.

However, T.'s constant emphasis on revelation as "message" and "truth" inspires a certain uneasiness. Is his understanding of revelation so static and propositional as it appears? He does not seem to take into account those other dimensions of revelation (historical, existential, and eschatological) which tend to constrict the meaning of papal infallibility even more than he suggests. He endorses the usual distinction between the perfectible "philosophical form" and the imperfectible "content of truth," the so-called husk-and-kernel theory of dogmatic development which has come in for so much justifiable criticism in recent years (cf. A. Dulles, "Dogma As an Ecumenical Problem," THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 29 [1968] 397–416).

T. reassures us that we can, most of the time, check an infallible papal pronouncement against the Word of God (e.g., through biblical exegesis), but there are times ("extreme and rare moments"), he admits, when Catholics must simply make an "act of faith," as in the case of the definition of the Assumption, where the connection between the papal utterance and the revealed message is not so clear. But this very definition of the Assumption is the one and only exercise of papal infallibility since Vatican I. Can one dismiss this as an "extreme and rare" moment?

When T. says that it is important for ecumenical reasons to show the connection between the papal magisterium and the revealed message, he is only stating the problem, not pointing to the solution.

Boston College

RICHARD P. McBRIEN


This extraordinarily well-documented and useful book consists for the most part of a survey of the Christology of the leading Catholic theologians since about 1940, with special reference to the theme of the Incarnate Word as the supreme and definitive revelation of God. Confining himself to Catholic speculative theology, Citrini does not deal with the biblical foundations, or with statements of the magisterium, or with Protestant or Orthodox theology. Nor does he deal with the general doctrine of revelation, or with any aspects of Christology except those which have a direct bearing on Christ as revelation.

The first three hundred pages constitute a historical survey. After a brief "background" chapter which touches on the preparatory work of
Karl Adam, Odo Casel, and Romano Guardini, C. takes up works published in the last thirty years. Major attention is given to Emile Mersch, Michael Schmaus, Karl Rahner, Juan Alfaro, and Hans Urs von Balthasar. Somewhat less space is given to other important thinkers such as L. Charlier, H. de Lubac, J. A. Jungmann, H. Rahner, J. Mouroux, O. Semmelroth, A. Darlap, R. Latourelle, and G. Moran. In a final chapter of this historical survey, C. surveys recent developments in Holland, including especially Schillebeeckx, Malmberg, Schoonenberg, and Hulsbosch.

In the last hundred pages (corresponding approximately to the last quarter of the book), C. undertakes a systematic synthesis of what he takes to be the valid achievements of the theological discussion of the past generation. He subscribes, in general, to the views of Mersch, Schmaus, K. Rahner, Alfaro, and Balthasar.

The longest single chapter in the historical survey is devoted to Balthasar, whose ideas are likewise those most emphasized and approved in the systematic survey at the end. Since Balthasar’s work is notoriously difficult to summarize, readers will be greatly indebted to C. for casting considerable light on Balthasar’s positions regarding Christ as the universale concretum and regarding the unique presence of God in Christ, as something to be discerned by the eyes of faith with the help of the Holy Spirit. Balthasar wisely refuses to separate the motives of credibility from the impact of revelation itself. Rather, he insists, the glory of the triune God, as perceived in the utter obedience of Jesus on the Cross, becomes its own evidence. “The man of good will can see in the face of Christ the face of God: this is evidence enough, and God could not have revealed His love more fully than this” (p. 409). As C. notes in his concluding chapter, Balthasar’s “theological esthetic” has immense implications for apologetics.

In his review of contemporary Dutch Christology, C. expresses many objections. In his treatment of Schillebeeckx, he accepts the latter’s view of Christ as the primordial sacrament of salvation. He is respectful likewise of Schillebeeckx’ response to J. A. T. Robinson, who unduly minimizes the “vertical” dimension of personal intimacy with God in favor of the merely “horizontal” relationship of men with one another. C., however, has reservations about Schillebeeckx’ rejection of the traditional idea that Christ’s humanity is the “conjoined instrument” of His divine person. Still less does he accept Schillebeeckx’ proposal to substitute the term “hypostatic unity” for “hypostatic union.” Schoonenberg receives adverse criticism from C. for his references to Christ as a “theandric person” and for his theory that God achieves His tripersonal being only when the Son and the Holy Spirit break into salvation history. Hulsbosch,
according to C., falls into still more grievous error when he asserts that the divinity of Christ is identical with His unique and pre-eminent humanity. Assertions such as these, in C.'s opinion, run afool of the teaching of Chalcedon regarding the nonidentity of the divine and human natures in Christ. "In Christ the duality of the human and the divine cannot be resolved by reducing everything to unity, and, in particular, cannot be resolved by denying the true personal divinity of the Savior" (pp. 287–88). Chalcedon, moreover, declared that Christ is consubstantial with us according to His humanity. Thus His humanity does not, as Hulsbosch seems to assert, constitute a new and higher stage of evolution beyond the rest of the human species.

In this learned, clearly written, and informative work, C. admirably accomplishes what he has set out to do. If there is any weakness, it is perhaps a failure to expose his own methodological assumptions and to bring them into confrontation with the assumptions of his adversaries. To do this, C. would have to go beyond his self-imposed limits and deal directly with the teaching of Scripture and the magisterium. In point of fact, he does appeal to the magisterium against the Dutch theologians. He cites Chalcedon and, on several occasions, Vatican II. For C., the Christology of Vatican II is contained in Dei verbum. With his lack of sympathy with secular theology, he not surprisingly overlooks the Christology of Gaudium et spes, although this Constitution, in articles 10, 22, 32, and 45, has much to say about the Incarnate Word as revelation. A further limitation is C.'s failure to treat the work of Teilhard de Chardin, which has surely been a major influence on many contemporary Catholic theologians. C. seems to fear that the high Christology of traditional Catholicism might be imperiled by concentration on the secular and cosmic dimensions of revelation. But it is at least equally possible that attention to these dimensions might actually reinforce the traditional doctrines of the divinity and universal lordship of Christ. In any event, here is an issue that C. might have discussed more explicitly in this admirable and helpful work.

Woodstock College

AVERY DULLES, S.J.


Nietzsche is reported to have said of joyless Christians that they claimed to be saved but did not look saved. R.'s study of the vicissitudes which have beset the Christian Messianic hope opens with the honest admission that although Christians today speak of a theology of revolution, there is little in their history to justify their claim for a "sociopolitical" or "revolu-
tionary" significance for the gospel. With that stated as an honest *videtur quod non*, the rest of the book deals both analytically and historically with the process by which "historical movements and ideologies that yearned for the radical renewal and transformation of society...arose from the Christian context, passed over into an anti-ecclesiastical form, and were then often 're-Christianized' by liberal churchmen" (p. 3).

R.’s project, thus described, might seem like that rather common ploy by which Christian theologians now claim for Christianity any movement enjoying notable secular (and liberal) prestige. R. is not, however, given to that form of neotriumphalism. If anything, she suggests that more than one theological adjustment will have to be made if the Church is to recover its own revolutionary impulse and thus reverse the process by which “the revolution” was driven out of the Church in the first place. In an excellent first chapter, in which she sets up a typology of the ways in which Christians have conceived redemption, she describes the decision by which the official Church let the revolution go elsewhere as “the Augustinian merger of the Messianic era with the Church.” With this merger, the Church existentially and in practice (not necessarily therefore in all its theology) lost its own potential for revolution and even for reform. Until the link between Church and kingdom of God was challenged by secular rediscoveries of the kingdom, Christians could not rediscover their own expectation of a genuinely new, saving event for the world on which a theology of revolution is necessarily based. Now is the time of that rediscovery.

