BOOK REVIEWS


Most Catholic theologies of revelation are formulated within the comparatively narrow framework of the Bible and Christian tradition. Even if they admit the existence of revelation outside the biblical religions, they treat this possibility as an afterthought. The distinguished Belgian Dominican J.-H. Walgrave here meets a palpable need by approaching the question of revelation through the various notions of salvation which lie at the heart of the great religions of the world and of modern secular humanism.

This book, although permeated by a theological concern, proceeds in three stages, each progressively more theological than its predecessors. Chap. 1, primarily descriptive, shows the interrelationship between the notions of salvation and revelation in the major living faiths. Here W. points out that the prophetic religions (primarily Western), as contrasted with the sapiential religions (primarily Eastern), attribute revelation and salvation to the special intervention of a free and personal God. Christianity is distinctive in its strongly incarnational and personalist character; it views both revelation and salvation as aspects of man's participation in God's own inner life.

Chap. 2, more apologetically slanted, enters into dialogue with contemporary secular humanism, which would envisage salvation in terms of an earthly community of peace, love, and justice, without making any appeal to divine intervention or to a transhistorical fulfilment. In criticism of this position, W. points out that on the purely horizontal level of history there can be no real satisfaction of man's deepest aspirations. Echoing certain themes and phrases from Bonhoeffer, W. maintains that man's activity in the "penultimate" sphere of temporal concern is not weakened but rather intensified by an ultimate commitment to God. This vertical relationship to God must be the cantus firmus giving harmony and strength to all the other melodies of human life.

Chap. 3, the most strictly theological section of the book, analyzes the Christian notion of revelation. This notion, according to W., includes but at the same time surpasses the philosophical notion as found, e.g., in Heidegger and Ortega y Gasset, both of whom speak eloquently of the unexpected self-disclosure of Being. The closest created analogy to divine revelation is the human intersubjective
event of the mutual self-disclosure of persons through word and gesture. In revelation God communicates Himself not simply through the external testimony of the prophets and apostles but also interiorly by grace.

In his final pages W. returns, from a theological perspective, to the question of revelation in the nonbiblical religions. Following the long tradition which goes back to Justin Martyr and which has been newly emphasized by R. C. Zaehner and others, W. unhesitatingly affirms that God does speak to man through these religions. To account for the possibility of such revelation, W. calls attention to three potential channels: cosmic revelation through the order of nature, moral revelation through the voice of conscience, and mystical revelation through man's experience of his own aspiration for the transcendent. These three types of revelation W. finds accented respectively in Islam, in Zoroastrianism, and in the sapiential religions of the East.

The most original and stimulating feature of this book is probably the comparative description of the notions of salvation and revelation in the great religions of the world. A certain tendency toward schematization, however, drives the author into some oversimplifications that he would doubtless wish to qualify in a longer work. His enthusiasm for Zoroaster would seem to have a somewhat tenuous basis in the obscure and fragmentary texts that have survived. Perhaps, too, W. is too severe on Islam and too pessimistic about its openness to mysticism and philosophy. If Al Hallaj and Averroes were persecuted, other Moslem mystics and philosophers, considered more orthodox, received honor and acclaim. W.'s glowing appraisal of Bhakti Hinduism, building on the previous work of Rudolf Otto and R. C. Zaehner, singles out a very promising area for dialogue between the great faiths of the East and West.

As a contemporary Catholic theology of revelation presented within the context of the religious experience of mankind, this book should appeal to many readers. Hopefully some publisher, inspired by the example of this French translation, may be encouraged to bring out an English version.

Woodstock College

Avery Dulles, S.J.


The tensions within a religion, according to Young, reflect those between that religion and other religions. Religions have variety, and
recessive characteristics of Christianity, such as mysticism, may correspond to dominant traits of another, e.g., Buddhism. This fact is one of the bases for dialogue. It also indicates one thing about *Encounter*: what it says about relations with other religions is a reflection of the stands it takes on issues within the particular sphere of Christian theology.

There are two main issues: the workings of revelation and the role of Christ. Y. rejects the Barthianism of H. Kraemer and follows Tillich, Temple, and H. Richard Niebuhr. He likes John Baillie's slogan "it takes two to make a revelation," and criticizes every extreme theory of "objective revelation" (such as Barth's) in which man's situation as hearer is ignored and revelation is "thrown like a stone" (in Tillich's words) at man. Y. prefers the more amiable approach, held here and there in the Church since Justin and Clement of Alexandria, which sees Christ as the universal logos, the logos *en archē*, present and at work salvifically at the heart of all religions. But then, what of the "particular" concrete logos, the historical Jesus? Y. feels that Tillich stresses the universal logos to the detriment of the claims of the incarnate logos. At the same time, however, Y. shies away from any exclusivistic view which denies that revelation is somehow present in all great religions or that Christ can be salvifically effective even where He is not known or accepted.

For the Christian theologian, all this is less a matter of evaluating other religions, or of accounting for salvation outside the Church, than of testing his own belief. Two seeming cornerstones of the Christian faith are that man needs salvation and that God saves through Jesus Christ. From these arises the missionary character of the Church, as well as the desire to save one's self (through conversion, faith, sacraments, works, or whatever). Y., with most Christians, constantly assumes that men stand in need of salvation. This makes perfect sense to anyone who holds a doctrine of the Fall, believes in hell, or looks for supernatural relief from suffering, death, and the terrors of a chaotic society. Contemporary man, however, does not feel the need for salvation: Why does he need to be saved? Saved from what? How "saved"? The Christian theologian must question whether the gospel's answer to the "thirst for salvation" is still an answer to a real thirst; at least he must listen carefully to the modern phrasing of the question. As for the mediating or incarnate logos, one must deal with the view accepted in Judaism that God Himself is the sole and sufficient "savior." The encounter with world religions will help the Christian theologian see more clearly just what his hidden assumptions are.
Y. is liberal without being an extremist. His presentation of revelation and the logos is usually solid, open, and provocative. He develops four theses: the traditional doctrine of revelation has broken down; revelation is more than propositional truth; revelation involves fallible receivers; and revelation is "confessional." He thinks the fourth is the most important, since it takes full account of relativism and historical conditioning. In explaining his theory of the logos, Y. wisely points out that the logos is not identical with a principle of rationality, but includes elements of nonrational religious categories. He relies here on the old doctrine of the hiddenness of God, and wants to say that the universal logos can never be grasped or contained by the human receiver, even in revelatory events.

Y. has managed to present his ideas in a clear way and has conducted his arguments with great fairness as well as a lively, well-focused critical sense. Tillich said that the history of religions should be truly significant for theology; Y. has surely helped it to be just that. His book is a nice contribution to fundamental theology and ecumenism.

St. Mary's Seminary, Baltimore

Anselm Atkins


Propagandist of the apocalypse, octogenarian Ernst Bloch writes in the eschatological tradition of the Book of Daniel and Joachim di Fiore, of Thomas Munzer and Karl Marx. In Man on His Own, Bloch's visionary theories become accessible to English readers for the first time. Edited by Jürgen Moltmann and Reiner Strunk for a German audience in 1959 as Religion im Erbe: Eine Auswahl aus seinen religionsphilosophischen Schriften (Frankfurt a. M.), this anthology contains an assortment of Bloch's writings from the 1918 Geist der Utopie, through his masterpiece Das Prinzip Hoffnung (1959), to Tübingen lectures published in 1966. Contrary to the suggestion of the title chosen for the English edition, the general subject of these essays is not specifically Marxist-humanist atheism. Its subject is apocalypse: apocalypse as the core of religious consciousness and apocalypts as the unique representatives of the Judeo-Christian tradition.

The principle of apocalypse is the drive for the self-adequation of human longings in the face of every form of repression and every man's inescapable meeting with death. According to B.'s analysis, the beyond of daydream and desire is not merely possible, "it is downright
necessary, far removed from all formal or real indications...and premises of its existence.” The beyond of human aspiration is an a priori in the revolutionary’s utopian will “that we shall be saved, that there can be a kingdom of heaven.” Essentially the utopian will for the kingdom is the longing to be like God. Repeatedly B. invokes the refrain “Eritis sicut Deus” to sum up the eschatological promise of religion. The longing to be like God, however, is, according to B., a longing which brings its own fulfilment in the constancy of human purpose that the new age come. The kingdom is godless; it is human-centered transcendence arising in the collective will. The kingdom is not a theological term. Its intent is wholly eschatological, that is, the unfolding of a totally human future. Apocalypse, then, is the explosive inauguration of a radically new eon in which the community of men becomes adequate to its own essence, and God appears only as “the utopian entelechy of the soul.”

The uniqueness of the focal figures of Judaism and Christianity is, according to B., that they transformed the otherness of transcendence from an oppressive, awe-inspiring power to an “open space” for a human future. Moses and Jesus took possession of the divine, just as Jacob forced a blessing from Isaac. The terrible power of the God of nature, with them, becomes the mercy of a God of promise. They inject, says B., human aspiration into the divine. It is for this reason they are remembered and the founders of nature religions are forgotten. “The Dionysiac founder foams away before his nature god; the astral-mythical one plunges away before his, like a shooting star; and even Buddha, the great self-redemption, finally sinks away in the greatacosmos of Nirvana. Moses, on the other hand, compels his God to go with him; he turns into the exodus light of his people. And Jesus pervades transcendence as a human tribune and makes it the utopia of the kingdom.”

After Moses, God is measured by His promise. After the Exile, the idea of the Messiah “comes as a no-confidence vote in Yahweh”; and after Jesus, homousia and “all hallows” disclose the dissolution of the glory of the God-king into the kingdom of brotherly love. Throughout the covenantal history there is an increase in the human content of religion, and so in the realization that promise is the heart of religious awareness.

In the longest and most revealing essay in the collection, “Man’s Increasing Entry into Religious Mystery,” B. traces what for him is the direct line of the true Israel: from the tribal desert period through the prophets and Nazirites to John the Baptist. The continuity of this
biblical history lies in the memory of nomadic semicommunism. It is loyalty to this memory that gives rise to Yahweh's appearance "as a foe of the expropriators of peasant holdings and the accumulators of capital, as an avenger and tribune of the people."

Jesus comes as an eschatological figure of decisive importance. His fraternal eschatology eclipses the theocratic power of Yahweh. There is a new Lord, and a new eon, a novum (B.'s term). With Jesus, believers no longer need submit themselves to an Oriental potentate God, for mankind through Jesus has inserted its full self into the Above. The numinosum of terror has become, in Christ, the humanum of hope. "He [Jesus] is more exactly present in this superhumanization of his God than either Zoroaster or Buddha. He injected not the extant human being, but the utopia of human possibility whose core and eschatological brotherhood he lived as an example. God had been a mythical periphery; now he has become the humanly adequate, humanly ideal center, the center of the community wherever it may be gathering in his name." Through Jesus the brotherhood first held in nostalgic remembrance, and then in promise, becomes realized eschatology.

According to this general theory of man's increasing entrance into religious mystery, Jesus is the eschatological prophet of dispossessed people. He preaches "an ethics of immediate eschatology." Only in the context of adventist expectation, B. points out, do the "quietisms" of the Sermon on the Mount make sense. "The passage on the lilies of the field and the fowls of the air is by no means naively economic, for when the gravediggers of the world and its worries can be heard at the door, providing economically for the day after tomorrow is silly." Concern for the dispossessed in Jesus' eschatological teaching is best seen in the Christian approach to love. In contrast to the ancient world's eros of beauty, Christian love embraces the inconspicuous things of the world. "Reverence for the inconspicuous is the final key to this reversal of the motion of love, and to its hearkening, gripping, waiting for a turnabout at the asides, the silences, the anti-greatnesses of the world." This love is unparalleled, and so it marks a novum in religious consciousness, a genuine eschatological beginning.

Just as B. sees Jesus as an eschatological prophet to the downtrodden masses, so he sees religion as man's consciousness of an open, dynamic future in the kingdom. The kingdom, not God, is the focus of man's yearning. "Eye has not seen, nor ear heard, neither has it entered into the heart of man the things which God has prepared for them that love him," quotes B. in asserting that Christianity is the pinnacle of eschatological wish-fulfilment. Man is to become virtually divine.
This is what always has been significant in religious expectation: intimations of glory. Accordingly, B. equally deplores the theist for alienating man from himself by the hypostatizing tendencies of theology, and the atheist for denying man in denying mystery and depth to human existence.

B.'s eschatological reinterpretation of the Judeo-Christian tradition is refreshing. He forces the reader to look with fresh eyes at the human and social conditions at the origins of our inherited faith. He leads him to probe the soft underbelly of organized Christianity—prophetic, chiliastic expectancy—and to weigh its meaning. Exegetes will hold their breath at B.'s free, unreserved interpretations of Scripture. Dogmatists will frown at his promotion of heretical enthusiasms. But anyone who takes up this book will be rewarded by the bright sparkle of novel insight B. gives to texts and events tarnished with the familiarity of completed understanding.

The outstanding difficulty in B.'s position is his rejection of theology, that is, of any theoretical or theoretical-existential position which finds God rather than human fulfilment as the term of religious consciousness. Appreciation of B.'s decidedly reactionary stance might arise from the common observation that much theology tends to an implicit docetism which repeatedly neglects analysis of the human pole of the divine-human encounter. Given this setting, B.'s position makes some sense. This docetist tendency, however, is one which much of the writing of Karl Rahner, especially his Hearers of the Word, has counteracted by the development of an anthropocentric starting point for philosophy of religion. More than Rahner, however, process philosophers and theologians (Whitehead, Hartshorne, Ogden, and Cobb) have made it possible to think the kingdom, as B. urges we do, as an eschatological community of men, but as an eschatological community for which the existence and effective presence of God is a necessary condition. Accordingly, Christians can reject those hypostatizations of human fulfilment into God which deny man his proper growth. They can reject them knowing that if anything is a mark of transcendence for man, it is human self-transcendence. B.'s contribution, then, to the Christian theological project is twofold: he points out that affirmation of God ought not entail the denial of man, and he teaches that religious expectancy does entail the divinization of man. Hopefully the circulation of the works of this philosophical gadfly among theologians might generate more discussion about the human pole of revelation, and a revival in the effort to understand grace from this perspective.

In the last analysis, B.'s difficulties arise because he is not philo-
sophical enough, not dialectical enough. Despite admirable erudition, he is an impressionistic thinker, a visionary. There is no sustained systematic analysis leading to an atheistic conclusion, no consideration of theistic alternatives. Even on his own philosophical ground, expectancy and will, phenomenology and metaphysics need not end in atheism. On the contrary, as Ricoeur’s phenomenology of will and Blondel’s philosophy of action indicate, an analysis of will can yield a religious expectancy in which faith in God and His salvation has a role to play. Religious mystery can be understood as referring to a future which is divine as well as human: divine insofar as it is the transformation of men in the presence of God, human insofar as it is of men, by men, and for men. The notion of the kingdom as the heart of religious mystery sums up the Blochian vision, because it envisages a transformation of man in a community which is still a community of men. What he lacks by his rejection of theology, B. makes up by his appreciation of the human phase of grace. It it takes an atheist to make Christians aware of God’s affirmation of man in the biblical traditions of “the image of God” and “sons of God,” and in the events of Incarnation and Resurrection, we should not clench our fists and bite our lips like frustrated siblings, rejecting for its lack of complete truth what we should take for its enrichment of our spirituality. Visionaries ought not to be refused our recognition for the admixture of shadow in the light they hold up for us; for every new light shows a space of which we might have been unaware, a space for man and a space where God may meet man.

