BOOK REVIEWS


This is a book to provide scholarly underpinning for such a heartbreakingly perverse interpretation of Jesus as is to be found in Albert Cleage's The Black Messiah. Brandon has assembled with great erudition the biblical and extrabiblical evidence for Jesus the nationalist Messiah who preached armed resistance against the detested foreign domination of His people and who as a consequence died on a Roman gibbet ("the most certain thing known about Jesus of Nazareth"), whose patriotic movement was transmuted by Paul and the Evangelists into a universal gospel of salvation with a spiritual and supranational Christ.

The thesis, as B. freely admits, is not a new one. Most of its elements appear in the German criticism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in the work of H. S. Reimarus (mentioned once by B.), D. F. Strauss (not mentioned), F. C. Baur (whose name is misspelt by B. and has been confused by his indexer with that of W. Bauer), the Tübingen school, and more recently in the writings of R. Eisler (often cited by B.). What is new is a rather thoroughgoing study of the Zealots in the context of Jewish life in Roman Palestine, with full use made of the Masada data (a number of interesting plates are included). This study alone may be thought sufficient to give the book permanent value.

It is difficult to assay the degree of ingenuousness with which B. asks for his work to be examined by Christians kaltblütig and not be taken by them as an attack on Christianity. It is, of course, an attack on Christianity, as complete and total an attack as can possibly be imagined. And if only because Christianity has attained a certain right of possession in B.'s chosen field and has had its rival interpretation of the facts confirmed by some historical experience, Christians may perhaps be excused if they do not expect to be contrarily persuaded in a short time by B.'s evidence. They are not thereby excused from examining the evidence, but they are not required to pretend that nothing more is involved than an academic seminar in historical credibility. As a reviewer wrote recently in the Times Literary Supplement of another of B.'s works: "We have no business to be asked to agree that behind all this [the atonement] there lay a sorry affair of faked records, which when they are examined by modern scholars reveal a story so different that Christianity can only be dismissed as a mistake." An old-fashioned argument this, but then B.'s book is an old-fashioned one; this is not the
first time that common sense has had to be a refuge against scholarship. If "the concept of the pacific Christ" and the gospel of universal love are really the rather casual achievements of not-too-clever forgers, if we are left with only a Jewish partisan whose execution "was not particularly remarkable," does not the astonishing success of the fraud, or the colossal size of the mistake, leave us with historical enigmas less tolerable than any interpretation Christianity has ever offered?

B.’s arguments, nevertheless, must be met on the same dialectical ground he has chosen. The reviewer’s primary objection to B.’s use of the Gospel evidence is not that it is selective but that it is calculated never to permit him to lose in the exchange. If a Synoptic author has let slip something he can use—something about swords, let us say—we are said to be in the realm of statistical fact. If the same author pronounces clearly against the interpretation B. has given to the fact, the denial can be used, too, as evidence of the attempt to conceal it. Nowhere, really, is the historical reliability of the Gospels or their redactional interests considered apart from the Tendenz that B. has assigned to them.

Questions are provoked on every page. Why did Mark “conceal” the presence of a Zealot among Jesus’ followers so ineffectively, leaving behind an Aramaic term for which Luke in all good faith supplied the Greek translation? Why did he not conceal it once for all by expunging the word from his source? If Jesus led an armed and fierce band, why was He taken so easily, and why did He die in isolation from His disciples, unlike His compeer Theudas, unlike the followers of the Egyptian Messiah? Would Pilate’s offering of Jesus for Barabbas be necessarily “the act of an idiot”? Explanations have been offered that are at least as plausible as B.’s reconstruction (cf. A. Bajsic, “Pilatus, Jesus und Barabbas,” Biblica 48 [1967] 7–28). B. has constructed an elaborate hypothesis of an Alexandrian Jewish Christianity, a daughter church of Jerusalem reinforced by Peter’s presence, which fed the opposition to Paul at Corinth. Thus there were “Peter” and “Christ” parties of authentic Jewish Christianity fighting against Paul. But B. seems not to have noted that there was an “Apollos” party as well, equally Alexandrian ex hypothesi. Does 1 Cor 3:5–9 indicate that Paul “denigrated” Alexandrian Christianity? Is Gal 2:1–10 consonant with the idea that Paul “insinuated that the Jerusalem Christians taught ‘another gospel,’ which concerned ‘another Jesus’ and involved a ‘different Spirit’”? These negative criticisms are not intended to put anyone off from reading this book. One thing it does very well is to show that Leben-Jesu Forschung has not disappeared from the world of scholarship. If
some Christian scholars no longer express any interest in the life of the historical Jesus, others quite obviously do.

De Paul University, Chicago

BRUCE VAWTER, C.M.


The text of the new volume by the Titus Street Professor of Ecclesiastical History at Yale draws from various sources: a series of lectures with two other chapters (1-2) revised from lectures given at St. John’s University, Collegeville, Minn., and Woodstock College, Md., and an article prepared for THEOLOGICAL STUDIES. To this the author has added a preface, a brief introduction, and a conclusion. Indeed, the diversity of the occasions which were the genesis of the book is the cause of a certain imbalance between the introductory chapters and the patristic discussions. The three patristic chapters (on Cyprian, Athanasius, and Hilary) are, however, straightforward enough. The first shows how the doctrine of original sin was developed by Cyprian from Tertullian, but now with the acceptance of the necessity of infant baptism, in the formulation of a dogmatic position which was to remain in the West as the bulwark against Pelagius. The third piece (chap. 5) deals with the development of the doctrine of the Filioque in Hilary of Poitiers, and it is one of the clearest and best, although it is true to say that the ideas are not new.

The second chapter of the triad (chap. 4), perhaps the weakest, is a discussion of Athanasius’ position with regard to Mary. As with Cyprian, Pelikan attempts to relate Athanasius’ doctrine to Church practice, but here his position is on less secure grounds. Though it is correct to say that “the mutual concordance of devotion and dogma in the mariology of Athanasius deserves consideration as another principle and method of the development of doctrine” (pp. 112-13), yet he goes too far in suggesting that Marian doctrine in Athanasius was derived by extrapolation from the lives of contemporary consecrated women vowed to perpetual virginity. The distance between fictional portraits of the life of Mary, as we find them in Ambrose, e.g., and the doctrine of theotokos, with all that it involved, is quite extensive. Hence in this chapter Pelikan seems to combine scholarship with a broad element of the speculative.

The three patristic chapters are, however, the best part of the book. My chief difficulty is with the first two introductory chapters, which attempt to define the limits of doctrinal development; for, though they take their point of departure from Cardinal Newman, they lack a cer-
tain clarity of design and structure. To say that the dichotomy between Protestants and Catholics is equivalent to that between the positions of F.-P. Guizot and Newman, or to "locate the continuity [of the Church] not in 'principles' but in the Christian experience" (p. 16), is not really to state the problem correctly. Indeed, how the basic point at issue could ever become so obscured is, to me at least, a mystery. I would hesitantly suggest that P. has not yet completely come to grips with the problem of doctrinal development. Else, surely, he could not have written: "Doctrine develops out of earlier doctrine within the total life of the Church in the world. And it does not do so on the basis of the a priori logic prescribed by the theologian, but on the basis of an a posteriori logic to be described by the historian" (p. 51). And yet, all the while, the lucid statement of the late John Courtney Murray was chosen for the opening paragraph of his introduction (p. 1), so that the ultimate clue was there for all to read: "That development has taken place in both communities [Catholic and Protestant] cannot possibly be denied. The question is, what is legitimate development, what is organic growth in the understanding of the original deposit of faith . . . and what, on the other hand, is accretion, additive increment, adulteration of the deposit, distortion of true Christian discipline?"

Thus, when Murray continues to warn both against "archaistic stuntedness" as well as "futuristic decadence," he is doing more than merely raising the question or setting the stage; he is, as was his wont, actually intimating a solution. For the problem of "legitimate development" cannot merely be solved by the historian who records history wie es eigentlich gewesen. For certain doctrines only have meaning within the context of the sensitive community, the People of God, who have long since woven the truths into the texture of their liturgical lives. For this reason, I submit, I cannot fully approve of any solution to the problem which will make the historian the ultimate arbiter; and this, perhaps without intending it, P. gives the impression of doing.

But these are minor areas of disagreement. This attractive volume, with its liberal and open approach to historical theology, will commend itself to the theologian and ecclesiastical historian alike, in whatever camp he may find himself. Its genial and literate style recalls some of the better pages of Harnack, without the master's narrowness of focus and partisan prejudices. Both Protestant and Catholic will perhaps find material for disagreement in Pelikan's monograph; but all surely will agree that it is an open, forthright discussion that lays bare much of the sensitive areas which still form an obstacle to ultimate union.

Fordham University

HERBERT MUSURILLO, S.J.
This volume of Trembelas’ dogmatic theology treats the sacraments and eschatology. It is written in the textbook style of Orthodox theologians. Their method is similar to that of Catholic manuals in a logical exposition of the subject matter, but depends largely on the mere positive statements of Scripture and the Fathers with scarcely any exegesis or argumentation. In the section on the sacraments in general T. concentrates on the supernatural efficacy of the sacraments as instruments of God’s grace. He equates this with the *ex opere operato* doctrine of Trent. Although he accepts the doctrine of the “character,” he does not consider it a matter of faith. He defends the doctrine of Cyprian, which is accepted by the Orthodox church, regarding the invalidity of the sacraments of heretics and schismatics. The theory of “economy” is expounded to account for the variances in the practice of the Orthodox regarding heterodox sacraments. This doctrine is not very palatable to those engaged in ecumenism. This section is also subject to the criticism of all scholastic manuals of the past, since it has nothing of the modern approach to sacramental theology, which is concerned with personal encounter with God in the saving acts of Christ.

T. regards the Latin custom of baptizing by infusion as unjustified except in necessity. The efficacy of baptism of desire does not seem demonstrable to him. In conformity with their theory on heterodox sacraments, the Orthodox logically reject baptism administered in necessity by a non-Christian. In confirmation, however, T. rejects the Catholic doctrine that the bishop is the sole ordinary minister of the sacrament and maintains with Macarius that the priest receives this power at his ordination. The old question of leavened or unleavened bread is reviewed in the section on the Eucharist, but T. seems content to leave it to custom, although he favors the Greek arguments that leavened bread was used at the Last Supper. He insists, however, that the epiclesis of the Greek anaphora is a necessary and essential element for the Eucharistic conversion. The Catholic practices of not giving Communion to infants and ordinarily giving Communion only under one species to adults are condemned as unjustified innovations based on vain human rationalizations. While T. accepts the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation, he mistakenly thinks that it was intended as a philosophical explanation of the transformation. The section on penance is for the greater part in conformity with any Catholic manual, except for its doctrine on satisfaction. T., as do other modern Orthodox authors, denies the possibility of making satisfaction for punishment
due to sin and consequently affirms that the penance imposed in the sacrament is merely medicinal. Gordillo has attributed this doctrine to the influence among Orthodox theologians of the Protestant theory of justification. Logically, it includes the denial of indulgences. When treating orders, T. again applies the doctrine of Cyprian to the case of a bishop who has fallen away from the doctrine of the Church and concludes to the invalidity of his administrations. It is interesting to note that it is this doctrine that is being used today by a group of American Orthodox to condemn the Patriarch Athenagoras and the Archbishop Iakovos. The dignity and sanctity of the sacrament of marriage is exemplified with many quotations from Scripture and the Fathers. The customary arguments for the practice among the Orthodox of allowing divorce in the case of adultery are also presented. T. rejects the doctrine that the sacramental sign is the contract, on the grounds that it is not traditional and leads to a merely civil concept of marriage. There is little to be remarked in his exposition of the anointing of the sick, except the emphasis that he puts on the fact that the Orthodox priest is the one who blesses the oil. He also mentions the administration of the sacrament in certain circumstances to those who are healthy.

The last section deals with eschatology. This part of theology was never systematically developed in detail among the Greeks; consequently, its treatment is rather vague on many points. This is especially true of the doctrine of purgatory. After all the years of controversy over this subject, it is surprising to find T. speaking of the Catholic "dogma" of fire in purgatory. After rejecting the arguments of Catholic theologians from Scripture and tradition regarding any satispassio, he presents some of the theories of Orthodox theologians, who attempt to explain the effect of suffrages for the deceased in a vague sort of way.

As a textbook which gives expanded comment from patristic sources, it will probably have little interest for those whom Maritain calls neo-Modernists, but if there be any theologians who may be termed classicists in a nonpejorative sense, they will find a wealth of very inspiring observations by the Fathers on the significance of the sacraments.

Boston College

JAMES L. MONKS, S.J.


Yves Congar agreed "many years ago" to write the volume on ecclesiology for the Dogmengeschichte of Herder. This volume is not yet
published, the *Dogmengeschichte* having easily beaten all records for slowness of publication. The text of his contribution (C. confides in his introduction to the present volume) being extremely concise because of the limits imposed on him by the publisher, he did for himself the background studies necessary to arrive at the summaries that were eventually included in his still unpublished manuscript. At this time, however, and whatever will happen to the concise history of ecclesiology then written, Congar has decided to publish some of these background studies, elaborating and arranging them in order to provide a detailed ecclesiology for a given period. Several volumes are promised.

Such is the origin of the present book on the ecclesiology of what popular historiography unfortunately calls the Dark Ages. The exact period covered goes from the death of Gregory the Great (604) and Isidore of Seville (636) to the election of Leo IX (1049). In other words, it is the most neglected era for the history of any theological tractate. For this reason alone, C.'s study will fill the enormous gap in the knowledge of the tradition felt by the average contemporary theologian.

Largely on account of its origin, however, the book does not try to be systematic and exhaustive. Significantly, it is not divided in chapters but in sections (A, B, C), each one of which is fashioned of a number of more or less disconnected subsections. C. examines the most important ecclesiological themes one after another. Beginning with “the Church in itself” (Section A), he studies “the concept and the images of the Church,” “the Churches, the episcopate, and the Roman primacy,” “the regulation of Church life,” and “the Roman primacy seen from Rome.” Section B, on “the temporal aspect of the *ecclesia,*” surveys several items of the political theology of the times, dealing chiefly with the relations between papal and episcopal authority on the one hand, imperial and royal power on the other. Section C considers the main trends of Oriental theology in the period, under the headings of “the Church as mystery,” “the social and canonical life of the Church,” “the communion of the Churches” (together with the progressive estrangement between Rome and Byzantium). This last section is particularly welcome: it provides a valuable counterweight to the excessive westernization of theology by presenting in one study the evolution of thought in both East and West, though Western developments obtain the lion’s share.

Because this was not a period of outstanding theologians, C. has, most of the time, studied the period together, showing the historical developments where there are some (especially in the matter of the Roman primacy) but abstaining from monographic studies of single au-
thors. There are some notable exceptions. The ecclesiology of Hincmar, Archbishop of Rheims from 845 to 882, is singled out for special treat­
ment (pp. 166-77). Hincmar, who is known for his involvement in the predestinarian and the Trinitarian controversies against Gottschalk, defended a very conciliar conception of the Church in which the metropolitan played a key role. His views often conflicted with those of the popes, especially Nicholas I. The ecclesiology of Nicholas I (858-67) is also studied at length (pp. 206-27); Nicholas’ conceptions were influential in the development of Western ecclesiology away from the views of Hincmar, and still more important for the deterioration of the relations between Rome and Byzantium, since the Photius affair started during his pontificate.

As I see it, the main interest of the book today will lie in its account of the growth of the papal idea. C. makes it clear that Rome and the rest of Christendom as a whole did not follow the same pace in the development of their conceptions about papal authority. To say nothing of Eastern doctrine, carefully studied by C. but generally known already, the West itself, particularly in Gallic and Germanic regions, did not automatically follow the same course as Roman canonical and ecclesiological thinking. There was never a real opposition to the Petrine claims of universal authority, but there was considerable disagreement as to the extent of this authority and the modes of its application. Yet Rome, since the days of Leo I, interpreted the promise to Peter (Mt 14:18) as applying also to the bishop of Rome, while others were quite reluctant to follow suit and frequently applied it to all the bishops. In their quarrels with various princes, the Roman pontiffs emphasized their own authority as kingmakers in Christendom, while other bishops stressed episcopal or (like Hincmar) metropolitan authority. In this period, indeed, the forgers of the False Decretals were at work, supporting papal authority with inauthentic documents, yet C. finds that the Roman claims of the times were never based on them: these, rather, were based on the Roman claims. At any rate, it was not before the reformed papacy which followed the ascent of Leo IX to the papal throne that the voice of Rome began to be commonly heeded in the matter.

This volume will be of great help to researchers for its extended bibliographies and footnotes. Never forgetting that he was long a teacher, Congar likes to suggest topics for theses and monographs. . . . In our days of confusion all should also gain some serenity from this serene account of an immeasurably more confused period than ours.

_Pennsylvania State University_  
_GEORGE H. TAVARD_
definitely Catholic according to the Queen's understanding, following the best tradition of Scripture and the early Church. In 1563 she put the case in a letter to Ferdinand: "We and our people—thanks be to God—follow no novel and strange religions, but that very religion which is ordained by Christ, sanctioned by the primitive and Catholic Church and approved by the consentient mind and voice of the most early Fathers."