R.’s first major section covers the historical movements, both secular and on the edge of the Church, in which the revolutionary impulse reappears within Christianity and in secular society. A second section is, in effect, a survey of modern theology beginning with the neo-orthodox critique of liberal optimism and moving through the death-of-God theologies and into the theology of hope. This is followed by a rather brief survey of contemporary American social movements and a very thoughtful, even moving conclusion on “Man As Revolution.”

The book as a whole is very clearly written. Much of what R. says (especially in the historical section) can be found elsewhere, but she has synthesized the material well. Her own analysis and comments are always perceptive and even shrewd. (While clearly sympathetic towards revolutionaries and radicals, she is also sensitive to the totalitarianism and/or despair to which apocalypticism easily leads.) Her theological comments often reflect the distrust of “early Catholicism” and the sympathy towards post-Bultmannian theology that marked *The Church against Itself*, but she is not stuck at that theological point.

R. certainly resolves the historical difficulty which she had posed for
herself. Despite its many good qualities, however, *The Radical Kingdom* is somewhat disappointing. It may be that R.'s central theme (and revolutionary impulse) gets lost in the course of even excellent theological surveys. Nonetheless, although it never quite comes through, all the material is here for a well-grounded, contemporary theology of revolution and redemption, and to that extent the book is preliminary but successful.

*Woodstock College*

JOHN W. HEALEY, S.J.


This collection of essays is highly recommended, especially to those who do not recognize the names of the contributors. Originally offered as a lecture series at the Harvard Graduate School of Education in 1968, it contains rich insights on issues of great importance to educators, parents, and counselors. Moreover, it introduces the reader to scholars whose longer works deserve a wide audience.

Keniston's chapter, "Youth and Violence," derives from research published under the title *Young Radicals: Notes on Committed Youth* (1968). His first book, *The Uncommitted* (1963), is an analysis of alienated American youth. In the present essay, K. begins with a description of the psychological impact on youth of the postwar era. "Breakneck social change, technological destructiveness, the revolution of the oppressed, new techniques of communication, the technologization of life, and the fact of automatic affluence were not merely the distant scenery of this generation's development but its stuff and substance" (pp. 113–14). Out of this situation came "the postmodern style." The focus upon 'process' rather than program is perhaps the prime characteristic of the postmodern style, reflecting a world in which process and change are more obvious than purpose and goal" (pp. 114–15). To these children of change who grew up in the postmodern world, the avoidance of violence is the central moral concern. Having witnessed violence acted out on a gigantic scale, and having imaginatively participated in the possibility of worldwide destruction, the young have grown to fear their own violence. Just as their parents, products of a Victorian era, repressed and feared their own sexuality, the young repress and fear their own violence. "To summarize a complex thesis into a few words: the issue of violence is to this generation what the issue of sex was to the Victorian world" (p. 127). With heightened awareness of their own angers and aggressions, the young have a "sufficient understanding of inner violence to enable them
to control it in themselves and oppose it in others” (p. 130). More questions are raised than answered in this discussion, but exposure to the questions is a value in itself.

Bruno Bettelheim, on “Moral Education,” thinks we are making a mistake to suppose we can expect children to grow to moral maturity (characterized, as it is, by the fearless exercise of responsible judgment) without first subjecting them to a stringent morality based on fear. “If, as modern middle-class parents are often advised, affection is guaranteed to the child no matter what, there will be no fear. But neither will there be much maturity” (p. 89). The stern, punitive superego is known to have caused psychological damage in the past. But, as B. suggests, the tender superego of today is not without its problems. He applies this insight well to the problems of contemporary efforts to educate the disadvantaged.

Those unfamiliar with the work of Lawrence Kohlberg, professor of education and social psychology at Harvard, will find his essay on “Education for Justice: A Modern Statement of the Platonic View” well worth the price of the book. He has good things to say about justice as a principle rather than a rule of action. There are exceptions to rules but no exceptions to principles. He argues that there are not many moral virtues, only one: the principle of justice which governs morally mature men.

K.'s most interesting and original contribution stems from research conducted over the past fifteen years on growth stages to moral maturity in the U.S., Great Britain, Turkey, Taiwan, and Yucatan. In all cultures he has found six forms of moral thinking that constitute “an invariant sequence of stages” through which the path to moral maturity is traced: (1) obedience and punishment orientation; (2) naively egoistic orientation; (3) good-boy orientation; (4) authority and social-order maintaining orientation; (5) contractual legalistic orientation; (6) conscience or principle orientation. In the first two stages, moral value resides in “external, quasi-physical happenings, in bad acts, or in quasi-physical needs rather than in persons and standards.” In stages three and four, moral value resides in “performing good or right roles, in maintaining the conventional order and the expectancies of others” (p. 71). In the fifth and sixth stages, moral value resides in “conformity by the self to shared or shareable standards, rights, or duties” (p. 72). Knowledge of the stages is highly useful in focusing moral discussions when the parties may be speaking from distinctly different stages of development. K. applies his theory to recent antiwar protest actions as well as to the whole question of teaching morality in the schools.

Gustafson's essay on “Education for Moral Responsibility” and Peters’
paper on "Concrete Principles and the Rational Passions" round out a very worth-while book.

Woodstock College

WILLIAM J. BYRON, S.J.


Prof. Fried of Harvard Law School centers his tripartite treatise on the development of a philosophical theory of morality and the application of that theory to contemporary human and social problems. In Part 1, F. begins with an analysis of ends or values as they appear in ordinary human experience. Then he argues that those particular values which entail some element of reason are ordered by more general principles. Those human values called moral are grounded in what he terms "the principle of morality." He describes its meaning in this way: "the principle which specifies the concept of morality is an expression of the concepts of equality, of impartiality, and of regard for all persons as ends in themselves" (p. 42). F. indicates that his interpretation of this principle is "squarely in the tradition of Kantian moral philosophy" (p. 41) and is "substantially equivalent to Rawls's principle of right" (p. 72). The influence of John Rawls is also evident in F.'s account of the derivative principles of justice and fairness. He concludes his discussion of general ethical norms with an analysis of the dependence of love, trust, and friendship upon the principle of morality. Then he argues that moral values ought to be linked with other kinds of rational values to form a "life plan." He sums it up: "The picture that emerges is of man as a rational animal, in the sense that his world and instincts are pervaded by a tendency to system, to rational coherence. There is a tendency to order the whole repertoire of ends a man pursues, to make inclusive coherent wholes" (p. 100).

Parts 2 and 3 involve the application of the theoretical structure formulated in Part 1 to societal institutions and to the issues surrounding the fact of death. Of particular mention here is F.'s lucid discussion of the value of privacy for a human being in a technological society.

The strongest part of F.'s argument is his grounding of morality in the more comprehensive effort of human beings to establish a life plan. The notion of a life plan is, as F. suggests, a fruitful way of confronting the problem of personal identity and giving positive expression to the diversity of human life. "We must choose the shape of our life plans, and thus who we are. To be fully human we must be moral, we must love and trust, and these things define partially the shape of our life plans—as do the other major ends, and the general disposition to make of our lives rich and
coherent wholes. But the choices all this leaves open are not only infinite, but highly varied" (p. 177). But that diversity appears to be severely limited within the kind of ethics F. proposes.