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ANDREW CHRISTIANSEN, S.J.


This is an important and original book especially for Christians, and more particularly for Christians of the Roman Catholic tradition. The author, professor of philosophy at Queens College, New York, and an editor of Cross Currents, is a Roman Catholic. Though many may judge him a heretic or even an apostate, his book clearly shows his deep commitment to his Church and Christian faith.

F. begins with the premise that the Western world, “understood as a stable world order providing a fundamental value-structure within which men located and identified themselves” (p. 19), is in a state, not just of crisis, but of collapse and has been so for several centuries. The collapse of religion is only “a heightened manifestation of this broader
cultural collapse" (ibid.). Accordingly, the Christian faith, with its symbols and institutions, is also in need of a radical reconstruction.

The term "reconstruction" indicates the need not only to create and assimilate new values, ideas, and institutions, but also to conserve previously achieved values, insights, and visions which have enduring value. F. uses the term "radical" to express his conviction that the traditional or classical framework of ideas and symbols is basically incapable of providing the reconstructed framework needed to rebuild the collapsed culture and value-structure of the Western world.

F., however, does not so much reconstruct the Christian religion as "point toward" this reconstruction. He lays the foundation and only hints at the superstructure which might be built on it. Throughout the book his main purpose is to get clear about, to put some kind of consistent and coherent order into, and to bring out the implications of, the fundamental world order and value-structures in terms of which Western men seem today to be tending more and more to locate and identify themselves. Thus, he tries to bring out the hidden assumptions and implications of the contemporary "world view" (which is still in the making) in contrast to those of the traditional or classical "world view."

F. uses the terms "world view" and "metaphysics" interchangeably to designate both an angle of vision or perspective and a set of principles or assumptions. Though he acknowledges that many have serious objections to these terms, he does not try to meet them directly. Instead, he sets forth frankly, and rather successfully, the basic assumptions underlying his own position and method.

The term "classical" or "traditional" includes not only the ancient and medieval thinkers but also the intellectuals of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Though F. recognizes the difficulties and distortions involved in using such blanket terms, he is convinced that when compared with most twentieth-century thinkers, the classical thinkers have some striking and significant similarities. A huge gulf divides the very different ways in which classical thinkers on the one hand and contemporary thinkers on the other see man, the world, truth, knowledge, and religion.

Because the contemporary world view is still in the making, the category "contemporary" is even more problematic than the category "classical." For this reason F. concentrates on one particular expression of this world view, American pragmatism especially as expounded by William James and John Dewey. F. belongs to the rather recent school of interpreters who have "discovered" and stressed the metaphysical
thought of these philosophers. According to this school, pragmatic
metaphysics sets forth a processive and relational world view. In his
extraordinarily well-written first chapter, F. describes this world view.
His exposition of the field metaphor, of relations, and of man as re-
lationa in the very core of his being (and thus as lacking any perma-
nent unchanging nature or essence), as well as his presentation of the
pragmatic conception of truth in chap. 2, are very well done.

Particularly significant is F.’s novel approach to the faith-reason
problem. For F., faith and reason not only are functionally distinct but
neither is subordinate to, or higher than, the other. Rather, both are
forms of human experiencing. Faith, therefore, is not a form of knowl-
edge, and so it does not give us knowledge about any “sphere” or
aspect of “reality.” Faith and reason are two different ways (function-
ally distinct) in which man encounters and comes to terms with “re-
ality.” Consequently, faith never has to give ground to newly acquired
knowledge. Of course, in the well-integrated man these and other forms
of human experiencing will not be unrelated; for man is through and
through constituted by, and is what he is because of, his relationships.
F. presents his position well but could have made it more cogent if he
had brought out more clearly how faith and reason experiences are
related. Specifically, he might have further developed the relation of
faith to intelligence and imagination as Dewey did in A Common Faith
(and elsewhere) and as John Herman Randall did in his chapter
“Knowledge, Intelligence, and Religious Symbols” in The Role of
Knowledge in Western Religion.

The chapter on morality is well done but, like the chapters on God
and religion, is somewhat general and repetitious. In these chapters F.
might have developed at greater length some specific topics which he
at best only touched on: the Trinity (especially the Holy Spirit), the
divinity of Christ, immortality, infallibility (which, given his world
view, he surprisingly, but without explanation, considers a still viable
symbol), and some of the particular questions usually treated in gen-
eral moral. But we must remember that F. holds that any reconstruc-
tion is necessarily a community effort, and so we cannot expect him
to go at it alone.

The weakest part of F.’s book is his doctrine of God. Perhaps his
weakness here is connected with his bracketing of “the question of how
the Church in and within which [he believes] and would like to help
create would differ from humanism” (p. 33). Though he believes that
Christianity and humanism are not in fundamental conflict and that
“an authentic developmental Catholicism and an authentic develop-
mental humanism” would converge, he thinks that “it is too simple,
sentimental and descriptively untrue to say that they are identical" (ibid.). F., however, does not feel prepared at this time to address himself in detail to these questions. Here again F. offers Christians and the human community generally an opportunity to enter into a dialogue and common effort to reconstruct significant and enriching symbols.

Whether we like it or not, traditional symbols have lost their power over many men. Large numbers are discarding or seeking to reinterpret old symbols or are searching for new ones—not only through theorizing but, more importantly, in ritual and action. Not only are some priests engaging in (authority-) “free ministries,” but even lay persons are at times presiding over Eucharistic celebrations. Theologians are searchingly reinterpreting the symbol of “the Christ” as they propose evolutionary visions of Christ, man, and the world, speak of human auto-creation, and celebrate “play” and the secular city. Underground liturgies, other paraliturgical rituals, new prayers, and new prayer-forms are likewise insinuating new interpretations of traditional Christian symbols, including the Mass and the priesthood. Some traditional symbols like confession are almost disappearing.

F. does not take up these developments, but he does attack a point which too many liberals still think can be made, namely, their claim that these developments do not affect the essence of Christianity but only its outer clothing or accidental forms of expression. (Here the conservatives like Cardinals Ottaviani and O’Boyle have a far better “feel” for the situation than many liberals do.) F. vigorously questions this liberal claim while, as against the conservatives, he defends the need for radically reconstructing old symbols. He proposes a framework in terms of which the new developments can be coherently and consistently understood and evaluated. He suggests ways in which we might preserve the irreplaceable values which were achieved in the past but which the old framework can no longer support. Finally, he shows us the need and a way to create and reconstruct intelligently (in the Deweyan sense) the symbols which will serve, enhance, and enrich human life.

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JOHN J. MAWHINNEY, S.J.


The most decisive influence upon theological thinking and theological method in the last century and a half has come from the develop-
ment of the experimental sciences. According to Gilkey, theology has ceased to speak *factually* about nature or history, about geological epochs or particular events, leaving these to science and to historical methods. Theological language (and theological truth) is not in continuity with scientific language or truth on the level of factuality. Even the Neo-Orthodox attempts to evade the confrontation between science and theology in their hermeneutic witness in practice to this influence of science.

Science, however, does open a place for religious inquiry, not in the objects with which it deals but in the very act of knowing that constitutes it. For underlying and presupposed in all activity of human judgment is a self-validating contact, however fleeting, with ultimacy; for to judge is to affirm the virtually unconditioned and the self as knower. This confrontation with ultimacy goes beyond philosophic inquiry as such; it opens on to a realm of mystery that is characteristically the religious sphere. However, we may not at once name this ultimacy "God."

Our age, as much as any other, needs and employs "myths" in order to speak of the total structure of reality, to indicate the meaning of human destiny even in suffering and evil, and to provide norms for individual, social, and political decision. By "myth" we understand not simply primitive fantasies of explanation and control, but "a certain perennial mode of language, whose elements are multivalent symbols, whose referent is in some strange way the transcendent or the sacred, and whose meanings concern the ultimate or existential issues of actual life and the questions of human and historical destiny" (p. 66). Among the myths of this scientific age, G. finds especially strong, but dangerous and intrinsically contradictory, that of "technological man."

In a final chapter G. endeavors to relate myth, philosophy, and theology to one another within our contemporary scientific culture. Myth traditionally was a story with a transcendent content. While it was the first step toward understanding man's religious apprehension, hence a prototheology, it was also a forerunner of science, philosophy, and history. But these three gradually broke away from myth and developed in their own right. First, reflection on self-consciousness and the world gave rise to philosophy, which manifested the universal structures of things and provided the language for speaking of the transcendent in universal and permanent ways. However, since the Christian religion affirms the freedom and the historical involvement of God, mythical language continued to be necessary, though in a postreflective manner; for philosophical language, according to G., cannot reach beyond the immanent, universal structures found in things to a tran-
scendent beyond. Nor can it adequately deal with the contingent intervention of the transcendent in history. "Religious thought—in this case mystical religious thought—in transcending the universal images of speculative philosophy, returns to a new, rarefied usage of the mythical when it seeks positively to be expressive of genuine ultimacy and sacrality" (p. 114).

The basic problem remains of relating religious thought and discourse to the realm of facts, and this in three areas: the present, the past, and the future. Here it cannot rely simply on myth, but must avail itself of phenomenological analysis, historical inquiry, and social analysis, integrating the data of these secular studies into its own view of man's meaning and destiny.

This work urges, with particular clarity and force, the central problem which science has imposed upon theology in our age. It is not the task of religion to be a source of factual knowledge. But it is the task of religion to interpret the meaning of facts, the actual happening of the real world, in terms of the transcendent. But, although G. eloquently underlines the problem of relating concrete facts to divine transcendence, he really has very little to offer by way of a solution to this problem. It seems to this reviewer that in speaking of "the postreflective use of myth" he is approximating the notion of the analogy of being; for this use of myth must be understood in a totally different way from its primitive use, since there is no longer question merely of a comparison based upon subjective feeling and imaginative content, but a comparison of objective intelligibility pointing to a mystery lying beyond. The analogy of being (which is very frequently misunderstood and misrepresented by those who wish to explain it while not holding it themselves) alone allows us to speak coherently of the relationship and union of the transcendent with the historical.

There is, finally, one curious incoherency in discussing philosophy. On the one hand, philosophy is said to be necessary for truly transcendent language; on the other hand, it is said that it cannot reach beyond, transcend, the ultimate structures immanent in the universe of finite beings. It seems that you really cannot have it both ways.

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JOHN H. WRIGHT, S.J.


What shape will theology have in America? The editors have selected ten forces which are likely to act upon theology (future, politics,
revolution, culture, history, technology, behavioral sciences, language, mass media, and education) and ten authors to answer the central question. Although this format lends itself to the theology-is-what-I'm-doing syndrome, the authors succeed in stimulating no small interest.

C. Mooney traces the social and philosophical background of our current concern for the future. He gives a good critical analysis of the theological reflections which have been used to justify and to further a Christian commitment to a truly human future. H. Cox sees a political future for theology: “theologians grip us today only if they have the power to change our inner and outer worlds, to make them more worthy of human habitation.” R. Shaull’s theologian must experience “a real exodus and exile in relation to the prevailing culture and dominant social system.” He claims, on the basis of certain historical Christian experiences, that supporting a revolution is theology’s authentic stance. M. Novak appeals eloquently for social concreteness in theology. But the future Christian theologian must become modest in the face of other traditions which have much to say about the concrete social. He states with cogency: “Theology is at the present moment weakest in its ability to put into language such matters as the following: elements of personal history, attitudes, emotions, impulse, instinct, trained perception, imagination, fantasy, intuitiveness, a sense of fitness, the criterion of satisfaction with evidence, etc.”

C. Braaten’s future theologian will look back to history. The rejection of ideology, which is allied with the rejection of history, is itself biased ideology. The historical perspective enables us to approach the present “with transcendent insights and oppositional power.” The horizon of the future, B. suggests, is that which unites present with past. While it seems that we can respect the past without invoking such an elaborate theory of the future, B.’s point remains true: a sense of history will help in any revolution. H. Richardson encourages the theologian to work up “practical explanations” of Christian truth. This means that the theologian must be able not only to observe reality (including the future) but to manipulate it. He must be strong on sociotechnical disciplines such as economics, polling and psychological testing, management and mass communications. R.’s observations (manipulations?) lead him to demand much more participatory democracy in and out of the churches: “only in this way can we create an information-gathering, decision-making, experimental base large enough to cope with the magnitude of problems that will be raised.” G. Milhaven embraces the behavioral sciences as the future mode of theology. Their self-evident value shows that the future belongs to them,
and one of the few clear Christian ethical principles is that their insights should be followed.

J. M. Robinson argues that language will be increasingly important in theology. He interprets the death-of-God theologians to have said that it is a salvific thing to exclude all God-talk, since it inevitably offers a heretical doctrine of God. R. is less helpful on what language is important and orthodox. While he hopes for some sort of synthesis of present with future, he gives no clue as to why the bitter wars between language-worlds should cool rather than intensify. In the wordiest contribution, A. Squillaci decries a theology oriented to the written word. His theologian must use the arts, especially film, to help man live humanly amid change. He must therefore be less concerned with maintaining an organic Christian community; he must expose individuals directly to values through art-media, confident that they will thereby gain true insights into the Incarnation; he must avoid imposing anything on anyone. In S.'s view, the future is now (his italics), and now is media. Throughout S.'s essay there runs a confusion between the demands of thinking theologically and the need for communicating a theology which has been thought out. S. seems to identify media-communication with thinking; but then he also considers business and science the best-adjusted elements of our society. Finally, P. Rooney sees the emergence of new value-freighted life styles among the young. This relocation of value, mostly to a social concern, requires that education in the future be measured not by how much a student knows "but rather [by] how he views and reacts to the evidence or information which he uncovers with the aid of the teacher." The old model of magister-auditor is being replaced by "discovery-learning." R. judges that an educational theology must be developed whose task will be "to delineate the place of teaching/learning in the human process leading to salvation."

All our modern Christian anxiety is evident here, our sense of not doing enough. Also present is our prejudice against thinking as a way of doing. Projections does not dig into—some contributors do not even seem to be aware of—the problem of theological truth: its criteria, its counterfeits, its transcultural claims, its likely habitat, its relation to good and bad will. While there is little caricature of the past, neither is there much mention of cyclically recurring patterns in the history of theology which ought to have some influence on our projections. Instead, each author challenges us to take his route to theological truth. But what if these challenges remind one of ancient odds and outcomes, of cul-de-sacs, and even of betrayal? It is noteworthy that several con-
tributors consider Bultmann and Barth passé, even though they represent two relatively constant poles in man's attempt to make sense out of the Word of God. Perhaps side-stepping the original terms of the problems is the way to a rosier future for theology. Perhaps not. There is little room in *Projections* for the study of the Christian community's scripture and tradition. The theologian is hurried along to meet the great cosmic Christ who created culture. But the question remains: why, then, did Jesus happen?

*St. Peter's College, N.J.*

**George McCauley, S.J.**


The dimensions of the "life of Jesus" research, from its beginnings with Reimarus in the eighteenth century to the contemporary "new quest," are so vast that one senses the need for a handy guide which will give a synopsis of the principal developments for the benefit of the uninitiated. The book under review, authored by an ordained Baptist minister who received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, seeks to answer this need.