Concentrating upon the first decade of the reign, H. does not take into account the evidence concerning the Queen's religion which comes from consideration of her birth, education, and early experience, particularly the harrowing experience of Mary Tudor's reign. The Queen's own interpretation of the faith grew under the influence of persons such as Cheke and Ascham, moderate Protestants deeply rooted in humanism and appreciative of right reason acting in concord with revelation as witnessed in Scripture. Nor does he take into account evidence from a later period, particularly Elizabeth's confessions of faith arising out of her desperate struggle over Mary Stuart. Thus H. stops short of fulfilling the promise of his title, *Elizabeth and the English Reformation*. The book, valuable as it admittedly is, is not an exhaustive study of the Queen's understanding of and relationship to the English reformation.

H. is correct in recognizing the Queen's important role in the reformation. He sees her and her bishops as the first defenders of a distinctly Anglican tradition, characterized not only by its liturgy and polity, but also by its rejection of dogmatic confessionalism. And he proposes that in any arrangement of individuals having influence upon Anglicanism Elizabeth the laywoman be ranked with Thomas Cranmer the cleric. He is not entirely devoted to the Queen, recognizing as he does the financial abuse of the Church for which the Queen was responsible. But this book is an Anglican's monument to a great Christian ruler, the more impressive because it is an essentially scholarly book, well documented.

*Episcopal Theological School*  
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**John E. Booty**


This study shows the polar interdependence of Kierkegaard's affirmations on God and on man. A centrifugal or diastatic movement opposes God and man in his work, while a centripetal, synthetic relation connects them. Since Christ is always present to Kierkegaard's idea of
God, it is by no means arbitrary to concentrate on His role. The theme of Sponheim’s book is important and well chosen. It underlies the basic texts in which Kierkegaard outlines his religious anthropology and it determines his entire vision of authentic Christianity. Moreover, S. is to be commended for his courage in venturing upon a systematic approach to Kierkegaard in the face of the inane antirationalism so pontifically proclaimed from prestigious theology chairs in this country. In this respect S. makes a welcome break with most of the Kierkegaard tradition in the English language.

Unfortunately, in another sense he remains very much within the “establishment.” He emphasizes the synthetic aspects of Kierkegaard’s work, for he feels correctly that the past interpretations known to him have been primarily diastatic. Yet there is another tradition and S. suspects its existence. At the end of his introductory part he writes: “One might expect to find a parallel tendency in considerable Roman Catholic literature on Kierkegaard” (p. 46). Since this interpretation is in line with what he sets out to do himself, one expects him to consult it. But except for intermittent references to James Collins and, at the end, the inevitable names of Teilhard, Rahner, and Marcel (all of whom remain at a safe distance from Kierkegaard), we never hear again of this “considerable Roman Catholic literature.” In a thousand footnotes the author manages to ignore en bloc all Catholic interpretations of Kierkegaard, even the ones written in English, even the ones directly related to the subject (such as Przywara’s Geheimnis Kierkegaards, which is not even listed). With one insignificant exception, not a single work in French or Italian is mentioned in the bibliography (much less in the text), not even Wahl’s 700-page Etudes Kierkegaardiennes or Mesnard’s and Fabro’s important writings on the topic. Instead, S. diligently concentrates on giving its full due to every little remark made in any book or article of his own Protestant Anglo-Germanic tradition. Of course, particularly in this case, some price was to be paid for such a systematic oversight. The metaphysical meaning of Christ in Kierkegaard’s theology, the theory of the Church, and the notion of imitation have been treated extensively and more intelligibly by Catholic or by Latin commentators. To ignore history is to repeat it and to repeat all the errors that already have been eliminated.

Such obvious disregard for an entire tradition in a work that attempts to restore precisely the elements which this tradition has laboriously pointed out is all the more remarkable in an author who so strongly prefers erudition over clarity or even coherence. For the strength of this work on Christian coherence is certainly not logical coherence. Half the time it is impossible to detect the logic which connects the
paragraphs and often even the sentences. The difficulty is increased by S.'s inability to conceive ideas distinctly and to express them clearly. Instead of focusing on an idea until it becomes lucid, he burdens his exposition under a multiplicity of cryptic allusions, undigested quotations, and the above-mentioned thousand footnotes. The jacket lauds the book for being learned; the reader would have preferred it to be intelligible. As it stands now, it illustrates what makes theology today, particularly in our country, such an easy target for the gibes of the philosopher and of anyone trained in logic.

Where a solid philosophical basis is lacking (and S.'s treatment of Hegel reveals that his deficiency is not only in logic), the handling of ideas tends to degenerate into an accumulation of titles or into undisciplined constructivism. Both flaws are present here, the second one in spite of a fully justifiable theme which needed no artificial constructions. This constructivism partly results from the author's method. He takes up various themes of Kierkegaard's theology, points out the diastatic and the synthetic trends, and then concludes that they interpenetrate each other. But in a writer as dialectically coherent as Kierkegaard, the central theme treated in this study has a development of its own to which a discussion of various theological themes cannot do justice. To trace this dialectic and to make it intelligible to the reader would have been a marvelous task. Maybe S. will do it in another book; the present one went too early to the printer.

Georgetown University		Louis Dupré


To say that Total Commitment is a "poor man's Blondel" is not a disparagement. S. has performed a real service in providing the English-bound public with an abridged (roughly one half the length), simplified paraphrase of Blondel's seminal work—the dissertation of 1893, L'Action. The book will be a stopgap until a full translation appears, will suffice as an introduction for those who never will get at the original, and will be a useful interpretative ancilla for the expert. S. gives the complete argument of L'Action, along with enough significant detail to make it believable, while omitting the verbiage that sometimes mars the masterpiece itself. Not that Total Commitment is easy. It is perhaps as clear as it could be, considering the difficulty of the matter; but it is still a very demanding book. There are many passages I was not able to understand, and numerous arguments which, in their present telescoped form at least, failed to convince me. My
over-all impression, however, is that Blondel has a good program. If, as Plato and Aristotle supposed, philosophy is always on the way to becoming politics—and if the thinker must ultimately “return to the cave,” bringing his speculation to bear on the real problems of man in society—then Blondel is a timely philosopher.

S. himself summarizes the argument in a way that is hard to improve: “Blondel had tried to show that the internal dynamism of the will, when followed to the limit, uncovers various levels of life and values for which men live and die: sensation, science, consciousness, freedom, society, metaphysics, the idea of God, religious expectancy, the supernatural. Then, having developed an ordered series of means for the expansion of the will, he maintained that these ideal conditions, revealed to the understanding by the phenomenological method, must be freely embraced in their totality as a system of ends. We are faced with the metaphysical option: whether to submit our will and action to an order that stands before us as a heteronomous imperative, or whether to refuse and try to make phenomena suffice. Submission ... requires that the ideal and conceptual exigencies of the system be given concrete expression in our action” (p. 18). In the “ordered series” from sensation to the supernatural, Blondel tries to show that at each level there is an irreducible leftover which forces the phenomenological analysis to move to a next higher level—and so on up the scale. Thus, empirical science cannot account for the continuity and discreteness in its objects without a secret appeal to a subject; the subject cannot be understood apart from freedom; etc. Ontology is bracketed during this progression, arising only in the second (and more difficult) half of the book with the questions of objectivity, knowing and being, and the “bond” of action.

Before Blondel can climb the phenomenological ladder, however, he first has to show that there really is a problem of action: that man must ask what he is to do with his life, whether life has a meaning, and whether his acts make any difference. The first two chapters, accordingly, dispose of negative answers to this problem, especially nihilism. Blondel did well to put his finger on nihilism—one would suppose him to be either a prophet or a reader of Dostoevsky. His answer to nihilism may be too hurried, but there is no doubt that he struck on the most agonizing problem of twentieth-century man.

In two phases of the phenomenological ascent called “from consciousness to voluntary operation” and “from intentional effort to the first exterior expansion of action” there is a valuable study of freedom. Freedom is preceded and conditioned by determinisms in man’s physiology and unconscious. At the other end, it unleashes determinisms
into the world, an imperishable chain of external events for which one is responsible. Act we must, however, even with imperfect foresight, and at the risk of being compromised. In his appraisal of the determinisms and ambiguities that surround the irreducible primacy of freedom, Blondel has achieved a realistic and attractive view. What is lacking—as it so often is in the introspective French tradition which Blondel represents—is a feel for the historical and sociological dimension of man.

A final warning: Blondel is a dialectician. The nondialectical reader will frequently be at a loss to see why one thing is always “both” itself “and” its other, and why a train of thought that seems to point one way invariably ends up, like an ice-hockey puck, going “precisely” in the other. Aply is Blondel called “the Catholic Hegel.”

Monastery of the Holy Spirit
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Anselm Atkins, O.C.S.O.


This book, with neither bibliography nor index, is divided into four parts which might have been more accurately called chapters. It is principally concerned with one aspect of the psychology of the act of faith: What is the relation between certainty (not to be confused with security) and faith? Or, how can modern man, brought up on the premise that only physical certitude is real, make a responsible act of faith?

M. devotes Part 1 to what he considers the historical and theological causes of the present impasse. Faith in the Pauline sense was primarily fides qua, but during the patristic age the accent gradually shifted to fides quae. The subsequent attempt to differentiate the knowledge of faith from other kinds of knowledge led to the distinction that the latter deals with things seen, while the former deals with things unseen, a trend which continued to the time of Thomas. Indeed, the most commonly used scriptural text during the whole patristic period was Heb 11:1. Though the first to place the operation of faith in the speculative intellect, Thomas did not appreciably contribute to the solution of the problem: since an act of the will is necessary for the assent of the intellect, the latter is not adequately determined by its object; hence faith is still orientated towards that which is unseen. The post-Cartesian and post-Kantian problems complicated an already intellectually serious situation which Vatican I did not correct. In fact, Vatican I seems to have endorsed the prevailing interpretation of the Thomistic view.
Part 2 is concerned with the notion of biblical faith as found especially in the NT: faith consists essentially in grasping on to Christ Jesus and thereby perceiving in Him God who reveals Himself. M. then proceeds to Part 3, where he more closely examines the act of faith and advances to his central thesis. Aside from the question of grace, the intellect-will relation involves to some extent a "theory" of knowledge. Here M.'s analysis has unmistakable phenomenological overtones. Man is capable of knowing physical things by the very fact that they are given; but such knowledge is unfree until man decides what these things shall mean for him. Modern man must therefore be led to see that even in the apparently neutral ground of physical certitude he has opted for meaning before he has opted for truth. Decision is then the differentiating factor in all human knowledge, all the more intimately involved in knowledge entailing moral certitude. Man must freely decide what the revelation of God in Jesus means for him before he comes to consider whether this revelation is true. Thus meaning is psychologically prior to truth, while freedom in decision is the ultimate basis of true knowledge (Wissen) and consequently of certitude (Gewissheit). The important question of the truth of the faith as distinguished from its meaning will be solved principally in and through the Church as community.

Part 4 is limited principally to the historical consequences of the inherited impasse between intellect and will. The first result has been the overemphasis of the former, so that faith has come to mean primarily assent to propositions. Having thus become immobile and somewhat rigid, the content of faith seems easily threatened by new situations and perspectives in the face of which it runs the risk of becoming unintelligible. Paradoxically, faith may next become creedless, in that not seeing the relevance of belief one nonetheless holds on to the faith as if it were true, or in that one believes without adequate justification. The Christian may then be tempted to seek security elsewhere (here M. uses Gewissheit as synonymous with Sicherheit), namely, in faith's relevance not to his own life and destiny but to the world, or to an inadequately founded sense of Christian community in which faith becomes identified with a social ethic. Here we reach the climax of an unfortunate and unnecessary process, in that the role of Christian community is reversed: instead of paving the way for faith, as M. had insisted in Part 3, community replaces it. Despite that danger, the meaning and the truth of faith found in and through the Church as community entails a change in life-style affecting social as well as personal behavior. The creed embraced for the right reasons was and is meant to be not terminus ad quem but terminus a quo.
Such is the general direction of M.'s book. This reviewer's first and lasting impression is that M. has simply attempted too much even for what he calls a sketch. M. seems right in pointing out not only the Scholastic abuse of Heb 11:1 as the most common scriptural source for the notion of faith, but also the results of this imbalance in Thomas. However, M.'s summary of the century preceding Descartes and that which followed him is entirely too facile: M. seems unaware of sources indispensable for understanding the problems which developed, the causes of which are much more complex than he seems to imagine. Again, in attempting to find a balanced scriptural orientation on faith, M. is to be praised; but one is astounded to see that despite abundant use of the TW, no reference whatever is made to 2 Tim 1:12, where the implications of the Greek text could have summed up everything M. was trying to achieve.

Much more disconcerting are M.'s use and occasional misuse of Thomas. His chief criticism of Thomas is not that the will inclines the intellect to assent, but that the influence of the former is external to the latter. Clearly stated in the principal thesis of Part 3 is that an act of the will is internal to any free (in M.'s sense) act of knowing. But here one notes a decided discrepancy between text and critical apparatus. Thus, in the text (p. 30) M. says an inconsistency in Thomas is that on the one hand the influence of the will on the intellect is external, while on the other this fact does not enter into his metaphysics. Yet, on the previous page (n. 32) M. says that in Thomistic metaphysics as a whole there may be a fundamental union (Einheit) between the act(s) of knowing and willing, but that such a union remains to be shown; that whatever be the case, this concept did not enter into Thomas' theology of faith. In a later footnote (p. 35, n. 46) M. brushes aside the obvious meaning of "voluntas et intellectus mutuo se includunt" (Sum. theol. 1, q. 16, a. 4, ad 1m), which militates against his interpretation of Thomas. It is true that the specific context of the article just referred to is not concerned with the theology of faith; but is it so clear that this "mutual influence" Thomas speaks of is to be excluded when it is a question of the act of faith? One wonders what the basis of such exclusion might be.

However, the fundamental objection of the undersigned is that M.'s comments on Thomas fail to distinguish sufficiently between object of faith and motives of credibility. This failure seems more than anything else a root cause of misunderstanding. Certainly statements like "Est autem objectum fidei aliquid non visum circa divina" (2, 2, q. 1, a. 6, c), which reflects the overemphasis of Heb 11:1, do not refer to motives of credibility. The same distinction applies elsewhere, e.g., De
veritate, q. 14, a. 1, c (C), where Thomas speaks of the intellect being "captive" of the will. That the distinction itself is substantially in Thomas' thought should be clear from 2, 2, q. 12, a. 9, ad 3m. Indeed, the very freedom in decision which M. sees as the basis of all free (i.e., fully human) knowledge and consequent certitude does not seem entirely foreign to the reply to the second objection in the article just mentioned. Moreover, there is not a single reference to Thomas' earlier work, Quaestiones disputatae de caritate, which could have cleared up some of the obscurity in the Summa, e.g., 2, 2, q. 2, a. 10, ad 2m, taken up by M., pp. 34–35, where his remark that faith as the acceptance of things unseen stands in competition with knowledge (p. 34) is entirely unjustified. Manifestly, Thomas' treatment of the psychology of the act of faith leaves something to be desired, especially in terms of what the second half of the twentieth century may need; but in pointing out deficiency where it exists, nothing is gained by oversimplification.

A few final considerations. The central thesis of Part 3 appears to be a step in the right direction: in the world of lived experience, meaning is psychologically prior to truth; any realistic "apologetic" must bear this in mind. But there are limits: certain given have relations which do not seem dependent on subjective and intersubjective activity. How far M.'s Heideggerian perspective can be defended on the physical level is open to very serious question indeed; its value here lies primarily in the possibilities it offers for exploring the nature of decisions involving moral certitude. M. is likewise to be commended for showing in Part 4 the dangers of faith consisting especially in assent to propositions. As to Konvergensbeweis (p. 89) as a method for establishing the truth of the faith and the essential structure of the Church once they have been grasped as existentially meaningful, M. seems to think that an "apologetic" based on lines of convergence is a relatively recent insight, and this apparent fact again confirms what was said above in another context, namely, that M. seems unaware of studies in other areas besides phenomenology (in this case, e.g., of the qualitatively significant research carried out for the last thirty years on Pascal's unfinished apolétiqûe and the nonscholastic theory of knowledge it presupposes) which could undoubtedly help in his thoroughly worthwhile endeavor.

Much more might be said both in praise and in blame. Georg Muschalek obviously intends this book as the preliminary outline of a subsequent, more developed work. For that reason its importance is not in proportion to its size. The value of Glaubensgewissheit in
Freiheit, which M. modestly calls a sketch, lies not so much in what it is as in what it could become. Prospere procedat.

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This is a translation of Ebeling's Wort Gottes und Tradition (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1964). The twelve articles collected here reflect two decades of E.'s research on theological hermeneutic and the problem of tradition. They are more particularly concerned with the implications of this research for an analysis of the Catholic-Lutheran confessional difference.