In the spirit of the Kantian tradition, F. implies that, for the reasonable human being, morality entails certain fixed obligations. In addition, in the case of beneficence, e.g., he refers to "the directly intuitable nature of the obligation..." (p. 203). First, I have serious doubts as to whether anything is directly intuitable. Second, the apparent fixity of moral norms tends to militate against the diversity of outlook which is so valuable an aspect of F.'s notion of a life plan. Such diversity would be more substantial in the context of a theory of morality which recognizes the need for continued growth in our interpretation of moral norms.

*Le Moyne College, Syracuse*

**THOMAS V. CURLEY**


After studying at the Institute of Lay Theology, K. worked in parishes and has been teaching theology at Marymount College in Salina, Kansas. He does not expect his book to sell well because of its subject and viewpoint. I hope the book will sell and be widely read; for K. does not present a simple apologetic for authoritative Catholic teaching. Rather, his book shows that he has read widely on both sides of the question, that he has given much thought to both sides, and that hard planning has gone into the exposition of his thought.

The book has three sections: the ecclesial, the theological, and philosophical aspects of the question, and practical considerations. In the first section he takes up Newman's concept of the *consensus fidelium*. After examining the conditions for the validity of the *consensus* and applying them to the response given to Catholic social teaching, to attitudes in this "post-Christian" era and to chastity, K. concludes that the argument from the *consensus* is not valid. The Church is in need of a prophetic voice. This voice is Paul's.

The second section begins with a detailed study of the theological and philosophical arguments in favor of contraception. K. says that arguments from science, the new concept of man, and sociology say nothing about the morality of contraception, while that from the love union fails to distinguish adequately between married and unmarried love. He offers an extended analysis of "the principle of the total human act" as an argument for contraception, and shows that this kind of thinking is a subtle kind of end-justifies-the-means morality. The argument from conscience turns on how one can be practically sure that he has adequately formed his own
conscience. In the last part of this chapter K. shows the weaknesses in the criteria proposed by the majority report of the papal commission—weaknesses which even the most sympathetic supporters of that opinion have puzzled over.

K. presents his own argument for noncontraception as a covenant theology of love and sexuality. It does not contradict the natural-law argument but is related to it as the general to the more specific. It places sexual acts within the context of marriage and from that context it states the morality of all specifically sexual acts. In the marriage promises the couple enter a covenant, which has a God-given structure, between themselves and with God. They covenant without reservation for richer and for poorer, etc., hoping that the better will be there but also accepting the negative. The sexual union is the renewal of the covenant, the sign of the interpersonal and God-made covenant including the “without reservation.” Contraception is done from fear. The couple seek to exclude the negative elements of the covenant, the elements which call for genuine self-giving love, which require that they put their faith and life-together in the hands of God. It is not a renewal of the covenant. K. explains the difference between rhythm and contraception. The book has many other things. The book is recommended.

Jesuit School of Theology
at Berkeley

Robert H. Dailey, S.J.


After being a subject of heated controversy for several months after its publication, the Encyclical Humanae vitae met with a silence that seemed just as profound as the previous interest. This may have been nothing more than a reflection of the emotional exhaustion generated by the level of intensity of the initial discussion. But whatever the cause, in commenting on this silence, Philippe Delhaye feels that it has had a salutary effect in cooling the emotions and that now one is in a better position to carry on a dispassionate, and therefore more profitable, discussion of the whole question.

D. thinks there is another reason for carrying on a more enlightened discussion of the question today. Although he still regrets that Paul VI did not act in a more collegial way in preparing and issuing the Encyclical, he argues that this defect has been corrected to some extent by the statements of the various episcopal conferences subsequently issued. I presume it is for this reason that these statements have been collected in the present
volume, although even the identity of the editor of the present volume (let alone his reason) is not clear. At any rate, it contains episcopal statements from all parts of the world. The reader will find those from the Third World particularly interesting because of the difference in cultural background.

I suppose the significant question regarding all these statements is whether the bishops are speaking solely on a pastoral level or taking a moral stance somewhat at variance with the Encyclical. D. seems to feel that some of them (particularly the French bishops) take a slightly different moral position. I think all would have to admit that the wording of at least some of these statements is ambiguous at times, but I am not sure that even the French bishops’ statement must be taken in the sense in which D. explains it.

D. seems to think he finds a basis for allowing exceptions to the law against contraception in the Encyclical itself in the use of the expression “intrinsically wrong.” I believe he is correct in taking the position that “intrinsically wrong” does not necessarily mean “absolutely wrong.” But the expression in the Encyclical must be interpreted in the light of other statements made there which clearly imply that contraception is intrinsically and absolutely wrong, e.g., the statement that every act (quilibet usus) must be open to procreation. I would agree that this does not rule out the traditional exception allowed in rape cases, but I do not think it would allow for other “hard” cases. One may disagree with the teaching of the Encyclical, but I do not think there is much room for disagreement on what that teaching is.

Bellarmine School of Theology, Chicago   JOHN R. CONNERY, S.J.

SHORTER NOTICES


Despite the large number of infelicities of translation and proofreading (e.g., “Sin, O barren one, who did not bear . . . ,” applied to the Virgin Mary, p. 191), the book can still be recommended to the general reader as a generally reliable introduction to and summary of Proverbs, Job, Ecclesiastes (Qoheleth), Ecclesiasticus (Sirach), Daniel, and Wisdom of Solomon. The title accurately describes B.’s purpose, which is to present the content of each book in the context of one central problem, the retribution of human actions. This is obviously not as central an issue in the individual parts of Proverbs as in the other books, but B. argues well that this is the concern of the editor of the book, especially as presented in the prologue. B. makes some applications (e.g., folly and wisdom as representing
Eve and Mary) that are no more than accommodations, but these are legitimate extensions of a popularizer trying to make the contents more meaningful to a Christian reader. In general, however, he remains within the theological ambit of the books themselves and has some especially good observations on the meaning of Job and Ecclesiastes. Although the principal protagonist of the book of Daniel may be based on the figure of an ancient sage, the book is not usually classified along with the wisdom literature. B.'s principal justification for its inclusion here is that it does deal with the destiny of the Jewish people. In all, one who finds the wisdom literature too abstruse or speculative will find here a useful guide and some provocative insights.

Eugene H. Maly


The name of E. C. Colwell is well known in American NT circles, especially for a series of painstaking studies of Greek NT codices and various families of NT text-types. As president emeritus of the School of Theology at Claremont, California, he has now gathered together eleven of his articles, originally published in various magazines, Festschriften, and the like, into a convenient volume. They span the period 1932–68 and are mostly concerned with the external evidence of the manuscripts for the critical NT text. In an effort to bring some unity into the collection of somewhat disparate articles, C. has changed the titles of the articles in most cases, usually by introducing the word “method.” Thus, the original title, “The Significance of Grouping of NT Manuscripts,” has now become “Method in Establishing the Nature of Text-types of NT Manuscripts”; “Scribal Habits in Early Papyri: A Study in the Corruption of the Text” has become “Method in Evaluating Scribal Habits: A Study of Ρ45, Ρββ, Ρ75.” In this way six of C.'s articles are now cast under the heading of methodology in the genetic group relationships of Greek codices, two under the heading of methodology in the dating of NT codices, and two under the heading of elementary procedures in evaluating variant readings and scribal habits.