The book is evidently intended for those who read only English, since the references are almost exclusively to literature appearing in that language. In restricting himself to works in English in a question so dominated by German scholarship, A. is often obliged to rely on secondary literature and to forgo consulting the authors themselves. This is particularly clear in his first chapter ("Studies to the Close of the Nineteenth Century"), which is largely a summary of Schweitzer's *Quest of the Historical Jesus*, as the long *Ibid.* list candidly acknowledges. In place of those liberal lives of Jesus treated by Schweitzer, A. considers, in his second chapter, five writers of diverse national backgrounds who wrote in the first third of the twentieth century: Harnack, Goguel, Mackinnon, Case, and Klausner. After a consideration of the history-of-religions school limited to Bousset and a treatment of Schweitzer and Kähler (important for his influence on Bultmann) comes a chapter entitled "Form Criticism and Bultmann." Obviously, Bultmann's position on "the historical Jesus" is intimately connected with his *History of the Synoptic Tradition*. Still it is regrettable that in a compendium of this type so much space is devoted to a subject which has been summarized so often before and is readily available elsewhere, whereas relatively little attention is given to Bultmann's own "life of Jesus." The same lack of *immediate* relevance to the subject
at hand is sensed in A.'s lengthy summary entitled "Bultmann and Mythology."

More useful are the concluding three chapters, which deal with critics to the "right" and "left" of Bultmann and with Bultmann's own students. In the second category one notes with surprise the absence of any reference to Herbert Braun.

It is unfortunate that at the close of the first chapter A. decides to confront all those included in his study with the same six questions: (1) Is it possible to write a biography (history) of Jesus? (2) What is the place of miracle in the life of Jesus? (3) How should the resurrection of Jesus be interpreted? Literally or in some other way? (4) What is the nature and place of mythology in the NT? (5) What is the historical value of John as compared with the Synoptics? (6) What is the central significance of Jesus? These questions are certainly not exhaustive, and in the case of some of the authors whom A. considers they are not the really pertinent questions.

The most regrettable aspect of the book, however, is the author's abstention, except on rare occasions, from any personal criticism of the writers whom he presents. He justifies this with the contention that "succeeding critical schools point out the inadequacies of earlier movements" (p. 6) and declares his intention of offering a more personal analysis in a subsequent volume. However, this abstention detracts from the interest and usefulness of the present work. Still, especially in the last three chapters, the summaries and quotations give a helpful orientation to the general reader.

Woodstock College

Schuyler Brown, S.J.


This is an avowedly conservative collection of introductory articles and commentaries on the books of the NT. In most Roman Catholic circles in the United States the contributors are not well known, save for F. F. Bruce. I say this beforehand, not in any destructive sense, but to recall to others that our perspectives are sometimes more limited than we believe.

The book is addressed to the nonspecialist. It is a pleasure for me to be able to say that the authors have succeeded admirably in writing for those whom they wished to reached. There is no doubt that they are aware of modern scholarship, its vocabulary, its trends; yet they
eschew technical terminology save where that is necessary, and then they succinctly but clearly explain what is meant.

The book is uneven both in the quality of the work presented and in the amount of space devoted to a given topic. Thus, more space is devoted to 1 Corinthians than to Romans; thirty-eight pages are devoted to John, while Luke receives forty-eight and Acts fifty-two. J. M. Houston's "An Environmental Background to the New Testament" is an excellent piece of work which makes the two following articles on the historical and political background and on the pagan religious background suffer by comparison. It is unfortunate that the three articles were not combined into one written by Houston.

The authors adopt a conservative stance in almost every question treated. Even 2 Peter is thought to depend directly on the apostle. The only exception—if it can be called an exception—is that those who treat of the Synoptics accept the priority of Mark and admit the existence of Q, although not necessarily as a unified source. Yet this conservative stance is not taken without a consideration of the evidence for other views, which is set forth fairly. Thus they give evidence that the adopting of conservative stances should be considered academically respectable. They show respect for those with whom they do not agree, but they should be accorded respect for their views as well.

There is nothing particularly noteworthy in any of the commentaries. Occasionally, as in H. L. Ellison's treatment of Mt 16:16–18, an anti-Roman Catholic bias appears, although earlier in the book he is cited by F. R. Coad, "The Apostolic Church," as advocating ideas on church order which would be much in accord with the thinking of Catholic systematic theologians of the pre-Vatican II era. To some extent the treatment of the Pastoral Epistles by A. G. Nute has an anti-episcopal bias, although he admits, almost unwillingly, that in the churches in which Timothy and Titus were there were present stable ecclesiastical functionaries, including, of course, widows and deaconesses. I have no quarrel with that view concerning feminine offices.

Undoubtedly the book will appeal mostly to those who share the general doctrinal views, in which I include questions concerning church order and structure. Those who do not share the views, especially those interested in ecumenics, might profit by seeing that there are positions accepted by a number who regard themselves, and with good reasons, as faithful Christians which are usually overlooked by those who consider modern Christianity. It is well that one be aware of as many facets of Christianity as possible. The scholar will gain little, if anything, from a reading of the book which will further his scholarship, but fur-
thering scholarship was not the purpose of the book; the scholar would see, however, an example of how to popularize successfully.

*St. Charles Seminary, Phila.*

John J. O'Rourke


This book is a remarkably stimulating exegesis of Mk 6:52: "For they had not understood about the breads; but their heart was hardened." What is most outstanding is the rigorous methodology presented and followed. What is of greatest interest and relevance to the biblical theologian is the clear analysis of the redactional elements of Mark's Gospel. Careful distinction is made between historical analyses of events as they may actually have happened and their meaning in the Gospel account, that is, in the intention or mind of Mark.

After an introductory chapter presenting by way of background all the various conflicting interpretations of 6:52 (and reductively often of Mark's Gospel as a whole), Q. makes a strong point in criticizing previous interpreters for lack of sufficient discussion of their principles, presuppositions, methods, and norms of exegesis. He then clearly sets out his own method, based fundamentally on editorial analysis, into which he introduces objective controls through a rigorously explicit scientific statement of aims and procedures. His first step is to examine 6:52 in itself and in the immediate context of the pericope in which it stands. This investigation shows that 6:52 is redactional in nature and introduces certain points which seem to be parts of larger themes in the Gospel. His second step is to compare other material in the Gospel which is verbally similar to 6:52, with a view to establishing a wider redactional context. Here he examines three other passages in detail: 4:1-34; 7:1-23; 8:14-21. He concludes that all these passages, including 6:52, are the result of one redactional hand. His third step is to search for the intelligibility of this redactional sequence in light of the redactional aspects of the over-all structure of Mark's Gospel. Here he concludes to an overwhelming probability that Mark's redactional intention was to raise problems of the lack of understanding of men about God's message of salvation and of the identity of the person of Jesus in the first half of the Gospel, weave them together finally around the mystery of bread, and bring them to a climax in the rebuke on non-understanding in 8:17-21. His fourth step is to move on to examine whether evidence of themes in the rest of the *NT* supports the hypoth-
esis that Mark's audience would understand the development of these themes. Here he concludes that Mark's imagery and allusion in regard to mystery could be expected to have been appreciated in the context of the Christian thought-world, and that bread with its Eucharistic connotations would have been a suitable figure to carry Mark's symbolic intention of understanding the mystery of the saving events of Christ's life. Finally, he returns in a fifth step to re-examine the four similar redactional passages of the second step, including 6:52, in the new light of the findings of the third and fourth steps; and here he concludes that the texts gained considerably in intelligibility when regarded consistently in the light of the theoretical probable solution.

Throughout the procedural steps, Q. is careful never to exceed the restricted goal of each step; he draws out of each text as much meaning as possible from it alone. Particularly instructive is his analysis of formal patterns at the level of content similar to that long practiced mainly on the textual and linguistic levels by G. D. Kilpatrick.

Q. has the gratifying ability to let the reader know precisely where he is at and where he is going at every stage of the argument by well-placed introductory remarks and summaries.

This is not a book which can be digested in an evening; its richness is increasingly appreciated as one works back and forth between it and the text of Mark. This is not the least value of the book—that it works from the NT text and in turn leads the reader back to the text with renewed interest and greater insight.

Fordham University

Francis T. Gignac, S.J.


Raymond Brown's commentary on the first twelve chapters (the Book of Signs) of the fourth Gospel (Anchor Bible 29, 1966; cf. TS 27 [1966] 454–56) was so superb that biblical scholars have all been waiting with great impatience for the second volume, which was to contain his commentary on the remaining chapters of the Gospel and the three Johannine Epistles. It now appears that the commentary on the Epistles will be published as a separate volume, but no one, I think, will really be disappointed. This commentary on the Book of Glory lives up to every expectation. There is the same judicious handling of difficult problems, the same profusion of theological insights, and the same awesome mastery of the relevant literature which marked the first volume. Given the different character of the three Epistles and the differ-
ent questions which they raise, it is difficult not to agree that the decision to postpone publication of B.'s commentary on them was a wise one. In any case, we now have the unexpected boon of anticipating still another volume of the best Johannine scholarship.

B. divides the Book of Glory into three sections: the Last Supper (13-17), the Passion Narrative (18-19), and the Risen Jesus (20). Chapter 21 he regards as an "epilogue" composed by a redactor steeped in Johannine theology. Like most commentators, B. cannot accept the discourse material in 15-17 as part of the original Gospel. It was added by the redactor; but this does not mean that the interpolated material was "inferior to or even later than" the original Supper discourse in 13:31—14:31 (even within this section, B. notes, we cannot be certain that all the sayings were part of the Evangelist's arrangement). Throughout the Supper discourse, as now read, we must be prepared to find "a collection of sayings composed or rephrased at various stages in the history of Johannine eschatological thought, as well as early sayings reinterpreted in a way consonant with later thought" (pp. 581-603). B. does not exclude the possibility that "some of the independent sayings incorporated into the Last Discourse may have originally been transmitted in a post-resurrectional context" (p. 585), and he alludes to W. J. P. Boyd's defense of this thesis in Theology (1967, pp. 207-11), though he seems not to have read V. M. Breton's "Jésus au cénacle: Une hypothèse exégétique" (Études franciscaines, 1950, pp. 263-78), which makes another strong case for the postresurrectional character of Jn 17 (perhaps the only oversight in B.'s bibliography).

There is scarcely a page of the commentary which does not throw some new light on the riches of Johannine thought. For the purposes of this review, we must content ourselves with some of the more generally interesting instances.

For this reviewer at least, B.'s most perceptive exposition appears in his treatment of the famous noli me tangere episode in 20:17. B. sees that "the resurrection does not fit easily into John's theology of the crucifixion," which, like that of the author of Hebrews, views the transition from death on the cross to glorification with the Father in heaven as immediate and definitive. The statement "I am ascending to my Father" has "no implication for the state of the risen Jesus previous to that statement. It is a theological statement contrasting the passing nature of Jesus' presence in his post-resurrectional appearances and the permanent nature of his presence in the Spirit." If Jesus appeared to the disciples, as the tradition which John received had insisted, then for John "he appears from heaven" (pp. 1011-17). As B. notes, "it is quite obvious that the gospels do not agree as to where and to whom
Jesus appeared after his resurrection” and the stage of preaching recalled by Paul placed no importance on the geographical location of the appearances. Insofar as John was constrained to narrate appearances, he made use of this vagueness to locate them in Jerusalem (p. 971). The Galilean appearance in 21 is the work of the redactor responsible for the whole epilogue (pp. 1077–82).

Generally B. deals gingerly with the question of implied symbolism in this Gospel. He is very sensitive to it but reluctant to admit it in several instances (e.g., in John’s references to a “garden,” kēpos [18:1; 19:41; 20:15], which some have seen as an allusion to the Paradise of Gn 2–3 [pp. 806, 943, 990]), but he does acknowledge its reality in the figure of Mary at the foot of the cross: “In becoming the mother of the Beloved Disciple (the Christian), Mary is symbolically evocative of Lady Zion who, after the birth pangs, brings forth a new people in joy” (pp. 922–27). But he cautions against reading into this—on the basis of the text—a doctrine of Mary’s spiritual motherhood such as appeared centuries later in both East and West. B.’s approach to those passages in this part of the Gospel where sacramentalism has been discerned by others must also be described as very cautious. If there is a Eucharistic symbolism in the mashal of the vine (15:1–17), it is only secondary (pp. 672–74), as is the baptismal symbolism in the foot washing (13:2–11; pp. 559–62). He attaches only “probability” to the presence of sacramental symbolism in the flow of blood and water from the side of Jesus (19:34; pp. 951–2) but finds the Eucharistic symbolism in 21:9, 12–13 “plausible” (pp. 1098–1100). Of course, his caution only serves to inspire confidence in the over-all solidity of his judgment, even if some of us may feel that such caution does not do justice to John’s artistic genius.

B.’s interpretation of the Paraclete passages in the Supper discourse hews closely to his previously published articles on them, though he writes with more assurance here: “the Paraclete is the presence of Jesus when Jesus is absent.” John is not interested in the Trinitarian concerns of a later theology, “where the main problem will be to show the distinction between Jesus and the Spirit; John is interested in the similarity between the two.” Moreover, B. agrees in principle with Loisy, Kragerud, and others that the Beloved Disciple is “the incarnation” of the Paraclete (pp. 1135–43; cf. also pp. 642–48).

Forthright, too, is B.’s exegesis of the commission to Peter in the epilogue: “In our judgment, exegetes who think that Peter had authority over the other disciples cannot conclude this from John xxi 15–17 taken alone but must bring into the discussion the larger NT back-
ground of Peter’s activities.” On the other hand, B. rightly asks why the Johannine redactor included this reminder of Peter’s pastoral authority some twenty or thirty years after Peter’s death: “Was this just an interesting fact, or did Peter’s pastoral authority have some continuing importance?” (pp. 1112-17).

St. Michael’s College, Toronto

J. Edgar Bruns


Prof. Fortna of Vassar College is a brave man. Not only does he bring wide learning to his task, as defined in his subtitle, of separating out the source narrative of miracle stories from the added work of the Evangelist, but he actually prints the Greek text of what he deems to be that source. Not many Form Critics would be so bold. After discussing the narrative of the eight miracles, he goes on to examine the narrative of Passion and Resurrection on the same principle and turns finally to the passages concerning John the Baptist and the Samaritan woman. The Cambridge Press has done him proud, printing out his resultant source Gospel in some eleven pages at the end of the book, with all his marks of omission and doubt inserted in the Greek text.

At the outset some thirty pages are given up to a consideration of the general principles which should govern such an investigation. It is to this section that most critics will turn to find out what they are going to get. The start is from the *aporiai* which can be noticed in the text of the narrative portions of the fourth Gospel as we now have it. These were first seized upon by Eduard Schwartz in some papers published in the *Nachrichten* from Göttingen in 1907-1908. Now Schwartz in his day was working on the assumption that the fourth Gospel did not have its final edition until 140 or later; he thought it showed signs of polemic against Valentinus and Basilides, and he was even prepared to allow some two thirds of the second century for its formation. All these assumptions look very different in the light of what we know from the Rylands papyrus and the *Gospel of Truth*. The editing, if editing there was, would have to be completed by the end of the first century. F. is willing to allow that his source may have come into being before the fall of Jerusalem, but this leaves him open to the objections made by Lagrange as long ago as 1924 (in the *Revue biblique*). Could not the Evangelist in old age, he asked, have added bits and pieces to his own earlier composition, so as to leave signs of unevenness and dislocation?
If he was an old man, could he not have died before finishing his revision and amplification? Almost contemporary with the appearance of F.'s work there has been published a series of *Studies on the Fourth Gospel* by Leon Morris, who devotes a whole chapter to considering variations in phrasing of parallel statements as a characteristic of the style of John the Evangelist. Thus does nature provide the dock leaves of Morris to assuage the sting of Fortna's nettles.