Ecumenically the book is somewhat discouraging. As the leading systematic thinker among the German post-Bultmannians, E. can speak with a certain authority for at least one school of contemporary Lutheran theology. As an honest and generally well-informed critic of contemporary Catholicism, he is in a position to offer a searching analysis of the old Catholic-Lutheran confessional difference and the present-day possibilities of transcending that difference. Yet article after article ends on a sober note: developments in both Catholic and Lutheran theology indeed make a number of traditional confessional disagreements questionable today, but further reflection quickly shows that the old confessional difference has only moved to a more fundamental level. E. locates this basic confessional difference in the theological hermeneutic (and the ontology implied in this hermeneutic) proper to each confession: Catholics and Lutherans are in fundamental disagreement over how the word of God is made present in the world today (and, consequently, over the analysis of the saving efficacy of that word). Thus, Catholics regard the Church as Christus prolongatus, an unambiguous norm of interpretation for both the apostolic witness to Christ contained in the Bible and all later Christian witness (including Church doctrine) interpreting the Bible throughout Church history. Lutherans, on the contrary, insist that the Bible must be sui ipsius interpres; all later Christian tradition must be criticized in the light of the biblical text; the biblical text itself must be criticized in the light of its Sache, Christ, the Word of God in person. Similarly, Catholics treat proclamation as something preliminary and partial, ordered to the acquisition of grace, which is possessed "ontologically" only through the sacramental life of the Church. Lutherans,
on the other hand, insist that salvation is decided in terms of the pro-
claimed word of God and man's response to that word in faith or un-
belief; grace is the relational reality of the man of faith coram Deo;
sacraments are simply special instances of saving word-events. Finally,
Catholics subordinate the individual Christian believer to an institu-
tional, infallible Church, while Lutherans uphold the radical re-
ponsibility of the individual conscience standing under the liberating
word of God and deny that organizational unity beyond the level of
individual churches is ultimately necessary for the genuine unity of
the one Body of Christ.

Such candid confessional analysis, more concerned with isolating
fundamental oppositions than with suggesting ways of overcoming con-
temporary confessional disagreements, is not as fashionable today as
other, more irenic approaches. But precisely this kind of analysis can
be quite profitable—both for Catholic ecumenists who claim E. has
distorted or oversimplified Catholic confessional claims, and for Lu-
theran ecumenists who do not share E.'s particular interpretation of
Lutheranism. If Catholics, at least today, do not hold what E. claims
they hold, what do they hold? If Lutheranism is not what E. says it is,
what is it? These are legitimate questions, and questions which E. can
legitimately demand be answered by his critics, Catholic and Lu-
theran, before his own analysis is dismissed as hopelessly negative. In
the judgment of the present reviewer, E. is clearly asking, of both
Catholics and Lutherans, precisely the questions which need to be
asked today. The problems which he raises in an article like "Sola
scriptura and Tradition" are fundamental in any adequate theological
hermeneutic today. What sense does it make to claim that certain
doctrinal pronouncements of the Church may not be criticized in the
light of the Bible, and simultaneously affirm that the Church stands
under the Bible? What sense does it make to talk of a normative bib-
lical canon and simultaneously deny the possibility of any normative
agency in the Church competent to establish such a canon? In the
light of our present knowledge of the genesis of the NT, in what sense
is the biblical kerygma grounded in the person of Jesus of Nazareth?
What alternative to biblical fundamentalism is available for either
Catholics or Lutherans besides some sort of biblical Sachkritik? If
none, what are the criteria for such Sachkritik, and how does one
justify such criteria? These are all valid and central questions, still
unconscionably neglected in certain theological circles today. Perhaps
the merit of E.'s book is that he has raised precisely these questions
with a particular urgency.

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BOOK REVIEWS


The physiognomy of the law-gospel debate has only in very recent years appeared as a dim shadow on the horizon of Catholic thought. One looks in vain, e.g., for any specifically Catholic treatises on the subject. In a way this lacuna is an anomaly, for hardly any other confession has so consistently placed its caesura on law. One might even infer from the scroll of Catholic theological history that gospel as such has been judiciously relegated to scholia and footnotes in the theological megastructure. But this would be somewhat of an oversimplification; for if the law-gospel dialectic has not received systematic treatment, nonetheless the gospel has been operative on the existentiell level of religious living. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the gospel managed to surface as a dolphin in the vast ocean created by treatises on moral theology, canon law, and official pronouncements. Present somehow or another, the gospel has managed to show an enormous capacity for survival among the heaviest waters. If these statements seem too strong, it might be well to recall Auerbach's observation that the demands of Scripture are tyrannical; they yield to no other authority.

At this juncture of history, however, law-gospel is no longer an exclusively Protestant problem. Current Catholic theology as well as religious practice are bringing the law-gospel problematic to the forefront of Catholic consciousness, even though, to my knowledge, few theologians have raised the unthematized to the thematic and theoretical level. The law-gospel antinomy should be a major motif in any theology, because there is the persistent danger that theology be substituted for the saving events it seeks to understand. And this procedure, as Herbert Richardson points out in the Introduction, creates a theology which becomes a sort of law and can quite easily find itself in opposition to the gospel.

From the Protestant standpoint, Forde claims that the debate about law and gospel is 150 years old and dates from J. C. K. von Hofmann, who propounded a Heilsgeschichte theology in opposition to the Orthodox position on vicarious satisfaction. The orthodox Lutheran position stressed the freedom of God in the process of justification. Nonetheless, God acts in accord with a law of His own essence, a lex aeterna, to which man should conform. This conformity appears when man observes the natural law or the reproduction of the divine law imprinted on man's conscience. Yet, since man cannot fulfill the law, the satisfaction of Christ atones for man's helplessness. Hence the law-gospel puzzle enters the configuration of any theory about atonement. The orthodox view created problems in the doctrine of justification as well
as for the ethical life. Atonement, according to this view, is objective and works are excluded from justification. Atonement is past; its description is found in Scripture, which provides ground for a series of propositions in which man must believe. This orthodox position, especially in dogma and the inerrancy of Sacred Scripture, should be familiar to theologians of any denomination familiar with apologetic textbooks of the not too long ago.

When the sun of historical criticism began to rise, there was enough illumination for Hofmann to question orthodoxy, to postulate his *Heilsgeschichte*—God acting in history. Christianity, Hofmann maintained, was a concrete experience mediated by a community of believers. Theology's function is to explore the depths of the experience, which can only occur in the context of a series of past historical events. Scripture is the norm by which the actual experience is judged. And Hofmann provides norms and criteria for adjudicating the contrary claims of diverse experiences.

It is said summarily that since law did not succeed in Israel it was superseded. Now righteousness occurs when man accepts God's action in history. While this now may seem a naive theological opinion, Hofmann does explore and develop his theme much more fully than we can here narrate.

For justification Hofmann sought escape from the juridical approach. Thus, God's righteousness is fulfilled, but in the sense that His original design for man's blessedness is fulfilled. Jesus does not, as it were, suffer in place of man and thus satisfy God. Rather, He establishes the new creation and the new humanity by perfectly fulfilling His vocation. Man becomes related to God, not by a juridical framework, but by the activity of Jesus, who literally creates a new humanity no longer enslaved to sin, which is no longer an object deserving God's wrath, for Satan has been definitively conquered.

Hofmann's theory of the atonement became more nuanced in his answers to the orthodox, who accused him of departing from tradition and substituting mysticism and subjectivism. Hofmann thus opened up reconsideration of precisely what Luther held on atonement. F. points out that the atonement controversy was inconclusive because of a failure to note the central issue: the place of law in the total theological system. This question occupies the last half of the book. F.'s own answer is an existential interpretation in which the death of Christ is the ultimate proclamation of the law. F. attempts to move faith from the cognitional order to the real dispensation of participation in the death and resurrection of Jesus. Or, as it appears to men, F. is seeking to make the transition from the abstract to the concrete,
the theoretical to the intersubjective, the order of thought to the order of religious practice. At this point, of course, one might wish that the epistemological presuppositions of the writer were more explicit, or at least better known to this reviewer. Yet one notes that F.'s distinctions are clear and, in my opinion, not greatly different from the Bultmannian approach with its roots in Melanchthon.

Perhaps one of F.'s most valuable contributions is the elaboration of Luther's own thought, not only as interpreted by Hofmann, but also as it is explained by Theodosius Harnack, Albrecht Ritschl, Wilhelm Hermann, Ferdinand Kattenbusch, and Karl Barth. Here one senses the theological enterprise as a corporate, evolving, communal project. Observing systematic theologians directing the searchlight of intellect on one point—the relation of love and wrath—will engender empathy in the biblical theologian, who experiences the perplexing riddle of reconciling the two extremes encountered in Scripture.

Hofmann is the link in the law-gospel debate between past and present. When men experience the rule of God in their hearts, they are independent of historical records, since the experience of love or hate has little to do with narrations of the subjects. Experience of the rule of God or the inner life of Jesus is accompanied by struggle and by a great shaking of the soul. We have here, quite evidently, a solution more religious than theological.

Barth totally reversed the above procedure by stressing the relation of gospel to law. God's law arises out of the social situation. Both gospel and law are addressed to men. But in no case is the word of man to be substituted for the word of God. Therefore God's word is capable of being either law or gospel but in either case is grace. Law, for Barth, is really the form of the gospel.

F. then gives a series of replies to Barth, now well known to all theologians. Wingren's response is particularly relevant, for he emphasizes the fact that what man needs is not knowledge but justification. Thus Wingren moves himself away somewhat from the problematic of revelation as a series of propositions, necessary though they be, enlightening the intellect. At the same time Hans Iwand adds the corrective that man never really experiences the word of God, and consequently justification, except through the media of man's words.

None of the above renders harmless the theologically accepted phantoms of earlier ages. And F. notes that there really is confusion among the theologians—a generous and necessary concession. One begins to wonder if the law-gospel categories are adequate to handle all the theological problems generated by the terminology.

Throughout the reading of this book, I wondered what F. meant by
the eschatological character of revelation (p. 218) and was curious as to when he would discuss revelation as such. Not much is said on the subject—a point for which F. should not be criticized, since it lies outside the intent of his work.

Catholic theologians in particular should find this book stimulating. Whether one talks in terms of law-gospel, Spirit-structure, obedience-initiative, or comparable terms, no one can deny that the Church today is suffering from a theology which only recently has come to grips with the above dialectic. In a Church with members formerly accustomed to subjection, the deficiency was not serious. But that day is gone forever. The theological seismographer of tremors that may turn into earthquakes within the Church would do well to come up with some theories about law and gospel and their place among the People of God today. F. has not provided all the architectural details of solution either on the theological or religious level, but he has proceeded through the subliminal labyrinth of connected and urgent theological problems to put the paper on the drawing board.

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P. Joseph Cahill, S.J.


Ziegler wrote this book with the interest and need of the faithful in mind. The uncertainty and helplessness that have followed the developments during and after Vatican II in the reorientation of the members of the Church made it very clear that a great segment of the faithful were totally unprepared to face the new realities and to cope with them effectively. Their failure in this regard stems from the fact that in our contemporary society the center of gravity has been transferred from universally valid and compelling principles to the conscience of the human person. And people, unaccustomed to relying on their consciences, simply do not know how to face their new responsibilities. The book is designed to help them.

Z. does not opt for either of two extremes. He recognizes the value of the universal principles and subscribes to the prominent role of the individual conscience. An either-or approach is simply unthinkable for him. But so also is any effort toward determining the same relationship in an a priori manner. Human experience clearly shows that the most important basic principle of human life rests with the principle of polarity. Where there is polarity, there is tension. The degree of the tension can and does vary according to the center of gravity between
the two opposing poles. That center is not fixed once and for all; still more important, it can only be located a posteriori, in the analysis of the available data of the human experience. While in past periods that center tipped the balance in favor of the universal principles, today it is unmistakably on the side of the person's conscience. The mandate of the theologian is therefore quite clear: he must help reinterpret the present tension of the two poles in such a way as to bring about the best possible working arrangement of the two.

What does all this mean concretely? The essence of law must be seen as a service to God and to man requiring a positive answer from man. Consequently, the essence of conscience too must be found in the affirmation of God and in salvation offered to man. Law and conscience have, then, the same objectives, and only as complementing each other can they bring fruition to their subject and to society. This elementary thesis already implies that Church authorities must opt for a form of law- and doctrine-proclamation that, instead of inducing the faithful to the inertia of conscience, would challenge them to the task of conscience-building. Z. devotes a whole chapter to this important topic (pp. 118–50), in which he investigates first the duties of Church authorities, then those of the faithful, in the process of conscience-building, and finally the postconciliar possibilities and assistance that help and promote the realization of such an important task of the contemporary man. His conviction in this regard is clearly reflected in the statement that today one cannot expect a pastoral letter, e.g., to interfere with a person's freedom of decision by imposing sanctions on his conscience (p. 122).

The book has three parts. Part 1 studies the Bible in reference to conscience. Part 2 offers theoretical clarifications of the two poles of the creative tension: conscience and law. His distinction between the order of redemption and the infallible teaching office on the one hand, and the order of creation and the fallible pastoral office on the other, deserve particular attention (pp. 86–90). Part 3 is the practical section, embracing the problems of conscience-building and conscience-activities in regard to both the faithful and the theologian. Concerning the latter, he stresses, among other things, the importance of co-operation with the anthropological disciplines (p. 180) as well as the recognition of legitimate theological pluralism (pp. 188–89).

This book was written for the faithful. Though well footnoted, basically it remains a practical guide for Christian living rather than a new insight into research of contemporary problems. But as such it certainly contributes to what Z. considers the primary duty of today's Christian: to build a new house for himself that is bright and friendly,
yet strong enough to withstand the storms of the time. This can be done solely in one way: by moving the center of gravity over from law to conscience.

_SABBAS J. KILIAN, O.F.M._


This is a collection of essays and exhortations on the problem of authority and obedience in the Church, particularly as it affects the religious professional. The contributors represent various levels of ecclesiastical life: bishops, theologians, seminary rectors, a Jesuit administrator, and a diocesan priest. The book is predictably uneven in quality, and Karl Rahner’s lead essay is mainly responsible for this condition. Without his paper, this volume would be more uniformly mediocre.

The style and tone is too frequently hortatory and homiletic; rigorous argument is sacrificed for pleading and platitude. The pace is agonizingly repetitious and the theological orientation almost monolithic: authority in the Church is for the sake of the common good of the community; the will of the superior (especially the pope and the bishops) is the will of God and, with the rarest of exceptions, must be received as such; each Christian, and the priest in particular, must have constant recourse to the Holy Spirit and manifest real docility to the teaching authority of the Church. “Practical infallibility” is implicitly extolled more than once and, though many of the authors defer properly to the declarations of Vatican II, the exegesis of the conciliar texts is noticeably uncritical. Certain of these characteristic deficiencies appear in the article by Bishop Carlo Colombo, “Obedience to the Ordinary Magisterium,” where it is stated, without significant qualification, that article 25 of _Lumen gentium_ contains “a complete doctrine on the ordinary teaching authority, its nature, its organs, its religious value and the relations of the faithful with it” (p. 79). He argues that all those who participate in the teaching authority of the Church, including parents in the instruction of their own children, “perform their task as helpers of the bishop and the universal episcopal body” (p. 81). Such views must rest upon an exceedingly narrow ecclesiological base, more constricted certainly than the second chapter of _Lumen gentium_. C. is prepared to accept theological dissent within the Church, but he is not about to encourage its public expression. In the final accounting, C. does not seem to understand the nature and function of theology. In this view, the theologian’s primary and essential task is the explanation, dissemination, and defense of
Catholic doctrine (p. 92). C. thereby tends to confuse theology with indoctrination and the theologian with an administrative spokesman. Rahner's eighteen-page essay, "Christ as the Exemplar of Clerical Obedience," is the only item in this collection that might warrant the expenditure of time and attention by the professional theologian, its schematic format notwithstanding. Proceeding from an analysis of the NT, R. argues that obedience to the Father is a key concept most often used to express the whole mission of Christ. "Christ redeemed us," R. says, "by that action which is to be performed by us in faith, though in Christ it can scarcely be called faith: this action was the free acceptance of an inscrutable divine disposition" (p. 9). R. defines obedience as "the unconditional acceptance of life, in its obscure facticity, moving towards death, as of a divine disposition proceeding from fatherly love" (p. 9). He distinguishes between the functional and the religious dimensions of obedience. The former refers to the need for order (shorn of all feudalistic interpretation), the latter refers to "the abnegation of self, the prompt sacrifice of legitimate aspirations" that every act of obedience entails. Clerical obedience is seen in the context of the servanthood of Christ and the Church's own mission of diakonia. There is never any reason for an uncritical or unquestioning acceptance of authoritative precept as such; for just as Jesus is the exemplar of obedience, so He is also the exemplar of "disobedience" (e.g., in His rejection of the authorities of the Synagogue of His time). The "disobedience" of Jesus was radically an act of obedience to God.

Had R.'s essay been submitted to the other contributors beforehand the quality of this volume might have been improved considerably.