The concluding article, “Hort Redivivus: A Plea and a Program,” discusses the contemporary situation in NT textual criticism. It is in part a jeremiad, denouncing “the extremist errors of the last forty years . . ., a by-product of the Sitz im Leben of New Testament studies.” “Our fathers classified it [textual criticism] as a part of ‘Lower Criticism’ and regarded it as essential. We classify it as a low form of criticism and regard it as dispensable” (pp. 148–49). C. pleads for a revival of the comprehensive critical work of F. J. A. Hort and proposes a program for such a revival with five steps: (1) begin with readings; (2) characterize individual scribes and manuscripts; (3) group the manuscripts; (4) construct a historical framework for them; (5) make a final judgment on readings. NT scholars will agree with his program but take offense at some of the strictures on contemporary critical studies. However, the book will be an excellent guide for young NT students who want to acquaint themselves with many of the necessary procedures and techniques needed in the difficult and often unrewarding work of textual criticism.

Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J.

An excellent introduction to the thought and writing of the very first two theological pioneers. M. does not attempt to summarize the content of the extant works of Philo and Clement, but rather to show how these great Alexandrians came to grips with such fundamental issues as the human knowledge of God, the nature and destiny of man, and the relationship between faith and reason. Philo he recognizes as the first genuine theologian—and it was Philo, of course, who first spoke of philosophy as the handmaid (*therapainis*) of revelation—and Clement as the first proponent of the principle that grace does not destroy nature but elevates it. Clement also appears as the author of the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*. Both Alexandrians translated biblical revelation into the sophisticated philosophical language of the Hellenistic world and laid the foundations for what we know as systematic theology. M. stresses the importance of their contribution and, in a thoughtful section on the relevance of Greek thought to contemporary theology, he concedes that Christianity can, and perhaps should, “abandon Greek philosophy if, by this, one means the amalgam of categories and metaphysical principles of Plato, or of Aristotle, or of the Stoics,” but he denies that it can reject rational method—and this, he affirms, is the real contribution made by the Greeks. It is to be hoped that M., who feels that his own countrymen have sadly neglected the works of Philo, will continue to present his personal appreciation of Alexandrian thought, for he writes with a clarity and a precision that is bound to win him many grateful readers.

J. Edgar Bruns

The author of this book (*The Book of Divine Life: A Dogmatic Treatise on Grace*) is professor at the diocesan seminary in Poznan (Poland). He previously published two dogmatic treatises: *On God the Author of Creation and Grace* (1959) and *On Jesus Christ* (2 vols., 1962). The present volume is meant as a textbook for seminary students. It is a traditional treatise on grace, on the problems of sin and justification, of freedom and predestination, of the beatific vision. The method is also traditional. The tractate is presented in the form of a series of theses: in each the state of question is given first, then various opinions are explained, finally the arguments based on the magisterium, Scripture, and the Fathers are expounded. At the end an exhaustive international bibliography and an analytical index are provided. The book is written in a modern, lively language and a fluent style.

D. reveals an adequate knowledge of humanistic sciences, a training in modern scholarship, and a sincere interest in the student’s spiritual progress. All these qualities would recommend the book. However, it contains serious defects. As a textbook, its size is discouraging to a student who must study many other textbooks of theology. Perhaps it might serve as a reference book, since it contains useful lengthy translations of ecclesiastical documents and patristic texts (taken from Rouët de Journel’s *Enchiridion patristicum*). But even this usefulness is limited, since the texts are offered without any critical historical and theological commentaries and introductions. The weakest part of the book is its theological content. It might have been written by an ultramontane theologian twenty or thirty years ago. It reveals no awareness of modern developments in biblical and historical studies, of the theological problems raised in the last several decades in grace and other fields of theology. D. is too talented and well trained in

modern scholarship to waste his precious time on the repetition of old clichés.

Joseph F. Mitros, S.J.


G., emeritus professor of philosophy in the University of Melbourne, examines the complex relationship between experience and religious faith from the viewpoint of a convinced Christian intellectual. In highlighting a continuity between them, he makes an important contribution to the current debate on God-talk.

G.’s argument falls into four parts. He first examines empiricism and shows that the empirical, or experience, is more than mere sensory observation. Empirical knowledge of the nonempirical cannot then be excluded. Turning secondly to proofs for the existence of God, G. argues that we can come to know God through His presence in the world, called “prolongations” from the side of God and “fringes” from the side of man. Although traditional arguments for God’s existence fail to achieve demonstration (since they presuppose what they are intended to prove), they nevertheless provide “good reasons” for believing and serve as “pointers” to a beyond. It seems to me that, in the course of these examinations, G. sheds needed light on the meaning of such terms as “demonstration” and “proof” when applied to divine existence.

Thirdly, G. examines the role of religious faith. Since God is metaphysically only probable (as he uses the term), it is precisely faith which lifts God into a practical certainty. This conclusion is based on his rejection of the association of the concept of God with the concept of logical necessity. Whatever may be thought of this difficult problem, G. offers an admirable analysis of the interplay between faith and reason (particularly as reason meets counterevidence against the existence of God), and of the interplay between faith and freedom and between faith and action. “Faith unenacted,” he believes, “is incomplete; action without faith is uncompletable” (p. 208).

Fourthly, G. argues for a return to metaphysics—to an empirical metaphysics—if the efforts of natural reason to proceed toward God are to be adequately grounded.

An eminently competent and honest book, recommended to both the scholar and student of philosophical theology.

John A. Dinneen, S.J.


We often hear of the “scientific mentality” and of the difficulties which a mind steeped in the modern attitude encounters when seeking an understanding of faith as a mode of knowledge and as an experience. In the endeavor to comprehend the relations between faith and science, according to L., professor at the University of Louvain and specialist in the philosophy of science, linguistic analysis opens up new perspectives. Such analysis provides an opportunity for a systematic examination of the objective forms in which meaning is conveyed. It can lead to a clearer grasp of the differences between scientific methodology and the procedures of faith and, once we perceive how their respective languages function, can show us how both may be harmonized in the unity of a single life. The problems that arise in this area are predominantly semantic, since they concern the mutual interdependence between meaning and truth.

From various angles, the essays and articles assembled in this volume converge on one question: How are the propositions in which faith is formu-
lated and the propositions in which the findings of science are expressed to be interpreted when they explore reality within a common horizon? This question has as its objective the announcement of the problematic of truth, and is asked for the purpose of preparing the way for a reasonable solution. Acquaintance with the technical idiom cultivated by linguistic analysis, the mathematical formalisms of some contemporary systems of logic, and the philosophical bases of semantics is desirable or even requisite for an intelligent approach to most of the studies republished in L.'s new book. Of the seven chapters, the last two investigate linguistic problems posed by faith and so should be of interest to the theologian. Chap. 6 displays how the languages proper to science, to philosophy, and to faith are capable of being brought together in association in spite of the differences they exhibit. Chap. 7, still cleaving to the analytical method, inquires into the nature of cosmological representations as set forth in the language of faith. What faith enables us to see does, indeed, remain shrouded in enigma, yet it always holds out to us a promise and a hope.

Cyril Vollert, S.J.


Teilhard de Chardin predicted: "Someday, after mastering the winds, the waves, the tides and gravity, we shall harness for God the energies of love and then, for a second time in the history of the world, man will have discovered fire." This quest inspires the authors of this series of essays. And Teilhard's vision of a unified consciousness explicitly prompts them to record what they feel is part of that evolutionary process: "Psychotheology maintains that the convergence of the theological and psychological journeys is more than a possibility—it is a fact" (p. 140).

