BOOK REVIEWS


First published in 1956 shortly after the author’s death, this volume presents examples of Jewish apologetic writing in narrative, poetry, letters, and record of debate from the early centuries of the Christian era up to the seventeenth century. Not only did Rankin seek to provide translations of important texts which had not been available in English; he also hoped to restore a balance by bringing to light Jewish reactions to pagan and Christian attacks. The attempt to date the Chronicle of Moses no later than the second century A.D. and to interpret it in the light of rising anti-Semitic feeling in Hellenistic cities on the grounds of its many parallels with Josephus and Philo, its silence concerning Christianity, and its apologetic elements (emphasis on God’s providence and divine retribution, the picture of Moses as a military leader, etc.), is not convincing; the criteria employed are simply not sufficiently sharp and precise to warrant the conclusion.

Far more relevant and fascinating is the fifteenth-century Memoir of the Book of Nizzachon of Rabbi Lipmann, which presents in poetic form Jewish responses to the Christian doctrines of the Trinity, the atonement, the Church as the heir of Israel, and Jesus’ Messiahship, as well as a spirited defense of the Jewish practice of accepting interest in lending money to Gentiles. Equally intriguing is the seventeenth-century correspondence between J. S. Rittangel and a Sephardic Jew of Amsterdam, which begins with a learned discussion concerning the proper exegesis of Gn 49:10 and degenerates into a fiery exchange of insults. Nachman’s (also known as Nachmanides and Ramban) account of his disputation with the Dominican Fra Paolo held at Barcelona in 1263 illustrates the Jewish interpretation of the “messianic” passages of the OT and brings out the major exegetical differences between Judaism and Christianity at that time. This is a collection of special interest to historians of exegesis and those engaged in Jewish-Christian dialogue. With the possible exception of the Chronicle of Moses, the selections have been well chosen; the translations are lively; the introductory and explanatory remarks are concise and serve to highlight the major issues involved in the texts.

Weston College  

Daniel J. Harrington, S.J.

Dr. Young, an Australian theologian from the University of Melbourne, begins this stimulating little work by proposing to examine Bultmann’s demythologizing project and biblical interpretation from his view of history. The choice of this perspective affords Y. the opportunity to do a good job in presenting a coherent and well-ordered description of Bultmann’s thought.

Y. moves with ease through his opening comments on Bultmann’s distinctions between Natur and Geschichte, his own peculiar distinction of historisch and geschichtlich, and the central significance of the constitution of human existence, personal history, as Geschichtlichkeit. Turning to the problem of hermeneutics, the author rightly emphasizes that for Bultmann this is not only a basic question for biblical interpretation “but of theological method as a whole” (p. 39). The difficulty of asking the right questions in hermeneutics, based upon the possibility of preunderstanding, must lead to Bultmann’s “putting of the question” of human existence. Y. points out that Bultmann has suffered misunderstanding in this matter: the “preunderstanding” is not to be understood as a positive natural revelation. Y. follows Macquarrie’s presentation of Bultmann’s reliance upon Heidegger’s thought, emphasizing the congeniality of Heidegger to Bultmann’s view of history.

In a succinct manner Y. presents the demythologizing project and the oft-repeated challenge that Bultmann is substituting anthropology for theology. And he reminds us that Bultmann’s reference to the historicity of God’s act and man’s response as reciprocally related “is because of his view of history rather than any overt humanist tendencies” (p. 67).

Bultmann’s rejection of Heilsgeschichte provides a setting for presenting his understanding of the revelation of God within history: decisive history is that which everyone experiences in himself. This then is each man’s reading of Christ as the eschatological event, a method that must lead to the problem of excluding some NT material. Y. parts company with his master when he says: “Present existence may be effectively challenged when the past is recited; Bultmann’s recognition of the kerygmatic rather than the historisch nature of the Gospels should have enabled him to see that” (p. 83).

Y. proceeds to a discussion of God’s act in Christ as the decisive eschatological event. Again, he is rightly dissatisfied with Bultmann’s relegation of NT material as “peripheral themes” when they do not cohere with his hermeneutical approach. Bultmann’s views have long suffered criticism from the fact that they seem to leave no ground for emphasizing God’s act in history, for a historical grounding of
Christ's cross and resurrection, and, on the other hand, from left-wing critics who feel existentialist theology is destroyed when one speaks in any way about an act of God in history. Y. feels that this classical dilemma in Bultmann demonstrates inconsistency only if he is held strictly to his earlier broad definition of "myth" (p. 112).

In the concluding essay, Y. turns to man and his existence, and to the questions that revolve about inauthentic and authentic existence. Bultmann's insistent interpretation of the futurity of the eschaton as really lying in present decision effectively denies an event in future world history. Y. recognizes Karl Löwith's criticism on this point and writes that it "does point to an incongruity in the way Bultmann deals with past and future events, for whereas Bultmann affirms that there is an indispensable occurrence in the past which, through preaching, becomes of decisive importance for the present, he makes no equivalent affirmation about a world-historical event in the future.... Bultmann holds that the kerygma would be destroyed if reference to God's past act in Christ were removed, but not when the reference to the future fulfillment is eliminated" (p. 143).

Y. has written a clear and readable presentation of Bultmann. The work says little that would be new to the NT scholar, but it is a useful presentation for those working in the philosophy and theology of history. Y. is aware and respectful of the significance of the arguments of the expositors in evaluating the Bultmann project—something not always found among the dogmatic theologians. The notes and index enhance the value of the book for the theologian.

St. Joseph's Seminary, Yonkers, N.Y. JAMES M. CONNOLLY


The ancients assigned to John the Evangelist a number of disciples representing a wide spectrum of views: from Papias the staunch conservative (as later conceived) to Leucius the Gnostic heresiarch (as later conceived). The fourth Gospel itself was rejected by Caius the Roman presbyter at the same time it was being defended by Irenaeus of Lyons. The ambiguous position of John in the second century was, however, readily forgotten by a Church which wisely and correctly judged the value of the Johannine writings. A joyous, peaceful acceptance of "John" characterized Christian theology from the third to the nineteenth centuries. Controversy reared its head again with the beginnings of Higher Criticism. The distinctive quality of the fourth Gospel called for a reassessment. For the most part, this first concerned itself with the
question of authenticity, an inevitable cul-de-sac. In the past forty years, however, it has centered on the form, purpose, and theology of the Gospel—far more rewarding avenues of approach. These aspects of study, nevertheless, necessarily involve a judgment as to the Gospel’s historicity, and some exegetes feel compelled to equate historicity with authenticity. As a consequence, we find today the same wide spectrum of opinion with regard to John which characterized the second century. All true disciples of John, however, recognize the complexity of their master’s thought and expression and, accordingly, they take for granted a consequent diversity in the interpretation of his writings. Dr. Morris need not fear, as his preface indicates he does, that “critical Protestant and Roman Catholic scholars” will turn a deaf ear to him even if they must disagree with him au fond.

Almost half this book is given over to the question of authorship. M. lays great stress on what appear to him to be positive signs of eyewitness reporting. This reliance on “vivid narrative” as confirmation of apostolic authorship must, at best, be viewed as a risky measure; for it passes over the simple fact that any good writer of fiction produces vivid narrative and recognizably real people, and he does this by supplying just those details which strike the reader as authentic. M. cannot believe, e.g., that John’s frequent references to time have any other purpose beyond indicating that “the author had been there and remembered when things took place” (p. 140). But this is a matter of opinion and others take quite a different view of John’s use of time in the Gospel (cf. NTS 13 [1966-67] 285-90).

Most exegetes today feel that the identity of the Evangelist is really unimportant. Few, I think, would want to argue strongly against the hypothesis that he was a disciple, or a disciple of a disciple, of the Lord, because what he has left us is seen as something more, and much richer, than a series of personal recollections. But this is precisely where M. parts company with the majority of modern Johannine commentators. In chap. 2, “History and Theology in the Fourth Gospel,” he takes the stand that this Gospel stands or falls on its historicity. He insists that the question be pressed: “what is the theological meaning of something that never happened?” (p. 124). Surely this is not a difficult question to answer. Would, e.g., the Cana episode in Jn 2:1-11 cease to have any theological meaning if it were to be proven the creation of John’s fertile imagination? Is it simply a story, true or false, about the changing of water into wine? Is it not primarily a declaration that in the person of Jesus the messianic hopes of Israel (and, perhaps, the religious ideals of the Gentile world) had been fulfilled and that a new age had been inaugurated? As a story, it would continue to mean
this even if we should discover the Evangelist’s work sheets, with a marginal note to the effect that the incident never did happen. The truth behind the “incident” is not affected, because Jesus did begin His public ministry at some point in time and the Evangelist could draw on a wealth of traditional biblical imagery (the messianic banquet, the banquet of Wisdom, the extraordinary abundance of wine) with which to say this. Of course, the story may be based on other “facts” as well, but they are overshadowed by the theological meaning of the borrowed imagery.

M., I know, would reply by saying, as he does (pp. 67–68), that “little evidence” can be found for the existence, in antiquity, of a type of literature which manufactured incidents in order to make theological points. But this is a misleading statement, as he ought well to know. What else are the Jewish midrashim and what else the dialogues of Plato? But quite apart from the question of relevant literary parallels, there is the fact that the Gospels are a genre of their own and have an aim which is incontrovertibly more theological than historical.

M. has performed a service in presenting a forthright and readable defense of the conservative evangelical position. He is very aware of opposing views and meets them head on. His own vigorous approach to the fourth Gospel serves to bring out in relief, for those who read Jn differently, the reasons why they do not share it.

St. Michael’s College, Univ. of Toronto

J. Edgar Bruns


Hans Freiherr von Campenhausen, recently retired as professor of ecclesiastical history at the University of Heidelberg, has devoted his life to the study of the early Church, but in all his works he has had his pulse on the problems of the twentieth century. He deals with men and events removed from us by more than fifteen hundred years, but he writes about the past with a freshness born of contemporary experience. He is not only a scholar of the Christian past but a participant in the drama he records. His life spans the end of the nineteenth century (he was born in 1903), World War I, the years of the Third Reich, World War II, the modern division of Germany, the postwar years of recovery and the new developments in German theology, and the tumult and uncertainty of the 1960’s. The essays in this volume have a peculiarly contemporary ring: “Tradition and Spirit in Early Christianity,” “Faith and Culture in the New Testament,” “The Historical Prob-
problem of the Resurrection of Jesus,” “Order in the New Testament,” “Christians and Military Service in the Early Church,” “Augustine and the Fall of Rome,” and “The Ascetic Idea of Exile.” The essays stem from different periods in C.’s life, but they all reflect in various ways the problems of a modern Christian thinker who is trying to understand the meaning of the historical experience of Christianity.

Two convictions run through the essays. Christians do not live in a timeless world. The Christian experience has been marked by change and variety since the very beginning, and on most difficult questions the Christian tradition offers no final and definitive answers to the new problems Christians face in every age. Christians, e.g., “have no definite political or social order to proclaim” (p. 157), but this does not mean they have nothing to contribute to society. “Christians cannot act as if their faith puts them into possession of a whole store of social and political knowledge, upon which they can draw and pass on to the world” (p. 158). On the other hand, C. believes in the permanent validity of the primitive Christian witness for Christian life and thinking. “Christianity is a faith based on a complete definitive revelation for this world, the revelation, in fact, of the truth and justice of God for this world, the revelation given in Christ. It is and remains, therefore, a religion of the past and of a tradition that is always valid and cannot be superseded by anything else” (pp. 9–10).

The essays show how Christian attitudes toward culture, toward asceticism, toward society were quite unformed at the beginning, and how in the course of generations, and in some cases centuries, Christian attitudes took shape as Christians lived out their experiences and thought about their meaning. He illustrates how early Christianity had an asceticism about wealth, but not of food, while recognizing that at a later stage Christians introduced an asceticism of food. At the beginning, indeed up until 175 A.D., Christians refused to enter the army, but as the Church and the Empire became one, almost the reverse principle was applied. In 416 Theodosius proclaimed that only Christians were to be admitted into the army; two centuries later Emperor Phocas had to be dissuaded from his opinion that all soldiers who met a heroic death in battle should be honored as martyrs. “From this it was but a step to the idea of the crusade, a holy war on behalf of the Christian Church” (p. 168).

The most important essay is on the historical problem of Jesus’ resurrection. Originally published in the Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften in 1952, the essay marks the beginning of a renewed interest in the resurrection and an attempt to criticize the
reigning assumption in German (and American) theology that the resurrection of Jesus is not a suitable topic for historical investigation. C. is interested, not chiefly in the traditions about the resurrection, but in the source of these traditions. What lies behind the traditions embedded in the NT? What really happened? "The Easter narratives have, in the past generation, as indeed always, been studied scientifically, and the general progress in the study of primitive Christianity has naturally furthered this work. Yet it seems to be that, with all the various researches into literary history, history of tradition, motive-history and form history, there has been undue neglect of the inquiry into history pure and simple, that is, the inquiry into the historical core of that to which tradition gives its historical testimony. Interest in these types of approach to the Easter event threatens to smother the event itself. But the philological work that necessarily has the first word in assessing the sources must not lead us to hold as secondary the strictly historical inquiry into what took place, the actual sequence of events and their interconnection, nor to relegate it to the fringe as crude and commonplace. Our legitimately critical attitude...does not ...absolve us...from the task of posing anew and answering the question the historian is bound to face; that is, of deciding how far and with what degree of probability the actual events and their sequence can still be ascertained" (p. 42). It is a mark, I believe, of the narrowness of much biblical scholarship that a Church historian has to invade the domain of the NT scholar to deal with the questions exegetes either overlook or avoid. But perhaps this is no invasion of a foreign territory. After all, the NT, lest we forget, is simply the first stage in the history of Christianity.

*Fordham University*  
ROBERT L. WILKEN


The Second Vatican Council speaks of the esteem with which the Church looks upon the Moslems, whose religion is similar to Christianity in the worship of one God, obedience to His will, reverence for Jesus and Mary, pursuit of moral perfection. The Synod asks us to forget the mutual hostilities of the past and look forward to a new era of understanding. In view of this advice, one might wonder about the value of this book by K., which presents the writings of authors who had no esteem for the doctrines of Islam and were often imbued with a polem-
ical spirit. Despite this, they do point out fundamental doctrines of Islam not acceptable to Christians, and sound ecumenism must recognize the fact.

The Introduction narrates the history of Mohammed's early relations with Christians (Nestorians, Monophysites, Melkites) and Jews, explaining the reasons for his change from friendly tolerance to military suppression. The texts selected for analysis in the body of the book are limited to the principal Greek editions of authors from the eighth to the sixteenth century who concentrate on the doctrinal aspects of Islam.

The opening text is from the "Book of Heresies" contained in St. John Damascene's "Font of Wisdom." D. considers the religion of the Ishmaelites as false because he finds no proof of a divine mission by Mohammed and no credible witnesses for the claims made about the origin of the Koran. When this book denies the divinity of Christ, it contradicts not only Scripture but its own witness to Him as the "word and spirit of God." The legends, the ritual prescriptions, and above all the legislation on marriage contained in the Koran discredit it. The author of "A Controversy between a Sarrasin and a Christian" is uncertain. Here the problem of evil is debated, the Sarrasin putting it under the absolute will of God, while the Christian explains the freedom of man's will and his responsibility for punishment under God's tolerance. The Moslem difficulty against the divinity of Christ from His creatural aspects is resolved by declaring the meaning of the Incarnation. Selections from the writings of Theodore Abuqurra, Melkite Bishop of Harran and controversialist, add the use of logic and philosophy to the controversy. The "reasonableness" of the Trinity is seen in the consubstantiality of God's knowledge personalized in the Son and the richness of God's royalty personalized in the Holy Spirit. The divinity of Christ can be understood from the nature of God as King, whose eternal commandment demands a coequal Son. On the other hand, the "unreasonableness" of the Sarrasin's claims for Islam, based on the evolution of religions, the inheritance of faith, and the satisfaction of man's nature, is evident from their irrelevance to the criteria of truth, revelation, and moral goodness.

The longest text is the "Refutation of the Koran" by Nicetas the Byzantine. This is an example of the violent polemicism of the age, but also of the highly developed philosophical scholastic theology which originated in the East. N. treats in detail some seventeen of the surahs in the Koran. The doctrinal points on the nature of God, the Trinity, and the divinity of Christ defend the Christian faith by explaining the philosophical concept of the analogy of being and the distinctions of relation, nature, and hypostasis. The apologetic and moral aspects of
the Koran are rejected as fables, psychopathic delusion, and moral depravity. Other shorter texts in the book reflect the influence of their predecessors. The same themes are repeated, emphasizing the Koran's lack of authentic proofs of revelation, falsification of the Bible, fatalism, and moral imperfection. The authors, in general, feel that they have convincingly overcome all the objections and defenses of their Moslem adversaries. Certainly a different approach to Islam is required today, but many of the insights contained in these texts provide a valuable background for any rapprochement.