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This book was first published in German in 1940 and rather substantially revised by Rahner's disciple Johannes Baptist Metz in 1963. It presents the link between the philosopher of Spirit in the World (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968) and the later theologian that is Karl Rahner. On the basis of his metaphysics of knowledge as developed in his doctoral dissertation, R. provides us in this book with a foundation of a philosophy of religion which at the same time is a fundamental-theological reflection on the conditions of possibility for revelation. It is a study of man as a being of receptive (material) spir-
Ituality who stands in freedom before the free God of a possible revelation. If this revelation occurs, it must take place in human history in the word. The book is a “must” for anyone interested in contemporary transcendental philosophy as it has been developed in the world of Catholic thought since Blondel and Maréchal, and especially for those who desire to become familiar with the philosophical and methodological assumptions that are operative in the theology of R. and his “school.”

Unfortunately, this important book is not yet available to the English reader, for the translation now published is simply abominable. Admittedly, it is difficult to translate R.’s transcendental philosophy into any other language. A first requirement is that the translator have a thorough understanding of this school of thought. This must be combined with a more than sufficient knowledge of the German language. The present translation lacks both to an incredible degree, so that R.’s reflections become even more difficult to follow than they are in German; often they are simply unintelligible, because the translator, who is apparently somewhat acquainted with ancient Scholastic philosophy, did not grasp their meaning. Out of the hundreds of examples (without exaggeration) we select a few at random.

Ideal (p. 10) becomes “idealistic” (p. viii), and real (p. 28) “realistic” (p. 14); hypostasierend (pp. 11 and 65) is translated as “hypothesizing” (p. ix) and “hypothetical” (p. 47); Möglichkeitsbedingung (p. 29), “precondition of existence” (p. 15); wie und als wer sich dieser Gott etwa offenbaren wolle (p. 28), “how and with whom this God desires to reveal himself” (p. 14). The rather crucial term Seiendes receives a variety of translations, at times in the same sentence: “existent being,” “existent thing,” “that which is,” “anything which exists,” “existing,” “existence,” “being-ness,” “existing individual,” etc. On practically every page there are careless deficiencies, negligent inadequacies, outright mistakes, and distortions. Where Rahner and Metz cite their own publications, the translator has usually not cared to refer us to the English translations when they are available.

It is incredible that any publisher would put such a faulty and therefore useless translation on the market. It is a disservice to philosophy and theology and an insult to its authors, Rahner and Metz.

A final note: the publisher has given us several translations of German works in the field of transcendental philosophy, fortunately all of a much higher quality than the present book. Certain basic technical terms (e.g., Vorgriff, Horizont, Fragbarkeit, Fraglichkeit) have received different translations in each of them. A certain co-ordination
and agreement regarding the translation of such terms are very much desirable.

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**BERNARD A. NACHBAHR**


This is a collection of six essays: five are the texts of a series of lectures given in the U.S. in November and December 1967, the sixth a concluding reflection on returning to Holland. The subjects treated are hermeneutics, belief in God in a secularized world, secular worship and Church liturgy, dialogue in the Church, the Church and politics, and God as man's future.

A common thread runs through: the need of Christian man to express authentically his relationship to God from out of the actual cultural framework in which he lives. Hence the Christian must reinterpret the ancient biblical and conciliar texts in the light of present circumstances. He must fashion an expression of belief that springs out of his own culture with its proper experiences and conceptual categories. He must worship in such a way as to recognize the transcendent God who is found in his involvement in the modern world and its complex social problems. He must dialogue with his fellow man precisely because he is called upon to express the meaning of the whole of the real world, and only in dialogue does he find that meaning. He must act in social situations that touch on politics and take up the risks involved in this enterprise; for unless he expresses himself with his whole being and not just with his mouth, he does not truly witness to the ultimate meaning of the world to his contemporaries. Hence, in his final essay S. indicates that it is an error to think that we are moving into an epoch that will not know God. Rather, the understanding and expression of God that sprang from cultural conditions that are fast disappearing is dying. God can no longer be seen as the answer to questions man cannot answer, as the eternal one emerging from an eternal past. Instead, since man is inserted into a society that looks to the future to be made, man's view of God will be that He is the one who is the absolute future of man, who forever draws man beyond his present condition and forever indicates that we have not here a lasting city.

With the basic stance of S. and with many of his conclusions of a subsidiary nature we cannot but agree. However, we would like to register one disagreement with a recurring position he takes. It appears that S.
is in the process of moving out of what might be called the hermeneutical stance, the stance that believes that Christian identity is preserved by reinterpreting ancient texts. S. refers to this idea in a number of places (pp. 9, 27, 125, 184), and in this he is agreeing with the greater number of theologians. But the operation in which S. is engaged in this book is quite obviously not a reinterpretation of old texts in the light of present reality, but interpretation of new present reality in the light of ancient texts. The texts are not in themselves bearers of meaning. Meaning only exists in persons, and the texts are but indicators of past meaning in persons that can assist a present person in a new context to discover in his present situation a meaning that is consonant with that of the past, though an advance on that past. In short, S. speaks explicitly of the texts as sources of present Christian understanding; he acts, however, as if the texts were really but catalysts—elements that remain the same while the real work of renewed understanding goes on in real people. We agree with his operation but not with his articulation of that operation, and we would hope that S. will bring the latter into conformity with the former.

St. Thomas Seminary, Kenmore, Wash. Peter Chirico, S.S.


The saving merit of this collection of Bea Lectures given at Fordham from 1966 to 1968 is that we meet a few men who have outlived their fascination with diagnostic prowess, and offer some hints instead about how they feel hoofing it with the rest of us. Predictably enough, as Bernard Lonergan notes in his own analysis, the subject of most of these lectures is not God but human culture; for the shift from theology to religious studies reflects the cultural transition effected by the major changes in patterns for human knowing: from Aristotle through Newton to Dilthey. But so long as religious studies "remains within the boundaries specified by the methods of modern science, [it] cannot get beyond describing and explaining the multiplicity and the variety of human religious attitudes." And this approach "tends toward a reductionism that empties human living and especially human religion of all serious content" (p. 170).

Lonergan’s trenchant observation is often repeated and as often exemplified in these lectures. There is a fascination with the fact of atheism, a growing realization that some sort of chasm exists between "religion" and "modernity," yet all too little awareness of where the
lecturer himself stands, and a fortiori whither lies his God. Diagnosis is a classical enterprise: it assumes one's categories secured, one's own position firm. This mode of thinking never succeeded, I take it, in rousing man to God. When proofs worked they were not needed. Their effectiveness traded on something else, something that commanded men's assent.

These lectures trace the processes which have weakened the hold of Christendom (R. Johann) and sensitively describe what grips us now: contingency, relativity, temporality, and autonomy (L. Gilkey). What moves Gilkey out beyond the diagnostic set is his willingness to help us say what it feels like to be so gripped. Here we have intimations of a style of reflection which may be able to insinuate itself as a new model for human knowing: "on the level of secular existence... contingency, relativity, temporality and freedom continually raise questions which point to and so reflect a dimension of ultimacy in our existence which secularity cannot comprehend" (p. 67). What Gilkey asks for he in some measure exhibits: a quality of reflection which is willing to question its own inherited and assimilated ways of approaching God and the world, and seek out a more appropriate way. The demand for relevance asks not for contemporaneity but for embodied reflection and holiness; for nothing less can free us to feel our way into uncharted regions. Bouillard knows this but can think of nothing to do but say it. The point, I take it, of all the diagnosis is that the context for saying these things no longer exists. So we must learn a new language—through examples, living examples.

 Teilhard de Chardin is one, and Christopher Mooney introduces us to the man. We meet him, he walks with us a while; we have learned how to put things a little differently about ourselves, our world, and our God. Robert McAfee Brown helps us to see a little differently, and in doing so drives home a decisive hermeneutical point: whoever God may or may not be, He will meet us in ways we will be quite unprepared to recognize. Jesus, in fact, is His greatest pseudonym, His most effective disguise. (John Courtney Murray let himself remind us that the Church does not do so badly at concealing Him either; and John Bennett exemplifies the same motif from the Protestant side). What is at work in the essays that do work is a reaching out for some new fashion of comprehending—shaping, yes, but also living with—ourselves and our world. If that style is discovered, it will certainly yield what we can know of God. So far it eludes our grasp. Perhaps the difficulty is that we are trying to grasp out after something when the very style itself may lie beyond any grasp. Leslie Dewart is on to this, but rather ineffectual, I feel, in leading us on; for he insists we retrace his own
peculiar route through the trackless waste of being to come into the beyond of presence. Meta-metaphysics only invites the next meta--; for it overlooks the fact that overcoming metaphysics inescapably involves us in recovering an appropriate style of reflection. Everything, I submit, hangs on this, and the demise of Christendom can be welcomed if the darkness impels us to search for light.

University of Notre Dame

David Burrell, C.S.C.


The Catholic triumphalist is a familiar figure: the zealot who found no fault in his own tradition and little good in any other. Until lately, though, the Catholic radical was a rather rare phenomenon. Now his name is legion. He too is a zealot but on the other side: he finds so little real good in his own Catholic past that he has turned elsewhere for his hope and comfort. Yet he and the triumphalists share in the same double-or-nothing mentality, and they are almost equally unhelpful in the current ecumenical dialogue.

The End of Conventional Christianity is a case in point. Its positive aim is to comment on the fact that “in our time we are experiencing the collapse of a pantheon of all sorts of Christian and ecclesiastical idols” and to suggest a theological stance that will “instead of blocking the road [into a hopeful future] keep it open to that God for whose coming we are waiting” (p. 297). This is, of course, commonplace rhetoric to readers of Bonhoeffer and Vahanian, and van de Pol’s development of the thesis draws heavily on his wide and attentive reading of a sizable stream of Protestant theology from Kant to Cobb. As a result, his survey of contemporary critiques of traditional Christianity is iconoclastic, yet often interesting. The short section on the later Heidegger, e.g., is meaty and instructive.

And yet, van de Pol’s good intentions fall short of any real fruition because of two pervasive faults: reckless rhetoric and a specious claim to neutrality. One could perhaps accept the logical challenge posed by occasional opaque aphorisms (e.g., “The more unbelieving we become, the more believing we become,” p. 297); equivocation is not always a mortal sin. But one comes finally to realize that overstatement is a fixed habit of van de Pol’s. “Conventional Christianity”—“Christianity as it has been conceived and practiced by the Christian people since the beginning of the christianization of Western Europe globally” (p. 30)—is defined as having been always and utterly uncritical. It allowed of no doubts or questions; it demanded blind acceptance of all its teach-
ings and practices, "all of them always for the sole reason that they had always been so taught and done" (p. 17). The morality of this mindless Christianity is alleged to have been "nothing but the Ten Commandments, the morality of natural law" (p. 41)—and "one of [its] most striking features... was the complete absence of social consciousness" (p. 43). "The biblical world picture" is said to have been "in no respect in keeping with evident reality" (p. 69). And so on and so forth. Obviously, if that sort of Christianity is over and done with, then we may all be thankful. But the assertion that this really is what all Christianity in general was really like, from Constantine to Kant, is absurd.

Van de Pol's passion for hyperbole is compounded by his repeated claim that the "book has a strictly phenomenological character. It is not intended to attack or defend anything (p. 59)... I do not make any judgments but limit myself to ascertaining facts" (p. 73). This leaves one literally baffled in the face of the value judgments thickly strewn throughout (e.g., "this book [John Cobb's Living Options] belongs to the best publications in the field of religious thought and Protestant theology of this century," p. 290). Apart from such disavowals, one might have no principled objection to such value judgments (the one about Cobb strikes me as valid; there are others more doubtful). But how is a careful reader to assess these discrepancies between a critical scholar's phenomenological pose and his partisan performance?

The lasting interest of this book will doubtless lie in its symbolic function as a sign of the times: a Catholic professor deeply alienated from his own tradition, turning to Protestant iconoclasm as the most viable alternative in his view. This, in turn, has been taken as his warrant for ignoring or dismissing the continuing agonies of progressive Catholic and Protestant theologians in their efforts to reformulate, from within their mixed traditions, a genuinely constructive theology for "modern" man (e.g., Lonergan, Dewart, Odgen, Macquarrie, et al.). It is as if van de Pol's own "liberation" from "conventional Christianity" had proved rather too much of a shock for him.

Perkins School of Theology
Southern Methodist University

ALBERT C. OUTLER


Anyone who is even tangentially touched by the rapid change and radical shifts of current religious thought and practice must, of necessity, wonder where it will all lead. Such wonder is really a question
about the future. The future is largely unknowable but speculation about it is always an engaging pastime. Religiously speaking, some people find the future frightening and look with longing to the past; others attempt to diagnose the wave of the future and try to ride with it. The former stance runs the risk of obscurantism, while the latter could be faddist. Marty also wishes to speak of the future from the religious perspective without an unrealistic plea to turn back to the "Age of Faith" or to look forward with bated breath while the age of secular religion dawns.

M. spends little time showing the impossibility of resuscitating a bygone era of piety but he does take considerable space to criticize the secular theologians of today. He admits that they served to chasten the complacency of theologians and stirred up fruitful discussion about the role of religion in our modern technological society, but he neither accepts their diagnosis of current religion and culture nor their prognosis for the future. M. raises essentially the same question about secular theology that Andrew Greeley once raised about *The Secular City*: Does modern secular man (or city or society, etc.) exist outside the graduate seminar rooms of our sociology departments? M. believes that to base a theology on a relatively few persons who are pragmatic, antimetaphysical, highly mobile, and "cool" is to write off vast segments of the population such as the alienated students, disaffected blacks, other unnoticed minority groups, or even the hopelessly square middle class. Furthermore, M. indicts secular theology as little more than a carefully disguised metaphysic of nineteenth-century liberalism concocted from generous measures of optimism, evolution, and progressivism.

Yet it is easy enough to fault the secular theologians because, to paraphrase Ninian Smart, "they mean well but they don't mean much." What does M. see as the role of religion for the future? Rejecting a monodimensional future of pure secularity as being too simplistic, he argues that religion must look to the future free from fad or stasis. He argues for projections which will make life and the search for life and its meaning possible. Blending insights from Teilhard, Bloch, Moltmann, and the notion of "pilgrim Church," M. would envision the man of religion moving in history freed from messianic delusions or moral arrogance but with serene conviction about the viability of faith to heal, reconcile, build, and give meaning. It would be a hope not channeled into false alleys by pressures from fad, for M. reminds us that nothing seems so dated as the previous generation's modernism. Thus any program for the future must remember the past. In a recent interview M. stated this (and the thesis) of his book quite well: "One
searches for the past for prophetic clues, images, and models. Bounce
them off a screen representing the future and act as if all depended on
you. (Add a neat trick: depend on grace all along!”) (New Book Re-

In sum, this is a first-rate book that combines broad theological com-
petence and a genuine concern for religion and its future. If M.’s in-
tention is to help men face the future with hope, it may be some con-
solidation for him to know that it will be books such as his that will make
the task easier.

Florida State University, Tallahassee          LAWRENCE CUNNINGHAM

Reflective Theology: Philosophical Orientations in Religion.
+ 211. $6.00.

In his preface to this book, Mircea Eliade tells us that he finds it
“refreshing to read a religious book without being confronted on every
other page with reflections or comments on Honest to God, The Secular
City, or the God-is-dead theology; in short to discover a book that de-
parts from the provincialism of the latest crisis, fashion, or cliché of
Western religious language and traditions.” So much is certainly true.
Whether what Munson, a professor of philosophy at De Paul Univer-
sity, offers us is a satisfactory substitute for the kind of theology he re-
jects is a much more difficult question. Indeed, what we seem to have
here is the emergence of a new intellectual fashion, rapidly achieving
the status of establishment acceptability in certain Midwestern the-
oblogical centers. The basic idea is that the philosophical aspect of
theology consists in the ferreting out of the presuppositions, the grounds
or commitments, of that discipline. These presuppositions can be un-
dcovered by a study of the phenomenology of religion together with a
reflective dialogue with some of the central actors of theology’s past
history. The idea is interesting and deserves careful investigation. M.
provides us with a very brief and modest beginning in this kind of “re-
fective” theology. Sandwiched between introductory and concluding
chapters we have reflective analyses of ideas and movements suggested
by or associated with Anselm, Descartes, Hume, Hegel, Wittgenstein,
Eliade, and Sartre. It is necessary to be somewhat vague in our descrip-
tion, because M.’s procedure varies appreciably from chapter to chap-
ter. He seems most at home with Hegel and Eliade. The chapter which
purports to discuss Wittgenstein is the least adequate. Here M. does
not seem to have the firsthand command of the texts which he displays
elsewhere. In places, such as the discussion of the “vagueness” of or-
ordinary language, his "later Wittgenstein" sounds more like a "middle Russell."