They may be correct. This response is born not of disbelief but of entering into the quest of the authors: how to ferret out, conceptualize, and define the range and limits of a "new science." Since they have chosen to struggle with their thesis in essay rather than dissertation form, the reader can hardly object to the lack of precise definitions of psychotheology. I assume the choice was deliberate, since it makes the work pregnant. Without undue attention to calculating, twenty-five partial definitions were noted, e.g., "Psychotheology limits discussion to the phenomenological area" (p. 97), "Psychotheology is non-categorical, non-diagnostic..." (p. 73). This handling is engaging and provocative, but of necessity unfinished. It generates the hope that the authors will intensify their pursuit. Of the eight topical areas meriting a chapter, each deserves a book written from the authors' perspective. And each book deserves an index.

The work is of greatest immediate value to moral theology. Its consciousness surpasses the earlier efforts of Tillmann and Häring; whereas others have excelled in incorporating scriptural aspects and foundations of man's behavior, Stern and Marino excel in the incorporation of the psychological dimensions.

A. W. R. Sipe


In this doctoral dissertation presented in the theological faculty of the Gregorian University (1964), V. reminds us anew of Aquinas' doctrine that love is more radically passive than
active, more a matter of openness, receptivity, appreciation, and (to use his term) "acceptance" than of overtly purposeful action. It is a theme akin to that developed (more relevantly and persuasively, I think) in these pages a dozen years ago by Frederick Crowe, S.J., under the title "Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas," but, for all that, worth restating. In an age like our own, with its overwhelming emphasis on doing and accomplishing, we do well to recall that personal growth is a function, not of manipulating the other (even with good intentions) but of letting him be himself in our presence and ourselves a yes to him. The capacity simply to open our hearts in warm appreciation is our most distinctively human mark, and alone can give meaning and point to whatever we purposively do.

Unfortunately, however, as in so many dissertations, the message here too gets lost in the medium. What might have been an insightful exploration of human possibilities turns into a rather tedious exercise in Wissenschaft. Bent on documenting every word with an appropriate text from Aquinas, V. is hardly in a position to move beyond him or even make him come to life. Even the references to contemporary psychology are used to support the medieval perspective rather than add anything new. The result, unhappily, is a dull book on an important theme.

Robert O. Johann


This concise, valuable study focuses on the role of the Anglo-Saxon king in his people's slow, often retrograde conversion to Christianity. C. concentrates on data about the Anglo-Saxons and their Germanic contemporaries, especially the Scandinavians, because he feels much previous scholarship has overstressed the Roman element in early medieval England and devalued the continuity of Germanic and pagan traditions. C. contends that the king played a major, indeed dominant role in the conversion because he occupied so large a place in Anglo-Saxon paganism. He was a sacral character descended from the god Woden. The king personified his people in their relations with the gods. Upon him rested the fortunes of the people; upon him fell the ultimate penalty if the mana departed from him. On the advice of Pope Gregory the Great (+604), the Roman missionaries in England worked as much as possible within the existing cultural and political framework; this circumvented many potential conflicts and allowed several aspects of pagan sacral kingship to continue into the Christian era, albeit with the proper modifications. C. demonstrates how some of these pre-Christian traditions survived and adapted; the topics covered include the royal priesthood, the king as object of beliefs and prophecies, his role in religious festivals, cult objects related to the monarchy such as animals and insignia, sacral kingship in Anglo-Saxon law, and the economic effects of the ruler cult. The book is well documented, especially from original sources, but there is unfortunately no separate bibliography.

Joseph F. Kelly


As the title indicates, this work is a specialized contribution to liturgical science. Pfaff traces the liturgical phenomenon in later medieval England of the introduction of nova festa. The most important of these were the Transfiguration, the Visitation, and the Name of Jesus, which had generally established themselves as regular ob-
servances in the liturgical calendar by the turn of the sixteenth century. P. also considers several "incipient" feasts which were in the process of gaining acceptance at the time the old liturgy was suppressed: the Five Wounds, the Crown of Thorns, the Compassion of the Virgin, and the Presentation of the Virgin. A special chapter is devoted to the curious Iconio, Domini Salvatoris, an "incipient" feast which combined the disparate themes of the remembrance of a miracle, the dedication of St. John Lateran, the translation of relics, devotion to the instruments of the Passion, and a vague confusion with the Transfiguration.

Besides laying the groundwork for a more comprehensive study of medieval liturgy, P. shows the relationship of popular piety to liturgy which led to the attempted, and in some cases successful, introduction of a new feast. Some were liturgical in origin: Transfiguration, Visitation, Presentation, Crown of Thorns, Iconia; others evolved from devotions in private manuals or books of hours: Wounds, Compassion, and most likely the Name of Jesus. On the basis of the actual liturgical patterns of later medieval England, P. shows that the process of introducing a new feast was a gradual one dependent on many factors. While historians may have misgivings about the liturgical vitality of the period under consideration, it is refreshing to note the organic relationship between the faith and spirituality of the people and their liturgical celebrations. This is an insight still somewhat foreign to our Reformation or Counter Reformation ideas of liturgical uniformity, and one deserving further study in the wake of the current liturgical revision among the Christian churches.

Charles W. Gusmer


The volume at hand is the first in a projected five-volume study which has been in process of publication over the last decade. The three other volumes already published are subtitled From Watts and Wesley to Maurice, 1690–1850 (1961), From Newman to Martineau, 1850–1900 (1962), and The Ecumenical Century, 1900–1965 (1965). The second volume in the series, From Andrewes to Baxter, 1603–1690, alone remains to be published. As the title clearly enough suggests, the purpose of this remarkably comprehensive exploration is not to retell once again the history of English theology or English liturgical practice, but to demonstrate the interdependence and interaction between the two over the last four centuries.

This particular phase of the over-all work is concerned with the emergence of the Anglican community as a viable theological and worshiping entity distinct from the Roman Catholic tradition. In neat dialectical form D. seeks to show the sui generis character of Anglicanism in the face of the Catholic threat on the right and the Puritan threat on the left. This threefold entanglement provides structural continuity throughout. The argument itself is divided into three sections: Part 1 is historical and theological in intent; Part 2 treats of the liturgical alternatives available in the Catholic, Anglican, and Puritan contexts; Part 3 delves into the frequently neglected areas of liturgical arts and aids such as architecture and art, music, and spirituality. The Catholic reader will very likely find himself most particularly drawn to the discussion of the historical background to the English Reformation, the quite penetrating assessment of varying Eucharistic models, the treatment of Catholic worship in the late medieval and Counter Reformation periods, and
the comparative evaluation of Catholic, Anglican, and Puritan spiritualities.

The work is extensively documented, contains twenty pages of bibliography, is excellently indexed in terms of persons, places (and churches), and topics treated, and includes a few illustrations. D. remarks at the conclusion that "piety and humour have not always been conjoined." He has himself, however, happily blended both humor and judicious scholarship into a very useful as well as a very readable study.

Donald P. Gray


The object of this new series is to make available translations of the critical editions of classical Cistercian writers. The four works included in the first volume are Bernard of Clairvaux's *Apologia to Abbot William*, *The Book of Precept and Dispensation*, *The Prologue to the Cistercian Antiphonary*, and *The Office of Saint Victor*. A detailed introduction to each work accounts for the circumstances in which Bernard wrote it, its structure, and its influence.