After Bultmann there was a reaction, led by Eduard Schweizer (not the man from Lambarene) and Ruckstuhl, who emphasized the stylistic unity of the fourth Gospel. The evidence of P 66 and P 75 suggests that, while individual verses of the Gospel may have had variant readings from the start, the practice of numbering the pages (which can be seen in the papyri) precludes any major dislocation of large portions of the text. F. has some polemic with Ruckstuhl's book (1951), but he will still have to deal with Morris. If the Gospel-maker used the name "Jerusalem" with the definite article in one verse and without it in the next, this does not give us an *aporia* nor allow us to call in a second author, when the old man who was writing may have had, as Morris claims, a possibly perverse love of varying his language.

Where the *aporiai* are detected in subject matter rather than in style, F.'s judgment does not inspire confidence. He holds, e.g., that the designation of the lakeside apparition as the third made to the disciples after the Resurrection (Jn 21:14) must be wrong since prior to it there have been two to the disciples (with and without Thomas) and one to Mary Magdalen. John says carefully "the third *to the disciples,*" and Magdalen was not a group of disciples; hence John is quite correct. But F. judges that John is mistaken, and then proceeds to reconstruct on a large scale. The word "third" is allowed to be correct, but this is taken to mean that this is the third *miracle* done by Jesus, following on Cana and the nobleman's son, which are labeled in the text as first and second miracle. The whole episode must then be transferred to a point after Jn 4:54. If the reader believes this, he will believe anything.

F.'s general method is open to cavil, for he never quite makes up his mind whether the Evangelist-editor has used the Synoptics or not. Details from the Synoptics are, however, drawn upon to argue that this or that trait is primitive (because found in the Synoptics) and therefore it must have been found in the source used by the fourth Evangelist. This Evangelist is then credited with being a subtle theologian, much enamored of instances of foreknowledge shown by Jesus and of His reading of hearts. But how do we know he was so subtle? There are all the prophecies of the Passion in Mark and a reading of hearts at
Mk 9:33. Are these primitive or not? One cannot without circularity make the Evangelist a subtle theologian and then credit him with adding to a baldly factual narrative all the deeper theological overtones. Students of the Gospel will find more help in F.'s questions than in his answers.

London

J. H. CREHAN, S.J.


Fr. Bruns, chairman of the graduate department of theology at St. Michael's College, Toronto, has made many contributions in periodicals to the vast literature on the fourth Gospel. In this small volume he does not repeat his previous work but rather offers the fruit of years of reflection on John in the form of a highly original study in three parts. As everyone knows, short books are often more difficult to summarize than long ones; their economy of words is their strength, and that is the case with this work. The first part of it deals mainly with the formation of the Gospel: its relationship to the Epistles of John, its inner parallelisms and developments of thought, its evidence of a long process of editing, its purpose (literary, not polemical or missionary or whatever). Part 2 deals with the message of the Gospel and the first Epistle, intriguingly presented in the form "What Jesus Gives" and "What Jesus Takes Away," followed by a section on Johannine Christology. In the third part B. collects and interprets the evidence about the Evangelist himself, his background and formation, advancing the hypothesis that he is John Mark, the beloved disciple.

There is a great deal to comment on here—which is reason enough to commend the book. But to stay within the limits of a short review, I should like merely to list some points that I find attractive and some with which I have difficulty. On the positive side, there is first the interlocking coherence of the argument throughout the book. The problem of dealing with the thought of John is the problem of knowing where to begin and what aspects of the Gospel to treat, since whatever one's theories of its composition, the whole is a complex interweaving of themes. B. is rigorously consistent in his treatment and is especially good at pointing out structural thought-patterns recurring in the Gospel. It is interesting to compare the central importance he gives to Jn 9 with the rather different use made of that chapter as pivotal by J. L. Martyn in his recent monograph. Secondly, B. has the merit of interpreting John against the multiple cultural backgrounds of the Hellen-
istic and Palestinian worlds. The fourth Gospel is theologically of enormous importance precisely because it betrays—subtly, to be sure—the essential and creative interaction of culture and revelation. Thirdly, the reviewer is much impressed by the method of argument and the felicity of expression found in the sections on John's message of eternal life as knowledge-through-love, and of sin as "a false and corroding sense of self-sufficiency" and "a failure to love."

On the negative side, there is first the use made of 1 John to interpret the Gospel. I am (still) not convinced that accepting the common view that the same author produced both works makes it legitimate to use 1 John in this fashion, the more so if one agrees with B. that the Evangelist's purpose was mainly to produce a literary work. It seems to me an appropriate canon of literary criticism that a work should speak for itself. Moreover, if the same author did indeed write both works, one must account for his specific purpose in each instance, and the difference in purpose may make it hazardous to interpret the books jointly. The concrete danger of this methodological step is reflected, I think, in B.'s handling of the double eschatology in the Gospel (e.g., pp. 58-59). Secondly, the presentation of a twofold Christology—a Son-of-Man Christology expressed in "vertical" language and a more original form expressed in "horizontal" language (except in 1:51)—is one of the most suggestive parts of the book but unfortunately not one of the clearest. It would not be surprising to discover multiple Christological imagery in John, along with multiple symbols of many kinds, but it is not clear to me that the descent-reascent pattern is, as it were, subordinated to an even "higher" Christology. It is in this context that B. advances the hypothesis that the Evangelist was influenced by Mahayana Buddhist thought. Predictably—B. himself predicts it—many readers will be unhappy with the suggestion. I find the parallels themselves tenuous and more likely to be accounted for by way of the Evangelist's reservations about Gnosticism, which B. agrees he knows, than by an influence from the East mediated through Alexandria. Finally, there is the John Mark hypothesis, which is very ably and modestly defended here. It is not the hypothesis itself which I find most troublesome, but it seems to me that the desire to identify a single author who would possess all the necessary contacts with both the Palestinian and Hellenistic worlds represents a failure to take seriously the questions of sources and stages of redaction in the Gospel. B. discusses the latter but does not appear to refer enough to the gradual growth of the Gospel when he interprets it. The importance of a fairly complicated source and redaction theory seems to me vindicated not only by
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the work of Bultmann but also by the recent commentaries of Brown and Schnackenburg.

If this review seems to balk at what might be taken as the most original insights of the book, let me hasten to reassure the reader. B. offers a challenging and eloquent appreciation of the fourth Gospel which deserves to be read and pondered by any serious student of Johannine theology.

Weston College

GEORGE W. MACRAE


Hammer, a devoted former student of Bornkamm, selected the essays which comprise this book from two German collections of his master's writings, Das Ende des Gesetzes (5th ed., 1966) and Studien zu Antike und Urchristentum (2nd ed., 1963). The articles were composed over the course of many years, from 1928 into the early sixties. Most of the articles (4-11) are studies on particular problems of Pauline exegesis and theology: "The Revelation of God's Wrath" (Rom 1:3), "Baptism and New Life in Paul" (Rom 6), "Sin, Law and Death" (Rom 7), "The Praise of God" (Rom 11:33-36), "On Understanding the Christ Hymn" (Phil 2:6-11), "Lord's Supper and Church in Paul" (1 Cor 10:1-22 and 11:23-25), "On the Understanding of Worship," studies on "The Edification of the Congregation as the Body of Christ" and on "The Anathema in the Lord's Supper Liturgy" (1 Cor 16:22), "The More Excellent Way" (1 Cor 13).

The first three articles are intended to serve as a kind of introduction to the exegetical studies. The first, "God's Word and Man's Word in the New Testament," was an address delivered at a Kirchentag in 1957; this accounts for its homiletic and devotional tone. In the second essay, a lecture published in ZTK in 1950, B. vigorously rejects E. Stauffer's thesis on the origin of Christian faith in the Lordship of Christ as a reaction against Augustan Rome's concept of empire and ruler derived from the Near Eastern myth of kingship. Stauffer's thesis is declared untenable because the Christian concept of the world is radically different from that of Rome and the Hellenistic world. The world, for Christians, was not the Stoic essence of what exists, nor the political order. Man lies at the center of the Christian concept of the world. The world is always considered in terms of its movement to and from man. Christ is Lord of the world because He is man's redeemer. In Him man
and, consequently, the world are returned to God. So for B., the message of the Lordship of Christ is the "gospel of justification, the word of reconciliation."

B. comes to grips, in his study on baptism and new life in Rom 6, with the problem of Paul's use of indicatives and imperatives in this context. He notes very acutely that the admonitions are necessary because of the hiddenness of the new life given in baptism. "It is true that the body we bear is no longer a 'body of sin,' i.e., possessed by the power of sin. That body is destroyed in baptism, our old man is crucified with it (Rom 6:6). But it can still be enticed. It is true that the body we bear is no longer a 'body of death,' i.e., subject to the power of death, but it is nevertheless a 'mortal body'" (p. 81). This is well said and brings out the tension of Christian existence. But when B. explains the hiddenness of the new life in Christ by citing Luther's statement "This life does not possess experience of itself but faith," and insists that while the baptized believes and hopes now, it is only in the future that he will have the life that is present now in the risen Lord, this reviewer suspects that the classical Lutheran theology of justification has kept B. from doing full justice to Paul's realistic mysticism. He does not conceive the grace of baptism as an ontic reality, a sharing even now in the new creation which is the life of the risen Lord. It is interesting that the bibliographical note appended to this article fails to mention A. Wikenhauser's Die Christusmystik des Apostels Paulus.

B. emphasizes, in the essay "On the Understanding of Worship," that the sacrament of the Eucharist is concerned with redemptive participation in the body of Christ that was "given for you" and in the "new covenant" order of salvation. It is communion with the Lord's body that was delivered up in death which makes the recipients into "the body" of the congregation. The phrase of 1 Cor 11:29 refers only to the sacrificed body of Christ, not to the congregation. B. insists that Paul is always the opponent of "gnosis." Nowhere in his letters is there any indication that knowledge, as Hellenistic mysticism understands it, leads to deification. The notes appended to each essay bring the bibliographical references up to date and offer useful pointers for further study.

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Richard Kugelman, C.P.


The question that stands as the title of this volume manifests the desire of the author to bring about an intelligible unity between "the-
ology" and "economy," i.e., between reflection upon the Trinity, God's life in Himself, and consideration of the activity of God *ad extra*, especially in the saving work of Jesus Christ. The book itself aims more at setting the problem and indicating the line of future development than at proposing a definite and complete answer.

L. indicates that before the Arian controversy and the Nicene settlement, Christian understanding, following the biblical presentation, tended to view in a unified linear fashion divine eternity, the plan of creation contained in Wisdom and expressed eternally in the Word, *OT* theophanies, the manifestation of the Word in the flesh, eschatological consummation. The Greek thought-forms in which this was cast tended, however, either to modalism or subordinationism. When Arius drew out the full implications of subordinationism, the Nicene answer of *homoousios* became absolutely necessary. But this threw all speculation about the Trinity back into the interior divine life and effected a relative separation between this and reflection upon creation, incarnation, and redemption. The direction of theological development was thus set along separate lines.

In the first part L. reviews post-Nicene Trinitarian thought in three representative Christian thinkers: Gregory of Nyssa, who developed the language of metaphysics to treat of this matter; Augustine of Hippo, who added the language of spiritual activity or psychology; and Thomas Aquinas, who developed a unity and profundity in his treatment by seeing *esse* not simply as immutable duration but as *act*. In each case L. gives clear, careful analysis of the doctrine and contribution of these men and shows their individual capabilities and limitations with regard to giving a unified understanding of "theology" and "economy."

In the second half L. deals first with Karl Rahner's outline of Trinitarian doctrine, based on the fundamental axiom "The Trinity of the economy of salvation is the immanent Trinity." He sets forth Rahner's position in careful detail and then criticizes it quite sharply both for some historical inaccuracies and for speculative inconsistencies; at the same time, he acknowledges his debt to Rahner's thinking. He concludes by endeavoring to show how a theology of the Trinity may be founded upon the paschal mystery of Christ, indicating the mutual relationships and radical unity of these mysteries. He defers the full execution of this project to a future volume, though what he offers here is considerably more than a mere statement of intent.

The chief value of this work is its contribution to theological method. For example, L. shows the theologian as continually involved in commentary (the understanding of Scripture), question (the search for
truth about man and the world), and the construction of meaning (the direction of his synthesizing efforts to a particular theological goal: doctrinal, kerygmatic, catechetical, homiletic, etc.). He exposes the oversimplifications that have surrounded many comparisons of the work of the Eastern and Western Fathers. He points out the need of speaking about God always in a dialectical manner (the viæ affirmationis et negationis), especially in dealing with the Trinity, when we must speak of identity and distinction, person and nature, relation and procession, etc.

It seems to this reviewer that L. is right in urging the central need for theology to achieve a coherent and unified way of speaking of the divine activity ad intra and ad extra (though in treating St. Thomas he neglects the suggestions offered in Sum. theol. 1, q. 34, a. 3, and q. 37, a. 2). This relative separation in our thinking may well be an important and profound cause of some of the malaise in theological thinking that afflicts us today: the antinomies of transcendence and immanence, the opposition of sacred and secular, the agony over the absence or the presence of God, even the unresolved tensions between contemplation and action, between nature and grace, between incarnational and eschatological orientations. Just as the Cartesian dualistic view of man precipitated a whole series of unanswerable questions (since they all had false presuppositions), so a view of God that too neatly divides His inner life from His exterior involvement may be expected to give rise continually to fruitless problems in many areas. This volume gives hope that L.'s efforts to shed some light on this matter will be successful in the future work he projects.

JESUIT SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY


Considerable attention has been given lately to the relationship between the communities of the two Testaments. Prof. Richardson studies the problem from the perspective of Christianity's self-identification as Israel. This identification, R. argues, came about slowly as the result of a series of transpositions, take-overs, and supplantations. There is an incontrovertible expression of the last in the appropriation of the title "Israel" for the Church by Justin Martyr about 160 A.D.