What is unsatisfactory in this book stems mainly from the fact that M. has tried to do far too much in far too short a space. There is scarcely a major figure in Western philosophy who is not mentioned, quoted, or alluded to. It is not unusual to find Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Jung, and Eliade (to mention only a few of the frequently cited authors) all referred to in the same short paragraph in order to illuminate some particular point under discussion. The price of doing philosophical theology in this grand manner and at such a rapid pace is the inevitable frustration when one jargon is "explained" simply by reference to another jargon. This reader had the feeling that he was at times really witnessing a very elaborate experiment in intellectual surrealism. M.'s ideas are extremely suggestive and interesting, but highly metaphorical. It is only when the metaphors are cashed in, and the ideas elaborated with far greater precision than we have in this brief account, that we will be in a position to judge their truth or falsity.

University of Wisconsin

VINCENT M. COOKE, S.J.


The first volume of this three-volume work contains the Constitution Gaudium et spes, the Latin on one page, the official French text facing it. A history of the texts by Philippe Delehaye follows. The second volume contains a general introduction by Bishop Mark McGrath, followed by a historical and doctrinal introduction by Roberto Tucci. The rest of the volume is devoted to essays on key themes by B. Lambert, F. Houtart, M.-D. Chenu, J. Mouroux, Y. Congar, etc. The third volume is composed of "Réflexions et perspectives." Congar writes on the "Problématique générale"; four essays give the laity's views; then a Protestant, a member of the Orthodox Church, a Marxist, and an atheist express their reactions. Charles Moeller writes a general conclusion, after which three authors comment on the Council's message to the world of October 1962, Pope Paul's address at the closing of the Council, and finally Populorum progressio.

Donald Campion says of Gaudium et spes that "it enjoys the interesting distinction of being the only major document to have originated directly from a suggestion on the floor of the conciliar aula." In late
November 1962, John XXIII commissioned two cardinals, Montini and Suenens, to draw up suggestions for a message from the Church to the world. Suenens proposed his ideas to the conciliar fathers on Dec. 3, 1962, and this was the beginning of a long evolution that ended with the Constitution finally promulgated on Dec. 7, 1965. The present commentary enables us to follow this development step by step from Rome to Malines to Zurich to Ariccia and back to Rome.

Bishop McGrath and B. Lambert both point out how the laborious growth of *Gaudium et spes* and its last-minute completion were significant of its character. Its composition was accompanied by a process of education, for there was much that was unprecedented about it, in content and method. The conciliar fathers were at first not prepared for it. It was a creation of the Council, three years forming in its womb. This in part explains its shortcomings. No one thinks it a perfect job, but its value is that it broke new trails which will inevitably lead to rich conclusions.

In reviewing so vast a work, to attempt to assay one or other of the studies is to lay oneself open to the charge of arbitrariness. There is so much that is good. The “pill and bomb” were, in the popular mind, the important issues of the Constitution. Delehaye is very helpful for understanding the nuances of the debates on the family. D. Dubarle has dealt competently with the bomb and germane considerations, fixing with great clarity precisely what the Council wished to say and to leave unsaid. Tucci’s essay on the political community is excellent, especially his explicitation of its latent democratic sentiments.

One of the complaints expressed again and again in the Council was that *Gaudium et spes* was too optimistic, portraying the world in roseate hues not found in reality; though the commentaries point out this bias, they themselves are not entirely free from it. There is much repetition: Tucci in his historical and doctrinal introduction repeats many things said by Delehaye in the history of the texts, as also does P. Haubtmann on the “human community”; the discussions over the name (“Constitution”) and the battle of the “annexes” are retailed in several places. The authors point out the presence of inadequacies and obscurities, often born of haste, or compromise, but on the whole they handle the Constitution tenderly. The same is not true of the four non-Romans. The Orthodox writer, Nikita Struve, is especially frank, and unhappy about what he calls the basic ambiguity of the Constitution. He means especially the ambivalence of the “world.”

The final vote on the Constitution showed remarkable unanimity, but this is not because everybody was pleased with everything. Many in voting accepted elements they were not happy about because they
were substantially content with the result. Delehaye pays tribute to Paul VI for the ultimate emergence of Christian optimism: "Unquestionably it would have been otherwise if those responsible for the schema had not had the confidence of Paul VI."

Loyola House of Studies, Manila


The publication in English translation of this first volume in a series of selected documents from the Vatican archives relating to the Second World War will be of interest to those concerned with the diplomatic history of the war itself. It also serves to shed some light on the questions raised in recent years about the wartime policies of Pius XII. The book covers the period from the accession of Pius XII in March 1939, which coincided with Hitler's precipitation of the crisis over Danzig, to the uncertain days of the summer of 1940 after the French defeat and before Britain had proved her mettle in repelling the massive air assault of the Luftwaffe.

The main body of the book consists of 379 documents carefully selected to illustrate the main thrust of the Vatican's efforts for peace in her diplomatic dealings with the major European powers and the United States. These documents consist primarily of communications between the Holy See and the interested powers, and confidential reports from the nuncios and apostolic delegates representing Vatican interests in London, Paris, Rome, Berlin, Warsaw, Washington, and several lesser capitals. The editorial procedure used is modeled after that employed by the editors of the official series of American diplomatic documents, Foreign Relations of the United States, although the actual editing and annotation of individual documents strikes the reader as being somewhat less skilful than is the case with that distinguished series. The translation is also occasionally awkward.

One extremely helpful feature is an 87-page introduction giving a historical sketch of the Holy See's diplomatic activity during the period in question. This section in based largely on the documents contained in the book, and provides the reader with a useful résumé of events before plunging into the documents themselves. The introduction should not be considered a substitute for study of the documents, but rather a survey of their highlights.

What can be learned from such a collection of state papers? In this
instance the material mainly deals with papal peace initiatives and the circumstances surrounding them. In the spring of 1939 Pius XII tried, with the encouragement of President Roosevelt, to promote a conference of the powers involved in the Danzig crisis. Later, on the eve of Hitler's invasion of Poland, a belated attempt was made through the offices of the Berlin and Warsaw nunciatures to advance a formula for German-Polish negotiations. Both efforts proved dismal failures, but they were significant moments in the general evolution of diplomatic activity leading up to the outbreak of war.

The diplomatic approach of the Vatican throughout this period reveals a consistent theme which lies at the root of much of the criticism directed against Pius XII's reluctance to condemn the Axis powers outright. This theme was best stated by Cardinal Maglione, the Secretary of State, in a letter dated June 24, 1939: "The Holy See must preserve its moral independence, in order to be able to exert with some hope of success, in an atmosphere so troubled by political passions, its providential conciliatory action amongst nations." Hence the refusal to pass judgment on any of the powers for fear of sacrificing the Church's possible influence for good in the future. The belief was that one could not work for peace if one alienated individual powers through specific condemnation of their acts. On the other hand, this policy did not preclude moral pronouncements on justice and morality in international affairs, as can be seen by the encyclical *Summi pontificatus* of October 1939, which, while it did not condemn Nazi Germany by name, certainly condemned the things the Nazis stood for.

After the invasion of Poland, the Vatican's primary concern was to keep Italy out of the war, and there is considerable material illustrating the constant but useless efforts to achieve this end, mainly through contacts with Mussolini's antiwar Foreign Minister, Count Ciano. Following the fall of France, there was a papal attempt to bring about peace negotiations in July 1940, inspired partly by principle and partly by the belief that Hitler would certainly defeat Britain.

These are some of the important matters covered, but there are also interesting sidelights on lesser points, such as Ribbentrop's embarrassing visit to Pius XII in March 1940 and the curious problem of the Vatican's elimination as intermediary for the Franco-Italian armistice negotiations. Unfortunately, very little is revealed in these documents of Pius XII's personality, official diplomatic correspondence being with rare exceptions the exclusive domain of Cardinal Maglione and his staff.

The publication of this work is a welcome addition to the literature on the history of the Second World War. While it provides deeper insight into Vatican policies, one should not minimize the revealing
glimpses it offers of the behind-the-scenes activities of the major powers during this critical period.

Maryville College, St. Louis  DENNIS F. WACHTEL


This is an extraordinary book. It addresses itself to one of the most acute questions facing the Christian conscience today, that of the relation between the gospel and peace. It does so with a sense of the complexity of the question, with an effort to probe and understand other positions, and with a "spiritual" quality rarely found in contemporary theological writings. Both the topic and the treatment are reasons for recommending The Non-Violent Cross strongly to those who are personally wrestling with the question of the theology of peace.

D.'s basic thesis is that the cross is the standard and model of the Christian attitude toward war and peace. This sounds simple, obvious, and entirely acceptable. But D. is speaking of the cross precisely as suffering love, of Jesus as the Suffering Servant. It is the transforming power of that suffering love which makes the cross so critical for the Christian's attitude toward war, injustice, violence. For D., the figure of this attitude in the modern world is Gandhi. The discussion of Gandhi's attitudes toward suffering and toward the Christian doctrine of the cross is very illuminating. From a great distance Gandhi saw the cross more clearly than those gathered at its foot.

The second main section deals with various contemporary discussions of these issues, e.g., the doctrine of nonviolence in Pacem in terris, the Vatican II discussion of war, and debate on the just-war theory as found in Paul Ramsey. The chapter on Vatican II is a model of careful explanation of how the sections in The Church in the Modern World came to be written. D. points out the advances, from the perspective of a thoroughgoing theology of peace, that this document represents, but he is also clear in pointing out its crippling compromises and limitations of the positions taken there. He sees the Council document as an attempt, an unsuccessful one, to carry through the prophetic visions of John XXIII. The debate with Ramsey is carried on in a spirit of understanding and appreciation, but D. makes his own position clear, i.e., that the whole just-war theory does not represent the gospel teaching and is an untenable compromise with it.

Many of the things D. says about just-war theory bear upon the contemporary argument about just violence or just revolution. Some of the most sensitive minds in contemporary Catholicism are torn between
the imperatives of a theology of peace and those of a just revolution. Though this is not his principal subject, D. shows clearly how this defense of just revolution as it is appearing today is based upon a just-war theory. And he asserts the limitations of this theory and its incongruity with the gospel message of peace just as strongly in face of the advocates of just revolution as he does in face of the supporters of limited war. This is a position which demands the attention and reflection of those who have modified, perhaps too rapidly, their theology of peace in order to accommodate a theory of just violence.

The third section of the book is the richest, both in its theological depth and in its practical implications. It is a meditation on the cross as the model of nonviolent love. D. says, "The Cross has two sides, violent and suffering, and to accept Christ each man must pass over from the first to the second, thus entering into Christ's suffering acceptance of man in his violence to him." In saying this, he is not ignoring the necessity of resistance to injustice, but he sees suffering love and not violence as the prime means of that resistance. In answer to William James's plea that mankind develop a "moral equivalent of war," D. says that this is the revolution of peace. "The moral equivalent of war... is the constant struggle of peace, moral revolution, and cross as suffering love."

These few lines have given little indication of the depth, richness, and tone of this book. It is a book upon which one meditates. I recommend it most highly to all who are tortured by the tensions of peace and revolution in our time.

Marquette University

WILLIAM J. SULLIVAN, S.J.


This book is just what the author intends: an introduction, very clear, to the art of pastoral counseling. The parish priest will gain much from its wise observations, particularly since the art of counseling normal people in their emotional problems tends to be eclipsed by our preoccupation with psychotherapy for neurotics and psychotics. Almost repetitiously, Fr. O'Brien warns the novice counselor to refer all persons with deep emotional problems to professional therapists. I say "almost" because he probably felt it necessary to repeat the caution to inexperienced priests not to involve themselves to a psychological depth for which they have been prepared. The priest must delimit the area of his competency in counseling and work within these limits in co-operation with psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

While developing the structures of counseling, O'B. keeps our eyes
focused on the counselor's important quality, "unconditional positive regard for the client" (p. 79). Later he points out that this positive approach must not deteriorate into countertransference, which is equivalent to the counselor becoming emotionally involved with the client. From his professional experience of the overly-dependent counselee, O'B. advises other counselors to avoid the devious ways in which individuals quite unconsciously attempt to impose their wishes upon the counselor.

Strict adherence to time limitations for the interview is one of the best safeguards. Since the client's good is paramount, the counselor will make referral of the counselee as soon as he realizes that the counseling relationship is not helping the person to gain necessary insight. Surely it takes a well-developed humility to recognize immediately one's own limitations in counseling.

One of the most fascinating elements of counseling, well presented by O'B., is the necessity for silence. Inexperienced counselors are afraid of these pauses in the interview when the client becomes silent. But they should welcome the silence instead of filling it with words, words which interrupt the thought of the client and pressure him to say something to avoid embarrassment. Too many words can keep both counselor and client from seeing the problem.

In a balanced presentation, O'B. applies moral principles to the problem of professional secrecy and to the possible correction of the client on rare occasions. Thus he differs from Carl Rogers' nondirective approach. The counselor makes it clear that acceptance of the person does not imply either approval or neutrality concerning the behavior of the client, to whom responsibility belongs in the first place. There is value, however, in allowing the client to express his feelings about what he would like to do: "the client often expresses what he feels like doing without in any way expressing what he intends to do. The counselor's empathic understanding of his feelings may give the client strength not to let his intentions be governed by his feeling" (p. 171).

O'B. allows for emergency situations when the counselor may have to intervene to save the client from himself. Since there are more weighty considerations than the good of the counseling relationship, the counselor at such times should consult according to the norms of confidentiality and then act. Whenever the counselor realizes that the client is abnormal, he should refer him to a specialist. But the referral must be made in such a way that the person realizes that the priest is not rejecting him, but will continue to keep an interest in him as he seeks psychiatric treatment. It is easy for the client to get the impression that the priest is "passing the buck."
In counseling the homosexual, I would suggest to O'B. greater emphasis on the future possibilities of group therapy, as indicated in the work of Dr. Samuel Haddon. With realization that O'B. is writing an introduction, I would further suggest that the counselor should provide some spiritual plan of life for the homosexual, the chronic masturbator, or the obsessive-compulsive person. Something more should be said about the complexities of marital counseling. On the other hand, O'B. puts his finger on a sore spot when he advises vocational counselors in a religious order or seminary to evaluate the emotional components evidenced during the interviewing of prospective candidates.

The reader will benefit from the section on counseling the scrupulous, which should be read in conjunction with J. R. Nolan's excellent intuitions, "The Problem of Scruples," in The Priest and Mental Health (ed. E. F. O'Doherty and S. D. McGrath; Staten Island, 1963) pp. 87–97.

De Sales Hall School of Theology
Hyattsville, Md.

JOHN F. HARVEY, O.S.F.S.


Fr. Curran was trained under Carl Rogers and for the last twenty-five years has been actively engaged in developing and applying the Rogerian counseling approach. He has been writing books all that time, and the present work represents an extension of his lifelong work.

The book has as its basic thesis the idea that an essential part of the counseling process involves the pursuit of value, of personal meaning and commitment. The notion of value is advanced as signifying "meaning plus self-investment." The specific values which are implicit in the counseling process are seen as rooted in religious belief. What issues, therefore, is an admirable presentation of the counseling virtues cast in terms of their spiritual and religious significance. Since these counseling virtues are so intimately related to religious values, C. feels that the permeation of the structures and functions of the Church with them is essential to the renovation the Church is trying to achieve in the post-Vatican era.

C. has some specific recommendations. The focus is primarily on the pastoral counselor and his counseling involvement. The counseling involvement is an incarnational and redemptive process. It is incarnational in that it involves a communication with the very incarnate being of the person leading to a gradual acceptance and respect for that incarnate self—with its animality and rationality. Only then can redemptive self-valuation and love take place. This incarnate-redemptive process
needs to be extended as far as possible. Besides pastoral counseling, sermons and other group techniques are recommended. Finally, the counseling process is extended to the Church, with the emphasis on the need for creative communication within the Church as community.

There is an ambiguity in this book, along with others of its genre, that leaves me with a vague uneasiness. No doubt, the formulation of the essential valuing and relating aspects of the counseling and therapeutic relationships is of significance and touches a profound level of the whole. Every therapist and counselor can verify this in his own experience. It is not clear that they need be considered religious, nor that there is any advantage in it. What causes this uneasiness is the unstated but possibly implicit message that therapy goes forward on this ground and that nearly anyone who is tuned in on these values can do therapy. The message seems to come across that any priest who is aware of these issues can do counseling and that counseling and therapy are indistinguishable. My own feeling is that it is very important to keep a clear distinction between the counseling process and psychotherapy, and the glossing-over of that important distinction makes me very uneasy. The fact that the formulations are quite adequate in regard to counseling, and are applicable but superficial and inadequate in regard to therapy, does not ease my discomfort.

There is a dilemma here. We are in the era of community psychiatry, in which maximal use of community resources is an important objective. The pastoral counselor is an important resource for the alleviation of mental disturbance in the community. One lesson that the history of the mental-health movement has taught is that functions have to be properly distributed. Not too long ago we were trying to get teachers to function as psychotherapists—totally unsuccessful. The pastoral counselor has an important role and a needed contribution to mental health (or religious growth). That contribution can best be described as counseling to the limits of his capacity, and referral to appropriate sources of therapeutic help when indicated.


Dr. Storr is a physician, psychiatrist, and psychoanalyst in private practice in London. He has given us a succinct, sensible, and highly readable account of current psychiatric thinking about aggression. While his theoretical vantage point is psychoanalytic, his style is easy, literate, and unencumbered with esoteric jargon. The pleasing result
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is that there is a deceptive simplicity to what is presented. It is a comfort to have such an effort in print to which one can refer on the subject of aggression.