For twelfth-century monks Bernard of Clairvaux was a one-man *Review for Religious*. He often received questions about monastic life and many of his writings were responses to particular problems. Two of the treatises included here deal with questions of poverty and obedience. The quality of the observance of poverty in the older Benedictine monasteries, especially the Cluniac, was the subject of acrimonious debate at the time of the Cistercians' rise and expansion. In the *Apologia to Abbot William* Bernard started by rebuking the pride of the Cluniacs' critics but rapidly mounted an attack of his own on the superfluous features of Cluniac common life. This is the tract that contains the famous description of Cluniac gourmet tastes, especially in the matter of preparing eggs. Bernard was young and he let his pen bite with more than occasional sarcasm.

*The Book of Precept and Dispensation* is the product of a mature mind which can appreciate the agonies of subjects exposed to the whims and rigors of unwanted superiors. Bernard upholds the principle of obedience to the abbot whose commands follow the tenor of the Rule, but he insists that all obedience must be requested and given in love: "Love is the fountain of Life, and the soul which does not drink from it cannot be said to live. But how could it drink if it were far from this fountain, this love, which is its God?" (p. 149). *The Prologue of the Cistercian Antiphonary* is Bernard's covering letter of promulgation of the Cistercian antiphonary revised by order of the general chapter in the 1140's. *The Office of Saint Victor* was written by Bernard for a local feast at the request of Gui, Abbot of Montiéramey in the diocese of Troyes.

If subsequent numbers of this series follow the high standards the editors have set in this volume, many libraries will be enriched not only by the smooth translations of Bernard's tightly-knit prose but also by their scholarly introductions.

Fernando Picó, S.J.


Its title and subtitle are the only major inexactitudes R. seems to have permitted himself in putting together this generous and singularly informative study of the writings of St. Teresa. *Lógica y mística* is not an attempt, à la
Bertrand Russell or W. P. Stace, to subsume mystic experience under the rubric of philosophy, nor is it at all concerned, à la Plotinus or the early Augustine, with reasoning as the way to transcendence. Yet I may here be doing the author a large injustice: publishers have been known before this, their eyes more firmly fixed on market than on manuscript, to provide titles of their own choosing. In any case, philosophy is shown to be present in the writings of Teresa without their thereby being philosophical works quite as (the comparison is R.'s own) it is present in the Summa theologiae of St. Thomas without its being a philosophical work either.

The upshot is that Teresa's is shown to have been a mind of a toughness quite unparalleled among the classic mystical authors—provided, of course, one excludes Ruysbroek. No particular premium is here being placed on mental muscles. It is just that R., better than anyone before him, has articulated the unremitting robustness of Teresa's thought processes from one end of her literary career to the other. He has made it possible for the interpreter, as he moves through the widely varying genres of her writings, to recognize them all without exception to be compact with thought. One small warning: R. drops names at a great rate and manages to misspell them with a frequency that is nearly as great. But the positiveness with which he almost invariably includes them in his text and the further clarifications their presence affords make one forgiving in the end. This is a good book.

Elmer O'Brien, S.J.


The older Newman grew, the more philosophic he became. After his return from Dublin in 1859, he set about seriously to read philosophy, primarily with a view to preparing a book on the philosophy of religion to strengthen the apologetic basis of Catholicism and to meet positivistic objections to religion. Not until 1870 did he publish such a work, The Grammar of Assent. Both before and after its publication, Newman set down on paper his philosophic reflections. And in 1888 he gave them a title: Discursive Enquiries on Metaphysical Subjects, and appended a notation: "What I write, I do not state dogmatically, but categorically, that is, in investigation, nor have I confidence enough in what I have advanced to warrant publication." What is the value, therefore, of putting these in print? First, they open a door into Newman's philosophic workshop. Fr. Boekraad has added a system of signs which indicate the tentative and groping nature of these entries. As he has seen so well, that constitutes their charm and their value. I might add that they are of incidental value in throwing light on passages in Newman's published writings: e.g., the first entry on the faculty of abstraction enlarges our understanding of the philosophic conception of knowledge and its division into various branches of knowledge as presented in the Discourses on University Education (Part 1 of the Idea of a University). The proof of theism, among others entries, allows us to see how Newman originally approached certain philosophic problems in isolation and then fitted these into the over-all pattern of the Grammar of Assent. Finally, many entries have their own intrinsic value as tentative forays into philosophic territory. The text has been scrupulously edited.

Vincent Ferrer Blehl, S.J.

The Achievement of John C. Bennett. By David H. Smith. New
The book joins two others, about Lonergan and Rahner, from the same publisher. S. intends to expose the characteristic concerns of a man who has consistently worked for thirty-nine years to move religion and the Church into making a unique contribution to social and political life. He has offered a kind of schematization of B.'s thought as it has extended over a lifetime. It is impossible to name here the large number of concepts he has touched upon. The movement is from the radical Christian perspective about God and Jesus. The love commandment must be translated into the language of social values and it requires that the Christian work for social welfare. Natural law is a bridge where non-Christian and Christian can meet. But the Christian is a member of the Church. This leads into a discussion of what the Church is, how it reaches its consensus, and what it does directly and indirectly about human welfare. "Middle axioms" is a term generally associated with Bennett and S. undertakes to explain it. Middle axioms are the midpoint in the translation of the language of faith to specific, concrete decisions in political and social action. They are specific statements of social and political objectives or goals in response to human needs in a specific time and place. By these time-conditioned judgments of factual need, the Church moves from the broad social values of freedom, order, justice, and equality derived from its perspective into the social and political arena. In his lifetime B. has enunciated a number of these middle axioms. Paul Ramsey interested himself in the preparation of this book and B. himself gave the author some help. The volume is interesting and will serve as a useful introduction to B.'s writings.

Robert H. Dailey, S.J.


A selection of translated texts from Protestant ethicists, grouped around certain salient themes. In these themes (Christian ethics as a subject, God's command and man's responsibility, human existence under judgment and grace, eschatology and ethics, the this-worldliness of Christian existence, the question of norms in Christian ethics) one recognizes theological issues which preoccupied men such as Barth, Brunner, Tillich, Bultmann, Bonhoeffer, Thielicke, Althaus, and Elert. These, in fact, together with fourteen other well-known writers, are the theologians who are cited.

S. is obviously drawing upon a wealth of Christian thought and the book is a useful one, provided that the reader remains mindful of certain limitations. First, though the subtitle speaks of "contemporary discussions" and S.'s foreword ascribes the texts chosen to "Protestant moral theologians of the present day," this is a translation of a book that appeared first in 1956. Accordingly, the insights of Protestant ethicists over the past fifteen years are not represented. Second, the thinkers from whose works these readings have been assembled can differ widely, in some cases radically, in their presuppositions, starting points, and orientations. One may be tempted to overlook this fact as one reads through a volume of this sort. Since the English editors followed the policy of using, where possible, any already published translations and for the rest employed the services of two more translators, the result, while mostly satisfactory, is understandably uneven. Moreover, pace the apologia for using "frontier" and "boundary" variously to render the Grenz- in phrases like Grenzsituation...
(p. 304, n.1), “border-line” still seems to me preferable to either. For most readers, the value of this book will surely lie in the excerpts that appear here for the first time in English, especially H. H. Thielicke’s excellent and extended introduction.

Nicholas Crotty, C.P.