Before that, during Jesus' ministry, there was little community consciousness among the disciples of Jesus, who thought of themselves only
as part of Israel and were ready to disband when Jesus appeared to have failed. The earliest mission of the Church after the ascension of Jesus, and in the pattern of His own ministry, was to call all Israel to repentance before the coming of the Son of Man. Later the Church expanded its mission to include the Gentiles, who nevertheless had to be incorporated into Israel to lay specific claim to Israel's attributes. Paul's adaptation of Jesus' own view of mission—to the Jews first, then the Gentiles—allowed Paul to free the Gentiles from the yoke of the law, thus opening the way to Gentile preponderance in the Church and to opposition from Judaism in all its forms, Christian and nonbelieving. The separation of Christianity from Judaism was intensified by the refusal of Jewish Christians to support the revolt against Rome in 66–70 A.D., even thought those who would later lead at Jamnia and the Jews of the Diaspora had also opposed the revolt. Roman persecution was not a major factor in the break of the Church with post-Christian Judaism, although where Romans were concerned, Jews were anxious to dissociate themselves from Christians before the first revolt, and Christians tended to preserve a distinction after it. The rejection of Christianity by its Jewish contemporaries was sealed definitively by Christian nonsupport of the Bar Cochba revolution (132–35). And by the mid-second century, Christianity had completed its appropriation of what it had found valuable in Judaism, even taking the title "Israel" for itself and sometimes thinking of itself as a "third race" beside the Jews and Gentiles. R. sums it up: "As long as the Church was viewed as a community gathered from Gentiles and Jews, it could not readily call itself 'Israel'. But when it was sharply separated from both, and when it had a theory that Judaism no longer stood in a continuity with Israel ante Christum, and when Gentiles not only could take over other titles but in some cases could claim exclusive rights to them, then the Church as an organizational entity could appropriate 'Israel'" (p. 204).

R. makes many good points as he describes the gradual drifting apart of Christianity and Judaism and the new self-identification of the Church as Israel. But his thesis would be better demonstrated if he could supply us with a clearer, more precise definition of the sort of discontinuity and self-identification he is seeking to trace. It is well to distinguish a "practical" (or "actual") from a "theological" (or "theoretical") separation between Christianity and Judaism, but if the "practical" separation is based on Christological grounds or on controversy over the status of the Mosaic Law, is it not "theological" (or "theoretical"); see pp. 2, 163)? At what point does "separation" set in anyway? With separate liturgies? Refusal of table fellowship? Differing theological views? Social ostracism? Persecution? Appropriation of another's
theological inheritance? Further, R. seems to treat the separation between the two communities a bit too rigidly, as though it were a unilinear and steady progression of the whole Church moving simultaneously in every locality (but marked by various milestones in particular places) away from the totality of Judaism. This leads him to downplay the Church's self-awareness as a community in its earliest stages (in the ministry of Christ and immediately after the Resurrection) and to minimize possible identifications of Christ and His Church with Israel until a relatively late date. But the choice of the Twelve and their mission seems to militate against R.'s statement that "Jesus... refuses to establish a new Israel, or to designate a group within Judaism as the remnant" (p. 69), and it indicates some sort of reconstitution of the old Israel by a new community, admittedly within it at first.

One might question other points (e.g., R.'s equation of "apostasy" with failure to believe [p. 109]) or regret the occasional overloading of the book (a hazard one encounters in published theses), but he will find much of value in this meticulous work. We can be grateful to R. for further light on the complexities of Jewish-Christian relationships in the first two centuries.

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NEIL J. MCELENEY, C.S.P.


The present monograph on Athanasius' doctrine concerning the Holy Spirit was presented as a doctoral dissertation at the University of Erfurt under the direction of M. Schmaus, K. Böhmer, and O. Müller in 1967. It is a very painstaking survey of all of the Athanasian texts, against their historical background, in the light of the recent literature; thus are reviewed in chronological perspective all the pertinent references from the time of Athanasius' attack on the Tropici and his important Letters to Serapion down to his writings shortly before the Council of Constantinople in 381. It is, of course, ground that has substantially been covered before, but it is helpful to see it all again methodically organized, with full documentation. Chap. 1 develops the historical background, beginning with Arius, the general crisis following the death of Constantine in 337, and the rise of the Tropici and the Pneumatomachi; chap. 2 discusses the doctrine as it developed throughout Athanasius' works, closing with the Creed of the Council of Constantinople (381); chap. 3 treats the doctrine by themes and topics—and, for the student of theology, this is perhaps the best (pp. 126-76); finally (pp.
177–82), the achievement of the entire monograph is summarized in a lucid conclusion.

Though L. does not always make it clear when he is following the views and interpretations of earlier authors (a perhaps normal defect in many doctoral dissertations), he does reveal a superb grasp of the vast field of Athanasian studies such as I have noticed in few modern patristic scholars. And, it is important to emphasize, he is theologically a moderate, and in his choice between divergent opinions he is regularly most reasonable and sound.

One interesting aspect of this monograph for scholars is the author’s exposition of Athanasius’ Trinitarian doctrine in the light of the teaching of the Cappadocians. Though Athanasius never refers to the Spirit formally as God (cf. p. 140), at the same time he condemns the Tropici and Pneumatomachi as blasphemers, and his mind is made clear from the various attributes and functions he attributes to the Holy Spirit throughout the course of his writings, both in a dogmatic and in a liturgical context. On this point L.’s conclusions are admirably clear and precise. Naturally, Athanasius develops his doctrine of the divinity of the Spirit within the context of his soteriology and Christology—a point that has, of course, been stressed by many scholars in the past. In view of recent ecumenical discussions, one of the most interesting parts of the monograph is L.’s treatment of Athanasius’ doctrine in relationship to the later Filioque controversy (pp. 153–55). Here he follows for the most part the work of V. Rodzianko (see Studia patristica 2 [Berlin, 1957] 295–308, cited on pp. 153 ff.): Athanasius, he suggests, cannot really be taken as a proponent of the Filioque doctrine; indeed, the best formula for reunion between East and West in this controverted area is the original Greek text of the Creed of Constantinople, which speaks of the “radiation” of the Spirit from the Son, “whose only Spirit He is, and from whose generation He receives all” (p. 155).

There are a few slips in the citation of Greek, English, and Italian, but these are minor points in a monograph eminently worthy of the scholarly Erfurt series in which it appears. The book is admirably indexed.

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HERBERT MUSURILLO, S.J.

MENSCHWERDUNG GOTTES: EINE EINFÜHRUNG IN HEGELS THEOLOGISCHES DENKEN ALS PROLEGOMENA ZU EINER KÜNF TIGEN CHRISTOLOGIE.


Gesellschaftskritik, the theoretical appraisal of societal structures and mores, is surely one of the strongest movements or trends in
contemporary German philosophy and theology. M. Horkheimer, T. Adorno, J. Habermas, and to some extent the German-American philosopher H. Marcuse make up the "Frankfurt school" of social criticism. Likewise, theologians in Germany, e.g., J. Moltmann and J. B. Metz, have published works which explore the implications of Christianity for the reform of civil society. Küng has clearly published the present work with an eye to this debate on the relevance of Christianity to Gesellschaftskritik. In addition, the publication of the book happily coincided with the beginning of the Hegel jubilee year. Its timeliness, therefore, cannot be questioned, even if one has some misgivings about the depth of insight into the problems under discussion.

The plan of the work is relatively simple. After an introduction, in which he gives a brief summary of the history of Christological speculation in the West and indicates Hegel's place in that development, K. undertakes a chronological survey of Hegel's life and works, to show the basic Christian (and Christological) orientation of his thought. The first three chapters analyze Hegel's early writings: the letters and copybooks from the student years in Tübingen, the Life of Jesus written in Bern, and the early speculative writings in Frankfurt. The following chapters take up in order Hegel's lectures and writings in Jena before the publication of the Phenomenology of Mind, the Phenomenology itself, the Encyclopedia and the Logic, and finally the lectures on art, religion, and the history of philosophy in Berlin. At each step K. analyzes Hegel's thought in its internal development and with reference to the social and religious problems implicit in his system. K. summarizes nicely the vast secondary literature on Hegel with reference to each phase of his philosophy. Then, in the last chapter and a series of appendices, K. appraises Hegel's importance for a future Christology. In particular, he maintains that the traditional Christian concept of God, which is rooted in the presuppositions of Greek metaphysics about the nature of being, must be supplemented by a new understanding of God as somehow involved with His creation in its process of self-fulfilment. He poses the question whether classical Christology has sufficiently emphasized the ontological reality of Christ as the God-man who suffered, died, and rose again for the sake of His creation.

Criticism of this book should take into account its dual character: an "introduction" to the theological dimension of Hegel's thought and a sketch or blueprint of a future Christology. It is clear that K. has given an admirable overview of Hegel's philosophy and of the secondary literature pertinent to each of its phases. An overview is, however, nec-
essarily superficial; and K.'s book is limited precisely at those critical points where an in-depth analysis of some aspect of Hegel's philosophy with respect to a contemporary theological problem is urgently needed. On those occasions K. usually limits himself to a discussion of the underlying issues without putting forth any concrete proposals of his own (cf. his analysis of Hegel's *Rechtsphilosophie*, pp. 364-81). For the same reason, K.'s book as a sketch of a future Christology is disappointing; for here too he gives only broad guidelines. Moreover, the connection with Hegel in this latter part of the book is tenuous, since the God of Christian revelation, by K.'s own admission, cannot be bound by the logic of the Hegelian dialectic in His dealings with man (pp. 552-57). Hence, even to the end of the book it remains questionable how much the principles of Hegelian philosophy can be adapted to the data of Christian revelation without oversimplification or distortion.

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*Mundelein, Ill.*

**THE CISTERCIAN SPIRIT: A SYMPOSIUM IN MEMORY OF THOMAS MERTON.**  

Eleven essays on various aspects of the Cistercian life and spirit. These chapters constitute some of the lectures delivered at an international symposium on "The Spirit and Aims of the Founders of Citeaux." When Thomas Merton died before the symposium was held, it was dedicated to his memory; the introduction offers some fine reflections on Merton. Of interest primarily to historians of religious life, the essays also provide some insights into the renewal of religious life in general. The interrelated chapters emphasize the importance of discerning the true spirit and aims of founders and of examining who were the actual founders of orders which have undergone evolution. Stress is placed on the proper interpretation of a monastic rule through its relationship to the gospel, tradition, history, and man in the present. Augustine Roberts clearly presents the growth and dynamism of the evolution between the first, second, and third generations of Cistercians and their emphasis on the primacy of love: "The first founders expressed their love in the establishment of a way of life, an institution, an Order. The second generation took this way of life and found through it the experience of the Lover. The third generation could only attempt to maintain this institution and this experience from excessive contamination by extraneous elements." This evolution is the
dialectic between juridic structures and spiritual liberty, between the monastic institution and the personal experience of God.

Dom Jean Leclercq, in his “Intentions of the Founders of the Cistercian Order,” treats of the founders’ insights into charity and poverty and their conception of the purity of the Rule of St. Benedict. He urges today’s monks to go back beyond observances of particular historical periods to the original observance, and at the same time respond to the capacities and needs of contemporary man and socioeconomic conditions. Charity today respects diversity and the need to develop God-given individuality; thus uniformity in the manner of praying and acting would not be in conformity with the intentions of the fathers of Citeaux. In his “A Sociological Approach to the History of a Religious Order,” Leclercq stresses the importance of a person’s being accepted for who he is, not for what he does; this leads to personal achievement and fulfillment and furthers the development of community.

Studies on St. Bernard, William of St. Thierry, and Aelred of Rievaulx bring out various facets of the Cistercian spirit and the different ways in which it can be lived and personally synthesized. Abbot Aelred influenced the development of a warm, homely, and humanly attractive spirit at Rievaulx with his strong emphasis on friendship; his writings have much to say to the post-Vatican II monk. William of St. Thierry stressed a new surge of enthusiasm for prayer and love in the simplicity of solitude, and he returned to the patristic sources that first inspired monastic life, developing a profound theological explanation of the way man experiences God.

The book offers a pre-position paper on the conclusions of the symposium as well as the conclusions themselves. The study concludes that the Cistercian founders were concerned with true renewal, the experience of God, charity, community relationship to the local and universal Church, the Rule of St. Benedict, gospel poverty expressed in manual labor and simplicity of life, and solitude.

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William F. Hogan, C.S.C.


It is hardly possible in the space of this review to give an adequate account of the nine essays that were selected to compose this volume. They illustrate the wide range of Chenu’s interests and the extreme
competence he brings to each of the questions. There does appear to be a pattern, however, and we can try to indicate the wealth of information and attitudes that Chenu reveals to us in three areas.

The first area would embrace in general the whole question of the varieties and types of Platonism found in the twelfth century, and C. treats these in the first three essays: “Nature and Man—the Renaissance of the Twelfth Century”; “The Platonism of the Twelfth Century”; “The Symbolist Mentality.” One major division is seen between the Platonism based on the Augustinian tradition and that following the lines of development provided by Pseudo-Dionysius. On Augustine, C. stresses that in order to understand the inner development of theology in the twelfth century, two poles are to be kept in mind: “the various kinds of Platonism, all highly volatile and constantly emerging at this time,” and “the enduring influence of Augustine’s Platonism as the common ingredient of all these syncretistic forms” (p. 60). In the long run, despite attempts to combine them, this Augustinian Neoplatonism remained incompatible with that taken from Pseudo-Dionysius.

C. discusses the stages in twelfth-century thought, which he characterizes as the “discovery of nature,” of the concept of the universe as a whole, the desacralization of nature, the conflict of art and nature.

The second and third essays consider extensively the differences between Augustinian and Pseudo-Dionysian schools in the twelfth century, especially their different stresses, such as sign (Augustine) versus symbol (Dionysius), use of anagogy, moralization of texts, the Dionysian symbol versus the Augustinian symbol.

The second group of essays is much harder to categorize: “The Old Testament in Twelfth Century Theology,” “Theology and the New Awareness of History,” “Monks, Canons and Laymen in Search of the Apostolic Life,” “The Evangelical Awakening.” The first deals with the use of the OT at a time before any theory of the relationship between OT and NT had been evolved. The other three essays deal with the confrontation of the Church and its thought with the changing world of the twelfth century. First, the religion of Christ was based on a series of facts in history. How were these to be related to the various philosophico-theological systems that had evolved or were in the process of development? What was the relationship between biblical fact and theological speculation? C. suggests that the very development of a theology into an organized discipline was an affirmation of history, for the economy of salvation is immersed in and intertwined with the events of man’s life. Secondly, he suggests that this whole development was a counterpoint to the various Platonizing philosophies, which tended to eliminate time and history. Cyclical views
could not be accommodated in this theological structure. Ultimately, then, to theologize was to accept the world.

The next two essays in this middle group raise interesting questions for our own time, for they deal with the doubts and hesitations that arose as the Church moved through the twelfth century. Times were changing; the old ways were going; and everything seemed to be unstable and uncertain. Were the old ways wrong? Why should they be changed? The demands of the times (the first crisis in the urbanization of the Western world is the context) for a return to the apostolic life, the questions about the relationship between the liturgical and the evangelical life, the doubts about the monastification of Christianity, the role of the laity asking for a renewal of evangelicalism and opposing mere conformity or institutionalism—all the demands are familiar ones. The questionings about faith, reason, theology, and the world of their time and the anxieties about the estrangement of the clergy from the urban world can offer us some hope and a certain calmness in facing the more recent versions of these problems.

The final two essays of this collection, "The Masters of the Theological ‘Science’" and "Tradition and Progress," give a rapid and critical overview of the evolution of medieval scientific theology and the questions that arose. There was the whole problem of the critical spirit and the conflict of the ancients against the moderns as in all great ages. Perhaps being a "modern," I find that C. goes too far when he opts again for the old slogan for the thirteenth century, "the most glorious century of [the Church’s] history" (p. 329); but this in no way detracts from the real value and insights in these essays.