The subject is aggression, not just anger or hostility. The thesis S. develops is that aggression is more than its destructive, hostile, and pathological forms. It is, in fact, an important and creative force in the development of human personality and in the initiation and evolution of man’s more creative and distinctly human attainments. The child cannot reach maturity unless he frees himself from dependence on his parents. Disentanglement from infantile wishes and dependencies is not automatic; it requires a vigorous effort at self-assertion and self-definition. Aggression is, therefore, a positive force in human individual development.

Aggression, however, also has important functions on the social and cultural levels. Sexuality requires a component of aggression on both sides—although the style and amount of aggression appropriate to each sex have decided differences. Adult autonomy and identity require the constant press of aggression and the constant reinforcement of the individual’s capacity to master his environment and its risks. The development and stabilization of human identity require a convinced adherence to a system of belief. Such adherence to social structures or, quite pointedly, systems of religious belief unite men in mutually supportive relationships and thereby contribute to a shared sense of tradition, belonging, purpose, and destiny. The more compelling the ties, the more vigorously are deviant beliefs opposed. Religious beliefs, touching as they do the deepest wellsprings of human motivation and anxiety, are sufficiently important to warrant the sacrifice of life itself—one’s own or someone else’s. The history of heresy is replete with such stories.

Since the present review is intended for theologically inclined readers, I should like to make a small suggestion. If S.’s argument holds water, systems of religious belief have a cultural and societal function of organizing and directing human aggression in the service of preserving psychological stability and integrity. As they succeed in mobilizing commitment through belief, they are ipso facto divisive. In so far as they succeed in channeling aggression to positive and constructive goals, they also create the convinced split between the believer and nonbeliever to which more destructive aspects of aggression might be directed. Religious beliefs are a culturally elaborated channel for sublimation or—to use a more exact term—neutralization of aggression. They are also culturally elaborated channels for the expression of frankly deneutralized aggression. My suggestion is a simple one: how about a theology of aggression?
The basic thesis I would propose is that theology is in some sense intimately related to and concerned with man and his deepest existential concerns. A theology that does not commit itself to exploring the reciprocal and multiple interactions between the most fundamental parameters of human behavior and experience is to that extent a theology in vacuo. To speak psychoanalytically for a moment, theology as a human process is in part an instinctual derivative. In terms of a theological anthropology, one cannot ignore the highly significant role of human aggression in the development of religious belief and thought. With this humble suggestion, I heartily recommend Storr's little book.


During the past fifty years the Church has granted an astonishingly larger number of divorces by way of the Petrine Privilege. Dr. Steininger joins forces with those contemporaries who propose that the Church should further extend her use of this privilege by applying it to ratified, consummated marriages. He develops his proposition as follows.

Marriage is eternal. Yet the Church rightly allows the surviving partner of a marriage terminated by death to remarry. It seems reasonable, therefore, to expect that the Church could sever other marriages if the grounds for doing so are analogous to death, as would be the case if an incurable mental illness supervenes shortly after a marriage is consummated so that any future wholesome human contact with the healthy spouse becomes impossible. However, many less stringent reasons would be admissible. In fact, a marriage could be disrupted whenever "the bond of the existing marriage is no longer acceptable to at least one of the spouses because it has resulted in a downright intolerable severance of the meaningful development of the personality of one or other partner" (p. 183).

To support his proposal, S. gathers various arguments. He appeals to Scripture, especially to the Sermon on the Mount (Mt 5:21-42), where the text forbidding divorce is equated with the prohibitions against oaths and self-defense. Since the Church permits the taking of oaths and acts of self-defense, she should also allow divorce for sufficient reasons. All three injunctions are ideals (Zielgebote) which admit of exceptions.

Since the Fathers of the first five centuries condemned divorce, S. can cite only one testimony, that of Origen, against their view. He states
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that, historically, teachings once held as certain have been reversed later on and, as an example, stresses that the Council of Trent solemnly declared the efficacy of the confessor’s absolution to delete the reatus culpae, although this doctrine had been denied by the great medieval theologians. Confronted by two canons of Trent \((DB 975, 977)\) which go counter to his thesis, he reduces them to disciplinary decrees.

S. argues further that the Church’s expanding practice of rupturing marriages by way of the Petrine Privilege is similar to the dissolution of ratified, consummated marriages. To buttress this allegation, he suggests that the unbaptized (how many is not stated) who lovingly contract matrimony have not only baptism of desire, but also matrimony of desire and so obtain all the graces which accrue to those who receive these sacraments in actuality.

Evolution of the universe and of man, individually and collectively, is regarded by S. as an established fact. Our view of man must be dynamic, not static. Accordingly, the individual, even if he adopts a definite calling after mature reflection, should be granted the opportunity of a "new start" (hence a new marriage) if this will enable him to fulfill his calling more perfectly. The Church seems to recognize this principle when she grants a dispensation of major clerics and professed religious so that they may marry.

Although several of S.’s specific cases should be pondered by the revisionists of canon law, some fundamental questions must be answered before his propounded thesis can be accorded even probability. How can it be assumed without any explanation or proof that “marriage is eternal”? How can this be true, since the contractants expressly state “until death parts us”? Can any of the purposes of marriage be perfected in heaven? If so, how and to what extent? What happens to a marriage if one partner attains the beatific vision and the other does not?

Is there any valid reason for assuming that death affords a merely canonical ground which justifies the Church’s concession of a new marriage? Is it not rather by divine law that death terminates a marriage and permits a following marriage for the survivor? One of the defects noticeable in S.’s book is the assumption that the dissolution of marriages belongs to the canonical sphere. This is opposed to the explicit declarations of Pius XI in \(Casti connubii\) \((DB 2236)\), a document to which S. never refers. Why is it not mentioned that Pius XI in his Encyclical avers that “no power of dissolving matrimony, for any reason, will ever be able to be exercised over a ratified, consummated marriage,” that this kind of marriage has “by God’s will the maximum indissolubility” and “is not to be disrupted by any human authority”?
The attempt to lower canon 7 of Trent (DB 977) to a disciplinary measure is rebutted by the canon itself, which is "in accordance with the evangelical and apostolic teaching."

The book creates the impression that the primary purpose of marriage is the perfecting of mutual love and of personality development. The word "love" is not defined or explained; no distinction is made between supernatural and natural love. "Self-fulfilment" and "personality development" are considered as essential to marriage, so much so that failure to obtain them is sufficient reason for divorce. Yet we are not told the nature of personality development and how a person can judge if he is acquiring it. It is not even suggested that the Christian's personality development is above all supernatural and that it necessarily involves suffering. It is even more regrettable that S. omits the social aspect of divorce. Its legitimacy is to be determined by the personal reasons of the partner or partners, with disregard for the effects of divorce upon many other persons, upon state and Church. To allege that some (many? all?) unbaptized contractants of a marriage inspired by love have an implicit baptism of desire and marriage of desire so that they obtain all the graces of those who are baptized and receive the sacrament of matrimony is, of course, a fantasy. Nor is baptism of desire correctly explained (p. 80).

Professors of the dogmatic, canonical, and moral theology pertaining to marriage will profitably read this book. They will get acquainted with the principal arguments used by those who are pressing for the dissolution of ratified, consummated marriages and will be provided with a partial bibliography of authors who either favor or oppose this issue.

Creighton University, Omaha

Clarence McAuliffe, S.J.

SHORTER NOTICES

Le plaidoyer prophétique contre l'Israël après la rupture de l'alliance. By Julien Harvey, S.J. Bruges: Desclée, 1967. Pp. 186. $6.50. The great advances in recent years in the areas of cuneiform law and ancient Near Eastern treaty practices have prompted many scholars to examine the possibility that a legal tradition and procedure lay behind the institution of the covenant in ancient Israel. The parallels between the Yahweh-Israel covenant and the international suzerainty treaties have been pointed out and brilliantly developed by Mendall and Baltzer. Once these premises have been granted, there remain many aspects of the culture and religion of ancient Israel which may be understood in a new way in the light of such parallels. In the wake of the recent short studies of the ṭb in the prophets, H. seeks to establish that the prophetic indictment is in fact a
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Dean Haugaard examines the Elizabethan settlement of religion in relationship to the documents of the Convocation of 1563, documents presently located at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, and at the library of the Inner Temple in London. This Convocation was the occasion for a concerted attempt on the part of the Puritans to push beyond the conservative settlement which resulted from the Parliament of 1559. The attempt failed, however, in large part because the bishops, many of them being strong Protestants but basically conformable, stood in the way knowing as they did that the Queen had already given as many concessions to the zealots as could be justified to the royal mind.

This careful study concentrates upon the crisis of the Convocation of 1563, its composition, its history, and the matters with which it dealt. But in considering the major issues there debated, H. reviews the background and sometimes reflects upon the consequences. Thus, there are chapters on liturgy, on supremacy, on administration and finance, on the bishops and their dealing with laws concerning images, vestments, and clerical apparel, on doctrine from the Declaration of certain Marian exiles to Alexander Nowell's catechism, and on Roman Catholic recusants. In one appendix there is a valuable detailed discussion of the specific documents of Convocation examined by H., a guide for future historians.

The book, taking into account as it does the major aspects of the settlement of religion, is thus no narrow monograph on Convocation. Indeed, H. is concerned to understand and to define the English reformation as a whole, convinced that viewing it in terms of the Puritan struggle of the 1560's one can best appreciate its essentially moderate character, with the preservation of much more of the traditional in liturgy, polity, doctrine, and ceremony than the more radical Protestants could allow. He makes his points convincingly.

Beyond this, however, H. is concerned to answer those historians who regard the Elizabethan settlement of religion as a secular compromise, the Queen herself being more politique than Christian. The evidence, as H. presents it, points in an opposite direction, suggesting that the Queen was a deeply religious woman whose concern for the Church was constant, whose reformation revived the religious settlement of the early years of the reign of Edward VI, more conservative than that settlement achieved under Northumberland in 1552, more Protestant than Henrician Catholicism, definitely antipapal but just as
definitely Catholic according to the Queen’s understanding, following the best tradition of Scripture and the early Church. In 1563 she put the case in a letter to Ferdinand: “We and our people—thanks be to God—follow no novel and strange religions, but that very religion which is ordained by Christ, sanctioned by the primitive and Catholic Church and approved by the consentient mind and voice of the most early Fathers.”

Concentrating upon the first decade of the reign, H. does not take into account the evidence concerning the Queen’s religion which comes from consideration of her birth, education, and early experience, particularly the harrowing experience of Mary Tudor’s reign. The Queen’s own interpretation of the faith grew under the influence of persons such as Cheke and Ascham, moderate Protestants deeply rooted in humanism and appreciative of right reason acting in concord with revelation as witnessed in Scripture. Nor does he take into account evidence from a later period, particularly Elizabeth’s confessions of faith arising out of her desperate struggle over Mary Stuart. Thus H. stops short of fulfilling the promise of his title, *Elizabeth and the English Reformation*. The book, valuable as it admittedly is, is not an exhaustive study of the Queen’s understanding of and relationship to the English reformation.

H. is correct in recognizing the Queen’s important role in the reformation. He sees her and her bishops as the first defenders of a distinctly Anglican tradition, characterized not only by its liturgy and polity, but also by its rejection of dogmatic confessionalism. And he proposes that in any arrangement of individuals having influence upon Anglicanism Elizabeth the laywoman be ranked with Thomas Cranmer the cleric. He is not entirely devoted to the Queen, recognizing as he does the financial abuse of the Church for which the Queen was responsible. But this book is an Anglican’s monument to a great Christian ruler, the more impressive because it is an essentially scholarly book, well documented.

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*JOHN E. BOOTY*


This study shows the polar interdependence of Kierkegaard’s affirmations on God and on man. A centrifugal or diastatic movement opposes God and man in his work, while a centripetal, synthetic relation connects them. Since Christ is always present to Kierkegaard’s idea of
literary formula connected with the same cultural and legal tradition which furnished ancient Israel with the treaty formula, that the prophetic indictment primarily reflects sacral apodictic law, and that the literary structure of the prophetic indictment owes its form to the ancient Near Eastern declaration of war—or the ultimatum—addressed by the suzerain to a disloyal vassal. If these points can be proved, the effects upon such concepts as the prophet as guardian of covenant law and the development of a penitential liturgy connected with the institution of the covenant are manifest.

In this study, originally presented in another form to the Biblical Faculty of the Pontifical Biblical Institute (Rome) as a doctoral dissertation, H. considers the previous investigations of the prophetic indictment and the examples of the indictment in the OT in the light of the extrabiblical materials. The work is thorough, convincing, and enlightening; it is a significant contribution to the study of prophecy in ancient Israel and of the cultural milieu in which it flourished.

_Donald L. Magnetti, S.J._

**THE COVENANT: A THEOLOGY OF HUMAN DESTINY.** By Jakob Jocz. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1968. Pp. 320. $6.95. This book claims to consider the Bible as a theological document, by which Jocz means “a battleground of opposing views” (p. 12). The definition is interesting, especially since, while the book can contain opposing views, source criticism, e.g., is condemned. J. is looking for a “unifying principle which binds together this heterogeneous literature,” and for him this is covenant (pp. 13, 31). This may or may not be the underlying principle, but as J. himself sees, it is not univocal (p. 103). In fact, covenant means many different things in the Bible, even if we restrict the examples to those used when it is an image of man’s relationship to God. To empty the various images of their nuances is to impoverish the total meaning. The only way to unify this variety is to study its development, not as mere growth but even as dialectic. However, this covenant in its biblical meanings cannot provide a universal upon which to construct a logically (in the classic meaning of logic) unified system of theology. The book contains an extensive but highly selective and tendentious bibliography. The covenant theory of grace and sacrament is already available in Luther’s _pactum/pactio_ concept. I can recommend the book only to someone whose profession demands that he try to see everything written about covenant in the Bible.

_Dennis J. McCarthy, S.J._

**PATH TO FREEDOM: CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCES AND THE BIBLE.** By Jean Corbon. Translated by Violet Nevile. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969. Pp. 246. $5.00. A delight to read, the kind of spiritual adaptation of the Bible that is encouraged. We mean “spiritual” in the sense of the subtitle, experiencing the authentic spirit of God’s word. Throughout there is an awareness of the profoundly personal and communitarian nature of biblical religion, summed up in the theme of gratuitousness which C. presents as underlying the Scriptures. Gratuitousness is “that which frees us from all necessity” (p. 7), thereby opening up the way to full realization of interpersonal relations between man and God and man and man. The first gratuitousness was God’s in creating; it continues in the redemptive activity of Christ. Man responds through his own gratuitousness, pre-eminently in the liturgy, whose attitude is that of offering (p. 231). This theme is pursued through ten others explicitly biblical: creation, promise, pasch, exo-
dus, covenant, kingdom, exile, return, resurrection, liturgy. These are not treated in the pedantic style of a textbook, but in the provocative style of the Hebrew sage. "The promise is God’s way of teaching us to become" (p. 68). "In hope, faith becomes fidelity that lasts in time. In hope, love becomes a presence through signs" (p. 87). "Confession can never be simply a list of breaches of a law, it is essentially an opening to a presence" (p. 190). While not overtly biblical in form, these statements flow, in context, from biblical notions and convictions. A few disconcerting chronological curiosities: the slavery in Egypt is dated "two thousand years before Jesus Christ" (p. 96); the J story of Gn 2-3 is set against the background of the Babylonian Captivity (pp. 52, 96, 173). Fortunately, these do not mar the central message of the book, which is highly recommended.

Eugene H. Maly

MORE NEW TESTAMENT STUDIES. By C. H. Dodd. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1968. Pp. vii + 157. $4.50. The papers in the present collection were produced mainly in the period since 1953, the date of Dodd’s New Testament Studies. They are taken principally from various Festschriften to which D. has contributed and are graced with that clarity of style and thought which makes D. a delight to read. Revision has been very slight, except in the case of “The ‘Primitive Catechism’ and the Sayings of Jesus.” The only hitherto unpublished essay is “The Historical Problem of the Death of Jesus” (pp. 84-101). D. finds that extraneous witnesses (T tacitus, the tractate Sanhedrin, and the Stoic Mar bar Sarapion) agree that Jesus suffered a violent death as the promulgator of unacceptable teaching. Following this hint, D. then sifts Christian evidence and finds that Jesus’ position, carried to its logical issue, meant that the halakah, the system by which the law was to be made applicable to every possible situation, was no longer central and no longer the sufficient guide to the good life. The “blasphemy” for which Jesus was condemned was, D. suggests, an admission of Messiahship (“plus”), serviceable as a quasi-political charge. The Pharisees had formed a strictly temporary and ad hoc alliance with the Sadducees to rid themselves of Him. One wonders, however, whether D. is fully justified in his way of prescinding from the theological understanding of blasphemy in the Synoptics. His own careful study (especially apropos of “Messiahship plus”) might at least have benefited from attention to what Lamarche says in RSR 50 (1962) 74-85. This useful, well-printed volume also contains “The Beatitudes: A Form-Critical Study,” “A Hidden Parable in the Fourth Gospel (Jn 5, 19-20a),” “Behind a Johannine Dialogue (Jn 8, 31-47),” “The Prophecy of Caiaphas: John 11, 47-53,” “The Fall of Jerusalem and the ‘Abomination of Desolation,’” “The Appearances of the Risen Christ: A Study in Form-Criticism of the Gospels,” and “Ennomos Christou (1 Cor 9, 19-22).” Indices of names and of biblical and extrabiblical references enhance the value of this collection.