Aware that Ignatian formulae on obedience are inadequate for today, Hayen applies his formidable knowledge of Aquinas, Loyola, and Blondel to the task of developing a theology of obedience in which “spherical” structures complement “pyramidal” ones. His point of departure is the article “Freedom. Authority. Community” (America, Dec. 3, 1966), in which J. C. Murray prophetically argued that the classical conception of subjects obedient to superiors had to yield in view of the new understanding of the Church as an interpersonal community of charismatic Christians each with his own authority. Unfortunately, despite his vocabulary of coresponsibility, H. is not able to move substantively beyond the unilateral theory and practice of the past: when all is said (dialogue, etc.) and done (petitions, etc.), the bishop or superior (he sees no essential difference between the two roles) still pronounces his lonely fiat and his decision “constitute la volonté divine” (p. 12).

Obvious flaws are (1) H.’s adherence to an outmoded world view: the superior is “prince,” “lieutenant of the Lord,” and “guardian of the flock,” and other Christians are consistently “inferiors”; (2) his failure to consult any of the recent studies on ecclesiology or even studies on obedience like Alois Muller’s. But the most disturbing flaw is H.’s implicit assumption that there is a harmonized “biblical view.” So, e.g., after grounding Christ’s obedience to the Father in Phil 2, he quotes Jn 20:21 as evidence that a Christian imitates Christ’s obedience by obeying his superior. He seems unaware of the existence of different understandings of apostleship, law, and authority within the canon, and tends to use Paul and Mark only in support of John and Acts. Nor does he allude to the fact that there is no unilateral obedience to any man anywhere in the NT, and that our classical theology of obedience owes more to Ignatius of Antioch than the NT. Obedience is a beautiful Catholic quality (Tavard), but the “signs of the times” and Gal 5 both serve notice that this quality will only be revealed within a larger theology of Christian freedom.

Joan O’Brien, O.P.


This volume cultivates a field already well ploughed. C. is principally concerned to articulate a strictly theological basis for the principle of religious freedom, and he thus reflects an approach proposed by many French bishops (most notably Alfred Ancel) during later debates on the Declaration on Religious Freedom at the Second Vatican Council. Yet C. devotes less than one hundred pages expressly to the scriptural foundations of religious freedom and is ultimately led to the same conclusion as the final draft of the Declaration, namely, that Scripture provides the “roots” of the principle but not its explicit formulation. Moreover, despite an evident distaste for the Murray-Pavan approach, C. develops for 150 pages the juridical questions related to applications of, and limitations on, religious freedom.
For the rest, C. reviews the history of religious freedom in Christian thought, especially that of the nineteenth-century papacy, and comments theologically on the role of the Christian in the world. The bibliography is comprehensive, although this reviewer noted the omission of key reports on the progress of the Declaration at the Council, e.g., Fesquet, Laurentin, Rouchette, Rynne, and Wenger. C.'s synthesis is thoroughly competent and personal; it is also, however, repetitive in more than one sense.

*Richard J. Regan, S.J.*


To read such a careful and well-balanced treatment of the urgent problem of intercommunion is a joy. This book will be especially valuable to bishops and others who must make decisions about admission to the Eucharist. Formerly director of the department of theology of the Lutheran World Federation, V. is head of the Center of Ecumenical Studies at Strasbourg. This background has made him particularly conscious of the ecclesial dimension of the Eucharist and sensitive to the feelings of those in positions of authority in the Christian churches. From the experience of the reformed churches in France, V. is fully aware that mutual admission to the Lord’s Table is not a short cut to reunion; nevertheless he proposes reciprocal admission to the Eucharist as a sign of an ecclesial reality already existing and as a means to heighten appreciation of one another’s spiritual gifts. Theologically there is only one Church; no longer can the Church of Christ be identified with the juridical boundaries of Roman Catholicism, for the bishops at Vatican II recognized elements of ecclesial reality among Protestants. They also recognized positive elements in Protestant celebrations of the Lord’s Supper. The major obstacle is church ministry. V. knows of several new approaches to the question of orders and believes they open the way for Catholic authorities to allow Catholics to receive the Eucharist of other Christians. He fails to see that these same principles logically justify intercelebration. V. opposes intercelebration: it would be a recognition of separated ministries within one church and would give formal approval to disunity; such a step should be postponed until it can be a genuine expression of full unity.

*Francis J. Buckley, S.J.*


This book is an important failure: important because it invites theological inquiry into a phenomenon that escapes comprehension by all the other arts and sciences; a failure because Ellul’s approach is rigidly fundamentalistic, nonincarnational, and permeated with a pessimism that seems to ignore the presence of the grace of Christ within man and within the city of man. On the last page E. speaks of "our miserable world," of the "detestable gangrenous suburb I have to walk through," and of that "awful mixture made by man" which goes by the name of city. For E., the meaning of the city can be drawn only from a view of the heavenly city, available now only in promise and vision. This New City "must not be made into an element of an intellectual system" (p. 186), asserts E., who would thus bar the theologian from applying creative theological understanding to the problems of the city in which he works, walks, prays, and worships.

Cain built the city to satisfy his quest for security in his flight from God. Thus
began “man’s triumphant march without God” (p. 16). The city marks man’s “advance against God.” The city is sin—separation from God. Moreover, the Church becomes a captive in the city, a captive in the center of confusion. The word for this captivity is Babel, noncommunication, “all that makes the gospel impossible to share” (p. 20).

E. grants a small opening to the possibility of the city “becoming something else because of God’s presence and the results in the life of a man who has met God” (p. 44). But his pessimism prevents him from even seeing that the problems of the city signal the absence of something the gospel promises to deliver in abundance here and in its fullness hereafter: community. The gospel of Christ is a call to community. By living that gospel, man can control the forces that permit the city to dechristianize as well as dehumanize man. By reflecting on the problems of the city in the light of that gospel, the Christian theologian will be able to speak to the city and prove that E. is simply wrong when he asserts that one can evangelize the city only “by miracle or martyrdom” (p. 24).

E. does a service by pointing up sharply the degree to which the city has become an environment hostile to the growth of the gospel. He also reminds us, severely perhaps but effectively, that Christianity is not a yes to everything.

William J. Byron, S.J.


This short book is H.’s intellectual autobiography. Three influences stand out clearly in his development as a theologian: (1) his strong Czech nationalism, (2) his wrestling with the religious philosophy of T. G. Masaryk, (3) his profoundly Lutheran sense of the mission of the living Church of Christ. He seems to advance the thesis that Czechoslovakia is the heritage of Hus and the Czech Reformation. Despite the title, H.’s concept of history is quite restricted and centers on the political and social history of Czechoslovakia and Central Europe. Against the background of this limited geographical area and with a tendentious theory to explain the events that took place there in the last half-century, he attempts to show his maturation as a theologian. American readers, many of whom are unacquainted with the recent political and religious history of Central Europe, will find this strand in his story quite difficult to follow. Masaryk’s religious philosophy is generally unknown in America and one has the feeling that H. is still grappling with M.’s theses. There is much in the book that would be illumined if the author had taken time to explain for what reason and in what measure he no longer could support M.’s religious philosophy.

The third theme, however, dominates the book. H. sees the Church as a force for social change and his theology is an attempt to awaken the Lutheran tradition to the duty of the Church to foster social change for the betterment of the human condition.