Boston College

JAMES L. MONKS, S.J.


Dr. Baldwin needs no introduction as a medievalist and Church historian, nor does the editor (Raymond H. Schmandt) of the series for which he writes. This account of Alexander III in relation to his age, showing B.'s command of twelfth-century sources and the best of European scholarship concerning the papacy, is of real service to those who read largely or only in English. Before this study, such a reader could rely only on H. Mann's long outdated Lives of the Popes (Vol. 10), with all the limitations of that work. As the third volume of a much-needed series, this book fulfills its part in the plan conceived by Schmandt to make "really significant popes" known "outside scholarly circles," to make these popes better and more accurately "understood by professional historians," and to remedy the distortions concerning the popes which both apologists for and critics of the papacy have created.

The book is chiefly concerned with Alexander's struggles with Frederick Barbarossa, who supported an antipope for seventeen of Alexander's twenty-two-year reign; with his struggles with Henry II over the Becket affair; and with his effective development of papal administration, especially through his great legal competence. The Third Lateran Council was in some ways the culmination of his reign as the first of the great lawyer-popes after the revival of canon law. Although the study is unified around these three major topics, many of the typical concerns and people of the twelfth century are woven in skillfully, such as John of Salisbury, Louis VII of France, Manuel Comnenus and the problems of the Byzantine Empire, and a Jewish community that lived under Alexander's protection in Rome.

This is a businesslike study, much concerned with details of action, and yet from it emerges a clear and realistic portrait of the man who
had one of the longest pontificates in history (1159-81). When one comes to B.'s excellent concluding chapter, one finds that the balanced, discerning analyses which he has been making throughout the study concerning Alexander's motives, character, and policies have been building coherently to his final synthesis. B.'s delineation of a man with scholarly prudence, fortitude, patience, flexibility, moderation, and enduring strength is convincing. One agrees with him that Alexander was not a creative innovator nor a commanding personality like Bernard whom he canonized, nor Becket who felt less than fully supported by him, but that he was another type of medieval ecclesiastic who, though less celebrated, also helped to build the Church.

B. attempts a simple style to meet a broad audience; his scholarly apparatus, though kept to a minimum for the series in which it appears, is very solid and can lead those who wish to deeper studies. His maps are clear and directly related to the text.

In view of the fruitfulness of the strong historical orientations in theology today, studies like the present one, not of the papacy in the abstract, but of a pope engaged in working out his part in the economy of salvation, are especially welcome. Theology students will be interested in B.'s account of the Third Lateran Council. They will find valuable his judicious comments on Alexander's concept of Church vis-à-vis Empire, of pope vis-à-vis emperor. In the light of the constant tendency even of scholars to oversimplify the Church-state polarization of the High Middle Ages, it is refreshing to find the balanced estimate of Alexander that he was "somewhat outside the line of development which led from Gregory VII to Innocent III.... He has...even been regarded as 'weak' in comparison with other more outspoken incumbents of the papal office." B.'s comments on this position give valuable insight on Alexander and the men of his times: "Alexander acted not only as a skillful diplomat, but according to his training as a scholar and lawyer. As a canonist of the mid-twelfth century, he shared the hesitations such men were currently evincing in their thinking about the relation of religious to secular authority" (p. 151).

Rosemont College, Pa. Caritas McCarthy, S.H.C.J.


This book, originally published in Tübingen in 1948, has long awaited an English rendering. It may be wondered whether, in the long run, it should not have been left that way. It was written long before 1948 but repeatedly denied publication by Nazi censors. On
reading it, one may occasionally ask himself why, unless these barbarians were also the complete maniacs that Richard Rubenstein has rather convincingly shown them to be. Early on we hear of “the Jews’ usurious practices,” “the spirit of profiteering and the murderous plans of the Jews,” and we are invited to distinguish between the Israel of promise and the “Judaism upon whom God’s curse” lies, this Judaism which has “polluted” the OT with “worthless rabbinical propositions.” And so forth and so on. Martin Luther’s anti-Semitism is not the topic of this book and certainly ought not to be dealt with as an isolated phenomenon: Luther was no more and no less bigoted than the generality of his Christian contemporaries. But the phrases we have just put in inverted commas are commentary on, rather than direct citation of, Luther’s words, and it is sometimes difficult to decide whether they are intended to reflect merely the master’s thought about these “children of the devil” or to include his hagiographer’s judgment as well. Now that the Reichsschrifttumskammerführer is no more, at least this point might have been clarified to make the reviewer’s task easier.

As has many another Roman Catholic, this reviewer has come late to an appreciation of Luther’s religious genius. He has not had this hard-won appreciation enhanced by reading this volume. It is not that the work itself is a bad job. On the contrary, it is thorough, workmanlike, and entirely scholarly. It is rather that the Alttestamentler Luther here capably revealed has little if anything about him that distinguishes him from his contemporaries or that retains a present value. This is a conclusion which, right or wrong, has been reluctantly arrived at, and it is all the more surprising when one reflects on the fact, pointed out more than once by Bornkamm, that Luther devoted most of his thirty-two years of lecturing to the OT (only three or four years to the NT) and that while his NT translation was done in a quiet three months his preoccupation with the OT extended over twelve years.

In his understanding of “the relation of Judaism to the OT,” “the OT as mirror of life,” and “the God of the OT,” Luther’s thoughts, despite B.’s efforts to make much of them, rarely transcend the commonplace. Certainly they hardly transcend the limitations of his time, as indeed it would be unfair to expect of them. They reveal a sturdy, literalistic piety, spiked with robust peasant humor; but of course there was more to Luther than that. B. has made no attempt to indicate any change of attitude towards the OT involved with Luther’s movement away from Rome to the Reformation, and apparently there was none.

Somewhat more rewarding is the central chapter that accounts for nearly half the book, dealing with Luther’s concept of the OT as word of God. Luther found his law and gospel opposition present in the OT
as well as the NT; rejection of the OT and its promises would reduce the NT to law. He tried, not entirely successfully, to do away with allegory in favor of history and the literal sense. Withal, his "political" interpretation of the Song of Songs could hardly be called less allegorical than that of Judaism and of the Fathers. Despite his best intentions, he was not always the "economical allegorist" he set out to be. For Luther, "faith rests upon history," B. insists. If this was the intention, doubtless we ought to accept it at face value and ignore the result. It was not entirely Luther's fault that he had to depend on typology and a pseudo history to link OT with NT.

The chapter on Luther's "Christian" translation of the OT (following the precedent of the Vulgate) is interesting, but hardly can be the help to the modern biblical translator that the author seemingly imagines it to be. It does, however, raise the pointed question of the legitimacy of the Christian use of the OT—a far larger question, as it happens, than that of interpretative translation.

The translation has been capably done; it has resulted in an entirely readable English. Surely, however, everyone by now, however innocent of German, knows what word it is that is rendered "salvation history" in English. Anfechtung is something else, to be sure. Still, it need not have been parenthesized after every occurrence in translation, especially since a prefatory note is supposed to have taken care of the matter.

DePaul University  


The Strasbourg reformation has been overshadowed by that of Zurich, Wittenberg, and Geneva. To students of Reformation theology, Bucer is but a name; they know not his teaching. With gratitude to Dr. Stephens, that lamentable lacuna may now be filled. S. limits his study to the role of the Holy Spirit in the over-all context of Bucer's theology, but in accomplishing this he has also given us B.'s theology in capsular form. Like Luther, B. did not author any systematic treatises, so S.'s investigation covers B.'s writings from the earliest to the latest, making generous use of the commentaries, along with the controversial works, pastoral writings, and personal letters. S. chose to keep to Bucer, and this he does; if comparisons are made with Luther or Zwingli, it is because they arise spontaneously from the context, but they always remain secondary to S.'s main point. Too, it was not S.'s
intention to investigate the sources of B.'s thought, nor to delineate B.'s influence on other members of the Reformation.

The monograph is divided into two parts. The first treats the Spirit in relationship to salvation: here we have B.'s opinions on the Spirit's role in predestination, vocation, justification, sanctification, and glorification. In the second part we have the Spirit's relationship to the Word, i.e., to Christ as Incarnate Word, Bible as written Word, Church, magistrate, and minister as servants of the Word, and finally the sacraments as the visible Word.

B.'s theology takes its shape and form from his doctrine on predestination. Salvation is seen from this one point of view, so that it is God's work from first to last, and always dependent on His grace. The Spirit is the mark of the elect, not because they possess the gifts of the Spirit—indeed, the reprobate may also possess these gifts—but because they possess the fruits of the Spirit. The reprobate also hear the Word, and may be intellectually convinced of its truth, but lacking the Spirit's fruits they are unable to embrace it. If there be ambiguity in B.'s teaching, and there is, it is because of his attempt to bring the ambiguities of Scripture into a single pattern. Vocation follows upon predestination and is primarily the work of the Spirit in attracting and illuminating the elect to respond in faith and love to the Word. Justification is twofold: it is the imputation as well as the imparting of righteousness, i.e., a man is transformed not only in the sight of God but also in the sight of men. True, B. does at times speak of a threefold justification, but he more commonly describes it as twofold. Regarding the Bible, its authority comes from the Spirit who inspired it, wrote it, and interprets it, and only those possessing the Spirit understand it. Nowhere does B. discuss the nature of this inspiration. The Bible alone is the criterion by which all things are to be judged; even the Fathers and the primitive Church are brought before this judgment of the Spirit. One would think that B. would have been hard pressed when he came to write in favor of infant baptism against the Anabaptists, but putting aside tradition, he managed with some difficulty, to be sure, to prove from Scripture that infant baptism is the will of God.

The ministers of the Church act as the instruments of the Spirit, and they do not preach on their own, nor do they simply announce remission of sins, but they themselves remit them. With reference to sacraments, B. initially opposed the idea that they were instruments of the gifts of God, thinking this would render them automatic. Later his accent changed and the sacraments become the instruments of God's gifts, not automatically, but by the power of the Holy Spirit.
We have only hinted at the variety of B.'s thought. At times he seems to hold the median position between Reformation teaching and his former beliefs. Too, one feels the influence B. must have had on Calvin, who lived with him during the time of his exile from Geneva. This is an excellent and welcome introduction to the teaching of Bucer.

**Baltimore**

**JOSEPH N. TYLENDIA, S.J.**


Commentaries on Pascal seem to fall naturally into relational patterns: Pascal and the Bible, Pascal and Port-Royal, Pascal and Kierkegaard, even Pascal and Ignatius Loyola. Now we have Pascal and theology. Prof. Miel has given us here a revised version of his dissertation, seeking to show that his subject deserves greater respect as a theologian than is generally accorded him. The pièce de résistance of his presentation is the little-known body of fragments left unpublished at their author's death, the so-called *Ecrits sur la grâce*. In this approach, M. is following cues from Broome, and especially Mesnard, who observed that "these writings on grace ... are little studied ... and are nevertheless one of the keys to Pascal's whole work."

In his introductory chapter, M. attempts to survey the entire history of grace and free will—an impossible task within the space at his disposal. His style is readable—a blessing in academic prose—but, if he proves anything, it is that Rondet's eighteen-chaptered work (ironically subtitled "A Brief History") cannot be condensed to sixty-five pages. Nor is there any hint of the need for a religious anthropology and a theology of sin as foundational to a theology of grace.

M. then moves on to analyze Pascal's major nonscientific works for their theological import. He places the *Ecrits* first, though scholars usually locate them between the *Provinciales* and the *Pensées*, i.e., late in Pascal's life. What M. does, in effect, is to cast both the *Provinciales* and the *Pensées* in the light of the *Ecrits* and thus to enhance Pascal's reputation as a theologian by a somewhat shaky procedure. M. is aware of this difficulty and uses his first appendix to open up the possibility—while admitting he has no clear-cut evidence—for an early date. His interest in the *Ecrits* spills over into the second appendix, where he provides several key passages in translation. These are very welcome, since the *Ecrits* are practically inaccessible today and have never been translated in their entirety. In fact, one wonders whether M. would not have done well to confine his study exclusively to these texts, which Mesnard thinks reveal an advance in theological perspective over the *Provinciales*. In them we see Pascal pondering the
Church’s teaching on grace as it evolved from Augustine to Trent—
theologizing, in the traditional sense, as nowhere else.

Mesnard’s view has much to recommend it, since the *Lettres provinciales* are unquestionably more polemical than theological. Their purpose, of course, was to awaken public concern for what the Jansenists considered a dangerous departure, led by the Jesuits, from the perennial moral teachings of the Church. Their over-all program embraced the typically Jansenist attempt to relocate love of God more centrally in the swirl of the slowly sterilizing controversy over sin and grace, and in the practice of the Christian virtues in the life of the faithful. What we need, therefore, is a careful study of the extent to which Pascal understood what the Jesuits actually taught.

In discussing the *Pensées*, M. minimizes their structure as an apologetic treatise. Lafuma’s reconstruction, now widely accepted, shows Pascal starting from man’s wretchedness without God, proceeding through the truth of the Jewish-Christian religion as established in the Scriptures, finally arriving at the point beyond which reason is powerless to lead: into the realm of faith. Here the heart responds to the invitation of God to submit to His will. This is the proper “reason of the heart” that the reason knows not. Thus emerges Pascal’s original *theologia cordis*, a distinction which loses some sharpness of focus in M.’s hands.

Uncomfortable as M. seems to be with traditional Catholic theological categories, he has succeeded in reminding us of Pascal’s importance in the history of Christian thought—a place that could be made even more secure by a thorough examination of the *Écrits sur la grâce*. M. has demonstrated his credentials for the job, and I hope he will undertake it. Meanwhile, I will sit and admire the striking use the publishers have made of the famous Bosquet engraving of Port-Royal, by reproducing it on the covers of this book—and wish the inside were more satisfying.

West Berlin

PHILIP M. STARK, S.J.


Why did other and more qualified critics than Charles Kingsley consider John Henry Newman to be an untrustworthy, or rather a “slippery,” wordsmith, even after 1864? This book provides a detailed explanation which casts new light on traits of Newman’s character and writings which have long puzzled his critical admirers.

The most important of the many issues touched upon concerns the interpretation of the last pamphlet (or chapter) of Newman’s *Apologia,*
called "General Answer to Mr. Kingsley" or "Position of My Mind since 1845." Here Newman attempted to show how the acceptance of the teaching authority of the Roman Catholic Church does not involve an abdication of reason or responsibility; in other words, that Catholics need not substitute obedience to Church authority for honest inquiry. John Coulson, in Newman: A Portrait Restored (London, 1965) pp. 49–52, has developed the thesis that Newman's emphasis in his chapter on the relatively tolerant policies which had characterized the magisterium in earlier centuries was an exercise in irony: on the obvious level it was a defense of the Church against Protestant detractions, whereas for Manning and others who knew the inside situation of the Church in the 1860's it was a plea to imitate their less repressive predecessors in Church office. Now Egner complements this thesis in a striking way by bringing out how Newman was at the same time a victim and even to a degree a practitioner of the arts of disingenuousness which crippled free speech in the Church. Egner calls the epistemological root of this weakness Cartesianism, and he succeeds in illustrating his point convincingly from Newman's writings. What he finds in the last chapter of the Apologia is not sovereign irony, but the half-smothered cry of distress of one who acknowledges, or at least will not dare to protest against, the legitimacy of the blows that are raining down upon him from ecclesiastical authority.

Where Egner is less convincing—as in the thesis that Newman's basic view of teaching authority in the Church stresses the separateness of hierarchy and laity more than their togetherness (p. 167), or in failing to allow for the profound development away from authoritarianism in Newman's later writings (signally in the Preface to the third edition of Via Media; cf. again John Coulson, "Newman on the Church, His Final View, Its Origins and Influence," in The Rediscovery of Newman: An Oxford Symposium [London, 1967] pp. 123 and 135–43)—he is so because he has concentrated too narrowly on but one segment of Newman's works. But these minor reservations do not detract from a very valuable contribution to the understanding of Newman and his times.

Boston College

Paul Misner


The problem of the one and the many is the most ancient preoccupation of philosophy and has never, since man began to reflect deeply, ceased to challenge philosophers, scientists, and theologians. Dr. Gray,
assistant professor of theology at Manhattan College, maintains with considerable plausibility that it was the main concern of Teilhard and is the key to a comprehension of the latter's many writings. A quest for unity is clearly a trait of Teilhard's thought; but this book represents the first systematic attempt to demonstrate that it is in fact the predominant theme of his evolutionary vision and spirituality.