Charles H. Giblin, S.J.

version" of this valuable book might appear. The editor has improved the book by the addition of many items, some of them American, which had been neglected in Rigaux's original bibliographical survey; occasionally, too, he has introduced further critical estimates (e.g., p. 180). This is all to the good. But one of the defects in the original work, annoying in a book purporting to be a bibliographical and critical survey of Pauline studies, was the abundance of false references and errors (at least typographical). Some of these have been corrected; but many of them have been repeated and a host of new ones have appeared, along with false renderings, unchecked bibliography, and English solecisms. Hence this version fulfills my hope only in part. To cite an instance or two of the carelessness evident in this book: R. referred to W. G. RümpePs masterly survey of NT scholarship, Das Neue Testament (Munich, 1958), as "un maitre livre," which now becomes "a teacher's manual"! The edited translation often means a paraphrase which changes the author's nuances. Thus, Renan was quoted in the original as saying "Ce n'est plus l'Epître aux Romains qui est le résumé du christianisme, c'est le discours sur la montagne"; this becomes "The Epistle to the Romans is no more a resume of Christian thought than the Sermon on the Mount"! R. wrote the article on Franz Cumont in the Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche and carelessly referred to it as appearing in "Theologie und Kirche, 2e édit., III, 107–108" (p. 19, n. 3); the English version repeats the same lapsus. Every incorrect reference in the original of n. 1 on p. 26 has been reproduced in n. 27 (p. 186). The conflation of W. L. Knox and John Knox is blithely continued (p. 223, n. 30). This sad litany could be carried on for some time. It is a shame that the English readers of an otherwise important book have to be warned against such deficiencies that a knowledgeable editor and competent copy editor could have eliminated.

Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J.

**Faith and Understanding** 1. By Rudolf Bultmann. Edited with an introduction by R. W. Funk; translated by L. P. Smith. New York: Harper & Row, 1969. Pp. 348. $7.50. Bultmann's collected essays, Glauben und Verstehen, first appeared in 1933, and they make up today four substantial volumes. Vol. 1, which is now presented in English (save for two essays already available elsewhere), has already reached its sixth German edition. Vol. 2 has been translated under the title Essays Philosophical and Theological (London, 1955), and Vol. 3 partly appeared in Existence and Faith (New York, 1960). Though the essays of Vol. 1 are of seminal significance for B.'s theology, and especially for his demythologization (as R. W. Funk's well-written introduction makes clear), it is nevertheless ironic that they are only now being made available to English readers. Eight of the thirteen essays were originally published between 1924–30; the five others, presumably written in the same period, first appeared in the collection of 1933. To those acquainted with B.'s thought, the essays in Faith and Understanding 1 will bring little that is new. But the translation of them is nevertheless a boon, for they will explain to a wider public the genesis and growth of B.'s thinking and reveal how he gradually came to be one of the major German Protestant theologians of this century. The titles of the essays indicate the wide range of subjects discussed: "Liberal Theology and the Latest Theological Movement," "What Does It Mean to

Many of the essays are intimately related to B.’s thinking, which eventually manifested itself in his notable synthetic work The Theology of the New Testament. Little in the volume directly concerns Roman Catholic theology; yet the influence that B. has had on the latter in recent years will make its students want to consult it for its historic significance. The translation is in general well done; but there are some lapses, which are almost inevitable in any attempt to render Bultmann’s German into English. The reader will do well to consult the original of the bottom of p. 117 and the top of p. 118. The English of the second sentence on p. 118 makes Bultmann say just the opposite of what he says in German.

In his introduction Funk rightly pays tribute to Louise Pettibone Smith, “who led the way in presenting Bultmann originally to English readers” with her translation of Jesus and the Word (New York, 1934), and who returns “after so many years to the unfinished task of providing the wider context” for that book.

Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J.

The Greek Patristic View of Nature. By D. S. Wallace-Hadrill. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1968. Pp. viii + 150. $5.50. W-H. has filled a conspicuous gap in the study of Greek patristic literature. The views of the Latin Fathers about nature have partially been examined in the Catholic University of America Patristic Studies, and the writings of Clement of Alexandria were similarly analyzed by C. G. Murphy. Thus, there is need for a large-scale and comprehensive study of the Greek patristic view of nature such as A. Biese’s Die Entwicklung des Naturgefühls bei den Griechen und Römern (1882-84) concerning pagan antiquity. The present book seeks brevity, and it is arranged topically into five divisions: (1) the study of nature, i.e., natural science; (2) the structure and functions of the human body—a chapter revealing the objectivity of the Fathers towards the body; (3) man in his setting, which includes philosophical views of man’s relationship to the physical world; (4) the appreciation of nature, which treats the reaction of the Fathers to the scenic beauty of the world and has an appendix on their attitude towards beauty in literature, painting, and sculpture; (5) the interpretation of nature, where W-H. concludes: “The Greek Fathers, for all their intense appreciation of nature, for all their interest in the structures and processes of nature and their insistence upon nature as a means by which God reveals his nature, nevertheless hold that God and nature are not identical, and that the mind must penetrate nature to find God.” W.-H.’s purpose is “to re-examine some of the writings of the Greek Fathers of the first four centuries in order, it is hoped, to elucidate a little further what they say about the physical world in which they lived” (p. 1) and to show that “to many of the Greek Fathers the world appeared interesting, enjoyable and important” (p. vii). W-H. has collected a large amount of in-
teresting material from their writings and has arranged, explicated, and interpreted this material with clarity, taste, and theological acumen. His book is made more valuable by detailed indices of patristic writers, non-Christian writers, and subjects, plus an excellent bibliography.

Margaret A. Schatkin

SCOTUS SPEAKS TODAY 1266–1966: SEVENTH CENTENARY SYMPOSIUM, APRIL 21–23, 1966. Southfield, Mich.: Duns Scotus College, 1968. Pp. 321. $4.00. If Festschriften are any indicator, relatively little notice in the English-speaking world has been paid to John Duns Scotus on the seventh centenary of his birth, especially in this country—all the more regrettable as Scotus, of all the thirteenth-century theologians, is perhaps the most relevant to the postconciliar Church and English theology. The student of Scotus will find each essay (and some of the critiques) a scholarly essay in itself; the general reader will find themes treated that are closely connected with the questions of the day and which will furnish him a vantage and motive for delving further into the study of Scotus. Among the themes treated are those bearing on theology, its nature, method, and object; and on Scotus’ influence at Vatican II; on ontology and epistemology; and on the relation between Scotus, G. M. Hopkins, and poetics. No attempt has been made to impose a unity on the essays other than that which the symposium provided, and the fact that each study shares, however disparately, a unity stemming from the common inspiration of a single master, one of the most unique and powerful to have graced the Western theological world.

Peter D. Fehlner, O.F.M.Conv.

GIANFRANCESCO PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA (1469–1533) AND HIS CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE. By Charles B. Schmitt. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1967. Pp. xiv + 252. Modern philosophy begins, as Pierre Bayle long ago observed, with the introduction of the writings of Sextus Empiricus. Less well known is the fact that the sixteenth-century scepticism which led to Descartes grew up in the context of criticism of the prevailing theology. This criticism was carried on not in the established university circles, but by laymen profoundly disturbed by the reliance of contemporary Christian theologians on the authority of Aristotle. One of the most incisive among these critics was Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola. Influenced by Savonarola, Gianfrancesco’s aims were radically different from his uncle Giovanni’s attempt to harmonize all systems of philosophy. His purpose was to destroy the foundations of all rational knowledge in favor of the one criterion of truth that he found in the Christian faith. His critique of Aristotle is contained in his Examen vanitatis doctrinae gentium (1520), in which Books 1–3 comprise an attack on pagan philosophy in general and Books 4–6 apply the results of this critique to Aristotle. The present book is an analysis of this work and brings out its significance for modern philosophy and natural science because of the new sources which it employs. Schmitt shows how Pico’s critique of the Aristotelian concepts of motion, time, place, and vacuum derives from the Greek Christian Aristotle commentator Johannes Philoponus (6th c.) and the Jewish opponent of Maimonides, Hasdai Crescas (+1410), and anticipate many of Galileo’s positions. The Greek philosopher Sextus Empiricus is the source for Pico’s critique of the Aristotelian theory of scientific knowledge. It is particularly this source that sets Pico’s critique apart from
the Platonic and humanistic criticisms of Aristotle in the *quattrocento*. In his use of Sextus Empiricus he prepared the way for Descartes and Kant. Schmitt has given us an important book which provides a remarkable introduction to modern philosophy.

*C. H. Lohr, S.J.*

**CALVIN AND THE LIBERTINES OF GENEVA.** By Ross William Collins. Edited by F. D. Blackley. Toronto: Clarke Irwin, 1968. Pp. ix + 210. $4.50. A popular and accurate account of the Reform movement in Geneva, with emphasis on the conflict between Calvin and the Libertines. The Libertines were not the rakes that the name may seem to suggest, but were the advocates of freedom; they yielded to no compulsion, and resisted the intrusion of the Church in attempting to determine their way of life. C. narrates how Calvin endured two periods of anxiety at the hands of the Libertine Party. The first period extended to the time of Calvin’s exile (1538); his problems were the refusal by many to subscribe to the new *Confession of Faith*, the election of these nonjurors to the Council, and their imposition of the Bernese Church Order in Geneva. The second period (1545–55) began a few years after Calvin’s return to Geneva. The anti-Calvinist group again gained control of the city government and Calvin’s problems now included dancing, fashions, the power of excommunication, and the Council’s desire to limit the number of French refugees into the city. The fall of the Libertines came in 1555 when the younger generation, having resented the way Calvin had been treated, overthrew the party by electing syndics who were staunch supporters of Calvin and his reform.

C. had been Professor of History at the University of Alberta, and specialized in the Renaissance and Reformation periods. He died prior to the completion of his manuscript; F. D. Blackley had been requested to prepare it for publication and kept C.’s wish that it be published without footnotes.

*Joseph N. Tylenda, S.J.*

**NO ORTHODOXY BUT THE TRUTH: A SURVEY OF PROTESTANT THEOLOGY.** By Donald G. Dawe. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1969. Pp. 185. $5.95. A study of the various intellectual and scientific currents and their impact on theology from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, from Socinus to Kant. Dawe delimits his analysis to one theme, the evolution of the new Christology of Protestantism, because he considers it as enfolding “the great questions of God and man, revelation and history” (p. 13). D. also confines himself to these three centuries since that period has “an inner intellectual integration” (p. 13) that suits his intended survey. To do otherwise would be a rather foolish task in so short a work. Ranging from Newtonian physics and pietism to the ramifications and influences of deism and rationalism, constantly highlighting the relationship between revelation and history, D. attempts to show how the theologians of this period tried to examine the unexamined past of the traditional Christological positions. As a survey it succeeds, and precisely as a survey it has the intrinsic flaw, perhaps unavoidable, of all surveys. What results is a sweeping aggregate of personalities with a quotation or two from their works, and it is this that makes one hesitate in evaluating a book of this nature. Is it an introductory work? If so, for what kind of readership? Or is it a quasi-reference work, leaving it up to the reader to delve further into an
individual man's thought? This is not to lessen the intrinsic value of the work; it does say and accomplish a great deal in relatively few pages. Perhaps had D. confined himself to the more important figures and to an in-depth analysis of their thought, leaving the lesser figures to footnotes or suggested readings, the average theological or historical reader would have found the book more appealing.

Anthony B. Brzoska, S.J.

EVOLUTION AND THE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN. By Stephanus Trooster. Translated from the Dutch by John A. Ter Haar. New York: Newman, 1968. Pp. 138. $4.95. It is not clear what the author's purpose is. In his first chapter T. recognizes that the theory of evolution creates difficulties for the "traditional" concept and expresses dissatisfaction with current attempts to reformulate it, especially in terms of "cosmic immaturity." At the outset he courageously takes it on himself to state the "essence" of the doctrine (p. 2), though one might have thought that would have been the goal of the inquiry. The second chapter deals with the notion of original sin in the OT, emphasizing the "strong feeling for the solidarity of all in sin... as it animates the entire Bible" (p. 49), and seeing this as a basis for the subsequent doctrine. T. thus suggests that there is an inchoate notion of original sin in the OT, yet he does not seem aware that the contrary opinion is almost universally accepted by scholars. The third chapter treats of Paul's concept of original sin. T. grants that in Romans 5 Paul is not primarily concerned with the idea, but maintains that Paul "presupposes a familiarity, no matter how, with this mystery" (p. 77). He interprets Paul as continuing the OT view of the solidarity of all men in sin. However, it is not that they have inherited a state from Adam; they have this solidarity because they have affirmed his sin by their own. The figure of Adam "personifies the existence of all" (p. 87). The advantage of this approach is that it lessens the problem of monogenism. The final chapter purports to treat of the history of the doctrine. The exhaustive work of Gross on this is completely overlooked, and attention is concentrated on the history of infant baptism; again, this approach surely needs to be justified rather than presumed. T. does not develop systematically any theological theory of his own. The closest he comes to this is to support the idea of a "universal rule of 'sin' in the world due to the solidarity of all in sin from the very first beginning" (p. 113). But if the rule of sin comes from the personal sins of men, what guarantees its universality? Only, apparently, the assumption that all men without exception have in fact committed personal sin, and that all will continue to do so. In general, the book is not clear in conception, argument, or style. The translation is poor at the beginning (esp. pp. 8 and 9) but improves as it goes on.

Patrick Burke

VOM SINN DER MENSCHWERDUNG: "CUR DEUS HOMO." By Rudolf Haubst. Munich: Hueber, 1969. Pp. 216. DM 16.80. H. justly remarks in his foreword that the title of Anselm's famous work is the first, last, and central question of Christian theology. It is a pity that it is so often relegated today to a "speculative" scholion and treated merely as a quaestio disputata along the lines of the hypothetical als ob formulae of fourteenth-century Thomism and Scotism: If Adam had not sinned, Christ would not have come—or would have come...
nonetheless, If we are to distil any lasting understanding from our contemporary Christological efforts, An­selm’s question must once again be­come a quaestio disputanda.

Within the limits set for himself H. has written an admirable outline of the question as it emerged in the thirteenth century from twelve hun­dred years of theological endeavor. A first section reviews the problematic, its theological and anthropological di­mensions. A second and third discuss respectively the bases in revelation for the so-called “soteriological” and “cosmic or absolute predestination,” i.e., “for us” or “for His own sake,” theories of motivation; and a final section essays the inseparability and coincidence of the two motives. Any exclusive concentration on the one or the other must lead to an unbalanced Christology. In this sense the classic Thomistic and Scotistic responses to the hypothetical question are types which apart are false polarities; to­gether they complement each other in providing angles of vision for a re­ality too rich to be exhausted by any one “catholic” system of theology. Thus, as a compendium of past efforts they serve as initial guidelines for future reflection. H., devoted student of Nicholas of Cusa, attributes this insight to Cusanus. Theological prob­lematics of a schematic nature all suffer the limitations and defects of hypotheses. To be effective, they must prescind from a good deal of his­torical matter which could modify the over-all impression, either con­firming or weakening the reconstruc­tion. To the extent H. interprets Sco­tus exclusively in terms of the sig­na voluntatis divinae, he seriously risks identifying the historic Scotus with a possible Thomistic caricature, or with the peripheral concerns, even if quan­titatively more impressive, of some phases of the Scotistic tradition, thus obscuring the true contribution of Scotus. This notwithstanding, H.’s re­construction of the problem to meet contemporary needs possesses con­siderable validity—a useful contribu­tion to a much neglected discussion.

Peter D. Fehlner, O.F.M.Conv.

THE CHURCH AS SIGN. Edited by William J. Richardson, M.M. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Maryknoll Publications, 1968. Pp. vii + 170. $5.95. The editor, who has had six years of expe­rience on Taiwan, is known for his several earlier works on mission top­ics. His most recent book, a collection of five essays by different theolo­gians, represents an attempt to con­front the identity crisis of the mis­sionary in a Church that lately has begun to understand itself as sign rather than sanctuary. From a modern ecclesiologi­cal perspective, in which the local community is the prime analogue of “church,” Bishop Blom­jous draws several practical conclu­sions as to where the proper respon­sibility for the assistance of newer churches should be properly located. Stephen Neill, former Anglican Bishop of South India, offers the as­surance that the present new age of mission history will see greater toler­ance for nonnationals who may be sent to assist the younger churches. Other essays take up the questions of the development of an indigenous church, the rise of a native clergy, and the formulation of a theology more congruent with the philosophy of a particular culture, especially in the East. Besides exploring missio­logical corollaries of the most recent developments in theology, the es­says offer several concrete suggestions for making the missionary efforts of the Church more effective in the fu­ture. In an appendix two documents from a Maryknoll general chapter are cited as an example, perhaps, of
the response of one mission society to changing needs and a renovated theology of mission.