In the course of this brief intellectual autobiography one grasps more of H.’s weaknesses as a theologian than his strengths. Thus it does not serve as a balanced introduction to his work as a theologian. His romantic notion that Czechoslovakia actually possesses a dominant strain of culture that is rooted in the Czech Reformation seems to be an assumption too narrow to do justice to the complex reality of Czechoslovakia and to his own theological work in that land. His rejection of Masaryk and of Troeltsch appears to proceed from an unexamined a priori. Throughout the book there is much assertion but little argument. The same tech-
nique of a priori assertion is felt in H.'s treatment of the Russian Revolution and the emergence of world Communism as necessarily an occasion for the advancement of social justice. That this event is extremely significant for theology cannot be denied. It presents a theological challenge and raises the most profound questions of theological anthropology and ecclesiology. But such a statement is little more than a truism. H., like Troeltsch, has failed to come to grips with the vital question of what norms for judgment the Christian Church can uniquely propose for the Christian conscience seeking corporate guidance amid the turmoil of our time.

*Herbert J. Ryan, S.J.*


This valuable work, with its rich content, excellent illustrations, annotated bibliography, and detailed index makes a great contribution to the history of religions. It encompasses twenty-five essays on comparative religion and represents at least in certain aspects a synopsis of all B.'s previous works. Following the opening chapter, "The Origin of Religion," B. turns to the various religions of peoples in ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, Israel, Greece, and Iran, emphasizing creation, death, time, the soul, and the judgment at death. Also included are studies of Osiris, Akhenaten, Job, and Aarathustra. B.'s preoccupation with religious eschatologies is evident in his attempts to define their material substance. While this generally summarizes the first half of the book, the latter part deals with religious ideas and events in the first three centuries A.D. and concentrates principally on Jesus and early Christianity. While some biblical problems are brought to the reader's attention, they contain no new insights but are rather a recapitulation of already-known controversies.

The annotated bibliography is designed to help interested readers who wish to pursue a more complete study of the subjects dealt with in the book. Some of the essays appear to have been intended as independent studies, and so there is some repetition in the areas considered. This has obvious advantages in providing a kind of continuity in what would have been a series of isolated studies. It is obviously B.'s intention to stimulate further interest in a subject so inherently fascinating and so profoundly important for understanding the nature and destiny of man as a religious being.

Although this work may stimulate some mild interest in academic circles, its basic information makes it of primary interest to students and the general reader. B.'s remark that "In the rise and fall of peoples and their civilizations ... no law or pattern can be demonstrated, despite the efforts of Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee" should have been modified. The scope of the work indicates that it is the universality of religion which constitutes the real meaning of human history. It is religion which places metaphysics in proper focus within the whole framework of mankind's development and progress.

*Ludwig Nemec*


The twelve essays gathered in this volume are more substantial versions of papers originally presented at a conference held at Princeton in the spring of 1968. Together they represent a
comprehensive discussion of the present character and future direction of religious studies in the liberal arts faculties of American colleges and universities. After an introductory historical sketch of changing attitudes towards the academic study of religion in recent decades, the major disciplines and subject matters currently treated within departments of religion are analyzed and evaluated by distinguished representatives of each field. The areas covered in the essays are biblical studies (Stendahl), Western religious history (Clebsch), philosophy of religion (Diamond), theology (McGill), Catholic studies (Preller), Jewish studies (Neusner), sociology of religion (Harrison), comparative religious ethics (Little), history of religions (Sullivan), religion and art (Turner), and religion and literature (Driver). Some more practical considerations and prognoses for the future are offered in a concluding chapter by James Gustafson.

The essays are highly diversified in the approach of their analysis, making the collection far more than a mere inventory of obvious data, and the level of probing insight remains consistently high. The field of religious studies has always been rather introspectively preoccupied with the question of its own legitimacy as an academic discipline, and it is not surprising that this theme runs through many of these discussions also. But one senses here that a new confidence and a more sophisticated self-understanding is emerging as religion departments win a more secure position within faculties of arts and sciences. Of particular value to the systematic theologian are Arthur McGill's reflections on "The Ambiguous Position of Christian Theology" within the academic tradition of autonomous rationality, and the very precise methodological distinctions made by Victor Preller in his discussion of "Catholic Studies in the University."

Thomas E. Ambrogi


In one sense it seems scarcely open to doubt that in human affairs knowledge should precede action; if what one does is to be meaningful, one should know what one is doing. It is, e.g., characteristic of man that when he makes something, he acts according to some antecedently thought-out plan. To say this, however, is not to say that the relationship of theory and practice is necessarily such that theory must precede practice, that action is justifiable only in the light of a knowledge which guides it, or that practical knowledge cannot be meaningful unless backed up by theoretical knowledge. Nevertheless, the history of Western thought, from Plato to the present day, bears eloquent testimony to the conviction, not only that thought is inseparable from genuinely human action, but also that theoretical thinking can and should determine the correct manner of acting. It is not merely that thought or deliberation is involved in each concrete action (if it is to be human), but also that theory is capable of telling us what action in general should be like—whether it be ordered to the achievement of a chosen goal or to the goal of human life itself.

This volume contains a number of studies, for the most part historical, of representative positions in Western thought on the place of theory in the practical affairs of life. It does not trace the development of Western thought on the question but presents, as it were, a spectrum ranging from the position of Plato to a possible contemporary theory which would aid political decision-makers to act more intelligently and responsibly. The histori-
cal positions treated are those of Plato and Aristotle, Hegel and Marx, which could have been expected, plus a disproportionately long study on Sartre and a disproportionately short study on Buber. Each of the studies, brief as most of them are, has definite merits, but the book as a whole turns out to be somewhat inconclusive.

*Quentin Lauer, S.J.*


Oraison’s autobiography is a fascinating account of the life of a man who is simultaneously a surgeon, priest, and psychoanalyst. O. with seriousness and yet humor, precision of events and yet soberness in details, recounts very simply how he became what he is today. In a style particularly pleasant he shows how, far from suffering from “identity diffusion,” he has followed a steady but circuitous path in his strange voyage. No obstacles have been too big to surmount. When to his amazement and sorrow an “ideological conflict” arose between him and the Holy Office following the publication of his doctoral thesis *Christian Life and Problems of Sexuality*, he went on with his work. When he was not allowed to “make psychotherapeutic visits to anyone who was by definition an ecclesiastic,” he focused his talent on helping juvenile delinquents. To friends who asked why he did not rebel-defrock, he said simply: “Because when something to which you have dedicated your life begins to go badly, you don’t improve by walking away and leaving it. On the contrary, the only way to improve it is to stay and find out what is wrong.”

Being a Belgian who lived through the war years in Europe, I can appreciate how lucidly and accurately O. has described the atmosphere in occupied France before, during, and after World War II. If the reader persists beyond the prologue, he will be rewarded not only by the marvelous description of a full life but by many of O.’s observations on human behavior. I especially enjoyed his thoughts on the central issue of reconciliation and on the role of “structure” in human society. “Reconciliation means to be reconciled with others, with the world, with oneself.” “Conflict is an essential element of any relationship. Indeed, it is what constitutes a relationship, for a relationship consists precisely in the continuing resolution of conflict... in order to ‘be with’ someone as much as possible.”

* Ghislaine D. Godenne, M.D.*

**BOOKS RECEIVED**

[All books received are listed here whether they are reviewed or not]

**SCRIPTURAL STUDIES**


*Criswell, W. A. Exposition Sermons on the Book of Daniel 2: Chapters 1–3.*


DOCTRINAL THEOLOGY


Holstein, Henri, S.J. Hiérarchie et


MORAL, LAW, LITURGY


PASTORAL AND ASCETICAL


HISTORICAL THEOLOGY


Egeria: Diary of a Pilgrimage. Tr. by George E. Gingras. Ancient Christian

PHILOSOPHICAL
Myer, Isaac. Qabbalah: The Philosophical Writings of Avicebron. New

SPECIAL QUESTIONS