The starting point of the evolving cosmos is pure multiplicity, which in Teilhard's esoteric terminology is equivalent to nonbeing. Creation is by no means to be restricted to a single divine act that occurred in the incalculable past; it is a continuous process of unification. The theory of creative union is proposed as Teilhard's fundamental insight, and everything else that is important in his works is related to it. By this procedure his thought is illuminated in striking fashion and is shown to be coherent; and we must remember that coherence is one of the criteria Teilhard himself consistently applied to test the correctness of a theory.

After a preliminary chapter which sets forth the idea of creative union as Teilhard's response to the question of the one and the many, other chapters deal more specifically with the relationship between matter and spirit, between individual persons and the community, and between creatures and God. The problem of evil is treated as a threat to unity. A final chapter turns to Teilhard's spiritual teaching and points out how it flows quite naturally from his general vision of unity.

The whole evolutionary process that began in a state of extreme multiplicity gradually passes through higher stages of union in pre-life, life, and man, to culminate at the pleroma in the union of all things in God, the goal of creation and the Omega Point of history. The primal energy of unification is love, unobservable in nonliving beings, distinguishable in various animal species, and functioning properly once the level of hominization has been attained. Yet purely human love is unable to unify the noosphere on a planetary scale, since it is limited to definite islands of unity (family, friendship, nation) and tends to exclude men who stand outside such circles. The activating power of universal love comes only from Omega, the cosmic Christ, head of collective mankind to be united in a single body. The divine activity, operating in creation, incarnation, and redemption, is the guaranty of ultimate success in the history of the universe and is the basis of Teilhard's optimism. Creative union includes redemptive union, and Teilhard's understanding of Christian spirituality is in the end a mysticism of union.

The reader who is acquainted with the bulk of the Teilhardian corpus may be somewhat surprised at the preponderant concentration
on the earlier period, from about 1916 to 1927, when *The Divine Milieu* appeared. Such selectivity is quite deliberate. The writings of these years, as G. points out, are indispensable for interpreting Teilhard. That is certainly true. He further contends that at that time Teilhard was more intent on exploring philosophical and theological themes than he was in most of his later works. Not all will concur in this estimate. At any rate, the religious perspective that marks Teilhard's evolutionary view is evident from the outset, and it never faded away.

Although much of the ground covered in this volume has been cultivated in previously published studies of Teilhard's thought, no other book undertakes an approach from the same angle. G. has made a valuable contribution to Teilhardiana.

*Marianette University*  
*Cyril Vollert, S.J.*


Thirty-six British and American writers under Richardson's direction have produced this small and attractively priced dictionary. The editor has standing not only in the area of apologetics and theology but also in the ranks of the Church of England, in which he occupies the post of Dean of York. Among his collaborators are Bishop B. C. Butler, Benedictines Placid Spearrit and Alberic Stäcpole, as well as a wide assortment of Protestant scholars. Thirteen of the authors wrote only one article each.

The emphasis in R.'s dictionary would be, according to his intentions, on the theological issues of today, but in some historical context. He means the "main thrust" of his dictionary to be towards the interlocking areas of philosophy and theology (Preface). The title list (things and persons) numbers about 800 items, including lemmas, which are numerous.

In all fairness it must be said that this is an addition to theological lexicography that ranks somewhere from mediocre to poor. The titles chosen needed editing and/or arrangement: there are uncalled-for Latinisms (e.g., Actus Purus, Imago Dei, Vestigia Trinitatis), recondite topics (e.g., Depravity), and omissions of titles obviously to be included in a dictionary of Christian theology (e.g., Jesus Christ). Long articles are given to some topics, short ones to others, but the length for each seems to have been capriciously measured, not according to a good lexicographical rule: length in proportion to the importance and complexity of the subject. Examples: one would expect a dictionary of
Christian theology to have more than 43 lines on the topic Theology (with no bibliography), when nearly adjacent to it lies an article of 250 lines on Teilhard de Chardin (with ample bibliography).

And since the subject of bibliography has been mentioned, one must note the painful deficiencies here. Some articles have long bibliographies, some have short ones, and some have none at all. Not only is bibliographical help inconsistently offered—the worst fault here being skimpy lists or no lists at all for important articles (e.g., Religion, Mediation)—but some of the best sources, recently published, are not mentioned. One feels from the evidence here that the editor simply gave up in a task that is always formidable: seeing that one's authors furnish adequate bibliography and, when they will not, supplying it.

The editor of a theological dictionary should know in general whether his articles are going to deal with words or the things signified by the words. His articles should not sometimes sound like grammar-school recitations or spelling-bee presentations, in which the subject is twice repeated before the definition or description is given. Tighter, more critical editing eliminates such flaws.

Standards are important for an editor to keep in mind for both the form and content of the articles placed before him. And there should be homogeneity of a sort among the articles in one dictionary. And the editor should have ambitions for his lexicon. The prospective reader of this dictionary has his fears aroused early that such will not be the case for the work that follows as he encounters an allusion in the Preface to "the magisterial Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church." For all its good points, the Oxford production should hardly be so qualified. If an editor is going to be in awe of such a short-entry reference work, he is not likely to have a sufficiently enlarged spirit to plan, allot, and edit what he must for his dictionary if he is to make a genuine contribution to the shelf of theological handbooks.

Aims too modest lead to a lack of editorial control that allows, among other things, too wide a variation in article structure. Thus, an article like that on St. Bernard of Clairvaux is allowed to slip through with two thirds of it a bibliographical study and listing and so be not at all representative of the structure of articles in the dictionary. Again, there is the article Liturgiology, for which R. would seem to be preparing us in the Preface: "Liturgiology, if it were to be adequately treated, would demand a dictionary at least as large as this one." Granted. And so the reader is mentally prepared for a significant article, albeit inadequate, on a theological topic designated in this way as important. Under the title, when he comes across it in the dictionary, he will be surprised to find only 2½ lines—duly signed, however.
As for another Preface promise, this time explicit, concerning the main thrust of this dictionary, it is simply not kept. The main thrust of this dictionary, indeed, is not the interlocking areas of philosophy and theology. Were the promise not in evidence, no amount of mere inductive energy expended on the study of the title profile or the allotment of space or the content of articles would lead a scholar to that conclusion.

But a book coming from a broadly interested theologian like Alan Richardson cannot be all bad. There are frequently brief, refreshing critiques by him that sum up pithily and justly what should be said about a question. His good sense is regularly evident in theological judgments. He has, moreover, seen to the ample treatment of many questions that have traditionally interested the Anglicans, and he has brought to the reader's attention a good number of recent Anglican publications that otherwise might have escaped one's notice. And the reverse side of the coin in the matter of his haphazard editorial control is that one discovers in his dictionary some lengthy essays on pertinent topics that should be treasured for themselves no matter where found and no matter how inharmoniously they relate to conjoined material, e.g., the article Benediction, Blessing.

University of Detroit

EARL A. WEIS, S.J.


This study of Gerhard Ebeling's hermeneutic fundamental theology illustrates how the hermeneutic circle can operate in a dialogue between contemporary theologians as well as in a contemporary interpreter's encounter with historically distant texts. Knauer analyzes Ebeling's Lutheran theology of responsible faith from a Catholic perspective, but at the same time sees a need to correct the traditional Catholic approach to the problem of faith from a Lutheran perspective. Because faith is concrete and worldly, responsible faith will always answer for its answer by relating it to the whole of human reality. But because faith is letting-oneself-be-grounded-outside-oneself, this apologetic dimension is inseparable from the faith experience itself: only faith "knows" the reality of God's self-communication to which it bears witness. The legitimacy of faith, however responsible, cannot be proved outside of faith. Only the illegitimacy of unbelief, which passes judgment on what it cannot possibly judge, can be proved. Catholic apologetics should content itself with showing the "incredifi-
bility” of unbelief and concentrate on committed witness to what faith alone can experience.

K.’s analysis of Ebeling’s own fundamental theology is, in general, quite perceptive. He correctly presents E.’s application of Luther’s law-gospel dialectic to the problem of natural theology: the word “God” points to man’s dependence as a creature on an absolute source of his own questionableness, unknown in itself, known only as that to which man’s “natural” reality is related. This is, in fact, God, expressing Himself in unconditional claims through man’s concrete reality; but man under the law, trying to respond to those claims, cannot know God in Himself. The Word of God as law is a word which conceals God, the “shadow” of the Word of God as gospel (in which God reveals Himself and not just His claims upon man). In Christ (and in contemporary Christian proclamation of Christ), God utters His proper Word, a Word in which He is personally present, a Word of grace. It is this Word, and this Word alone, which summons man to faith, liberates and grounds him, empowers him to exist as a true man and so “verifies” him that man himself is able to respond to the challenge of love and in turn “verify” human reality.

K.’s Catholic adaptation of Ebeling’s law-gospel dialectic is promising but inadequate. K. clears away a number of misunderstandings (both of E.’s positions and of Catholic dogma) and indicates a number of areas where contemporary Catholic theology has much to learn from E.’s Lutheran analysis. Two points of criticism occurred to me as I worked my way through the book. One is K.’s failure to incorporate the full significance of E.’s doctrine of law into his Catholic adaptation. Man as creature, man under the law, is, in K.’s adaptation, radically incomplete, radically incapable of entering into direct communion with God Himself. But the whole point of E.’s analysis of man’s existence under the law is that law is always lex accusans. The crushing experience of unavoidable personal guilt, of failing to fulfil unconditional ethical claims, of being doomed to a hopeless future, is precisely what makes man a “crumpled-up question mark,” a man-in-contradiction, a sinner who needs conversion and not just completion. This experience is what finally drives man to stop trying to set himself right and opens his ears to the gospel. K. does not seem to have worked this dimension of E.’s presentation into his Catholic presentation. Perhaps that is why K.’s argument for the “incredibility” of unbelief misses the mark. Why should a man bother enough about faith to resolutely reject what he is in no position to judge? The opposite of faith, like the opposite of human love, is indifference rather than resolute rejection.

The other point of criticism concerns K.’s much-emphasized theology of relation. As far as I understand the theory, a number of points seem
questionable or at least in need of further development. According to K., the real relation of a creature to God is identical with its reality. Hence, analysis of created reality yields knowledge that creation is really related to a real term, but no knowledge of the term itself. Conversely, since there is no real relation in God relating Him to creatures, God is not related to creatures at all and is, indeed, wholly unlike His creation. Apart from faith, being-a-creature means being simply incapable of communion with God; only the self-communication of the triune God—accepted in faith—permits man to enter into communion with God Himself. Three points seem particularly questionable in this theory. First, does it allow man, apart from faith, to make any existential predications about the God to whom (or to which) he is related? Second, can one argue from the absence of real relations in God to the conclusion that God as creator is totally unrelated to and wholly unlike His creation? Third, how is it possible for even God to communicate a share in His inner Trinitarian life to man, who, as creature, cannot know God in Himself and to whom God as creator is totally unrelated? If all created reality, natural or supernatural, is simply incapable of communion with God, and if God as creator is totally unrelated to all created reality, natural or supernatural, how can man ever hear the Word of love God chooses to speak to him? How could this Word ever reach man except through created realities (including the created humanity of Christ) which, in K.'s analysis, cannot establish communion with God and to which the Creator is totally unrelated?

*Saint Louis University*  

**Patrick J. Burns, S.J.**


This is the French edition of the German theological classic which appeared in 1964 and was rightly acclaimed as a major contribution to the theology of the Holy Spirit. Its translation into English is surely long overdue. The central theme of this massive, seminal study is the Person of the Holy Spirit and His work of sanctification; it is an elaboration of its key concept: “One Person in many persons” (i.e., in Christ and in the Church). The two volumes hold an honored place in the development of a new theology of the Holy Spirit, a subject of extreme importance, not only in dogmatics (including Mariology) but also in the spiritual life and in the ecumenical dialogues between East and West and between Rome and the churches of the Reformation.

Perhaps their most exciting contribution is in the area of ecclesiolo-
ogy, and of ecumenical ecclesiology in particular. It is here that the second volume raises some important questions, at least in the mind of this reviewer. What Fr. Mühlen has to say may be controversial, but it has the merit also of being illuminating. The illumination comes from a convincing clarity of insight into the real source of unity within the Church, the Holy Spirit Himself. We are given the salutary reminder that the Holy Spirit does not act by part of Himself but in His whole personality. M. applies the same kind of principle to the Church: particular manifestations of the Church are manifestations of the whole Church.

Two points especially raise a question mark. First, where the Spirit of Christ is present, "it is always the totality of salvation that is present, and not simply a multiplicity of 'elements' or 'graces'" (2, 198). This statement crystallizes his rejection of a *vestigia ecclesiae* theology of ecumenism. The differences between the churches or separated bodies relate to different *modes of existence* of the ecclesial elements, not to a quantitative evaluation of them (2, 231).

It is easy enough to accept M.'s principle that "in spite of the division of Christendom, the Spirit of Christ is in fact always present: one only Spirit, the same, entire, in the different human persons and in the different Churches" (2, 198). But he goes on to argue that one of the modes in which the totality of Christianity is realized is "the exercise of the ecclesial ministry" (2, 231). This is my second point of controversy. It may be the language used or the kind of emphasis or the style of thought pattern, but I must confess to being unconvinced. Surely the sacrament of holy order is more than a mode of "concrete realization," is an essential "element" or "grace."

It would have been extremely helpful, I think, if M. had at this point inserted a somewhat more extended treatment of the sacramental character (which he discusses in general in 1, 443–57). I prefer to see in baptism, confirmation, and holy order *structural* sacraments, necessary for the full ecclesial structure. The character of these sacraments, in fact, resolves the paradoxes inherent in a Church which is at once a Church of the Holy Spirit and a Church of flesh and blood, of "incarnation."

Here one senses the need for a *vestigia ecclesiae* theology. One senses the need, too, for an "incarnational" view of the Church, with a givenness of ecclesial structure, without which the Church is essentially incomplete, not just modally unrealized. It is not only the presence of the Spirit which creates the Church, but the structures which are themselves the creation of the Spirit.

One welcomes these volumes unconditionally, questions and all.
The vision of the Church which they present is dynamic and personal, nourishing deep theological reflection and at the same time true devotion to the Person and work of the Holy Spirit.

Edinburgh

James Quinn, S.J.


Anyone who stays with Gilkey will learn a great deal, and this book illustrates that contention. He shows in both cultural critique and close theological analysis a fine sensitivity to human issues as well as precise theological discipline. The entire enterprise is cast in a lucid and engaging style. In short, one cannot help but feel that he has the lay of theology land after touring with so contemporary and knowledgeable a guide. The current human situation comes in for close characterization, and its pretensions for careful critique; that short-lived theological movement which introduced itself as “radical theology” is shown up for the modish response which it was, yet praised withal for the insightful manner in which it read the contours of contemporary consciousness.

So-called “radical theology” caught clearly the demise of any sort of metaphysical temper or speculative tolerance among our contemporaries. G. is quick to appreciate this fact in his early chapters, but unable to work with it in his later systematic construction, where he dreams of a time when “speculative ontology may be able to begin again” (p. 449). Between the appreciation and the forgetfulness comes careful and dialectical criticism of the four pillars of self-styled secular consciousness: contingency, relativity, temporality, and autonomy. G. manages to show how each fails to stand still as the position it claims to be, and invites its own reversal. The implication he draws from this exercise is the presence of an underlying level of understanding and articulation: “we need to devise a way of examining presymbolic or prereflective experience...to discover the dimensions of ultimacy and sacrality latent there” (p. 279). So he explicitly relies upon a species of phenomenological analysis, which claims “that an analysis of prelinguistic experience by reflection is possible” (p. 277) and pretends to deliver “the relation to the felt meanings of experiencing” (p. 273) as a way of “eliciting from appearances the essential structures of our being in the world” (p. 280).

The result is a final systematic chapter which spells it all out—the relations between philosophy and theology, between revelations
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general and special, between God’s transcendence and immanence—in a manner which would bewitch us into believing we understood it. But of course we cannot understand “relations” professedly dialectical just because someone insists on laying them out on the page; for should we pretend to understand them in this form, we would have missed the force of “dialectical.” Hence the author must be joking or have lost his nerve—or else be plotting against his readers!

G. is neither joking nor plotting, but he has reached out too soon for help, when his own fine-grained critique contained all the elements of a reflective methodology for theological inquiry. His manner of showing the contentions of secularity to be pretensions exhibited throughout a careful attention to the positions asserted and the personal and social postures consequent upon them. By deft sketches of the ways of life entailed by a set of assertions, he managed in each case to show that “the actual experience man has in his day-to-day world is . . . a more paradoxical one than this secular account implies” (p. 253). All this G. carries out by paying careful attention to the language men adopt to illuminate their situation, and especially to its multivalent symbolic character. If he manages to show what he does show by careful attention to the languages we adopt spontaneously in our efforts to thematize our experience, why the fascination with “prelinguistic experience”? Furthermore, what he manages to show about metaphysics and its God (p. 441) mounts a direct critique on any attempt to reach out for an underlying or metaphysical way of catching hold of man’s experience with the divine. My suspicion is that someone reflecting on the manner in which G. carries out his incisive critique of other positions will be able to show that this sort of skill amounts to theological expertise. If the “aim of philosophy is sheer disclosure”—a quote from Whitehead to which Wittgenstein evidences more fidelity—what more do we want? And when we are given “more,” what can we do with it? The exercise of working with this book is its own reward.