The learning and ease of handling which the reader encounters in these essays fully justify the title the translators have given to C. in their introductory note: "magister magistrorum in our time." We are grateful to them for making C.’s work more accessible to the American audience.

Cornell University  

THOMAS E. MORRISSEY, S.J.


Episcopacy in the Lutheran Church? is a series of nine essays and a summary commentary on the development and definition of the office of church leadership. It was written in answer to requests from Lutheran churches throughout the world for clarification of the Lutheran under-
standing of the episcopate. Each essay was written by a specialist from a distinct geographical and historical point of view. After two opening chapters on the office of bishop before the Reformation, the focus is distinctively Lutheran. The largest single section is devoted to Germany, 1517-1918 and from 1918 to the present. Other countries are given proportionate attention.

As might be expected with such a broad area to cover and so many different perspectives, no single conclusion is drawn. Yet certain features stand out and promise to become valuable insights as Lutheranism enters more actively into the ecumenical movement.

The opening chapter sets the theme from which the rest of the book never departs: the episcopate is historic, indeed, but not in the sense that supernatural powers are conferred by the laying on of hands. Although the Pastoral Epistles speak of the laying on of hands as a kind of “ordination according to the customary Jewish and ecclesiastical use of the term,” this meant only the transmission of a definite office to be exercised for life. By implication, it also imposed the duty of preserving the apostolic tradition unchanged. But no more. “It must be remembered here, however, that the Spirit is never a supernatural power which man possesses or which he can control by certain acts. The Christian has the Spirit only in the sense in which through Christ he has God Himself, namely in faith. . . . In the Pastoral Epistles the charisma which the ordination mediates does not appear as a power which bestows formal authority, but always as that aid which makes possible a mystery whose objective is faith. Ordination is neither a sacramal nor a juridical legitimation, but the definitive call and as such authorization for a ministry which is performed for faith. Over against this Hellenistic ideas of the Spirit as a supernatural power became mixed into the third century Catholic doctrine of ordination of the bishops and their power to ordain—ideas which Paul had already rejected” (p. 21).

Throughout the book the basic position is restated: the episcopate belongs to the structure of historic Christianity. But the episcopate is understood as an elected office to superintend the externals of church polity. There is never any question of a bishop’s being divinely authorized to communicate to other men the unique power which the apostles received from Christ at the Last Supper or again what He conferred on them the day after His resurrection.

Jerald Brauer, in his afterword, asks the hard question facing world Lutheranism today: “What are the alternatives genuinely open to the Lutherans?” (p. 205). In his judgment, it is not easy to foresee a change in Lutheranism with regard to the theological groundings for the historical episcopate. He recognizes the advantages of having bishops for the
bene esse of the Church. On this premise, he concludes that Christian unity is impossible without bishops. But even so, their need is mainly functional. It is not of the essence of historic Christianity.

Bellarmine School of Theology, Chicago   JOHN A. HARDON, S.J.


David Tracy has written an excellent introduction to the work of Bernard Lonergan. He is primarily concerned with the structural and methodological emphases in Lonergan’s philosophical and theological investigations.

T. characterizes Lonergan’s thinking as horizon-analysis, when a horizon is defined as the maximum field of vision determined by the range of questions implicit within a methodological structure. He argues that Lonergan’s work is important because by means of horizon-analysis Lonergan has carefully tried to determine the theoretical meaning of language about transcendence. This is essential if we are to have religious discourse. The horizon-analysis method is a transcendental inquiry into the possibilities for metaphysical and theological understanding.

T. does not immediately plunge into the complexities of horizon-analysis. He surveys Lonergan’s work beginning with the doctoral dissertation Gratia operans and concluding with a preparation for the reception of Lonergan’s forthcoming Method in Theology. The importance of this historical survey of Lonergan’s thought cannot be overstated. Lonergan’s thought is cumulative, and his later work requires the illumination provided by his earlier writings in order to be fully understood.

Lonergan’s early work on Aquinas prefigures much of his later thought. T. says that in the Verbum articles “Lonergan’s hermeneutic attempts to move beyond and beneath the world of medieval theory in order to expose the world of interiority grounding it” (p. 44). The Verbum articles raise the important question of a horizon in the work of Aquinas. For the reader who is outside the Thomistic tradition, T.’s explication of Lonergan’s analysis of Aquinas is a helpful and informative review of Aquinas’ work. Through this study of Lonergan’s earlier works we begin to appreciate the importance of Aquinas’ emphasis on the dynamic element in the act of knowing.

After discussing Lonergan’s work on Aquinas, T. shifts his investigation to an analysis of Insight, Lonergan’s major epistemological study. T. says that scientific achievements and the critical movement in philosophy are of key importance in understanding Insight. Surprisingly, T.
does not sufficiently analyze the importance of Kant's transcendental philosophy for Lonergan's analysis of the problem of knowing, and there is very little discussion of Lonergan's relationship to transcendental Neo-Scholastic philosophers such as Joseph Maréchal. To many readers a more thorough explanation of the influence of critical philosophers such as Kant and Maréchal upon Lonergan's thought would be a helpful complement to T.'s very clear explanation of the Thomistic elements in Lonergan's understanding of the dynamic act of knowing.

T. broadly delineates the major themes in *Insight*. He discusses Lonergan's investigation of the heuristic structures of empirical method, the diverse patterns of experience evidenced in our lives, and the basic isomorphism between the knowing process and that which is known. He shows how Lonergan's understanding of metaphysics is deeply rooted in the reader's experience of self-affirmation.

There is a helpful analysis of the ethical dimensions in *Insight*. T. shows that "First, just as the dynamic structure of knowing grounds a metaphysics, so too that structure's prolongation into human doing grounds an ethics" (p. 166).

T. says that Lonergan's post-*Insight* work is a return to theology. Lonergan's work, however, is cumulative, and we can see a basic unity underlying all of the periods in his thought. Lonergan thinks that the real issue in today's theology is the acknowledgment of the phenomenon of historical consciousness. The meaning of Lonergan's conception of historical consciousness is importantly shaped by the horizon-analysis method used in his earlier works. An inquiry into the dimensions of meaning which are present in our historical consciousness is a recognition of the complexity of the dynamic act of knowing, and it is not a retreat from Lonergan's earlier epistemological concerns.

T. maintains that for Lonergan the question of method is foundational, and it is the central problem for contemporary theology. Lonergan conceives of theology in terms of its method, defining method "as a normative pattern of related and recurrent operations yielding cumulative and progressive results" (p. 235). The exigences of the methodological problem as developed in *Insight* become part of the theological context. T. says: "The problem of theology at present might best be stated as the need to move fully and coherently from . . . a notion of theology as 'reason illuminated by faith' to 'method illuminated by faith'" (p. 236).

T. has succeeded in introducing the American reader to the work of Lonergan; he has provided important insights into the development of Lonergan's thought; and, through his understanding of the contempo-
imary theological situation, he helps the reader to better understand the importance of Lonergan’s work.

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CHARLES E. WINQUIST


Abstraction as a factor in the process of human knowing still enjoys a prominent place in the tradition of the philosophia perennis, since it is through the doctrine of abstraction that universal concepts are grounded in the nature of reality and not merely in human convention. Outside of scholastic circles, however, abstraction as a meaningful philosophical concept has fallen on hard times. The term is avoided, presumably because it smacks too much of a naive realism which was first challenged by the English empiricists and then definitively refuted by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason. O. seeks, however, in the present volume to effect a reconciliation first between the proponents of the scholastic tradition and the advocates of Kantian transcendental method, and then between both these groups combined and still a third group (Marxists and others), who suggest that speculative philosophy is sterile because it is not immediately related to action (Praxis). This is an ambitious undertaking, which in my opinion falls short of the mark (cf. the third paragraph below). Yet it remains a speculative work of considerable erudition which may assist O. himself or some other scholar eventually to produce a more satisfactory synthesis of the various philosophical traditions which are treated in this book.

O. treats in succession the thought of Aristotle, Aquinas, Hegel, and Schelling on the subject of abstraction. In advance of the detailed study of these authors, however, he presents a historical introduction on the use (or misuse) of abstraction by the English empiricists, the Neo-Kantians, modern Marxist theoreticians, and finally the proponents of contemporary Sprachphilosophie (Wittgenstein, Heidegger, et al.). At the end of this introduction O. makes clear that abstraction, as he understands it, is not simply a factor in human cognition but rather recapitulates the entire process of human knowing from beginning to end. With this expanded notion of abstraction he then analyzes the work of the authors mentioned above. First, he establishes through text analysis that Aristotle was interested not only in the empirical abstraction of physical characteristics from material entities as an aid to their classification into genera and species, but also in the strictly metaphysical abstraction of the eidos or substantial form from the individual existent as its concrete nature or essence. In his analysis of
Aquinas' theory of abstraction O. focuses on the three degrees of abstraction (cf. *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 85, a. 1). The third degree of abstraction is, in O.'s opinion, distinct from the first two, because it is no longer really an abstraction from sensible experience but is rather a reflection of the human intellect upon its own immanent mode of operation. In this way it participates in the constitutive understanding of the divine intellect as it is creative of the objective order of reality. Hegel, too, was preoccupied with the problem of abstraction. In fact, he conceived his philosophy as an overcoming (*Überwindung*) of the special problem of abstraction which Kant created by distinguishing between the transcendental ego with its categories for the unification of experience and the strictly unknowable world of things-in-themselves. In reducing metaphysics, however, to a dialectically structured system of logical predicates, Hegel himself was guilty of abstracting from the empirical human knower and also from God as the ultimate subject of the cosmic dialectic. Finally, O. takes up the work of Schelling on abstraction, chiefly as reflected in his lectures on a *Philosophical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology*. In this work, which serves as the basis for Schelling's celebrated distinction between the "negative" and the "positive" philosophies, O. sees a natural ending to the problem of abstraction, as progressively worked out by Aristotle, Aquinas, and Hegel; for Schelling shows here the limitations of both the Aristotelian-Thomistic and the Kantian transcendental method in philosophy for the construction of universal concepts and points the way to a new "positive" philosophy which will be based on the self-revelation of the Christian Creator-God in history.

By way of critique, I would suggest first that O. has overextended the concept of abstraction. He distinguishes, for example, between empirical, mathematical, transcendental, and finally absolute abstraction, the last of which represents the transit from thought to language and practical life in general. There may indeed be a sense in which the life of the spirit is a continuous process of abstraction, but with equal right it could be claimed that the same life of the spirit is a process of continuous incarnation or self-expression in and through matter. Accordingly, it would be preferable, in my opinion, to reserve the term "abstraction" for specific mental processes of comparison and analysis on the empirical level and to think up new terms for other definable stages or functions in the total process of human knowing. In this way alone will it be clear that the unity of consciousness is constituted by the human ego itself and not by one of its functions, however important in itself. Secondly, I was disappointed by the lack of references in O.'s work to recent secondary literature on Schelling's *Spätphilosophie*. In
particular, O.'s exclusive attention to the "negative" over the "positive" philosophy and his severe judgment on the merits of S.'s philosophy of mythology and of revelation as a whole (p. 373) should have been defended, at least in a passing way, within the context of the current literature.

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JOSEPH A. BRACKEN, S.J.


The present-day need for dialogue between Marxists and Christians—and, ultimately, between Marxism and Christianity—is rooted in two basic facts: (1) that they are the two most potent spiritual forces on the contemporary scene, neither of which can afford to write the other off; (2) that, ideally at least, they make common cause against the most conspicuous evils afflicting man: poverty, war, oppression, racism, and the host of ills induced by the combination of all four. The evils themselves are perhaps material, but they have spiritual overtones, and the spiritual needs of man are not going to be satisfied if his material needs are simply ignored. The differences between Marxism and Christianity are, of course, enormous and multiple, but in the context of dialogue they can be subsumed under a fundamental difference of emphasis. Marxism seeks to eradicate the ills of man by a restructuring of society, the most significant means to which is the elimination of private ownership of the means of production. Christianity seeks to eradicate the ills of society by the conversion of man to an attitude of universal love based on the realization that all are children of a common Father.

In all this the Marxist has the advantage of having more clearly defined the means for arriving at his goal, and the disadvantage of not really knowing—although he claims to be "scientific"—just what the employment of the means will actually produce once the first stage of correcting the most obvious abuses has been passed. The Christian has the disadvantage of having to recognize in the witness of two millennia of history that the message of love has not adequately penetrated the consciousness of man (not even of those who call themselves Christians), and the advantage of knowing that no other means can succeed if love is absent.

Herbert Aptheker has written a book whose declared purpose is to facilitate the sort of mutual understanding which makes dialogue pos-
sible, in order that dialogue in turn may facilitate both mutual understanding and co-operative effort to right the world’s wrongs. A. is aware that his efforts will be fruitless unless both parties to the dialogue are willing to examine their consciences, and so he spends a good deal of time helping the Christian examine his two-thousand-year conscience, contenting himself with remarking in passing that Marxists, too, have been guilty of enormous, but unspecified, “aberrations, crimes, and failures.” In enumerating the failures of religion in general and of Christianity in particular, A. has dredged up much that should make the Christian strike his breast in shame, although, paradoxically enough, the presentation lacks that fine historical sense which is supposed to be the hallmark of Marxist “science.” What is particularly difficult to comprehend, however, is that he should choose a lengthy indictment of this kind as a means to promote dialogue; one suspects that it is more likely to promote bitterness—on both sides.

For the Christian, perhaps the most disturbing feature of this book will be its subtle confirmation of the persistent suspicion that even the most tolerant Marxist—and A. is one of the most tolerant and knowledgeable—looks upon religion as a phenomenon destined to disappear once reason has taken its rightful place, with the result that the dialogue in question is at best provisional. It is true, of course, that he contends, on the basis of considerable documentation, that not only Marx and Engels but also Lenin were not opposed to religion as such, frowned upon the persecution of religion or the disfranchisement of individuals (even priests) for religious reasons, did not consider themselves superior to religious persons, and did not foresee the early demise of religion even in a socialist world. There is no question, however, that A. is convinced that religion is a pis aller, that it fulfils a need only of “alienated” man, that religious concepts belong only to “oppressive social conditions,” that God is an obstacle to the autonomy of man, and that “Religion... traditionally and dominantly, is supra-rational and, indeed, antireason and antiscience” (p. 85). Such an attitude need not, of course, preclude dialogue, so long as both partners to the dialogue admit they could conceivably be wrong, but the cards are stacked in favor of the side which is clearly wedded to reason and against the one which represents unreason. It might perhaps be better to say that A. supports the necessity of dialogue in a way he least suspects: it is needed in order to clear up the kind of misunderstanding in which his book abounds.

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*QUENTIN LAUER, S.J.*

This collection of essays on ethical concepts and concerns is remarkable for its combination of scholarly seriousness, collective self-criticism, and general readability. The authors belong to the Reform wing of Judaism, but they present their arguments within the context of the tradition as a whole. In the contemporary ferment, the old lines of demarcation between Reform, Conservatism, Orthodoxy, and Reconstructionism are no longer decisive.