Francis X. Hezel, S.J.

DO WE NEED THE CHURCH? By Richard P. McBrien. New York: Harper & Row, 1969. Pp. 248. $6.50. The main thesis is succinctly stated in the Introduction: “the Church is but the sign and instrument of the Kingdom of God, the community of those who have been elected by God to give explicit witness to what has happened, is happening, and will happen in history. It is the kingdom and not the Church which is the ground and goal of all history. It is the kingdom and not the Church which is the only theological absolute” (p. 15). To enlarge on this thesis (and its correlatives, i.e., all men are called, not to the Church, but to the kingdom), McB. divides his book into three parts. The first surveys the “secular mood” of current theology by a short summation of the various ideas of men like Cox, Altizer, Bonhoeffer, Robinson, and Metz. It is by far the most unsatisfactory part of the book, due to its haste and superficiality. The subsection on Cox, e.g., is just a paraphrase of some of the subheadings of *The Secular City*, while Dewart merits only a two-page nod. The second section quickly summarizes current biblical thinking on the Church and postbiblical developments in ecclesiology. McB. spends a fair amount of space in tracing the antecedents of *Mystici corporis* through the writings of Tromp to the post-Tridentine efforts of Bellarmine. The last section deals with more current thinking in ecclesiology but without the benefit of a discussion of Hans Küng’s *The Church*, which came out roughly at the same time. The last section deals with the thesis I mentioned in the beginning. The author has read a good deal of ecclesiology, writes well, and has produced an interesting work. However, for a little more than the price of this book one could purchase Küng’s *The Church*, a far more substantial and decidedly more provocative work in that most interesting of areas, ecclesiology.

Lawrence Cunningham

THE LAST YEARS OF THE CHURCH. By David Poling. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969. Pp. xiv + 153. $4.95. A single theme runs through this series of exhortations to contemporary U.S. Christians: God is not dead, but the Church as we know it is dying—a thesis addressed in its first part to the anxieties of religious doubters and pessimists, and in its second part to the anxieties of religious optimists who would like to preserve a comfortable *status quo*. P.’s style is that of the journalistic prophet. Without denigrating the merits of this genre, one wonders at more than one point in the reading just how adequate the approach is for the problems addressed where this style is combined with an uncritical reporting of events, a use of generalizations equal to the best in old-fashioned accommodating of the Scriptures to present woes, and a rather nebulous theological context in which the meaning, limits, and validity of the language employed might be judged.

From one point of view, the trans-sociological, it is not possible, *stante verbo Christi*, to make such a neat juncture between the death of God and the death of the Church. They either live or die together. Whoever holds the thesis of this volume may understand neither the God and Father of our Lord Jesus, nor the Church, nor the process by which we know it, nor very likely the real source of the worries on both “left” and “right.” It would be utter blindness to deny the momentous changes presently engulf-
ing Christians. But is it truly compassionate (as P. describes his critique) to exhort pessimists and optimists on the basis of a diluted theology that only masks the anxieties of both? It is interesting that every major period of change in the history of the Church has been accompanied by a spate of writings proclaiming her last day and hour. They are themselves a sign of the times, but never seem to penetrate to the heart of the matter. The phenomenon will no doubt be with us to the end. None of the self-appointed undertakers, compassionate or otherwise, have quite gotten the body in the tomb and secured it once for all. All of which in an odd way is comforting.

Peter D. Fehlner, O.F.M.Conv.

THE ONE BREAD. By Max Thurian. Translated by Theodore DuBois. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969. Pp. 159. $4.50. Part 1 discusses the meaning and minister of the Eucharist, and the consequent effect the understanding of these have upon the question of intercommunion. Part 2 deals with Christianity, which T. sees challenged to a salutary purification by its presence in a secularized world. There is little exploration in either part. Informed general readers, however, will find here the broad range, convincing argument, and passion for unity that one associates with the Assistant Prior of Taizé. In the first and more interesting part, T. reviews the many points at which the Eucharistic faith of Christians converges. At the same time he recalls the remaining divergences, the greatest of which he counts as disagreement over the ministry, and the satellite question of who can validly celebrate the Eucharist. The solution to this problem "would be a key for access to intercommunion and the visible unity of Christians." For this reason T. calls for deeper inquiry into what is essential and accidental to the ministry. All the more need, therefore, for the reader to supplement the view T. gives of the Roman position with regard to ministry and intercommunion by reference to recent arguments recognizing the ministry of other churches. The work of Franz Josef van Beeck in the Journal of Ecumenical Studies 3 (1966) 57-112 comes to mind: he argues for the recognition, as sacrament of order, of the ministry of those churches celebrating sacraments in good faith. Mention should also be made of an expansion of van Beeck's thesis by Daniel J. O'Hanlon in Worship 41 (1967) 406-21. The developments of these authors, it seems, comply with T.'s wish that "Catholic theology will develop a concept of extraordinary ministry which is the fruit of God's supplying grace" (p. 42).

John Cordoue, S.J.

LA PERFECTION DU CHRÉTIEN. By I. Hausherr, S.J. Adapted from notes by M. Olphe-Galliard, S.J. Paris: Lethielleux, 1968. Pp. 252. 18.70 F. It is astonishing that this book could appear in 1968. Though H. is commendably competent in patristic literature and St. Thomas, he is dated in approach. The volume is a typical manual in its ideas, terms, thought patterns (e.g., act of man/human act; act/habit; subjective parts of virtues). H.'s problems are problems of yesteryear, and so we find a critique of quietism's "pure love" idea (pp. 206-8). His contemporary writers are Billot (1928), Stolz (1940), de Guibert (1935), Pinard de la Boullaye (1934), Garrigou-Lagrange, Tanquerey, de Caussade. The most recent are de Lubac (article in 1945) and Spicq (1958-59). We 'ound no reference to Vatican II except in O-G.'s epilogue. H. feels that all philosophers agree that man may be defined as an "animal raisonnable" and
that the distinction between counsel and precept is today "bien établie" (pp. 23 and 102). O-G.'s epilogue finds H. "in perfect harmony with Vatican II." This is true as regards orthodoxy but not as regards approach and subject matter. Furthermore, we find it difficult to reconcile the frequent assumption of Vatican II that all are called to the loftiest contemplation with H.'s position that infused contemplation is not necessary for perfection. If on H.'s own premise heroic virtue includes the supreme degree of faith and love, we have supreme contemplation, for supreme knowing and loving of God can be nothing other than what the Spirit infuses.

Thomas Dubay, S.M.

RESPONSE IN CHRIST: A STUDY OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE. By Edward Carter, S.J. Dayton: Pflaum, 1969. Pp. xiv + 274. $6.95. An attempt to present a renewed spiritual theology and answer a need of our times. C. presents traditional views of the elements of the spiritual life and seeks to integrate insights from new theological approaches. Intended for a general Christian audience rather than for the professional theologian, the book surveys the essentials of the Christian life, focusing on the centrality of Christ, who gives unity to them. The chapter on "The Christian Life of Grace" presents a core of new directions for a renewed appreciation of sharing in divine life and the Christian's relationship to God and creation; but it fails to develop them sufficiently to make a real impact. This is typical of many sections of the book; one could wish for more depth and dynamism in the unifying of modern with traditional thought. In some few sections the new currents seem merely to be superimposed on a familiar framework. "Incarnationalism and Transcendence" (chap. 5) is an excellent presentation of a much-discussed problem, and C. offers fine reflections on the factors determining the proportion of incarnationalism-transcendence in each Christian. The sections on faith and hope also present valuable insights for modern spirituality, especially in "Hope and the Secular City." This book faces a real need; if it does not meet it entirely, it may be because it tries to do too much or because of the difficulty of synthesizing different currents of thought. It should provoke further attempts to renewed spiritual theology.

William F. Hogan, C.S.C.

THE CHRISTIAN NEW MORALITY: A BIBLICAL STUDY OF SITUATION ETHICS. By O. Sydney Barr. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969. Pp. x + 118. $4.00. B.'s concern here is with the claim of situationists that they have biblical and dominical authority for their assertion that love alone, in its situational demands, is the ultimate ethical criterion. Aiming at discovering in the NT ethic not "proof positive" but simply material "highly supportive of the New Morality's claim," he discusses the antilegalism of Jesus and His love-ethic as found in the Synoptics, the "faith active in love" of Paul, and John's agape: God's love, so expressive of His innermost being, which is visible in Christ and to be mediated to the world through Christ's disciples. This proves to be a beautifully written and quite stirring exposition of Christian love which points up its primacy and centrality in the NT ethic and surely achieves the author's modest aim. At the same time one wonders why a treatment that sets John's doctrine on love side by side with that of the Synoptic Gospels and St. Paul fails to confront the problem of the so-called "Johannine exclusivism," viz., John's seeming preoccupation with love for "the brethren," with laying
down one’s life for one’s “friend,” etc., which contrasts with the insistence of the other NT writers, especially the Synoptics, that Christian love is disinterested, looking for no reciprocity or mutuality but extending very significantly to one’s enemies. Granted his wish to elucidate from the NT sources the nature of Christian love as well as its centrality, discussion of this problem would, I believe, have served B.’s purpose well.

Nicholas Crotty, C.P.

THE RELIGIOUS LIFE. By Sister Edna Mary. Baltimore: Penguin, 1968. Pp. 250. $1.45 Few treatments of the religious life can match this one in erudition, balance, and inspiration. The author is a member of the Anglican Deaconess Community of St. Andrews. Her academic background in English, law, and theology, plus her experience in ecumenical and campus ministries, endow her admirably for presenting to the lay reader the life of the counsels in historical perspective and contemporary reflection. The two chapters which deal with the history of the religious life are perhaps the best brief treatment available. The many footnotes contain a good bibliography. The author is especially well informed on the renewal of the communal life in Protestantism, and is quite at home with Roman Catholic currents too. The monastic tradition, with its stress on regularity, praise, and intercession, is especially favored by Sister Edna. Some American readers may find the serene detachment of the whole work lacking in a sense of urgency. But the volume remains one of the best recent studies on the subject. Its many beautiful insights and positive spirit deserve the highest recommendation, not least for religious themselves.

Thomas E. Clarke, S.J.

THE CRISIS OF FAITH: A PROTESTANT WITNESS IN ROME. By Frederick Sontag. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969. Pp. 285. $5.95. A curious amalgam of analysis, prescription, exhortation, and polemic, this work finds its basic unity in the author’s unique perspective. The first non-Catholic philosopher to offer a regular course in a Roman seminary, Sontag lived with and taught Benedictine monks during 1966-67, where he experienced many of the tensions and problems within monastic life in their relationship to the Church as a whole. While S. offers many perceptive reflections on monastic life, his central thesis argues that the crisis of faith in all of Christian life is “our crying need . . . for a new concept of God to appear, for it is clear that this absence is a prime factor in the theological crisis.” Lacking in Vatican II was any talk of the nature of God, yet its pastoral reforms raised precisely this question to a place of primary practical importance. This is a philosophic question which traditional Catholic philosophic training is not well equipped to handle. What is needed is a Vatican III with broad Protestant participation to address itself to such philosophic and doctrinal questions. The substance of the book relates this “crying need” to the crises of authority, theology, vocations, education, community, and ecumenism. In the last-named area S. offers an interesting distinction between unity and reconciliation, fruitful for a pluralism of theologies, liturgical forms, and Church polity. Throughout the book there runs an implicit polemic against Charles Davis. While this provides S. with a convenient foil for his own ideas, it is more distracting than helpful, never really coming to grips with Davis himself. Over-all, it is a forthright book, posing some sharp questions to those who rush into the
future without regard to the values and wisdom of the past.

James P. Hanigan, S.J.

THE FAITH OF THE ATHEIST. By Arthur Gibson. New York, Harper & Row, 1968. Pp. 218. $5.95. Gibson's stimulating, often provocative work illustrates again that a study of unbelief is inevitably an essay on faith. In the modern Western world every principal type of atheism is bound in what Dewart describes as sadomasochistic embrace with Christian theism. G.'s thesis is that the atheist, too, is a believer of sorts, not a cryptotheist but committed to some value or ideal as of ultimate concern, not only intellectually but passionately and with a moral earnestness. He proposes to illumine some of the facets of these forms of nonreligious belief by examining the positive fundamental convictions of six twentieth-century thinkers (rather, five such and Nietzsche). Each philosopher places his faith, his basic conviction, in a different value, and for each this value substitutes for the God of biblical theism. Not all of these men are optimists by a long shot; indeed, the God-substitutes reveal an absence or diminution of hope as much as of faith in the theological sense. The surrogate deity is embraced initially as a bastion against utter meaninglessness, but eventually the option dissolves and ends in inconsistency and disillusionment.

The atheistic values are not such of their intrinsic nature but only when stripped of transcendent personalness and enclosed within a finite, mundane framework and made to correspond to human projection. One of the authors included in G.'s selection, A. N. Whitehead, is not an atheist in the strict sense, while Samuel Alexander is a highly original but confused panthe-
chapter explores the causes of the present crisis of hope; the second deals with its essential structure as appearing to consciousness; the third is limited to the foundation of hope and the conditions wherein it is possible; the last is concerned primarily with transcendent meaning flowing from the foregoing analysis. E.'s principal conclusion is that hope is ultimately irreducible to a materialistic principle. In this he is mostly successful (e.g., the foundation of Ernst Bloch's Der Prinzip Hoffnung is quite thoroughly shaken) but fails in some respects (e.g., the now almost classic challenge of Bertrand Russell's Mysticism and Logic is nowhere met, and probably could not be met phenomenologically). Thus an unintended by-product of E.'s study is that it betrays the insufficiency of phenomenology as a total method. Apparent parti pris occasionally inclines E. to abuse the adopted method of research (e.g., the obvious but unplanned contrast between Bloch, pp. 179-82, and K. Rahner, p. 242, in the context of future orientation of religion and/or Christianity) and at least once to verge on the poetic (cf. the person as an apparently direct source of knowledge of the self, p. 70). Though overly dependent on Marcel, E. compensates for this by taking up problems not treated in Homo viator (e.g., the meaning of consciousness of the possible in Hartmann and Heidegger). On the whole, a very serious, occasionally repetitious, and very worth-while study which could have been improved by a bibliography and more aptly subtitled Phänomenologisches Prolegomenon für eine Metaphysik der Hoffnung.

Robert J. Schachner-Dionne, S.M.

CIVIL DISOBEIDENCE AND THE CHRISTIAN. By Daniel B. Stevick. New York: Seabury, 1969. Pp. xi + 211. $6.95. A much-needed monograph on a burning issue. Though referring to current events, S. does not limit himself to them, but searches for the general principles on which an enlightened judgment must rest. The question is not only social and political, but above all moral. If the majority can deny a minority its rights, it is no less true that a minority can infringe on the majority’s rights. The book is written from a general Protestant standpoint, but is not limited to any sectarian view. It is expressly Christian, but also contains arguments and evaluations of a philosophical and ethical nature. It opens with a fair statement of the issue and impartially lays out the case against civil disobedience as a nullifying of authority and a paralyzing of society, and the case in favor of civil disobedience when the state itself is the wrecker of injustice which it refuses to remedy. There follows a record of the ambivalence of the NT witness concerning the state, setting a strong No to the state alongside a strong Yes. There are two chapters on the tradition of Christian dissent from Tertullian to Bonhoeffer. There is the obedience which must disobey, i.e., obedience to justice itself, which is the state's purpose, requires disobedience to the unjust law or practice which the state, unfaithful to itself, is now tolerating or fostering.

A chapter on the conditions of responsible disobedience lays the issue on a practical line: the consequences of disobedience must not bring about more evil than good; the breaking of the law must be in the name of the law and not an act of disrespect to law as such; all other remedies must have been tried and found wanting; the disobedience must identify its specific aim and not be protest for protest's sake; there must be concern for the means used lest the conflict drop to the level of the oppressor; there must be respect for the essential structure of the law and hence in most cases a
willingness to accept the penalty; and the whole purpose must be the constructive one of bettering the community. The book concludes with a chapter on Christian nonviolence and another on the distinction between civil disobedience and revolution, both treated with balanced perceptiveness. The book does not pretend to be an exhaustive treatment of any of these important topics, but is a well-argued summary recommended to any reader.

Austin Fagothey, S.J.

BOOKS RECEIVED

[All books received are listed here whether they are reviewed or not]

SCRIPTURAL STUDIES


DOCTRINAL THEOLOGY


MORAL, LAW, LITURGY


Potter, Ralph B. War and Moral Dis-


PASTORAL AND ASCETICAL


HISTORY AND PATRISTICS


PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS

Barden, Garrett, and Philip McShane, S.J. Towards Self-Meaning.
BOOKS RECEIVED


SPECIAL QUESTIONS