University of Notre Dame

David Burrell, C.S.C.


The two present fascicles embrace 640 columns and include entries from “Hoehn” to “Hypocrisie.” The articles remain on the level of competence we have come to expect in the Dictionnaire: they are clear, well rooted in history, and contain up-to-date, multilingual bibliographies. Daniélou, Leclercq, Bougerol, Massaut, Marcel, and
Le Brun collaborate on a long article "Humanism and Spirituality" (947–1033). They deal with the early encounter of Christianity with the Greco-Roman world, the monastic humanism of the Middle Ages, the relations between the spiritual life and humanism from the twelfth to the sixteenth centuries, humanism in Italy, and the spirituality and humanism of Erasmus and Bremond. Massaut devotes considerable attention to Erasmus' erudition, his theology and its Christocentrism, his doctrine on interiority, prayer, asceticism, and freedom, his teaching that any genuine Christian trying to be perfect should live as a monk: "Quid aliud civitas quam magnum monasterium?" Hardly a popular idea.

Several other authors combine their efforts in a lengthy historical article (1033–1108) on the humanity of Christ in Christian devotion and contemplation. They discuss the patristic age (Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, and Augustine receive most attention), the Middle Ages, and the Carmelite school. The apparent opposition between the views of Saints Teresa and John of the Cross on the place of the sacred humanity in the highest reaches of prayer is reconciled in the Carmelite school by saying that while the humanity of Christ is a constant ontological cause of any prayer, it is not the object of the loftiest contemplation.

The article on humility by Pierre Adnes (1136–1187) is thorough. In an interesting study of pagan antiquity, A. concludes that even though in Greece and Rome there existed elements that could give rise to a concept of humility, the ideal was never explicitly disengaged and affirmed. He feels that this development did not occur probably because there were lacking an exact idea of divine transcendence and the notion of creation. One may add (as A. hints) that the astonishing kenosis of the Incarnation and the cross was also missing. A. views the first two Beatitudes, poverty and meekness, as together forming the "Beatitude of humility." The first expresses the lowliness before God of the anawim; the second, a form of fraternal humility. He regards the second Beatitude in Matthew as a gloss, leaving the original number to be seven, a number dear to the Evangelist. A. understands the difficult Pauline admonition that we consider others superior to ourselves (Phil 2:3) as referring less to a value judgment than to a practical attitude. His reasons for this interpretation are two: (1) we are to have Christ's mind, and He could not have judged others greater than Himself; (2) verse 4 exhorts us to be concerned with practicalities, others' interests, not our own.

André Derville writes on humor in the Christian life. He feels that one can discern humor in Scripture, e.g., in the wisdom literature, but
he hesitates to say that the passages were written with humor. D.'s bibliography, together with comments, is excellent. It includes works on humor in antiquity, among the saints, in literature (he notes especially English humor from Shakespeare to Chesterton), in philosophy, and in psychology.

Among the many historical figures dealt with in these fascicles, the best known is Hugh of St. Victor. In thirty-nine columns Rogar Baron discusses Hugh's life, style, works (authenticity, chronology, sources), thought, and influence. An English-speaking reader will be pleased to find an article on Gerard Manley Hopkins. Alfred Thomas finds in the poet that a mingling of Scotism and Ignatianism lies at the root of his most profound intuitions and that he combined a sacramental view of the universe with a great devotion to the Incarnation.

_Chestnut Hill College, Phila._

_THOMAS DUBAY, S.M._


The new, or rather renewed, romance between theology and culture has produced some interesting progeny. The creative artists have pursued in critical commentaries on their own works the hierophantic role, teasing the theologian with half-revealed mysteries. The theologians have responded, all too frequently, with crypto-theological comments upon the cultural scene. Among the theologians there exist two ends of the spectrum: those who choose to baptize the culture and those who attempt to discern what theology in her task of service may learn from the culture. Fortunately, the "baptizers" are less and less with us as their own naiveté has exposed the failure of their methodology; unfortunately, the "learners" are few and far between. This work of Sherrell must be classified as a "betweener," following as he does the general guidelines of a Tillich.

The book is composed of seven chapters, the first two and the last dealing with specifically theological-cultural matters. The middle four chapters treat a selection of plays drawn from the works of Samuel Beckett, Eugène Ionesco, Jean Genet, and Arthur Adamov. It is in these four chapters that S. works best: he functions as a critic attempting to draw forth from various plays a construct of the human image. Although an isolated critic here or there might be tempted to cavil at some small detail, the heart of S.'s criticism stands on its own merits. His analyses of Beckett's man faced with a void, Ionesco's man with guilt, Adamov's isolated man, and Genet's man in revolt are extremely well accomplished and his purpose in these chapters is achieved: the
presentation of man’s image through the eyes of the French avant-garde theatre. The pages that point to this theatre’s concern with linguistic problems are especially illuminating. The summaries of the plays, some of which may be unfamiliar to English-speaking audiences, are as concise and fair as any such synopses can hope to be. The virtue of these chapters flows from the basically sound principle formulated by S.: to let culture answer in its own terms and, here, in specifically theatrical ones.

One of S.’s basic assertions (and, in all fairness, he characterizes it precisely as an assertion) is that theological work is being done in the avant-garde French theatre. There is a lurking danger in this approach: theology becomes such a comprehensive term that it loses its specificity. The themes treated in French theatre or, indeed, in any artistic work obviously share with theology a concern for man and his state. A groundwork for conversation between theologian and playwright is thus radically posited. At the same time, there is the absolute necessity that both theology and the theatre maintain their own integrity. Theology, then, must shun the directive role in the field of the arts and forbear supplying a correct set of assumptions for the artist. The danger inherent in the approach of a Tillich or a Nathan Scott, shared by S. (and brilliantly criticized by Sallie McFague TeSelle in Literature and the Christian Life), is that the theologian will look too much to the usefulness of art to Christianity (and cf. S.’s heading “Art as a Resource for Theology” [p. 27]) or will move towards suggesting a program (and cf. S.’s “Theology as Interpreter of Art” [p. 29]). S.’s basic contention that he as theologian wishes “to enter into conversation with other theologians who happen to be playwrights by profession” (p. 9) brings him painfully close, at times, to destroying the distinction between theologian and playwright, who must remain integrally such if either is to survive as entire. Beckett, Adamov, Genet, and Ionesco are playwrights, not theologians, and S. is theologian, not playwright. Each must remain whole if he is not to become some strange monster or some illegitimate hybrid.

S.’s central chapters are rich with insights and understandings and can be read with profit. On the negative side, there is a theological posture that may be rightly criticized. To his credit here it must be noted that S. is not as guilty as some of destroying the legitimate and legitimating boundaries between theology and the arts. Even though the twain can meet, East must remain East, and West West.

University of San Francisco

KARL WELTON KLEINZ, S.J.

This small book deals with a subject that is becoming increasingly important for today's Church. It reports and explains a method of psychological screening applied to candidates for the seminary and religious life. It is one method of several in use for this purpose and consists of four standard psychological tests, modified and standardized for the purpose at Loyola University, Chicago, in the course of several years of extensive research. The predictive criteria developed in this research have proven quite apt for predicting perseverance under the rigors of religious life. However, since validity and reliability studies were made on subjects prior to the upheavals occasioned by Vatican II, it may be necessary to continue empirical studies to revise the image of the seminarians' personality.

As the Bishop of Manchester remarks in the Preface, the book does not propose to set up a complete and error-proof device for screening candidates for the priesthood or religious life. The device proposed is valid and reliable. It is not, however, a do-it-yourself. It needs trained people to administer the tests and interpret the data obtained. The neurological investigation that forms the fourth component of the series strikes the reviewer as too specialized and time-consuming to be put to general use. In the reviewer's experience, projective techniques like Story Sequence Analysis of the Thematic Apperception Test yield adequate information about emotional structure. This is not to disparage the usefulness of polygraph investigations when and where they can be done and properly interpreted.

It is the skill and experience of the interpreter that is of prime importance. And the value of his interpretation depends greatly on his conception of human personality: its nature, constituents, structure, and growth. H. sets his down clearly, simply, and succinctly in chaps. 1 and 2. There is a refreshing absence of jargon and terminological pomposity. His definition of normal personality is well founded and based on a nonmechanistic notion of life and human nature. His distinction between personality, character, and temperament is clear. One may not agree with it, but one has no difficulty in understanding the reasons he has for making his distinctions. His catalog and description of the traits of normal personality is comprehensive and expressed in simple language. His account of personality growth in its normative aspects includes the spiritual aspects of human life, something one seldom sees in psychological discussions. It is based primarily on the
development of the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity in the individual. It is solid and practical, though there will be those who say it is old-fashioned. The reviewer wishes H. had included a discussion of the place of the gifts and fruits of the Holy Spirit between the growth of the virtues and their culmination in the Beatitudes.

Chap. 3 discusses trait complexes not suitable for religious life. The instrument used for discriminating them is the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. The meaning H. attributes to the scales might be questioned in some of the details, but the research design was such that the skilled interpreter could not go far astray. For a further confirmation of the conclusions drawn, the reader must go to the studies listed in the bibliography. Chap. 4 contains samples of the tests administered. Here again the reader must go to the preliminary studies referred to by the author to confirm the validity of the conclusions and the reliability of the tests. They are valid and reliable.

The book concludes with eight appendices containing graphs of results and copies of paper and pencil tests. There is also a glossary of terms that is remarkable for clarity of expression.

*Spring Hill College*  
JOHN A. GASSON, S.J.


Postulating that suffering is in proportion to the distance between ourselves and others, Oraison intends in this work to analyse (psychoanalyze) the dynamics of interaction among human beings in an effort to help persons live their lives as fully (successfully, happily) as possible. Specifically, he intends to make manifest a few signposts which point the way to such a life. It is interesting to view with an analyst the reality, interaction among persons, to which these signposts point—and this from the most common chance encounters to the most profound personal relationships. The world is his clinic, everyone his patient. I use the term “patient” here advisedly, since identity is established by virtue of relationship and O. tells us that “every real relationship between two people involves some degree, though it will vary, of abnormality. All of us are, in fact, though again it varies, ‘sick’ in our relationships” (p. 120). While this is not exactly the most cheerful news, it is meant to indicate the analyst’s real concern for psychological well-being.

On the whole, O.’s approach is a fundamentalist adherence to
Freudian interpretation. Attempting to relate to persons—the book could as well be entitled “Becoming through Others”—means attempting to recover the “initial lost object” or one’s original biological integrity (more precisely, the placenta and amniotic fluid). Yet it is precisely the impossibility of such regression which makes it possible for an individual to live his own life, to become his true self, to identify himself in confrontation with others. Accordingly, the original birth trauma is a prime consideration for the analyst. So too is the anal phase in the child’s development. If, as is sometimes said a bit facetiously, physicians tend to make stoolgazers of their patients, Freudian psychoanalysts would have everyone take a close look at the activity of defecation itself (viz., at its symbolic meaning). For this is the “first experience of a genuinely creative act” on the part of a person; “he produces something, out of himself, literally of his substance; something which becomes separate from him, in relation to which he can stand back and look at it, something he can give to someone else, for that was the purpose for which he produced it in the first place. This first experience is really the first step in what will, at more and more complex levels of activity, be a commitment of himself as agent, as contributing his own individual and irreplaceable part to the increasing network of relationships to other people that constitute his life” (p. 69). The alleged implications of this are far-reaching indeed—and all of them as considered in this chapter (3) can be read in any primer of Freudian psychology. Those schooled in traditional spirituality, however, will hardly be edified to find the words of Christ “Greater love no one has...” paraphrased to read “In the end, everything one gives is no more than excrement” (p. 82).

Happily, O. does make some observations which deserve special mention here. The closeness-distance factor, one of necessary conflict, that makes for a free and hence mutually beneficial relationship is placed in intelligible and acceptable relief. In consequence, love of neighbor does not consist in self-annihilation or self-forgetfulness; rather, “it means thinking oneself and wanting to be oneself in relation to another person, both for his sake and one’s own, distinctly” (p. 119). One of the most incisive considerations in O.’s work is, to my mind, that of one’s relationship to God, the “Immense Other.” Since this Other is inaccessible to direct experience, man, in an effort to control and in a sense to fully understand his relationship to God, falls into “structurism” or “religionism.” While the desire to feel reassured in this relationship is natural, it is also dangerous. Psychologically, O. rightly contends, it is easy to see why those who uphold religious (ecclesiastical) structures, who feel reassured only when things are de-
fined and immutable, become violently aggressive when those structures are called into question. We are all painfully aware of this in a postconciliar era—not to mention the fact that engendering a false sense of security has been the bane of moral theology for centuries.

Marquette University

DENNIS J. DOHERTY, O.S.B.


There has been a noticeable dearth of literature in normative ethics, and this anthology seems a positive step toward alleviating such a condition. The volume contains twenty essays, culled from the popular media, on topics ranging from race relations to sensitivity seminars. It is regrettable that the editor did not see fit to prepare an index, nor to substantiate the excessive factual statistics often utilized to establish a point (cf. Jackson’s article on the Kerner Report, as well as Guttmacher’s and Ratner’s on abortion, etc.). Footnotes often prove tedious, but serve to remove wrangles over explanations of respective viewpoints, as witness Lederberg’s disavowal (pp. 98–100) of Fleming’s attributions to him in regard to the ethical ramifications of embryology.

It is also lamentable that C.’s expressed policy of presenting polarization often undermines a more rational debate over the respective merits raised by contemporary moral issues. For example, O’Brien (pp. 48–56), a student activist at Colgate, employs such inflammatory rhetoric that the more imposing considerations raised by his accusations go unanalyzed. Serious moral debate clearly presupposes such nonmoral virtues as impartiality, respect for factual considerations, and conceptual clarity, but O’Brien arrogantly claims “those... who cannot understand the force of my moral need simply do not understand morality” (p. 50). Furthermore, O’Brien enunciates the empirical generalization that demonstrations invariably occur at Eastern liberal-arts colleges on the part of concerned humanities majors (p. 52), O’Brien being obviously geographically unaware of the events at Berkeley, San Francisco State, etc. The establishment is described in Nietzschean terminology as “the mores of the herd” (p. 54), and philosophy fares no better, for life is what is important. Quite inconsistently, O’Brien neglects his exemplar’s Platonic admonition that the unexamined life is not worth living, and that states of character unless carefully delineated by their correlative moral principles are bankrupt.

G. F. Kennan, former Ambassador to Russia (p. 57–72), has a counter-
proposal to student activism which is well taken until his rhetoric leads him to misconceive the concept of civil disobedience. Kennan argues that (A) "respect for the law is not an obligation... obliterated by willingness to accept the penalty for breaking it" (p. 70), for to maintain the opposing activistic view is to (B) deny any status of law independent of sanctions established against its violation. But Kennan's intolerance for (A) results not in (B) but rather in (—B), by confusing a system of legal positivism (A) with a natural-law theory exemplified by (B). The activist might well plead for (—A) out of respect for (B), inasmuch as the law may be unjust, so Kennan's alignment with conventionalism cannot be supported by implicit appeals to natural-law theory.

Eunice Shriver (pp. 105-19) views abortion reform as symptomatic of the underlying conditions that characterize the "Hard Society" (cf. Ratner's description, pp. 137-49) of enlightened prudentialism, which needs to be refurnished with Teilhard's hope that "someday... we shall harness for God the energies of love, and... man will discover fire" (cf. Billy Graham, pp. 199-211). More specifically, Shriver calls for a normative program of (a) psychological counseling; (b) birth insurance and creation of a "family allowance plan"; (c) vaccination, especially against German measles, the prime cause of mental retardation; and (d) programs of education for responsible parenthood, etc. (cf. Guttmacher's counterproposal on pp. 135-36).