Within the limitations of a review, it is not possible to discuss the theses of the twenty contributors. Suffice it to call attention to some of the more challenging positions. Abraham Edel discusses the relation of religion to ethics within the contemporary context of philosophical analysis. In spite of the prevailing disillusionment with all claims to objectivity, he strikes an optimistic note: mankind will rediscover its way to a workable set of ethical principles. In his analysis he does not take account of the notion of the sacred, which is the meeting point of ethics and religion. Hans Jonas points out that the delicate subtleties of contemporary philosophers frequently do not stand up as well in a moral crisis as the classical principles for all their analytical inadequacies. Julian N. Hartt discusses some modern "images of man." He urges the utilization of creative imagination for the purpose of dramatizing the joyous affirmation of the role of the sacred in human life.

I. M. Blank poses a big question: Is there a common Judeo-Christian ethical tradition? He arrives at a negative answer by way of scattered citations from Christian and Jewish writers. He concludes that it was only down to the middle of the third century, when both Judaism and Christianity were arrayed against paganism, that they defended a common policy; later their paths diverged. But how about the neo-pagan challenge of our own day? The Marxist-Leninist? The nihilism of evolutionary biology? The new civic religions? The new existentialism of the philosophic and vulgar varieties? It is precisely because the Judeo-Christian heritage as a whole is today being questioned that the author's inference from selected quotations is so inappropriate. Michael A. Meyer balances Blank's thesis by calling attention to the messianic aspect of Jewish ethics. This emphasis is particularly meaningful in our apocalyptic era, but messianism needs to be guarded against the many forms of pseudo messianism. In the case of Herrmann Cohen, whom M. cites, socialism took on the seductive glamor of messianism; and we know the price of socialist fanaticism.

Steven S. Schwarzschild demonstrates that pseudo messianism is capable of distorting the perspective of Jewish people even today, by
analyzing the reactions of some ideologists to the Six-Day War. They were quite ready to let theology spring full-blown from the barrels of jets. Happily, such reactions are only temporary aberrations.

The editor contributes an essay bristling with common sense and deflating some long-cherished dogmas. His emphasis on Jewish "peoplehood" coincides with the Reconstructionist position, which is presented in outline by Arthur Gilbert.

*Reconstructionist Rabbinical College*  
*Jacob B. Agus*


The first issue is the relation of Christian morals to non-Christian morals, especially that of humanists and Marxists, or the relation of Christian morals to the general moral striving of mankind. It is one of continuity and the pursuit of common goals. The second issue is the shape of theological ethics appropriate to our time. M. is generally dissatisfied with the situationism of Robinson, Fletcher, and Lehmann and finds the foundation of Christian ethics in the nature of man and a newer interpretation of the natural law. The third issue is the relation of religious faith and moral law. M. sees a positive relation between them and finds it beneficial. He relies upon Scripture, contemporary systematic theology, and philosophy. He carefully tries to avoid two dangers: questioning the integrity of nonbelievers by representing them as a kind of cryptobelievers, and diluting Christian morals.

Ethics begins with a study of man. M. sets aside the fixed-essence concept and sees man as a dynamic existent in a changing world. Since self-understanding is a constituent of the human existent, man himself changes as his self-understanding changes. Self-understanding is expressed in images. Five characteristic images express the constitution of contemporary man: changing, embodied, and social man, man as agent, man come of age. Changing man is a being-on-the-way; his nature is open and self-transcending. "Human nature" and man "in his very being" change. Now jet transport, television, and the "pill" are "part of human nature." One might wish that M. were more exact in saying what "nature" and "natural" mean.

The nature of man leads to a study of his end or goal. As the nature of man is not fixed but dynamically changing and open, so the end of man cannot be fixed and easily defined; it is open. M. acknowledges the theological doctrine of the vision of God, but he thinks we need to understand better what that vision means. He rejects the idea of "a quietist, individualistic, other-worldly absorption," and asserts that the
vision of concern to ethics is the one we have of God in this world through our responsible action in it. M. is concerned with dialogue with non-Christian ethics and not with eschatological speculation. But the importance of the end of man in biblical and theological tradition demands more development of this section.

M.'s study of conscience is interesting. He sees three main levels of conscience: decision on a course of action, knowledge of general moral principles, and "a special and very fundamental mode of self-awareness—the awareness of 'how it is with oneself.'" At this level, conscience discloses the gap between our actual selves and that image of ourselves which we have in virtue of the "natural inclination" toward the fulfillment of our end. Conscience, therefore, is a call or summons to that fuller humanity of which we already have some idea or image. Conscience's command to do is more fundamentally a command to be. M. introduces the problem of the conflict of personal conscience vis-à-vis conventional standards and suggests a solution in terms of community: "the judgement and counsel of his fellows," and, if one is Christian, the Bible and the Church. "Only when he has endeavored, to the utmost of his ability, to make allowance for his own tendencies toward distortion and egocentricity can a person justifiably set up his own conscience in opposition to the commonly accepted code." He may still err, but often the risk must be taken. This book is recommended.

Jesuit School of Theology

ROBERT H. DAILEY, S.J.


Daniel Callahan has wrought so rich a union of intensive research and moral sensitivity as to make most arguments about abortion sound shrill, dogmatic, and glib by comparison. In the present climate of controversy most readers will look immediately for his conclusions. Obligingly he signals them from the beginning, not to emphasize them but to alert his readers to the convictions that influence his ordering of data. Actually his conclusions may be less important than his illumination of issues often swept under the rug by pious censorship or polemical passion. The fact that he changed his own beliefs during his study means that he can get inside more than one position. But he is not timid in exposing fraudulent information and reasoning in all positions.

This book is a helpful model for investigation of many ethical issues raised by new technology, especially medical technology. It works between two interacting poles, the empirical and the moral. The empirical
data, gathered in a world-wide study, concern medical and legal practices—their purposes, methods, and consequences. As an empiricist, C. wants factual answers to questions, e.g., whether laws achieve or frustrate their declared purposes, what the actual social consequences of various policies are, what programs encourage an "abortion habit." Yet he knows that data do not dictate decisions; moral insight must decide how to respond to evidence. Thus, to take a crucial case, biological facts contribute to understanding when human life begins and ends; yet the answer to the question depends upon what we mean by human life, and that is in significant ways a moral decision. Biology shows both continuity and distinction between a fertilized, unattached ovum, an eight-month fetus, a newborn baby, a mature person, and an aged invalid in irreversible coma; still such information does not define what it is to be a person.

But what moral convictions can become the basis for public policy? The moral regulations of a society (as distinguished from an individual or a church) must appeal to some kind of consensus. For just this reason traditional Catholic doctrine looked to natural law as a moral authority for all men, whether or not they shared the faith in revealed law. But such is the pluralism of our time that natural law has become a "sectarian" symbol in the public mind. C. proposes as a moral basis for policy the widely and deeply held appreciation of the sanctity of human life.

Such a principle does not produce automatic and precise moral rules. It implies something for nascent life in the womb; it also implies something for the personal freedom of a pregnant woman. C. rejects the absolutizing of any single implication as against other implications. He therefore criticizes as one-dimensional the traditional Catholic prohibition of all abortion (held also by some Protestants, including no less a "situationalist" than Dietrich Bonhoeffer). He criticizes likewise the claim of some feminine liberationists that a fetus is a woman's property at her sole disposal.

Through this process C. arrives at this moral judgment: "A bias in favor of the sanctity of human life in all its forms would include a bias against abortion on the part of women; it would be the last rather than the first choice when unwanted pregnancies occurred." Yet "it is also part of a respect for the dignity of life to leave the way open for an abortion when other reasonable choices are not available."

Moving from moral to legal judgments, C. points to two major wrongs that result from the highly restrictive laws prevalent in most of the United States: (1) the frequency of illegal abortions, with all the attendant hazards and consequences; (2) the accessibility of abortion to
the affluent and educated, and its denial to the poor. Moderate revisions of laws have done little to change such abuses. Hence C. examines the proposal of Robert Drinan, S.J., and others that abortion be removed entirely from legal control. But he prefers that it be kept under regulative, though not prohibitive, legislation. His reasons include a concern for the protection of the women concerned, whose freedom of decision may be frustrated as much by pressures toward abortion as by restrictions, and for the freedom of physicians who may be conscientious objectors to abortion. In the process advocated the voice of the woman directly involved would be decisive.

The reasoning is the more impressive because of its open acknowledgment that there can be no "wholly satisfactory solution to the problem of abortion." Likewise it is impressive because it gives attention to the social context of the problem. Abortion is no answer to many of the social problems that make women want abortions. Hence C. urges attention to sex education and availability of contraceptives; to the social censoriousness that, even in a sexually permissive society, makes many an unwed woman prefer abortion to motherhood; and to the poverty and inadequate medical care that often drive women to desperate desire for abortion.

Unlike most of the literature on the subject, C.'s book aims to heighten moral sensitivity rather than simply ease a painful social problem. In "the ethos of technological societies" he finds a growing pressure to make moral choice "easy and problem-free." C. will be more acclaimed for his conclusions than for his desire to encourage a hard wrestling with conscience.

An important by-product of the book is its unexpressed vindication of the uses of moral philosophy. C., though writing with a minimum of abstractions and complex casuistry, shows the importance of careful and refined moral distinctions. We live in a time when some of the most passionately moral people resist such thoughtfulness. The appeal to gut feeling is more contemporary than intellectual penetration. But gut feeling can respond in anger at the killing of a fetus or in outrage at legal prohibitions. It is C.'s gift to combine cultivation of moral feeling and clarification of mind.

Union Theological Seminary, N.Y.  ROGER L. SHINN


It is very appropriate that Shin Buddhism should be published after Dr. Suzuki's death, for its simplicity is a quality so astonishing that
one must read it against silence. The accomplishment of the author in these lectures, first delivered at the New York Buddhist Church in 1958, is to open a gateway for the Christian-Western reader into the realm of later Japanese Buddhism of the Amida or Pure Land tradition. Those who know Buddhism in its classical forms might pass over any teaching of the Pure Land school, since it has always been regarded by intellectuals as a folksy form, centering on salvation, and not, therefore, devoted to the attainment of “no-mind” or pure emptiness. But S. has taken the Shin approach, divested it of many accretions, and plunged the reader into the world of formlessness (spirituality) of Amida Buddha. According to S.’s explanation, the Pure Land is not many millions of miles away; it is right here; it is “the dirty earth itself.” S.’s method of presenting his unconventional view of Shin is quite simple.

He first describes the location and historical background of the Shin sect. Then he briefly lists the main beliefs and comments on them. But in the course of the commentary he develops from the basic folk beliefs a dimension of deeply interior religious consciousness. Both his spoken method and what remains unspoken have brought to life in this book the purest teaching of Shakyamuni, early founder of Indian Buddhism.

Historically, the Shin teaching of the Pure Land school is the latest evolution of Mahayana Buddhism. Originally, the Pure Land idea dates back to India before the Christian era; it meant a Buddha-land presided over by Buddha. But the school based on a desire to be born in that land in order to attain the final end of Buddhist life did not really materialize until Buddhism began to flourish in China. The Japanese genius of the thirteenth century matured it further into the teaching of the Shin school.

How this happens is described gently and sparingly in the last four chapters of S.’s charming, modest book. The impact of his lectures is like an arrow shot straight at the target. Obviously, the author, late in life, is shaping words with the effortlessly sure hand of a master. The experience of watching him reveals three interwoven levels of meaning. He is giving a description of the Pure Land beliefs. Around the edges and just supporting that description is a comprehensive and subtle understanding of the entire Buddhist tradition. But more delicate and complex than either of these is his delineation of the razor edge of the mind where rational thought stops. For example, at the close of chap. 3, he summarizes: “This absolute faith is reality. This is the moment as indicated by Shinran, that if you say Namu Amida Butsu once, it is enough to save you. That ‘one’ is ‘absolute one’ is
quite mysterious.” Suddenly, all the verbal thought-patterns of fifty-five pages are brought together into a sharp point of simplicity. They vanish into silence.

Ultimately, the experience of a Shin believer takes place within a sincerity which is utterly unself-conscious. As long as sincerity is conscious of itself, S. says, it is not genuine. Religious or spiritual forgetfulness, spiritually turning into the unconscious, is something not to be defined or explained, but lived or experienced. Here again, the shock of a disarming paradox may leave the reader either delighted or dismayed. There are hints and guesses of how to enter the meaningless meaning of the Other power, of how to let go of the self-power, of praying for nothing and gaining all.

It is true that some information about classical Buddhism could aid the reader in grasping S.’s comments on formlessness and meaningless meaning. But the book as a whole can be enjoyed by anyone who has thought seriously on religious questions. It is a book about living religion, about perceiving the transcendent in a very simple way. Obscurely, S. and John the Evangelist are brothers.

Mount Saint Agnes College
Baltimore

MARY VERA DUVALL, R.S.M.

SHORTER NOTICES


This book brought its author “le prix Noël 1969.” The award, annually announced by a jury consisting of nine writers in Christian theology, is intended to draw the attention of the public to a highly qualified book which in form and content might be of interest not only to believers but also to nonbelievers or even professed atheists. The author, a Dominican, has a background in science. He is polytechnical and engineer, but actually teaches philosophy at the Institut Catholique in Paris. His scientific background as well as his philosophical-theological training are mirrored in the issues he discusses. As a “meditation on faith,” the book wants to give a testimony and to serve as an itinerary or guidebook. A testimony, in so far as R. professes his commitment to the personal decisions and religious presuppositions of his formation; an itinerary or guidebook, in so far as the methodological doubt is radically applied to personal faith without denying, however, an “original truth.”

The tension between a scientific mentality and the life of faith is developed in the first part. R. collects an arsenal of questions, ranging from the relation between critical doubt and Christian faith to the problem of God’s providence and the possibility and necessity of prayer. The second part deepens the problematic by reflecting on human freedom in this world; the third part prepares an an-
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shorter notices

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swer of faith to the issues raised in the opening chapters. The conclusion is: what verifies the affirmation of God is a believing existence itself. The fourth part offers a very good description of the tension between work and contemplation, faith and violence, action and prayer. The books ends with the acceptance, critique, and verification of two statements: "Christ is risen" and "God exists." The possibility of criticism along with the verification process does not do away with the truth of the believing existence, but manifests la foi d'un mal-croyant. Because of the variety of issues discussed and because of the originality of its solutions, the book makes an excellent contribution to the concerns of fundamental theology.

Ferdinand P. Brüngel, S.J.


This dissertation, done partly at Perkins School of Theology of Southern Methodist University in Texas, disengages painstakingly the significance of Newman’s Grammar of Assent for Christian apologetics. This is no small task, as Newman’s presentation in the Grammar seems more lucid and orderly than turns out to be the case under closer inspection. For Newman himself, the problem yielded to the approach through assent, that sure and firm assent which is involved in the act of faith and which on its part necessarily involves a previous apprehension (whence the famous distinction between notional and real apprehension). His lasting contribution, however, is rather his emphasizing in an unforgettable way that which sets faith apart from other intellectual acts of assent. “By distinguishing between assents and conclusions, he indicates that faith-statements are not to be classed as conclusions but as statements which describe personal commitments to what is held to be the truth. These commitments involve claims about what is factually true but they can never be completely justified or compelled by reasoning alone” (p. 195).

Pailin is a reliable guide to Newman’s thought, especially for those to whom the Neo-Thomist basis of comparison used by Walgrave and Zeno in their earlier studies may be of no great assistance. In the admittedly short section on historical background, the works of J. M. Cameron and G. H. Harper would have helped fill out the picture.

