
From time to time our knowledge of patristic literature is augmented by the discovery of previously unpublished texts, as, e.g., the recent publication of Didymus the Blind’s Commentary on Zechariah. There is a less dramatic side to the editing of patristic texts and that is the slow, tedious work of examining the catenae to discover fragments of works of the Fathers. In the case of the exegetical works these fragments frequently provide the only clues we have to the exegetical writings of some Fathers. In the 1930’s K. Staab published a large collection of fragments from the commentaries on Paul by the Greek Fathers, other scholars have published fragments of individual exegetical works, and several years ago J. Reuss published the fragments of the commentaries on Matthew of the Greek Fathers. In this present volume he complements the edition of fragments on Matthew by the fragments on the Gospel of John. This work, like the work on Matthew, is a superb piece of scholarship and an outstanding example of how fragments should be edited.

The volume includes the following authors: Apollinaris of Laodicea, Theodore of Heraclea, Didymus the Blind, Theophilus of Alexandria, Cyril of Alexandria, Ammonius of Alexandria, and Photius of Constantinople. The bulk of the fragments come from Apollinaris, Theodore, Ammonius, and Photius. From Didymus we have only twenty-one, from Theophilus only one, and twenty-one from Cyril. Cyril is included, though we have almost the full text of his Commentary on John (ed. P. Pusey), because Books 7 and 8 of the Commentary are in fragmentary condition. Thus Reuss includes fragments from these two books, though his hope that the examination of the catenae would turn up the complete text of the two lost books was not realized.

R.’s chief aim is to provide a critical text of the fragments of the lost commentaries on the Gospel of John. Therefore he does not include fragments from those commentaries which are preserved relatively intact (e.g., Chrysostom on John), except for the two books of Cyril on John. He also excluded fragments of an exegetical nature which come from the polemical and dogmatic writings, even though the author may have been expounding a verse from John. Finally, R. excluded those authors for which the catenae did not provide any new material beyond that which had already been edited, as, e.g., Theodore of Mopsuestia. So far the rationale and scope of the work.
On the basis of his study of the catenae and by comparison of fragments with the commentaries we do possess, e.g., Chrysostom, R. came to the conclusion that the compilators are generally quite faithful to the original text and that in many cases they had before them the original text and not another catena. He admits, however, that it is frequently impossible to decide whether the compiler had the original text before him. When two compilators present the same comment on a given text by the same author, R. presents both texts in parallel columns to facilitate critical evaluation of the text and to illustrate the method of some compilators. At times the compiler would abbreviate or otherwise alter the text before him. By comparing the fragments with extant commentaries, R. was able to reassign certain fragments to their proper author.

The texts themselves are highly interesting and give us a better sense of what these Fathers were up to in their exegesis. The over-all impression created by reading these fragments is that, though the theology of the exegete does shape his interpretation, the Fathers were quite careful and diligent in their approach to the exegetical task and they are not simply running the biblical text through their own particular theological mill. This is true of Apollinaris, whose peculiar Christological views are seldom represented in the fragments. R. cautions the reader, however, that the compiler may have purposely avoided copying such passages from the commentaries. The fragments do show, however, that, if a commentator’s own particular theology stays in the background, the major theological themes of a generation or an epoch do provide the backdrop for the interpretation of the text. Thus, the fourth-century writers regularly interpret the Gospel of John in light of the Trinitarian question of the relation of the Father to the Son. In this case theology and exegesis serve to complement each another.

Among the authors included, Theodore of Heraclea is of particular interest, since he has affinity with the Antiochene school and we have so little of his exegetical or theological work outside of these fragments. R. includes no less than 430 fragments from his commentary. Theodore is another witness to a non-Eucharistic interpretation of Jn 6. It is noteworthy that not only Theodore, but most of the other commentators, seldom use allegory in their interpretation of John, and this applies to Apollinaris and Cyril as well as Theodore. Ammonius, whom R. identifies as the presbyter Ammonius of the first half of the sixth century, contributes the largest number (649) of fragments. Ammonius is important because he apparently had many of the earlier commentaries before him as he went about his interpretation. Photius, writing at a much later date, appears not so much the perceptive interpreter as a highly gifted and accomplished prose writer. Photius frequently follows Chrysostom closely.
The edition also includes an index of verses from John which are commented on by the authors, a biblical index, an index of parallels and citations from other writers (largely ecclesiastical), an index of names, and a list of Greek words (prepared by Albert Heitlinger). This list is quite lengthy (58 pp.) and serves as a supplement to the Lampe Patristic Greek Lexicon by documenting words and other meanings not in Lampe. However, it should be said that a comparison of sections of this list with Lampe gave me new appreciation for the Lampe lexicon.

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ROBERT L. WILKEN


L.’s volume is devoted to the exegesis of Jesus’ saying at the Last Supper: “I tell you I shall not drink again of this fruit of the vine until that day when I drink it anew (with you) in my Father’s kingdom.” In Mt 26:29 and Mk 14:25 the verse occurs immediately after the institution of the Eucharistic cup. The Lucan form (22:18), “I tell you that from now on I shall not drink of the fruit of the vine until the kingdom of God comes,” is in reference to the first cup that Luke mentions at the Last Supper and precedes the institution of the Eucharistic cup (22:20, if genuine). Moreover, the Lucan account of the Last Supper opens with a related announcement, “I shall not eat it [the Passover meal] until it is fulfilled in the kingdom of God” (22:16). Luke may be giving two forms of the same statement, derived from different sources. However, J. Jeremías and H. Schürmann attribute a certain priority to the Lucan doubling.

L. begins with a survey of pertinent background material. Among the items that appear in the OT and Jewish apocrypha are: an eschatological meal that Yahweh or Lady Wisdom will eat with men; an association of a plenitude of wine with the days to come; iconography of the vine as the tree of life; a tradition that the Messiah would make his appearance during Passover. Of particular importance is the Qumran document (1QSa) that describes an eschatological meal of bread and wine, and makes provision for the presence of the Priest (Messiah of Aaron) and the Messiah of Israel. Seemingly, at Qumran this meal was eaten or associated with daily meals in an anticipatory atmosphere: the end-times had already been inaugurated by the Teacher of Righteousness.

The exegesis of the Gospel verse is centered around two problems. First, what is the significance of Jesus’ vow to abstain from wine (or from the Passover meal)? L. relates it to the Nazirite abstention from wine, which he places in an eschatological context. The abstention will cease when the Father’s kingdom has come, and the vow is uttered in light of the imminent
effective realization of the messianic era. In a context where the Jews looked for the coming of the Messiah at Passover, Jesus says that henceforth the sacral use of wine will be the sign that the kingdom has come. But—and this is the second problem—what is meant by the kingdom? If it is purely an eschatological or heavenly reality, Jesus would seem to be implying that His parousia and the ultimate triumph of God would immediately follow His death. L. avoids the difficulty by showing that the kingdom is the Church and that Jesus is speaking about the Eucharist in the Church. Thus, on the occasion of His intimate table-union with His disciples in the Eucharist instituted at the Last Supper, Jesus looks forward to the Eucharist to be shared in the Church (“that day when I drink it anew with you in my Father’s kingdom”). Such Eucharistic celebrations in the Church will themselves anticipate the ultimate table-union of Christians with the Son of Man on the last day.

After his exegesis of the text, L. discusses the aquarian movement in the early Church (the use of water for wine at the Eucharist). Seemingly he detects a misunderstanding of the logion under discussion, whereby it was thought that wine should not be drunk until the Parousia. The last third of the book is devoted to patristic interpretations of the logion, on the grounds that “all exegesis that desires to respect Christian authenticity must necessarily refer itself” (p. 187) to such patristic tradition!

A 300-page book on a single verse of Scripture, especially on one that is not frequently cited, is almost a tour de force. The reviewer is somewhat embarrassed in suggesting that, despite the undoubted worth of the commentary, L. has neglected an essential aspect of his quest. The interpretation he presents is plausible as the early Church’s understanding of the logion, but L. does not really solve the problem of whether Jesus could have foreseen such Eucharists in the life of an established Church. He does not come to grips with the problem of the human knowledge of Jesus, though he mentions it in passing (p. 107). The logion, like that in Lk 25:43 (“This day you will be with me in paradise”), may reflect Jesus’ conviction that His death would lead to victory and the establishment of God’s kingdom—a conviction that does not necessarily mean He knew how this would be accomplished. An increasing number of Catholic exegetes and theologians now admit that such a lack of knowledge can be tolerated within a theology of the divinity of Jesus and of a hypostatic union. Thus, the reviewer suggests that the best way to make sense of the logion is to interpret it in terms of final eschatology on Jesus’ lips and to recognize that in the Gospels it has been reinterpreted in terms of realized eschatology.

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RAYMOND E. BROWN, S.S.
THE THREAT TO FAITH: AN EXEGETICAL AND THEOLOGICAL RE-
EXAMINATION OF 2 THESALONIANS 2. By Charles H. Giblin, S.J. Analecta
L. 5700; $9.50.

The author points out (p. 11) that, despite the difficult and challenging
nature of this text, no full exegetical monograph has been dedicated to its
interpretation. There can be no doubt, then, that the present work is timely.
It retains the original format of a doctoral dissertation defended in 1966 at
the Pontifical Biblical Institute in Rome. The extreme scholarly detail of
much of the presentation does not make for easy reading, but help is given
by constant résumés along the way and also by the availability of the Greek
text and G.'s translation, both schematically arranged: these two pages can
be unfolded from the volume and consulted while the book is being read.

The work falls into the natural divisions of “Introduction,” “Exegesis,”
and “Some Theological Implications.” In the first section, G. examines the
views of earlier scholars and generally finds them wanting. These are in
particular concerned with the problem of the *katechon* and *katechôn* of vv. 6
and 7, and the development of Paul’s thought in the whole passage.

The major work of the book appears in the exegesis section. Here G.
proceeds with commendable thoroughness. Before tackling the major
problem of *katechon*, he discusses “The Scope of the Imagery in Verses 3-4
and 8-10,” “The Thessalonian Faithful and Paul’s Cathechesis,” and “The
Transition at Verse 5 and *oidate.*” He rejects the view of Rigaux and many
others that Paul is mainly concerned with correcting the false idea of the
Thessalonians that the Day of the Lord was upon them. Here the under-
standing of the anacolouthon in v. 4 is of fundamental importance. Its
implicit conclusion should not be understood as “The Day of the Lord will
not come,” but, given the whole context, as something like “The judgment
of God will not have been executed against the powers of deception,
removing them once and for all” (p. 135). The problem of the Thessalonians
was not merely a misunderstanding about the day of the Coming, but a
deviation from Paul’s teaching about the Coming, with its insistence on the
conditions of evil and hostility which must be fulfilled before God’s judgment
and messianic fulfilment can take place.

There is a long and very detailed discussion of *katechon* and *katechôn* of
vv. 6 and 7. G. does not take it as a benign influence or person restraining
the forces of evil, but translates the whole section “And now you know by
experience the Seizing power for his being manifested at his own (proper)
time. For the Mystery of Rebellion is already at work. But the Seizer (is to
be, is to seize) for the present until he is ousted.” The background to this
interpretation is the supposition that a pseudo prophet in the Thessalonian community had proclaimed a false apocalyptic view of the Lord's coming under the influence of a demonic force. It is this force, in alliance with the other elements of evil mentioned in the context, which is called the katechon and later, in personal form, the katechom.

The last section is an attempt to situate the teaching of 2 Th 2 in the greater context of developing Pauline theology. G. formulates a principle basic to all Paul's theology as follows: "It is through trials and difficulties of all sorts in the service of the Lord, but, at the same time, through the power of God working in the faithful in Christ through the Spirit that the Kingdom of God (viewed mainly as the glory or sovereignty of God realized in a NEW CREATION) will be realized fully" (p. 262). Having exemplified this principle in the accepted Pauline letters, he sees it at work in Paul's soteriology and apocalyptic.

The book presents a serious challenge to accepted views on the interpretation of 2 Th 2. Before any definite judgment on its value is made, it should be recalled how unsatisfactory, by general consent, is any alternative interpretation. This new understanding of the text could bring light and clarity into an area full of obscurity. Yet some serious hesitations remain in the mind of the reader. Despite the attractive general treatment of the context and background, can the various terms of the text be made to bear the meaning suggested? Can katechē in its active form reasonably be translated by "seize" with a meaning akin to demonic possession? This is made even more difficult when no object is expressed. Again, despite the problem of harmony with 1 Th 5:1-2, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that it is really the time of the Parousia that Paul is concerned with in 2 Th 2. This seems to emerge from the text itself. Or is it the ingrained attitude of the present writer?

In spite of these and other hesitations, the work should be accepted as a fine and much-needed reconsideration of a text which has long defied every effort of the exegete.

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Modern technological and industrial society is interrupting the rhythm of work and leisure provided for centuries by the seven-day week with its Christian Sunday and Jewish and Moslem counterparts. To meet the problems which this situation raises for rest and worship on Sunday, Christians
must know as best they can the origins of the Christian observance of Sunday. With meticulous care, W. Rodorf searches for these origins.

The invention of the seven-day week is not attributed to Israel, although its precise provenance is conjectural. As an Israelite institution, it dates from the settlement in Canaan, and its Sabbath rest served initially a social and ethical purpose: rest from work for slaves and other laborers. It then became a day for the Israelite to recall that he had once been a slave in Egypt, and finally it became a day for God, perhaps as a result of cultic activity on that day.

The planetary week did not emerge until between the first and third centuries of our era, and then quite possibly under the influence of the Jewish seven-day week. In the planetary week, the day named after the sun, Sunday, had only secondary significance. The primary day was that named after Saturn, which assumed features of the Jewish Sabbath.

The primitive Church made Sunday a special day, but not as a substitute for the Jewish Sabbath. The early Christians met, at first on Sunday evenings, to celebrate the Lord's Supper, the result of which was Sunday's coming to be called "the Lord's Day." The proximate origin of this practice was the meal with the risen Lord on the evening of Easter. During this meal, R. conjectures, Jesus instituted the Eucharist a second time, as it were. Other postresurrection meals with the risen Lord confirmed this practice. The Last Supper, therefore, was a more remote origin for the Eucharist on Sunday. The Resurrection itself was the general background.

Accordingly, the observance of Sunday by the Christian community's Eucharistic worship is one of the central elements of Christian life, originating with Jesus. The purpose of this Sunday Eucharist was the building-up of the Body of Christ. The importance of this worship was manifested by the early Christians' adherence to it with fidelity even at the risk of their lives in times of persecution.

Persecution it was which led to the celebration of the Eucharist being transferred to Sunday morning from Sunday evening. To avoid suspicion of being a seditious political group, the Christians transferred the Eucharist to the morning in the second century. Since they had already developed the custom of meeting before dawn on Sunday for a service of worship, and since they had come to recognize a distinction between the Eucharist in the strict sense and the meal in which it was set, this transferral presented no problem.

The Sabbath rest and its commandment were newly interpreted by the primitive Church in eschatological, spiritual, and Christological terms, so that in early Christianity they were not considered binding in any literal
sense. Only with the legislation of Constantine and subsequent emperors did Sunday become a day of rest. No specifically Christian motivation inspired this legislation. After Sunday did become a day of rest, however, Christians sought to justify the practice by applying to it the Sabbath theology and commandment of the Old Law, making it the "Christian Sabbath." From this time on, Christians were increasingly concerned about Sunday rest, although this had no place in the primitive Church.

For the future, R. concludes, observance of Sunday should be maintained; for, of strictly Christian origin, it is central to Christian life. Hence access to church on Sunday must be assured for Christians, if necessary, by obtaining civil legislation. Sunday worship must regain its importance in the life of the local church, and it must include the Eucharist. As for Sunday rest, R. believes this should be maintained, not because of the Sabbath commandment of the Old Law (a difficult task theologically), but because a common day of leisure should exist in society so that families, friends, and acquaintances can meet, and because Sunday is as good a day as any for that purpose.

One or other point in a work which seeks to reconstruct the ancient past from available historical evidence will surely draw criticism from scholars in the field. But R.'s detailed knowledge of the sources, his careful argumentation, and his cautious conclusions will make criticism difficult. With regard to the future, one might question R.'s conclusion that the question of the Christian Sunday is really the question "Are we willing to stand up for Sunday as the day for worship?" (p. 304). What seems to have been most important for the primitive Church in its observance of Sunday was its purpose: to build up the Body of Christ by celebration of the Eucharist. Not only work on Sunday but modern recreational needs and habits may make it extremely difficult in the future to gather the local church together on that day, so that it could be said in any meaningful sense to be a day on which the Body of Christ is built up. It may eventually be more important to see to it that the Eucharist is celebrated among Christians frequently, whenever and wherever groups of them can be gathered, without placing so much emphasis on Sunday and church.

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In the current reshuffling of the Christian approach to man's moral dimensions, a thorough appreciation of the role of Clement of Alexandria as a
moralist is a distinct service. It was not Prunet's intention to take part in the contemporary debate on the renewal of the Christian moral perspective as such. This makes his book all the more significant, since it is a well-written, documented, and integrated analysis of the mind and mentality of the man who was truly the first of the Church's great moral theologians.

Clement's accomplishment consisted in giving a new direction to the Church's moral thinking by blending the scriptural approach of the primitive Christian documents with the classic paideia that was basically ethical in its accomplishments. This is precisely the kind of development being sought today, if in a direction quite different from that taken by Clement.

On an immediate approach, the arrangement of material in this elucidation of a great mind leisurely assessing the horizon of human responsibility and the degrees of human perfectibility (Clement distinguishes between the simplicior and the Gnostic Christian on the basis of their awareness of perfectibility in Christian living, not on esoteric knowledge) seems strange. But reflective consideration reveals the pertinence of beginning with Clement's over-all doctrine, and then demonstrating how it fits into the moral teaching of the NT, which P. has mastered in a previous work on the fourth Gospel.

The risk of repetition thus taken is justified in the literary skill with which P. assembles the data leading to his clarification of Clement's doctrine, and then redeployes this information in relation to the framework of NT teaching. He has thus given a final foundation for this convenient historical summary of the moral awareness that characterizes the primitive, postscriptural documents and the writings of the earliest churchmen, all of which were incorporated into Clement's thinking.

The breadth of vision exercised by Clement is truly universal in context. He was totally at home in the Hellenic tradition, and apparently fully conversant with the Christian tradition. His style of writing reveals the sophistication of the cultured, ancient world's leisurely absorption and re-evaluation of the wisdom of the ages. What to the impatient modern reader appears to be merely repetitious or platitudinous is in fact frequently sagacious, if not original, despite the tendency to fixity of patterns of expression that mark the classicist approach. It is here in particular that P.'s patient analysis proves itself invaluable.

In his trilogy (of fact, if not of intent), the Protrepticus, Paedagogus, and Stromata, Clement reveals his own structured approach to a stabilized moral order. At the same time he lays the foundations for a Christian moral doctrine that starts with the necessity of uprooting sinfulness and replacing it with holiness via the virtuous path that proceeds from apatheia to autarkia,
strictly Stoic in conception, but working its trajectory toward the Christian development known as the purgative way. He justifies this procedure through an allegorical interpretation of Abraham’s ascent of the mountain, based directly on Philo of Alexandria, as is so much of Clement’s OT observations.

There is no dichotomy between doctrinal and moral theology in Clement’s way of thinking. Hence P. found it necessary to present Clement’s dogmatic framework in the early part of his monograph. At the same time, Clement can be most concrete in his depiction of moral objectives in marriage or in the obligations of the rich vis-à-vis the poor. As P. insists, however, it is not sufficient to study the vignette of a full day of married life in chaps. 10 and 11 of the second book of the Paedagogus. Clement’s theoretical considerations scattered through the Stromata must also be taken into consideration before one can fully appreciate his total reasoning on this essential factor in the Christian way of life.

In recent years much study has been devoted to Clement’s moral doctrine, particularly in the model introduction to the first book of the Paedagogus supplied for the Sources chrétiennes edition by H.-I. Marrou (Paris, 1960), supplemented by his notes in the second book (Paris, 1965); as also in monographs by F. Quatember (Die christliche Lebenshaltung des Klemens von Alexandrien, Vienna, 1946) and W. Völker (Der wahre Gnostiker, Berlin, 1952). P.’s study incorporates the findings and completes the analysis of Clement’s moral achievement obtained in these studies to provide a rounded assessment that, in its urbanity and wholeness, savors of the Alexandrian’s total vision of the temporal merged into the eternal.

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Robert F. Evans, Associate Professor of Religious Thought at the University of Pennsylvania, has written a timely, scholarly, and important book. The work is timely because of the current interest of psychiatry in what E. shows to be a misunderstanding of Pelagius’ doctrine. Fromm is wrong to find in Pelagius a simple antithesis to “authoritarian religion.” E.’s documentation takes up forty-two pages of this book, and it is only to be regretted that the Seabury Press did not see fit to put these valuable notes at the bottom of each page. E. argues closely from the citations he makes in the notes, and it would have been a considerable help to have E.’s abundant source material closer to his text. He has utilized the best editions of Pelagius
and his contemporaries, is aware of the latest literature on his subject, and forthrightly admits that he had written his book prior to the publication of G. Bonner’s extremely important article “How Pelagian was Pelagius?: An Examination of the Contention of Torgny Bholin,” Texte und Untersuchungen 94 (1966) 350–58. The work is important because E. has written the most stimulating book on Pelagius in English.

E. has not attempted to redo Georges de Plinval’s biography of Pelagius or to write so ambitious a study as John Ferguson’s disappointing work of a decade ago. E.’s book is a series of separate yet interrelated essays on Pelagius and the early phases of the Pelagian controversy. His first essay concerns Jerome’s Dialogus adversus Pelagianos and other anti-Pelagian writings, and explains why Jerome should concentrate on linking Pelagius with Origen because of Pelagius’ teaching on sinlessness. E. shows that Pelagius defended himself by revising the old charges that in his commentary on Ephesians Jerome had used passages and espoused ideas from Origen and that in his treatise against Jovinian Jerome had gone too far in his depreciation of marriage. E. argues that the first charge against Jerome is justified. Of more immediate theological import is E.’s situating Pelagius’ De natura and De libero arbitrio in the context of this revival of the Origenist controversy. The second essay takes up de Plinval’s suggestion that the unnamed monk in Jerome’s letter to Domnio is Pelagius. E. presents the case well by a convergence of twelve considerations that yield a substantial argument. Following de Plinval, Ferguson and J. N. L. Myres have made use of this identification, but E. is the first to have given so well reasoned an argument for it. The next essay shows the influence of the Sentences of Sextus on Pelagius. This essay concludes tantalizingly by showing a most interesting parallel between Origen and Diogenes Laertius which R. A. Norris pointed out to E.

The following essay deals with Augustine and Pelagius. E. shows that the Pelagian controversy in the West becomes specifically a controversy over Pelagius and not Celestius or “the Sicilian Briton” when Augustine reads Pelagius’ De natura in 415 and sees Pelagius marshaling the authority of indisputably orthodox writings behind his position. This essay ends with an unfortunate sentence: “The issue in 415 between Pelagius and Augustine could be formulated broadly as follows: which theological synthesis, which attempt to bring clarity, which novelty will prevail?” (p. 89). This essay would have been more balanced had E. had the opportunity of consulting Bonner’s article mentioned above.

In the final essay E. delineates Pelagius’ theology as it centers on the fundamental problem of man and the saving activity of God. E. is aware
that "there can be no exposition without interpretation" (p. 90). E.'s interpretation tends towards the Reformation problematic with the consequence of some eisegesis (e.g., the second paragraph of p. 113 and its supporting notes). His generally careful study would have been better had he sought what the fifth century understood by sola fide and not have run after Loofs's red herring in Realencykl. für prot. Theol. und Kirche 15 (3rd ed., 1904) 753. E. does not take up Pelagius' doctrine of the Trinity. When he does so, perhaps the theological issues concerning redemption which separate Augustine and Pelagius will appear in sharper focus.

My suggestions and criticisms are not intended to give the impression that this careful and scholarly work is not recommended. This is an important and stimulating work, and Prof. Evans is to be congratulated on a difficult job well done.

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L.'s monumental work on Protestantism down to 1950 was completed with the third volume in French in 1964, shortly after the author's death. This smooth translation begins with an Introduction on the religious need detected in the Late Middle Ages and proceeds with order and clarity to present the growth of the Reformation down to Calvin's death in 1564.

The ordinary Christian yearned on the eve of the Reformation for Christ the Saviour, who should come to the individual independently of one's striving and of the self-perpetuating media interposing themselves between Christ and the Christian. The Reformation is thus seen as answering the need for a simple, consoling piety. The hierarchy was too distant from the people, the lower clergy too often discredited by immorality, and the humanists too theoretically inclined to bring the Christian message of grace to those yearning for it. Luther's doctrine meant salvation for the individual without his co-operation. Admittedly, his teachings spread and took hold because of decisions by temporal or ecclesiastical authorities, but these were supported by real religious need as well as by German resentment of things Latin. The elder Luther fought on many fronts for purity of doctrine, and in one place he is seen as addicted to "constant renewal of the sequence of his conversion—the anguish of sin, despair, surrender," so as to experience the joy of grace (p. 129). L. places Zwingli within the humanist reformation that checked the spread of Lutheranism, but chides him for giving the civil
magistrates such wide competency as to start a new "caesaropapism." The Strassburg reformers Bucer and Captio were guilty of "ecclesiolatry" and even "sacerdotalism." Henry VIII did not lead England into schism, but rather restored the most ancient form of Christianity. L. judges that Melanchthon deviated into teaching synergism and "a sanctification imparted by man's determined struggle against his evil instincts" (p. 248). On the Catholic side, L. is charmed by St. Ignatius' fraternal and joyful spirit, but ineptly relates that Trent proclaimed the doctrine of justification by works, thus formally condemning the Lutheran view of justification (pp. 259 and 283). L. stresses the realism of Calvin's thought on Holy Communion, and laments that his followers inclined toward Zwingli's mere symbolism. Calvin's *Institutio* of 1536 fares well, since it all but omits an ecclesiology. L. sees decline as Calvin learned from experience and from the Fathers that the Church has an essential role in salvation.

Let us hasten to add that L.'s history will serve well as a scholar's handbook, in spite of his antiecclesial bias. There are not only sixteen general bibliographies (pp. 356-433), but also frequent bibliographical footnotes on even the most minor figures in the Reformation drama. Further editions would be enhanced, and made useful for undergraduate and ministerial students, if an appendix could be added listing English translations (e.g., of the small works of J. Lortz, Zeeden's *The Legacy of Luther*, H. Bornkamm's *Luther's World of Thought*) and titles of the significant works on the Reformation since 1959. It is strange that this edition refers so extensively to French translations, e.g., of the works of Calvin (pp. 411-14), but makes no attempt to list English translations.

The recurring term "ecclesiolatry" will alert the reader to L.'s ideal of a small band of barely organized, devout believers, whose pastor is authorized "from the Word itself," and whose discipline is minimal and strictly *jure humano*. Thus L. has no understanding for any Reformation theology which attempted to deal positively with orders, structure, and ecclesial discipline. His bias is so clear as hardly to be dangerous. More serious is L.'s attempt to underscore elements in Luther's theology of salvation most opposed to the Catholic tradition. Thus he also presents a Luther at variance with the results of reputable Luther scholarship. For instance, L. tells us that Luther rejected any combat against sin and urged the justified Christian to make dominant his sense of the sin still in him. But modern work on Luther points to the sanative, transforming aspect of justification, to a "gift of God" with which the Christian must co-operate, and to the clear possibility of growth in justice. See, for instance, Luther's *Two Kinds of Righteousness*, given in Vol. 31 of the American Edition. This latter Luther is not the product of a
Catholicizing fringe group, but emerges from the work of men of the stature of Karl Holl, Paul Althaus, and Wilfred Joest. We can pass over L.’s crude formulations regarding indulgences (pp. 48, 49, 58), his incorrect reading of Article 4 of the “Regensburg Book” of 1541, and even the opening sentence of the Preface making Protestantism the quasi-official religion of the United States. The worst defect of this expensive book remains its superficial presentation of Luther on justification. This points to the duty of Protestant scholars with a reliable knowledge of Luther “turn and confirm their brethren.”

Bellarmine School of Theology


In eighteenth-century France a new world was being born, the world of the independent, successful, and resourceful modern man. One of the first proponents of this world was that enigmatic figure, the bourgeois, the man produced by the early industrial revolution. He is an important man, for he did much to create the modern world, its attitudes and thought, its desires and values, its problems, successes, and failures.

The Church was not quite sure how to deal with or understand this group. The clergy and moralists were quite acquainted with the problems of those on the two extremes of the social ladder. They counseled the rich and the aristocratic against the vices and temptations of their class—vanity and pride, pomp and despair; they comforted the poor and downtrodden and warned them against the temptations to envy and despair. But what was to be done with these “new men”? They would not dream of the excesses of the upper classes; vulgar display and extravagance were the furthest thing from their mind. To the rich and poor alike the Church had always preached that all things came to man from God’s hands, that death or disease would strike any man no matter what his station in life. The uncertainty of life, the fickleness of public favor and acclaim were all there.

But what of these men who believed that man received only what he went out after and earned, that he continued to possess what he was able to preserve by prudent measures. These were the men who were desacralizing all of human life. How was the Church to deal with them?

There was never any one definitive answer to any of these questions. They depended upon too many factors. This is the great value of G.’s book. His account is rooted in and immersed in the sources, the diaries, letters, and
BOOK REVIEWS

sermons of the people of the time. He captures the response of the different groups to the various problems that arose for them. He shows how the Church presented the problems under different images and with different stresses for these men, how the Church strove to create a conscience and to develop a morality for the world of business then being born. We see how they discussed God, sin, and death, what were the social obligations of the Church and how they were to be presented.

This book, then, presents a carefully depicted overview of the whole problem of the birth of the modern secular world in one country two centuries ago. We see, in addition, the various controversies of that time and how they were involved in these problems. This is especially true of the long and famed Jansenist-Jesuit debate. For an understanding of an early attempt to acculturize the message of Christ to the secular world, this book is to be recommended. It shows both the successes and the failures of that critical period in history.

One note of criticism: it is unfortunate that in a book so replete with references to the sources, no index is provided to enable the reader to consult these sources and the different figures involved in them.

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THOMAS E. MORRISSEY, S.J.


In 1966 the first Oxford Newman Symposium was held, largely the result of the third International Newman Conference and of the feeling that it was time “to bring Newman home.” He may indeed have been brought home, but there is no sign that he has left the Continent; the Newman industry there flourishes more and more, and now the famous collection Théologie has added a volume which does justice at once to the standards of that series and to those of Continental work on Newman.

One who is sick of old controversies stuck deep in their well-worn ruts, and so recoils instinctively from a book whose title promises another study of “Scripture and tradition,” will do well to attend to the subtitle of this one; for S.’s work is really a historical account of the slowly developing ideas that led Newman to his essay on development—so much so that the study ends, almost abruptly, with the year 1845. There is particular emphasis on the personal development of Newman, and hence special recourse to the letters and autobiographical writings. With these emphases S. finds a field still to be worked even after the studies done by Senaive and Biemer.

The book traces the path of Newman from Evangelism to Catholicism. S.
finds Newman beginning with the "religion of the Bible," at which stage tradition lay outside his field of interest; to evangelize meant to distribute Bibles and interpret the sacred text (chaps. 1–2). But the word, for Newman, was a living word; his pastoral interests and his conversations with Hawkins gave him a wider perspective and showed the need of the Church's formulations, her creed and catechism (chap. 3). Whately brought him next to a new sense of the visible Church as a divine institution, though Newman still thought mainly of the centuries nearer to biblical times; here his work on the Fathers and the Arian controversy was formative (chap. 4). Then Newman came to distinguish between apostolic tradition and prophetic tradition, the latter including developments from the apostolic teaching. S. shows us the complexity of Newman's position at the time of the *Via media*: tradition does not depend on Scripture but derives directly from the apostles; but Scripture is superior in its sacramental character and in its probative force. Still, from 1837 on, Newman began to see that the patristic way of citing Scripture was defective as a proof, that the reliance of the Fathers is really on the Church (chap. 5). Finally, his studies on the Monophysites and his reflection on the Augustinian *securus judicat orbis terrarum* brought him the last step on his way: he is now convinced that God founded a Church that would remain one and infallible to the end of time (chap. 6). The last and longest chapter (7) studies Newman's theory of development, a theory worked out not to prove a position (that is already established) but to answer an objection.

S. has done an extremely painstaking piece of work. The amount of information he digs out of archives is phenomenal. The investigation of influences is thorough. And he is singularly accurate in his reproduction of English texts. His book, in the main, is strictly positive—only in the last pages does he undertake an apologetic, defending Newman's theory of development against Chadwick's objection—but there are scores of intelligent and highly suggestive observations, judgment on all of which I leave to the Newman experts.

Theologians brought up on Newman's prose, with the cadences of *The Second Spring* and *Christ upon the Waters* still making music in our minds, find it hard to discuss Newman technically. For that reason, of course, European Continental studies are all the more useful, even though they almost inevitably contain for us a measure of the obvious. In our tradition Newman functions, I think, somewhat as he conceived the deposit to function in the early Church. He is in our blood. His mentality guides us implicitly, not only the positions he worked out but also the deeper notions that, by a kind of intellectual instinct, formed his judgments. Continental
work often isolates and clarifies such notions better than Anglo-Saxon studies. This struck me on reading S.'s remarks on the way Newman conceived the deposit of faith as a *whole* (p. 183)—a small point in S.'s argument, but illustrative for me of the way he formulates notions that I think are absorbed and operative in the unformulated system of those steeped in Newman from their youth. We owe a great debt, therefore, to the researchers of France, Germany, and the Lowlands, and S.'s book is a worthy addition to their already considerable library of Newman studies.

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F. E. Crowe, S.J.


We have here the second volume of S.'s collected writings. Like the first, it is concerned with questions introductory to theology (the two together seem to form the first unit in an eight-part series). It has four chapters, dealing with the concept of truth, the nonconceptual element in the act of faith, salvation history as the basis of theology, and new trends in dogmatic theology today. There is also a long appendix that studies the thought of St. Thomas on the nonconceptual in our knowledge of God.

I find here the same grappling with real questions and the same sobriety of judgment in answering them that I noted in reviewing the first volume (*Theological Studies* 29 [1968] 339-40). There is what seems to me a wise balance in regard to new theology and old (chap. 1), in regard to kerygma and dogma (p. 101), in regard to the forces behind the modern theological revival (pp. 107 ff.), in regard to "theology" and "economy" (p. 144). But I have still the same complaint against the way the articles are forced into an artificial unity at the expense of their original scope. To take some simple material criteria: the chronological order jumps from 1954 to 1962 and 1963, then back to 1953, up to 1961 again, and finally back to 1952; three articles are run together into one and introduced as if they answer a demand made a decade later by Vatican II (p. 5). My own strong preference is for a plain chronological order, with introductory notes locating the articles in their original context. May I also remark that the references in this edition need more careful checking? I looked up two in which the error leaped to the eye and found that on p. 42, l. 29, q. 19 should be q. 10, and on p. 43, l. 9, II-II should be I-II.

But let us proceed to more substantive matters. The chief interest of this volume for me lies in chap. 2, really a study of the natural-supernatural question, and in the Appendix, a study of what we would now call God-talk.
I will begin with the latter, which deals with fundamental questions of urgent importance today: the possibility of speaking about God, the names of God, analogical knowledge, negative theology, etc. S. touches, too, on important historical issues: the influence of Scotus and Cajetan on later Thomism, and the possibility that this resulted in misreading Aquinas himself.

Nevertheless, I have to say that it is hardly profitable for me to dialogue with S. on these questions, simply because of a difference on a still more fundamental level. We can pinpoint the difference: S. says bluntly (and repeatedly): “we have no concept of God” (p. 205; see pp. 194, 199-200; also pp. 20-22 in chap. 1); this, moreover, is stated to be the “constant doctrine” of Aquinas (p. 172). There is a supposition of cognitional theory latent here and it comes to light in phrases like “impossible to grasp this . . . conceptually” (p. 170; see p. 200, and, in chap. 1, p. 20). The point is that S. does not distinguish between understanding and conception: to “grasp” is to “conceive,” and since we do not understand God, or do not “grasp” Him, therefore we do not conceive Him. Thus also S. is led to state that “significatio always means the conceptual content” (p. 171), though note 36 on the same page would indicate rather the correspondence of meaning and understanding for St. Thomas (“intelligatur” equated with “significetur”).

S. does not appear to have known Lonergan when he wrote these articles, and, of course, I do not know whether he would have modified his position if he had. But, in consequence of Lonergan’s work, I would hold that one act of understanding (insight) is the source of many concepts, including the concept of what is beyond the insight and cannot be grasped or understood, so that we do form concepts of God as well as concepts of the nonexistent (the concept of nothing) and of the unintelligible (the concept of sin). With this lack of a common basis in cognitional theory, discussion becomes pointless. I merely add that differences on understanding and conception lead to differences on judgment and on what St. Thomas meant when he said we do not know God’s existence (p. 165).

Chap. 2 is a critical study of Max Seckler’s book on the nonconceptual “instinct” in faith; it leads, therefore, to the very topical question of the relation of natural and supernatural. In this complicated area of study, where I find myself more in sympathy with many of the views expressed by Schillebeeckx, I limit myself to the putting of a question that might be suggestive; for if the distinction between natural and supernatural was worked out in the period prior to St. Thomas, and their relationship has been the object of study since Blondel, it remains that the whole discussion is regarded as irrelevant by many today. My question is: Are contemporary
objections due to a too material conception of the natural and supernatural components in the universe, as if they were blocks lying side by side, with the supernatural still extrinsic to the natural in the way deplored by Blondel? And if so, is the effective conception of their unity achieved by exploiting the transforming power of meaning? To take an example, the “material” realities of marriage may remain largely the same while the whole is “elevated” and transformed by the meaning of Christian marriage. Christian marriage does not mean the same as non-Christian marriage; as a result, Christian marriage really differs from non-Christian marriage, and so there is a real distinction between natural and supernatural. S.’s own insistence on the twofold lumen (p. 68) would be pertinent in following up this suggestion. But then I am afraid we are back at the divisive issues raised by his Appendix; for a theory of meaning can hardly be independent of a theory of knowledge.

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F. E. Crowe, S.J.


Overman is a young physician (M.D., Stanford University) who holds a Ph.D. from the Southern California School of Theology, Claremont, and is an Assistant Professor of Religion at the University of Puget Sound. He has written a precise and readable discussion of evolution, using the formulations of Alfred North Whitehead as the foundation for his attempt to harmonize scientific and theological understandings of the created, evolving world.

The first half of the book is a survey of the development of evolutionary theory from the OT emphasis on the causal efficacy of God and Aristotle’s conviction of the inherent purposiveness of nature down to modern trends in the theory of cosmic and human evolution. It reviews in detail the story of Darwin’s predecessors (noting that evolution was a national creed in England even before The Origin of Species) and the national differences in the great debate on Darwinism in Britain, Germany, and America. O. is familiar with recent advances in our knowledge of the origin of life, genetics, and the origin of man. He shows that while intuitions of change, movement, and growth have replaced intuitions of permanance in cultured thought, modern evolutionary theory is heir to the gradual exclusion of all concepts of final causation in nature.

The second half of the volume is devoted to (1) an exposition of Whitehead’s cosmology, in which purpose is an integral part of the whole phil-
philosophical framework; (2) a modification of that philosophy suggested by Overman; and (3) a Christian synthesis of the personal categories of biblical thought with the objective categories of scientific thought in a spirit that elsewhere would be called teilhardian. O. shows that both efficient and final causation are to be found in nature and that the purposes of a real God are partially determinative of every event.

Abandoning the idea of enduring substances that undergo change, Whitehead explains evolution in terms of "occasions of Experience" that become but do not change. Nature is a group of brief events called "occasions." (A single enduring electron, e.g., is a society of electronic occasions, each as brief as one vibration of the electron.) Each occasion is a subject actively experiencing its past. Every occasion is by nature oriented toward a transition to a future occasion. Each occasion brings to the next a transmission of "emotional tone" analogous to human emotion. In addition to its "physical pole," each occasion has, again by analogy, a "mental pole" whereby novelty and adaptation can be introduced into the series.

Whitehead built his system on William James's belief that human experience grows by tiny bursts or droplets of experience. He also saw in the quantum theory the usefulness of supposing an individual electron to be a connected series of distinct vibratory electronic happenings. Using human experience as his model, he suggested that the actual occasions of which the universe is composed are all subjects; even the simplest entities exemplify, if only in a trivial way, all those categories such as feeling, valuing, and purposing, which are found in human experience. (The matter of degree, of course, makes all the difference.) O. asks: "Why should we naively take the deliverances of sense perceptions as our only clue for understanding a world that existed for millions of years before sense perception evolved?" Why not include the fulness of human experience, including our feelings of purpose?

In this system each occasion enjoys a fleeting moment of subjective existence, a phase of solitary process or becoming whereby its possibilities are narrowed down to the final concrete reality that it becomes in the stage called "satisfaction." The completed occasion remains in the world as an object to be felt by subsequent subjects. This is its phase of objective immortality. There is a certain fluency in the internal process of becoming and a second fluency in the "transition" from a completed entity to every new process that is affected by it.

Whitehead had thought of God as a single actual entity. He did not apply the notion of transition to God. O. modifies Whitehead's idea of God by introducing the notion of transition. He contends (as other disciples of Whitehead had already proposed) that God be thought of as a society—a
personally ordered society of occasions. Each (relatively brief) occasion of God's personality would prehend its past and envision its future with perfect completeness. Transition in God would allow one to explain His effect on creatures in a manner consistent with Whiteheadian cosmology. As each occasion in God flows on from its phase of solitary subjective intimacy to objectivity involving transition to the next occasion, God, as the principle of order in the universe, prevents chaos by supplying to each new creaturely occasion the initial aim with which its own self-causation starts.

Reactions in a minor key: When the idea that God creates, conserves, and governs the world by one act is labeled "Lutheran doctrine," Catholic eyebrows may well be raised. Only a chemist would notice the repeated misspelling of "pyrimidine" in the text. Most ordinary mortals would, however, be fascinated upon first hearing that an occasion of human personality lasts from 100 to 250 milliseconds.

In an age estranged from God, the scientific enterprise provides the categories and typical modes of thought and sets the style of feeling and responding to the world; it conditions our common sense and determines the extent of popular hopes and the bounds of what people find credible. This vision, unfortunately, fails to nourish a lively apprehension of God. In the popular mind, scientific assumptions are in unresolved conflict with religious assumptions. O. attempts a remedy, to show, in particular, that belief in the reality and effectiveness of divine purpose can be integrated into a modern understanding of the evolving world. His emphasis on final causation is in the right direction. The arbitrary denial of the possibility of purpose has been one of the less scientific attitudes of many modern scientists.

In summary, O. gives us Whitehead in clear and convincing terms, although his proposal about transition in God may make him a Whiteheadian heretic. The work of this medical theologian gives plausible witness to the oneness of truth.

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Owen W. Garrigan


This is easily Balthasar's most important book yet to appear in English translation. Rivaling the scope of Science, Religion and Christianity (Eng. tr., 1958), which B. himself now regards as a disappointment, and the spiritual power of Prayer (Eng. tr., 1961), which Louis Bouyer put in a class with the masterworks of the seventeenth century, A Theological
Anthropology is B.’s main statement on the theology of history, considerably expanding the Christocentric approach of *A Theology of History* (Eng. tr., 1963). (The English title of this latest book, though partially justified, is misleading on several counts. Would it not have been better to translate the German more exactly as “Wholeness in the Fragmentary” and also to translate “Geschichtstheologie” throughout as “the theology of history” instead of “the theology of man in history”?)

There are four stages in the author’s meditation on his central thesis. The thesis can be stated negatively, arguing that the world’s technical progress must not be identified with the growth of God’s kingdom (Teilhard de Chardin is the special adversary here), or positively, affirming that there is nevertheless a tendency toward wholeness in the fragmentariness of our experience. Part 1, “The Fragmentary Nature of Time” (chap. 1 in the English translation), agrees that we might want to go beyond Augustine in explaining the development of the world (with Soloviev, e.g., to whom B. has devoted a chapter in *Herrlichkeit* 2); still “the ultimate meaning of history is to be found where Augustine sought it” (p. x), namely, in the realization that the whole structure of time can only be resolved vertically, through the elective love which is God himself, eternal fulness offering Himself to a temporal history which in itself can only be fragmentary.

Part 2, “The Perfectibility of Man” (chaps. 2–3 in translation), proposes that man can conceive of wholeness, formally indicated in his relation to God, but that it surpasses his nature and in his fallen condition even contradicts it. B. gives brilliant sketches of the “possible ways to wholeness”: the way of appearance, towards unity through the renunciation of multiplicity; the way of tragic conflict, finding wisdom through suffering; the third way of love, where only the elective obedience of the man Jesus satisfactorily responds to the elective love of His Father, “in order to realize mysteriously the essentially irrefrangible wholeness within the essentially uncompletable fragmentary” (p. 63). Under the Spirit’s guidance this way is lived out in the “bridal Church” which professes Christ’s resurrection as a constant challenge to sheer reason. For it is only beyond man, in the sphere of God Himself, that humanity is perfectible.

Is it possible to specify further this wholeness, this “freedom and immortality with God,” even granting that it is of its essence to be invisibly prepared for us? B. suggests a way in Part 4, “Gathering in the Word” (chaps. 7–10 in translation), where he meditates on the relations of history, language, and the eternal Word, and then on the revelation (in the strict theological sense) which the mysteries of Christ’s life offer us. But first he turns from having considered primarily the personality of man to a re-
flection on the meaning of history as a whole (Part 3, “The Perfectibility of History”; chaps. 4–6 in translation). Here he contributes a subtle critique of the linear conception of time, arguing that religious time is primarily vertical (with Augustine's “distentio animae” again the key concept) and proposing a qualitative theological tie which has different layers agreeing only by analogy: creation time, sinful time, revelation time, and Church time (cf. p. 135). Time in the Old Testament is conceived as a horizontal preparation for Christ, whose ascension once and for all issues in the vertical time of the pilgrim Church. Church time is thus the era when the Spirit “convinces” the world of the truth eternally spoken in the Word become flesh. The author is probably at his most provocative when he insists that it is primarily the world which develops in time, while the Church remains above time, transcending it and expressing those of its possible forms which each age in turn requires.

Rosemary Ruether has spoken of B.'s theology as “romantic.” But “spiritual,” I think, is a better word for it. Not only because its greatest practicality is to lead many readers to prayer. Not only because it makes its philosophical premises evident but does not fully elaborate them (on the crucial distinctions, e.g., between person and being, spirit and nature, nature and person). Not only because it uses peak experiences to serve as paradigms and norms for what is experientially valuable, nor because it consciously employs literary suggestion and ambiguity as the means of a mystagogy. B.'s theology is “spiritual” because it centers on Spirit (God) so heavily that the world becomes purely reality-for-Spirit: “The significant element in time . . . is its being enfolded by the eternal” (p. 39); “the interpretation of God comes first” (p. 78). For B., relative autonomies seem not to be of relative interest (which they should only be) but of secondary interest (which they may be, but with the danger of what Guardini called “the religious short circuit”).

The very pattern of the author's thought shows this. Meditative and circular, it is superb at casting new light on old symbols, at suggesting syntheses between the most disparate thinkers, at challenging every theological security which diminishes the Deus semper major. But it is less suited for assimilating new theological language (there is a notable absence of modern symbolism, for example), for concretizing the demands of faith, hope, and love, for explaining the status and value of the incredible variety and extent of human history. Just this feel for the vicissitudes and convulsions of the historical process, posing questions of meaning in their own right, is what many readers will find lacking in B.'s treatment. For moments of supreme personal decision, it may be pertinent to say that “The life of the Church is
like walking on the spot; it is journeying in the darkness of faith, . . . in that subterranean chiaroscuro which renders vain all calculations of progress” (p. 38; cf. pp. 107, 131, 136-41, 173, 309-11, 335). But for the intricately structured society of today’s world, the long and common paths to such special moments are at least of equal importance.

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**Leo J. O’Donovan, S.J.**


What is Christian faith and how is it communicated? C. Ellis Nelson, a Presbyterian minister and head of the Department of Religious Education of Union Theological in New York, maintains that faith is communicated not primarily by individuals or by teaching agencies but by a community of believers, and that the meaning of faith is developed by its members out of their history. His book, a series of lectures given in 1965 at Virginia’s Union Theological Seminary, explores the prerational attitudes and dispositions shaped by culture which form the underpinning of religious faith. If a person’s religious development depends on the way he is socialized by his parents and the surrounding community, then the Church’s task is to discover how this primordial indoctrination works and to use it more deliberately and intelligently.

Using basic concepts of social science, N. attempts to examine what culture is “in order to separate to some extent the Christian tradition from culture.” This partial separation is necessary because “America is increasingly becoming a secular, pluralistic, urban society, and the Protestant ethos which dominated when the Constitution was written is no longer the ethos of the country generally” (p. 43). As religious sociologists like Will Herberg, Gerhard Lenske, and Peter Berger have been pointing out for the last decade, American Protestantism has become increasingly a “cultural religion,” providing chiefly a divine ratification of the status quo. This presents grave problems to the Christian at any time, but above all when the general culture is no longer specifically Christian or even religious. N. insists strongly that the Christian faith has an origin and a direction outside culture, and challenges the Christian to develop a way of life somewhat different from that prevalent in culture. Yet it is through culture, in the widest sense, that religion is transmitted. Unless one confronts this problem directly, “religion will forever be at the mercy of the cultural value-system” (p. 11). It is not simply a question, then, of how Christianity may be passed on to one’s children; the question is rather how the parent himself, and the congregation, may acquire it.
An examination of the biblical record of the ancient Hebrew and early Christian method of transmitting religious values leads to the conclusion that "tradition preceded Scripture" (p. 80) and is indeed its matrix. Learning takes place by participation in events and community reflection on their meaning. Correspondingly, the God of the Bible is known rather in things that happen than in abstract statements. Those wishing to communicate faith must see that it is bound up with events: contemporary experience and the faith expressed in a tradition reciprocally interpret each other. "Since religious beliefs function as values, we must constantly state, test, and reformulate our beliefs" (p. 181). This searching for the meaning of Scripture in the light of contemporary events, and of the meaning of the events in the light of Scripture, should be carried on by the community—if possible, the local congregation. Believers must learn both to interpret the Bible historically, in line with the best modern scholarship, and to analyze the contemporary social situation in detail with a view to understanding how a Christian can best operate within and for today's culture. The NT creatively interprets the OT in the light of God's new revelation in Christ. Similarly, "we must see ourselves as interpreting a tradition that was in its day an interpretation" (p. 185). The reality with which we must work is the community of believers: "We cannot get a perspective without comparison. We cannot know God except as we know how other generations responded to him" (ibid.).

In its strong emphasis on tradition and the whole social and historical dimension of faith, N.'s book offers convincing evidence of how the conclusions of biblical scholarship can bring the Reformed and the Catholic traditions very close together. The only serious objection to the material presented in the main part of this book is that it is all rather familiar. The final chapter, "Guidelines for Communicating Faith," is by far the most interesting, as Nelson suggests practical means for the local congregation to function as interpreter of the biblical tradition. Where Faith Begins is a solid, sober, and somewhat unexciting book.

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JUSTIN KELLY, S.J.


This volume represents lectures in Christology given at Strasbourg by the well-known Danish Lutheran in 1962–63. The author regards it as a *retractatio* of the Christology contained in his earlier (1955) systematics, now available in English as *Creation and Redemption* (cf. *TS* 29 [1968] 115). English-
speaking readers will also be familiar with P.'s study of Luther, *Spiritus Creator* (1953).

An attractive feature in P.'s work is his constant concern to integrate dogma (which he regards as defensive in function), confession (the center of worship), and preaching (which differs from confession in that it takes the form of doctrine, not of doxology). "Une christologie dogmatique est pour nous une doctrine de Jésus-Christ qui, tenant compte de la règle défensive du dogme, explique d'une manière positive la confession, en vue d'une prédication de l'Evangile" (p. 30). After making these and other points in an opening chapter on method, P. devotes five pages to the Christological dogma, and then, in a long third chapter, turns his attention to oral tradition i.e., confession. The reader is here treated to an impressive correlation of baptism (conceived as happening on the border of Church and world) and the Eucharist (conceived as taking place in the center of the Church, separated from the world) with the present and future life, with the royal and priestly offices of Jesus (against Calvin, P. subsumes the prophetic under the royal), with the Christological titles Son of Man and Servant of Yahweh, with justification and redemption, and with the exaltation of the man Jesus and the humiliation of the Son of God (see especially the summary on pp. 72 ff.).

At several points P. highlights the distance, rather than the resemblances, between Lutheran and Catholic teaching. Thus, for him the Real Presence is not by transubstantiation; bread and wine, not the body and blood of Christ, are offered in the Eucharist; and the priest is only the delegate of the community, possessed of no special powers by and for consecration.

Chaps. 4 and 5 turn from oral to written tradition, i.e., to Scripture. P.'s formulation of the relationship between the two sources is that written tradition is the dogmatic norm of oral tradition, and the latter is hermeneutic norm for written tradition. At several points he takes issue with Bultmann, whose distinction of the Jesus of history and Christ of faith he considers docetic. He accents the motif of the kingdom as a key to understanding Jesus, and even more the importance of a Trinitarian approach to Christology (an emphasis developed at greater length in *Creation and Redemption*). In fact, P. holds there is really only one dogma, Christological and Trinitarian.

The final chapter resumes these developments and seeks to relate them to philosophical currents. While acknowledging values in three contrasting ontologies (supernaturalist, naturalist, and existentialist), his own affinity seems to be with the last. He considers Friedrich Gogarten the most profound and consistent existentialist theologian, and his pages on the secular Christology of the Göttingen theologian are one sign of P.'s own development since
Creation and Redemption. In these last pages, especially, one senses a greater concern for contemporaneity. One is struck, too, with the relatively slight place given to the doctrine of justification in the Christology of these lectures.

There would be much to discuss in an extended analysis of this rich and important work. This review must confine itself to noting less than perfect adequacy in P.'s handling of the basic Christological question. He faithfully repeats the scriptural and some of the credal and conciliar formulations, but at times interprets them in a way which falls short of clear expression of their full meaning. To say, e.g., that Jesus is Kyrios and God is surely to say much more than that He is at the center of the future kingdom of God, or that with Jesus God has made His kingdom enter into the world. P. believes that the two-nature approach to Christ is foredoomed to a choice between Monophysitism, adoptionism, and other errors. The point is worth arguing (not, however, on the basis of the side-by-side conception of two natures here delineated). But one may ask whether P.'s own preference for the categories of history is able to do sufficient theological justice to the Christological confession which both Luther and his Catholic opponents considered basic and understood in agreement.

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M.-J. Nicolas introduces the theme, stressing the actual phases of what Lumen gentium pointed out—that Mary's motherly intercession continues even to the consummation of the elect. He recommends a study of intercession in general before taking up Mary's. A. George, Marist exegete, writing on the scriptural foundations of the intercession of Mary, sets out from OT intercession by friends of God, especially the prophets, as the servant of 2 Isaiah, Amos, and Jeremiah. Jesus is intercessor par excellence in the new
dispensation (Rom 8:34, Heb 7:25). Yet Jesus honored the requests of others, as Jairus, and recommended in the Our Father prayer for others. Examples of prayer for one another are common in the Acts and Epistles, though prayer of the dead for the living scarcely appears (Ap 5:8; 11:16–18).

Cana is the only NT direct reference to our Lady, but George finds that Lk 1–2 "offre un point de départ solide pour une réflexion sur ce point," in that Mary holds a privileged place of friendship before God. In the OT "behold the handmaid" is sometimes the bride's reply (1 S 25:41). Gabriel’s greeting is a vocation: this daughter of Sion fills the role of the people of God. John completes Luke, placing Mary at the two extremities of her Son’s mission. Mary’s remark at Cana is a request rooted in faith; finally, Calvary solves the problem of separation posed by the words of Jesus, even as He acceded to her petition at Cana. How much better still will her prayer be heard now by her Son in glory (the "hour") as He constitutes her mother of his disciples and figure of the Church.

Jourjon, Jouassard’s successor in patrology at Lyons, develops his master’s position that the phrase of Irenaeus, “advocata Evae,” shows a rudimentary Marian intercession, in light of the known custom of martyrs interceding for lapsed Christians. Jourjon also cites Gregory of Nazianzus and Ambrose of Milan. Gregory writes of the virgin Justine appealing to the Virgin Mary for assistance, and Ambrose shows Christian virgins similarly dependent on our Lady. Both Fathers offer their advice without apology, as if reflecting an accepted situation in Christian life. Is this the same sort of conviction in the contemporary Greek prayer we know as the Sub tuum praesidium? Summing up, Jourjon writes: “If we ask what aspect of the mystery of Christ led the piety of the Christian people of the first centuries to believe in the value of Mary’s intercession and directed the thought of the Fathers in the same direction, we suggest: the considerateness of Christ towards women made of Mary the advocate of virgins; as the restorer of woman and in this life restorer of the grace which renders possible virginity and the martyrdom of a young girl, Mary answers for all Christian hearts.”

Wenger’s paper is personal as well as scholarly. He comments critically on the incredible failure of the Eastern bishops to bring to Vatican II the witness of Byzantine tradition on the intercession of the Virgin Mary. When he asked about it, he was told they regarded it as a Latin debate between Catholics and Protestants. The reviewer recalls the remark made by the Orthodox Alexander Schmemann in the discussion following his paper on Mary in Eastern liturgy at the Mariological convention, Dayton, Ohio, Jan. 3, 1968, that as the Council went on it seemed more and more to be a dialogue between Rome and Tübingen.
Wenger's paper, on the intercession of Mary in the East from the sixth to the tenth century, takes up two names and three trends. The names are Romanos Melodus (6th c.), who regards Mary's intercession as corollary to the divine maternity, and John the Geometer (10th c.), whose "life of the Virgin" (la somme mariale de la théologie mariale) Wenger is editing. The trends are: (a) Mary's garments as gage of her intercession, analogous to relics of the saints, especially in her protection of Constantinople (as early as 619); (b) intercession as bound up with the Assumption—the homilists say unanimously that Mary has not left Christians orphans, as early as Theoteknos of Livia (6th c.); (c) intercession for the dead—as in the Dormition apocrypha.

The final paper is by medievalist H. Barré, on the Virgin's intercession in the West at the beginning of the Middle Ages. He sets out to answer Con-gar's question: "By what right does St. Bernard say to our Lady: Tuo filio nos reconcilia?" Barré shows the doctrinal basis in the communion of saints, and its practice as far back as the seventh-century Visigothic liturgy. It has not been sufficiently noticed that the role of reconciliation assigned to Mary by the Middle Ages is always "with her Son."

The remaining Etudes mariales on our Lady's intercession are awaited with interest, as also the many papers French theologians contributed on the origins of Marian cult in the first centuries to the Fifth International Mariological Congress, held in Lisbon, August, 1967.

College of Our Lady of Mercy
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EAMON R. CARROLL, O.CARM.


The astonishing thing about this book is the time lag between original and translation. The book appeared originally in French in 1962; the English translation reproduces this practically unaltered. Astonishment grows when one reflects on the enormous development in its subject matter in the years between. On the Catholic side, ecumenism may be said to have begun formally in 1960, with the establishment of the Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity. Yet this is the very year at which, for all practical purposes, the bibliography stops short, apart from some updating by references to the documents of Vatican II.

The quality of the book makes this a matter for profound regret. A second, completely reworked edition could have caught a new tide of ecumenism. This is a science that is expanding so rapidly that no serious work on ecu-
menism can afford to neglect the proliferating literature on the subject, and especially its highly significant minor literature, so essential to its development and therefore to its understanding. To take some examples of the loss in contemporaneity: there is no mention of New Delhi (though Montreal appears in a footnote); the new relationship with the United Bible Societies (one of the most important of all developments in ecumenism) goes unchronicled; the first stirrings only of the “Consultation on Church Union” are recorded (p. 128).

It may be that this kind of criticism is unfair, asking for the kind of book that L. did not intend to write. The subtitle of the English edition, “Theology and History,” is in fact misleading. The French title is “Le problème oecuménique.” In a footnote, L. explains: “it hardly seems necessary to repeat that this book is not a history of the ecumenical movement, but a definition of various constituent aspects of the ecumenical problem, valid, with the necessary adaptations, for all, whether they be Catholics, Orthodox, Anglicans, Protestants or Jews” (p. 66). Though the book does contain a wealth of historical information and judgment, its main accent is on principles. At the same time, one is entitled to one’s regrets, and dreams of what might have been.

The meager amount of updating is itself a tribute to L.’s sure theological eye. His original analysis of the trends that created Vatican II has stood the test of time, and nothing substantial had to be changed; only “a few minor adjustments” had to be made. It is a massive work, but finely proportioned, with a due balance of theology, spirituality, and psychology, always with an eye on the concrete situation. Its fundamental value remains.

Among many excellences one may single out two in particular: the twin expositions running through the book of Catholic and Reformed theology. L. has a genius for tracing confessional differences back to their theological or psychological base. There are outstanding essays on Catholic ecclesiology and liturgy, presenting what is in fact the theology of Vatican II in a positive and refreshing way. Reformed theology is treated with sympathy, objectivity, and theological precision. (Not that other positions are less well handled, but there is a special richness here). One of the great virtues commended and exemplified in this book is the sympathetic study of the total way of life of other communions.

There is a generous understanding of Protestant ecumenism. “The idea of the Church, as held by the Reformers, was ecumenical; it springs from the very nature of Protestantism” (p. 10). Again, “the World Council is...a result...of an infinitely wider movement, one arising from the dynamic elements of the Reformation and the intrinsic power of Christian-
ity. Its driving power, what controls it, is the quest for, the vital need for that without which permanency in being is impossible, namely unity. It has no meaning save within a greater movement and a greater problem” (p. 101).

If Protestantism is driven on by the values of the Reformation to seek Christian unity, can Protestant theology serve as the structure for a re-united Christendom? What, in any case, are the values of the Reformation? In discussing “The Heart of Protestantism” (pp. 143–81), L. examines the Protestant complexus of Word, Christ, and Church, and shows how it leads to an overeschatological view of the Church. On the other hand, he hints at a possible imbalance in Catholic theology for which the Reformation sought redress. “At least as an hypothesis, we may ask whether the great Protestant return to the Word of God was not an attempt to compensate for the absence of the Semitic element in the Church [this is discussed admirably on pp. 145–50] and whether its stress on the eschatological realities was not an attempt to re-establish the balance upset by the departure of the Eastern Churches from the Catholic Church” (p. 504).

There are special chapters on the Eastern Churches and on the Jews. The Anglican Communion is given a special place (as in the Decree on Ecumenism), but the brief section on episcopacy in the Anglican Communion is rather sketchy and unsatisfactory. But this perhaps carping criticism concerns less than three pages (pp. 241–44) out of more than five hundred.

*Edinburgh, Scotland*

**JAMES QUINN, S.J.**


This is the last in the series of three volumes dedicated to the spirit and the documents of Vatican II edited by Hampe. If the first two volumes represented a fresh approach to Vatican II (cf. *TS* 29 [1968] 537–42), the same is doubly true of this volume, for two reasons. First, the documents commented on are those that set a completely new tone in the language of the contemporary Church, i.e., the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, the Declaration on Religious Freedom, the Decree on the Instruments of Social Communication, the Declaration on Christian Education, the Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to Non-Christian Religions, and the Decree on the Church’s Missionary Activity. Second, many of the commentaries are really thought-provoking and challenging. The editor has taken the position that the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, unlike the texts of the other con-
ciliar documents, is the product of the Council itself. Furthermore, more than any other conciliar text, it is the work of the theological advisers and bishop-theologians. It should, therefore, be looked upon as the genuine expression of the spirit of the Council and the Church’s answer to the burning questions of the man of today. These questions come to the fore, in all their complexities, in the commentaries. In keeping with H.’s conviction that it was the duty of the Church to put all her cards on the table in the Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, the contributors have tried very seriously to show whether the Church has succeeded or failed in her effort to do so. Chap. 5 of the book, dedicated to the future, is especially indicative in this regard.

Like the first two, this volume also comprises five chapters. The first deals with “The Dignity of Man and Freedom” in two subdivisions: “Man in His Time” and “Freedom of the Believers.” Chap. 2 treats exclusively of the “Partnership of Husband and Wife.” Chap. 3 analyzes the “Shaping of the World” by pointing out three of its main features: “Culture and Education,” “Poverty and Hunger of the Peoples,” and “Call for Universal Peace.” Chap. 4 is devoted to the “Gospel as It Relates to Others,” again in three sections: “The Council and the Jews,” “The Council and Mission,” and “Council Debate concerning Atheism.” Chap. 5 deals, as already noted, with the “Future.” In addition to these five chapters, the volume contains several appendices. Two of them are particularly useful: a list of terms that suggest how to read the three volumes, and a general table of contents of the entire work.

Some of the contributions will certainly provoke discussions and perhaps even contradictions or at least resentment on the part of those who can never see any wrongdoing as far as the Catholic Church is concerned. Jacob Soetendorp’s “A Jewish Answer” (pp. 512–17) is one such contribution. He contends that a mere declaration on the Jews cannot satisfy the Jews themselves if it does not point out the blunders of the past as well as the strange symbiosis of paganism and Christianity in the attitude of so many Christians. Another thought-provoking and controversial presentation is Karl Gerhard Steck’s “The Question of Martin Luther” (pp. 635–45). In a way, the whole methodology of the Council Fathers is challenged in this article. Instead of accepting the Catholic position that the Church’s self-awareness is significant for knowing her true nature, the author addresses himself to the more concrete question of Luther: Where is the true Church in the many Churches? His distinction between the visible and the invisible, between the kingdom of seeing (Seh-Reich) and the kingdom of hearing (Hör-Reich),
is certainly interesting, but hardly acceptable today in the exclusiveness Steck attributes to the invisible and to the kingdom of hearing.

One can easily subscribe to the thesis suggested in this volume that the real enemy of the Church is not atheism, but unbelief found in her own midst. This unbelief is often generated by an attitude that magnifies the Church's institutional aspect out of all proportion. To counteract it, sound critical judgment and perennial renewal are needed; for only the latter can create an atmosphere of new credibility for and in the Church. And a new credibility is badly needed. The whole future of the Church can depend on it. *Die Autorität der Freiheit* has tried to help bring it about by advocating the spirit and practice of genuine freedom in the life and operations of the Church. For this reason, both the editor and the contributors deserve the reader's deepest thanks and appreciation.

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SABBAS J. KILIAN, O.F.M.


This carefully organized book divides naturally into three basic sections that are indeed so designated. Fr. Echlin delineates the purpose of his book as a study of doctrine rather than of either history or liturgies. In this he remains consistent. Yet in this studied approach, history and liturgies flow through the book as an added inclusion which can only serve the reader as added interest and delight.

To the Roman Catholic scholar as well as the Anglican, E. gives definition to some of the key words which have tended to make the Eucharist ecumenical so far as these two great Christian bodies are concerned. Words like "sacrifice," "real presence," and "transubstantiation" are defined most often directly, though occasionally by implication. But these words, terms, and doctrinal definitions lose their former polemical structure and assume a sharp edge of commonality. For this we are all grateful; for ecumenical purposes can only be achieved when emotional words are reduced to dispassionate articulation, so that each participant is not "hung up" on the wrong thing. It occurs to me that all of us who have been so sure that we knew all about the theology of others might well find this book reminding us that not only do we have deficiencies in this direction but also that we might well need a real jogging about our own theology.

The central and largest portion is the survey (not really a fair word) of
the Anglican authors who have expressed themselves on Eucharistic doctrine. From Thomas Cranmer to the Book of Common Prayer of 1789 we follow this expression of concern, sometimes heated, sometimes with prejudice precluding a fair analysis of the commentators' position. E.'s scholarship is well-nigh impeccable and he has used sources which are not easily obtained. Massey Shepherd, the Episcopal Church's great authority on the Prayer Book, expresses in a short note commendation for the materials used. A second delight, therefore, is the rereading of some well-known expressions on Anglican Eucharistic doctrine—but now reading them from an entirely different perspective. This together with many new comments is gratifying to the journeyman as well as to the scholar. Moreover, the extensive bibliography not only serves its normal purposes but also provides an excellent resource for other work in this or allied fields. While little is said about the methodology in selecting this phase of Eucharistic doctrine, one feels that scholarship finds the conclusions; sources are not selected to reach a conclusion.

But what about the ecumenical perspective? E. advances arguments again and again to show that in extant materials Anglican doctrine has not departed from the Roman Catholic doctrine if one properly understands both doctrines. Moreover, if one cuts away the emotional overlay of the Reformation ethos, this becomes even more apparent. I am not sure one can always remove one factor from the historical and liturgical ethos and claim continuing independence. Certainly, most people are unable to maintain a complete intellectual position without reference to the pressures of the times in which they find themselves living. This would be true, I think, of the great controversies within the Church of England and the external pressures exported so gleefully from the Continent. It would be equally true of the English-American relationship of the late eighteenth century. But this is a small point and one feels strongly that E. has laid bare the bedrock of a strong ecumenical future. He says so in his conclusion and it would be difficult to show that his conclusion either as a scholar or as a Christian can easily be put off.

A final word, about E.'s manner of writing. The great bulk of the book is quotation, some of considerable length, together with introductory sequences and comments. There is never a feeling of being overwhelmed by this tremendous amount of material. Some of it, apart from its primary intention, is quite fascinating. The interplay of Bishops Seabury and White is a good example, as is the Laudian personality as E. portrays it. Fr. Echlin is a gracious author to all concerned in the ecumenical perspective; he endears
himself to many Anglicans when he introduces himself as "a Catholic of the Roman persuasion."

_Episcopal Diocese of Bethlehem, Pa._

LLOYD EDGAR TETER, JR.


This is a book for men in the Christian ministry that lays the theoretical groundwork for an understanding of the phenomenon of resistance in the Church and gives suggestions on the manner in which such resistance is to be met. Resistance, in the context of this work, refers to the obstacles that church members place before the minister in the carrying out of his task: their refusal to adapt and to change; their unwillingness to get into the mainstream of modern life; their trivializing of worship and church education; their opposition to the minister's efforts to help them in counseling situations. It is the thesis of this book that such resistance is not to be seen simply as something to be overcome. Rather, this obstructive behavior is often the ambiguous manifestation of an ultimate commitment to Christ and to the Church; accordingly, it must be met by the minister as an occasion for the fruitful realization of his ministry. He has to find the real meaning of the resistance, unmask it, and help the persons involved to know better the inner drives that lead them to resist.

While D. believes that resistance can be successfully confronted in the social sphere of the Church's ministry, he concentrates upon the more individualistic manifestations of the phenomenon. The examples that he uses to illustrate (not prove) his thesis are largely drawn from counseling and psychotherapeutic situations and from typical encounters of a minister with members of his congregation. Of special interest to this reviewer were D.'s opinions on church structures, on specialized ministries such as inner-city work, and on the role of the Church as being "out of the world." D. sees a real function for church organization. He marvels that an age which admires the way that such organization in business and politics gets things done should assume that the machinery of church life is simply an obstacle to be destroyed. He sees in the seeming irrelevancy of much church structure the frequent presence of real Christian values. Regarding those who would forsake the present forms of ministry for the more specialized crisis ministries such as work with the deprived Negro, D. claims that they risk becoming the beatniks of the Church, who protest against irrelevance and isolation from the real world by isolating themselves in individualistic Greenwich
villages. He compares them to the monks of the past who renounced humdrum conventionality to seek the Lord in a more intense life style; he salutes the desire of these men to be deeply and personally involved with people who are conscious of their need and immediately responsive to those attempting to help them, whether the response is favorable or unfavorable. However, he does not think that such ministries can be normative for the Church. The mediocre and the smug (who apparently constitute the majority) also need the gospel. Finally, D. sees the Church as furnishing an atmosphere of freedom within which members can work out their deepest problems. In a way that is analogous to the counseling situation, the church situation allows people to escape the ordinary relationships of life where they are pressured and to step into a milieu that is "out of the world" where they can find their truer selves. Because he sees this being "out of the world" as essential, D. thinks it a serious blunder for the Church to simply reproduce within itself the entire social structure of the world in which it dwells. And he would question the validity of making church situations, especially the worship situation, into ecclesiastical restatements of the secular.

_The Church in the Way_ is clearly and forcefully written. D.'s tone is moderate and his points are made with needed qualifications. My own experience indicates that his basic thesis on resistance and many of his subsidiary statements are justified. The one thing I would like to have seen is a greater effort to reduce the reported phenomena to their basic theological equivalents. It seems to me that it is possible to interpret church structures, the factor of resistance, and other matters treated by D. in terms of a theological anthropology. D., however, is obviously more at home in psychology than in dogma; perhaps it is too much to ask him to be at home in both. At any rate, he has given us an excellent psychological study of the Church and the factor of resistance within it.

_St. Thomas Seminary, Kenmore, Wash._

Peter Chirico, S.S.


These pages represent a reworking and development of the lectures given by H. at the Pastoral Institute in Conception, Missouri, in 1964 and 1966 and at the University of San Francisco in 1966. The result is a practical, pastoral work on the sacrament of penance written by a master theologian who reveals himself to be at the same time an unusually sensitive person. The aim of the book is not to anticipate or predict future changes in the celebration of the sacrament of penance but simply to help confessors make
the best use of all the present opportunities. H. sees the confessor as a prophet of joy and messianic peace, whose main concern is the direction and maturation of Christian consciences. He illustrates his thesis with many practical examples which show the far-reaching effects that a change in attitude and emphasis can achieve. Of all of H.'s writings this is perhaps his most valuable contribution to the pastoral work of the priest.

Half the book treats of the sacrament of penance: its administration, the various roles of the confessor, the dispositions of the penitent, material integrity, the different types of penitents, and the meaning and usefulness of the sacrament. The other half takes up specific moral questions, following the customary outline of the theological virtues and the commandments; but here too H.'s view is pastoral, directed to the celebration of the sacrament of peace. An order for a communal celebration of the sacrament is printed in an appendix.

In this book H. takes the opportunity to clarify an opinion which he says has been badly misrepresented by the American press. The question concerns a spy who commits suicide under his government's orders to protect vitally secret information. H.'s opinion is that "it is conceivably a moot question" (p. 178) whether taking one's life in these circumstances is suicide in the strict moral sense. He supports his distinction between taking one's own life and suicide in the strict moral sense by four examples. When condemned to death by his government, Socrates was ordered to drink a goblet of poison. Members of the Japanese nobility when convicted of a capital crime are not executed by hanging but are ordered to commit hara-kiri. Soldiers in battle often fulfil commands which they know will involve the sacrifice of their lives. And Fr. Kolbe volunteered to take the place of a man who was arbitrarily condemned to death. Yet none of these cases are instances of suicide in the moral sense. H. does not claim to have proved that the spy who takes his own life under government orders does not commit suicide in the moral sense. But he does think that the question should be discussed and that we should avoid apodictic teaching in extreme and intricate cases such as this until we have taken a closer look at the moral meaning of the acts.

It is difficult for one working with traditional categories to support H.'s opinion. If one defines illicit homicide as the direct killing of an innocent person, the cases of Socrates or the Japanese nobility are not parallel to that of the spy, since the former were judged guilty of capital crimes. And if one carefully distinguishes means from ends as is done in the usual casuistic approach to morals, then neither is there any clear parallel with the cases of Fr. Kolbe or the soliders who sacrifice their lives, since their deaths can be
seen as indirectly voluntary. But, unless I am mistaken, the question that H. is raising here is not whether this case can be favorably resolved in terms of means and ends and the categories of the direct and indirect voluntary. The question is whether these categories are adequate to assess the moral meaning of our actions. The implication here, it seems, is that human action is essentially intersubjective and its moral meaning is not objectively given in the material content of the physical act but can be grasped only after its full human significance is established. On this principle, then, the spy who kills himself performs a material act which intersubjectively is an act of patriotic self-sacrifice, which should not be confused with suicide in the moral sense. If one applies this principle to other areas such as abortion, euthanasia, sterilization, artificial insemination, etc., its fundamental and far-reaching import comes clear. Since H. does not tell us plainly the thinking that lies behind his opinion on the case of the spy, there is danger that I am misreading it. But if the discussion he calls for on this question is to be productive, he will have to reveal more clearly the principles that he brings to bear on it.

Finally, it should be pointed out that this book is more than a new look at some old questions. The author is especially alert to the new moral problems that have arisen in our own day. The confessor’s duty is to form consciences on present-day issues according to the current teaching of contemporary theologians and the living magisterium. Therefore, H. expresses his impatience with “professors of moral theology whose convenience is best served by using out-dated lecture notes based on nineteenth-century manuals” (pp. 231–32). One can only remark that if student rioting has not already remedied all instances of this practice, H.’s book will serve as a useful and more tranquil corrective.

St. Mary of the Lake Seminary

JOHN F. DedeK


Vernard Eller, himself a product of a Church of the Brethren seminary, argues a thesis which at first glance seems as improbable and ill-advised as the efforts of a few to show that Søren Kierkegaard was really, down-deep and without himself recognizing it, a Catholic. Eller’s thesis: “The perspective from which S. K. viewed Christianity was a radical discipleship essentially one with the concept of classic Protestant sectarianism.”

The recluse, S. K., is to be understood in terms of a religious position stressing Gemeinschaft? The gifted intellectual anti-Hegelian bourgeois Dane is to be interpreted in the light of German dissenters living in Pennsyl-
vania farm communities in the eighteenth century? Well, that is just what Eller undertakes and in a beautiful study succeeds in establishing. He is careful first to define "classical sectarianism," placing it within a spectrum of Christian positions (inspired by Troeltsch, but very interestingly refined by E. The chapter on "classic Protestant sectarianism" will interest anyone who cares to understand the varieties of Christian positions). Then, theme by theme, E. compares what K. has written with the main documents (they are sparse) of "the Dunkers." The correspondence is astounding. But what is even more convincing is the inner logic of their respective positions, which Eller unfolds with admirable clarity and succeeds in manifesting as pure and simple, with a great deal of the immediacy and subtle naïveté of apostolic Christianity. Given the intellectual sophistication of the Dane and the homespun "primitiveness" (in the sense in which shrewd old Gran'ma Moses is primitive) of the Pennsylvania Dutchmen, showing that the same conception (I should say, the same Spirit) is animating both, is no mean feat. Lacking any grounds from which to mount a counterattack, I am obliged to admit that I think the reason Eller can pull it off is that it is true.

But then how reconcile the recluse of Copenhagen, who is sometimes almost misanthropic—the prophet of "the individual"—with a folk for whom Gemeinschaft was everything? E. shows that the roots of Kierkegaardian individualism and the Brethren's community are exactly the same. Both are resolutely anticrowd and yet devoted entirely to love of neighbor for the love of God. In other words, nothing is so essentially anticrowd as true neighbor-love. From this it follows that neither K. nor the Brethren are antichurch; they belong nowhere near the left wing, the anarchical side of the spectrum. They protest against the established Church, the sacrilegious instrument of worldly power, but affirm the presence of God in the Church community devoted to neighbor-love in Christ. Hence both attach great importance to the sacraments, especially the love feast of Communion.

But why then did K. not join a sect? E. argues that K. knew of no such community firsthand. (Incredible as it may seem, K. had heard of the little Pennsylvania sect—through Ben Franklin's autobiography, through the distorting lens of which K. saw more deeply than le philosophe, and expressly approved.) He founded none either, not only because of his young death but because of his peculiar personality. E. several times reminds us delicately of the difference between this prophet's deepest vision and the reality of his humanity.

This book is engrossing. Not only does one learn much about the Brethren, who are wonderful to know; not only does one come to see a coherent Kierkegaard in a deep and religious light; one comes away stirred by the purity of
the Christian message held up to us here. Hence it was a relief to this awfully churchly Christian to read E.'s diagnosis at the end, when he asks: "What are we to make of S. K. and of the spirit of classical sectarianism?" In the era of ecumenism, says E., an unprecedented openness within the churches makes possible, in a way inconceivable even a very few years ago, the introduction within them of the spirit of primitive Christianity—the Christ-centeredness, the Word-centeredness, the fellowship, the emphasis on the love feast, the detachment from worldly power, and the effective living of non-violence. There is the suggestion that the Spirit works in mysterious ways, maybe now through an oversensitive, university-educated, yes, even Hegelian Dane; now through a tiny group of German expatriates who have to defy Philadelphia because of their refusal to use force to achieve the ends of the Revolution; now through a learned pastor imprisoned in a Berlin jail, radiating hope even as the S.S. noose tightened. Those of us who are certain that the spirit has never ceased to work too within the institutional Church (though in some eras quietly, individually, and in small subsocieties in the Church—good families, communities, parishes, and in better national churches) see many signs of the purity and simplicity and directness of the classical sects manifesting itself in the Catholic Church. Would it take a wild imagination to picture Pope John in earnest religious conversation with Alexander Mack, Jr.? Matching wits with S.K. would be another matter, of course. I cannot think of anyone to nominate for that job!

University of Toronto

THOMAS Langan


This book should be read by anyone interested in Tillich or in philosophical theology. Its author, a member of the Philosophy Department at Purdue, is something of a rarity in speculative theology today, an extremely clearheaded thinker. He has paid Tillich the compliment of reading him very carefully and of taking seriously precisely what he says. The result is a book on Tillich's doctrine of God and his theory of symbolism, which, as it treats topic after topic, consistently achieves that sought-after goal of philosophical analysis, perspicuity. This does not mean that I agree completely with what R. says, but he is never silly and very rarely muddled. Unlike many less-gifted commentators, R. does not content himself with merely reporting the many opaque things which Tillich has said on a given topic; by a painstaking analysis—occasionally one suspects the point could have been made a little
more quickly—he tries to discern as much determinate meaning as possible in what Tillich says, and then with an equally careful procedure he tries to determine whether there are any good reasons to think that what Tillich says is true.

The first chapter deals with Tillich's doctrine of God as being-itself. There is a helpful analysis of the various possible meanings of "ultimate concern," and an evaluation of the very intricate reasoning that Tillich employs in order to establish the conclusion that being-itself is the object of man's ultimate concern. There is a good discussion of the very puzzling question of the precise logical status of the statement "God is being-itself." Does Tillich propose it as a literal statement, which he seems to do in Vol. 1 of *Systematic Theology*, or as a symbolic statement, which he seems to do in Vol. 2? Tillich was not consistent here and seems to have changed his mind at least a couple of times. R. concludes: "As far as this study is concerned, the doctrine of volume 1 will be accepted, namely, that 'God is being-itself' is a literal (nonsymbolic) identity statement. This has the consequence that the ontological status of God and the ontological status of being-itself are not two different questions but one and the same question."

R. raises the question whether Tillich is being anything more than arbitrary in identifying the meaning of "God" with "being-itself," "the ground of being," or "the power of being" (the terms seem to be interchangeable in Tillich). R. writes: the "objection is that 'God' is primarily a religious notion, whereas the phrases used in explaining the meaning of 'God' are primarily philosophical. Is there any reason to suppose that in using the former, religious people are referring to what Tillich means by the latter?" R. seems here, quite uncharacteristically, to be guilty of some significant imprecisions. Is he seriously proposing that the question of identity of meaning is the same as identity of reference? Surely Frege's classical discussion of the morning star and the evening star exposed that one! In his whole discussion R. does not seem to be especially attentive to the various ways he is using the word "meaning." The root of the difficulty seems to me to be that R. is here intending to answer a very common and serious objection to Tillich's whole program without having thought through the real significance of the objection. The point is not whether a particular religious term and a particular philosophical term can be said to refer to the same object. The question is one of meaning. Do the terms mean the same? "My old friend" and "that old rascal" can both be used to refer to the same person, but the meanings of the two expressions are quite distinct. My presumption is that it is the function of a Christian theologian to elucidate the meanings of Christian terms and expressions; he is to provide us with a perspicuous representation of the
grammar of faith (to use Wittgenstein's way of putting it). Otherwise all the talk about meaning is a fake. The objection is that Tillich does not do this. His doctrine of God does not elucidate the meaning of "God" but rather changes it. "God" as used by a religious Christian, and "being-itself" as used by anyone who wants to use it, simply do not have the same meaning. The depth grammar of the expressions is quite different. R. does not seem to realize how pervasive a variation of the referential theory of meaning is in Tillich's whole enterprise. To be sure, in another context he recognizes that Tillich occasionally falls into the rather gross "'Fido,' Fido" version of the referential theory (the meaning of "Fido" is Fido), but does not consider this of great importance. Yet it is only a more sophisticated version of this theory which provides the framework of Tillich's theology. The meanings of Christian expressions are constantly explained by reference to a metaphysical theory. 'In Tillich's system... religious statements using the symbol God are elucidated in terms of ontological statements using the concept being-itself.' When we read a Christian theologian, we expect that he will help us get straight the meanings of Christian terms and expressions. But metaphysical theories (whatever they may be) are not the meanings of Christian expressions (whatever those meanings are), any more than metaphysical theories are the meanings of football expressions, army expressions, chess expressions, or hippie expressions. In fact, meanings are not things at all. Tillich may reply that his purpose is not to offer us the actual meanings of Christian expressions but rather what they ought to mean (or, which comes to the same thing, what they really mean). This would be all right if Tillich could give us some good reasons for thinking that the meanings which he creates for us are the right ones (whatever that may mean). I do not think he does this, and so I cannot but conclude that his identification of God with being-itself is hopelessly hypothetical. To adequately treat this problem would require much more space than we have here. It is to be hoped that in some future work R. will devote his acute critical faculties to this central objection to Tillich's theology.

The second chapter is a highly successful attempt to elucidate Tillich's notion of being-itself by comparing it with certain things which have been said about universals and by comparing it with Plotinus' conception of the One. R. finds the main difference between being-itself and the One to consist in the fact that Plotinus sharply dissociates negativity and evil from the One, while Tillich asserts that negativity (nonbeing) must be posited in being-itself.

The third chapter is an explanation of Tillich's paradoxical claim that "God does not exist." Here there is an interesting comparison of some of
Tillich's theses about essence and existence with those of Aquinas. R.'s analysis would have gained in precision if he had noted that in the very texts which he cites from Aquinas there is an inherent ambiguity in Aquinas' usage. Sometimes Aquinas uses the words in the traditional sense of his contemporaries, i.e., to point out the difference between what a thing is and the fact that it is. At other times Aquinas is concerned with insisting on his own peculiar Neoplatonic thesis that essence and existence are related as principle of limitation and principle of perfection. Aquinas was not concerned with reforming the ordinary usage of his day, and frequently employed it himself when it did not seem to have any particular metaphysical importance. In his technical sense it is, of course, nonsense to say that God has an essence. It was his employment of ordinary usage which allowed him to say that God's essence was identical with His existence.

The fourth chapter deals with Tillich's important distinction between sign and symbol, and the fifth treats the specific nature of religious symbols. Chap. 6 outlines Tillich's classification of religious symbols into different levels and groups, and gives his account of religious myths. This latter chapter contains a detailed analysis of the inconsistencies involved in Tillich's interpretation of the myth of the Fall. It was not quite clear to me why the stories which Tillich calls myths need to be interpreted at all, although R. seemed satisfied on this point. Cannot they just be understood? The final chapter is an excellent attempt to explicate what Tillich means when he uses the expression "truth" in connection with religion, and to examine Tillich's attempt to establish criteria for determining the truth and value of a religious faith. R.'s conclusion is that a careful investigation of Tillich's claims concerning the superiority of the Christ symbol do not mark any very profound difference between Christianity and the other great religions by which men live.

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Vincent M. Cooke, S.J.


This latest book by Metz is a reworking and a uniting of a number of previously published essays in fundamental theology. By allowing the individual essays to remain complete in themselves, M. has been able to incorporate a large number of themes into a single volume. The less fortunate result of the format is that the reader is forced to endure a considerable amount of repetition and at times to work out for himself the connections between the various ideas presented. All the essays do, however, revolve around a
single thesis which M. attempts to establish and develop: the worldliness of
the world, which is ever more complete and more sharply pronounced in our
contemporary world, is in its foundations, though not in all of its manifesta-
tions, an event that arises from within Christianity itself and is not contrary
to Christianity (pp. 16–17).

M. seeks to establish the thesis historically and theologically. The pagan
understanding of the world, even in its most highly elaborated form in
Greek philosophy, failed to perceive a clear division between the worldly
and the divine. The world always remained to some degree numinous, and the
gods to some degree of this world. In the Christ-event and in the preparation
for the event in the OT, God was for the first time seen as utterly other than
the world, and the world consequently as purely worldly. The clear accept-
ance of the transcendence of God was the founding of the world in its prop-
erly worldly character. In its theological understanding of the Christ-event,
the Church has consistently emphasized God’s free adoption of mankind as
a taking-up of what in itself was not divine.

In the development of his theme, M. argues that the full meaning of the
Christ-event becomes clear only if grounded in an understanding of the
biblical experience of the world. In this experience the world is in no sense
nature but is rather the Umwelt of man. It was man and only man who was
the locus of God’s Amen to the world in the Incarnation. Without further
argument M. assumes that since the Enlightenment and especially since the
work of Kant and Marx it is no longer possible to develop a workable philos-
ophy or theology apart from an anthropocentric epistemology. Our present
world-experience reveals ever less clearly the vestigia Dei and ever more
clearly the vestigia hominis. The locus of the numinous must henceforth be
found, if at all, in man rather than in nature.

Recent existential and transcendental theology arose out of a correct in-
sight into the need to personalize our experience of the world, but in its
excessive emphasis upon the personal relationships of the I-Thou encounter
neglected the thingly and worldly character of human experience. By failing
to take serious notice that the human world is a thing world and a world of
institutions as well as a world of personal encounters, this theology became
in the highest degree abstract. One of the chief tasks of theology today must
be the “deprivatizing” of our understanding of the gospel calling.

The deep-seated pluralism of our society and within the individual
members of our society makes it impossible for philosophy to unveil an
ultimate meaning of human experience. Furthermore, by holding to teleology
as a principle of explanation, philosophy has bound itself to the past and to
the present and made itself incapable of dealing with the radically new.
Since man, and especially modern man, is oriented to what-not-yet-is, to the future, it is only an eschatology founded in hope and not a teleology that can provide the logos for human development and the fulfilment of human freedom. What freedom truly is can be discovered only in practice and in living, and not from a transcendental consideration of human nature. In such a situation the Church herself must become an institution of criticism, radically oriented to the future rather than to the maintenance of the status quo. Such a Church would have the negative task of continually and courageously criticizing the ideologies of unfreedom and scepticism, and the positive task of teaching men to live in the calling to an eschatological fulfilment. M. sees no alternative to the political theology whose fundamental outlines he attempts to delineate, except ideologies which result in either a scepticism or an unfounded world optimism. The possibility of a philosophical optimism of hope and fidelity gets scant attention in view of M.'s insights into our pluralistic society and his understanding of philosophy as looking only to the past and the present. The critic, however, may well wish for a clearer exposition of the structure and ultimate foundation of the pluralism of which M. speaks. If the pluralism is a radical pluralism, is it compatible with God's Amen to the world of man? If the pluralism is not radical, can we not even now have some understanding, and even a philosophical understanding, of the way open for human fulfilment? The critic may also wonder whether M. is not himself, and within his exposition of an eschatological hope, proceeding in a teleological fashion from a present experience and understanding of freedom. Until such questions are answered, it remains questionable whether the proposed political theology will not appear as another ideology to believers as well as to unbelievers. Although the book does not answer these questions, it does constitute an important development in the continuing effort of the Church to understand herself in the contemporary world.


Fabro, one of Italy's best-known and most prolific philosophical scholars, has traced the history of atheistic thinking in the writings of every major Western philosopher from Descartes to Heidegger. The focus is maintained on highly technical argument and the positions reflectively worked out by professionals and intellectuals, so that the concept and interpretation of atheism emerge as highly cerebralized, the expression largely, if not exclu-
sively, of a reasoning process, the response to demands which are predominantly systematic. There is, consequently, an almost total neglect of the historical (cultural, socioeconomic) matrix to which, as a world view, an atheistic mentality can correspond, as well as of the more properly religious (personal, theological) dimensions in which atheism is ultimately situated. The resultant impression might be that atheism is a practical possibility only for the most cultivated of minds, the most theoretical of spirits; but such is not F.'s intention. He has deliberately confined his treatment to what he calls the internal dynamic of atheism in its philosophical formulations, an approach that makes possible considerable enrichment and penetration in depth, although it omits some of the most interesting and important aspects of an extremely complex human phenomenon. Within these limits, however, he has produced what is the most comprehensive historical study of the subject and will be the standard work in its field for a very long time.

F.'s historical research is enlivened by a sustained critical analysis of the metaphysical premises underlying each philosopher's atheistic argument. This metaphysical critique constitutes an additional value in a work already priceless by reason of the sheer wealth of materials assembled and organized. F.'s Thomism is revealed in a realism which is both grounded in the primacy of being and sensitive to the exigencies of a personalist subjectivity. After an introduction in which the theoretical features and problematic of present-day atheism are delineated, the "tragedy of modern man" is outlined in eight parts. The entire exposition is thematized around the idea of atheism as the logical conclusion to seventeenth-century Cartesian rationalism. F. has attempted to interpret and judge every statement of atheism in terms of what he identifies as "the principle of immanentism" and which he insists upon as "the inner nucleus of modern atheism": "For when the act of knowing is posited as the ultimate beginning, it has no other truth than that of its naked self-positing and self-effectuation; and the content is its own sheer process of realization, its truth being dissolved into the pure historicity of (the) human being (Dasein)" (p. 1062). F. has immensely complicated the task of critical interpretation, first by seeking out in every author, whatever the individual's own intent or concern, the active presence, operation, and atheistic implications of the aforementioned principle, and then again by insisting on a continuity, consistency, and consequentially which make of modern philosophy a monolith that is almost wholly an artificial and arbitrary construct. Apart from the adequacy and accuracy of the sources amassed in his historical account, F. must make out a case for his interpretative thesis, a self-imposed burden which, if carried off, doubles the value of his labors.
In terms of ground covered, i.e., authors included, it is hard to think of a European philosopher or serious writer who has been overlooked. F. is obviously, and understandably, more familiar with Continental than with British (Scotsmen, such as Hume, resent being called English) authors, although he has done his homework very carefully and conscientiously and exhibits a grasp of what is significant, at least in the pre-Enlightenment empiricists and deists. He is not at home, however, in the section on "Anglo-American empiricism," a catchall category in which cosmic idealists are lumped together with pragmatists and naturalists. For this English edition a new section, on dialectical theology and the death-of-God idea (represented by Robinson rather than its more original and radical American spokesmen), has been added. A rather vague and at times puzzling preoccupation with Marxism, as a sort of prototypical contemporary atheism, inserts itself with fairly frequent regularity. Parts 4 and 5, on Hegelian and post-Hegelian atheism, exhibit F.'s analytical and critical powers at their most incisive. The final section comprises a reflective review of the historical line and an examination of the immanentist inspiration of modern atheism in its psychological, ontological, and scientific ramifications.

One cannot exaggerate the service Fabro has performed in digging into literally hundreds of long-forgotten treatises, essays, occasional pieces, and polemical works, to document the breadth and depth of an option which has fascinated, where it has not actually captured the allegiance of, many of the leading minds of the past three centuries. The translator, himself a learned scholar in the field of atheism, has managed to provide references to English versions of most works cited, where these are commonly available. One wonders, therefore, why Kierkegaard, for example, is constantly quoted from Italian editions (even allowing for the fact that F. himself has been responsible for these). Typographical errors are unusually abundant and there are numerous misstatements of fact and an irritating variation in spelling the same proper names. It is not clear why Marx, Nietzsche, and Kant, among others of equal rank, should receive fewer pages of text that Bauer, Strauss, Bradley, or Royce. How can Shaftesbury have collaborated with d'Holbach (p. 217), when he died over fifty years before the latter began to write? There is not nearly enough on Hume, a key figure in the emergence of irreligious secular thinking. The appendices inserted after each section are not always helpful and often contain material which seems to belong to the main body of exposition. It is to be expected that F.'s work will run through numerous editions and that in future some, at least, of these defects will be attended to.

Nevertheless, even as it stands God in Exile is destined to a place in the
front rank of a literature that is striving to keep up with what is perhaps the most ominous and critical development in the world we live in.

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Whatever else one may be inclined to say about Personality Types and Holiness, he is not likely to say it is a typical book. It is both useful and annoying. R. writes of what he terms differential asceticism, an investigation into what, if any, correlation there may be between temperament types and holiness. Basing himself on the psychological typology of W. H. Sheldon, he concludes that there are three different manners of responding to holiness and that consequently three diverse rules for pursuing perfection of life may be indicated. He first summarizes Sheldon's system of personality types and explains why he accepts it. The three Sheldonian attitudes toward life are the viscerotonic (vital, social, pleasure-loving), the somatotonic (energetic, aggressive, dominating), and the cerebrotonic (introverted, restrained, mentally occupied). R. then searches out the "basic hagiotypical components" which are the final elements into which Christian holiness can be analyzed. This gives rise to three irreducible polar types of sanctity: agapetonia (loving, peaceful, lazy), prasotonia (energetic, active, aggressive), deontotonia (dutiful, austere, withdrawn). Next he offers practical pastoral advice for the correct spiritual direction of each type of person.

The remainder of the volume is devoted to an analysis of three canonized saints (Francis de Sales, Francis Xavier, John Berchmans) as examples of each hagiotype, and a study of Christ the "hyperhagionorm." R. discusses Jesus' somatotype, psychotype, and hagiotype and finds Him the perfect personality, the supreme saint, what he calls a 7-7-7 type. This analysis of Christ's typology and virtues is interesting even if one cannot agree with every point. (For example, regarding Christ's inclination to mental prayer, R. states that there is very little [explicit?] data available. In addition to a whole series of prayer texts in Mark and Luke, a few of which R. notes, there is the vastly impressive summary remark of Lk 5:16: "He would always go off to some place where he could be alone and pray." ) Christ is the "Key to Differential Ascetics" (p. 324).

R. analyzes defense mechanisms according to different personality types and finds that they tend to be localized more around one component than another. This can be useful information. So also can a knowledge of Sheldon's polar personality differences be helpful to members of a family or religious
community in understanding the frequent and inevitable rubs that occur even in ideal groups. Yet we are not so sure that all of R.'s advice for spiritual directors is unexceptionable. We question, e.g., whether "no spiritual director should give psychological tests to his subjects," whether the Rorschach test may be given only "as a last resort before sending the subject to a psychiatrist," whether Roger's nondirective counseling is philosophically incompatible with Catholic doctrine, whether all who seek perfection normally pass through a stage of scrupulosity (R. holds that there are scruples of supernatural origin in normal persons), whether one should urge a "definite subject" for meditation on the viscerotonic type, whether "mysticism is a hagiotypic modality." We cannot subscribe to the conclusion that the majority of the problems discussed in chap. 3 find "their full solution in differential ascetics" (p. 198), and we would like to see studied more closely the position that one temperamental component is won at the expense of the others, so that even a saint does not attain the same eminence in all the important aspects of sanctity due to inherent somatic and psychological limitations (p. 256). While we would agree that temperamental traits can and do predispose a man one way or the other, we feel that R. has things too neatly worked out. We sense some unreality in saying that one type (A) is inclined to affective "contemplative love" and another very different type (D) is disposed to "mental prayer." This may be true, but experience indicates that those inclined to affective contemplative prayer are inclined to mental prayer. Is there any necessary difference?

We have said that the book is annoying. How? For a scientific work, it contains far too many unjustified universal statements (on pp. 150-51 we count nine or ten universal statements dealing with practical matters). We think, though, that many of these are simply due to R.'s way of expressing himself. Even though this volume contains interesting insights into pure types, R.'s descriptions are sometimes unduly exaggerated. We read, e.g., that the duty-oriented person "has no understanding of the use of prudent judgment in fulfilling obligations, and will continue something to the end that is patently irrational" (p. 87). And we would contest a number of his statements regarding the psychology of "the average woman."

R.'s theology does not reflect an awareness of contemporary developments. Most of his citations are dated in the forties and fifties, and we do not recall a single hint that Vatican II has occurred. He refers to Carl Rogers' Client-Centered Therapy as recent (p. 151). One can only protest the statement we find on p. 57: "When we speak here of perfection and holiness, we obviously must mean the road of the Evangelical counsels, whether in the state of perfection or not. Only analogously can these concepts be applied to the mere fulfillment of these precepts."
The style and translation are poor. We have archaic terms (therein, thereby, hereby), capitalization of words we no longer capitalize (Monism, Psychiatry, Theology, Grace, Evangelical), mistakes (“a divisional criteria,” footnote mechanics on p. 143), awkward sentences (“The way is full of difficulties although also of hopes” [p. 109]. The spiritual director should get his client “to try to garner a better understanding with others” [p. 175]). Although this volume is written for “all spiritual directors” (p. 7), we fear that few will easily adjust to the abundance of technical terminology in chap. 1.

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SHORTER NOTICES

FOUR RELIGIONS OF ASIA. By Herbert Stroup. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. Pp. x + 212. $6.00. A difficult subject, the religions of India. Anyone writing a brief study on this complex set of traditions is undertaking a challenge of considerable proportions. S., remarkably aware of the problems, wished to be both lucid and comprehensive in relation to the four most significant of the advanced religions that originated in India: Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism. He says plainly that he is writing a “primer” (p. 21), that he seeks to describe these religions “as social systems” (p. 9), that his primary intention in this book “is not to interpret the meaning and value of these religions” (p. 22). After an introduction concerned with religion generally and the relations of religion with magic, morality, and science, he takes up these four religions and in each case treats of the founder or origin, the history, scriptures, and teachings. In the section on teachings he gives special attention to those concerned with God, the person, society. Quite naturally he ends up by listing items in a logical but not a living sequence. He is exterior to his subject matter and consequently bland in presentation. This descriptive, detached attitude can be quite effective in presenting information on the higher religions, but only when the description manifests exactness of knowledge, depth of understanding, and precision of statement. Here S. is only moderately successful. His information is, on the whole, quite sound. His understanding has no great depth. His presentation is sometimes inadequate, as when, e.g., he writes rather much on the Yogacara school of Buddhist thought with no mention of the Madhyamika (pp. 153–55); also when he associates the Lotus Sutra with Zen rather than with the Amidist tradition of Buddhism (p. 150)
and makes no mention at all of the Wisdom Sutras or the doctrine of Emptiness. Also there is a tendency to overrate the Buddhist antagonism to caste outside of the monastic setting. It is an exaggeration to say that Buddhism "almost dealt a death blow to caste" (p. 163). Having said all this in a critical vein, I would end by saying that it is a book with a sizable fund of good and reliable information on the origin, history, and scriptural writings of these traditions.

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*Thomas Berry*

**Isaiah and the Assyrian Crisis.** By Brevard S. Childs. *Studies in Biblical Theology, Second Series* 3. Naperville, Ill.: Allenson, 1967. Pp. 144. $2.85. This careful study of one of the central problems of Isaiah can be instructive not only for students of the *OT*, but also in certain respects for those dealing with the *NT* from the standpoints of historicity and the building-up of a theological tradition. C. has undertaken the challenging task of sifting by Form-Critical methods all those clusters of text in Is 1-33 which can tell us something of the prophet's attitude toward the Assyrian threat, and of the events which provoked his response. This is followed by the less elusive but still formidable quest for an evaluation of the different strands in the narrative texts, especially Is 36-39, along similar lines. Good insights on the perspectives and, where this exists, the evolution of particular passages abound. A prima-facie, over-all conclusion is that the eclectic use of these materials to build up a one-track historical reconstruction hardly does justice to the complexity of the sources or the degree to which in their present form they yield only a refraction of the basic events and of the underlying preoccupations of the prophet himself. The theological conclusion is almost equally reserved: "The problem of developing theological norms with which to evaluate the diversity within the Old Testament finally forces the interpreter outside the context of the Old Testament and raises the broader questions of Scripture and canon" (p. 127). Within *OT* times, a kind of culmination of the theological development sparked by the Assyrian crisis is evident in the book of Judith (cf. *CBQ* 25 [1963] 94-110).

*Catholic University of America*  
*Patrick W. Skehan*

**The Biblical Doctrine of Heaven.** By Wilbur M. Smith. Chicago: Moody, 1968. Pp. 317. $4.95. From a conservative, almost fundamentalist standpoint S. considers the meanings of the words for heaven and attempts something of a synthesis of themes found in the Bible. He is knowledgeable concerning all types of recent studies in Scripture and theology, but rejects without argument those which are often termed modern.
This is both the strength and the weakness of the work: its strength, because it takes biblical revelation seriously; its weakness, because it does not face some of the true problems which result from the conclusions of scholars of the Form-Critical school. One must admit some measure of demythologizing as correct at times, just as one must admit lack of univocity in the use of a given term; the latter truth is admitted by S. It was a joy to read this work, because it took me back into a theological style so different from that which is deemed up-to-date, but this book will only interest those who are as conservatively oriented as the author. This is unfortunate, for the book does serve as a reminder that theology should be concerned above all with God's revealed word found in the Scriptures and should accept as its principal norm not what is acceptable to today's men and women but what is contained in that revelation.

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M A R Y : T H E V I R G I N A L W I F E A N D T H E M A R R I E D V I R G I N ; T H E P R O B L E M A T I C O F M A R Y ' S V O W O F V I R G I N I T Y . B y J o h n F . C r a g h a n , C . S S . R . Rome: Gregorian Univ., 1967. Pp. xxiv + 274. The mystery of Mary consists in the normal and ordinary—yet leads to the extraordinary. C., in his doctoral dissertation for the University of Munich, maintains that Mary's implicit intention was to enter a normal marriage and raise a family. Hebrew mentality opposed virginity insofar as it was related to barrenness. Identifying herself with the ongoing will of God, her desire was to contribute to the advent of the Messiah, if God so chose. However, at the Annunciation (and not before) Mary took a vow of virginity. C. marshals evidence, both positive and negative, to sustain the legitimacy of his position. Exegetically, there is nothing positive for or against a pre-Annunciation vow position. Further, Form Criticism has put the Annunciation scene in an entirely different light: the words are not Mary's, but Luke's. Tradition for such a vow is neither scriptural nor dogmatic, but interpretational. Historically, nothing positive can be adduced from the Fathers and the Apocrypha, before Augustine, for a pre-Annunciation vow. C. finally analyzes Mary's pre-Annunciation attitude in terms of virginitas mensis ("the firm resolution of preserving integrity, as regards the disposition of the spirit"), this is the essence of virginity. Such a virginity of spirit is not opposed to entering a normal marriage. Thus, one must avoid stressing the purely physical in Mary's virginity. Her integrity is rooted in faith, not chastity. Mary's virginity, as discussed among the Dutch theologians, is
mentioned (p. 7) but immediately rejected. However, do we not need an
in-depth study of the *virginitas mentis* as it relates to man's androgy—
which can be fulfilled in either marriage or celibacy?

*St. Joseph's Seminary, Wash., D.C.*  
*Francis Schroeder, S.S.J.*

**THE MASS: ANCIENT LITURGIES AND PATRISTIC TEXTS.** By André Hamman, O.F.M., ed. Translated by Thomas Halton. Alba Patristic Library 1. Staten Island: Alba House, 1967. Pp. 256. $4.95. **BAPTISM: ANCIENT LITURGIES AND PATRISTIC TEXTS.** By André Hamman, O.F.M., ed. Translated by Thomas Halton. Alba Patristic Library 2. Staten Island: Alba House, 1967. Pp. 240. $4.95. H. is well known for his major contribution to the revision of Migne's *PL*. His knowledge of patristic texts and the history of the early Church makes him particularly qualified to undertake a selection of sources to aid the general public to come to an accurate appreciation of the understanding of the Eucharist and baptism in the early Church. The policy of reproducing each document in its integrity renders service to the serious theological student, who will be able to read in context extracts which he frequently encounters in theological manuals. The first volume contains texts of the Mass used in the third and fourth centuries, commentaries of the Fathers on biblical references related to the Eucharist, and occasional writings, especially sermons, in which the preachers of the fourth century expounded the mystery of the Eucharist. A number of sources are produced for the first time in English by T. Halton, the English editorial supervisor. A good introductory survey of the liturgical development of the Mass and the teaching of the Fathers on the mystery of the Eucharist is provided by the editor. The second volume contains a series of patristic documents dealing with baptism. Beginning with Tertullian's *Treatise on Baptism* and ending with Leo the Great's *Letter 16* to the bishops of Sicily, a substantial presentation of the baptismal catechesis of the Fathers is presented. Several English translations of sources are furnished by Halton where none were available. In a brief introduction H. gathers together the fundamental themes of this catechesis. In both volumes the notes on authors and texts and the linking commentaries help to situate the sources within the history of the early Church. For the English-speaking public these volumes will serve as an excellent addition to the somewhat similar work of P. Palmer, *Sources of Christian Theology 1: Sacraments and Worship* (Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1955).

*Weston College*  
*Edward J. KilMartin, S.J.*
PREX EUCHARISTICA: TEXTUS ET VARIS LITURGIIS ANTIQUIORIBUS SELECTI. Collection directed by Anton Hänggi and Irmgard Pahl. *Spicilegium Friburgense* 12. Fribourg: Editions Universitaires, 1968. Pp. xxiv + 517. Fr./DM 55.— A source book for the theologian and historian, consisting of a wide selection of anaphoras or canons from the Eastern and Western Churches, preceded by a number of Jewish liturgical texts (edited by Louis Ligier) and of early Christian texts down to Hippolytus and the *Constitutiones apostolorum* 8 (edited by Joseph A. Jungmann). The lion’s share of the book, as far as number and variety of texts are concerned, is taken by the Eastern-rite anaphoras (edited by Alphonse Raes). Twelve different types (under the three major headings of Alexandrine, Antiochene, and Syro-Oriental) are represented, two of them by as many as ten different anaphoras, most by at least three or four. The Western liturgies, on the whole, are notably less varied, though the limitation on the number of canons in the Roman (one) and Ambrosian rites (three; all edited by Leo Eizenhöfer and Irmgard Pahl) is partially offset by the variety of prefaces given (thirty-eight for the Roman rite, nineteen for the Ambrosian). The Gallican and Celtic liturgies (same editors) are represented by thirteen canons (i.e., the variable parts), to which are added a further selection of Contestationes or Immolationes and of Post-Sanctus and Post-Secreta (or Post-Mysterium) prayers; but the Eucharistic prayers in these liturgies have only the Sanctus and the account of Institution in common, so that “canon” can be used only loosely. For the Spanish liturgy (edited by J. Pinell), finally, ten Masses are given. The texts are all in Latin, accompanied by a Greek text where such exists in the Eastern rites. Introductions are extremely brief, but bibliography is given for each section and, for the Eastern liturgies, for each anaphora. It will be obvious how valuable this collection is for anyone who wants to survey the development of the Eucharistic prayer, to compare its forms, and to profit by the resources which the Eucharistic piety of the past provides for us.

*Fordham University*  
*M. J. O'Connell, S.J.*

**ENGLISH CISTERCIAN MONASTERIES AND THEIR PATRONS IN THE TWELFTH CENTURY.** By Bennett D. Hill. Urbana: University of Illinois, 1968. Pp. 188. $6.50. All religious, but especially monks and Cistercians, will be grateful to H. for publishing this very interesting and informative study of the rather complex story of the relations of the English Cistercians with the landed lords who made it possible for this monastic renewal to establish itself in all parts of twelfth-century England. This lucid study in the decline
of an ideal is a forceful warning to religious engaged in renewal. Beginning
with the epigrammatic "in religion, nothing fails like worldly success," H. traces out those successes which undermined the lasting success of an
ideal which he deeply appreciates. For all religious, "the example of the
Cistercians is instructive." Their ascetical, hard-working lives quickly
brought them prestige, honor, wealth. But "the only way for an individual
or religious institute to be poor in spirit is for him or it to be poor in fact."
Added to the burden of quickly acquired wealth was the burden of numbers
in individuals and in communities. The hundreds of novices who en­
tered in the twelfth century could not all have had genuine vocations, and
the toleration of the lukewarm could only have a detrimental effect on the
spiritual climate of the houses. In addition, the absorption of the Congrega­
tion of Savigney into the Cistercian Order in 1148 caused a loss of pristine
fervor and ideals. In these days when Perfectae caritatis urges the union of
similar religious institutes, and monks speak of moving towards one mo­
nastic order, the salutary warning of this historical experience should be
carefully weighed. One of the effects of the incorporation of the Congrega­
tion of Savigney was a decline in the regularity of attendance at the general
chapter, the bulwark of Cistercian renewal. An effective system of checks
and balances seems essential to keep a religious ideal truly viable. Even
more, there must be fidelity to the true mission of the particular religious
institute. The judicial responsibilities imposed upon the Cistercian abbots
by the Holy See took them away from their monasteries for a considerable
amount of time, to the detriment of good discipline and high ideals. How­
ever, H. underlines as the most essential cause of the decline the enshrining
of the Cistercian ideal in a constitutional law which was unrealistic and
poorly adapted to the social conditions of the time. While the Cistercians
are especially challenged by this historical study, all monks will find of in­
terest this disinterested scholar's thoughts on the true meaning and role of
monasticism. H. notes the struggle within monasticism today and concludes:
"In a century when many men, especially educated men, are ill disposed
to take any religious beliefs seriously, the manner in which this struggle is
settled will be extremely portentous for the future of the Church." And
every religious institute can bear in mind these final words: "No institu­
tion, certainly no Christian institution, can survive in a world in which
it does not bear witness according to terms which that society can under­
stand."

St. Joseph's Abbey, Spencer, Mass. M. Basil Pennington, O.C.S.O.
Zwanzig Jahre Melanchthonstudium: Sechs Literaturberichte (1945-1965). By Peter Fraenkel and Martin Greschat. Travaux d'Humanisme et Renaissance 93. Geneva: Droz, 1967. Pp. xii + 214. For all interested in Reformation research in general and in Melanchthon in particular, this monograph provides a useful instrument. It is, as expected, quite thorough. The first report covers the period from 1945-59 and is divided according to various areas: bibliographical, texts and translations, biographical, Melanchthon and the educational world, M. as humanist, as philosopher and ethician, the loci and the development of M.'s thought, M. and Luther, his theological sources, his involvement in the controversies of his time. The second report is a supplement to the first and has the same divisions. The third report is devoted to the works that appeared in 1960 on the 400th anniversary of Melanchthon's death and has somewhat different divisions: e.g., individual theological questions in M.'s theology. There follows a further supplement on the literature from 1945-59. The fifth report is an additional survey of the literature from the jubilee that appeared in 1960-62. In this section even more detailed subdivisions are used. The final report covers 1963-65 works; it too is followed by an additional supplement which extends back to include works that appeared in the 1940's and 1950's. To make these reports even easier to use, at the end a register is furnished giving all the authors cited, and a chronological list of Melanchthon's works. A useful addition to any library's reference room.

Cornell University

Thomas E. Morrissey, S.J.

Newman on Justification: A Theological Biography. By Thomas Sheridan S.J. New York: Alba, 1967. Pp. 264. $6.50. The subtitle of this work is more informative than the title. A thorough study of Newman's Lectures on Justification would require another book the size of this one, writes S. in his final chapter. What he has done, and done well, is to trace the beginnings of Newman's theological thought on the central problem of baptismal regeneration from his youthful Calvinistic position down to the year 1838, when the Lectures were delivered. He has dredged successfully in the Newman papers at Birmingham Oratory and has produced some valuable new material which helps one to trace the slow development of Newman's mind. The interest of this work is more than merely historical; for the position held by the youthful Newman was practically the Methodist position, while the end of his evolution saw him in full occupation of the Catholic ground which was to become so vital for Manning a few years later in the days of the Gorham judgment and which is no less vital today in the negotiations for reunion between Anglicans and Methodists. One of
the unpublished sources used by S. is the tract on baptismal regeneration which Newman wrote (1834) for the famous series of tracts but which never saw the light. Why it did not, S. does not tell us, though he notes that Newman annotated his script with the comment that this material was afterwards turned into sermons. In this tract Newman is appealing to those who, like the mentors of his youth, held that baptism was merely the sign of a justification which had already taken place; their great objections to baptismal regeneration were that the baptized did not show in their lives that anything had been done to them at baptism and that it was inconceivable that infants should undergo a moral change. These difficulties, says Newman, are the product of rationalism and would sound well in the mouth of a deist. They would not be understood by the Fathers. In his tract Newman was trying to offer an olive branch to the Evangelicals in the hope that they would join the Oxford Movement and help to check Liberalism. Now that Methodists in England are preparing to resist attempts at reunion with the Anglicans, this work has the greater relevance.

London, England

J. H. Crehan, S.J.

THE STRUCTURE OF CHRISTIAN EXISTENCE. By John B. Cobb, Jr. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1967. Pp. 160. $4.50. In this brief work (twelve chapters and an appendix) C. has very successfully launched an interesting "inquiry into what is distinctive in Christianity and its claim to finality." In a clear, almost painstaking, and at times repetitious development, he deals with that area where history and theology overlap. Strongly influenced by the categories of Whitehead's philosophy, he begins with a detailed examination of human existence, the conscious and unconscious processes, and the crossing of the threshold from primitive to axial existence. Within the axial structure, with its new role of rationality in man's existence, C. traces the threshold crossings from Buddhist to Homeric to Socratic to Prophetic to Christian structures of existence. Comparing their high points, without in any way forcing the comparison or his conclusions, he succeeds in maintaining the delicate balance of continuity and discontinuity while indicating the historico-theological development of their points of intensification. He concludes with a penetrating study of the structure of Christian existence, which he defines as "spiritual existence that expresses itself in love." He claims that the distinctive element in Christianity is self-transcending existence in love. And he claims that the finality of the structure of Christian existence is based upon Jesus Christ, His resurrection, and the Easter experiences of the community. He offers an interesting, thought-provoking analysis of the historical development of
the notion of person in the cultures and thought he examines. His stimulating book gives an added perspective which must be considered by all who are interested in the present-day questions of atheism, unbelief, secularism, and comparative religion; for he sees Western man’s “personalistic individualism” arising out of “centuries of interaction with the Biblical God.” And today his tension is seen as that of a person, formed in the context of meaning, trying “to understand himself in categories that preclude the possibility of meaning.” In opening up this new perspective, C.’s well-written book should generate much more light than heat.

Loyola University, New Orleans

J. Emile Pfister, S.J.

THE CHRISTIAN EXISTENTIALIST. By Bernard Häring, C.SS.R. New York: New York Univ. Press, 1968. Pp. 102 $4.50 An expansion of the Charles Deems Lectures delivered at New York University in 1966. The first chapter attempts to define a personalistic existentialism that does justice both to the demands of the individual and the community; a “personalism of encounter and community in word and love” (p. 11). Chap. 2 tries to integrate religion and morality by insisting that true religion is both faith and the community of faith rooted in the word and love of Christ. True religion then has as its basic moral imperative the love of one’s neighbor and the cultivation, in love, of a sense of responsibility. Chap. 3 examines the relationship between conscience and freedom. H. treats the subject in terms of openness to persons and to Absolute Person. The last chapter, developing the biblical theme of *kairos*, outlines H.’s ideas on Christian existentialism. H. puts great stress on personalism, but rejects a “false situation ethics” which he feels is merely the opposite extreme of ethical legalism. All the basic themes that have characterized H.’s writing in the past are present in this work: Christocentric morality; a holistic view of man; human relationships worked out in terms of dialogical relation. Because H. treats a great number of seminal ideas in the course of these chapters, the over-all impression is that of sketchiness. The book does provide a quick overview of some basic concepts that have characterized H.’s thinking, but the thinness of the volume and the prohibitive cost might cause second thoughts about its purchase.

Florida State University

Lawrence Cunningham

THE SENSE OF ABSENCE. By Geddes MacGregor. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1968. Pp. 158. A useful chapter in the definitive treatment (as yet unwritten) of the issues raised by the “God is dead” movement. M. is unimpressed by the claims to revolutionary novelty issued by the theo-
logians of the secular. If they understood the Christian tradition more discerningly, they would see that the “absence of God” is no sudden discovery of either the nineteenth or twentieth century, but actually pervades the Church’s doctrine, sacramental symbolism, and ascetic practice. M. analyzes all three in the light of “absence”; the result is illuminating. His central thesis is that the sense of God’s absence contains a positive and creative dimension that discloses a paradoxical presence. But if this presence is to escape the constant danger of trivialization at the hands of the churchy Philistine, the sense of God’s absence should be an idea central to Christian thought and not, as heretofore, peripheral to it. The centrality of this idea, and more, the personal experience underlying it, would make clear the affinity between the unbeliever’s sceptical anguish and the believer’s docta ignorantia. M. traces the experiential route by which the believer discovers God’s presence in his own doubt, restlessness, and forsakenness—that is, in his own finitude adequately understood. M.’s familiarity with the lex orandi of the Church—especially the peculiar “silence” characteristic of it—proves exceptionally instructive here. As far as it goes, this phenomenological analysis offers a sound corrective to many of the extravagant misapprehensions of the death-of-God theologians, but M. simply avoids other substantive questions that lie at the root of their objections to traditional theism. Ultimately, he refuses to deal with the problems posed by human autonomy and evil, since he does not consider the problem of an appropriate conceptuality for speaking affirmatively about God, and thus seemingly misses the point that much of theism’s unacceptability originates in its traditional conceptual systematization. M. suggests that the believer, unlike the atheist, feels his destitution so painfully that “he does not boggle at even the heaviest of venerable theological cobwebs.” But that is precisely our dilemma: we do boggle.

Southern Methodist University

David S. Toolan, S.J.

MAN OF GOD FOR OTHERS. By Jacques Leclercq. Translated by Charles Davenport. Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1968. Pp. 169. $5.50. Although this book is by no means a theological treatment of priesthood, I find it difficult to dismiss it out of hand for readers of TS. Canon Leclercq, seventy-three years old, fifty years a priest, pens an exhortation to the diocesan priesthood of the world, an exhortation, it is true, that appears to the theologian to ignore many of the latest theological attempts at understanding priesthood, to espouse an almost Cartesian disjunction between “temporal” and “spiritual” (“The true priest does not love the temporal order and finds it repugnant.”), to slight religious life and the religious
priesthood, and, in general, to speak too confidently and boldly for the theologian's cautious rhetoric. And yet, L. strikes me as a kind of Eric Hoffer of the pastoral priesthood. His choppy, direct style, pithy insights into the relationship of priesthood and worship, common-sense approach to many of the muddled areas of contemporary priestly life, all afford a rather intimate insight into the attractive personality of this elderly man of God for others. "I know what I am talking about, for I have been a priest for fifty years and from the bottom of my heart I have to say that I have never seen a good priest unhappy." The pages of this book are filled with the sincerely presented, practical wisdom of an alert old age. In sum: a theologian will find little in this book of professional interest; "young turks" will find the book both annoying and quaint; a clergyman troubled by "all the changes in the Church" will find the elderly Canon's ready acceptance of much that is new both challenging and, we hope, reassuring.

Fordham University

William Dodd, S.J.

Change Not Changes: New Directions in Religious Life and Priesthood. By C. J. McNaspy, S.J. New York: Paulist, 1968. Pp. 164. $1.95 (paper). Dialogue is both purgative and restorative: while seeking to restore the clarity which ought to surround the central purpose of an institution in a given time, it exposes the extremes of territorial imperatives, fixed assumptions, and unditched inertia. But dialogue remains concerned about the "center" towards which the extremes must eventually bend if they are to remain on the vine. Erich Fromm, in Psychoanalysis and Religion, says that religions always experience a seesaw movement between authoritarian and humanistic tendencies. Certainly today's tension can be located in the middle of that seesaw plank. So we would like to think. Rather it would seem that we have tired of the seesaw altogether. Today's changes are not just token changes; they herald a new style of man and a new constellation of values with new emphases, insights, and perspectives. The new man is prohuman; he is a listener bent on renewal; his mode of knowledge is dialogic, which becomes a way of experiencing history. For the new man, his community is both situation and process in which he grows in self-realization, grows into the type of person he wishes to become, and becomes aware of his divine destiny. Community now means a person-oriented community of service. The vows take on immediate apostolic importance: poverty—dispossession in order to be possessed by real needs; chastity—an attitude of the spirit open to participation and conquest for the sake of the other's good; obedience—the constant reciprocal sharing of experience and ideals to make sure that what we do will remain "of the moment" and
worth while. This is an age of instant feedback and correction of the course of activity. For institutional structures to ignore this revolution in means and sensibilities is dangerous and leads to obsolescence. McNaspy offers a brilliant summary of the findings of the Santa Clara Conference held by the American Assistancy of Jesuits to draw up concrete ways of meeting the challenge of Vatican II. With startling ease he has been able to pick out the central issue in each case in the discussions of commitment, personal development and community, freedom and authority, the vows, liturgy and prayer. We shall be indebted to him for a long time to come for the deep sensitivity he shows in discerning the real issues from the merely probable, and in the highly civilized manner of expression he has given them. From what he has done we can now begin to build a theology of leadership in the Church which takes the Incarnation seriously, and which takes the "eucharistic" nature of the religious life and the priesthood seriously, as the "center" which celebrates the presence of the sacred within the confines of the secular. By bringing us to the "center," McNaspy reminds us that we are really in a circle with an edge that grows constantly outwards; if liberals and conservatives are to serve the Church, they must not leave the center stock but rather stop, brood, and fold gently back to the "eucharistic" center of our commitment.

LeMoyne College, Syracuse, N.Y. Edward G. Zogby, S.J.

INTERVIEW SUR LA MORT AVEC KARL RAHNER. By Florent Gaboriau, O.P. Paris: Lethielleux, 1967. Pp. 128. 9.60 fr. G. is disturbed that no recent philosophical work has treated death at any length, for one's view of life is conditioned by his attitude toward death. Moreover, he finds it disconcerting that some Catholic theologians present death in such a way as to make it impossible for nonbelievers to accept their theories. He therefore chooses to investigate the best-known recent work on death, Karl Rahner's Zur Theologie des Todes, in order to discuss the philosophical presuppositions involved. G. faults Rahner fundamentally for setting up an anthropology based on transcendental deduction and proceeding from an idea of what man is to what death ought to be, rather than observing the fact of death as a phenomenon and then understanding man in light of this. G. does not consider death as the completion of life, as an act of man, his own death; death is rather merely the end of life, a biological phenomenon. G. does not question the irreversibility or the definiteness of death, but he does question Rahner's premise that death and the subsequent judgment are the result of a personal act of the human spirit. Nor do death and resurrection form the unity that Rahner imagines; death is rather the
destruction of man, while resurrection is wholly different, the action of God on man. G. thinks that the dialogue should begin with the philosophical bases of Rahner's system, but he refrains from undertaking this in the narrow confines of the present work. G.'s concern to explain death in a way that all men, Christian or not, can understand seems to lead him to doubt without sufficient reason recent theories proposed about death, while he fails to advance a totally satisfactory or coherent explanation of his own.

Xavier University, Cincinnati

Ralph J. Bastian, S.J.

Fundamental Concepts of Moral Theology. By Franz Böckle. Translated from the German by William Jerman. New York: Paulist Press, 1968. Pp. vi + 111. $4.95; $2.95 paper. B. distinguishes clearly between ethics and moral theology. The orientation of his treatment is explicitly towards Christ and God. "What ethics envisages is human effort toward self-perfection; moral life in grace is much more a yielding to the power and glory of God, 'to the praise of his glorious grace which he freely bestowed on us in the Beloved' (Eph. 1, 6)" (p. 4). The treatment might have been more theological in the middle section on moral principles; there it is almost purely ethical. The Introduction and first and last chapters are more theological, relying a great deal on Scripture and tradition. The treatment is elementary and does not pretend to probe the depths of any of the problems in the way Ford and Kelly did in the first volume of their Contemporary Moral Theology a few years ago. Much of B.'s treatment would meet with universal agreement from traditionally oriented moralists, including his stressing that tradition and Scripture must be factors in forming a conscience (p. 68), that a judgment of exception to a moral law by epikeia should be certain (p. 65), and that a private revelation for moral guidance "is highly unlikely, but in theory it cannot be excluded" (p. 82). Other statements might arouse objections from some, including this reviewer. Some confusion from older terminology is not clarified: the distinction between volitum and voluntarium (p. 31), between imperfect voluntary and voluntarium secundum quid (p. 31), between invincible ignorance and inadvertence (p. 35). All civil laws are held to bind directly in conscience (p. 65). A "white lie" is labeled materially sinful without advertence to the fact that most of what are popularly called "white lies" may not be lies at all, even materially. However, all in all, the paperback edition of this little volume could provide a handy textbook for a beginner's course in fundamental moral theology along traditional lines.

Alma College

Joseph J. Farraher, S.J.
Absolutes in Moral Theology? Edited by Charles E. Curran. Washington: Corpus Books, 1968. Pp. 320. $6.95. The eight contributors tend to reply No to the title, by approaching the question from different angles. The relativity of the empiric enters when the behavioral sciences are seen, with Vatican II, as a source of ethical values by R. H. Springer. The equivocal, mutable, and culturally conditioned notion of teacher promotes a prophetic and dialogical notion of the magisterium (D. C. Maguire). Problems in medical ethics lead the editor to reconsider "natural law": not to be identified with "physical," nor to be considered unchangeable when grasped through a historical methodology; an inductive, empirical approach forgoes the false quest for certainty, undermines any fundamentalism in the magisterium, abolishes any absoluteness in law, while leaving a future (an ecumenical one) for "natural law" as a morality based on man and human community in the world. By analyzing texts of Aquinas, J. G. Milhaven finds that Thomas' crucial question to decide the legitimacy of a given means was the authority of the person acting, a point often ignored in today's controversy, which would profit by asking how to harmonize freedom of persons with God's overlordship. C. J. Van der Poel, on the principle of double effect, emphasizes the unity of the person and the totality of a human action, spread in time and space with good and bad aspects which have no separate morality of their own. Consummation and indissolubility (D. Doherty), the principle of totality (M. Nolan), and care for the dying (K. Nolan) are the other areas where absolutes are challenged. Perhaps a majority of professional moralists may be tired of this subject, but how many laity and religious, priests and bishops, have reflected enough to be able to abandon moral absolutes while retaining their moral balance? Recommended to all.

Milltown Park, Dublin

James Healy, S.J.

two, with some additional emphasis on the social aspect of our morality, with special reference to the Constitution on the Church in the Modern World. The reading of the two former articles confirms the favorable impression they made when they first appeared; the Periodica article in particular is of great value to anyone interested in the reshaping of the moral theology course after the Council. Taking the three great directives of the Council, that moral theology should show forth the vocation of the faithful in Christ, their obligation to bring forth fruit in charity for the life of the world, and that it should be scripturally based, F. sketches in outline some of the features that will be required of the new moral theology. He is excellent on the Christocentric approach, the interiorization of law and obligation in the Christian through the Spirit, grace and love, and on the sense in which the Christian practice of morality is a following of Christ. Some of his words on scriptural moral theology, especially as they apply to questions of general moral, are most instructive; but in questions of special moral theology his warnings against misuse of Scripture (p. 38), while doubtless valid, leave the main problems in this area practically untouched. F. is still a moralist of the natural-law school, but by relating the demands of nature to the archetype of our nature in Christ, he shows how this natural law is not merely an external norm, but becomes through love and openness to the Spirit a personalized following of Christ as exemplar. If this is too staid an approach for some, it will be to others a reassurance that a significant degree of continuity with traditional moral teaching is still possible. These articles are an excellent sketch, but what teachers of moral theology need now from a master such as the author is a detailed plan and specifications of the new structure to be built.

Sydney, Australia

William Daniel, S.J.

MORALITY FOR OUR TIME. By Marc Oraison. Translated from the French by Nels Challe. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968. Pp. 140. The book’s extreme polemic tone has already provoked harsh reviews. For Servias Pinckaers, O.P. (Nouvelle revue théologique 88 [1966] 503–6), its flaws outweigh its merits; for Giuseppe deRosa, S.J. (Civiltà cattolica 116 [1965] 555–72), it constitutes a regression, departing from the revealed sources of morality and denying the best Catholic traditions for the sake of psychologism. This is unfortunate, because O. does speak to a crucial problem which is not apparently appreciated by the aforementioned reviewers. If one distinguishes two levels on which moral renewal must occur, the theological or speculative (largely conscious) and the personal or practical (largely unconscious), he may find it worth tolerating O.’s flaws on the
first level for the sake of discovering on the second level major problems that are not even at times recognized. O.'s is a study in the psychological dimensions of moral renewal, doing for moral theologians what Moore (God Is a New Language) has, more humanely and more effectively, done for Catholics in general, i.e., uncovering the neurotic and dehumanizing tendencies that have developed in Catholic teaching. In describing "the contaminating effects of traditional morality" (p. 51), O. levels two basic charges. First morality has appealed to and operated excessively on the level of the super-ego. Here morality must be impersonal, speaks to man in the language of permission and prohibition, and controls man by fear. As long as man is in this bind, the only alternatives are either moralism or antimoralism. The former is not only infantile but results in idolatry (psychologically reducing God's role to that of an instrument of law) and pharisaism (requiring God only when the law has been violated); the latter is no better than adolescent and results in rebellion and rejection of law. O.'s second accusation is that traditional morality establishes a reversal between the world of the mind and the world of reality, where virtues, vices, and laws become ends in themselves, where actual situations and contacts with others are phantasized, and where man defends himself from the real demands of God. O. concludes that the findings of anthropology and the traditional formulas of morality are simply incompatible. If morality is to be operative on the level of the ego, a true revolution is needed, a drastic reorientation is demanded. Man must learn to proceed less by the application of reason's principles and more by his total response to the drama of life. The mystery, not the mastery, of the world becomes the moral problem for man. Man's self-arranged world must be constantly submitted to the ever-new world of other persons, in the first place with God. O. has no illusions that this revolution will effect a therapeutic miracle. Sin is not denied but, in some very interesting pages, recast in the personalistic framework. If O. had managed to confine himself within the limits of psychology instead of also attempting to explain the historical genesis of morality's ills and to prescribe proper theological treatment, he would have been more effective and certainly more sound. In spite of this, the book does make its basic point well.

St. Bernard's Seminary, Rochester, N.Y. Patrick Logan

SIN AND REPENTANCE.Edited by Denis O'Callaghan. New York: Alba, 1967. Pp. xi + 199. This book, or nonbook, is a collection of thirteen papers delivered at Maynooth Summer School, 1966, about philosophical, biblical, historical, and pastoral aspects of sin and repentance. Like the whole book, the most important of the papers lacks unity and direction, needs
rewriting: Jerome Murphy-O’Connor’s “Sin and Community in the New Testament,” much of which appears more clearly and succinctly in Theology Digest, Summer, 1968. His thesis is that the Christian community’s growing realization of its participation in Christ’s power to forgive sins was present from the beginning. The unifying themes traceable in the various papers appear most clearly in those of James P. Mackey and Enda McDonagh: personal relation to God “is not something which can subsist as long as no serious sin is committed; it is something that can only... grow from daily attention to it, that will die more surely from long neglect than it will from spasmodic immoralities” (p. 63). Sin is primarily an offense against a relationship with both God and community. This personalist and communal conception of sin and grave sin presupposes that ethical responsibility and decision-making is not merely a juridical responsibility to God but a creative responsibility before God. Mackey argues that such a personalist centering of morality on personal relationship instead of on reward and punishment makes the meaning of Christian morality and of sin more credible to modern philosophers, since a morality of reward and punishment seems to cater to egotism. Since traditionally the community’s prayer shares in the effecting of reconciliation, the present rite should show this (Michael Hurley), as should our theology of indulgences (O’Callaghan). The book also includes a symposium on catechetics and confession and an excellent paper by Sean O’Riordan which sketches the limits and mergings of confession and psychotherapy.

Temple University

Roderick Hindery

EQUILIBRIUM: FIDELITY TO NATURE AND GRACE. By M. J. André. Translated by David Martin. St Louis: Herder, 1968. Pp. xiv + 157. $4.95. There are bits of wisdom in this attempt to treat the problem of equilibrium or balance in the life of the Christian. Referring to the need of discovering an equilibrium between conformity and non-conformity, André sees much balance in those who assimilate the judgment and conduct of other people whenever they regard such as true, while feeling free to disagree with the judgments of others whenever they seem unconvincing. Such people run a greater risk of imbalance, but they counterbalance the excessive conformism in others. It is a mistake to think that everything that departs from the average is unbalanced; after all, the normal and the mean are distinct concepts. The Church should be a judge of human values “precisely because sin degrades the human” (p. 78). More than the service of men, sanctity is the love of God, which must be nourished by an interior life of personal prayer. In privacy with God each person expresses his
unique relationship with God. Some saints who were very much disinherited on the human level with mental illness made greater progress in charity than others who were psychically better balanced. Unfortunately, A.'s discussion of masculinity and femininity is dated, serving little to help contemporary men and women to understand not only the intermingling of masculine and feminine traits in their personalities, but also the flexibility of men and women to adapt to new roles for the sexes. One questions such statements as "Amazon women are against nature; they have become too masculine" (p. 105), or "the masculinity in the woman loves the masculinity in the man" (p. 107). Equally unconvincing is the attempt to show how a priest should be both paternal and maternal. A. uses the Jungian term animus to describe masculine traits, and anima to describe feminine: "It is with the anima in him [the priest] that he will love the Blessed Virgin, just as it is with her animus that the nun will love our Lord. . . . And does not every priest love the Blessed Virgin with the part of his heart that would have loved his wife?" (p. 111). I find this artificial and recommend Abel Janniere's The Anthropology of Sex for a more current point of view. Discounting the differential psychology of the author, the rest of the volume is useful for novices in spiritual growth.

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Hayattsille, Md.

DEITY AND MORALITY: WITH REGARD TO THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY. By Burton F. Porter. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1968. Pp. 176. 35s. P. starts with the naturalistic fallacy in its older form proposed by Hume, as the attempt to derive the ought from the is, and hardly touches on G. E. Moore's later formulation, as the attempt to reduce the good to a natural property like yellow. P. applies his critique of Hume to the problem of an ethics founded on the will of God, the theory that X is good because God wills it, presumably because that would be a reduction of goodness to something outside itself, to the prescription of a commanding will, which could be known to us only by revelation. This Ockhamist attitude P. seems to think characteristic of the whole medieval period instead of the period of its decadence. He makes no reference to St. Thomas as holding the opposite view: that God wills X because it is good, and can do so because God is Goodness itself. P. is at much trouble to show that the argument "God wills X; therefore X is good" implies a missing premise, "Whatever God wills is good," but that such a premise, being analytic, need not be stated. There follows a wearying discussion on whether God is a proper name, whether proper names have connotation, and whether goodness is
connoted in the name God. A large part of the little book is devoted to mysticism and to religious poetic discourse to determine whether direct contact with God is possible in order to discover what is His will. One senses a powerlessness of linguistic analysis to deal with such questions, and the inversion implied in trying to derive what things are from the way we talk about them instead of adjusting our talk so that it does express what things are from the way they are. The book has good things to say, but on the whole this reader found it disappointing.

University of Santa Clara

Austin Fagothey, S.J.

ECUMENISM OR NEW REFORMATION? By Thomas Molnar. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968. Pp. 169. $5.95. M.'s opening paragraph in chap. 7 fairly well summarizes his main thesis: (1) the modern Catholic Church is suffering from a crisis similar in intensity to that of the Arian heresy; (2) the contemporary dialogue is hardly directed to true ecumenism but rather is a "camouflaged ideology working also within the church and directed at her secularization" (p. 137). M. argues for a church that holds itself faithful to a transcendent ideal while making no compromise with the spirit of this secular age. He argues his case with great moral passion, aligning himself with the ideology recently enunciated in Jacques Maritain's Le paysan de la Garonne. It is easy to take umbrage at M. He is, by turns, fatuous (arguing that if priests were to marry, they would have to engage in premarital sex, because this is the rule of Western society); silly (telling horror stories about avant-garde priests throwing rosaries into wastepaper baskets); picayune (faulting Houtart and Pin for describing the Church as a sociological phenomenon when they are, in fact, sociologists); and downright uncharitable in suggesting that Rahner, Oraison, Dubay, and Curran do not apostasize from the Church because they need a platform for their ideas. Add to this a certain rhetorical overkill and most readers will despair of the book and be deaf to other things M. may have to say. That would be unfortunate indeed. The Church needs voices to protest the faddists in theology, the neoilluminati of Church reform, and the sheer bad taste that passes for some liturgical aggiornamento. However, the rigid categories that characterize some of M.'s thinking indicates that he is too much the laudator temporis acti, and this tends to weaken any good point he manages to make. In successive chapters on the secular city, Protestant dialogue, Marxism, ideologies in the Church, and future prospects for Catholicism, M. takes his stance against the "liberalizers," sometimes with trenchancy, more often with a profound distaste for the modern that barely misses being simple intolerance.

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Lawrence Cunningham
THE CONSCIENCE OF THE STATE IN NORTH AMERICA. By E. R. Norman. Cambridge: University Press, 1968. Pp. 200. $6.50. "The State cannot be said now to have a conscience," Gladstone wrote to Newman in 1845; "but the State still continues to act in many ways as if it had a conscience" (p. 75). Applied to North America, however, conscience as ascribed to the state is not fictional, even as the state stands in Canada and the U.S. at the present time. "Non-sectarian religious opinion is accorded a sort of established status," according to Norman. By implication it serves as the conscience of the state at a second stage beyond "public confession-alism" (pp. 184–85). Canada is clearly at this second stage; but the U.S. is less so, since it "has made some slight advances into a fuller practice of stage three neutrality..." (p. 185). When one considers the very broad time-span, the looseness in use of terms like "confessionalism," the exclusively secondary material as sources of documentation, and too broad a theme passing beyond striking research significance, this study is best described as a useful survey with many provocative interpretations. The uniqueness of the American constitutional arrangement is challenged, but N. has not understood John Courtney Murray's profound reflections on this historical phenomenon. (The bibliography makes no references to Murray's writings.) A strong case for the cultural cohesiveness of the English Atlantic community emerges from the broad picture presented here. The Methodist experience with educational institutions in Canada undoubtedly influenced the Church's attitudes toward government programs in the U.S. One is curious to learn if John England was affected by the intense conflict over lay control of the Church in Galway before 1830. The similarity of concern with specific Church-state problems in the different countries has been described with careful reference to chronological setting. While many similarities are coincidental, far more are evidence of an English-speaking conscience in North America.

Loyola University, Chicago

Thomas O'Brien Hanley, S.J.

LE SAINTE-SIÈGE ET MOSCOU. By Gaston Zananiri, O.P. Paris: Editions Spes, 1967, Pp. 172. 13.50 fr. A brief narration of the long estrangement between the Catholic Church and the Russian Orthodox Church as well as the Russian state, which gradually evolved almost from the inception of Christianity in Russia. After summarizing the early period of isolation and subjection of Russian Catholics during the period of religious domination by the Tsars, Z. cites the eighteenth-century decrees of Catherine allowing a semifreedom to Catholic minorities under the jurisdiction of the state. Paul I sought a reconciliation of the churches but died suddenly in 1801. Nicholas I, after long discussions, arranged a concordat with Rome in 1847 which lasted
until 1866, when difficulties between Pius IX and the Russian diplomat at Rome arose. A reconciliation between Alexander III and Leo XIII arranged for a Russian representative at the Vatican until 1917. The great Archbishop Andrew Shepticki of Lvov endeavored to organize the Eastern Rite Catholics in Russia who had been granted tolerance in 1905, but his work was frustrated after the Revolution. The Bolsheviks declared the separation of Church and state, which theoretically gave greater freedom to all Christians. In practice, however, the power of antireligious propaganda decreed in article 13 led to greater persecution. The popes made every effort to accomplish a rapport with the Eastern Orthodox, especially the Russian. Benedict XV established the Congregation for Eastern Churches and the Pontifical Institute for Oriental Studies. In 1922 Pius XI sent a relief commission to Russia to feed the victims of the famine. His Encyclicals on St. Josaphat in 1923 and on the Orientals in 1928 stressed the need of dialogue. Foundations (e.g., the Benedictines at Amay and the Dominicans at Lille) specialized in this field. The Bolsheviks and the Orthodox under their control remained cold to the Vatican. Even the impartiality and the appeals of Pius XII met with no success. Only after Stalin's death did a change of attitude take place. The last few chapters detail the amelioration: Russian contact with the ecumenical movement, official visits to the Pope, observers at the Vatican Council, exchange of courtesies, and accords reached with satellite nations. A new, if uncertain, era of dialogue has opened.

Boston College

James L. Monks, S.J.

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[All books received are listed here whether they are reviewed or not]

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