It strikes me that ultimately all the pragmatic proposals are futile unless the basic metaphysical issue is faced: what is a person? Surely, those willing to adopt the moral point of view would accept as self-justifying the moral principle: (1) "One ought not to kill, ceteris paribus, an innocent human being." Now, if we accept (1), and moreover (2) a fetus can be shown by relevant scientific evidence to be a person, then it follows that (3) one ought not to kill, ceteris paribus, an innocent fetus (i.e., abortion is morally wrong). Granted the non-metaphysical nature of Shriver's essay, but assuming we all have some preconceptual understanding of what it is to be a person, then her most forceful claim is in support of (2). Proponents of the "Hard Society" argue that abortion is but removal of live tissue, certain hunks of matter composed ultimately of DNA and RNA molecules. However, Shriver points out that fetal tissue by its genetic constitution differs from the parental organism, and eugenic research indicates that once a fertilized egg is implanted in the womb, no new genetic matter is added. Indeed, an eight-week-old fetus has a functioning heart, central nervous system, digestive and excretory system, a distinct cranium, etc. Such empirical considerations serve as support for (2) and accordingly
bolster (3), and that is Shriver's point. I believe the above line of argumentation will handle Guttmacher's infelicitous illustrations of injustice in a repressive society. Consider Dr. J., who is given a light jail sentence for performing abortions, and when released is medically disbarred; whereas Dr. S., who is guilty of tax evasion, is also given a similar jail sentence, but no medical censure. Guttmacher views the case as blatantly unjust, but is it? Surely Dr. S. has not committed any act of murder, and indeed may have performed only a legal infraction, not a moral misdeed, for Dr. S may have refused to pay his taxes out of opposition to governmental use of tax money to support a war in Vietnam. But what is to be said for Dr. J.?

In addition, Stanley Yolles, director of N.I.M.H. (pp. 178–87), meticulously provides a glossary of drug terminology, describing their chemical constitution and psychophysical by-products. Unpredictably enough, the Jewish president of Reed College (pp. 219–24) defends the papal ruling on birth control, and Black newspaper editor George Schuyler (pp. 42–47) places the blame for the state of society, not on racism, but on civil-rights agitators ("political perverts," p. 43). Historian Donald Fleming (pp. 173–88) describes the Orwellian horrors of "biological engineering," a favorable advent for Fleming, that will allow for "the manufacture of man," with quality controls by contraception, gene manipulation, biochemical intervention in the embryonic phases, organ transplants, etc. Fleming's account seems oblivious of, yet susceptible to, counterarguments suggesting (a) that anthropological considerations of culture and not gene manipulation alter the human condition; (b) failure to realize his unproven assumption that socially desirable behavior is linked with eugenics; (c) overemphasis on the incomplete science of psychopharmacology, with its resultant "genetic tailoring."

University of Notre Dame

JOHN DONNELLY


As conceived by Mr. Adler, philosophy "is a development of the insights already possessed by the man of common sense in the light of common experience" (p. xi). Consequently, when talking about ethics, morals, politics, etc., it is always the "wisdom of common sense" which has to be expounded and to which we have to recur over and over again. As a matter of fact, it is "the only moral philosophy that is sound, practical, and undogmatic" (p. 188; italics mine).
To develop the ethical implications of common sense and its basic question, how one can make a good life for one's self, A. proceeds as follows. Part 1 (pp. 3-63) presents the answers common sense can give to the basic problems of life, which as "good life," i.e., when seen as a whole, is no longer a means but an end in itself. Part 2 (pp. 67-154) considers some arguments which might be raised against such a common-sense philosophy, especially from the viewpoint of linguistic analysis and of intersubjectivity (social co-operation). Part 3, with its title "The Ethics of Common Sense" (pp. 157-200), "completes" the "transformation of common sense into moral philosophy," i.e., a philosophy that "makes good sense," which "appears to be relevant," and "that has the air of truth as well." Part 4 (pp. 203-99) is an analysis of the present world situation in the light of the previous considerations. The book concludes with a Postscript (pp. 235-65) that strikes one as the most relevant section of the work. Here A. discusses his interpretation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and its impact on his own reflections.

A. is generous in telling us about the possible content of a good life, but he is quite niggardly when informing us about its meaning except in the sense that as a whole it is its own end. Consequently he has to set aside issues such as the religious one, which by its very nature aims at the impending possibility that every finite instance represents in its particular way infinite totality. In addition, those who either are not religious persons or do not believe in the dichotomy of the secular and the religious life "will, of course, not be aware of any need for such qualifications, additions, or dissents" as may result from the viewpoint of man's belief in God (p. 6). The level of magical abstraction thereby achieved makes it clear why A. has no particular difficulties in assuming that the good life will eventually become (or at least ought to become) the same for all men. To say the same thing differently: by assuming that there has been the good life among the aristocrats of the past (p. 228) and by disregarding the quest for a good life as raised by those who actually live in misery, he furtively introduces a utopian elitism, which in the proclamation of a nondiscriminatory society becomes by necessity discriminatory against those who have lived and are still living, searching for meaning under the restricted conditions of their situation. Obviously it is the dialectic of common sense which appears in this context, a dialectic in which the truth of common sense stands as a pretense against that which truly is. Therefore the self-evidence of common sense (cf. p. 98) does not include problems such as illness, death, vanity, and conscience. Since their reality eventually turns out to be prohibitive against all forms of perpetuated self-righteousness, it would certainly be neither "sound" nor "reasonable" nor
"desirable" nor "prudent" nor "practical" nor "correct understanding" nor "good" to bother with problems such as these.

Because space limitations do not permit a critical analysis of details, we might summarize the over-all character of the book by using A.'s own refutation of the Marcuses and Galbraiths: establishmentarians like M. J. Adler "have their hearts (read: minds) negatively in the right place, but they are inhibited by their prejudices or prevented by their philosophical (read: ethical) ignorance, from putting their minds (read: hearts) positively there as well" (p. 225).

DePaul University, Chicago

Wilhelm Dupré


This is a thoughtful and useful book, rewarding more perhaps for the ground it covers in exposition and exploration than for any completely satisfying solution to the classical problems of conscience. The initial chapters present and broadly evaluate the various current conceptions of conscience. The treatment here is largely in terms of historical and theological perspectives, though the contributions of such extratheological disciplines as psychology and sociology to our understanding of the dynamics of conscience (in a wide sense of that term) are also noted. There is an abundance of citation, the great bulk of it from H. Richard Niebuhr, Lehmann, Thielicke, Bonhoeffer, and Ebeling, which is helpful for an understanding of the Protestant tradition in its different shadings—the tradition generally but not uncritically favored by the author.

M.'s purpose is to elaborate a theory of conscience which avoids the excesses of autonomous freedom, individualism, and situationism on the one hand, and of heteronomy, authoritarianism, and absolutism on the other. He is so evenly critical in his evaluations here that one is not always certain as to just where on the spectrum he is himself to be located. Despite a penetrating critique of the situationism of Fletcher and Robinson and the vagueness of "the new morality"—he agrees with Gustafson that love "is a word that runs through Fletcher's book like a greased pig" (p. 147)—he rules out the "decision in advance" and finds in absolute principles a straitjacketing of the moral life (p. 145). Yet toward the end of the book (pp. 168-70), glimpsing some horrors, he appears ready to draw lines and to concur in an outright rejection of military torture, the production of test-tube babies, and techniques for prenatal programming of value choices. Here he is willing to erect "'no trespassing' signs on holy ground which even the proposed im-
provement of mankind or his behavior cannot justify”; for “there is still a distinction between partnership with God’s ongoing creation and playing God, though the lines are not always easy to draw” (p. 170). This is an impressive statement, but the reader may have difficulty composing it with another made just twenty-five pages earlier: “In abortion cases the desire to preserve embryonic life must be weighed against the mother’s physical and emotional health or perhaps against the likelihood of the ‘life’ being a thalidomide baby” (p. 145).

Responsibility, the key notion of the book, is understood as “covenantal conscience,” as response to a personal loving God, to neighbor and community, particularly the koinonia which itself has a role in educating the Christian conscience. Responsibility is contrasted with “negative conscience,” the accuser and witness to man’s alienation from God, and with submission to impersonal law and “spiritual pulse-taking” or preoccupation with “being right” and “establishing one’s integrity apart from a saving God” (p. 99). M.’s theme is thus developed against the background of revolt against legalism, inauthenticity, and flight from responsibility through recourse to absolute overriding law. M. himself rejects what he terms the “faculty fallacy” or view of conscience as “a part of the self rather than the function or expression of the total self” (p. 27). Hence, while he recognizes some balancing merits in the Catholic position “for what is often a gap in Protestant ethical theory as well as for a tendency toward heedless spontaneity in some ‘new moralists’” (p. 155), he has little sympathy with its stress on the cognitive role of conscience or with its objective approach to the solution of individual moral problems. This is not to say he is relativist or in favor of autonomous, as distinct from theonomous, freedom. And while one may grumble at his reading of the Catholic view as “rational reductionism” (p. 27) guilty of “failure to reckon with the radicality of evil” (p. 100), and at his lumping together of Kant and Aquinas, his criticism of some standard moral theology is to the point. But though he is alert against confusing reason in Catholic thought with the ratio of the Enlightenment (p. 27), he nevertheless warns against the “rationalist pitfall of scholasticism” (p. 45), and it would seem that failure to appreciate the Thomistic understanding of natural law as man’s specific mode of participation in the lex aeterna and synteresis as connatural, and therefore God-given, insight into the exigencies of moral values leads him to conceive of law as an abstract impersonal principle and a merely human construct, so that any absolute regulation of the conscience by it is rejected as legalism or, worse, taking “the ultimate authority from the living God” (p. 91).
The absence of an index is a great handicap to the reviewer or the reader who feels the need to re-view.

_**Fordham University**  
**JOSEPH V. DOLAN, S.J.**


This book contains six contributions offered at the First International Conference on Ethics in Medicine in Houston. The editor has added an excellent bibliography. Part 1 sets the context: cultural and anthropological (Mead), philosophical (Mesthene). Part 2 studies illustrative problems: abortion and law (Drinan), genetic control (Ramsey), technological devices (Fletcher). Part 3 is theological (Thielicke). The book is so rich and thought-provoking that a short review cannot do it justice.

One of the highlights is Paul Ramsey's paper on the ethics of genetic control (announced by Richard McCormick in _Theological Studies_ 30 [1969] 685). After an introduction that gives an understanding of the scientific language, Ramsey takes up clonality, a method of asexual reproduction taken from the plant world and being experimentally applied to frogs and toads. He makes virtually a line-by-line study of a short paper published by Stanford geneticist and biologist Joshua Lederberg. Assuming that what man can do he eventually will do, Ramsey explores the ramifications of clonality applied to human reproduction and excludes it as an unethical procedure. He underscores the different perspectives of the scientist and ethician and shows how the things the scientist and technologist can do need to be subjected to the hard reasoning of the ethician if genetics is to be kept under fully human control. At the same time, the ethician has to do the hard work of understanding science and technology if he intends to moralize about them.

Helmut Thielicke's contribution "The Doctor as Judge of Who Shall Live and Who Shall Die" moves from fundamental considerations, through specific practical problems, to the possibilities and pitfalls of progress. The limitless capacities of the life sciences make him ask: "To what extent dare we to implement the technical capacity of modern medicine to transform [man], to change the way he functions, indeed, to alter his genetic constitution?" This raises the question about the nature and destiny of man. What actually constitutes "humanity" and where does one draw the line which circumscribes its limits? What man "can do" exceeds what man "is" and creates a tension which Thielicke delineates in terms of two questions: (1) Where is the limit of the mandate to heal? or "At what point does help cease to be help and be-
gin to cancel itself out?” If the decisive point is “meaningful” life, we are back to the original question: What is specifically human existence? For we are caught between what is not under our control, “the fundamental meaning and purpose of human existence,” and what is under our control, the ministrations of modern medicine—“the problem being that, by preserving a man only in part, medicine may actually be depriving him of, and thereby violating, the very meaning and purpose of his life.” (2) How shall we determine the positive goals to be achieved by medicine, e.g., “by hormonal and neurological interventions or by altering hereditary material?” Already man cannot control the things he has made for lack of native mental and biological capacity. Thus man might appear to be “badly engineered” and in need of restructuring (e.g., astronauts without legs?). But progress along this line may make the things man has made the measure of man himself, instead of man being the measure of things. Things he has made may determine how man shall be structured. Indeed, these things threaten to turn upon and destroy man, for modern medicine often moves in a vicious circle. “Whatever it does to preserve diseased life threatens at the same time to deteriorate the hereditary mass.” A diseased life prolonged into maturity may procreate and introduce “into the hereditary chain its own deficiencies, thereby multiplying them.” The example used is the phenylketonuric child. Thus there is often an ambiguity about progress—“constructive powers are always accompanied by a destructive tendency.” This raises the ethical question of accepting the consequences, and the religious question about the disturbed state of creation.

Jesuit School of Theology
at Berkeley

ROBERT H. DAILEY, S.J.


The title of this small book indicates its timeliness. It is not a theoretical discussion of democracy nor a scholarly interpretation of the First Amendment nor an examination into the conditions of a justified revolution. We need not go to this book for factual information on the critical social issues facing America today, though the chief ones are here described succinctly and pointedly. What is of most value is the unique viewpoint from which these problems are faced by one who is a lawyer and a priest, a jurist and a moralist.

This viewpoint is of special value because of the traditional American veneration for law and order, and the common American delusion
that all problems can be solved by legislation. Unlike autocratic states which rely on suppression, oppression, and repression as means of keeping their people in line, Americans have no other way of governing themselves except by the enactment of wise laws and their just execution. But when many of our laws have lost their wisdom and when even good laws are enforced inequitably, the very value of our government and way of life has fallen into sore jeopardy.

So our minorities have become disillusioned with the American dream, shifting the accent from "American" to "dream" in the sense of something illusory and unreal. The disgust that minorities feel when they see that law and order mean the preservation of the status quo in which they have no status, that legal protection can be secured only by resorting to illegal methods, that their rightful place in the social order is attainable only by the deliberate creation of disorder, is becoming understandable even by the entrenched majority now that their position has become threatened in the lawlessness of our cities.

With a few quick strokes Fr. Drinan takes up the Black revolution, crime and juvenile delinquency, the student revolt, the poverty question, dissent to war and especially to the one in Vietnam. These have been explosive issues in our time. Less spectacular but perennial problems are touched upon: the condition of prisons and prisoners, the handling of alcoholics and drug addicts, the treatment of the aged and of the mentally retarded. On the whole, there is a vigorous indictment of the law for its failure to deal with these situations in an enlightened and progressive manner. To enforce the law simply because it is the law is benighted behavior and one of the best means of producing contempt for law. Many of our evils can be blamed on lack of proper enforcement of the good laws we have, but in too many cases the laws themselves are unenforceable even when they are not iniquitous. The main burden is on the legislators to bring old laws up to date and to enact new ones to cope with changed situations. A case in point would be selective conscientious objection, which seems so reasonable but runs into a stone wall of Congressional opposition.

D. is a well-known critic of the courts in their actual functioning and of legislators in their work of devising and passing the laws we need. If legislation never could solve all our problems, much less can it do so now. A commonly-held background of unstated principles is important in any society, a public philosophy without which no laws will be effective. We are gradually losing the public philosophy which has guided us with relative success for so long. The corrosion of our public morals through the ineffectiveness both of the home and of the public schools as educators of the young bears a major responsibility
for our present lawlessness. The mass media contribute to the banality and futility of values. The churches have lost their thrust and even expect themselves to be ignored. Obedience to the unenforceable, adherence to a body of moral principles independently of the civil law, is essential to any ordered society. This book does not tell us precisely how to reactivate such principles, but very frankly puts before us the need of them. If formulating the question is half the answer, D. has led us many steps in the right direction. As a tract for the times, his book is of great value to all concerned Americans.

University of Santa Clara

AUSTIN FAGOTHEY, S.J.


This book is a documentary history of the controversy which surfaced in the Dutch Church when Jos Vrijburg, Jesuit chaplain at the student parish in Amsterdam, announced that he intended to marry and also wished to continue his priestly functions. Vrijburg received the active support of his copastors, Jan van Kilsdonk, Huub Oosterhuis, and Ton van der Stap. The editors, two Americans studying theology in the Netherlands, have divided the book into two parts: the first is a lengthy sketch of how the controversy began and developed; the second presents twenty-seven speeches, sermons, and articles authored by the principals of the affair, including Cardinal Alfrink, Jesuit General Pedro Arrupe, and several well-known Catholic and Protestant theologians. The goal of this format is to provide a framework to aid Americans in understanding the Dutch, and then to allow these controverted figures to speak for themselves.

All that they say centers around the issue of how and how soon clerical celibacy can be “uncoupled” from priesthood. The issue quickly becomes one of the role of authority and the theology of the Church. Bishop Theodore Zwartkruis and the other Dutch bishops argue that they cannot grant immediate unilateral approval for married priesthood because of their obligations to the universal Church. The priests and the congregation of the student parish are unconvinced. They are seeking a more concrete communion of inspiration and belief, rather than the formal and disciplinary unity which they believe the bishops are urging. Working together in lengthy discussions, meetings, and debates among themselves and with theologians of both Catholic and Reformed Churches, the chaplains and students issue a call for pluriformity within the Roman Church. They see freedom as the fundamental Chris-
tian value, and conclude to a congregational ecclesiology with the hierarchy as an overseer and critic, rather than as ruling power.