Paul Misner


It hardly seems probable that a baker’s utensil could have anything significant to say about the faith and theology of a people. This book stands as proof that it can. This is a full and painstakingly pursued study of bread stamps, those humble tools employed to impress an image or other markings on the Eucharistic species and on other breads employed in Christian ritual. G. confines his investigation to the early Christian Eucharistic rites in general and to the Byzantine liturgy in particular. As such, the work is of most value to the student of Byzantine Christianity, although often enough the conclusions reached bear on the life of other branches of the Christian Church as well. So, e.g., according to G., the bread stamps witness to the fact that in the very beginning, until at least the fourth century,
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It hardly seems probable that a baker’s utensil could have anything significant to say about the faith and theology of a people. This book stands as proof that it can. This is a full and painstakingly pursued study of bread stamps, those humble tools employed to impress an image or other markings on the Eucharistic species and on other breads employed in Christian ritual. G. confines his investigation to the early Christian Eucharistic rites in general and to the Byzantine liturgy in particular. As such, the work is of most value to the student of Byzantine Christianity, although often enough the conclusions reached bear on the life of other branches of the Christian Church as well. So, e.g., according to G., the bread stamps witness to the fact that in the very beginning, until at least the fourth century,
no differentiation was observed between the various types of bread in use among the people and the Eucharistic bread. Bread stamps had an all-purpose character and could as easily be used on ordinary dough as on that destined for religious use. A simple sign of the cross made by hand or incised with a knife sufficed to give Christian religious value to a loaf. As time progressed, however (and this is the story the stamps seem to tell), Christians became increasingly reluctant to make the Eucharist appear as ordinary bread and so devised bread stamps with distinctively Eucharistic character. This, of course, is in marked contrast to what appears to be the contemporary trend in the Latin Church to give the Eucharist the look of ordinary bread.

One can only admire the patient, systematic way in which G. has approached his task. Before he could enter upon the essential stages of his study, he had to cut his way through a thick undergrowth of indeterminates and ambiguities. This he has done with neat dispatch. He comes to grips, e.g., with the very fundamental question as to which of all the stamps that have survived from ancient times may be accepted as tools meant for bread and not any other element. He concludes with unexceptionable common sense that only wooden ones can be certainly connected with bread; for wooden stamps used on clay or other firmer materials would scarcely have lasted till the present time. So, too, the delicate problem of stamps intended for common bread as distinguished from those for bread used in religious rites. G. addresses himself to this and various other prior questions that block the way to a sharp consideration of the subject he has in hand. He succeeds in finding a satisfying answer in most instances. One is rather taken aback to note that the author of so thoroughly scientific a work as this has seen fit to rely upon the dated King James version for his scriptural reference. However, this need not be construed as a grievous flaw in the book, since there is not much occasion to refer to Scripture in maintaining the thesis.

G.’s book is valuable for what it says and for what it suggests. It strongly intimates that the physical remains of the Christian past, cathedrals, frescoes, and so on, are eloquent commentaries—for the most part still unread—of the faith and theology of the past.

James C. Turro


In 1059 Pope Nicholas II reserved the election of the pope to the cardinals. Shortly thereafter one hears of “consistories” in which the pope and cardinals met collegialiter to conduct important Church business. In this way the cardinals exercised much greater power than they have today. The purpose of A.’s book is to examine the reasons offered by theologians and canonists from the eleventh to the fourteenth centuries to justify this situation. To achieve his purpose, A. studies documents already known but considered from other angles and also documents which have been neglected but seem to be of exceptional importance.

Those who accepted and justified what some called the “divine right” of cardinals to assist the pope in the government of the Church appealed to the fact that they had elected him, that he needed their counsel, that the cardinals inherited the role of the apostolic college gathered around Peter prior to its dispersion. Gener-
ally, these supporters of the cardinals regarded the college of cardinals as superior to the college of bishops. A. notes in his conclusion that during the centuries under consideration the college of cardinals exercised the responsibility of the college of bishops, namely, the sollicitudo omnium ecclesiarum. Vatican II has reaffirmed the responsibility of the bishop not only to his own church but to other churches as well. A.'s book documents an interesting and instructive situation in the history of the Church.

Edward J. Grätsch


James Capocci was born at Viterbo of noble parents about 1255. He entered the Order of the Hermits of St. Augustine about 1270. He studied at Paris from 1275 to 1282, acted as definator and visitator for his order from 1283 to 1285, and received the baccalaureate at Paris in 1288. He succeeded Giles of Rome in the chair of his order at Paris in 1293 and remained there as Master Regens until 1299. He was delegated to participate in the general chapter of his order at Naples in 1300 and was appointed primus lector for the Studium Generale there. He served in this post until September 1302, when Pope Boniface VIII named him Archbishop of Benevento. The following December he was transferred to the see of Naples. He died there in 1308. His works include the (doubtful) Lectura super quattuor libros Sententiarum; the (doubtful) Abbreviationes Aegidii in 1 Sententiarum; the Quaestiones disputatae de praedicamentis in divinis, De animazione caelorum, and De Verbo; the De regimine christiano; Sermones; and Quodlibeta. His famous De regimine christiano (1302) is the most extensive treatise on Church politics of the period next to that of Giles of Rome, whose views he follows here as in the rest of his works. The Quodlibeta, previously unedited, are sets of treatises on various philosophical and theological questions written while James was master at Paris. Of special interest are Qdl. 1, qq. 4–5, where James deals with the question of the distinction of essence and existence; Qdl. 1, q. 12, which seeks to reconcile the Aristotelian doctrine of the agent intellect with the Augustinian doctrine of illumination; and Qdl. 2, qq. 3–4, in which much use is made of Simplicius' commentary on the Praedicamenta.

Dr. Ypma knows all the manuscripts listed in Glorieux and in Zumkeller, and bases this edition on Paris BN lat. 15362, collating it with Florence BLaur. Plut. 17. sin. 2, and Naples BN VIII.E.44. Previously edited excerpts include Qdl. 1, q. 4, published by Grabmann in Acta hebdomadae Thomistae (Rome, 1924) pp. 162–76; Qdl. 1, q. 5, published by Benes in Divus Thomas 4 (1927) 334–46; and Qdl. 2, q. 17, published by Lottin, PM 4, 559–68. Quodlibeta 3 and 4 remain unpublished. We hope they will appear shortly.

Leonard Bowman


A fascinating and important insight, the mutual relations of Christianity and Islam, is developed in this little volume. The subject matter is presented in four parts: the Islamic religion, the Muslim expansion, the
Christian reaction, and the modern period. Six interesting genealogical and dynastic tables and a handy twenty-two-page chronology of relevant events in the histories of Christianity and Islam are provided in appendices. Subject and name indices conclude the volume.

We have histories of Islam, of European knowledge of Islam, of Christian attitudes towards Islam, of the mutual relation of Christian and Muslim theology. The precise topic of the relations of the two religious groups has not hitherto been taken up. It scarcely needs to be added that none of these subjects has yet been given final treatment. In its brief compass the present volume is necessarily selective and highlights points of particular interest to French and Oriental Christian readers. Throughout the book the constant awareness of the exact Christian group, Catholic or Orthodox, encountered by the Muslims is pleasantly striking. The vagaries of transliteration are not missing, e.g., Kindi (p. 76) but Kindy (pp. 130 and 132). The familiar “There is no God but Allah” appears in two strange forms: “There is no Allah but Allah” (p. 25) and “There is no God but God” (p. 73). This is not the book through which to make a first acquaintance with Islam. The density of the treatment precludes the author’s justifying his particular choice of opinions.

Joseph A. Devenny, S.J.


The series The Church in History presents a general survey of Church history for use by laymen. The emphasis is upon history and not theology; accordingly, only the most passing references are made to doctrinal formulations. Volz’s book is smooth reading, although his treatment of the late medieval period is rather skimpy. He is especially lucid on the investiture controversy. His chapters on Church-state relations and on relations with the Eastern Church are the best. Besides the well-chosen appendices of original documents (in both volumes), V. is particularly talented in selecting interesting and relevant passages for quotation in the text.

The volume by Dannenfeldt is somewhat less successful. Its relative lack of cohesiveness is due in part to the characteristics of his subject. Because the series does not concentrate on intellectual or theological developments, a lay reader of this volume would find it very difficult to discover reasons for either the Protestant or the Catholic Reformations. Dannenfeldt concentrates on the reforming decisions affecting worship and church polity. His very brief treatment of the Renaissance does not really set the context for the Reformations, and his short chapter on the Catholic Reformation leaves the false impression that the Council of Trent was a purely defensive reassertion of old truth.

John R. Loeschen


This excellent and thorough study of Luther’s own way of preaching Christ eschews an approach through Lutheran tradition or contemporary Christological concerns, and chooses instead a patient inductive examination of texts. It follows the order of the history of Christ, proceeding from Luther’s views on the scriptural witnesses to Christ to an examination of
His prophetic office, the knowledge of God in Christ, the atonement, His kingship, the question of "very God and very man," and finally some of Luther's favorite images of Christ. A brief epilogue insists that Luther was preacher, not theologian, and suggests that in a sense it is questionable whether Luther "has a Christology at all." Despite his insistence on letting Luther speak for himself (the "Register of Luther Citations" runs to thirty-nine pages), S. is thoroughly familiar with the secondary literature, and on occasion disagrees with some well-known interpreters. His impressive knowledge of Luther's own writings requires that these differences and his beautiful work be taken seriously.

Thomas E. Clarke, S.J.


A change in the language of public worship can be a paradigm of a change in an age's religious style, sensibility, and values. Language in Worship spells out a number of the connections that exist between the language of public worship and the religious temper of an age. S.'s primary focus is on the world of sixteenth-century belief, which formed the Book of Common Prayer, and on the world of twentieth-century belief, which is trying to form its own models for private and public prayer. In trying to develop the models and the language for a contemporary style of public prayer, the churches must face squarely the problems of form and formlessness in prayer, of the theological and anthropological perspectives affirmed by old and new styles of prayer, and of the relation between the forms of private prayer and of public prayer. This volume gives a clear, concise, and balanced presentation of these problems and offers viable guidelines for dealing with them. There is a keen sensitivity to contemporary religious insights and to the variety and riches of the Christian tradition of public prayer. There is also a clear awareness that both contemporary insights and the tradition of public worship do have points of weakness and are capable of more adequate expression. Development of a contemporary style of public worship governed by the kind of critical sensitivity shown in this book could bring about liturgical forms which are properly expressive of this age's religious insights and which exhibit due reverence for the authentic values which have found expression in the traditional forms and language of Christian public worship.

Philip J. Rossi, S.J.


Prof. Sellers attempts to restore the idea of moral action to the status of a public reality, to point up the need for the new discipline of public ethics, and to restate the role of theology and theological ethics in our society. He sees the moral crisis in the Western world arising from extrinsic space. Deliverance from the crisis is to be realized by gaining the initiative and capacity to dispose of one's space. American space has not been fully organized as yet. However, the industrial sector has become such that it rules while the state tempers its power. Americans need new agencies to arrest, temper, and criticize the corporate imperium. In order to form these agencies and free space from extrinsic control, Americans need willed commitment, willed initiative, and the ability to make decisions with the commonwealth in view. S. holds that
"agape" is not as basic a category as "gospel" understood as a response to contemporary predicaments in the greater community. The moral tradition of this greater community is supposed to supply us materials for making new rules that take into account the unfolding promises of the community. Christian theology should study the moral tradition and identify those elements which express the gospel.

The book is uneven in organization and, despite fine insights here and there, does not provide an adequate theory or program for the development of a public ethics.

Thomas M. Garrett


Published in 1969, this volume contains six essays and discussions from a colloquium held at Notre Dame in 1967. It witnesses to the rapidity with which seemingly crucial questions can become remote and almost obsolescent. It is a tribute to the twenty-five distinguished participants that they almost unanimously refused to speak as partisans of "Christian secularity," and that they honestly acknowledged that they were not quite sure of the meaning of this and other jargon terms. Though the particular discussion has now been largely transcended, students of the more recent theologies of hope, the future, and revolution can profit from these essays of Martin Marty, W. C. Smith, Bernard Cooke, Louis Dupré, Theodore Runyon, and Edward Schillebeeckx, and from the related discussions.

Thomas E. Clarke, S.J.


A translation of Maréchalian texts previously unavailable in English, consisting of excerpts from Le point de départ de la métaphysique and M.'s two classic articles on abstraction and intellectual dynamism which are required for a proper understanding of his major work. The merit of this valuable book lies in its judicious selection of texts and the expository comments which introduce them and link them together. This is undoubtedly the best presentation of M. available in English. His long, difficult, often needlessly involved work has been pruned to manageable size and greatly clarified by the editing of America's leading Maréchalian expert, aided by a number of leading European Maréchalians.

The philosophical and theological movement associated with M. has moved beyond the problematic and, in some respects, beyond the method of its founder. Coreth, Rahner, and Lonergan are all Maréchalians with a difference. For a proper appreciation of their diversity as well as their unity in a common tradition, a solid understanding of M. is indispensable. Unfortunately for many English-speaking students, the texts required for such an understanding were inaccessible in translation. Thanks to D., they are at last within the student's reach. Furthermore, even the student for whom the original text presents no difficulty will be helped in his mastery of a very difficult work by D.'s lucid exposition of the structure and progress of its argument.

Gerald A. McCool, S.J.


A superb, remarkably even anthology on contemporary explorations in
natural theology, with essays by Emil Fackenheim, Gordon Kaufman, Harvey Cox, Charles Hartshorne, and Richardson. Less known but stimulating contributors are Michael Murphy of the Esslen Institute, Donald Schon, and Robert Bellah. Self-process in a multidimensional reality emerges as the key to the contemporary experience of transcendence in a series of rich essays. Huston Smith suggests a neo-"negative theology" which aims "to make room for Transcendence if it shows a disposition to enter through extrarational channels" by showing that in modern epistemologies reason is limited to certain ranges of reality to which it is appropriate. Murphy and Keen both stress the repressed and censored aspects of self revealed in psychodynamics as clues to a definition of man that includes transcendence. Richardson describes the Judeo-Christian themes of Exodus, Exile, and Passion-Resurrection as "conflict and vindication" myths. Pointing out that "to win identity through conflict means that one is dependent on conflict to sustain identity," R. suggests myths of "integrity and transformation" (e.g., Stanley Kubrick's 2001: A Space Odyssey) might provide more inclusive symbols of self-understanding.

The outstanding essay of the collection is Schon's "The Loss of the Stable Self." Although his language is suggestive ("I have believed for as long as I can remember in an afterlife within my own life—a calm stable state to be reached after a time of trouble...Being Grown Up...the Stable Self"), S.'s achievement is to deal explicitly and practically with the problems implicit in a process view of man. Among other threads in the collection, Murphy, Bellah, Richardson, Keen, and Cox articulate a mysticism in which symbols are integral issues of a natural process. Bellah quotes Wallace Stevens: "The poem is the cry of the occasion, part of the res itself and not about it." Smith and Richardson offer brief but excitingly precise analyses of mystical experience, and Kaufman of the origin of God-talk. Smith opens the way for "ontological transcendence," and Hartshorne gives a summary of his formal analysis of divine absoluteness and relativity.

Andrew Christiansen, S.J.

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