BOOK REVIEWS


When *Heil als Geschichte* made its appearance in 1965, it had been eagerly awaited, for in it the eminent *NT* theologian and ecumenist was expected to synthesize his theory of salvation history, already well known from *Christ and Time*, and systematically defend his views against his opponents. And there had been no lack of opponents. The English translation is welcome, for the influence of Cullmann’s work has by this date extended far beyond the German- and French-speaking areas.

The book begins with a rather varied set of “Prolegomena” which state the thesis of salvation history as the key to understanding the *NT*, give a brief history of modern research on the question, define some key terms, and the like. This section includes a brief chapter on the relationship between early Christianity’s struggle with Gnosticism and the current attempts to “dehistoricize” the Christian kerygma. Any rapid summary risks deforming its subject (as mine does C.’s views), but I feel that C. oversimplifies when he denies that Gnosticism had any interest in salvation history. There is a kind of “salvation-historical” recital in some of the Gnostic works (e.g., the *Apocalypse of Adam*), though it differs *toto coelo* from the *NT* counterpart in that it presupposes a concept of “broken” time (see H.-C. Puech’s famous *Éranos* paper “Gnosis and Time,” 1951) which is more akin to a cyclic notion than a linear one (C.’s own distinction in *Christ and Time*, which retains some validity in spite of subsequent criticism). I think here C.’s analogy with modern existentialist interpretation breaks down. It is true that Christianity is intimately and uniquely related to history, and it can be argued that Bultmannian interpretation fails to do justice to this relationship, but to imply that Gnosticism and existentialism are guilty of the same basic misunderstanding seems to me misleading.

Part 2 locates “The Genesis of the Salvation-Historical Approach” in the mutual influence of event and interpretation upon each other within the *NT* itself. Part 3 then moves on to analyze the “Phenomenological Characteristics” of salvation history, relating it to myth and to history and bringing it to focus on the tension between the “already” and the “not yet,” which C. describes as the very nerve center of his book. We may welcome his emphasis on the centrality of this eschatological tension as the key to understanding salvation history and thereby to fathoming the *NT* message itself, but I feel that the totality of *NT* theology would be better served by broadening the idea of tension to include not only the
present-future, but also the divine-human, the spiritual-material, the individual-corporate, and the like. The suggestion that the essence of the Christian message lies in the tension itself and not in either pole is a valid insight and an important one. In Part 4 the author sketches the main NT types of salvation history in the preaching of Jesus and in Luke, Paul, and John. Here C. takes a very different position from many contemporary NT theologians on the relation of Lukan theology to that of other NT writers. Finally, Part 5 attempts to relate salvation history to areas of systematic theology such as canon, Scripture and tradition, worship, ethics, etc.

Two general qualities of this work stand out: it is very personal and it is very polemical. In each of these qualities lie some of its strengths and weaknesses, and I should like to group some critical remarks around these headings.

The book is a great personal achievement by a great NT theologian whose eminence is acknowledged even in the opposition that his view of salvation history has encountered among members of the Bultmann “school.” C. displays a profound mastery of the NT materials and exercises the craft of exegesis with the skill and objectivity that are well known. Yet this is not to say that his interpretations are always beyond challenge: e.g., he may indeed be too categorical in discussing Jesus’ eschatological statements (pp. 213 ff.). Though the argument of the book is at times not easy to follow, since the structure of it contains its own tension between “already” and “not yet” in terms of anticipated conclusions, the reader can only be grateful for the clarity with which C. states his positions. The book is personal, too, in that it refers very frequently to its author’s own previous writings, but in view of the fact that it is intended to be a comprehensive summary of his own synthesis, this is understandable. I should like to question one aspect of this synthesis, however, which is basic to the whole function of the NT in theology. C. seems to me to dismiss much too readily the current hermeneutical debate—which is certainly one of the nerve centers of modern theology—by assuming a kind of hermeneutic which is not really distinct from exegesis itself. “The aim of interpreting New Testament texts is to understand the faith of the first Christians, its origin, its content, and the manner in which it is fixed in the New Testament. The latter would call us to the same faith. It is not wrong to say that the ultimate goal of exegesis is fully attained only when this faith is subsequently achieved by us” (p. 65). It is not wrong to say this, but is it enough? If I understand C. rightly, he would answer yes, because for him contemporary Christian faith should be as identical as possible with that of the NT (see also pp. 72–73). But is this not an implicit admission that
salvation history has really come to a halt with the $NT$—an admission which C. explicitly denies in the last part of this book? This is not to say that the revelation goes on, but that history goes on and unceasingly conditions our receptivity to the time-bound and culture-conditioned message of the $NT$. Whence the need of a constantly self-renewing hermeneutic.

The book is also polemical, but with rare exceptions (e.g., pp. 170, 192) not sharply or unpleasantly so. C. generously and appropriately dedicates the work to the Secretariat for Christian Unity, and it must be acknowledged that his own salvation-historical perspective has been very influential in furthering ecumenical discussion on the $NT$ between Protestants and Catholics. But in this work C.'s dialogue is not with Catholics, but rather with Bultmann and his pupils and sympathizers. And the reader will be grateful to have C.'s forthright statement of his own views in the context of what continues to be much more than a personal debate among a few scholars. The polemical context leads occasionally to what I would have to regard as overstatement (e.g., the Judaizers as abandoning salvation history, p. 261), but it nevertheless sharpens the issues.

Finally, a spot check suggests that the work is very ably translated. It is also generally well printed; the reviewer noted only a modest number of misprints (more serious ones on pp. 93, 109). The few criticisms given here should dissuade no prospective reader. This is a major work by a truly great $NT$ theologian.

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If Kierkegaard expressed only a half-truth when in relation to religion he said "subjectivity is truth," it is the kind of half-truth we are apt to forget in the age of the dialogue. It is good for us to be reminded that a living faith generates a certain receptivity toward its sources that an outsider will never have.

So, Jewish scholars, studying the literary documents of first-century Judaism, will discover therein a body of insights that escaped the perception of Christian savants, whose vision was formed by a different faith. In their turn, non-Jewish scholars were liable to be swayed by either the bias of their faith or the prejudice of their ethnic origin. In the first case, they were likely to see Judaism as the dark matrix of the Christian light and to view rabbinic Judaism as somehow a "degenerate" or "corrupt" form of biblical thought. In the second case, they were predisposed to find
corroborating evidence for the supposed limitations of the "Semitic" mentality.

It is the purpose of the Jewish-Christian dialogue to generate a living confrontation of the two traditions, in the hope that out of the encounter both will be enriched; for all spiritual growth is achieved by way of response to a challenge.

The republication of this work is a great contribution toward the development of the dialogue. Adolf Büchler was one of the titans of Jewish scholarship, belonging in the company of Shechter, Abrahams, Krauss, Louis Ginzberg, and Claude G. Montefiore. His work on *The Types of Palestinian Jewish Piety* served to explode some prevailing clichés concerning the Pharisees. He pointed out the three-dimensional character of Jewish saints—their popular and mystical sides as well as their legalistic tendencies.

In this work B. set out to examine the original material in Talmud and Midrashim bearing upon the concepts of the covenant, of the duty to serve God in fear and in love, of sin as a form of impurity, and of atonement through repentance and sacrifice. Because it is so heavily laden with quotations and variant readings, the argument unfolds slowly, diffusely, and uncertainly. This fault is also a virtue, in that fidelity to the sources is ranked above systematic clarity. The genius of rabbinic thought consisted in its being life-centered as well as Bible-centered, never straying far from either pole; but it allowed an ample range of views, so long as the authority of Torah was granted and the pragmatic consequences were in keeping with the tradition.

In his Prolegomenon, Frederic C. Grant offers a sensitive appreciation of Büchler's work. In his judgment, B.'s thesis should go far toward the acknowledgment of a deep gulf between rabbinic and apostolic, especially Pauline, thought. He calls attention to some of the false stereotypes that it demolishes: the notion of Judaism as a "book-keeping" religion, of sin as a quasi-physical corruption, and of sacrifices in the Temple as a self-contained regimen of reconciliation.

To my mind, G. overstates the results of B.'s study. Paul's obsession with sin is by no means incomprehensible within the rabbinic framework, providing two assumptions are made: the final Day of Judgment is at hand, and the plight of Gentiles as well as Diaspora Jews is taken to heart. The Temple was still standing, but the Jews of the Diaspora could participate only occasionally in its rituals of atonement. The Gentile people and the very soil outside the Holy Land were in the grip of "uncleanness," though the precise date when these decrees were promulgated is disputed. It is precisely because Paul was educated in Palestine, not in the universalist
school of Philo, that he felt the sting of sin to be almost overpowering. After the destruction of the Temple, the archaic concept of guilt and its removal was subordinated, though not eliminated. The old rites were studied lovingly and recited liturgically, so that their psychic impact continued to be felt. So, e.g., the Archangel Michael was described as offering "the souls of saints" in the form of fiery lambs on the altar up in "Zebul," the third heaven.

The "corruption" of mankind was assumed in the Talmud, too, though the Jews had this "corruption" removed from them at Sinai. According to the Zohar, this "corruption" took hold of the Jews, too, after they sinned by worshipping the Golden Calf. Rabbinic thought covered the entire spectrum between the concept of sin as a ubiquitous impurity and a moral-rational view of sin as a free act. The great rabbis tried to impress upon their pupils the fear of impending judgment after death.

The point is that early Christianity and rabbinic Judaism differed in the kind of "mix" they made out of the same elements, with the rabbis, after 70 C.E., de-emphasizing the rites of the Temple, and the Christians stressing the atoning role of Christ's death. The two faiths diverged ever more decisively, but in Paul's lifetime the author of Acts was right: Paul could expect Agrippa to understand him, whereas Festus could only regard him as mad (Acts 25:29-32).

In the first chapter B. deals with the source and sanction of Torah. The source of Israel's special obligation is the fact that it was taken out of Egypt. The Lord obtained the people Israel as His "slaves" through this act of intervention. Later, when the Israelites accepted the Decalogue at Sinai, they had bound themselves by oath to abide by His covenant. The Lord possesses the right, therefore, to exact obedience from the Israelites. The irrational laws of Torah are symbolic of this duty to render obedience unquestioningly. But another note is mingled with this one: the Israelites are His "sons," chosen in love. And the two metaphors are blended in one phrase on occasion, as in "subjecting their hearts to their father in heaven."

B. does not fully uncover the concepts of obligation that functioned in rabbinic Judaism. He does not inquire why the mere command of God was insufficient as a source of obligation. Manifestly, the rabbis thought of man and God as being bound by the same laws of justice and compassion. But all men are not obligated to serve Him exclusively or through the ways of Torah. The Israelites, however, were favored by Him in history, as in the Exodus; therefore He imposed a covenant upon them at Sinai, and they accepted it. We have here an assertion of human freedom, even against God. In the Talmud a legend is quoted that God imposed the covenant upon
the Israelites by threatening them with destruction if they refused. In that case, the Talmud argues, the Israelites would not be bound to observe the Torah. But then it is through God’s Torah that the Israelite becomes free: “no one is free who does not busy himself with Torah.”

Man attains the fulness of his stature only when, like the Israelite, he accepts “the yoke of the kingdom of heaven” by undertaking “to love God with all his heart and all his soul and all his might” and following up this general acceptance by the acceptance of the various commandments. In the end of days all men will enter “under the wings of Shechinah,” but until then non-Israelites are obligated only to observe the Noachide laws. The basic distinction, then, is between the moral-rational law, which applies to all men, and in respect of which man is obligated by virtue of his humanity, and the special laws of Torah, which refer only to the Israelites. This distinction was at times unclear, and the rabbinic thought reflected the tension between the two polar propositions: “that which is good is divine” and “that which is divine is good.”

In the second chapter B. discusses the tension between the motives of fear and love in the service of God. He analyzes the comments of the rabbis on the Book of Job. Did Job serve God in love or in fear? Manifestly, the debates of the rabbis concerning Job did not belong in the realm of literary criticism. They identified the lot of their people with that of Job. The point of their discussion was the compatibility of doubting and questioning with true piety. Could one follow Job’s example, since he too worshiped God in love, or must one regard Job as a lesser kind of pietist on the ground that he served God only in fear? There was also a dispute as to whether Job was a Jew at all—a dispute which was doubtless involved in the struggles between the Pharisees and the Sadducees concerning the belief in resurrection. Interesting are the comments of some of the rabbis who denigrate the character of Job, in spite of the clear intent of Scripture. In their eagerness to get the people to accept suffering, not only in resignation but with joy, as a mark of divine love, they described Job as the prototype of the imperfect believer.

Is fear of God, then, a lesser motivation of Him than love? In most passages the supremacy of love is assumed. But it is not difficult to document the assertion that fear is the higher motive. In medieval pietistic literature the distinction was drawn between two kinds of fear: the fear of punishment and the fear of that which is infinitely exalted. Certainly, in the apprehension of the holy, there operates the feeling of boundless awe and even terror. In their struggle against the Gnostics, the rabbis of the second century were particularly eager to stress that God is the source of wrath
as well as of love. Wise indeed are the words of the Tannaitic master: "for you have love in the place of fear and fear in the place of love only in relation to the Holy One, blessed be He."

To accept suffering in love is to contribute to the redemption of mankind. So David, prototype of the Messiah, is represented as begging to be punished. Suffering atones for one's own sins or for the sins of one's generation. One can hardly escape the defiling touch of sin, since even a fleeting feeling of elation, during a lecture, may render one deserving of death.

The question whether a person is more likely than not to attain the World to Come was probably reflected in the dispute between the Hillelites and the Shammaites concerning the worthwhileness of life. Since we cannot escape sin and its consequent punishments, is it not better not to have been born at all? Temporarily the Shammaites won, and they offered the mood of perpetual penitence as the only protection against the bad bargain that is human life.

In the language of Scripture, sin causes defilement of the land as well as of the person. To what extent was this defilement merely rhetorical? Or did the rabbis assume a quasi-physical contamination of the soul? Similarly, did the rite of repentance involve only a moral transformation, with physical lustrations being only symbolic? Or was there a positive miasma of "uncleanness" that had to be removed by some physical act? B. points out that Plato and Hellenistic writers generally assumed that the soul was "stained" by sin, with the consequent need of it being purged and purified. So the Hellenistic-Jewish authors speak of the cleansing of the soul as well as of the body. The Palestinian rabbis, following the destruction of the Temple, relied on repentance alone, as the instrument of moral transformation. But God could bring a person to Himself through suffering as well as through His great mercy.

B. cites a passage which speaks of "the spirit of uncleanness," which corresponds to the "spirit of cleanness," or, in one version, to the "spirit of holiness." Here, then, "uncleanness" is more than a metaphor. Similarly, the rabbis speak of "unclean food" as the cause of "a coarsening of the heart." Since the Day of Atonement, the regular sacrifices, and the special sacrifices had the effect of atonement if preceded by repentance, it is evident that they referred to some objective transformation. In general, it appears to this reviewer that one cannot assume that all the rabbis, even of the first century, were of one mind. Rabbi Ishmael's school is far more rationalistic and Rabbi Akiba's school far more mystical than the usual norm.

Did the rabbis require immersion in a baptismal bath, at the end of a
period of repentance, in order to mark the attainment of "purity"? B. con-
cludes that a ceremony "of the purification of sin by an immersion or by
washing the body" cannot be traced to the rabbis of the first century
(p. 373). "It would then seem that John voiced here the otherwise unknown
Essenic idea of purification from sins, which has parallels in the mysteries
of the Greek Eleusinia, in the Egyptian mysteries and in Mithraism" (p.
368). The Israeli historian Gedaliah Allon assumed that immersion after
repentance was the usual practice among the rabbis. In medieval sources
the requirement to immerse ourself before the Day of Atonement is taken
for granted.

Taken as a whole, this classic study collates many of the basic texts bear-
ing upon the concepts of sin and repentance. The ideas that we encounter
in this source material fall into a spectrum extending between the notion
of sin as a substance, somehow related to the forces of evil and of death,
and the view of it as a moral failure, which is overcome completely by re-
pentance and God's mercy. The opinions of the rabbis fall into a bell-
shaped curve, with only few and rare judgments belonging at either end.
in current Judaism, which thus offers another possibility of development from Scripture. In fact, says B., Judaism, not Christianity, is the better possibility, since it is based on the obvious meaning of the Scriptures. Seen thus, rabbinic tradition challenges Christianity, something which apparently Christians cannot stand, because they have constantly applied pressure upon Jews in an attempt to bring about their conversion.

The third major theme is the nature of the Christian experience. Christian claims concerning Jesus' passion, His divine nature, the atoning efficacy of His death, and indispensability of faith in His messiahship as a means of salvation—all these are a further source of cleavage between Christianity and Judaism. These doctrines are not an inescapable inference from the teachings of the Jewish Scriptures, as Christians assert; but when Jews voice this objection, Christians take their remarks as satanically inspired.

B. has chosen well the principal issues for Jewish-Christian dialogue; his treatment of them is something else. In his description of the Bible, for instance, he does not come to grips with precisely the issue he has raised: the completeness or incompletion of the Jewish Scriptures. Rather, he contents himself with the unexamined assertion that "in each age the authorities of Judaism chose certain works from a large number extant at the time. They were vested with authority and were entered in the official collection we call the canon, literally, the 'measure.' The canon was finally closed in the early part of the second century C.E." (pp. 50-51). Such a viewpoint does not even skim the complexities treated in Sundberg's *The Old Testament of the Early Church*, or Bright's *The Authority of the Old Testament*, to mention only two recent works.

When discussing the nature of the rabbinic tradition, B. rightly notes that the Bible as authoritative, normative literature needs living interpreters (p. 60). Whatever Jewish authors may have to say of B.'s explanations of Jewish interpretation as now found in the Talmud, one can admit that B. is undeniably correct in pointing to past Christian vilification and neglect of the riches to be found in the normative Jewish literature, something which contemporary Christian scholars are attempting to correct in themselves. One might ask, however, about the objectivity which depicts the Jewish method of oral midrash as yielding "a rich harvest to the development of Jewish tradition" and "ideally suited to serve the longings of the Jewish people for a literature of edification and inspiration" (p. 95), while asserting that Christian "dependence on an oral tradition going back to events more than a generation earlier leads to inaccuracy—in which the Gospel abounds" (p. 185). Does such polemic establish the climate for friendly and reasoned dialogue?
For his third theme, B. attempts to place Jesus in a good light. He was a pious Jew in the main stream of Jewish tradition. Unfortunately, Jesus, though not deeply involved in political revolt against Rome, was sufficiently seditious to be executed by the Romans as a possible revolutionary. Some Jewish leaders, puppets, were involved, as well as some personal enemies of Jesus and His views. But these opponents largely represented opponents to revolution and proponents of the administrative status quo, not the people at large (p. 243). The real villains in Christianity, however, are the Evangelists, who "perverted the facts, thereby misleading generations of Christians into an unreasoned hostility toward Jews" (p. 236).

Apparently, for B., all roads lead to anti-Semitism, and here we are in the area of what the book conveys. It conveys the impression of an apologist sincere in his faith and enthusiastic for it, but one who sets the best understanding of his own tradition against the worst possible interpretation one can give his opponent. The failing is human enough, and many a Catholic apologist has fallen into it too, but it hardly supplies the basis for dialogue. And that is the shortcoming of this book. It has raised key issues, made important points, touched upon areas in which Christians will have to correct their thinking and their attitudes towards Judaism. But does all the fault for Jewish-Christian division lie on the Christian side? If only Christians change their attitudes, will all be well? B.'s book may challenge us to think about what we have done to our Jewish brethren and how we differ from them, but it will not bring us together in a friendly exchange of views. What is still needed is a friendlier Jewish appraisal of Christians and their thought, not merely of their Founder.


Gerhardsson publishes here four of a projected eleven chapters on the Synoptic episode of Satan's temptation of Jesus, considered as an example of the Christian use of rabbinical methods (see his Tradition and Transmission in Early Christianity, 1964).

After first giving his reasons for believing that the temptation accounts are not historical (that is, do not describe events that really happened), G. selects Mt's version as his primary text. He sees it as a haggadic elaboration of the Shema of Dt 6:4-5: "Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God is one Lord; and you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with
all your soul, and with all your might." The three temptations of Jesus show Him loving God in exemplary fashion with His heart, soul, and might respectively, in accordance with the standard rabbinic interpretations of the Shema that appear in the Mishna, the Sifre on Dt, and the Babylonian and Palestinian Targums.

G.'s case is convincing, and it provides a decisive argument for regarding the text of Lk as secondary, since Lk changes the order of the temptations. G. also believes that Mk's account is clearly an abbreviation of Mt and Lk. This is the position maintained by A. Feuillet ("L'Episode de la tentation d'après l'évangile selon saint Marc," *EstBib* 19 [1960] 49–73), whose arguments I found inconclusive ("The Devil in the Desert," *CBQ* 26 [1964] 190–220, esp. 214). G. offers a much more persuasive approach, which he promises to develop in a future chapter.

Before taking up the individual temptations, G. studies the meaning of the terms "Son of God" and "temptation." He argues against regarding the episode as messianic. Though the Messiah was sometimes designated as God's son in late Judaism, far more commonly the biblical tradition of Israel as the first-born son of God was maintained, and it is in this sense, G. maintains, that the term is used in the present context: Jesus is regarded as an embodiment of the people of God. This meaning is in accord with the use of the word "tempt," which primarily seems to imply "a testing of the partner in a covenant to see whether he is keeping his side of the agreement." It is a sin for man to test God, since it demonstrates his suspicion and unbelief in not regarding YHWH as trustworthy.

The Son of God has the Spirit of God in the temptation scene, which is appropriate, since the Spirit of God was particularly active among the people of God in their wanderings. Nevertheless, the temptations are also divinely inspired: "the Lord your God is testing you, to know whether you love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul" (Dt 13:3). Satan, therefore, must not be regarded as God's enemy but as His instrument or agent, which is his normal role in parallel literature.

In the Mt account the desert is of significance only for the first temptation, as a place for a humiliating and testing hunger. G. disagrees with the interpretation of Jesus here as modeled on Moses, who delivered his people by procuring manna for them; rather, Jesus is the typological equivalent of "the hungry people of God," whose sin was to be discontent with the manna and to crave other food: it was characterized as a lack of trust and belief, the condition of halfheartedness or doubleheartedness. It was, therefore, a failure to fulfill the command to love God with one's whole heart, which the rabbis interpreted as meaning with both one's inclinations, the "evil"
as well as the good. As G. points out, the evil inclination is not sinful in itself; it is created by God and is necessary for the maintenance of life, and is legitimately expressed in hunger, thirst, the reproductive instinct, and so on. But it is inclined towards evil and must be held in check.

G. sees the second temptation as Jesus’ maintaining of the injunction to love God with His whole soul, that is, even to the extent of giving up His life. Satan wants Him to tempt God by requiring God to save Him as a token that He is going to keep His covenantal promises. Jesus demurs and remains on the wing of the temple, which G. associates with the Torah assurances of protection under God’s wing.

In the third temptation G. admits a parallel with Moses; he believes that Jesus’ survey of the kingdoms of the world was inspired by Moses’ view from Mount Nebo of the riches of Canaan. He also notes that the high mountains were the sites of the idolatrous worship that Israel was to avoid. But at this point G. himself goes astray after false gods. He asserts that in Dt 32:17 and Ps 106:37–38 idolatry and demon worship are placed together and identified. This statement needs to be severely qualified. In the Hebrew text the object of sacrifice are the šedîm, alleged deities that are specifically said to be “no gods” at all (Dt 32:17). There is no evidence than any spiritual reality was attributed to them; rather, the definition of šedîm by way of parallelism as “the idols of Canaan” in Ps 106:37–38 indicates that they were regarded as lifeless images. The fact that the LXX translated the word by the contemptuous term daimonia does not mean that they were thereby vivified. At one point the object of heathen worship is said to be ta daimonia ha ouk estin, which can perhaps best be translated as “the nonexistent godlets” (Is 65:3). It is instructive to note that when the LXX translated the word spûrim, it uses daimonia when it refers to the beasts of the wasteland (Is 13:21; 34:14), but “idols” and/or “worthless things” (mataia) to designate the object of sacrifice (Lv 17:7 and 2 Par 11:15). When St. Paul quotes LXX Dt 32:17 (1 Cor 10:20), he likewise seems to have in mind “dumb idols” (1 Cor 12:2), and not the unclean possessing spirits of the Synoptic tradition. However, it may be true that the OT texts cited by G. were instrumental in inspiring the later idea, expressed in 1 Enoch 99:7, that unclean spirits and demons as well as idols were worshipped.

When the Martyrdom of Isaiah identifies the object of Manasseh’s worship as “Satan, his angels, and his powers,” no doubt the author was inspired primarily by “the host of heaven” spoken of in 4 K 21, rather than idols like “the graven image of Asherah,” for Satan did come to be associated with the guardian angels of the nations. G.’s reference to Sammael in the
Golden Calf in the ninth-century *Pirkê de Rabbi Eliezer* is of no value for associating Satan with idolatry in NT times.

But G.'s basic point concerning the third temptation is sound: Satan is the ruler of the world, the representation of the whole might and wealth of the world, what the rabbis called *mamon*; loving God "with your whole might" meant "with your whole property," and Jesus remembered His duty never to forget God for the sake of earthly riches.

G. identifies the author of the temptation midrash as an ex-Pharisee like St. Paul. In coming chapters he will show how the life of Christ, as for example in the Passion narrative and the parable of the sower, was the central influence upon this learned scribe. Hopefully he will furnish us with many more valuable insights into this fascinating Gospel episode.

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At the international Mariological Congress, Santo Domingo, March, 1965, Laurentin read a paper out of which has grown the present study, a sequel to his *Structure et théologie de Luc I-II* (1957). Its theme is that Lk 2:48–50 is the point of convergence of the whole Infancy Gospel. The book deals with two questions: (1) theological understanding of the incident—and here the faith of Mary plays a part for Luke; (2) extent of Mary's knowledge of her Son's divine identity, since "they did not understand." The main concern is the properly exegetical first question. "Annexe I" treats "the knowledge Mary had of Christ's divinity," examining also "what are Catholic norms in this matter"; "quite open," is L.'s reply, especially in view of Vatican II's reserved use of Scripture. The *status quae-estionis* which is chap. 1 would seem to belong rather with "Annexe I."

L. shows beyond further serious question that *en tois* (Lk 2:49) can only mean "in my Father's (house)." That is the only meaning the Church knew for over a thousand years, and even when Albert the Great (d. 1274) proposed "my Father's business," he still retained the underlying temple sense. Later times, carried away by Western activism, progressively abandoned temple or house, and thereby lost the rich paschal meaning of the boy-Jesus' mysterious "word." The "Did you not know?" and the brusque switch from "your father and I" to "my father's house" mark the passage to a deeper level of knowledge. The nadir of mistranslation was reached in the vague generality "things of my Father," and L. gives examples from English and other vernaculars.
What Mary "did not understand," yet "pondered in her heart," was the tension between "Father's house" and her Son's return to Nazareth. Lk 2:50 is in perfect accord with NT usage of συνιέμι (understand) for events and sayings at first not grasped, yet handed down and eventually understood; Luke uses the word for the Passion (18:34). Mary appears as witness not to an event so much as to an obscure revelation—here of the "Son of the Father" (2:49 and 2:51), as earlier of "Christ the Lord" (2:11 and 2:19). Luke's concern is not anecdotal but "catechetical"; hence the stress on the third day, losing and finding, in the setting of the temple in Jerusalem. L. demonstrates this by examining 2:48-50 in its immediate setting, and then in comparison to similar paschal-event keywords in Lk 3-24 and selected passages in John (Jn 2:1-22; 7-8), e.g., Jerusalem, Passover, "I must," fulfilment, and seek-find.

The second temple scene, as the first (Lk 2:22 ff.), focuses on the transcendent Messiah. The word of Simeon in the first visit, the word of Jesus Himself in the second, both bear on the Passion-Resurrection return to the Father. The "sitting among the doctors" has the coloration of Mal 3:3, as the February 2nd liturgy long ago expressed. L.'s short éclairage de la littérature de sagesse is a modest exploration. The ending is in wisdom terms: "stored up all these things in her heart," also "increased in wisdom, in stature, and in favor with God and men" (cf. Prv 3:4).

L.'s main argument shows that Luke neither negates nor minimizes Mary's "understanding" of her Son. Mary's "not understanding" the eventual passage through death to the Father does not detract from her knowing even then His divine sonship. L. holds here as in earlier writings (Structure et théologie . . . ) that our Lady did know from the Annunciation of her Son's divinity, though he scores as a false question "Did or did she not know the divinity of her Son?" He grants that biblical data do not provide a firm answer to the fair question "What knowledge had she of her Son's divinity?" What does L. mean, however, in claiming "Mary had a real and profound knowledge of Christ's divinity, though limited to the verbal and conceptual means of expression of a humble woman of her day"? Perhaps he points to an answer by invoking St. Thomas' "faith has its term not in concepts but in realities."

The book has appended dossiers of Greek and Latin authors from patristic times to the Middle Ages, with relevant entries from the thirteenth century to the present in a carefully annotated bibliography. Sets of useful indexes (names, subjects, Scripture, and some Greek words) complete this quality production.

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This is a very useful book for the serious student of the Church’s practice and doctrine of infant baptism. The study undertaken by Canon Didier was given impetus by the contemporary situation in France, a country in process of “dechristianization or even of an absence of evangelization.” A. M. Roguet notes in his preface to the work that this is a question for all times, “but the question is posed today with special sharpness.... Not that the response could be massively negative; this whole work proves that. But the question is posed in this way: is it necessary, in France today, to baptize without exception all children of baptized parents? And is it necessary to baptize them immediately?” D.’s book, including the two pastoral documents issued by the French episcopate in 1951 and 1966, shows that a nuanced answer must be given.

The book has four major divisions: the NT epoch, the period before Augustine, the era of Augustine, and from Augustine to Trent. Each of these sections consists of a historical-theological introduction, followed by the pertinent texts of the period in French translation.

D.’s conclusions on each section can be briefly summarized. The NT texts allow us to hold that “it is possible and even positively probable that the usage of infant baptism is primitive. No certain proof can be furnished for this but—and this is essential—this usage is certainly in conformity with the biblical doctrine of baptism.” In this section D. is in rather close agreement with the Protestant scholars Jeremías and Cullmann.

From the second through the fourth centuries the practice of infant baptism was widespread in both East and West, but the principal reason given for the practice was different. In the East the emphasis was on the positive values which baptism brings to its recipient even when there is no sin to remit; in the West the emphasis was on baptism as a remission of sins. In neither East nor West was any voice raised against the absence, in the case of infants, of a personal profession of faith. In both East and West it was agreed that “to die without having received the ‘seal’ was, even for infants, the worst of misfortunes.”

The Augustinian era is divided into the period before Pelagius and the Pelagian crisis, in order to show the development of Augustine’s thought. In the pre-Pelagian period, Augustine’s thought centered on infant baptism as the healing of the wound of sin; but, it must be carefully noted, the sin in question here was personal sin, and infant baptism was presented as a safeguard for the future. It was also in this early period that he faced the problem of the infant’s inability to personally participate in the act of his baptism, and solved the problem by his conception of “the faith of others”—
parents, godparents, and all those who presented the infant for baptism. It took the Pelagian crisis to push his reflections further and lead him to realize that “if infants can and must receive the remission of sins, it is because they are sinners, but for them it can only be a question of the sin of Adam which they have inherited by the simple fact of their birth.” Thus it was the practice of infant baptism that led Augustine to his assertion of the existence of original sin, and not, as Wilfred of Strabo was to misinterpret in the ninth century, the existence of original sin which led him to assert the necessity of infant baptism.

From Augustine to Trent, the practice and doctrine of infant baptism were both further solidified. This period also bears witness to an excessive rigidity in some quarters—e.g., the Assembly of Wessex, around 690, established the penalty of total confiscation of goods for those priests and parents who negligently allowed a child to die without baptism, and the Penitential of Theodulf in the ninth century demanded a year of canonical penance for the same fault. It was also during this period that the adult catechumenate became the exception and the administration of the sacrament centered on infants. When the Albigensians of the eleventh century insisted on the radical uselessness of infant baptism, the practice became the touchstone of orthodoxy for the period. The necessity of personal faith, based on Mk 16:16, was asserted by the Albigensians with the conclusion that “neither the faith without baptism nor baptism without the faith has the least efficacy for salvation.” In response to this, Augustine’s principle of “the faith of others”—now stated explicitly to mean the faith of the whole Church substituting itself for the incapacity of the infant—again came to the fore. In this, Peter the Venerable and St. Bernard stood out among the defenders of orthodoxy. But it was Peter Lombard, with his distinction between the munus fidei and the actus fidei (the former given in the sacrament of baptism itself and producing acts of faith when the infant reached the age of reason), who provided the definitive answer to this problem.

D. concludes his study with the two pastoral documents of the French episcopate mentioned above. These documents, assessing the contemporary French situation, insist that pastors avoid the extremes of severity and appeasement in addressing themselves to the dechristianized condition of many French parents who present their children for baptism. While making it clear that they do not at all call into doubt “the sovereignly efficacious action of the salutary grace of Christ,” they insist that it is foolish to baptize infants whose Christian education can in no way be assured. The operative principle here is that the Church can in no way disassociate her sacramental action from her proclamation of the faith. The bishops insist on a sort of
catechumenate for parents and, where possible, for godparents, postponing
the decision to baptize or not until those responsible for the child's Christian
education can themselves be instructed and either assume or refuse the
obligations that are theirs. If after this period the parents decide to either
postpone or refuse baptism for their children, "the priest will respect their
decision" and neither consider them as apostates from the faith nor break off
his contact with them. In all of this, however, it is noted that the traditional
practice of the Church regarding the baptism of infants in danger of death
remains the same.

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THE COMING CHRIST AND THE COMING CHURCH. By Edmund Schlink.

Notwithstanding the heterogeneous circumstances of the original en­
counters for which the chapters of this volume were first prepared, they do
indeed, as S. notes, enjoy a more than artificial unity, a unity that testifies
to the validity and inner consistency of the method followed by S. over the
years in pursuing the objectives of Faith and Order within the ecumenical
movement.

At the World Conference on Faith and Order at Edinburgh in 1938
Archbishop Temple stated: "Our Churches sent us here to confer about our
differences with a view to overcoming them." S. believes that the achieve­
ment of this goal requires: (1) a method of dialogue and encounter that does
not bypass dogmatic problems for the sake of some more startling project
of the practical order and which could only be a short cut to a unity that is
ecclesial relativism at the expense of truth; (2) a method sufficiently dynamic
to enable the presently separated local churches to contact that source of
unity and truth already given them and which underlies their various tra­
ditions in their present divided state and which will enable them to inter­
pret these traditions in view of the coming Christ and the unity of God's
people still to be realized. Hence the importance of going beyond a method
which restricts itself to comparative studies of similarities and differences
among present ecclesial traditions, a method that must always fall short of
the true goal of ecumenism, because it either overlooks the deeper signifi­
cance of actual differences for the sake of a unity based on existing simi­
larities, or freezes the differences for the sake of preserving the values they
enshrine and which might be sacrificed in an ecclesiastical version of the
"social contract." For S., the key to the problems of method is to be found
in an analysis of the structure and unity of dogmatic propositions, a subject
he expounds in truly magisterial fashion.
What this analysis means in terms of the content of dogma is illustrated in the chapters of Part 2. These are more than random examples. Each is a further explicitation of a consistent method in the context of a unity given and a unity to be realized, of a salvific order whose organic laws are reflected in the methods by which they are made known. Because the person of Christ is the source of the unity already given in the Church, the Christology of Chalcedon remains a constant point of reference for all Christian Churches. Only when Christians are able to comprehend the person of Christ and the inner unity of the dogmatic affirmations concerning Him will they be able to perceive the deeper meaning of their different traditions in other areas. Subsequent chapters deal with Christ and the Church in terms of the people of God in pilgrimage (twelve theses for ecumenical discussion between Evangelical and Roman Churches), the marks of the Church, worship, law and the gospel as a problem of controversial theology, apostolic succession, and the problem of tradition.

Only in the chapter on apostolic succession could a pattern of understanding be discerned still significantly apart from the Roman. While accepting the need of an ordained ministry that is apostolic, S. appears to omit any need such a ministry and such a succession of ministers might have of a historical link with persons, dates, and places of the past—above all, a direct historical link with the apostles and Christ (the so-called historical title-deeds of Roman theology). Rather, he makes of succession much more a continuous walking in the pattern of the apostles who were witnesses to the Resurrection, first of all by the whole church, and then by pastors who may well be appointed more conveniently and prudently by those already ordained, but not always and necessarily for the validity of the ministry. How this very obvious difference is to be transcended in doing justice to the truth of each tradition is not immediately apparent. On the other hand, the truly catholic conclusions reached in so many of these discussions by way of S.'s method surely provide added grounds of hope for the resolution of the arduous problems surrounding the question of a valid ministry.

The final section deals with ecumenical hopes—for the coming Christ and the coming Church—in terms of the same basic principles. Only the reality and unity of a dogmatic faith in the same Christ who has come and is coming can ground a hope capable of bridging the actual disunity of the ecclesial traditions and of sustaining a will to preach the gospel and to work for justice till the final communion is realized. An examination of the development in Protestant reflection vis-à-vis the Eastern Churches serves as a backdrop for a consideration of two points: the limitations of the Western tradition in general and the Roman in particular, and the significance of
Vatican II for the Evangelical evaluation of the Roman tradition. S. notes changes in stance on both sides. And without implying necessarily a rejection of her past, S. observes that for the Roman Church the dogmatic definition of unity and of the frontiers of the Church is still open in the sense that the absolutely final word has not been uttered, and that it is through this opening that many remaining differences may be overcome.

In collecting these essays, S. has made a clear and convincing illustration of what an ecumenical method in dogmatic theology ought to be. There is a unity given to all baptized Christians that their baptism supposes, and there is a unity to be realized among the local communities of the baptized in view of the coming of Christ to judge the living and the dead. By going ahead to meet the Lord, we tend to transcend differences; and we are able to go ahead to the extent that we constantly return to the source of the unity given. Is this a vicious circle? Is it foolish to believe in the future of the Church and the final communion of saints that is the work of charity rooted in faith? Perhaps the last chapter, originally a sermon, on the resurrection of God’s people, provides a more than adequate clue to the prophetic affirmative every Christian with S. would give to that question.

St. Anthony-on-Hudson

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Peter D. Fehlner, O.F.M.Conv.


These constitute the first two volumes of a monumental three-volume work dedicated to the spirit of Vatican II, embracing all the conciliar documents, not necessarily in their original form but broken up into topical divisions to serve the editor’s special purpose. Each volume contains five chapters, and most chapters have exactly the same structure: an introduction written by the editor takes care of the unifying principle of the whole work; then follows the reprint of some of the main addresses delivered by the Council fathers on the specific subject of the chapter; in the center one finds the text of the document under discussion; finally, a series of commentaries by contemporary theologians rounds out the picture and brings home some interesting points for reflection.

The first volume treats the following five topics: (1) the Council in historical perspective; (2) revelation; (3) the nature of the Church (based exclusively on paragraphs 1-17 and 48-49 of the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church); (4) salvation and the saints; this chapter also contains an
intermezzo on the reform of indulgences and a special section devoted to Mary the mother of the faithful; (5) the liturgy. The five chapters of the second volume, on the other hand, deal with (1) the common priesthood of the faithful and the service of the laity; (2) the particular priesthood and the service of ordained priests and deacons; this chapter is greatly enlarged by added sections on the education of seminarians, priestly celibacy, and the question of the diaconate in the Council; (3) the service of religious; (4) the service of the leadership, and the unity and purpose of Church law; (5) the relationship of the Church and the Churches, with a special section on the Eastern Churches.

In the flood of postconciliar publications, what is the special purpose of this particular book? Indeed, does it have one? The editor makes it very clear at the outset that, in his opinion, Vatican II had but one proper theme, i.e., the ecumenical perspective. For history testifies to the fact that whenever the Church renews herself, her renewal also brings about a meeting point for the separated Churches. Renewal and reunion go hand in hand. This is also true for Vatican II. Consequently, the postconciliar literature cannot limit itself merely to the publication of the conciliar documents or the history of the schemata and debates. It must promote fresh insights, new exchanges of viewpoints, new constructive dialogues among Christians. Vatican II and its documents are only the foundation on which theologians must build; they are not the finished building itself.

The purpose of this publication, therefore, is to re-create Vatican II for the reader by going behind the scenes of the Council and looking for deep-seated motives and powerful undercurrents; by making available the widest collection up to now of Council speeches; and by inviting objective, sympathetic, but forward-looking commentaries by both Catholic and Protestant theologians. But the real newness of this three-volume set lies in its title and in what the title stands for. Johann Christoph Hampe, the editor, who functioned at Vatican II as one of the reporters for the Protestant press, has resolutely called it *The Authority of Freedom* to make perfectly clear that this analysis of the Council is ecumenical in scope and looks toward both the present and the future of the Church.

In his introductory note to the fifth chapter of Vol. 2, H. even quotes the statement of the 210 Churches present at New Delhi that to obtain unity means no less than the recognition of the fact that the present plurality of forms of Christian living must die and then be reborn. When all is said and done, this is, in itself, a small price to pay to bring about Christian reunion. As a matter of fact, this idea is the *Leitwort* of the entire present undertaking; for the first and most basic outcome of the Council can be seen in the aug-
mented freedom in face of the so-called secondary traditions separating the Christian Churches and in the readiness of the whole of divided Christendom to overcome them. By this freedom and this readiness the Council brought back to the Church the freedom so manifestly present in her at the time of her birth.

The fact that this publication is not a specifically Catholic endeavor, though Catholic theologians have greatly contributed to its content, only stresses the importance of the freedom idea as its Leitwort. Standing firmly on the ground that the Council is, as it were, the common possession of all the separated Churches, the publisher, editor, and contributors have decided to explore the freedom aspect of the Council on behalf of Christianity as a whole. It does not really matter whether they explore the ecumenical possibilities of the dispute concerning the main characteristics of the self-understanding of the Church, as it is found in the first volume, or whether they expound the true meaning of service to be rendered to the People of God by the laity, priests, religious, bishops, and the pope, which forms the contents of the second volume. Their way of looking at things remains ever the same: the freedom of the Christian in promoting reunion of the separated Churches. This is why the whole last chapter of the second volume is expressly and expertly dedicated to the central issue of the Decree on Ecumenism.

There are many interesting instances, incidents, and interpretations in these two volumes that deserve careful consideration and genuine reflection. Hampe’s analysis of Christian freedom and authority (1, 17–34) is absorbing and challenging; the record of important, decisive moments of the Council (Pope Paul VI’s famous intervention among them) is handled tactfully and interpreted objectively (1, 51–55) by Albert C. Outler. His question, what would Vatican II have become without the intervention of “higher authority”? is particularly intriguing. So also is Otfried Muller’s understanding of the nature of postconciliar Catholic theology, with its threefold purpose and duty (1, 85–94). Special appreciation is due to Ferdinand Klostermann for his clearly-worded theses, fourteen in all, in which he summarizes Vatican II’s understanding of the layman of the world (der Weltläue, two theses), the world of the layman (die Welt des Laien, five theses), and the duties or tasks of the layman in the world and the Church (die Aufgaben des Weltläuern in Welt und Kirche, seven theses) (2, 72–87). The problem of the layman is further scrutinized by Rudolf Bohren, who basically identifies it with the problem of the Holy Spirit in Catholic theology (2, 92). But perhaps the most refreshing thoughts, analyses, and suggestions are found in the third chapter of the first volume, “The Nature of the Church” (1, 243–372), and in the fifth chapter of the second volume,
“The Relationship of the Church and the Churches” (2, 553-697). Both chapters are strictly ecclesiological in nature, the latter depending on the principles of the first. Hence, to give a fair impression of the freshness of the work, its general ecclesiological outlook might fittingly be indicated here.

Heribert Mühlen spells it out in a positive sense by analyzing the Church as a mystery in its Trinitarian relationship, particularly in that with the Holy Spirit. Although he clearly espouses the so-called incarnational notion of the Church, he cautions about the unlimited use of the Incarnation-Church analogy. Between the two world wars it led to a kind of divinization of the Christian (1, 297). To avoid committing the same mistake in the future, the unexchangeable attributes of the Incarnation in addition to the exchangeable ones must clearly be taken into consideration, together with those functions of the Holy Spirit that are different from the function of Logos. Mühlen elaborates on both these points in 1, 297-99. He is deeply convinced that the really new element in the ecclesiology of Vatican II is found in the distinction of the function of the Holy Spirit from that of the Son in the economy of salvation (1, 294). In all these reflections he only continues outlining and stressing the principles and importance of an ecclesiology of the Holy Spirit made available to the reading public in two of his works, Una mystica persona and Der Heilige Geist als Person. Also worthy of attention and careful consideration are his understanding of the infallibility of the People of God and that of the pope, as well as the notion of a kind of agreement or consent on the part of the people—die Zustimmung der ganzen Kirche (1, 309-10).

Edmund Schlink’s ten entirely appreciative and constructive remarks on the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church not only follow Mühlen’s contribution in the work, but also enlarge and complete it. In remarks no. 8 and 9, however, Schlink voices some negative observations that could be instrumental in future ecumenical work in clarifying the Constitution on these points. After having given a rather attractive treatment to the meaning and interpretation of the term “subsistit in” (1, 319), he expresses his disappointment at the fact that the Constitution does not go beyond a merely phenomenological reference to the non-Catholic Christian Churches and does not expressly recognize their real ecclesiological status. The situation is much better in the Decree on Ecumenism, although the exact meaning and scope of the term “Churches and ecclesial communities” is nowhere spelled out in this document either (1, 324). It is, then, somehow natural that Schlink finds even Vatican II’s concept of the Church too narrow a notion—at least from the point of view of the non-Catholic Christian communities. His analysis offers five different reasons for this narrowness, all
of them present in the text or prevailing in the spirit of Vatican II and all of them to be corrected, hopefully, in the future:

(a) It is the unity concept of the Roman Catholic Church as she understands herself today, and not that of the primitive Church, that is manifest in the documents. Although witnessing is a historical fact, Vatican II never recognizes its manifoldness. (b) The importance of the local community is nowhere brought out in the first two chapters of the Constitution. The stress is always on the universal Church to such an extent that one has the impression that the only thing really needed for solving all the problems of the local communities would be the application of the deductive method. (c) The Constitution says nothing about Christ as the Judge of the Church; yet this concept is a part of the People of God notion. (d) The freedom of the workings of the Holy Spirit is not fully vindicated. To do this, the Constitution would have needed more precise biblical exegesis and the acknowledgment of an abundance of historical facts. It is Schlink's conviction that in the light of these two factors, the Constitution's present distinction between hierarchy and laity could not be upheld. (e) He also regrets the predilection of Vatican II for substantive concepts and metaphors instead of verbal descriptions in presenting the Church in the first two chapters of the Constitution. Interestingly enough, Wolfgang Dietzfelbinger also contrasts these two approaches, comparing them to a huge painting on the one hand, and to an animated movie on the other (1, 329).

Schlink's comments reflect characteristically the value as well as the difficulties of the whole work. Basically, it represents a new fresh approach to the documents of Vatican II in applying to it the creative scope of emancipated freedom toward secondary ecclesiological traditions. In this regard it is rather daring in its outlook and very promising for further future explorations of the groundwork of Vatican II. It might also be added that precisely this limited yet very enriching scope of emancipated freedom distinguishes this work from any other post-Vatican publication, e.g., the Vatican II volumes of the *Unam sanctam* series published by Cerf. Nevertheless, this advantageous approach also creates some serious problems and difficulties. All of them might be summed up in this fundamental question: What is meant by "secondary" traditions or by secondary forms of Christian living? Unfortunately, there is no a priori answer to this question. Certain traditions or forms of living can be evaluated and interpreted differently by Catholic and by Protestant or Orthodox scholars. This possibility is clearly present in the way of handling the documents of Vatican II. And the fact that the great majority of the contributors to these volumes are non-Catholic Christian scholars clearly tips the scales in favor of freedom vis-à-vis
secondary traditions. This is hopefully a healthy sign of a theological catharsis being born out of the spirit of Vatican II.

These volumes deserve the attention and effort of all who approach the conciliar documents with great expectations and study them with undiminished and well-founded Christian hope in the self-recreating powers of an unbiased ecumenical theology. I look forward with keen anticipation to the third volume.

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With Fr. McSorley’s Munich dissertation, Heinrich Fries impressively begins a new series aiming to promote a “theology of understanding” between separated Christians. McS. works from a clear confessional identity enriched by his sense of the biblical and patristic themes of sin, grace, and freedom. The book rests on wide theological reading and offers some valuable critiques: e.g., of Nygren on Augustine and of Oberman on pre-Reformation theological confusion and on Trent’s doctrine of merit. One finds the whole history of interpretation of Luther’s doctrine *de servo arbitrio* spread with Germanic thoroughness through the footnotes and excursuses. One should not be discouraged by the size of the book. It is most orderly and quite generous with summaries. I hope the English version will include an index of the modern scholars McS. discusses with such balance.

McS. begins with a 200-page “state of the question.” After laying down clear definitions of natural, circumstantial, and acquired freedom, he sketches the biblical paradox of man’s responsibility and his bondage to frustration outside of Christ. Central here is the acquired freedom given by God’s Spirit. Bultmann witnesses to the free decision nonetheless entailed where the *NT* speaks of the obedience of faith. McS. handles nine works of Augustine, stressing the presence of an analogical idea of “sin” where Augustine speaks of the works of the pagans. The problematic of Semi-Pelagianism comes out clearly as being not synergism but the ultimate initiative in conversion. On Aquinas, McS. urges the transcendent character of God’s operations. God wills *totaliter aliter* than man, and His greatest glory is His free conferral of freedom on His creatures and collaborators. Here univocal thinking will only distort and deceive. McS. does not spare Ockham and Gabriel Biel from the charge of Semi-Pelagianism in their insistence on man’s initiative in preparation for justification. Tragically, Luther saw them
as authentic Catholic teachers. McS. sees the young Luther first defending this Semi-Pelagianism and then turning sharply against it in 1515–16 under the influence of Augustine's *De spiritu et littera*. Here McS. works with too few Luther texts to be convincing. Leif Grane has covered this material carefully in *Contra Gabrielem* and has brought out well Luther's stress on the inroads of sin, prevenient grace, and the overriding theme of the *opus Dei* down to 1515. We must look elsewhere than to Gabriel Biel to find Luther's theological roots.

The immediate background of Luther's *De servo arbitrio* is a fascinating series of polemical exchanges. The crucial point was Luther's heavy-handed use of a philosophical assertion ("omnia de necessitate absoluta eveniunt") in 1521 to undergird his argument for man's bondage outside of grace. In *De libero arbitrio* (1524) Erasmus fixed on this secondary argument used by Luther, and unfortunately made no mention of liberating grace in defining "free will." Erasmus actually inclined toward Thomas' insistence on the absolute need of prevenient grace, but—such was the theological confusion of the age—he saw no fundamental difficulty in Biel's option for congruous merit of grace by unaided free will.

McS. turns then to an 80-page analysis of Luther's response to Erasmus. Here he sifts carefully. Luther's deepest concern was genuinely Catholic, as he sought to posit firmly the absolute necessity of God's grace for every human action in any way relevant to salvation (p. 280). But in asserting his thesis, Luther used an unbiblical and necessitarian idea of God's foreknowledge, thus making *servum arbitrium* mean something other than Scripture's bondage to sin (pp. 284 f.). Luther came into serious difficulty, obfuscating the role of free assent under grace, and making no mention of man's decision in a tortured explanation of the origin of sin. But Luther's final section (one sixth of *De servo arbitrio*) gave a fine description of man's bondage to sin, a treatment one could well summarize with chap. 1 of Trent's Decree on Justification.

McS.'s most significant ecumenical contribution comes in the brief concluding sections on the fate of Luther's theology of bondage in the Lutheran confessional documents and in modern Protestant theology. In both, Luther's necessitarian argument finds no echo, while his quite Catholic thesis on the absolute need of grace is fully accepted. Many people are evidently not impressed by Luther's judgment ranking *De servo arbitrio* with his catechisms as his only books of lasting value.

The real questions raised by this book must be answered by Lutherans themselves. Will they accept McS.'s presentation of the Catholic tradition and so desist from depicting the Erasmus of 1524 as its representative?
Will they agree that McS. has capsulized correctly Luther's deepest concern? Will they join him in his incisive and just criticism of Luther's excesses in depicting how God is at work in us through His healing and liberating grace?

Bellarmine School of Theology

JARED WICKS, S.J.


Järvenpää, Finland, was the scene of the Third International Congress on Luther Research in August, 1966. The present volume makes available the twelve papers of the Congress, eight in German and four in English. Gordon Rupp's opening lecture takes stock of recent research, pointing to lacunae in what we know of Luther's medieval background, e.g., in fifteenth-century Augustinian theology and in the late devotio moderna, and noting briefly that the great Protestant essay on Luther's limitations has yet to be written. Three papers treat Luther's relation to mysticism. Heiko Oberman speaks with erudition on the classification of medieval mystics, and then with sensitivity for the complexities of Luther's rejection of speculative mysticism along with his absorption of a characteristic Christ-mysticism. Bengt Hägglund stresses the importance of Tauler's mysticism in Luther's development. Erwin Iserloh, the only Catholic speaker, develops Luther's Christ-mysticism from four perspectives: union with Christ sub contraria specie, faith and experience of salvation in Christ, the Christian's "happy exchange" of his sins for Christ's justice, and Luther's stress on the priority of Christ's sacramental influence over our following of Christ's example.

A second set of papers studies rather diffusely Luther's idea of the continuity of the Church. Wilhelm Maurer relates, somewhat uncritically, the elder Luther's idea of the duplex (i.e., vera et falsa) ecclesia. René Esnault reviews Luther's rejection of the religious life precisely because it divided Christians into the ordinary and the perfect and so brought discontinuity into the Church itself. Jaroslav Pelikan analyzes closely Luther's De instituendis ministris ecclesiae (1523), Luther's most Protestant exposition on Church order, finding there a combination of historically-conditioned expediency, a nearly-Donatist view of the Church (only a phase with Luther), and the strong conviction that the basic continuity of the Church was the proclamation of the gospel, not a historical succession of ordinations.

A third theme of the Congress was Luther's idea of the natural order. Gustaf Wingren concentrates on Luther's treatment of the daily life of
unselfish service as the human life for which Christ has saved us. Gerhard Ebeling contrasts Luther’s thought with Scholasticism’s two-level scheme of natural and supernatural orders, each of which has its goals and corresponding empowerments in man. Luther moved into a wholly different universe of discourse to understand man not as agent but as hearer of God’s word. Luther’s dualism is forensic: man understands himself over against law and gospel, condemnation and acquittal. With no superstructure casting its shadow, the natural order of marriage, work, and service comes into its own. William Lazareth recommends Luther’s idea of “civil righteousness” as providing a cluster of norms, which though not redemptive still give sufficient foundation for ethical judgments on the otherwise autonomous structures and institutions of contemporary society. Finally, two short papers by Wilfred Joest and George H. Williams present the argument between Luther and the spiritualist “left wing” of the Reformation on sanctification. Joest recalls Luther’s strong opposition to a mystical cultivation of interiority as he insisted on word and sacrament as God’s route of approach to us. After faith, the direction is from within outward to good works, which are not prescribed by law but prompted and made good by their origin in faith working in love. Williams delineates the various kinds of spiritualist contemporaries of Luther and samples four of them in their charges against Luther, e.g., that he neglects the sanctification of life and does not see our union with Christ’s resurrection. Against Luther’s territorial Church, they emphasized the voluntary commitment in believers’ baptism to suffering and eschatological expectancy.

This can be a useful volume for Catholic theologians. Iserloh shows that the idea of merely imputed justice is insufficient for categorizing Luther’s view of the just man. Pelikan offers a well-documented formulation of the penultimate ecumenical question of ministry and orders. Ebeling marks off the abyss that makes it impossible to cast Luther’s teaching in Scholastic forms. It would seem that if Luther’s continuity with the Catholic tradition can be established, it will be done by building bridges from other than Scholastic abutments. Could future congresses study “Luther and Bernard” or even “Luther and Ignatius”?

Bellarmine School of Theology

JARED WICKS, S.J.


July 1966 saw Hanns Rückert complete thirty-five years as Professor for
Church History in the Protestant Theology Faculty in Tübingen. The festivities of a torchlight procession by students and the assembling of this impressive and expensive Festschrift witnessed to the respected position he held. R.'s influence was less by the written word than through his lectures, his seminars, and his direction of the commission for the completion of the Weimar edition of Luther's works. His two dissertations under Karl Holl, one on Trent's teaching on justification (1925) and the other on the theological development of Cardinal Contarini (1926), are seldom cited, even by Catholic historians. The one example of R.'s work known to the reviewer to be available in English is his penetrating lecture "The Reformation—Medieval or Modern?" (Journal for Theology and Church 2 [1965] 1–19). The nineteen contributors to the present book have carried further just this kind of inquiry into the spirit and history of the Reformation.

Ernst Fuchs begins with a dense and aphoristic exegesis of 2 Cor 1:3–11, highlighting the "logic of faith" as man's continual passage from his own weakness into God's power and consolation. Fuchs argues sharply against the proponents (e.g., W. Könne) of a faith too much oriented to the historical facticity of salvation events. He echoes R.'s point that the pro me of Luther's faith already implies the overcoming of the subject-object schema.

Next are five essays on late medieval theology. Reinhard Schwarz presents Eckhart's concept of God's justice in man, a spiritual perfection ever radiating from God, always received anew but never absorbed. Eckhart was inspired by Neoplatonic thought to overcome the objectified and detached infused justice of a more Aristotelian theology. Renate Steiger compares Scotus, Ockham, and Biel on contingency and suggests that the two poles of nominalist thought are God's sovereignly free decree of an order of creation and an intense, innerworldly experience of freedom. She sees the incompleteness of nominalism in not attaining Luther's sense of God's present work within this order. Wilfrid Werbeck delves into the manuscript background of Biel's Collectorium, which will be published in a critical edition under Rückert's direction. Werner Jetter studies three New Year's sermons of Biel with a critical eye for his use of Scripture for proof-texts for Church doctrine, for Biel's view of Jesus as Saviour in the past preparation of saving medicine, and for Biel's moralistic exhortations to imitate Jesus. Martin Elze compares late medieval passion piety with three early sermons by Luther, arguing well that the monastic spirituality of compassion and imitation was the context of Luther's decisive shift to understand Christ as the sacrament (both sign and cause) of the new life we must accept in faith before we can follow Christ's example. Elze's work
points to a medieval background that serves far better for comparison with Luther than does Biel or even Aquinas.

The central section contains six studies of Luther. Siegfried Raeder presents the linguistic and spiritual suppositions of Luther’s biblical translations. Heinrich Bornkamm defends the historicity of Luther’s public posting of the ninety-five theses, apparently unaffected by the careful dismantling of the evidence by other researchers. Robert Stupperich reports on documents germane to Luther’s intervention on behalf of the Brothers of the Common Life in Herford, where a house continued after the city became Protestant. Hans Volz tells of newly-found documents from the correspondence of Johannes Mathesius, a student of both Luther and Melanchthon. Erwin Mülhaupt outlines Luther’s idea of the Christian in politics. Finally, Gerhard Ebeling gives a valuable comparison of Zwingli, Calvin, and Luther on the subject matter of theology. Luther went furthest in making justification sola fide the formative conviction touching the whole of theology, even the general doctrine of God. Luther’s norm for authentic theological statements is the attitude one takes before God: “peccatores iam et mortui [sumus] per Adam, justificandi et vivificandi per Christum.” Only in this situation can one know God and man. Here is another pointer toward medieval piety as the soil of Luther’s theology.

Heiko Oberman, R.’s successor in Tübingen, ranges through Calvin, pointing out the recurring “extra-dimension”: Calvin sees God at work in the world-at-large and not just in the Church; Christ offers Himself in the Supper even to the unworthy (a very late idea in Calvin); Calvin’s Christology has a strong anti-docetist tinge; and finally, God’s work, for Calvin, even transcends what has been established de potentia ordinata.

The final six essays pursue issues in post-Reformation Church history. Heinz Liebing seeks to widen the horizon of research on humanism by reversing the frequent question about humanism’s influence on the Reformation. Great areas of humanist achievement were domesticated in the schools of the dominant confessions, but enough elements remained outside this framework to lay the foundations of rationalism. Martin Schmidt relates how Richard Hooker treated the doctrine of justification (in 1586) with an Anglican concern for continuity with Catholicism and with some Protestant stress on human weakness and sinfulness. Wilhelm Bofinger reviews the role played by territorial parliaments in Lutheran states and concludes that they were not as stagnantly conservative as often portrayed. Johannes Wallmann points out problematic aspects of recent research on German pietism, e.g., the unsolved question of Philipp Spener’s debt to unorthodox spiritualist teachings. Martin Brecht narrates the steps by
which Spener's pietism gained ascendency in the Lutheran Church of Württemberg in 1680-1700. Finally, Klaus Scholder unfolds the peculiar character of the Enlightenment in Germany, where men like Leibniz and Wolff sought not to dislodge Christianity but to put it on a firm rational basis, thus leading to a devaluation of dogma and to stress on the moral usefulness of Scripture. Pietism prepared for this approach, and so hindered an Encyclopedist attack on Christianity. But the stress on practical Christianity opened the way to a more subtle erosion of Christian substance.

**Bellarmine School of Theology**

JARED WICKS, S.J.


The author, an English barrister whose previous books include biographies of men as widely separated by time, place, and occupation as King David and Roger Casement, here studies Henry VIII. All attention focuses on the English ruler's protracted and devious endeavors to have his first marriage annulled by the Church. The account starts abruptly with the year 1527, when Henry began to manifest scruples concerning the validity of his union, contracted in 1509 with papal dispensation, to Catherine of Aragon, widowed five months after her marriage (ratum but, according to her, non consummatum) to Henry's elder brother Arthur. With Pope Clement VII's final decision, March 23, 1534, upholding the validity of the bond, the story ends.

These pages tread a well-worn path, along which it would be very difficult to point out broad, new vistas, or even to discern previously unnoted details. Forgoing the attempt to do so, P. states at the outset that his aim is "to bring to this complex and difficult subject a greater clarity of exposition than it has yet received" (p. ix). He is to be congratulated on the success of his effort. His composition is lucid, orderly, calm, and objective. The attentive reader who peruses these closely-written pages will have seen exposed to him every turn and twist of the most momentous marriage case ever to confront the Holy See.

Based on careful research into the voluminous printed sources, as the numerous footnotes and extensive quotations attest, this chronicle is considerably more detailed than that supplied by Philip Hughes in his *Reformation in England*. There is a good analytical index (pp. 301–22) but no bibliography. Justifiably it has been omitted as unnecessary, in view of the ready availability of such excellent ones as Conyer Read's *Bibliography of British History . . . 1485–1603* (1959).
The dispensation from the impediment of affinity granted by Julius II was then somewhat novel but not unprecedented. P.'s treatment of the canonical aspects of the case is adequate, sufficient to expose the wobbly foundations of the King's arguments, which at no stage were impressive to the Pope, Cardinal Campeggio, or his fellow canonists in Rome. The book is at its best in describing the stratagems and activities of Henry and his clerical and lay ministers and agents to gain the one settlement acceptable to the King. Most of the space is pre-empted by the royal manoeuvres to have the "great matter" tried and definitively decided, without chance of appeal, in England rather than in Rome, where judges and witnesses could not be intimidated; and by the papal countermoves to delay as long as possible a conclusive, inevitably negative decision, in the hope that time would cool Henry's passion for Anne Boleyn, or in some other fashion would remove the Pope from the predicament whose danger he well understood. More protracted treatment could have been accorded the proceedings in Cranmer's court and to the arguments that sufficed to produce the desired annulment.

Few of the protagonists emerge from this episode with reputations enhanced. Sir Thomas More does; so do Bishop John Fisher and, above all, Catherine, who bore up nobly under persecution, injustice, loneliness, and mortal danger. (P. might have explained at greater length why she was not simply put out of this world, as were two of Henry's later wives when they became troublesome.) But Clement VII appears weak and vacillating. Still less flattering are the pictures of the time-serving Parliament and hierarchy, notably Cardinal Wolsey and Archbishop Cranmer, ready to accede to whatever the King required of them, and of the Macchiavellian schemer Thomas Cromwell. Least appealing of all is the principal character, Henry VIII, with his repeated resort to duplicity, bribery, threat, and injustice.

In tracing the annulment process to its conclusion, P. must note the start of the Henrician Schism. The former event was very largely responsible for the latter, but was not the sole cause it here appears to be because of the book's restricted scope. To correct for possible distortion of vision, it is advisable to supplement this work with one like Hughes, whose panorama is broader.

Weston College

JOHN F. BRODERICK, S.J.


Is it rational to believe in the existence of God? Prof. Plantinga proposes
a novel procedure and answer. Arguments from natural theology for a positive affirmation are found to be unsatisfactory. Logical analysis reveals natural atheology's reasoning for the negative position to be even more deficient. The impasse is overcome by a study of the arguments for belief in other minds. None of these suffices to prove the existence of other minds; yet clearly it is rational to believe in their existence. "Hence my tentative conclusion: if my belief in other minds is rational, so is my belief in God. But obviously the former is rational: so, therefore, is the latter" (p. 271).

The scant treatment of the last and key step of the general thesis suggests that P. plans another volume. Except for a few pages, the entire book concentrates upon the logical inaccuracies or inconsistencies of the above arguments. P. considers the analogical argument best for establishing the existence of other minds, even though this in turn is shown to be insufficient. The analogy between the teleological argument, which P. thinks the most promising for the theistic position, and the analogical argument for other minds provides the basis for his general thesis.

From natural theology P. selects for examination the cosmological argument in the guise of St. Thomas' Third Way, St. Anselm's ontological argument, and the teleological argument. Unfortunately, his treatment of Thomas reveals a basic ignorance of Thomas' intentions as well as of the literature. Apparently he is unaware of the distinctive form of the argument as a resolutio rather than a deduction or an induction. There is no evidence that he is acquainted with the traditional contrast between the metaphysical argument based on the Contra gentes and the physical argument of the Summa theologiae. That Thomas can employ the principle "quod est possible non esse quandoque non est" without elaboration because he had labored over it in his commentaries on Aristotle, In De coelo et De mundo and In Perihermeneias, obviously is unknown. But, more radically, he does not understand, as few seem to, what is meant by "necessary being."

Well worth study are the two chapters on the ontological argument. The usual attempts to reject the argument are shown to be logically deficient in meeting Anselm's point. P.'s own rejection recognizes that one must be able to avoid the reductio ad absurdum of Anselm, if one wishes to invalidate the argument. The entire discussion, however, is weakened by attending only to the English translation of cogitari as "conceive"; for the way to avoid the reductio ad absurdum lies, I believe, in distinguishing cogitari as "conceive" and as "judge."

Under natural atheology, two chapters are devoted to the problem of evil. Perhaps P.'s most incisive point consists in laying bare the logical structure of this rejection of God's existence. "No atheologist, so far as I
know, has proved or even tried to prove that the proposition ‘If there is any evil in the world, then there is unjustified evil’ is necessarily true. Indeed, it is hard to see what form such a proof could take” (p. 123).

P. employs devastating criticism on Flew’s famous falsifiability principle and his brief justification of it. He then reduces it to the verification principle and handles the multiple attempts to justify this latter, rejecting them all. Findlay’s ontological disproof of God’s existence is shown to be nonprobative.

The final section undertakes the exposition and criticism of various attempts to justify belief in the existence of other minds and succinctly proposes the general thesis of the book.

Few will be able to “read” this book. It requires diligent study. Perhaps the most fruitful way to approach it is to read the Preface and the final few pages in order to get the general thesis. When one is engaged in examining any of the positions treated, then one can study with pen in hand the appropriate section. P. writes for professional philosophers, and the obvious intelligence and competence manifested in this volume give promise of future substantial contributions to the field of philosophy.

Weston College

JOSEPH H. CASEY, S.J.


This volume continues the publication of Congar’s articles published over the years and hitherto of easy access only to those who subscribe to many periodicals or frequent theological libraries. All the pieces included here are, however, relatively recent, having been written chiefly on the occasion of Vatican II. As the title suggests, they all deal with some aspect of the theological revival of which the Council was, to a large extent, the outcome. The title is borrowed from the longest essay of the volume, where it is preceded by three others on “Theology since 1939,” on “Theological Research, 1945–1965,” on the “Theological Method of the Council,” and followed by three, on “Christ in the Economy of Salvation and in Our Dogmatic Tractates,” on “How to Use Denzinger,” and on “The Language of Spirituals and That of Theologians.”

As may be gathered from these titles, C.’s main purpose is to understand and explain the modes and concerns of theology in our times. Since this touches on the historical situation and interpretation of Vatican II, one could fruitfully compare C.’s reflections with analogous surveys by Roger Aubert (La théologie catholique au milieu du XXe siècle, Paris, 1954), by Elmer O’Brien (Theology in Transition, New York, 1965), and by myself in the first chapter of The Pilgrim Church (New York, 1967). The the-
Theological research which led up to Vatican II corresponded with the growing concern of the contemporary philosophical mind with existential experience. Theology is thus passing from the older metaphysical focus of the Schoolmen, which somehow, thanks to the repetitive character of much seminary teaching, survived in theological and ecclesiastical circles long after it had practically disappeared from the intellectual world of our contemporaries, to a focus on man, his experience, and his problems. This has implied taking a new look at ethics and its conditions and demands, at the world and its tasks and questions, at contemporary philosophy, at the biblical substratum of the Christian doctrines, at atheism. Thus theology has had to face new problems that were thus progressively introduced into the Church’s self-awareness. Thanks to this, Vatican II, although it “was not very dogmatic . . . was very theological” (p. 40). Far from opposing to one another theological and pastoral orientations, C. adds: “This was pre-requisite to its being pastoral.” If I may venture an opinion at this point, I will remark that it is mainly in English-speaking countries that we find a discrepancy or a misunderstanding between “theologians” and “pastors,” theology being conceived as an occupation for professors, and “pastoral care” being too often identified with parish administration. In a sane order of things, there is no pastoral activity without a theological justification, and no theology without a pastoral dimension. Such have been the theology of the great theologians of our times and, as witness Cardinal Suhard, the pastoral care of our great pastors. Thus, to mention an instance cited by C. (p. 54), when in November, 1964, one Cardinal asked in the Council for “more of St. Thomas” and another for “much less of St. Thomas,” they did not necessarily contradict each other: more of St. Thomas by all means, if St. Thomas is understood as an initiator of bold research; less of him, on the contrary, if he is believed to have said the last word on every important problem of the Church.

The task of theology is seen by C. at two levels: that of knowing the datum, and that of elaborating the intellectual synthesis. The datum is the field of the positive or historical branches of theology, and the elaboration is that of a more or less systematic and philosophical reflection. Both the Fathers and the Scholastics proceeded chiefly at the level of elaboration, though with differing methods and with diverse emphases in their knowledge of the datum. Since the seventeenth century, the datum has been more and more thoroughly investigated, thanks to the growth of the modern historical sciences, until a rather sharp cleavage appeared in our century between historically and speculatively oriented theologians. The present trend seems to be in the direction of new elaborations in the light of our more scientific
knowledge of the datum. Some of these, like that of Henri de Lubac or that of C. himself (p. 77), remain focused on the historical, and the history of theology provides their framework. Others, like that of Karl Rahner (p. 76), are more centered on the problems of man today. While the former dominates the Constitutions on the Church, on Revelation, on Worship, the latter obtained the blessing of Vatican II in the Constitution on the Church in the Modern World.

These few remarks provide a brief insight into the very rich reflections proposed by Congar on the current theological situation. Perusal of this volume will help to an understanding of the trends of our times and to a balanced assessment of the place of Vatican II in the history of thought in our century.

Pennsylvania State University

GEORGE H. TAVARD


It is difficult to review a teacher so acclaimed as the late Fr. Richard, for when he turns author he still remains very much a teacher. The clarity with which he shows us how to read van Buren, Robinson, and Cox testifies to a classroom manner which would undoubtedly earn students' gratitude. For he is patient and painstaking in leading us through their works. His approach is sympathetic, and in the process he has an opportunity to recall to us distinctions like supernatural/preternatural, do his part to restore to favor the Bultmannian proposals, and generally help us through some rather difficult material.

Yet, if one has managed to read van Buren, Robinson, and Cox, then he might well find this book superfluous. In this sense it is essentially a second-hand piece. It is a careful and sympathetic presentation of what has been said, with a glance now and then at some of the roots of the movement, such as Bonhoeffer, Ebeling, and others. There is some judicious critique of the criteria employed especially by van Buren, namely, "empirically-minded man." This, like J. J. C. Smart's "scientific plausibility," is a persuasive way of making an epistemological point. What is most disappointing in the book is its silence on the critical, crucial questions which the author raises. He notes that van Buren refuses to talk about "the transcendent God of objective reality" (p. 74); "the more serious and more characteristic problem of secularization," R. feels, "is not historic factuality so much as objective reality, especially the objective reality of God" (p. 73). The issue does not lie so much in the area of biblical theology, in other words, as in the more critical and rigorously philosophical areas of language about God. However,
R. makes no forays into this area nor does he note any of the extensive literature which has begun to speak of more sophisticated criteria than those taken over by van Buren from an exhausted positivism. In other words, his presentation is sympathetic and thorough but seldom penetrating.

There is, however, an even more incisive critique of this work. Perhaps our two years' vantage point on the author of the original manuscript puts us in a better position than he to assess the optimism of Cox and his brand of secularizers, but few of us would hold that optimism to be justified today. One fears that R.'s experience here was far too secondhand: "it has been our personal experience while lecturing on these themes that someone in the audience will almost always want to argue that Cox's optimism is refuted by one obvious fact, namely, the progressive breakdown of morality throughout the modern world. But we find ourselves very much on the other side" (p. 162). He goes on to nicely castigate the narrow conceptions of "morality" implied in this objection, but then adds: "we would likewise have to consider, still to make the picture really complete, the evolving attitude on such further matters as international and personal liberties, the constantly growing and articulated respect, in principle certainly, for the sovereignty of even the smaller nations, and for the civil rights of all groups within any given nation. In our view, then, Cox's thesis is profoundly valid: the Gospel and the world take the same direction" (p. 162). This statement today represents a tissue of naivete and optimism unwarranted by the subsequent facts of American domestic and foreign policies and their execution. Indeed, the facts of the past two years have done more to undermine the project of "secularization theology" than any amount of academic response or critical reading thereof. Paul Minear, speaking at the University of Notre Dame symposium on Vatican II, strongly objected that the Constitution on the Church in the Modern World was far too accommodating and simplistic in its view of progress. Specifically, he noted the absence of any reference to those destructive powers so evident in the NT, and the constant tendency to speak of evil as a lack or imperfection. R. ends his book by noting the convergence of this conciliar document and the style of secularization theology. History has proven Minear and the NT authors more perceptive than either Council fathers or well-meaning and well-fed theologians of a secular persuasion.

*University of Notre Dame*

**DAVID B. BURRELL, C.S.C.**


It should be said at the outset that the present work is a work of value. The author is a Dominican friar who studied psychology at the University
of Montreal and is presently professor of moral theology and dean of studies at the Saulchoir. The basic effort in this work is to integrate the studies of Jean Piaget on the development of cognitive processes in children with the theological teaching on faith and other religious processes. The work must be praised as a well-wrought attempt to bring the resources of contemporary psychology to the understanding of man's religious experience.

To this basic treatise are appended some previously published papers which had appeared in the pages of *Supplément de la Vie spirituelle*. They deal with subjects of considerable interest—affectivity in the knowledge of God, penance, and clerical celibacy—fertile areas of consideration. But we shall confine our comments to the major thesis of the book.

The major thesis, briefly, is that the cognitive aspects of religious thought and faith share many parallel elements with what Piaget described as preformal and precausal thinking in children. Piaget's studies led him to formulation of the development of thinking as progressing from a kind of egocentric and "syncretistic" thinking to increasingly causal and logical models of thought as the child's thinking capacity matured. Before the age of seven or eight, Piaget felt, the types of causal explanation determinable in adults were still largely undifferentiated and causal explanation was almost entirely identified with motivation. Precausality was a kind of primitive relation in which causation still carried the overtones of a quasi-psychological explanation. The why's of the world were the why's of motivated action and intention. The whole is colored by varying degrees of animism and anthropomorphism.

A work of the present kind raises many difficult problems, not the least of which is whether an analysis of religious thinking on these terms is even possible. One must be careful, of course, of succumbing to the easy temptation to say that religious thought is syncretistic or precausal. There is a delicate but significant difference between saying that religious and precausal thought share certain descriptive elements and saying that religious thought is precausal. There is at work a kind of reductionist fallacy quite widespread among social scientists who study religious phenomena. Durkheim begins his classic work on the forms of religious life by defending the methodological point that the best way to understand religion in general is to study it in its most primitive and simple forms. The approach has its rewards, but it is something like studying the thinking of babies and drawing conclusions about human thinking in general. It is obvious that human thought is fully manifest only in its most complex and sophisticated forms. A similar case can be made for the study of religious phenomena.

The question, then, must be raised whether the complex symbolism and belief of mature religious thinking is really precausal after all. The whole
area is poorly studied, probably because the techniques of social science are poorly adapted to the study of such phenomena and because the phenomenon of mature religious thinking is difficult to identify. Mature religious thinking is not always found where one might expect it. Nonetheless, there is some evidence to suggest that religious faith can better be considered as a transcending of precausality than as an immersion in it. One can cite Godin's study of the development of faith (Lumen vitae, 1958) in children, in which the operative aspects were the capacity to use and understand symbols and the ability to recognize and accept mystery.

The present work serves the useful end of underlining the availability of a certain set of concepts and a vocabulary with which we can approach these difficult matters. What is more important than a reductive analysis is the delicate business of illumining the ways in which precausal elements function in the more mature context of a more developed religious disposition. The precausal elements are not lost in the process of maturation, but they are meaningfully transformed.

W. W. MEISSNER, S. J.


We are now just on the verge of releasing Feuerbach studies from the two-pronged vise in which they have been held for too long. One of these prongs is very general in nature and concerns the way in which Feuerbach has been conventionally treated in the history of philosophy. He is usually handled as the "skip" in the hop-skip-and-jump approach to the development of German thought from Hegel to Marx. His value is confined to his transitional function in the growth of the Hegelian Left on its way toward Marxian humanism. This view of him is venerable, since it represents the estimation of the intellectual situation made over 120 years ago by Marx and Engels themselves. But it is only one variant way of reading Feuerbach and, indeed, one that becomes more and more difficult to maintain in the degree that our historical sense gets educated. The more one probes into Feuerbach, the more one realizes that he is a thinker worth studying for his own sake, and not primarily as a way station to someone else's philosophy.

The other prong of the vise is held in place by the historians of theology who have been so impressed by his Essence of Christianity that they are reluctant to widen the scope of their research to include his other works on religion (apart from those aphorisms which fit into the functional treatment
of Feuerbach as a path toward understanding Marx on religion). This again is a venerable closure of attention, sanctioned both by those who fulminated against this formal study of Christianity and by those (like Barth and Buber) who glamorized its impact on the Christian sensibility. The only difficulty is that the conventional neglect of Feuerbach’s later writings is forced to depend on the shaky hypothesis that he went to seed very rapidly. But the fact is that, after writing the Principles of the Philosophy of the Future (in which the students of Marx’s genesis are mainly interested) and the Essence of Christianity (in which the theologians are mainly interested), he finally felt prepared to tackle the main issues in his own fashion. One of the products of the strong creative spurt enjoyed by Feuerbach after 1845 is the book presently translated for the first time, Lectures on the Essence of Religion.

Here he takes a retrospective look at his earlier writings, noting that despite their diversity of direct content “all have strictly speaking only one purpose, one intention and idea, one theme. This theme, of course, is religion or theology and everything connected with it. I am one of those who very much prefer a fertile one-sidedness to a sterile, futile versatility and prolixity; who throughout their lives have only one purpose in mind, upon which they concentrate all their powers; who study widely and intensively and never cease to learn, but who teach only one thing and write about only one thing—in the conviction that such singlemindedness is the only means of exhausting a subject and accomplishing something in the world.” Anyone who has been puzzled by the praise given to Feuerbach by a mind apparently so diametrically opposed to his—by Søren Kierkegaard—will recognize in this theme of singlemindedness a likeness to Kierkegaard’s own lifelong focus on “only one thing.” Kierkegaard concentrates on the question of what it means to become an individual and thus to keep trying to become a Christian; Feuerbach concentrates on the question of what it means to become a man and thus to uncover the human function of religion.

The plateau which Feuerbach reached in these Lectures is that of being able at last to analyze the nature of religion more generally than in his studies of Christian dogma and practice. He retains two traits from his previous research: a special concern about the Christian expression and manifestation of the religious phenomenon, and a lively interest in theological statements considered precisely for their (often inadvertent) power to reveal something about the religious disposition of the community within which they are framed. But he is no longer satisfied with an incantatory appeal to the Hegelian concept of projective alienation as an explanation of religion. In this latter respect, he regards the other Left Hegelians as being somewhat retarded and lacking in sensitivity toward the religious reality. Feuerbach
invokes the principle of plural analysis of religion: "To gain an understanding of religion, we must not account for it by any single cause, or rather, we must assign each cause its proper place." On this basis, he is dissatisfied with the purely consolatory role assigned to religion in the Marxian account of it as the sigh of the oppressed, as well as with Schleiermacher's one-tone appeal to the feeling of dependence. These lectures show what can be done in relating the religious to man's striving for happiness and his imaginative power.

Saint Louis University

James Collins


One of the more curious events in the world of books was the publication in 1963 of the "only authorized translation of The Philosophy of Martin Buber," which was to appear in the same year. It did in fact appear in 1963, but only in the bibliography of Maurice Friedman's Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue. At long last we have the English "original."

Another curiosity comes to mind, this one connected with the person of B. himself. As Union Theological's James Muilenberg puts it, "Buber is the great Jewish teacher of Christians" (p. 382), yet a recent symposium conducted by Commentary showed, according to Milton Himmelfarb, that Buber's influence on Jewish thought in America is "relatively slight" (The Condition of Jewish Belief, p. 3).

This book, however, gives a sense of the astonishing breadth of B.'s interests and influence. There are thirty essays dedicated to various facets of B.'s thought: metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of religion and of history, education, politics, Hasidism, Christianity, and American Pragmatism.

There are "autobiographical fragments" assembled by B. himself and, most importantly, B.'s reply to the critical comments addressed to him. Maurice Friedman, in addition to contributing a perceptive essay on B.'s ethical theory, has painstakingly compiled a thirty-nine-page bibliography.

When someone says, "I do not philosophize more than I must" (p. 702), and insists, "I have no teaching. I only point to something. . . . I have no teaching, but I carry on a conversation" (p. 693), such a man imposes on critics a form of inquiry to which few are accustomed. For this reason a number of the critical essays have more weight as directed against systematizers of B.'s thought than against B. himself.
Charles Hartshorne begins his essay with the words: "Buber has no
metaphysics; Buber is one of the greatest of metaphysicians" (p. 49). B.'s
response to this is to accept only the first part of that statement. All of
Hartshorne's closely-reasoned argument concerning God as the absolutely
relative, the Transcendental Relativity, seems so alien to B.'s style of
thinking that he replies with great brevity. In fact, at one point he is led to
remark how difficult it is for him to find a common language with a modern
metaphysician (cf. p. 717).

The great fascination of a book of this sort is to see what new clarifications
critics will be able to evoke from an author. This process is, of course,
especially appropriate in the case of B., who for so many years was the
great apostle of dialogue. He was moved by one remark to shed more light
on the following point in his theory of I-Thou: the apogee of the I-Thou
relation is not necessarily found in spiritual friendship. On the contrary, B.
says, the I-Thou relationship "seems to me to win its true greatness and
powerfulness precisely there where two men without a strong spiritual
ground in common, even of very different kinds of spirit, yes of opposite
dispositions, still stand over against each other so that each of the two
knows and means, recognizes and acknowledges, accepts and confirms the
other, even in the severest conflict, as this particular person" (p. 723).

Furthermore, B. does not esteem solicitude (Fürsorge) as the access to the
otherness of the other. Unless one has this access apart from solicitude, one
may clothe the naked and feed the hungry all day and yet it will remain
difficult for such a one to say a true Thou. "If all were well clothed and well
nourished, then the real ethical problem would become wholly visible for
the first time" (p. 723).

There are many riches in this book, and some poignant memories, e.g.,
Helmut Kuhn's recollection of B. in the dark days of 1933 speaking with
great simplicity and cheerfulness of the miracle: how the expectation of and
the belief in the possibility of the world-transforming miracle (perhaps it is
near, tomorrow already it may come to pass) transforms the soul into a
vessel of readiness (cf. p. 654).

The editors merit our deep gratitude for making this volume available to
us. Repetition, the ever-present danger in this sort of collection, is held to
a minimum. The articles which needed to be translated into English read
well. Only occasionally does a sentence betray its origin, as in "Judaism has
experienced itself as the by God ordained for the world's sins vicariously
suffering people" (p. 346).

Georgetown University

WILLIAM C. McFADDEN, S.J.

Kuhns presents a helpful introductory volume for a better understanding of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Since his thought has become the seminal basis of much modern theologizing and pastoral reform, this book serves an especially valuable purpose. The main advantage of K.'s presentation is his skilful interweaving of B.'s thought and life. B. is not converted into a disembodied intellect, a rarified Germanic theological computer. On the contrary, B. comes through as the deeply committed churchman and scholar who hammered out his theology amid the crisis of the German Church struggle under the Nazis.

Many facets of B.'s thought, as K. points out, offer stimulating challenges for Church reform, especially for the Roman Catholic community. The strong sense of "Christ existing as a community," evident in B.'s writings from his earliest days, urges reform-minded Catholics to reassess their own view of community. Does a juridical and abstract supercollectivity still distort the life and witness of more personal and concrete communities in the Church? B.'s own life manifested the vital importance of Christian community for his own spiritual growth: the community of like-minded men who drew up the Barmen Declaration, the intimate community of his seminarians at Finkenwalde, the precarious community of those in the Abwehr who plotted against Hitler's life, and the community of family and friends to whom the Tegel prison letters were addressed.

Kuhns finds that B.'s insistence on authority in a visible Church has a special affinity for Catholics. Although K. does not sufficiently consider the newer orientations in Catholic thinking on authority, he does indicate how B.'s less legalistic views about ecclesial authority could complement older Catholic perspectives. Authority is for service and mission in concrete situations, in which the Church, itself under the constant judgment of God, must learn to speak a risk-filled and commanding word. It is not enough for authority to be legally vindicated; it must be willing to place its prestige and even its life on the line, if it would aspire to inspirational leadership.

A renewed form of Christian anthropology, in the Bonhoeffer style, can also foster Church renewal. K. analyzes this anthropology into a search for this-worldly wholeness, a willingness to live fully in the concrete moment, and a sensitive ability to respond to human needs in each place. Such a view of man is depicted in terms of worldly holiness and secular transcendence. Although these terms are hard to define adequately, they are partially clarified in contrast to the individualistic, provincial, and other-worldly concerns of B.'s homo religiosus. Worldly holiness calls for the gospel metanoia,
which implies humble listening and suffering involvement with Christ truly incarnate and crucified in the human family. In this realm, neither cheap grace nor easily realized justification is of much avail. Rather, one must be willing to shoulder the painful task of reconciliation in a value-laden but alienated humanity.

Relatively little has been written about two other dimensions of B.'s life, namely, his attitudes toward war and his views of the ecumenical movement. K. explores the reasons for B.'s gradual movement from a pacifist position to one of active resistance to the Third Reich. Just as B.'s personal life became more fully involved in the world, so too his ecumenical writings constituted an uncompromising summons to the Churches for engagement in the "worldly" life. In so doing the Churches would cultivate unity and participate in the sufferings of God in the world.

Although this book is generally well organized and readable, it would have been improved by less repetition. Of course, it is unavoidable that the author should repeat some of B.'s key insights. But had the manuscript been reduced by fifty pages, a clumsy kind of unsynthesized repetition could have been eliminated. Yet this is small criticism for an otherwise worth-while book.

University of Santa Clara

EUGENE C. BIANCHI


Adler's book is a twentieth-century rarity: a clearly and forcefully written philosophical work that treats a substantive question with a calm and detached objectivity and competence. His main theses are these: first, the question whether man differs in kind or merely in degree from all other types of things on earth is one that can be adequately answered neither by philosophy nor by science alone, but only by the two working together. Next, the phrase "differs in kind" needs precision. In general, two things differ in kind when one possesses a characteristic totally lacked by the other. But there are differences in kinds of kind, too. A "superficial" difference in kind is one that exists between two beings which have a basic, underlying unity in their ontological make-up but one falls above a certain critical threshold in the perfection of that make-up and the other does not, with the result that the one can perform certain kinds of acts that the other cannot. A "radical" difference in kind is had when the ontological constitution of one being contains a factor that the other simply lacks.

Taking as premise the admitted fact that only man has propositional speech in a true sense, A. argues that man’s difference from other beings
must be one of kind. The question is, what sort of difference in kind, "superficial" or "radical" (the terms are in quotes to indicate that they are intended to be descriptive only, without pejorative connotation)? Put another way, does or does not man's nature contain a factor found in no other type of being—an immaterial factor, in the terms of traditional Western philosophy? A.'s contention is that this question cannot yet be answered, but it will be at some time. For if man's technology succeeds in devising a machine that can, by dint of its highly sophisticated electrical circuitry, employ propositional speech in the same manner that man does, it will be shown clearly that man's distinctive trait is not distinctive at all, but rests merely on the more highly developed make-up of his physical brain. This is not merely a hypothetical matter: technologists are trying to perform such a feat right now, particularly in the Turing robot experiment.

The consequences of the Turing experiment are far-flung. If man differs only superficially—if, that is to say, all that man does (and hence is) can be duplicated in principle by a machine—it will follow that there is no particular reason for regarding man as a person and other things as nonpersons. This will have resounding ramifications in ethics, politics, religion, and other fields. The repeated failure of the Turing experiment, on the other hand, would tend to support man's uniqueness (it would not prove it apodictically, as failure could always be laid to laboratory and technical inadequacies). It would also place in jeopardy the principle of the strict phylogenetic continuity in nature, so dear to contemporary science since the days of Darwin.

A. brings an appalling amount of data to his book. He knows his philosophy and, more particularly, his history of philosophy (his knowledge of the Thomistic position is as accurate as it is rare in contemporary philosophy), and he knows his science and technology. What is more, he welds it all into a unified and comprehensible whole. Clifton Fadiman's capsule comment on the book characterizes it well: "The Difference of Man makes a difference in one's thought. Of how many books may this be said?"

Michigan State University

MARTIN D. O'KEEFE, S.J.


The author writes as a philosopher who has found in Thomism the initial inspiration of his personal thinking, but he presents a view of man which evolves through an extended phenomenological analysis. He writes that the intuition at the base of the study is derived from the intuition of St. Thomas and that he has developed it. With this I would agree.
Through his phenomenological reflection W. argues to the reality of a life-act (soul) which is incarnate. He stresses the centrifugal aspect of this life-act and the centripetal movement from the world. So the life-act comes to existence in an already existing world, unfolds itself from its definite center, and in so doing recasts the world into its own self-acting movement (centrifugal movement). Simultaneously, from its total environment, the incarnate act returns to its source and in its own unfolding is itself conditioned by its own incarnated structures and the worldly ambiance in all its plenitude.

W. is particularly preoccupied with preserving the unity of man, incarnate-act in the world. He takes to task those who in a theory of knowledge too sharply distinguish and emphasize either the knowing subject or the known object. He would hold the ambivalence of knowledge: it is a double movement—from the subject towards the object, from the object towards the subject. It is a synthesis of subjective spontaneity and objective determination. He likewise denies the “intellectualistic” problematic as too strong a cleavage between the object “out there” and the subject as distinct from the world. He rightfully rejects the idea of the intellect as an independent faculty considered apart from the totality which is man. His position would be that “objectivity” refers to the power of intellect for knowing things-for-us-and-in-us, things as related to our expressive-centers.

Again, W. tries to preserve this unity of man which can be so easily destroyed by the philosopher who, in attempting to explain the phenomena, will speak as if first there is an act of perception, or an act of imagination, specified by an external object, and then there is an act of sensitive appetite motivated by the former, or the intellect “passes on” the known good to the will, etc. Rather, the whole process takes place within my life-act incarnate, not in the form of an action of one faculty upon another or through a succession of distinct acts, but “in the form of a continuous movement which has, no doubt, various aspects, various moments—which are called perception, imagination, affective motion—but which remains entire in each one of its expressions” (pp. 158–59).

W. has an extended treatment of “cosmic persons” (pp. 355–68). As explained by him, they are prehuman or suprahuman persons who do not belong to the earthly community, but who are in a real way present and living in me. These cosmic persons are much more perfectly personal than we are; they have no bodies similar to ours; each one is created as a personal life-act constituting the world from a cosmic center other than the earth. Through all the parts of our world we continually receive life, movement, inspiration from the cosmic persons. Our bodies are possessed, moved, fed by these cosmic personal acts. The cosmic persons are truly present at the
heart of all our perceptions, impulsions, feelings, desires, imaginations, thoughts, decisions.

This is a most confusing section of W.'s book. He asserts that our knowledge of these cosmic persons will be an approximation which will be grasped analogically, interpretatively, connatively. These cosmic persons sound at times like the separated substances of the Scholastics or the angels of revelation, but I do not see that their existence follows in any way from the author's phenomenological analysis. He attributes to them a list of attributes which in no way are substantiated by his philosophical examination.

We have said that W. has emphasized the centrifugal and centripetal aspects of the life-act, "unfolding" in the world and being influenced by it. But at times he overstates the fact that every object, insofar as it exists for me, is constituted by my life-act unfolding itself from the center which is my existence, that my world is myself incarnate. In an attempt rightfully to stress my "being-in-the-world," he seems to have my life-act informing the world. Perhaps this is an attempt to express intentional existence of the material "other" in me and thus truly structured by me with my a priori forms of sensibility and the a priori schemata which my own intellect imposes on reality—or the molds in which it receives material reality. But W.'s mode of expression seems ambiguous and inaccurate in that he does not have the metaphysical terms to express the fact that, granted my spirit informs matter and does have contact with the world which is other than spirit, yet the mode of "information" which constitutes my body is quite other than the "information" of the world which W. seems to suggest occurs in my contact with a reality distinct from myself. I would admit the contact and laud the author's attempt to express this contact, but I do not think he has done it in a philosophically satisfying way.

W. gives an extended presentation of community and concludes with an affirmation of God's existence, a study of the world in relation to God, and an exposition of human liberty "in-the-world."

My over-all view would be that W. has striven well to develop the all-important thought that man is truly spirit in the world. He has attempted to present many of the conclusions which are implicit in this proposition and stated as a most general proposition by other philosophers with a Thomistic base for speculation. But it is a slow-moving and somewhat painfully repetitious, overextended statement of what I see as the fundamental excellence of the book.

Weston College

Daniel J. Shine, S.J.
THE TEN COMMANDMENTS IN RECENT RESEARCH. By Johann Jakob Stamm. Translated with additions from the second, revised, and enlarged German edition by Maurice Edward Andrew. *Studies in Biblical Theology, Second Series* 2. Naperville: Allenson, 1967. Pp. 119. $3.50. Two sections: an introduction to the whole problem of the Decalogue (transmission, original form, age and origin, various problems that need the attention of the specialist) and an exegesis. A.’s additions to the second German edition (1962) are extensive (over thirty pages in the Introduction) and make the study worth while as a summary of recent scholarship. The latest periodical studies could obviously not be included, but the more comprehensive studies (e.g., Gerstenberger, Beyerlin, Baltzer, McCarthy) are competently handled.

The work, therefore, is most important for those general readers whose understanding of the Decalogue has advanced no further than Alt or even Mendenhall. It is possible only to mention some of the areas where most progress has been made. Alt’s designation of apodictic law and his emphasis on the cultic context continue to be analyzed more thoroughly. Thus, the criteria for a literary grouping of legal material have been newly approached by both Gerstenberger and McCarthy, the latter working especially on the supposed parallels between the Sinai covenant form and that of Near Eastern treaties.

His conclusion that no solid evidence exists for an early dating of the Sinai covenant form nor for direct dependence on extrabiblical (e.g., Hittite) treaty forms means that a different origin will have to be sought for the apodictic law. It is here that Gerstenberger has worked and has seen the origin of the prohibitions “in the Semitic clan-association, and that they were the authoritative commandments of the elders of the clan or the family” (p. 50). This would suggest the possibility of even a pre-Mosaic origin for some of the commandments, although “the commencement of the creation of the Decalogue in its whole comprehensiveness” would be placed after the Conquest, Gerstenberger even suggesting a postexilic date for the Decalogue as a complete series (p. 69). These observations only point up the extreme complexity of the study of the covenant form and of the Decalogue itself. Stamm’s and Andrew’s presentation provides a helpful synthesis of the work already done.

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Eugene H. Maly

which we commonly call 'The Letter to the Hebrews' is given with the discovery of the fourfold structure of chapter 13." After the carefully-woven argument of chaps. 1–12 about Jesus the Son and High Priest and His sacrifice and heavenly intercession, the following structure is found in chap. 13: (1) varied teaching, injunctions, and information (1–19); (2) a formal benediction (20–21); (3) further personal instructions and information (22–24); (4) the closing brief benediction (25). This fourfold structure is also noted by F. in 1 Th 5:12, 28; 2 Th 3:15–18; Gal 6:1–18; 2 Tim 4:9–22; Phil 4:10–23; 1 Pt 5:1–14, and possibly in Rom. Such a structure in the concluding chapter well suits the literary form of Heb, which F. would not simply characterize as an essay, treatise, oration, sermon or homily, biblical exposition, epistle or letter—proposals which have often been made in the past. He prefers to regard Heb as an exhortation (paraklēsis, 13:22), or better as a "written message, which sets forth vital aspects of the Christian gospel on the basis of Scripture...; it was sent from a distance to be read aloud to a Christian congregation assembled for worship, fellowship, and instruction;... the work of a leader who was known to these Christians and could speak to them concerning their current situation with a note of authority... and deep pastoral concern for their total Christian life" (p. 21). After a survey of the opinions questioning chap. 13 as an integral part of Heb, F.'s study supports the strong arguments for the unity of Heb already set forth by R. V. G. Tasker and C. Spicq. He devotes most of his attention to a comparison of key phrases and themes of Heb 13 ("yesterday," "Jesus Christ," "a sacrifice for sin," "we have an altar," "the eternal covenant," "outside the camp," "here we have no lasting city," etc.) with items of chaps. 1–12. While admitting that not every exhortation in chap. 13 will be fully paralleled in the earlier chapters, F. detects "a basic agreement in the thinking and concern" of most of them to show their intimate connection and relation. Many of F.'s arguments are quite convincing for showing the relationship of the themes of chap. 13 to 1–12; but when all is said and done, has he established any better the unity of chap. 13 itself, which may be the real question today? Does v. 19 really belong to the first part of F.'s fourfold structure? It introduces a personal note, which forces F. to include "information" into the descriptive title for this part of chap. 13, which has otherwise 18 vv. of exhortation. Together with vv. 22–25, v. 19 remains the only part of Heb which has the ring of epistolary style. Granted that F.'s arguments have not been concerned directly with style and have considered rather the content of chap. 13 in its key themes and their relation to 1–12, most of his discussion has not concerned these verses. Finally, the stylistic parallels to the fourfold structure in other NT books are not always equally
convincing; F. seems to be aware of this when he uses such descriptive phases about them as "appears rather clearly," "may be discerned" (p. 23). However, we are indebted to the author for a clear and freshly stimulating presentation of arguments bearing on the problem of Heb 13.

Woodstock College

Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J.


Polycarp's letter to the Philippians, the story of his martyrdom, and the fragments of Papias are perhaps the least interesting, if not the least important, of the Apostolic Fathers. But they do nonetheless witness to certain trends of thought in the primitive Church, and their references to scriptural writings and authors are of value in comprehending and evaluating the early Church's understanding of history as occurrence and as record. William Schoedel has subjected these writings to a careful scrutiny, and his conclusions about them are based on an analysis of both ancient and modern discussions. Most noteworthy are his defense of the unity of Polycarp's letter, and his treatment of the possibility of Polycarp's being the author of the Pastoral Epistles. A balanced treatment of the *Martyrdom of Polycarp* serves as an excellent introduction to this unusual genre; after a study of its links with both Greek myth and the Bible, S. rejects extreme interpretations that would do away with either influence. Then he analyzes the particular type of "historicity" involved here in terms of the purpose of a "Martyrdom," namely, edification, not instruction in fact. This aim is further developed through the description of the martyr as one who imitates Christ, and especially through the use of baptismal imagery, summed up aptly in the idea of the martyr's death as being his "birthday." The identity of John in Papias (and whether there are one or two of them) is a question that would require too much space to discuss here; but S. treats this quite fully, in light of his dating of Papias about A.D. 110. The texts throughout the book are heavily documented and annotated, and this often leads to a certain scattering of key ideas, a problem which could perhaps have been avoided by longer introductions. But on the whole this volume continues the excellent quality and utility of this series.

Campion Hall, Oxford

Gerard H. Ettlinger, S.J.


The *Hypomnesticon* is a com-
prehensive and systematic refutation of Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism. But few patristic scholars have realized its theological importance, and it is not even mentioned in the textbooks of Cayré and Altaner. But Chisholm has atoned for these centuries of neglect. The present volume serves as an introduction to the first critical edition of the text, which will appear in a later publication of this same series. He first describes the historical setting and shows that the six sections, called *Responsiones*, were directed mainly against the heretics Celestius and Julian. From a study of the text (the external evidence is meager and inconclusive) he proves that it was probably written between 428 and 435. A more difficult task is to determine the author. After eliminating Leo the Great, Mercator, etc., he concentrates on Prosper of Aquitaine. By comparing the latter’s doctrine, style, and use of Scripture with that of the *Hypomnematon*, he reaches the conclusion, which few will challenge, that Prosper is the anonymous author. In the closing chapters he brings out the essential harmony between Augustine and the *Hypomnematon* on the key doctrines of original sin, grace, and predestination. Yet the writer is no mere copyist. He moderates the more fearful aspects of Augustine’s *massa damnata* and offers explanations and illustrations of A.’s doctrine which show ingenuity and originality. There is a complete bibliography and general index, as well as a list of all the scriptural passages and patristic authors cited in the text. The high scholarly standard of this book makes us look forward to C.’s second volume on the same subject.

*Ponce, Puerto Rico*

**Stephen McKenna, C.SS.R.**

**ABELARD AND ST. BERNARD: A STUDY IN TWELFTH CENTURY “MODERNISM.”** By A. Victor Murray. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1967. Pp. viii + 168. $6.75. M.’s study is divided into two parts. The first traces the historical background of both Bernard and Abelard, outlines the contemporary political situation, and relates the circumstances which brought them into open conflict at the Council of Sens in 1140. The second part is a detailed study of the *Capitula haeresum P. Abelardi* containing the points against Abelard presented at Sens and an equally critical examination of Bernard’s *Epistola 190*. The book concludes with a statement of Abelard’s position on the Trinity and on the work of Christ, and Abelard’s theological method. M. successfully refutes the romantic picture of Abelard drawn by John de la Meung, George Moore, Rémusat, and Deutsch. The weakness of the book lies in M.’s failure to understand Augustinian theology. Had M. been more cognizant of Augustine’s anti-Pelagian writings, the theological content of his study would have been considerably deepened and the significance of the theological issues that separated Bernard and Abelard would
then possibly have been presented more forcibly, succinctly, and solidly. M. has written a descriptive study of a theological controversy concerning issues which he has regretfully failed to plumb. The shell of the controversy is well presented; the meat escapes him.

Woodstock College

Herbert J. Ryan, S.J.

LE THOMISME ET LA PENSÉE ITALIENNE DE LA RENAISSANCE. By Paul Oskar Kristeller. Conference Albert-le-Grand 1965. Montreal: Institut d'Etudes Médiévales, 1967. Pp. 301. The study of the history of Thomism is, in many respects, still in its infancy. A good deal of work has, of course, been done on the important figures in the Thomist tradition and on particular controversies embroiling the theological schools. What has been lacking is the insertion of the Thomist tradition into the intellectual and cultural life of each period. A few years ago, Frederick J. Roensch published his Early Thomistic School (Dubuque, 1964; cf. TS [1965] 170–71), which gave biobibliographical information on the Thomists in France and England during the first fifty years; the concentration was deliberately on the defenders of the characteritic Thomist theses, while the limitation to France and England seems to have been taken for granted. The reason for this last, which is common, may be the presence of theological faculties at the great universities of these two countries; the importance of these same faculties often leads us unconsciously to consider them as self-contained worlds and not to inquire how they fitted into the larger intellectual and cultural picture. At any rate, in Italy there were no separate theological faculties at the universities until after Trent, and the student is thus more readily invited to consider what influence or role Thomism may have had outside the studia of the religious orders. K. deals with the period after the canonization of St. Thomas (1323), an event which inevitably led to his rehabilitation as orthodox, where this may have been necessary, and to a wider interest in his work; K. also limits himself to Italy. The result is a thoughtful, informative, and stimulating essay, and one which, for the lay reader, throws a new and attractive light on the Italian Renaissance as an intellectual movement. There is no need here to attempt a summation of the results of K.'s investigations, except to say that they show St. Thomas to have been indeed an honored figure but not a dominant one. However, while there were undoubtedly reasons for this which were peculiar to Italy (e.g., philosophy in the universities was in the hands of laymen who professed, for the most part, an Aristotelianism not dominated by theological considerations, and it was usually taught to laymen interested in medicine), a wider view of the intellectual scene in other countries during this period would probably yield
analogous results. K.'s conference is followed by the edition of two interesting texts: the *Opus aureum in Thomistas* by the Blessed Battista Spanoli of Mantua, O.C. (1447–1516), an attack on St. Thomas and the Thomists (pp. 127–85); and a *De beatitudine hominis* by Vincent Bandello of Castronovo, O.P. (1435–1506), addressed to Lorenzo de' Medici, against the views of Marsilio Ficino (pp. 187–279). The whole is an elegant and fascinating essay.

*Fordham University*  

M. J. O'Connell, S.J.

**The Immaculate Conception in the Divine Plan.** By Jean-François Bonnefoy, O.F.M. Translated by Michael Mellach, O.F.M. Paterson, N.J.: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1967. Pp. xviii + 75. $2.50. Controversalist to the last, B. has produced a "monumental" work, climax to his life: (a) to place the IC in the same original decree that eternally predestined the absolute primacy of Christ; (b) to establish the Scotist synthesis (the one authentic explanation for the IC and Christ's primacy) as the only true theological system, its principles having been exclusively accepted in *Ineffabilis Deus*. B.'s principal arguments: (1) If God annulled an original decree (by later introducing Christ's primacy and Mary's IC because of Adam's sin), then divine immutability is contradicted; or, if God could not effect this decree, then His omnipotence is impugned. (2) Therefore, in one and the same original decree both Christ's eternal primacy and Mary's IC are totally secured. (3) Redemption of Mary, as with the good angels, took place by preservation from possible fall. (4) Any *debitum peccati* for Mary is unthinkable. Mary is in no way under Adam's moral headship. (5) All other syntheses (even the Scotist to a lesser degree) vitiate divine immutability. Only the distinction between the substance and mode of the Incarnation (B.'s contribution) safeguards it. B.'s arguments, categories, and synthesis seem, for most today, irrelevant and unreal. The nature of original sin, the development in Christ's saving humanity, the role of Mary's IC as it universally unfolds in all men in the redeeming Christ, Gospel purification of Mary, etc., are ignored. May this historical "monument" mark the end of an old and glorious era.

*St. Joseph's Seminary, Washington, D.C.*  

Francis Schroeder, S.S.J.

**New Approaches to the Eucharist.** By Colman O'Neil, O.P. New York: Alba, 1967. Pp. 126. $3.95. Since the Eucharist is the center of our Christian life, it is understandable that loose talk about rethinking and reformulating our teachings is bound to stir up solid opposition, bitter feelings, and religious indignation. On the other hand, serious theologians must ever
dedicate energy and talents to how we can think and speak of the Eucharist in a way meaningful today—a delicate task. Pope Paul's Encyclical *Mysterium fidei* gave assurance to many, but the initial reaction in many quarters was open resentment, since this was viewed as the choking off of free and honest theological discussion. O'N. believes this reaction is almost without parallel for an encyclical of this nature; he feels that with time more sober reflection showed that the Pope was not trying to stifle discussion but was offering a valuable service to the Church by laying down sound guidelines according to which theologians are to carry out their mission of reappraising our teachings. But it is significant that this new theological controversy should center on the Eucharist; O'N. is convinced that this is because “linked with our understanding of the Eucharist is our whole understanding of the Church as the body of Christ, and, indeed, our understanding of the relationship between creation and redemption, between reason and faith, between the Christian and Christ.” He deals professedly with three specific points recently controverted. One concerns the value of the private Mass, a question that has arisen again since Vatican II gave permission for con-celebration. O'N. offers balanced advice on this timely subject. Another problem is the Real Presence. The praiseworthy attempts of many to speak of the Eucharist in more meaningful personalistic terms and more dynamic language has sometimes run the risk of at least giving the impression that Christ is not present *substantially* but only as a dynamic form of spiritual energy somewhat along the lines of Calvin. The book as a whole is a model of conciseness and clarity, and reveals profound reverence, religious feeling, and professional competence. I found most helpful O'N.'s observations on why phenomenology is not able to cope with the problem of transubstantiation.

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*Michael D. Griffin, O.C.D.*  
*Washington, D. C.*

*A Catalogue of Sins: A Contemporary Examination of Christian Conscience.* By William F. May. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967. Pp. 208. $4.95. Sin and the freedom it presupposes has been overestimated in many ways. The task of preventing this overestimation, particularly the judgment of sin in the hearts of others, remains largely ahead of us. But there also exists the simultaneous task of preventing the underestimation of sin; for God's forgiveness becomes real in a man when he repents, and a man can repent only to the extent he recognizes his own sins as they actually occur in him in his contemporary situation. Without wishing to reify sins, M. seeks to examine not merely sin or sinfulness but sin
in its plurality of forms. He feels that it is underestimated when it is ab­stracted from its concrete expressions. It is this effort towards concreteness and fuller knowledge which explains, he writes, the relatively autonomous character of the essays. A chapter is devoted to each of the following sins: impurity of heart, faintheartedness, avarice, envy, hatred, neglect, betrayal, lust, deceit, craving and anxiety, pride and sloth. Description and analysis of each sin is followed by remarks biblically inspired. Many of M.'s prophetic insights may strike the reader as uncomfortably on target. Avarice, e.g., is said to be very prevalent today not because society hoards but because it burns—time and resources. The American experiences avarice not in clinging to gold but in grasping for too many activities. The sin of neglect is less visible today because "we have learned how to remove from sight the sick, the aged, the dying, the poor. . . . We seal them off in parts of town through which we never travel, or assign them to institutions we never enter." While the sin of pride belongs especially to the righteous, the self-righteous eventually become the unrighteous; the self-justifiers eventually justify murder. At its roots sloth is dejection, boredom, apathy. The slothful man is "a dead man, an arid waste. He is a medieval man in his extremity; his desire itself has dried up." At the end, M. writes of the dangers of limiting himself to the subject of sin; I take it that the reader should not separate reflections on sin from previous reflections on God and his life. But I think the book could have been improved if M. had directed the course of such reflections. If sin is "whatever violates our life in God," its mystery could be better understood by exploring it in the light of what that life is, what it is to be in God and in Christ, to be for others. M.'s insights would take on further meaning if they were cast more clearly in the light of man's interpersonal communion and of the biblical doctrine on man's solidarity in sin. His observations could have been even more helpful and practical if they had taken greater account of man's intrapersonal unity and of how sin leads to sin. In other words, while there may be advantages to looking at sins in separate essays and avoiding a systematic approach, there are also disadvantages. Concretely, one form of sin never exists except as an expression of a deeper *hamartia* or state of sin which is also concrete and real at the heart of the sinner. If the real must be reached through synthesis as well as analysis, the reader may hope that M. will choose to supplement this excellent analytical study; he is well equipped for the task.

*Conception Seminary, Kansas City*  
*Roderick Hindery, O.S.B.*

**NEW FRONTIERS IN THEOLOGY 3: THEOLOGY AS HISTORY.** Edited by James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr. New York: Harper & Row,
1967. Pp. x + 276. $6.00. The idea behind this series is original and excellent. The work of outstanding Continental theological scholars is here discussed by the leading scholars of the U.S. The basis of each volume is a programmatic essay by a Continental scholar of note, introduced by Robinson and followed by critical and constructive contributions by American scholars. These in turn are assessed by Cobb and by the original author of the essay. This volume has its own special interest because the basic essay, "The Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth," is provided by the German theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg, whose views have been treated in recent times with increasing seriousness in Germany and elsewhere. In what seems an extreme reaction to the school of Bultmann, P. refuses to distinguish between Historie and Geschichte, and insists that history itself is the bearer of divine revelation, and that this is open to honest and unbiased critical enquiry. Religious faith supposes this enquiry and in some sense builds on it. Basic to this approach is the emphasis he puts on the resurrection of Jesus as a historical fact and the apocalyptic understanding of all history. Thus the approach of Barth and his school, which emphasizes the word as the bearer of revelation and which puts revelation itself beyond the reach of historical criticism, is equally rejected by Pannenberg. The chapters provided by Buss ("The Meaning of History"), Grobel ("Revelation and Resurrection"), and Hamilton ("The Character of Pannenberg's Theology") approach the problem from various angles and provide an excellent starting point for Pannenberg's final response, which rounds off a book which any student interested in the living theology of today will wish to read.

Canisius College, Pymble, N.S.W. William J. Dalton, S.J.

Frontline Theology. Edited by Dean Peerman. Richmond: Knox, 1967. Pp. 172. $4.50. A very good book. It is the collection of the essays which appeared in the Christian Century (1965-66) under the guideline "How I am making up my mind," and so presents, in one moderate volume, an excellent sampling of the types of theological thought guiding American Protestantism today. The authors are men in medio vitae. They were born in the fervor of an era which had rediscovered the uniqueness and "other-worldliness" of Christianity: the era of Bultmann, Brunner, the Niebuhrs, Tillich, and above all Barth. But the straight way has been lost. And so they ask and try to answer the general question, what is it to be a Christian at this new moment? More precisely they ask about as many distinct questions as there are authors (and herein lies one of the book's chief characteristics). Because the essays are relatively brief, they move quickly to central issues. The question of methodology, of the legitimacy of
the whole theological enterprise, is pervasive. The main focal points emerge as the fact and necessary acceptance of the secular as good, the historico-cultural situatedness of man, the nature of language. The key to it all, however, is the very old thing "faith": and it seems, at once, to have as many designations as the authors who use it, and to stand as the opaque source out of which all the rest flows. Hence the real questions are the questions of "God" and "man," asked from within the particular horizons of experience that are ours today. For the most part, the essays beautifully reflect the situation of mature and honest men at work in a time in which commonly-held recognitions are few. Some penetrate powerfully into the matter of man-and-God itself; equally many seem caught in peripheral issues, preambles without the full hike. The names of most of the authors should be familiar, and a few notorious. Altizer and Hamilton and Cox are there; but so are Kenneth Hamilton, Langdon Gilkey, Van Harvey, Robert McAfee Brown, John Cobb, Claude Welch, Schubert Ogden, and James Gustafson. This second group stands in the broad middle of Protestant thought, at once the most in tune with the deeper imports of the tradition, the least doctrinaire, and the most subtle and most positive. Paul van Buren, Gordon Kaufman, James M. Robinson, Jaroslav Pelikan, and Richard R. Niebuhr also have essays. They express a variety of positions and orientations (e.g., Kaufman and Robinson attempt to speak with "history" as their basis) somewhat discontinuous from the others. Two Catholic authors are included: Gregory Baum and Daniel Callahan. In all, the essays are like separately-running streams, although most flow recognizably in the same direction. A few seem aimed over cliffs, however, and hopefully will evaporate in the long fall to the bottom.

Fordham University

John Ryan

ECUMENISM, THE SPIRIT AND WORSHIP. Edited by Leonard Swidler. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1967. Pp. 258. $4.95. Twelve essays originally presented at a series of seminars and a symposium at Duquesne in 1963–65. Many of the authors are editors of the Journal of Ecumenical Studies, and their contributions show the combination of scholarly competence, sympathy for differing views, and general balance we have come to expect from that periodical. The first four essays deal with the origin and history of ecumenism and offer valuable insights into the cultural and sociological forces which have helped bring us to our present positions. Bernard Cooke, S.J., offers provocative reflections on the relationship between the Churches and the committed unbeliever. George Lindbeck's essay includes a penetrating analysis of the reasons why Catholics show a
The authors of the second set of essays, on the Spirit and spirituality, stress the importance of openness: every Christian must be open to the riches of all traditions and to the contemporary world. Douglas Steere affirms that "genuine Christian spirituality is always breaking bonds and crossing boundaries" (p. 113), and then indicates some of the bonds that tend to limit us to our own traditions and some of the points at which more boundary-crossing may be possible. In the final group of essays David Buttrick contributes a useful critique of the norms sometimes proposed for renewing worship and lists some of the major interests of contemporary Protestant liturgists. James F. White offers a historical study of the varying importance given to deontological motivation (worship from a sense of obligation) and to teleological motivation (worship to accomplish some purpose) in the course of the history of Protestantism.

Union Theological Seminary, N.Y.C. Robert C. Collins, S.J.

MANSIONS OR THE SPIRIT: ESSAYS IN LITERATURE AND RELIGION. Edited by George A. Panichas. New York: Hawthorn, 1967. Pp. 414. $8.95. Some twenty essays of two kinds: general discussions of the religious element in literature, and criticisms of works which are in one sense or another religious. Both groups are introduced by Thomas Merton in a splendid piece on Faulkner which combines theory and practice. Not unexpectedly, the most substantial of the speculative essays turn on the meaning of the word "religious" as applied to literature. For Thomas L. Hanna, the term is univocal; those works are religious "which overtly deal with a publicly recognizable presence of the divine" (p. 85). In them God or the gods are somehow active agents. Writing which deals with ultimate human concerns may be "metaphysical" but it is not yet religious. Merton suggests that besides the literature of God's acknowledged presence, there is another kind, more significant in our own time, which, though it stops short of faith, is the product of wisdom. Such a literature searches for the ultimate meaning of human existence and can effect a kind of salvation. Frederick W. Dillistone rules out the possibility of conventional religious literature "at present" and is content to term religious that writing which is open to transcendental categories and values. Charles Moeller, though he makes room for works which are explicitly religious (Claudel, Greene, Böll), also suggests other ways of "discovering the deep motivations" and "deciphering religious symbols, whether present or absent (their very absence in significant)" (p. 63) in works as unpromising as La chute and Women in Love. One infers that for Moeller all great literature is religious. Vincent Blehl is not so
permissive. In an essay admirable for its thoroughness and its attention to essential issues, he distinguishes between human values such as beauty, honesty, fortitude, etc., which can be recognized without the aid of revelation, and others, “contrition, mercifulness, patience, meekness, and peacefulness . . . [which] are possible only as responses to the God of Christian revelation and to a world seen in the light of such a response” (p. 117). Presumably only a Christian could write and appreciate fully literature which embodies virtues which are exclusively supernatural. One wonders, though, about the usefulness of so sharply drawn a distinction, and, for that matter, about its validity as a norm, especially in view of the widely-held opinion that in the actual dispensation all virtues are in fact Christian and that “Humainism too lives by the grace of Christ” (Karl Rahner, “Poetry and the Christian,” Theological Investigations 4, 365). If one accepts this position, then the important distinction is not between Christian literature and one which embodies a “vague humanism” (p. 117), but between works which are consciously and others which are anonymously Christian. The contributors ask the right questions, give intelligent and illuminating answers. One could wish that more had pursued in greater depth the theological problem of the supernatural which underlies all their discussions. On this subject, as on so many others involving the border lands of theology, the reader had best consult Karl Rahner. The article cited above is still the most penetrating consideration of the problem of religion and literature, and sets a standard by which other writings on the subject must be judged. That several of the present essays fare so well when measured by that standard is some indication of their excellence.

University of North Carolina

James A. Devereux, S.J.

REALITY AND THE GOOD. By Josef Pieper. Translated by Stella Lange. Chicago: Regnery, 1967. Pp. 120. $4.50. The translation of the revised edition (1934) of P.’s Die Wirklichkeit und das Gute nach Thomas von Aquin, first published in 1931. This work, which takes St. Thomas as guide, has a quite limited objective: to show the dependence of reason on reality and of moral conduct on reason, and thus the dependence of moral conduct on reality. The first is achieved through an epistemology which holds that “the essence of knowledge is the possession of the forms of objective reality; knowledge . . . is the identity between the knowing soul and the reality.” This position seems questionable. One may wonder whether the common meaning of the word “know” is thus realized and be inclined to require in addition knowledge of the form possessed, knowledge of the self which has become the object. But this conception of knowledge and P.’s strong realism,
which many would consider exaggerated, are not truly necessary for the principal position defended, namely, the objectivity of ethics or the dependence of moral conduct on reason and so ultimately on reality. This is well presented and urged. The Thomist insights developed here are of perennial value and deserve to be reconsidered by the many subjectivistic ethicians of today. However, in P.'s treatment of the structure of moral action we miss the delicately probing phenomenological analyses of a von Hildebrand, above all his basic distinction between value (to which P.'s "good" more or less corresponds) and the merely subjectively satisfying. Any treatment of moral action which does not take this distinction into account seems at least incomplete. Because of his limited objective, P. also has little to say concerning human freedom. This deliberate omission is more conspicuous today than when this book was first written. On the other hand, P.'s interpretation of the voice of primordial conscience ("the real should move toward that toward which it tends by its nature to move") does, as he says, express "a total affirmation of the meaning of the world," and is quite in line with the strong emphasis on process and evolution in contemporary ethical thought.

_Spring Hill College, Mobile_  
S. Youree Watson, S.J.

B. twice expresses his purpose: the first, "the present volume is intended as a blue-print for renewal in the religious life," accords well with the title; the second, "the present book is written then, to show religious societies of men and women how genuinely relevant is _Pacem in Terris_," represents what is actually done. B. makes us conscious that in working for our renewal we must keep the broad perspectives of the People of God in the modern world very much in view. But one of the more "meaningful insights" given us by _Perfectae caritatis_ is that the first principle for renewal is the Gospels, followed by the specification of the spirit and aims of the particular founders. As B. frankly notes, "the appeal of Pope John in _Pacem in Terris_ is not made through the Gospels." And obviously the Encyclical has nothing to say of religious founders, to whom B. gives only nodding recognition. Thus, the "plan for renewal" is a very partial one, though B. does not seem aware of this. The basic assertion seems to be that the union of Christ with His Church is best manifested by the social doctrine of the Church, and a religious institute is to be evaluated in so far as it implements this social doctrine. This we cannot readily accept as an ultimate criterion. Otherwise the young legitimately ask themselves and us, why stay or why enter? Can
one not serve this social mission of the Church equally well as a lay person? Why consecrated celibacy? It is such an excessively task-orientated concept of religious life, much more than a failure to respond to today's social needs, which is the cause of fewer vocations and "temporary vocations." A true "plan for renewal" must aim to renew the inner wellsprings of union with Christ in the Church that are specific of religious life and give it its particular meaning among the People of God. Too much emphasis and space is given in this short book to the negative. And that which is presented is in many respects a caricature of the reality that exists in many if not most of our religious institutes in America today. Fighting a caricature does not produce very convincing results, even when much of what is said is really quite good. In this "plan for renewal" one especially senses an absence of appreciation for community and above all for that "summit of Christian activity," the liturgical worship of the community. However, in presenting an almost exclusively natural and social-minded program for renewal, B. does articulate well the outlook of not a few young religious. Those working in renewal leadership need to fully understand this view in order to integrate its very real positive contribution and to help those espousing it come to a fuller and more integral understanding of religious life and its role in the Church and the world today. If they have not already been adequately indoctrinated by their own young religious, they might profit from reading this book.

Saint Joseph's Abbey, Spencer, Mass. M. Basil Pennington, O.C.S.O.

LAW FOR LIBERTY: THE ROLE OF LAW IN THE CHURCH TODAY. Edited by James E. Biechler. Baltimore: Helicon, 1967. Pp. 221. $5.95. The proceedings of a three-day seminar (October, 1966) for a select group of theologians, historians, philosophers, sociologists, and canonists, sponsored by the Canon Law Society of America for the renewal of canon law. The papers and discussions have as their fundamental theme the role of law in the Church today, rather than simple changes to be made in today's Church law. Thus the questions of authority and freedom, law and conscience, and openness to change and stability are treated from the scriptural, theological, philosophical, historical, and legal viewpoints, with summaries of discussions. The papers are grouped under the headings "The Historical Context," "The Scriptural Dimension," and "The Dynamism of Law," with discussion summaries after each section. David Stanley points out the present need to restore balance between law and the function of the Spirit, and illustrates the adaptability of the early Church in its distinction between the reality of the Christian community and the means by which it was promoted. John Noonan indicates the need for a regular review by experts from all relevant
disciplines to ascertain the possibilities and opportuneness of timely revisions of different experimental and formative rules of law. James Hennesey asserts that the American heritage should help in the renewal of the American Church, which has always been a Church of paradoxes. Barnabas Ahern admirably treats the relationship between law and the gospel message of the Christian way of a life of love, then offers a thought-provoking criticism of the Code in terms of its lack of doctrinal orientation, its emphasis on means instead of ends, and its failure to capture the unique character of life in the Church. Daniel O'Hanlon capsulizes the style of authority in the Church as it should result from the real nature of authority. The second discussion summary then presents the important observation of one participant that many expect renewed canon law to achieve unrealistic goals, whereas law should be concerned with the removal of obstacles to the creation of Christian community, which is the work of the Spirit. The function of law is to create conditions to make Christian community and holiness possible. In the third section Charles Curran points out that overemphasis on law serves as a crutch which prevents the teaching Church from exerting the efforts really necessary, for it is easier (but ineffective) to teach in terms of mortal sins to be avoided rather than real values to be sought. Curran also summarizes the tensions between laws of the community and rights of the individual. Ladislas Orsy demonstrates how the Church could take inspiration from English common law to restore the balance needed between stability and openness to change and development. The statement of consensus reached by the participants incorporates ideas of NT theology of Church law and authority, makes observations on the role of law in the Church from theological, philosophical, sociological, and historical viewpoints, and offers recommendation for the renewal of canon law in terms of general principles and methods to be followed, along with practical suggestions for experimentation.

Collegio di Santa Croce, Rome  
William F. Hogan, C.S.C.

obstacles. Should he begin with the leadership or with the common people? He arrived in rags to meet the Emperor of Japan and was turned down. He donned princely robes to meet the potent feudal Lord of Yamaguchi, was warmly accepted, given a temple to live in, permission to preach—and could count five hundred converts two months later. While unable to make exact translations of Christian ideas into the Japanese idiom, he did remarkably well. Instead of a strictly theological presentation, he relied on a devotional approach to the mysteries of religion—a method successful enough to keep Christianity alive during the centuries when the West was kept out of the Far East. In the second phase the catechism approach became dominant. At first an underground religion because of political opposition to Western influences, the Church gradually emerged and expanded. By and large, very little was done to adapt Christianity in this period to the mentality of the people. Hugolin pioneered a new look in adaptation in the 1930’s. He was influenced by the rejuvenation in European catechetics, but conducted his own experiments on the home front with Japanese catechumens. The war came to slow down all efforts. But in 1956 Japan held a catechetical year, crowned by a catechetical week in Tokyo in August. Spurred by the kerygmatic fervor of Hofinger and the pre-evangelization theories of Nebreda, the work of adaptation is now in full swing in the Japanese Catholic community. M.’s book is a well-documented, fascinating history of the peak experiences of the catechetical movement in Japan.

Catholic University of America Alfred McBride, O.Praem.

HARNACK AND TROELTSCH: TWO HISTORICAL THEOLOGIANS. By Wilhelm Pauck. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1968. Pp. x + 131. $4.50. When a scholar of the stature of Pauck publishes even a slim volume such as this present warm tribute to Adolf von Harnack and Ernst Troeltsch, theologians instinctively take notice. This book contains two biographical sketches of the famous historical theologians which in substance P. delivered as the Tipple Lectures in 1967 at Drew Theological Seminary. The essay on Harnack is an expanded and reworked version of P.’s presidential address to the American Theological Society in 1964 and which was published the following year in Handbook of Protestant Theologians. The biographical study of Troeltzsch, under whom P. studied at the University of Berlin almost fifty years ago, takes up more than half the volume. P.’s work contains an Appendix in which he has translated Troeltsch’s contribution to the Festschrift dedicated to Harnack on his seventieth birthday in which Troeltzsch assesses the theological contribution of Harnack and F. C. Baur. The Appendix also contains Harnack’s moving eulogy of his friend delivered at Troeltzsch’s
funeral. Thus P. has presented his estimates of Harnack and Troeltsch and their estimates of one another. There is much to interest the theologian in this work, especially younger theologians who will be quick to grasp that in this book the medium is the message. P. typifies the humanist tradition of theology, not only in choosing to write about Harnack and Troeltsch, but in the very manner of his writing. Subtly by tone, style, and selective praise for the scholarship, devotion to work, gentility, and pastoral zeal of the subjects of his biographical studies, P. inculcates respect for the tradition of historical theology. One hopes that P.'s humanistic lesson will be read and pondered and that another generation of theologians will carry on the tradition that he himself so well exemplifies.

Woodstock College

Herbert J. Ryan, S.J.

BULTMANN–BARTH AND CATHOLIC THEOLOGY. By Heinrich Fries. Translated by Leonard Swidler. Duquesne Studies: Theological Series 8. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1967. Pp. 26 + 182. $4.50. Scholars are familiar with the original German work of Fries, which appeared over a decade ago. Swidler has made F.'s delicate and accurate observations on the similarities and differences in the three theologies available to a wider public. This is quite fortunate, because F. handles a difficult subject with ease, and the volume could well serve as an introductory text for students or for those not overly acquainted with Barth and Bultmann. The book is arranged simply, proceeding from the things held in common to the differences, then going on to the theology of demythologization and the relation of Barth and Catholic theology to the hermeneutic principle of demythologizing. Swidler's Introduction is a valuable addition to the original text. The translation, as far as this reviewer could discern, is accurate and readable. Major issues of significant theologians are so succinctly presented that this book should have a reasonably wide reading public.

Loyola University, Chicago

P. Joseph Cahill, S.J.

TILLICH: A THEOLOGICAL PORTRAIT. By David Hopper. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1968. Pp. 189. $4.50. An overview of Tillich's life and thought, written for a wider audience than that of the Tillich specialist but hardly a simple popularization. It is written with the conviction that “Tillich's own major purpose was to address life and that he was a man among men.” Therefore this portrait seeks to accentuate the bond of life and thought in T.'s work which H. believes to be the main mark of his existential thinking. The first part deals with various formative influences, the controversy with Barth, and the Hirsch affair. Emanuel Hirsch was one of the early proponents
of the ideas of religious socialism with which T. was also associated. Later Hirsch abandoned religious socialism to work for the Nazi-supported German Christian group within the German Evangelical Church. The controversy which followed forced T. to make much more precise his early doctrine of kairos. The last chapter, an exposition of the main ideas of the Systematic Theology, is preceded by a chapter which elucidates T.'s long-neglected 1912 treatise Mysticism and Guilt-Consciousness in Schelling's Philosophical Development. It is H.'s thesis, undoubtedly correct, that this early work is an indispensable guide to determining the structure of T.'s thought. "Fichte, Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher represent thinkers whom Tillich knew intimately before World War I." Without a detailed knowledge of the background of German idealism, T.'s ontology is completely unintelligible. H. has thus exposed the trick which many people suspected all the time. T.'s theology will only look like something dealing with concrete existence to those who are willing to get themselves involved in the whole set of conceptual confusions and fantastically undisciplined uses of language which constitutes German idealism. I suspect, however, that H. would not put the conclusion exactly this way.

Yale Divinity School

EDMUND HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY. By Joseph J. Kockelmans. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1967. Pp. 359. $7.95. As phenomenological psychology cannot be meaningfully discussed without showing both its foundations in a phenomenological philosophy and then the service it is to render, in its turn, to that philosophy, and as K., addressing a North American audience presumably little informed about phenomenology, carries out the task of filling in the needed philosophical background very thoroughly, this work could actually be used to introduce a student to Husserl's philosophical thought. Care in defining technical terms, accuracy, simple style, and an easily followable historical approach assure the work's success as an introduction. For the advanced student of Husserl's thought, the work offers a handy summary (unfortunately based largely on secondary sources) of the relevant history of psychology and a précis of the long work Phenomenological Psychology which can prove helpful in finding one's way about in that fairly recently edited study. All in all, K.'s book covers much the same ground as Hermann Drue's Edmund Husserl's System der phänomenologischen Psychologie (1963). In the concluding chapter a few remarks situating Husserl's thought in relation to his successors reveal K.'s preference for Heidegger's ontology. The discussion was obviously not meant as a full-fledged critique of Husserl's project of a phenomenological
psychology, but more as an indication of the issues which would be involved in such a critique. K. raises the right ones, and because it is there the deeper philosophical interest of the subject begins, I am disappointed that this serious student of phenomenology did not go on to complete his study with a fuller critical statement.

University of Toronto

Thomas Langan

CHRIST IN THE THOUGHT OF TEILHARD DE CHARDIN. By Francisco Bravo. Translated by Cathryn B. Larme. Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1967. Pp. xviii + 163. $4.95. A short and smoothly-flowing summary of Teilhard’s Christology, an outline of “the Teilhardian vision of the world and Christ in the process of unification,” not a study in depth but “a panorama of the whole” (p. 138)—compact, clear, well organized, translation excellent. The central and longest section is a study of the place and function of Christ in the cosmos, and treats synthetically T.’s ideas of Christ-Omega, Incarnation, redemption, Christogenesis, the Church and the Eucharist, and the Parousia. This main section is preceded by three short introductory chapters that lucidly sketch T.’s scientific phenomenology, his general scientific theory of evolution; the matter contained in The Phenomenon of Man and Man’s Place in Nature, as well as that scattered in diverse essays, is skilfully condensed and presented in essence. The book concludes with two stimulating chapters. The first evaluates the significance of T.’s Christology for contemporary theological renewal; the evaluation is positive and the lines of progress indicated seem productive. The last chapter considers T.’s theology in terms of its relevance for current pastoral renewal; again, B.’s ideas are excellent and well expressed. He makes manifest the importance of T.’s thought for the proclamation of Christ in today’s world. Evangelization is not a matter of bringing Christ to the world, but of arousing the awareness that Christ is present in the world and that He calls man to Himself. A short, enjoyable, accurate introduction to T.’s theology of Christ.

Catholic University of America

Robert L. Faricy, S.J.

BOOKS RECEIVED

[All books received are listed here whether they are reviewed or not]

Scriptural Studies

BOOKS RECEIVED

Doctrinal Theology


Recla, Henricus, O.F.M. *Andreae Vega, O.F.M. doctrina de iustificatione et Con-


Moral Theology, Canon Law, Liturgical Questions


Pastoral and Ascetical Theology, Devotional Literature


History and Biography, Patristics


**Philosophical Questions**


Special Questions