The students and priests of the student “ecclesia” are on the fringes of the official Church. They proclaim themselves an “outpost community,” and believe that they are pointing the way into the future. With all their disenchantment with the ecclesiastical system, it is ironic that an issue such as celibacy became the cause célèbre of their congregation and apparently dominated the consciousness of the entire Dutch Church for nearly a year. There are constant attempts throughout the selections to show that this is really not a strictly “churchy” issue. The struggle of the priests is several times compared to that of revolutionary churchmen in Latin America. The parallel seems a bit strained.

One cannot evaluate the substance of this book without evaluating the entire process taking place in the Dutch Church, and certainly this cannot be done here. Clearly, the controversy was a manifestation of the spirit of dialogue on both sides. When the book was published, the priests and bishops had reached a temporary compromise, the “step beyond impasse” of the title. Unfortunately, a similar solution could not be reached with the Jesuit superiors. But the whole debate seems radically incongruous in social circumstances such as those which exist in America today. The book reveals an unfortunate reality: the Dutch Church has become introverted and self-concerned to an extent which does not appear healthy from the outside. The bishops were not intransigent, nor were the priests naively iconoclastic. Celibacy is indeed a most important issue for both groups. But one hopes that the Church has more to say to men of today than this debate reveals as the preoccupation of the Catholics in Holland. Citizens of nations whose social fabric is being severely tried as it is in America might be well advised not to expect too much guidance on Church reform from the Netherlands.

Woodstock College

G. David Hollenbach, S.J.


These two books are appropriately reviewed together. Both are written in a Lutheran tradition. Both show an intense awareness of the malaise felt by many Christian theologians and preachers in their
attempts to speak of God. Both are related to what we have come to call (J. might say "carelessly") "the theology of hope." Finally, B. notes in his own preface that the two authors were in conversation at Oxford while they worked on their respective books and that the two books represent a converging thought—with B. coming at his position from a Tillichian stance and J. reaching a similar position from a more Barthian angle.

Although both books intend to establish the legitimacy of Christian language within the context of modern culture, each author enters into conversation with a different partner. J. speaks to the intellectually cautious linguistic analyst and to the secular historian. B.'s "modern man" is the revolutionary and/or secular "futurologist." His basic thesis is that "the Christian faith is wholly oriented to God as the power of the future which arrived in Jesus of Nazareth under the signs of promise and hope" (p. 17). He recognizes, of course, that the dialectical theologians were well aware of the eschatological dimension of Christian faith, but faults Barth, Bultmann, and to a lesser extent Tillich for having collapsed the real Christian future into a nunc aeternitatis of the present moment. He himself wants a future in which new events will happen and which will receive its final intelligibility from the coming (adventus) of God which we still await.

Although he intends to write a "small dogmatic" within the context of this eschatological "horizon," B. is primarily concerned to restore the meaning of God for man. The God of whom he speaks is not, however, an Absolute to whom man can escape in retreat from the threats and responsibilities of history, but rather "the God of the promises" to whom Jesus remained faithful and who is both still to come in power and also proleptically present in the resurrection of Jesus. To put it simply, God matters to man if His promises matter, and these promises can in turn matter only and insofar as man himself truly cares about the future and thus lives on hope. Finally, recognition of the true futurity of God must lead to an eschatological understanding of the Church and of each of its doctrines. The Church does indeed live on memory—and is to that extent "conservative"—"but the genuine appeal to memory is a call of hope to remember the future which has been promised in the past and which the Church is to prefigure through her faith and love in the present" (p. 42).

In many ways B.'s book reads like a Christian Manifesto. It is a stimulating book which moves quickly from point to point and from redefinition to redefinition. Its one limitation is that its many insights will probably be useful only to those who are already engaged in the process of reformulating Christian faith against its eschatological hori-
zon. It is not likely to impress those who wonder whether any religious hope can be more than an as yet unexorcised illusion. Here is where J.'s book comes in.

In an extraordinarily clear first chapter on "The Problem about 'God,'" J. points out that the misgivings that Christians (and others) feel about their assertions follows on both the dominance of scientific language as the model of truly informative language and also on the rise of a scientific historical attitude which disallows on principle any event having the universal validity which Christians attribute to the events recounted in the Gospels. To his great credit, J. refuses to take any easy way out of these difficulties. He refuses, e.g., to grant that because Christian language is used by Christians, it is therefore worth using. The important point is whether such language in fact fulfils a function which other languages do not fulfil just as well or better. He also refuses to scorn the "objectivity" of scientific history, but on the contrary gives it quasi-Christian status as a form of "secularized repentance" or civil-righteousness to which all men are called in facing life honestly.

Having set up his problem as sharply as possible, J. then examines the logic of theological discourse in Origen and Thomas. His presentation of Origen's symbolism and Thomas' analogy is careful, perceptive, and sympathetic. (His criticism of Thomas is, it must be said, less sympathetic and in the end even a bit doctrinaire.) Finding no adequate grounds in the tradition for the informative character of God-language, J. then proceeds to work out his own understanding of Christian language with representatives of the British analytic tradition. Despite his passionate concern for clarity, the development of J.'s position is not always easy to follow. His basic position would seem to be that Christian utterances are (following John Wisdom) verdictive utterances and thus informative but not experimentally adjudicable. They are also (following with some reservations Austin and Evans) commissive and expressive of an "onlook" which is correlative to the discovery of the world as itself an exercitive utterance expressive of a divine onlook. J. is at his clearest when he deals with I. M. Crombie's understanding of religious utterances. With Crombie he accepts the religious concept of God as a "vacuous" concept growing out of man's need to make sense of his life as incomplete and obligated. The concept of "God" is given content only in the story of Jesus. Thus J. can say that "theological utterance is narration of the story about Jesus, qualified by and qualifying 'God'" (p. 139). In saying that "God" qualifies the story of Jesus, J. means that "the absolutely last thing has happened, in the events of Jesus' existence" (p. 140). In saying
that the story of Jesus "qualifies 'God,'" he means that "Godly" means "appropriate to the career of Jesus of Nazareth" (ibid.).

Up to this point J. admits that he has only established a rule for Christian theological usage. The question remains whether assertions made according to this rule are statements which are in some sense verifiable by public experience and thus continuous with our other human assertions. To answer this question, J. appeals to the notion of eschatological verification, which he understands in a way very different from that proposed by John Hick. Our present statements about Jesus as Lord are, according to J., statements about Jesus' future acts, i.e., statements of hope which will be either conclusively fulfilled or disappointed.

All this, of course, presupposes that Jesus' story can be told as other men's stories are told and still have the universal validity which Christians give it. The second half of J.'s book is therefore concerned with the problem of the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith. His own insistence on the legitimacy and necessity of scientific historical research raises the difficulty that Jesus' Resurrection-Lordship is both basic to the Gospel and unavailable to historical research. His solution to this problem is novel and intriguing. By relating historical research to Christian proclamation as law to gospel (as that very subtle distinction is understood in the Lutheran tradition), J. is able to maintain both the "faithlessness" of objective research and its absolute necessity to authentic Christian faith.

If B.'s book reads like a new Manifesto, J.'s concern to relate his own position to almost every significant contemporary Protestant theologian makes his book read like a modern Commentary on the Sentences. His position is so complex that it will hardly start a new trend in the understanding of religious language. At the same time, however, his argument is so detailed and rigorous that any future commentator on the same question will have to give serious consideration to this very stimulating book.

Woodstock College

JOHN W. HEALEY, S.J.
SHORTER NOTICES


T.'s purpose is "to bring into focus one important 'theological intention' of the Old Testament which ... seems to be relevant also for the New Testament people of God" (p. 29). His theological position is Calvinist and conservative, and his treatment is more popular than scholarly in orientation. He regards the "author" of the Tetrateuch, the exilic or postexilic originator of its present form, as the most significant for biblical interpretation. While recognizing that the rebellion motif arose secondarily in Israelite history, perhaps, he suggests, as part of the struggle against idolatry during the last years of the Judean monarchy (his position is much less nuanced than that taken by Coats in his recent traditio-historical study of the same motif), T. prefers to concentrate on the Tetrateuchal author's use of the theme. He argues that the latter "presented the fathers, the rebellious generation, as a negative archetype, one not to be followed, and by other elements of the motif he encouraged his generation, the generation of the restoration, with the ready help of the Lord and proclaimed his unconditional grace" (p. 94).

T. finds a similar and more explicitly didactic use of the rebellion theme outside the Tetrateuch. The fathers, including now the generations after the conquest, still appear as negative archetypes. The warning not to follow their example may be either explicit or implicit. There are confessions of sins in which the promise is made not to imitate the example of the fathers, as well as accounts of rebellion history that allegedly imply change for the future. Finally and most important, there is the frequent proclamation of divine forgiveness for whatever sins the fathers committed. T. finds here a clear recognition by the OT that man inevitably rebels, no matter what his good intentions, and an equally clear affirmation that God's grace is always there for those He has chosen. It is this message that he finds necessary for the Christian Church, which he claims never wants to admit its very real rebellions—of speculation or of doctrine, of official polity or of ordinary practice—and its radical need of divine grace, a grace that will inevitably be there.

Kevin G. O'Connell, S.J.


S., professor at the Pontifical Biblical Institute, Rome, made his mark in biblical research by his excellent Rédemption sacrificielle (1961). He now presents the most complete, up-to-date, and reliable study on the Psalms available in English. S.'s book does not argue a specific thesis like S. Mowinckel's monumental The Psalms in Israel's Worship (Oxford, 1962), nor does he compete with Mitchell Dahood's extraordinary grasp on the Ugaritic background to The Psalms in the Anchor Bible Series. He is best for an over-all presentation of important trends in the understanding of the Psalms today. His book is more technical on larger issues and less extensive in treating individual Psalms than the commentary by Artur Weiser. With the scholar he shares his notes and bibliography; over 850 different titles are cited, many frequently.

S. attends most seriously to the types or categories of Psalms, their role in Israel's worship, and the Psalmists' prayerful appreciation of God as Israel's ever-present Savior. He cautiously favors a more commu-
nity approach against Mowinckel's overliteral interpretation of the "individual" in the Psalms. He warns against any strong acclamation of Yahweh as King and Creator in pre-exilic Israel. He never lets an excessively dogmatic approach sweep aside Israel's more existential style of thinking and praying. He writes, for instance, "that no final judgment can be passed on the monotheism of the psalmists (see on ps 82)." He argues for a "practical monotheism" which allows a "theoretical monotheism" (1, 75).

The division of the Psalms in this book occasionally poses question marks. Why would a prophetic exhortation like Ps 95(94) or a liturgy like Ps 134(133) be classified under the larger category of Didactic Psalms? A few other lacunae appear. The commentary on Ps 22(21) says nothing about the Hebrew text in v. 22, 'ānîtānî, "you have heard me," maintained by Kraus (Psalmen 2, 175-76); in Ps 51(50) no mention is made of the major work of E. R. Dalglish and his arguments for a postexilic anthology from Dt, Ez, and Dt-Is. Ps 45(44) is never related with the northern kingdom of Israel, nor Ps 89(88) with 2 S 7. In this latter case, J. L. McKenzie's study in TS 8 (1947) 187 ff. should have been cited. A number of misprints mar the work; many abbreviations and the style of reference to other parts of the book at times baffle the reader. But a work of such extensive coverage as this cannot answer everyone's questions. To have raised questions stretching beyond the boundary of acquired knowledge enhances still more the value of a work which will long remain a standard reference book.

Carroll Stuhlmueller, C.P.


Many Christians understand the relationship between the OT and Christ in terms of isolated messianic verses or of "OT promise" replaced by "NT fulfilment." In this fine book, one of Germany's leading OT scholars shares with the general reader many results of modern biblical study in an attempt to move the reader beyond such stale stereotypes to a vision of some deeper dimensions of this relationship. W. examines each of the three bodies of OT literature—prophecy, history, and writings—with the following conclusions. (1) Prophecy: As messengers of judgment, the prophets pointed beyond themselves to a salvation through forgiveness. As men critical of their nation and people, they suffered. Their suffering found fulfilment in Jesus Christ. (2) History: The historical books describe God both as one who saves His people and as one who, through the promotion of life, growth, and increase, blesses His people. Both modes of activity are at work in the Christ-event. (3) Writings: Within the Psalms, the individual's lament, particularly the complaint of one who mediates for his people, is a theme leading to Christ; and the song of praise, full of "astonished joy at God's inclining to the depths of human suffering and guilt," corresponds in thought and expression to praise in the Christian Church. Wisdom literature is concerned with man's growth and maturation and expresses its theme in terms of common human experience. Jesus, who "increased in wisdom and stature," incorporated wisdom elements in his exhortations, instructions to disciples, and parables. Thus wisdom was a part of Jesus' message.

In conclusion W. turns to the common model of promise and fulfilment and finds it useful if one sees promise-fulfilment as "an integral event which
is reported in both the Old and New Testaments of the Bible." Fulfilment does not replace promise or reduce the promise to nullity. Fulfilment is appreciated precisely in relationship to the experience of promise. W.'s book is lucid, clear, and unburdened by technical terminology. It well fulfils its stated aim.

Byron E. Shafer


A revised version of M.'s doctoral dissertation. He feels that for too long the image of the Church as the Body of Christ has dominated Christian thinking on the Church, that a whole series of images must be studied and kept in mind for a satisfactory understanding of the NT doctrine of the Church. His contribution to this understanding is this scholarly and thorough investigation of the Church as God's new temple. Apart from Congar's The Mystery of the Temple, a more popular and general treatment, there exists no investigation of this image comparable with M.'s. His point of departure is the new temple of Ez 40-48, although the first chapter is devoted to the significance of the temple for the people of the Ancient Near East. The succeeding three chapters examine the different ways in which the conception of divine presence was developed in Israel. In these chapters M. traces the origin of hope for a new temple and how this hope persisted and fused with the doctrine of a heavenly temple on the one hand and a spiritual temple on the other. Eschatology, not history, is his main concern; historical investigation receives attention only insofar as it shapes the eschatology of the Jewish hope that could and often did exist without the figure of a mesiah, but never without the thought of God dwelling in the midst of His people. The fortunes of the second temple of Jerusalem are traced in these and succeeding chapters. Chaps. 5–11 trace the fulfilment of this eschatological hope for a new temple in Jesus and His Church. M.'s reinterpretations of the idea of the temple in Jewish and Greek thought are most interesting. The use of this image of the Church in the NT is examined at great length and with deep thoroughness. M. notes the differences and similarities in extraneous traditions. Of value to the reader are the summaries appended to each chapter and the excellent bibliography with which the work concludes.

John Powell, S.J.


This dissertation, written at Fribourg under C. Spicq, O.P., investigates a neglected area of Pauline studies. Treatment of Pauline ethics often considers the religious motivation he uses, such as eschatology, the Church, imitation of Christ, or faith, hope, and charity. A., however, devotes his attention to natural motivation, or to Paul's appeals to altruism, common sense, decency, expediency, modesty, pride, propriety, self-respect, and shame. The first two chapters are introductory. Chap. 1, "Motive: A Problem of Perspective," discusses contemporary scientific definitions of motivation vs. a common-sense understanding of it, Christocentric motives vs. natural appeals, and seeks to limit the research to aspects of "worldly living." Chap. 2, "The Pauline View of Man: A Problem of Semantics," considers various modern approaches to Pauline anthropology, criticizing views which A. groups under such
headings as biblical metaphysics, and the religious or the synthetic or the concrete character of Hebrew thought. The next four chapters constitute A.'s real contribution; they deal with the natural motives used by Paul in connection with work (chap. 3), worldly possessions (chap. 4), dietary practices (chap. 5), and the canons of social behavior in the *Haustafeln* and catalogues of vices and virtues (chap. 6). A brief presentation of conclusions is given in chap. 7. A rather useful bibliography on Pauline ethics and on motivation terminates this study.

A. admits that his discussion is not exhaustive, but he has isolated and grouped together many of the Pauline passages that make appeal to natural motives. The discussion of most is sober and supported by reference to secondary literature. It is regrettable, however, that A. did not take a more critical approach to the Pauline corpus; he regards the Pastorals as Pauline, and proceeds to criticize Bultmann's view that every anthropological assertion is likewise soteriological and Christological by appealing to 1 Tim 2:9 f. (p. 21). Moreover, there is too much lecturing of exegetes, scholars, and specialists in the book (some of whom are quoted in a very superficial way). Finally, in his attempt to introduce borrowings from unfamiliar disciplines into the world of biblical specialists, A. is rather patronizing. There is good material in this book, but it is unfortunately presented; the long quotations from secondary sources betray its genre as a dissertation. Perhaps A. will be moved to present this topic in a more detached way some day.

*Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J.*


In writing *An Anthology of Patristic Literature*, M., professor at the Academy of Catholic Theology in Warsaw, intended to provide the student of theology with an elementary manual of patristics. It was not his intention to produce a source book for the dogmatic theologian or the historian. He wished rather to offer the student as well as the general reader a handy survey of ancient Christian literature, of its historical-literary importance, its development, and its contribution to theology, to the liturgy, to the institutional, pastoral, and cultural activity of the Church. With this purpose, he has selected and translated (from the original) rather lengthy extracts from the important writings of the most prominent and representative ancient Christian writers. Though rather free, the translation is accurate; the language is simple, clear, and yet richly nuanced and flexible; the style is light and smooth. Each writer has been provided, often with a brief, sometimes with a lengthy, introduction as to his role and importance in the history of the Church and the conditions and circumstances in which he was writing. This is the first volume of a series; it covers the first three centuries of the Christian era. The excerpts have been drawn from the writings of the Apostolic Fathers, the Apologists, Irenaeus, Hippolytus, Tertullian, Cyprian, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Gregory the Wonderworker, Methodius of Olympus, Lactantius, the *NT* Apocrypha, the Acts of the Martyrs, the most ancient homilies. Erudition and scholarly impartiality make the book a valuable contribution to the study of patristics.

*Joseph F. Mitros, S.J.*

**Etudes sur l'écclesiole de saint Augustin.** By Emilien Lami-
A collection of twelve independent essays on various topics all more or less closely related to Augustine's ecclesiology, on which L. is an acknowledged authority. The problems discussed fall loosely under four general headings: the mystery of the Church, the Christian people, the ministry, and the eschatological dimension of the Church. The method is mostly expository or doxographical rather than critical, with the notable exception of chap. 10, on the timely problem of ecclesiology versus eschatology, in which L. takes issue with a number of recent theologians who have accused Augustine of substituting the institutional Church for the expectation of the kingdom and hence of "des-eschatologizing" the Christian message. Chap. 9 rightly stresses the dynamic and functional aspect of Augustine's doctrine of the ordained ministry but glosses over the notion of consecration, which is equally fundamental to Augustine's thought. On this point one would have welcomed a direct confrontation with Benz's thesis, which faults Augustine for having invented the doctrine of the indelible character bestowed by holy orders—a doctrine allegedly responsible for the virtual disappearance of the charismatic element in the Christian community, the impossibility of any return to the lay state on the part of priests, and the gulf that has come to separate priests and laymen in the Church (cf. E. Benz, Evolution and Christian Hope, chap. 2). Even if it contains few real surprises, L.'s book nevertheless makes available in clear and concise form a wealth of pertinent data on problems that lie at the root of many of our present-day concerns. It is regrettable that the author, undoubtedly a busy man by reason of his duties as dean of a theological faculty, did not find time to weave his materials into a more homogeneous pattern or to explore more fully the basic (and today often questioned) assumptions from which Augustine's views derive their intelligibility.

Ernest L. Fortin

The second volume of the Iberian Fathers selected and translated by Prof. Barlow of Clark University contains the writings of Braulio of Saragossa (d. 651) and Fructuosus of Braga (d. 665?). The excellent translations are provided with a number of informative notes and prefaced by valuable introductions with bibliography. Previously there was no complete translation of the Letters of Braulio into any language, and his Life of St. E militia only existed in two Spanish versions. This is the first English translation of the works of Fructuosus. There is still need for a new Latin edition of the two Rules of Fructuosus, and a thorough study of the language and literary sources of Braulio is yet to be made: he seems to have derived his knowledge of classical literature from Augustine and Jerome.

The writings of Fructuosus are significant for the history of the Spanish (Visigothic) monastic tradition, which has been studied by C. J. Bishko; it is characterized by a preference for double houses and for the use of codices regularum, including the rules of Pachomius, Augustine, Basil, and more rarely Benedict, in place of a single rule. Braulio "is conceded by all to have been the best writer in Spain at the middle of the seventh century, and second only to Isidore in all of Visigothic literature" (p. 3). His letters reveal the nobility and sweetness of Christian character.
To his friend Iactatus he writes (p. 29): "I ask myself why those who share one love should have to be separated at such a distance. . . . Once again I am aware that this is not the home of the pious and they are separated in the regions of mortals in order that they may be joined in the land of the living." He reveals the essence of Christian friendship (p. 28): "[I] put everything behind me, and contemplated only you and me, putting nothing else between us except that love which is the Creator of both." It is hoped that B. will continue to pioneer with distinguished translations of the Spanish Fathers.

*Margaret A. Schatkin*


A summary of the ideas contained in the Byzantine texts on Islam previously reviewed and now arranged in systematic order. The introduction explains the attitudes of intellectual confrontation between Moslems and Christians. The military victories of Islam, interpreted as the favor of God, gave the Moslems a sense of superiority which gradually developed into intolerance of any criticism. The Byzantines are puzzled and hurt by the situation, while the irritability they feel at seeing their proud culture contemned by ignorant Bedouins is expressed in fine polemical reasoning. After examining the history of the Byzantine texts, K. selects their arguments against the authenticity of Islam which declare it to have no witnesses, no precedents, no prophecies, and no miracles. The Koran cannot be favorably compared to the Bible, because it contradicts the revealed word on many points, such as the prophets, Abraham, Moses, and Christ. Its doctrine on the nature of God is wrong—in fact, idolatrous. It lacks a sacramental means of salvation, promotes immorality, warlike passion, hatred, and cruelty. The apologetic defense of Christianity, especially the Trinity, the divinity of Christ, and the Incarnation, is presented by arguments from the Koran itself, but principally by rational theology of analogical concepts of God's knowledge, power, and will. The military defeats are explained as punishments of God or as effects of the general law of suffering. K. concludes that the Byzantine approach was too negative, polemical, insulting, filled with prejudice and frequent misinterpretation. Its rational defense of the mysteries of Christianity offered no solution to the fundamental problem of the transcendence of God in Moslem theology. In this day of the open world, we should begin with the mutually acceptable ideas of the Koran on love.

*James L. Monks, S.J.*


Praepositinus of Cremona (ca. 1150-1210) was a theologian, exegete, and liturgist who occupies a key position in the transition from Early to High Scholasticism. Nothing is known of his early career. Before 1194 he seems to have taught theology at Paris. In 1194 he was named scholasticus at the cathedral school of Mainz. From 1206-1209 he was chancellor of the University of Paris. He seems also to have been active at some time as a missionary among the Cathars. Although many of the works formerly attributed to him have been shown to be spurious, his literary production is still considerable. His *Summa theologica* (between 1190-94), in which he codified the teaching of his predecessors
for the early thirteenth century, enjoyed a very wide manuscript distribution. In addition to a *Summa super psalterium* (1196–98), some *Sermones*, and (lost) *Distinctiones*, he also composed a *Summa de officiis* (before 1196–98) which is important in the history of liturgical exegesis.

Although the most ancient liturgists, like Isidore of Seville in his *De ecclesiasticis officiis*, gave no place to symbolism, the application of the moral and allegorical explanations of the Fathers to liturgical practices began in the ninth century with Amalarius of Metz’s *Liber officialis*. This tradition was dominant in the tenth and eleventh centuries, and continued into the twelfth century in such liturgical writers as Honorius of Autun, *Gemma animae* and *Sacramentarium*, and Rupert of Deutz, *De divinis officiis*. About this same time, however, a distinct change begins to take place in the character of liturgical treatises. The introduction of the use of dialectics in the study of theology and the interest shown in the liturgy by theologians of this period led to a more systematic treatment of the rites of the Church. Although the Amalarian tradition does not disappear, the liturgy is now examined in the light of history, reason, and revelation. The originator of this tradition is apparently the Paris theologian Johannes Beleth, a representative of the school of Chartres. His *Rationale divinorum officiorum* became the source for subsequent writers: Sicard of Cremona, William of Auxerre, and Praepositinus. Of these three, Praepositinus is of significance because he combined the new rational method of Beleth with the older tradition, particularly as it is found in Amalarius and Honorius. His work was, in turn, the principal source for the great liturgical *summa* of the Middle Ages, the *Rationale divinorum officiorum* of William Durand, Bishop of Mende (+1296). The present edition of Praepositinus’ work is based on the five extant thirteenth-century manuscripts, and provides a careful source analysis, together with a detailed indication of the use made of the work by Durand.

*C. H. Lohr, S.J.*


On the occasion of the 450th anniversary of the appearance of Luther’s ninety-five theses, scholars at Union Theological Seminary and Fordham University held (Oct. 20–21, 1967) a conference of leading experts in order to promote better understanding of the nature of the Reformation. The present volume includes the principal papers delivered at the conference. After an introduction by Robert E. McNally, S.J. (pp. 1–14), Roland H. Bainton in “The Problem of Authority in the Age of the Reformation” (pp. 14–25) points out that both Protestants and Catholics were divided on the question of authority and that the problem was not simply one of confessional difference. McNally, in “The Reformation: A Catholic Reappraisal” (pp. 26–47), emphasizes the progress which has been made toward mutual understanding. Wilhelm Pauck, on “The ‘Catholic’ Luther” (pp. 48–58), makes some important qualifications about Lortz’s description. John T. McDonough deals with “The Essential Luther” (pp. 59–66), maintaining that Luther’s challenge means in practice that the Church is the extension of Christ, and as such must adapt itself to each age and not identify itself with any system of philosophy. Two of the most important papers concerned the social
situation of the Reformation. Hajo Holborn shows, in "Luther and the Princes" (pp. 67-74), how the dominant role that the Protestant Reformation assigned to the princes contributed to the development of absolutist government; and Harold J. Grimm, in "The Reformation and the Urban Social Classes in Germany" (pp. 75-86), presents the Reformation as constituting in a majority of imperial cities the first broad movement in which the urban classes acted vigorously as a group. Margaret Mann Phillips, in "Some Last Words of Erasmus" (pp. 87-113), deals with some of Erasmus’ notes and documents from the years 1532-35. Finally, John C. Olin, in "Erasmus and St. Ignatius Loyola" (pp. 114-33), maintains that Ignatius was not so far from the fundamental spirit of Erasmus as we are often led to believe. The volume concludes with a valuable bibliography (pp. 134-50) by Lewis W. Spitz on recent studies of Luther and the Reformation.

C. H. Lohr, S.J.


An analysis of Calvin’s conception of the manner in which the Christian participates in the spiritual warfare against Satan. H. sees Calvin as a warrior, a wholehearted and successful soldier of God, who so took Paul’s metaphor of spiritual warfare to heart that H. feels he can analyze the Reformer's entire theological and practical work from this one viewpoint. H. treats the subject as elements in a four-act drama with prologue and epilogue. In the prologue we have a summary of Calvin’s teaching on God and His eternal will to save; in the first act we meet Satan and Adam, as understood by Calvin, together with the Fall and what can be called Satan’s kingdom. In the second act we encounter Christ the Invader, who by His redeeming death and resurrection has definitively routed the enemy. The third act is the analysis of the Christian’s part in this warfare, spiritual because the weapons used in overcoming the onslaughts of Satan are spiritual, i.e., divine providence, confidence in God, solidarity with the ministers of the Word, the Word, and sacraments aided by discipline. H. tells us that he used more than a thousand citations from Calvin in this one chapter. The fourth act touches the eschatological dimension of this warfare, and the epilogue bridges the Reformer’s teaching with twentieth-century Christian living. Though the book at times seemed wordy, it has this merit: it offers a detailed study and interpretation of that spiritual warfare in which each Christian must engage himself.

Joseph N. Tylenda, S.J.


Studies in St. John of the Cross have multiplied in the last two decades, so that syntheses like the present book become necessary road maps. R.’s work is more than a mere introduction; it is a complete study along the lines of Morel’s three volumes or the more simple survey of E. W. Trueman Dicken, The Crucible of Love. This book is more comprehensive, almost encyclopedic, in four parts: (1) the man, (2) the works, (3) the doctrine, (4) spiritual development according to John. R. manages to relate under these headings the his-
tory and current status of a vast array of Sanjuanist topics. He makes no secret of special pleading; he defends John on any and all fronts. At times this leads to defensiveness which mars objectivity, e.g., the section on John’s “limits,” which R. chooses to exemplify in the areas of the liturgy and incarnationism (pp. 150–55). In both areas he launches a strong counterattack on critics; in the process he misrepresents an article of mine (p. 154).

R. attempts a total view of John and generally succeeds. The result is a balanced, integrated account. The John of the Vejamen, e.g., who spoke so strongly for contemplation as to move St. Teresa to complain ironically against absolutist mystics who would make everyone a contemplative, is an abstraction (insofar as the picture represents only one side of his character); the real John is the spiritual director who met novices where they were and suited his advice to their condition (p. 131). The noche, described in isolated pericopes, is a void, a negation; in fact, it is one side of loving union with God. R.’s insightful concept of “total symbolization” (p. 124) contributes greatly to a proper understanding of the elements in the prose works and the goal of a total view. Insights like this and the survey of key questions make this a useful companion for the study of John.

Ernest E. Larkin, O.Carm.


Despite the fact that much of our Anglo-American culture is due to the Puritan-sectarian tradition, it was not till quite recently that solid scholarly investigation of the deep religious convictions which underpinned it was begun. Instead, cliché-ridden hand-me-downs, bordering at times on the ridiculous or historical caricatures, were propagated through our literature, theological and otherwise. Finally we decided to be honest with ourselves, and the net result has been a truer understanding of the insights of that theological labyrinth, seventeenth-century England. G.’s book is a successful attempt at unraveling some of the theological and religious thought and influences of one of its prominent leaders, John Bunyan. Though his Pilgrim’s Progress still sells ten thousand copies per year in England alone, no theological study as such has ever been made of the thought of this self-made man. Bunyan adhered principally to positions advocated by the strict Calvinists, but he was also influenced by certain distinctive ideas of the Antinomians, the Quakers (at least negatively), and of Luther, especially his commentary on Galatians. Enamored of such Pauline themes as predestination and grace, Bunyan used Luther’s view of God in terms of the wrath-grace dichotomy rather than Calvin’s emphasis on God’s sovereign will. It was in Luther also that Bunyan found impetus for his more personal and experiential appeal in preaching rather than in the more logic-bound orthodox Calvinism. Hence God is emphasized as Savior rather than Ruler, justifying without works, and it is on this Lutheran foundation that Bunyan built his Calvinistic superstructure, especially his covenant theology further nuanced by Antinomian refinement. At the same time his ecclesiology and sacramentology (no real significance in any of them) were neither Lutheran nor Calvinistic but were developed from the Independent-Baptist tradition. But the real focal point of Bunyan’s thought, according to G., was the doctrine of the grace of God re-
revealed in Christ. The net result of G's book is that a student of Bunyan must be most careful in applying any unqualified theological label to the man.

Anthony B. Brzoska, S.J.


At a time when systematic theology is being reinterpreted and reoriented toward a more anthropological vision, it is illuminating to turn one's attention to Ritschl, one of the "fountainheads of modern theology," whose own vision was decidedly anthropocentric. If it is true that "between his death in 1889 and the present, perhaps only Barth and Bultmann have exerted so decisive an influence upon theological construction as he did in his own lifetime and thereafter" (p. 159), it is evident that Ritschl's influence must be carefully studied and properly evaluated. Two factors in particular contributed to that influence: first, that Ritschl seriously tried to do justice both to the objective and historical as well as the subjective and personal dimensions of the Christian faith; second, that consequently he helped develop a new historical hermeneutic as the basis for interpreting that faith. In both these features one easily notes the continuity between Ritschl's theology and the theological questions raised today.

There is, however, another aspect of Ritschl's theology which can be especially meaningful today. When Herbert W. Richardson proposes a new term for faith in our sociotechnic age—one that would affirm the contemporary intellectus and express its proper function in our culture—he uses fides reconcilians; it is apt for signifying "the possibility of unifying a multiplicity of intellectual perspectives" (Toward an American Theology, p. 49). It is eminently understandable that one sees everything today in the light of true and active reconciliation. But it was not so easy to pinpoint the same problem in the second half of the last century. Ritschl, nonetheless, succeeded in isolating it in a remarkable way. If he did not solve the problem, at least he focused attention at the three points of the circle of Christian commitment: God, the world, and man. "Within Christianity, this trinity is seen in terms of God, Christ, and the Church, and within the latter the individual Christian is drawn to Christ and through him to God" (p. 20). M. elucidates this well, especially in his concluding chapter. He boldly asserts: "The fact that Christian existentialism in our century has little appreciation for the priority of the church over the individual believer represents a radical deficiency in their theology and a retrogression from Ritschl's viewpoint" (p. 162).

In addition to his treatment of Ritschl's significance, M. considers his theological method, the presuppositions and the nature of his doctrine of justification and reconciliation, and the consequences of reconciliation from the viewpoint of the Christian life and the kingdom of God. Particularly noteworthy is M.'s section on the scope and problems of Ritschl's theology. M.'s enthusiasm for one of the masters of the last century never makes him lose objectivity; he remains sensitive to Ritschl's deficiencies as well as his genius. The value of this study is perhaps fittingly expressed in M.'s own words about Ritschl: "Some of the problems to which he addressed himself are no longer ours, and some of his solutions have been rejected. But since the church must always re-
flect on the relationship between God, man, and the world, Ritschl’s vision remains impressive and instructive at many points” (p. 180).

Sabbas J. Kilian, O.F.M.


This is a sequel to Part 1, reviewed in TS 28 (1967) 422 f. It covers the years 1860–1914, bringing together an even richer array of material, much of it from unpublished sources. Men so long-lived as Newman figure largely in this volume as in the first. Newman lived too close to his own age to prove himself an unbiased critic, and C. points out what many have forgotten, that the Apologia is not a history of the Oxford Movement. After the darkness came the light: the failure of his Catholic University of Ireland in 1861–63 was a severe blow to Newman, and Kingsley’s demand that he justify his position forced from him his most private meditations. He felt this a public duty, something he owed to the Catholic priesthood of England, and he proved that his own Anglican days were simply a stage on the road to Rome. When he received the red hat in 1879, all educated Protestant England rejoiced, and Oxford still considers him one of her favorite sons. The various cultural, economic, and religious movements already studied in the earlier volume here come home to roost. England by 1914 was a more godless country than in 1830. Public opinion had so softened in all those years that Darwin dying in 1882 could be buried in Westminster Abbey with Christian rites, when he had expected to be buried at Down. Atheists could now sit in the House of Commons, fellowships could be held at both Oxford and Cambridge without receiving holy orders as a sine qua non. The old ideal of the country parson reading

the Greek Fathers, writing Latin verse, and preparing the Sunday homily was replaced by a hunting man, or a pastor working for the social betterment of his parishioners. This was all to affect the Sunday observance. We all looked forward to this second volume and found it not wanting in good taste, fair judgment, and full knowledge.

Robert T. Meyer


This book joins the growing list of studies dealing with this great poet and critic as a religious thinker. While systematically treating Coleridge’s views on major Christian doctrines, B. traces both the chronological pattern of his development and the interrelationships of the various topics. Chapters treating the Trinity, Christology, justification, creation, etc., reveal C.’s essential orthodoxy and brilliant if unsystematic skills as a speculative theologian. Of special interest are the long chapter on the nature of faith and the one on the nature and role of Scripture. These not only add to C.’s stature as a Christian thinker but also help to flesh out the study of nineteenth-century concern over such burning issues as faith and reason, Scripture and higher criticism. Because of C.’s profound and sweeping influence on later British religious thought, this comprehensive study will be invaluable to those working on such figures as Maurice, Gore, Westcott, Lightfoot, Hort, and even Newman and the Oxford Movement.

Central to C.’s religious reflections are his personal realization of man’s need for redemption, the role of man’s moral being, and the priority of will over reason. As other studies have
shown in parallel areas, C.'s great gift lay in a psychological and episteme-
tological analysis of his own religious experience. True to his desire to achieve a "reconciliation of opposites," he was endlessly torn between his great concern for practical Christian life and his prodigious capacity for speculation. Time and again one is struck by the modernity of C.'s thought. Summarizing his analysis of faith and its underlying epistemology, B. suggests that it would be difficult to "locate Coleridge's conception of faith with any exactitude within the tradition of Christian theology." Perhaps this is due not only to the fact that C. synthesized the best of the past, but also because he anticipated the future directions of Christian philosophy and theology. Those interested in tracing the historical roots of Christian transcen-
dental method—as now set forth by Rahner, Lonergan, and Coreth—and its influence on Christian apologetics and theology might well return to the writings of Newman and Coleridge. Those studying the latter will be aided immensely by B.'s thorough study.

Philip C. Rule, S.J.


Pastor C. J. Curtis of Chicago's Im-
manuel Lutheran Church has assembled here a sort of college outline series of introductions to the men who have been at the cutting edge of Protestant theology. There are chapters on ecumenical theology citing the work of Bonhoeffer and Soderblom. He devotes attention to the process theology of Whitehead and Ogden and includes Teilhard de Chardin in this company. There is a section on the death-of-God theologians and on the Neo-Orthodox, Barthian tradition. Beyond this we hear from Buber, Tillich, Cox, and Fletcher. Most inter-
esting of all is a chapter on the Negro contribution to theology, where C. analyzes briefly the non-
vioent posture of Martin Luther King. Otherwise, students of the main-
stream of Protestant theology will find little new in this volume. Even this survey-outline approach has al-
ready been competently done by Macquarrie. Nevertheless, C. writes clearly and descriptively. A book of this kind is probably helpful to col-
lege teachers of religion who want a hasty review of this or that man's theology—and possibly to students prepping for an exam.

Alfred McBride, O.Praem.


The history of biblical faith and its transmission is the story of a struggle to maintain in balance faith's various elements. In particular, M. sees this history as a dialectical swinging be-
tween the personal, experiential di-
mension and the speculative. Man comes to faith through the experience of his own radical insufficiency and of the trustworthiness of a transcending God. Man, however, wishes to under-
stand his belief, and this effort can obscure the personal, experiential element at the root of faith, leading to a revival of this subjective ele-
ment. M. follows the story from the persevering, corporate confidence of the Hebrews in the Lord, through the NT's testimony of personal com-
mitment to Christ, the affective as-
sent of Augustine, the Thomistic dynamic searching into the eternal Truth, the Reformation experience of God's graciousness, the reasonable faith of Vatican I, and the stress on personal faith of modern existential-
His method is to assemble passages from the major figures in the history of Christianity. Each of these men makes his own positive contribution, underlining the dimension of faith which he prizes and which may not be receiving due attention. Where do we stand at present in the dialectic? M. thinks that as a result of Vatican II and the ecumenical movement "the gap is closing between the personal and the impersonal, the subjective and the objective, the practical and the speculative, the existential and the eschatological, the individual and the corporate" (p. 181). M.'s study is a good, rapid overview of the history of faith. There is a wealth of scholarly reading and citation in this volume; the twenty-page bibliography is especially valuable.

William C. McFadden, S.J.


The purpose of this critical reflection is to develop "an expanded concept of faith." This is needed, D. feels, to replace the "narrowly rationalistic and lifeless" understanding that Catholics inherited from Vatican I, and at the same time to counteract the antirationalism he finds prevalent in theology today. D. has his finger on a wide array of contemporary issues—e.g., the nature of the magisterium—and his bibliographies are helpful. But the breadth of his outlook is achieved at heavy cost. The rich and important evolution of the theology of faith, especially as culminating in Trent, is simply washed out in his approach. And in his zeal to readjust our faith to a more personalistic and worldly spirituality and thus to superecede the older manuals and catechisms, D. tends to reduce even the biblical data to these patterns. He therefore misses the real impact of the twentieth-century biblical movement, as well as the awakening of historical consciousness that was a hallmark of Vatican II—two major thrusts that give current theology its vitality. Without serious consideration of Scripture as the normative source of our faith, and of historical context as the condition of all theologizing, D. cannot go very far toward displacing "the old apologetic."

Philip M. Stark, S.J.


This popular treatment of confession succeeds in its principal aim of offering suggestions for making confession more meaningful by seeing it as an approach to a loving Father, recognizing it as an encounter with the Lord. Helpful hints for a more relevant examination of conscience are offered. The style is overly simple at times, as though the author were addressing children, although the ideas are meant more for those who are involved in giving children their introduction to confession. Although the book contains many helpful hints, I would hesitate to recommend it to anyone not trained in theology. In attempting to solve some very real pastoral problems connected with confession, B. makes a number of statements which are at least debatable, if not false. For example, to state that all once-a-year Easter-duty confessions are "empty gestures without faith" (p. 88) is a falsifying oversimplification. His treatment of the fundamental-option theory is also confusing. Most would agree that a person could rarely go through any regular routine of committing formal mortal sins and repenting of them week after week. But the solution can be found
in a proper understanding of formal mortal sin as a fully free deliberate choice, rather than in a confusing distinction between "serious" sin which must be confessed and mortal sin which separates one from the life of grace. Confusing also is B.'s contention that preadolescents are incapable of even venial sin, while twelve-year-old adolescents are capable of formal mortal sin. I would judge the opposite on both counts to be more ordinarily true. To state that the doctrine "that one serious sin puts you in hell is theologically false" (p. 56) is again oversimplistic in its solution to the admitted exaggerations of retreat stories of how one might end up in hell for one mortal sin. It seems too bad that a really helpful book should contain such questionable doctrine.

Joseph J. Farraher, S.J.


The book is part of the collection Réponses chrétiennes directed by Philippe Delhaye and Gustave Thils of Louvain. It is short, has a small bibliography, and is fairly interesting. But it is hard to see just what kind of public it is meant to serve. It is too simple for the person accustomed to serious reading, and for the novice in ethics it is misleading because it treats great problems without much depth. C. believes the changing conditions of human existence are so profound that they should be called mutations; they call for corresponding mutations in moral theology. He proposes to contribute to this mutation by presenting the main lines of development of a method which integrates human reflection and Christian faith, and applications to the wide areas of man, politics, the economy, culture, and revolution. One expects the first chapter to give the first outlines of a method. The outlines are there but they are bare outlines: morality on the human level should accent the person, sociability, historicity; noetically, there should be a synthesis of many disciplines. Evangelical morality gives us an interior law; this morality is a dialogue; God incarnated in Jesus Christ is the measure of the ethical demand. All these things have been said so many times. The last chapter is about revolution. C. gives the situation which might justify revolution—the state of violence: totalitarian, socioeconomic, racist—each in broad and simplistic strokes that really do not mean anything to a person who has been through the last month on a college campus. He discusses the principles of a just revolution against this background. It is a bit like the usual résumés of the just-war theory. But the book shows that C. is widely read and has thought deeply about the problems he discusses. A book with more depth and less broad in scope would be welcome.

Robert H. Dailey, S.J.


The time has come, Persons proclaims, for contemporary philosophers and theologians to consider seriously the possibility that man is not alone in the universe. While this idea is not entirely new—men have given much thought to the existence of such nonhuman intelligent beings as angels and God—a quite different dimension would be added by the existence of intelligent, organic extraterrestrial beings. The unifying element of the book lies in the concept of person, and P. devotes an initial chapter to careful analytic examination of the meaning of the word. His conclusion is that intelligence is not an adequate criterion.
for what we mean by person; a person must be a moral agent. From this basis he moves into plausible and exciting interdisciplinary speculation. The possibility of person-artifacts (e.g., an advanced design of computer) is explored. P. then moves on to his main concern: naturally evolved moral agents on planets other than the earth. After marshaling the compelling scientific arguments and assumptions that make the existence of such nonhuman persons a real and not a remote possibility, P. calls on widely disparate fields of knowledge in order to speculate on the physical structure and social order that might characterize such a race. The practical possibility and importance of communication with another intelligent race is realistically treated. Finally, in a chapter on divine Persons, P. examines the effects that the existence of extraterrestrial moral agents would have on traditional religion. The implications of such a discovery would be particularly challenging to the historical revelations of Judaism, Islam, and Christianity. While the treatment is by no means theologically sophisticated, the questions posed to religion and theology are certainly stimulating. One thing is certain: one can no longer regard the existence of nonhuman extraterrestrial persons as the bizarre concoction of writers of fiction; the possibility must be taken seriously.

_Peter C. McNamee, S.J._


Chicago, capital of the American heartland, has repeatedly produced leaders of American Catholicism, not the least of whom is Ed Marciniak. Long involved in social action, he has stepped on toes, and the present volume will continue to do so. No sycophant, he is hard to categorize as anticlerical or clerical. The terms in his case are meaningless. He is rather the authentic layman, the secular Christian. He finds it farcical for the clergyman, however genuinely intentioned, to spell out specifics for bringing the Church into the world. It is, instead, the layman's role, as one already in the world, to Christianize society. He is to be the "man of the eighth day," a day that inaugurates a new era, a man of "pilgrimage into the future, called to freedom and love in service." For "there is hope on earth when men are its caretakers for God." The "man of the eighth day" is neither slave nor master. With a sense of freedom he carries on his life's work, since "taking the world off God's hands is a supremely religious act." Speaking from wide, long, and hard experience, M. cautions his fellow laymen against biding "their time looking for others to take the initiative and to bear the burden of responsibility." A lively contribution to the theology of the world, useful to layman and cleric.

_C. J. McNaspy, S.J._


Church denominationalism, state exploitation, dying fish, and swinging billies—these are the failures of our society on which the judgment of this book is based. It is a kind of ethics for the neophyte (and which of us is not one?) to the nonviolence and unity which a penetration back to Jesus involves. The new community is a Church complete with saints, Jeremiah, Francis, Wesley, Fox, and with sacraments, the seven demands of the revolution: fidelity, love, usefulness, justice, service, hope, and joy. Jesus is the model as nonselfassertive in service who has passed over to the other side of death; the cross is the sacrament of politics. The language
is that of the past decade: "baptism is the permanently valid symbolic act by which we receive solidarity with Jesus' way of non-violence." But what really makes it our guidebook is that it repeats our own doomed directives to ourselves: "keep in mind the changes in society required by the needs of the planet and of the poor; believe that those changes can be made by our fidelity and nothing else."

There are places, however, where B. reveals the frailty of our plans; this example is so ironically un-American: "The wagon wheels of our journey on the unmarked roads of the revolutionary frontier sink into the swollen stream. We look for every possible route. Salvation is the last resort." If the dying fish and swinging billies mean judgment, then this is a book for those disciplined to insisting on more than smiling through the apocalypse.

George W. Bur, S.J.


Post-World War II Germany, confused, battered, and almost dead, is the principal setting for this first official biography of the "miracle worker" of the Vatican diplomatic corps. B.'s sympathetic account quickly traces Muench's life from his birth to Bavarian immigrant parents in Milwaukee in 1889, through seminary days, economics and social studies, seminary professor and rector, Bishop of Fargo in 1935. With his appointment as apostolic visitor to Germany in 1946, M.'s life took on new direction and vitality. He was also head of the Vatican mission and nuncio to Germany, liaison consultant for religious affairs to the American Military Government, military delegate to American Catholics. He soon realized that his main concern was to come to the aid of the helpless victims of the war. He quickly found favor and support among most German bishops, for he spoke their language and respected their manners and customs.

As visitor and later as nuncio, he was engaged in many diplomatic confrontations, e.g., the protracted negotiations on the implementation of the 1933 Vatican concordat with Germany. Problems were numerous and often potentially explosive. One problem never resolved was his relations with the Catholics of East Germany: he was the Vatican representative in all of Germany but in fact was free and operative only in the western sections. He was expected to promote good will between the Army of Occupation and the German people—a delicate mission, because he could not identify too closely with the military lest he risk attack from Russia as a tool of the imperialists and discredit his apostolic mission. He became seriously embroiled in the Bavarian school controversy when the American forces attempted to fashion a school system contrary to the confessional institutions previously existing in that land.

M., in many ways a romantic, longed to return to Fargo, but Pius XII insisted that he remain in Germany and continue his work. In 1959, he was named to the College of Cardinals and given a Vatican post. This was the beginning of the end. He felt unsuited to curial life and, although he tried to play an active role in the Vatican as a member of the Congregation for Extraordinary Affairs, he found himself out of place and alone. His health declined, his cheerful disposition faded, his spirits drooped, senility set in, he died Feb. 15, 1962.

If the work has limitations, it is by way of omission. M.'s extraordinary accomplishments, his docility and obedience to the wishes of ecclesiasti-
cal superiors, and his universal love had to be motivated by a deep and enduring spiritual life nourished by fruitful prayer. Yet this aspect is never developed. What emerges is more of a surface picture than a portrait in depth. B. has consulted innumerable archival depositories, talked with scores of people, and fashioned a competent biography the scholarly equal of his previous work on the German Americans.

Francis G. McManamin, S.J.

BOOKS RECEIVED

[All books received are listed here whether they are reviewed or not]

SCRIPTURAL STUDIES


Fortna, Robert T. The Gospel of Signs: A Reconstruction of the Narrative Source Underlying the Fourth Gos-


DOCTRINAL THEOLOGY

Anselm of Canterbury. Why God Became Man & The Virgin Conception


MORAL, LAW, LITURGY


PASTORAL AND ASCETICAL


HISTORY AND PATRISTICS


Hodges, Melvin. *Growing Young Churches: How to Advance Indigenous Churches Today.* Chicago: