BOOK REVIEWS


Too much historical erudition is often believed to obstruct philosophical reflection. Prof. Collins' study on the founders of the philosophy of religion clearly shows that at least in this field a detailed knowledge of the historical origins is indispensable for a correct understanding of our present philosophical attitudes and methods. His analysis of the treatment of religion by Hume, Kant, and Hegel reveals at once the limits and the potential of this controversial branch of philosophy.

What distinguishes the three leading philosophers of the century 1730-1830 from their predecessors in the study of religion is an attempt to undertake this study independently of theology or any other extraphilosophical considerations and to incorporate it into the totality of autonomous philosophical inquiry. Their work laid the foundation for a new branch of philosophy. It also marked the beginning of secularization insofar as Hume, Kant, and Hegel were among the first to consider religion an integral part of man's mundane experience. Such a secularization does not necessarily reduce religion to a mere experience. In fact, C. absolves all three philosophers from this sort of reductionism. "The approach which they take is that of analysts, rather than creators and founders, of religion among men. Whatever their ultimate expectation of making a radical evaluation and transformation of religious meanings, they see the initial need for respecting the actual forms and shapes of their subject matter" (p. 355). When Hume refers to hope and fear as the origins of religion, C. considers this an expression of the same restless quest for a transcendent good found in Augustine and Pascal: only the passions are human, not the term to which they refer. Similarly, the ethical orientation of Kant's religious ideal is interpreted not as a moralization of religion but as an attempt to complete and humanize the ethics of duty by a new transcendent element. According to C., Kant fully allows for a revelational element that escapes philosophical determination. Even Hegel never "subordinates" religion to philosophy; for the same Absolute Spirit which makes philosophy the ultimate interpreter of religion, first reveals the religious content which philosophy is to express in the form of pure thought. Far from eliminating the revelation, Hegel's philosophy shows that religion must be revealed. Whether or not one entirely agrees with these unusually generous interpretations (particularly for Hume and Kant), C. certainly proves that one can accept the foundations of philosophy of religion without reducing religion itself to a purely immanent experience. By this accom-
plished scholarship the author has made it impossible henceforth to dismiss the founders of philosophy of religion as simplistic reductionists.

But this critical re-evaluation of the past is not the only achievement of the present study. More important even is C.'s analysis of these principles which would eventually result in a religious revolution. Philosophers used to consider the theory of God independently of the subjective religious act. The former was merely an overgrown appendix of metaphysics consisting mainly of some purely objective proofs that were thought to be convincing to any unbiased spirit. Religion, on the other hand, was taken to be a section of ethics dealing with a particular obligation of justice. So there was no need for a separate branch of philosophy. This need first arose after 1730, when the theory of God became "religionized," that is, indissolubly connected with man's religious attitude. To some extent this subjectivation was due to circumstances extrinsic to religion itself. In Hume and Kant it resulted from a negative attitude toward metaphysics. Since Hume's empiricism and Kant's criticism outruled any possibility of transcending the empirical, the "object" of religion was either to be discarded from philosophy or to be given a foundation in experience. Hume found this foundation in the passions of fear and hope, Kant in the implications of the moral life. By preserving his predecessors' attitude toward the theory of God while radically returning to metaphysics, Hegel made it clear that the new approach had in the meantime found its intrinsic justification and could no longer be ascribed to an antimetaphysical attitude. Hegel had a metaphysical theory of God, but he did not construct it independently of the religious attitude or even of the revelation. For him, the arguments for the existence of God were valid objective expressions of man's religious attitude, rather than rationalist constructions in a religious vacuum. Hume and Kant had shown that belief in God is not an impersonal truth which man can be coerced to accept. Hegel added that a subjective belief by no means excludes objectivity.

The emphasis on the subjective character of the religious affirmation introduces the problem of religious symbols. If the religious affirmation is never purely objective, neither is its symbolic expression. The difficulty is to define this specific character adequately. Hume found it hard to distinguish religious symbolism from "day-dreaming, impossible hypothesizing or sheer projection of our wishes" (p. 408). Kant, on the contrary, possessed the proper means to preserve the specific character of religion. His theory of the schemata of the imagination can be extended far beyond the limits of strictly theoretical knowledge. The schemata can articulate even those spheres of existence to which the laws of objective knowledge do not apply. The theory of the schematism connects Kant directly with the best contemporary theor-
ists of symbolism, particularly Ernst Cassirer. In a similar way, Hegel's theory of religion as the absolute in the form of representation also assigns religious symbols to mediate between the sensuous and the spiritual order.

The most important element for the present religious revolution, however, is that our three philosophers, by subjecting religion to an autonomous philosophical inquiry, made it into a secular value. C. points out that secularity for them never became secularism, that is, dereligionization of human life. I find this somewhat hard to believe in the case of Hume. Nor do I think that secular theologians would fully accept his description of secular man as "being under a call" and "waiting in expectation of God's help" (p. 486). But this is irrelevant next to the expertise with which C. traces secularity to one of its most important sources.

Reviewing this highly illuminating work, two basic questions may remain unanswered in the reader's mind. (1) Why should a study on the foundations of philosophy of religion be restricted to Hume, Kant, and Hegel? Lessing and Schleiermacher have probably raised more original problems in this field than Hume and Kant. C. does not fully justify his choice. Yet one cannot accuse him of arbitrariness, for originality alone does not lay foundations. This requires a philosophical system sufficiently comprehensive to incorporate original insights in a coherent interpretation of man's total experience and sufficiently balanced to transmit these insights to later generations. (2) It will be more difficult to justify C.'s recurrent concerns and expectations about "theistic realism." His study does not make it clear why such realism should be in a better position to do justice to the problem of religion. On the contrary, with characteristic honesty C. points out how philosophy of religion emerged independently of, or even in opposition to, realistic theism, and how realists even today have not come to grips with its problems. The reader unacquainted with the rest of C.'s work will want to know why he bothers with it at all. The others know that his entire opus presents the best case that can be made for realism.

In the meantime, we are grateful for what this study offers us at the critical moment when religion is attempting to understand itself. Philosophy of religion is essential in this process of self-understanding. But philosophy of religion can grasp its object only when it understands its own foundations. These I have never seen better explained than in this book.

Georgetown University

Louis Dupré


Basic: "available" and "foundational." Ferré is easy to read, clear, and
often enjoyable: the whole of chapter 11, by way of example, is cast as a
dialogue between three modern types: Simplicus, Skepticus, and Theophilus.
F. screens out nonessentials to allow room for close analysis of main prob­lems—notably the question of the existence of God. As a lucid introduction
to this topical issue, the book is surely a success. Though F. does not say so,
what he has here is a textbook for college and seminary. Aficionados, for
their part, will be interested in the arrangement of the problems, the analyses
of the classical arguments for God pro and con, and scattered pages and
sections representing F.'s own contributions. Some may find the first three
chapters, on defining "religion," a little dull. F. does not really put his foot
in the water until p. 60, where he introduces his generic definition of religion
as a "way of valuing." The general considerations which slow these chapter's
down might have been worked into the body of the text as needed and where
relevant; and the illustrations would have been more enlightening if, in­
stead of making them up, F. had taken actual historical cases. Furthermore,
his decision to include world religions in his definition prevented him from
coming quickly enough to concrete root issues. Christian theologians are
absolutely obliged to cope with world religions; but this book is really about
a specific Christian problem, and F. could have used his space more profit­
ably had he bowed to this restrictive necessity from the beginning.

Modern: from Descartes to Altizer. The chapter on Descartes and Paley
sets out the three classical "proofs": teleological, cosmological, and onto­
logical (F. also distinguishes Descartes's "semantical" argument). F. spends
several pages introducing Descartes's philosophy, explains the theistic argu­ments in some detail, and then points out underlying assumptions, difficul­ties, and possible answers to difficulties. This format is used in successive
chapters on Hume, Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Comte, James, and
some contemporaries. The reader thus has before him in a neat package most
of the basic tools for dealing directly with the substantial issues. This self­sufficiency is one of the book's main virtues. As a supplement, however, one
would need James Collins' God in Modern Philosophy (which should have
found a place in F.'s select bibliography) and his new Emergence of
Philosophy of Religion. And in an index with nearly two hundred names, the
absence of Schleiermacher, Newman, Baron von Hügel, Blondel, Henri
Duméry, and John E. Smith is surprising.

Philosophy of Religion: not philosophical theology or apologetics. F.
works as a philosopher in a philosophical field. His method is reflective rather
than purely descriptive or historical. Linguistic analysis is the school F. is
most at home in, and he makes the classical philosophical arguments lead
directly into the concerns of modern positivists and analysts. From this
point of view, the dilemma formulated by Hume in his *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* (either God is incomprehensible, and we are theological agnostics, or God is brought into the empirical world, and we become gross anthropomorphists) appears as the ancestor of contemporary positivism's challenge to theism: How can the theist's language about God be immune to disproof by empirical happenings (or nonhappenings), yet simultaneously have a meaningful or even specifiable content?

In tackling this latter problem, F. tries to defend the cognitive content of religious language by likening that language to a model or set of images (e.g., the parables of Jesus) which has some real relation to that about which it speaks. In science, models are subordinated to theory; in religion, however, model is first, theories second. The basic Christian model-image presented in the *NT* has in fact been "interpreted" into many philosophical theories—Platonism, Aristotelianism, etc.—none of which can make absolute claims. Yet even the basic model which Christianity uses is open to some ethical or value-orientated objections, and F. wonders whether current revisions will be able "to keep Christianity a living religion for those who have not abandoned it, or to draw back others who are convinced of its present inadequacy." In the end F. reluctantly concludes that "traditional religious imagery" is retained at the price of "excessive dilution of the rule of evidence," and opts out. "At present the commonly available institutional religious alternatives do seem to me, at least, to involve imagery articulated by theories that are not honestly affirmable." Two things we can and must retain, however, even in the interim: ecumenicity (embracing non-Christian religions) and *agape*. Whether F. could have arrived at a more satisfying conclusion by using a wider and deeper framework than the religious thought of Descartes and his linear descendants is, of course, another question.

*Monastery of the Holy Spirit, Conyers, Ga.*

**Anselm Atkins**


In this rather bulky volume, written in a lucid rabbinic Hebrew and in his own inimitable style, Abraham Heschel continues his analysis of religious thought and theology in the literature of the Tannaim, who taught during the first two Christian centuries in the Holy Land.

Although neither the Mishna nor the other works of the Tannaim nor those of the teachers of the Talmud, who followed in their footsteps, contain what might be regarded as systematic theology, there is no escaping the recognition of a general climate of thinking that unites the various views expressed. As Max Kadushin pointed out in his study of rabbinic thought,
Organic Thinking (1938), there was an unmistakable coherence binding together into an organic whole the welter of reflections about God, man and the world, Israel and its law, scattered throughout rabbinic literature.

In this second part of his investigation (the first appeared in 1962) H. devotes himself to a thorough discussion of what the recognized Jewish religious authorities, who were the standard-bearers of Jewish tradition during the period in question, understood by the concept of the divine origin of the Torah or Pentateuch, which is the foundation of the Jewish faith. To what extent did they consider it the work of God? Did the Creator of the universe actually write it, and how much of it came from His hand, or was Moses His amanuensis?

To answer these questions, H. marshals his vast erudition and brings to bear all available versions of the dicta of the teachers of the Mishna and the Talmudim, as well as the statements of the homilists quoted in the Midrashim. He adds thereto the interpretations of their views by later commentators to the nineteenth century.

H. discerns in the matter of the divine authorship of the Torah the same two distinct schools of thought as with reference to the topics treated in the first volume of his inquiry. Here, too, the extreme, literalistic position is taken by the ardent mystic Rabbi Akiba and his disciples. Not only did the Torah in its entirety stem from God; all its latest interpretations had been transmitted to Moses, who had for that purpose actually gone up to heaven. His opponent and colleague Rabbi Ishmael has no more doubt than Rabbi Akiba about the sanctity of the Torah and the binding power of its commandments; yet he refuses to read into the sacred text more than is actually in it. "The Torah," he says, "employs human locutions of speech." "Moses never actually went up to heaven. He merely lingered on the summit of Mount Sinai. Nor did the Divine Presence ever come down to earth." Only the first two utterances of the Decalogue emanated directly from deity; the remainder were transmitted by Moses. A distinction is even made by certain rabbinic Bible commentators between the first four books of the Pentateuch and Deuteronomy. The latter represents the words of Moses, while in the former God Himself is the speaker. Also, there were a number of decisions Moses made on his own, although they coincided with the will of God, whose approval they received later on.

Even if H. were mistaken in his conclusions, the mere collection of the materials would have made the two volumes published by him indispensable to any systematic study of rabbinic theology. So far as this reviewer is concerned, he has proven his basic thesis. The only adverse criticism that might be made is that of verbosity. A considerable amount of repetition could have
been avoided, so that the reading of the two volumes would have been less taxing.

Johns Hopkins University

Suzanne Daniel observes in her Introduction that as part of the general neglect of philological studies of the LXX there have been few systematic studies of translation technique. In her book D. has begun the description of the translation technique of the LXX on the basis of a number of detailed investigations which are intended to suggest a methodology for further research in addition to offering specific conclusions. When allowance has been made for the Hebraisms necessarily involved in such a translation, D. believes that the LXX can still pretend to represent an authentic witness to the living language of Alexandria under the Ptolemies. On the conviction that the LXX version as a whole displays relative homogeneity as a result of the pervasive influence exercised by the original translation of the Pentateuch over the translators of the other books, D. thinks that it is possible to find a consistent translation technique throughout much of the LXX. Strict methodology, she asserts, would require that a global study of the whole LXX with respect to grammar and lexicography should precede special studies of only certain parts.

In taking the first steps in such an ambitious program, D. is compelled to operate within narrow limits. She has chosen to study the area of religious concepts because of the great difference between Jewish and Hellenistic religion. But even the treatment of this subject must be restricted to the most concrete and precise of cultic terms which, though less significant in themselves, permit the elaboration of a methodology of research and exposition. The substance of the book comprises sixteen monographs dealing with terms related to the sacrificial cult and an excursus for each of three less important expressions. The structure of each monograph is more or less the same. First there is an analysis of the Hebrew term as it is found in the MT of the Pentateuch. Next follows a discussion of the Greek equivalent (on the basis of the text of Codex Vaticanus) comparable to a dictionary article. The chief concern is to determine whether the LXX interpretation of the Hebrew cultic term can be related to some tradition of exegesis reflected either in the ancient versions or in medieval commentators. Throughout these complex and technical discussions D. displays competence in the handling of the distinct disciplines of biblical science and classical philology.
By way of illustration of the author's methodology and specific conclusions, the first of the sixteen monographs (pp. 15–32) can be summarized briefly. To translate the Hebrew word for altar (misbeäh), a neologism (thysiastèrion) was created by the translators of the Pentateuch and used in the majority of instances. In a small number of passages, however, the ordinary Hellenistic word for altar (bômos), in use since Homer, was employed. Why this inconsistency? In translations of the Hebrew Bible, bômos is used only for the Pentateuch, Joshua, Isaiah, and Jeremiah. It is always employed with reference to idolatrous altars, with the exception of the ambiguous altar erected by the trans-Jordanian tribes (Jos 22). Elsewhere in these books thysiastèrion is used, always with reference to the altar of the true cult of Yahweh. In 1 and 2 Samuel, 1 Chronicles, Psalms, Lamentations, Ezra, and Nehemiah it is impossible to determine whether the translators were concerned with the distinction mentioned above, because reference is always to altars of the true cult, and hence thysiastèrion alone is employed. This holds too for Tobit, Judith, Wisdom, Baruch, and 1 Esdras. In Judges, 1 and 2 Kings, 2 Chronicles, Ezekiel, Hosea, and Amos the distinction is no longer maintained, since thysiastèrion is used for all altars indiscriminately. The late Greek versions of the Christian period also follow this practice. 1 Maccabees, as well as Christian writings in Greek, follow the lead of the Pentateuch. 2 Maccabees, however, and Ben Sira employ bômos and thysiastèrion indiscriminately, and in Philo and Josephus bômos is preferred translation for altar, in accord with secular usage.

Despite the distinction made in the LXX of the Pentateuch in the employment of thysiastèrion and bômos, D. denies that the translators had any intention of distinguishing between “good” and “bad” altars, just as no distinction was made by them between good and bad priests or prophets. Nor would they have introduced the neologism thysiastèrion because of any pious aversion for pagan cultic terms, as is shown by their extensive employment of pagan cultic terminology in other contexts. D. suggests that thysiastèrion was coined because of its derivation from thysia, which could be used for either animal or grain offerings. The translators of the Pentateuch would have wished to accent the idea that the altar was the place for offerings in general, rather than the locus for the act of immolation. Thysiastèrion thus became the normal word for altar in the sacrificial cult of Yahweh. The ordinary Hellenistic word bômos became “bad,” not because it was originally a pagan term, but because it was deliberately chosen to designate idolatrous altars. D. thinks that the superficial resemblance of the Greek word bômos to the Hebrew word bâmäh, a cultic installation frequently condemned in the OT, may have prompted the choice of bômos to designate
idolatrous altars. D. maintains that the translators of the Pentateuch were motivated solely by a desire for clarity, not piety, when they instituted the distinction between *thysiasterion* and *bômos*. In particular, they were interested in giving the reader guidance, in the manner of a Targum, as to how the episode of Aaron and the golden calf (Ex 32–34, where the altar is *thysiasterion*), and the intervention of Balaam (Nm 23, where the altars are *bômos*) were to be understood. The author's argumentation in explaining the distinction between *thysiasterion* and *bômos* is convincing. An excellent example has been chosen to illustrate her thesis. It remains to be determined, though, just how widespread and typical this subtle translation technique was.

D. has listed in her bibliography the book of Barthélémy, *Les devanciers d’Aquila*, in which he demonstrated the existence of the *Kaige* Recension. It would appear, however, that the implications of this research have not been dealt with in D.'s investigation. An examination of the different translations in the Vaticanus text of a Hebrew word closely related to the word *mizbeah* discussed above will illustrate the complication which recensional development of the Greek text introduces into the discussion of translation technique in the LXX. In the Pentateuch the usual translation of the Hebrew verb *zâbah*, from which the noun *mizbeah* is derived, is *thyein*. This equivalence corresponds to secular usage. No distinction is made in the Pentateuch or subsequent books between the sacrificial slaughter of animals in a true cult or a false one. In the Vaticanus text, however, in those sections of Samuel and Kings which Barthélémy has identified as belonging to the *Kaige* Recension (2 S 11:1 and 1 K 2:11; 1 K 22:1 and 2 K 25:30), the Hellenistic verb *thysiazein* is employed to translate *zâbah*. It can be demonstrated that *thysiazein* as the translation of *zâbah* is a characteristic of the *Kaige* Recension in Samuel and Kings, most probably also in the other books of the *OT* where this recension is found, and in the versions of Aquila and Theodotion. As could be expected, in those sections of the Vaticanus text where *thysiazein* is used, no distinction is made in the translation technique between orthodox and unorthodox sacrificial slaughter. The contrast *thyein/thysiazein* as a translation of *zâbah* reflects the difference between original translation and subsequent recension. In light of the recensional development of the Greek text, which now emerges as being considerably more complex than formerly supposed, even with regard to the Vaticanus text alone, caution must be exercised in speaking of the homogeneity of the LXX and the possibility of tracing consistent techniques throughout.

S.'s concluding description of the technique of the translators of the Pentateuch can be summarized as follows. As a general rule, when a Hebrew word had both a cultic and a profane usage, the distinction was clearly
noted in the Greek, and if necessary neologisms were created for this purpose. Pagan terms were used not only for designating idolatrous rites, but also for specifically Israelite practices. No perfect one-to-one equivalence between Hebrew and Greek terms was made, nor was there apparently any interest in etymological correspondence. The translation was literal, if the result was acceptable in Greek. Otherwise, figurative language was rendered more abstractly, but no attempt was made on theological grounds to spiritualize anthropomorphic expressions referring to Yahweh. Even when syntactical equivalents in Greek were not available for a Hebrew expression, the translators managed by one means or another to balance the wordage of both texts. Something of the flavor of the Hebrew original was allowed to come through in this “bonne traduction de professeurs,” who were both competent in Greek and scholars of the Bible. Their achievement served as a model, and even as a sort of dictionary, for later translators. While thoroughly steeped in the most authentic current of Jewish exegesis, the translation of the Pentateuch reflects a Judaism confident of itself, beneficiary of the culture of Alexandria, and possessing a remarkable freedom of spirit.

This interesting and stimulating book is completed by indexes for Hebrew and Greek terms and citations from the Bible, together with a select and classified bibliography of Septuagint studies.

Woodstock College

JAMES D. SHENKEL, S.J.


Most American theologians have known Walter Bauer primarily as a lexicographer and philologist and the editor of the Lexicon of New Testament Greek translated into English by W. Arndt and F. W. Gingrich. Bauer was also an exegete and historian. In recent years his work Heresy and Orthodoxy in Earliest Christianity, first published in 1934 and recently republished, has become the focal point for much debate and the starting point for new research in primitive Christianity, specifically on the meaning of heresy in the young Church. Long before B. published his lexicon and wrote his study of heresy and orthodoxy, he had written a massive study of the literature of the second and third centuries. Thanks to the scholarly “book club” in Darmstadt, this work is now available again.

In his study of the life of Jesus in the second and third centuries, B. collected and organized the vast amount of material, not simply from
apocryphal gospels, but from the many other works of the period: writings of the Church Fathers, homiletical and catechetical materials, non-Christian authors. On the basis of this material he constructed a portrait of how Jesus was viewed both within the various parties of the early Church as well as without the Church. The result is an exceedingly valuable collection and a systematic attempt to evaluate the material, compare it to that preserved in the canonical Gospels, and see what it tells us about the life of the early Church and the development of the tradition concerning Jesus.

The book has two major sections and a lengthy appendage. In the first part B. presents in great detail the portrait of Jesus drawn in the second and third centuries by outlining the various views on the chief events in His life. Thus, he discusses Jesus' parents, His background and genealogy, His birth, and the situations surrounding His birth (e.g., the purification, circumcision, visit of the Magi). Next he turns to Jesus' youth, John the Baptist, Jesus' baptism, temptation, transfiguration, and public ministry, and concludes with the institution of the Eucharist, Jesus' passion, trial, crucifixion, and resurrection, the chronology of His life, etc. What we learn from the authors of the time is a great deal of detailed information about Mary and Joseph, as well as Jesus' early years, and many of the gaps left by the canonical Gospels are filled with rich and imaginative stories; e.g., a number of so-called "infancy gospels" arose simply to fill in the missing period of Jesus' youth. In most cases B. shows how religious and devotional concerns of the community gave rise to new material or reshaped older material in line with new expectations. "If Jesus is the kind of person we say he is, then he must have been like this, or done such and such. . . ." But the motives behind the traditions are exceedingly complex and vary from locale to locale.

B.'s second part presents a topical discussion of various aspects of Jesus' person and activity—e.g., His personality, what He looked like, His miracles, etc. Most writers thought He was not an attractive person. Here B. discusses His relations with Jews and heathen, His miracles and teaching, His associations with the disciples, etc. Again we can see how the tradition grew as new situations arose, and the fascination that Jesus' person held for the early Church. One of the appendixes includes a collection of the materials from without the Church—specifically, how Jesus was viewed by outsiders, i.e., Jews and heathen, where they got their information, and how they understood and interpreted His person and activity. In contrast to the Christian authors, these writers exercise a much greater critical sense in evaluating the tradition, and in some ways they come to conclusions which are similar to those of critical scholarship today. Perhaps more significant is B.'s contention that they are wholly dependent on the Christian tradition.
for their information about Jesus. They had no choice but to be critical. At the same time they never see Jesus as a product of fantasy and are ready to take the tradition at face value when there is reason for the claims.

The book closes with a methodological discussion of the "forms" which the writing of the life of Jesus took, and the motives that were at work in the writing of the life. Though the book is now sixty years old, what B. says here is still of interest to the NT scholar concerned with the motives at work in the development of the Gospel tradition in the first century. What is apparent is that many of the same factors which shaped the tradition in the second and third century were already at work before the Gospels were first written down. From the apocryphal literature we can gain a perspective on the tradition and insight into its character and the forces which governed its development.

The book is also valuable for the historian of the early Church. In recent years we have become aware that the theological tradition of early Christianity is not representative of the total Christian experience, and that what took place at the level of popular piety and devotion may be as significant for Church history as the development of the doctrine of the Trinity or the monarchical episcopate. B. enables the historian to take a much closer look at "popular Christianity" and to assess its role in the developing Church.

*Fordham University*

**ROBERT L. WILKEN**


Vol. 1 of this projected four-volume dictionary was issued in 1962. Its editorial board so far has been H. F. Davis, Aidan Williams, O.S.B., Ivo Thomas, O.P., and Joseph H. Crehan, S.J. Of these, Williams died in Rome as Vatican II reached its last session; Crehan serves as secretary to the editorial board (as well as author of a large number of the articles—45 in Vol. 1, 63 in Vol. 2—and not by any means the smaller or less important ones).

Pages are 7½" by 10½"; they carry two 63-line columns of easy-to-read type divided by headings of articles, paragraphing, and one size of boldface subhead. Each article is followed by a short bibliography. Vol. 1, thirty pages shorter than Vol. 2, goes from A to Casuistry; Vol. 2, from Catechism to Heaven. Vol. 1 has sixty-three contributors; Vol. 2 has considerably fewer, 36; of these 36, 5 died between the completion of their articles and the publication of this volume.

Among the articles in Vol. 2 on topics of greater theological significance are those on Catholicity (by H. F. Davis), Celibacy (G. Culkin), Certainty
(B. F. McGuinness, a young lay philosopher of Queen's College, Oxford), Charisms (J. H. Crehan), Charity (E. Hardwick), Church and State (Crehan), Communion of Saints (E. A. Sillem), Concelebration (Crehan), Conception, Immaculate (E. O'Connor), Confirmation (Crehan), Conscience (Crehan), Creation (Sillem), Doctrine, Development of (Davis), Eros (K. Foster), Eucharist (Crehan), Evolution (P. G. Fothergill), Extreme Unction (Crehan), Faith (P. Flanagan), Free Will (R. Maloney and Crehan), Grace (P. De Letter), and Heaven (J. P. Kenny).

The industry and productivity of Fr. Crehan and the editorial board are remarkable and praiseworthy, not to mention their merit for having stimulated so many co-operating theologians to write for them. It is a commonplace to say of collections, such as the one they are making, that the articles are uneven. Because there are different talents in theology and in the sciences, essays by various people in the field will always be uneven. The general capability of those associated with Crehan in this work will impress the reader. He will expect and receive top-flight work from some of the contributors, e.g., J. Gill, P. De Letter, and G. Ellard (now deceased). But each essay (thus called because short, definitional articles are absent from the work) should be read and judged for its own merits by specialists in the area of the writing.

A legitimate criticism can be made of the planning and editorial work. As far as the master title list of this volume is concerned, the editorial board should have engaged in a little more discussion of the suitability of some of the wordings. Why is *Communicatio idiomatum* selected as a title rather than Communication of Idioms or Communication of Properties, which are both used in the body of the article? Is Extreme Unction really better than Anointing of the Sick ("because most adult readers will still know the sacrament under that name")? Is Gospel Kerygma better than simply Kerygma? Or again, is a question a suitable formulation of a title? One finds: Councils, General, How Many? One fears that very personal taste or merely editorial convenience has played too great a role here.

Going back to Vol. 1, the reviewer finds his worry deepened by entries such as Abbot, Ordination by; Abel in the Liturgy; Ablutions and the Laity; Acts of the Holy See, Variety of. These may be phrases that ring in the minds of the editorial board or scopes of articles suitable in some collections, but they are not obvious foci of reference for those seeking information in a dictionary such as this (though some of them would well fit into an index of several hundred thousand references).

Once the subject of scope properly so called has been brought up, one asks whether or not it is reasonable to include some of the articles in the Cate-
chasm-to-Heaven section of the alphabetical listing or in the dictionary at all: Causality of the Sacraments (causality is too generic an idea in theology to have a discussion of it confined to the sacraments); Christ, Mission of and Divinity of (if this is all there is to be under the title Christ); again, Extreme Unction (why not Anointing of the Sick?); God, Natural Knowledge of, and God, Proofs of the Existence of (if this is all there is to be under the titles consisting of or beginning with the word God); and Communism in the Church (would one really go for material on this subject to a theological dictionary that has a relatively restricted number of listings with some such title in his mind, especially when there is no article on Communism?). On the other hand, one would expect to find in this dictionary an article on the Church, and not a patchwork of cross-references. He would be disappointed. At the present time one would expect to find an article on contraception. In view of these omissions one is surprised to discover six columns on Elias, Theology of. These complaints could go on.

For all its idiosyncrasies, probably no seminary library can afford to be without the set of which these two volumes constitute the first half. We are already grateful to the editors, but our gratitude will grow if in the meanwhile there arises more critical dialogue, or at least more effective critical dialogue, among the members of the editorial board as regards the planning of the work. It will then be a Catholic dictionary of theology in a fuller sense.

_Corpus Instrumentorum, Wash., D.C._

EARL A. WEIS, S.J.


This new book of Regin Prenter, Professor of Dogmatics at the University of Artus in Denmark, is a personally rethought synthesis of Protestant Lutheran dogmatics. It is also an attempt at ecumenical presentation of the Christian message of salvation as understood by the Reformation, particularly by Luther. For a Catholic reader and theologian, it may serve as an apt introduction to Protestant dogmatics in both its historical variations and its present state.

What is characteristic of Reformation theology, e.g., its opposition to "natural theology" or to the intrusion of philosophy into dogma, and its exclusive adherence to the word of Scripture and to faith, is found here in a carefully-mapped-out synthesis. The first two chapters explain the task of dogmatics as P. conceives it, and its prolegomena, mainly a methodological introduction to dogmatics. Particular to P.'s rethinking is his Trinitarian approach: "the idea of the Trinity as point of departure for the critique of
THEOLOGICAL STUDIES

authority," as the setting and structure of the Christian message proposed in "the word." In connection with the latter, he insists on the unity of the salvation message in the "prophetic" and the "apostolic" writings (OT and NT). One may wonder whether his attempt at excluding philosophy from dogmatics is successful. Does not reason seek "understanding of the faith"?

His ecumenical research in the various views of the biblical message seeks to be objective and fair. But his understanding of Roman Catholic Christianity is pre-Vatican II. Even within Lutheran Protestantism there is a current that repudiates his radical opposition between "Roman papalism" and Lutheran justification sola fide, as though the two phrases stated the articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae.

What strikes a Catholic reader in this sincere and (apart perhaps from some neuralgic points where papalism is concerned) objective presentation of doctrines is the large field of agreement between the Protestant and Catholic understanding of the revealed message, despite basic differences in approach. That field has been extended even more since Vatican II's rethinking of Catholic doctrine on the Church, revelation, liturgy, missions, and ecumenism. Even the differences concerning faith, man's sinfulness, law and gospel, creation and redemption (creation as known not from reason but from the biblical witness), etc., may be less deep, as far as insight into the mystery of salvation goes, than appears from P.'s presentation.

P.'s intention is "to acknowledge the Lutheran understanding of the biblical witness to revelation, a message of salvation at the center of which is justification by faith alone." He divides his exposition in two parts, creation and redemption, and in each of these he studies God and man. Creation has its own law, God's wrath, and its own gospel, providence. The God of creation is "the God of grace seen in the unity of hidden majesty (holiness) and eternal power (mercy)." The man of creation, according to biblical anthropology, is sinner. The original state and the Fall "are not prehistoric phenomena in the lives of the first human beings, but in their unexplainable contemporaneity they are that contradiction of existence in which the unity of God's creative and redemptive work constantly reveals itself in man under the condition of sinfulness."

P.'s theological insight often coincides in a remarkable way with Catholic understanding, though he persistently fights shy of nonbiblical theological explanation. His understanding of man simul iustus et peccator seems basically identical with Trent's teaching on "concupiscence" remaining in the justified. His fervent repudiation of merit—as self-righteousness or works-righteousness—may well reject a concept that is not in Trent. Equally based on misunderstanding is his polemic against the "Roman theology of the
meritorious mass" or "the intermediary state with penitents under the jurisdiction of the Pope" (purgatory). These and similar blemishes show that the book was written before "the new phase in ecumenical dialogue ushered in by the Second Vatican Council."

St. Mary's College, Kurseong, India

P. De Letter, S.J.


The "shape" of Christology in this important study of Christological procedure is a function of its data, its methods, and of the "models" employed when the data is subjected to methodical scrutiny. M. first discusses the notion of the given in general, and then inquires after the Christological given. It is, he maintains, complex. Neither Scripture alone nor the historical core of events discernible through Scripture nor God's self-revelation in Christ nor our present experience of Christ suffices to constitute adequately the data of Christology. It is only when all are taken together that we are really in a position to begin Christological reflection.

What of method? The second chapter follows the pattern of the first by beginning with some observations on method in general before turning to the specifics of Christological method. Once again complexity is the rule. Literary, historical, sociological, liturgical, and ethical methods must be drawn on. Method itself, M. acutely notes, is not a simple notion. He is on strong ground when he suggests that among the single methods there exists or should exist a system of checks and balances, with no single method standing outside the system. One regrets, however, that he did not go on to show just where and how an integral Christological method finds its unity. The integration of qualitatively different methods into a single discipline would seem to call for some principle of organic unity.

The next chapter, on models in Christology, is the center of the book, for the last three chapters will simply evaluate three principal Christological models. M. draws on I. T. Ramsey's Models and Mystery for his notion of models. Structural similarity to the given is what qualifies a term to be a model. In Ramsey's phrase, the models "chime in with and echo" the phenomena, and with the phenomena serve for "disclosure" about some "mystery." M. compares scientific and theological models, and indicates how "the theory of models succeeds in reinstating the doctrine of analogy in modern theological logic" (p. 63). Models in Christology thus achieve the status of real description, though this is not to be understood on the model of pictorial representation. The Christological models are the terms in which we apprehend the person of Christ. Today, M. contends, models serve to
fill the vacuum vacated by the "confessions" of Christian faith. Finally, there is an integrative function, drawing together the different Christological statements. The chapter concludes by giving several criteria for the choice of models: isomorphism with a greater number of biblical and ecclesial situations; resulting depth of perspective concerning Christ; light on the relevant areas of religious thought and action; ability to mediate Christ to hearts thereby inspired to love and service.

No analysis will here be given of M.'s detailed examination of three principal models: two-nature, psychological, and revelational. The discussion of these is solid, extremely well informed, and appreciative of both advantages and limitations of all three models. M.'s final word is one of caution against making too close a connection among the different models. Each should be allowed to stand on its own as a service of theological imagination to the Christian faith.

This work renders major service to Christology, not by propounding a new theory of the person and work of Christ, but by calling attention to the indispensable prerequisite of any sound theory, namely, sound method. It will undoubtedly do much to influence, for the better, the "shape" of Christology.

Woodstock College

THOMAS E. CLARKE, S.J.


This long, difficult, and disturbing book offers a detailed Catholic analysis of the Church. It is probably the most significant study of the Church to appear since Vatican II. It is certain to provoke sharp controversy. K. will not be unhappy about that. For all his theological learning, K. is a reformer, and reformers want to be taken seriously, not ignored or accepted uncritically.

K. divides his study of the Church into five parts. Part 1 discusses the radical historicity of the Church. The Church exists concretely only in limited and changing historical forms. This is also true of the Church in the apostolic age. Nevertheless, the pluralistic witness of this apostolic age, handed down to us in the biblical canon, is normative for all later understanding of the Church.

Part 2 develops the connection between Jesus and the primitive Church. Jesus' eschatological proclamation laid the groundwork for the Church, but the historical Jesus did not establish a Church. The Church came into existence only at Easter, with the rise of faith in the risen Lord. The primitive Church understood itself as a pilgrim Church, living under the present
lordship of Christ, working for an approaching kingdom of God not identical with itself.

Part 3 offers a lengthy analysis of the three basic biblical images of the Church. (1) The Church is the People of God, the community of believers. This community is rooted in Israel as the radical realization of Israel's mission. It is a community of individual persons but is not itself a person. It exists only in concrete and sinful human history, never as a suprahistorical ideal. (2) The Church is the Creation of the Spirit. It is liberated from the bondage of the law to exist in love under the cross of Christ. The Spirit is Christ's gift to all the members of the People of God. The Spirit is over the Church, may not be identified with the Church, may not be distorted either in the identification of Church office and the gift of the Spirit or in the immediacy of "enthusiasm." (3) The Church is the Body of Christ. It is constituted by baptism, unified by the Eucharist, present in its fulness as local churches in union with one another. It is united with Christ but under Christ, not identified with Christ, no substitute for Christ. It is essentially one but constantly troubled by divisions and challenged to deepen its self-understanding by heresy's exaggeration of neglected truths.

Part 4 studies the four classical "dimensions" of the Church. (1) The Church is one, though from the very beginning the Church has been pluralistic. Yet in the course of history the Church which is essentially one has become divided. There is ultimately no justification for this division. The Church's essential unity, though it is a unity only in faith, must be a visible unity. In the face of a divided Christianity, no one church can be simply identified with the Church universal. Vatican II claims only that the Church universal "exists in" the Catholic Church. (2) The one Church is also essentially catholic. But it is catholic (universal and authentic) only if it is whole, all that it should be in the light of its biblical norm. "Outside the Church there is no salvation" must be corrected to read "Outside Christ there is no salvation." It is incorrect to include in the Catholic Church Christians who do not want to be Catholics, and in the Church universal men who do not want to be Christians. (3) The one catholic Church is also essentially holy. But the Church is holy because it is set apart by God and made holy in spite of its sins. It is incorrect to isolate a holy Church from its sinful members or otherwise abstract from the sinfulness which is part of the Church's concrete reality. Nevertheless, God is ever with His Church: the community of believers cannot be destroyed and, in spite of all the error within the Church, cannot ultimately be deceived. In this sense the Church is infallible. Further investigation is required to determine in what sense individual statements of the Church are infallible in any unambiguous fashion. However, in-
individual Christians have a responsibility to theologize in union with the Church universal—though always in the light of the gospel. (4) The one catholic holy Church is apostolic. It does not substitute for the unique apostolic Church, but it continues its apostolic mission throughout human history in the light of its normative witness. This witness is contained in the Bible and nowhere else. The whole people of God shares in this apostolic mission, not only the officials of the community of believers.

Part 5 concludes K.'s study with a discussion of the priesthood of all believers and the distinctive contribution of officeholders to the welfare of this priestly community. Office in the Church must be interpreted in the light of the community, not vice versa: the hierarchy exists within the Church, not above it. All Christians share in the unique priesthood of Christ. All Christians have immediate access to God, offer sacrifice, proclaim the word, participate in the execution of baptism, the Eucharist, and the pardoning of sins, mediate Christ. All Christians are called to serve the community in some way. Service is thus the criterion for the community contribution of all Christians, including officeholders. History shows that the function of office in the Church can be fulfilled in a number of different ways. Our present arrangement must not be absolutized. There is no need to separate officials from the other members of the community in terms of a special state. Apostolic succession is not an automatic process. Although authority in the Church comes from Christ and not from the community, the whole community has a voice in the exercise of this authority. The criterion of service is particularly important in evaluating the contribution of the papacy to the life of the Church. Vatican I must be interpreted in the light of Vatican II. Unfortunately, the history of the papacy is, with few exceptions, a history of ever-increasing papal power without a corresponding increase in papal service. The Oriental Churches had the Bible behind them in opposing the authoritarian absolutism that developed in the West. The papacy, which should be the ultimate bond of unity among all Christians, is now the most serious obstacle to Christian unity. The unity of all Christians will never be achieved unless the papacy renounces papal power wherever that power fails to serve the genuine needs of the Church universal. The papacy has an important contribution to make to the life of the Church, but only if that primacy is understood biblically as a primacy of service.

This brief summary does not do justice to K.'s imposing study. In particular, it omits the vast amount of exegetical and historical data K. analyzes in the course of the book. But it does indicate K.'s basic positions and the broad scope of his study. As a reformer, K. wears three hats throughout the book. He is a Catholic theologian trying to make Catholic theology take
history seriously. That is the point of his polemic against theological speculation which does not fit the facts of history, dishonest apologetic which ignores the sinful reality of the Church, and abstract language which hypostatizes and divinizes the community of believers. K. is also a Catholic critic trying to correct the Church's contemporary self-understanding in the light of its biblical norm. That is the point of his emphasis on the priesthood of all believers and the pluralism within the primitive Church, in contrast to the clericalization and centralization of the Church since Constantine. Finally, K. is a Catholic ecumenist trying to overcome the confessional divisions within Christianity. That is the point of his plea for more Pauline theology in the Church, his distinction between the Church universal and the Catholic Church, his stress on the essential limitations and historical abuses of office. K.'s three hats involve him in any number of challenging programmatic positions. But programmatic positions unfortunately need to be worked out in detail, and a detailed encounter between Christian tradition and the contemporary Christian problematic is precisely what K. does not offer in any of the areas he discusses. Particularly those who share K.'s dream of a unified and biblical pilgrim Church may feel that he would have written a more effective book had he concentrated on a thorough treatment of a few problems, instead of attempting a systematic program for Church reform. But perhaps that is just another way of saying that contemporary Christian theology is not yet ready for a systematic treatment of the Church. Perhaps, too, it betrays a lurking suspicion that gentle and balanced critics are in the long run more effective than blunt reformers, because they are easier to live with. But who ever said that reformers should be easy to live with? Certainly not Hans Küng.

Woodstock College

P. J. Burns, S.J.


Commentaries on Vatican II texts can probably be roughly put into one of three classes. There is the kind exemplified by the multiauthor commentaries edited by G. Baraúna and published in several languages. This sort of work has its obvious value: an impressive list of authors, many of them Council periti who themselves participated in the drafting of the texts, good bibliographies, and fairly exhaustive indices. These volumes have a special claim to attention and a fairly secure place on reference shelves. Then there is the individual theologian's full-dress commentary, of which Bernard Leeming's book on the Decree on Ecumenism is a better-than-average sample. A book like this can aim at a relative unity and completeness of cover-
age, but it also runs the risk of being (as a reviewer has said of one such comment) a hashpot into which the author throws the near-total content of his note-and-clippings file on the subject, especially if his publisher is after him to get the manuscript to the printers quickly. And then we have the collection of articles and addresses on a given decree, addressed often enough to nonspecialized audiences. Such a collection avoids with only the greatest difficulty the pitfalls, \textit{inter alia}, of mere paraphrase and the stringing-together of bland generalities. How does one say something really worth hearing on chapter 2 of \textit{Lumen gentium}, to listeners who often come "cold" to a lecture? The speaker/author is a captive of the genre, and has little room within which to invite originality or allow sustained liveliness.

Fr. Tavard's book falls into the third class just indicated. The first chapter, on the theological setting of the Council, is (in part) a paper read at a symposium at the University of California; the next four chapters were given as the Swander Lectures at Lancaster Theological Seminary; part of chapter six was read before the clergy of the Youngstown, Ohio, diocese; and "The Mystery of the Church in the Liturgical Constitution" first appeared in \textit{Worship}, January, 1965.

Within its genre \textit{The Pilgrim Church} is quite successful. In investigating some of the major themes of the Constitution on the Church, T. calls on a wide theological background and brings both boldness (in some positions he takes) and serenity to his discussion of issues. This is not to say that all pitfalls have been avoided, but T. does not hesitate to give voice to personal views, and throughout the book one meets perceptive and graceful passages.

The chapter on the hierarchy, a commentary on the third chapter of \textit{Lumen gentium} (= \textit{LG}), picks out for discussion the topics of the sacramentality of episcopal consecration, the collegiality of the episcopate, "the meaning of papal infallibility in relation to the opening of the Church's structure to the requirements of a missionary and eschatologically oriented catholicity," and the relationship of bishops as pastors to the People of God. It is a chapter which is noteworthy for its clarity and balance. We might note that in discussing the sacramentality of the episcopate, T. holds that \textit{LG}'s emphasis on the episcopal consecration as sacramental does not end "the debate between those who consider the bishop as a priest, whose responsibility for the whole Church of Christ in a certain locality gives him a unique function in the Eucharistic priesthood, and those who believe that the bishop has qualitatively and quantitatively more priesthood than the priest" (p. 89).

On the other hand, the first chapter does not strike this reader as a particularly helpful analysis of the theological scene which formed the back-
ground of Vatican II, but perhaps this does not say anything more than that I would read some of the trends T. discusses quite differently, and that I find his posing of what he calls “the fundamental theological problem of our century” not quite a happy one, unnecessarily polemical, and not too sharply on target. This is how T. asks the question on the nature of theology: “Is theology today the remnant or the continuation of a speculative system based on the data of revelation, analogous to what scholastic philosophy tries to be in relation to the data of natural experience? Should we answer this question affirmatively we must support and develop the system that satisfies us best—Thomism, Scotism or any other—and beware of everything that does not easily fall within our categories. Or is theology a reflection, not only on the past datum of the Gospel as embodied in Scripture and the Church’s tradition, but also on the spiritual experience of Christians today, as it was formerly a reflection on Christian experience then?” (pp. 20–21). One gathers who T.’s “adversaries” are from the question. Given this as the issue, one gladly places himself on T.’s side of the divide; but is this precisely the way the problem should be posed?

Not a few views T. advances in his chapter on the religious life in the Church today, though not peculiar to him, are sufficiently fresh to invite attention and comment. He believes that the still-prevalent understanding of the “counsels of perfection” as specific obligations applying to one set of Christians rather than to another is very questionable, as it has no clear foundation in Scripture and patristic teaching. Rather, all Christians are called to practice poverty, chastity, and obedience in their lives, according to their circumstances and moral obligations. Hence these counsels are not specific of the religious vocation, and the vows themselves are not necessary to the religious life as officially recognized by the Church. The two foci of the religious life are the freedom of the Spirit and the centrality of the Word Incarnate; hence there is no characteristic of religious orders that could not also be predicated of the Christian life as a whole. The specific element of the religious life is the concept of community: not the fact of community life, “but that it is this particular concrete community, the association of such and such, with their peculiar vocations and gifts, their understandings of their function, their spiritual and natural individualities and personalities, their past, their dreams and their future, their qualities and their shortcomings” (p. 145). With considerable hardiness, T. draws some conclusions which follow from his premises: e.g., one wonders “if the religious life is not destined, simply, to disappear” (p. 146); the opinions of psychologists and sociologists are adduced in confirmation of this belief.

Writing on the “vows” of religion,” T. has this to say in a summative
paragraph: "Christian perfection is the perfection of love, hope and faith. And if chastity, poverty and obedience make any sense in relation to the quest for perfection, this can only be insofar as they are nothing but love, hope and faith. Religious should not pronounce vows of chastity, poverty and obedience; they ought to vow love, hope and faith, because this is what chastity, poverty and obedience mean. They mean nothing else" (p. 150). There is no space to comment on these (and other) statements in chapter 6 of The Pilgrim Church. Neither does T. sufficiently develop his views to give us their extended and more technical justification; this would have taken him beyond the limits of this particular commentary. Perhaps he will do us all the service of returning to the ideas he sets down here, in the near future, at greater length, and with sharper definition and justification of his argument. Others are inclined to be somewhat more hopeful about the survival of religious communities, preferring to stress (what T. himself notes on p. 147) that "whether religious Orders will last will depend on their power of renewal" and that as it was the achievement of common meanings which first brought these Christian communities into being, so through a re-creation and achievement of (if need be, new) common meanings, these communities will be able to renew themselves and renew in themselves fresh energies of the spirit for the service of the Church of tomorrow. These others, I am sure, would welcome further discussion of religious life in the Church of today from T.'s facile pen.

What has been said will indicate some of the interest T.'s book arouses and some of the questions it asks. It will serve as a companion to his The Church Tomorrow, and should appeal to the many readers who have read that deservedly well-received work.

Loyola House of Studies
Quezon City, Philippines

C. G. Arevalo, S.J.


Fr. McBrien thought that "to have ignored J. A. T. Robinson would be to have ignored one of the most significant phenomena of our day." Notice, he makes no claim for Robinson's lasting place as a theologian or ecclesiologist; he simply recognizes that the Bishop of Woolwich caught and carried a religious mood of our times and brought it to great prominence. However, the Bishop's best sellers, M. shows quite conclusively, do not give a sufficiently rounded view of his doctrine on the Church. They could, taken by themselves, give a distorted view.

M. moves with great ease and sure knowledge amid the full complex of
R.'s publications, from his earliest essays in philosophy and religion, through his heavier exegetical works, into his recent books. Personal communication with the Bishop, who also wrote a foreword for M.'s book, adds to the authority of his scholarship. He has pieced together from scattered sources a cohesive and informative study of R.'s ecclesiology. Sometimes writing with one finger in the documents of Vatican II and another in the pages of prominent Catholic ecclesiologists, M. shows great similarity of thought between these doctrines and R.'s. This is especially true with respect to the nature of the Church and the liturgy. M. probes deeply into the Bishop's *The Body: A Study in Pauline Theology*, and concludes that the Body of Christ entails solidarity and interdependence among Christians based on an inner union, and not only aggregation into some preceding Church. Scrutinizing R.'s ideas on the eschatological community, M. shows that his doctrine on the Church, even in his great insistence that the kingdom be placed higher than the Church, is not at variance with Catholic opinions on inaugurated and realized eschatology. The Church, R. would hold, makes present Christ's reign; it is the earthly center from which the full lordship of Christ becomes visible.

However, M. does not gauge R.'s writings solely from a Catholic viewpoint. It is his constant concern to situate him in his own Anglican context and in the stream of current Protestant thought as well. He manages this with great success, especially in the book's second half, dealing with the Church's mission. Here M. brings to light Robinson the pastor committed to Christ and to the twentieth century. R. believes that both these commitments, not incompatible, must be taken seriously, and M. skilfully demonstrates the dimension and genesis of this conviction. For R., the Church is the incarnation of the Son of Man on earth; it must be a servant Church; it is the divine entering through the door of ordinary human history and everyday experience. It must be considered less of a gathering, less of an institution, and must grow around the needs of the world and be continually submitted to the claims of God, who is acting constantly in this unreligious world which the Church serves. Neatly but much too sketchily, M. traces the growth of R.'s notion of the servant Church through Cullmann, Tillich, Bonhoeffer, Berger, and Congar. He assesses the relative importance of each and judges to what extent R. made use of their ideas. Bonhoeffer, he says, plays no significant role in R.'s understanding of the Church's nature, but from him he acquires a spirit: specifically, as Christ was a man for others, so must the Church exist to serve humanity.

The chapter on "The Church: The Missionary Community" treats the
problem of the relevance of today’s Christian faith. This is the question that plagued R. during his illness in the early sixties. M. shows to what extent he used Tillich, Bultmann, and Bonhoeffer to formulate a new apologetic.

M.’s great contribution has been to show the fulness of R.’s ecclesiology. He demonstrates a greater respect for the Church on the Bishop’s part than the famous Honest to God could ever have led a reader to suspect. This is true in the matter of the liturgy also. R.’s small book all but dis­countenanced sacramental worship, yet his love and appreciation for the Eucharist, so clear in many of M.’s references, sound like echoes of the Decree on the Sacred Liturgy.

M. has written with manifest affection for R., but in no way compromises his critical judgment. He clearly and sharply differs with the Bishop on ministry, apostolicity, the distinctiveness of the ordained priesthood, even Christology, and holds up the ambiguities of his recent books to the critique of others. His work is a balanced and comprehensive guide to what R. thinks the Church is and what it should do.

Shadowbrook, Lenox, Mass. RAYMOND P. BERTRAND, S.J.


Within four years twenty-one of the sixty volumes in this series have appeared; presumably the increased pace of publication, already noticeable, will bring the series to completion in a relatively few years more. Once the current anti-Scholastic and anti-Thomas mood passes and the theology of St. Thomas is seen as one of the great and permanently valid moments of Christian tradition, rather than as a system that “has to be studied,” the student will be happy to find that he has in these volumes an excellent help for getting to Thomas rather than to the commentators (historically and theologically important as these may be) and, above all, to the lesser epigoni. The general merits of the series have already been noted (cf. THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 26 [1965] 135–38; cf. also 26 [1965] 464–73; 27 [1966] 284–86, 696–98, for earlier volumes). Some unevennesses from volume to volume have also been noted, but these perhaps arise more from
expectations of what the reviewer would like to see in a given volume than from the volume itself.

This last point may be illustrated from two volumes of this most recent batch. Fr. Gilby, the tireless general editor, has authored them. The first, *God's Will and Providence*, completes the volumes on the *De Deo uno* section of the *Summa*. One might expect G., whose books usually abound in interesting appendixes, to be expansive on this subject with its knotty problems of providence and predestination and with its long and involved theological history. In fact, he has but one appendix, on "Sin and the Divine Will" (a half page long, and appealing to the mystery of the divine will as the only source of resolution). Yet G. is obviously not unaware of the problems and their history, nor determined to pass them over as though the problems were baseless and the history only an unfortunate divagation in the development of Christian thought. Instead, his translation is fully annotated and it is here that he brings in the later theological development (cf., e.g., pp. 104-5 and elsewhere). On reflection, G.'s decision to handle matters thus is a good one. For anyone who has studied the theology of providence and grace, it is difficult to go back and read St. Thomas with an innocent eye and not to see him through the distorting glass of later controversy, while anyone approaching Thomas without a knowledge of the controversies will do better to try to comprehend him and then, if need be, study the controversies in some extended treatment of them; for both kinds of readers G.'s annotation, concerned primarily with explicating the text, will be helpful.

Gilby's second volume, *Law and Political Theory*, finds him on ground long familiar to him, and his eight appendixes on theological aspects of law, with their numerous cross-references to other volumes of this series, will be a good introduction or review for the reader. A dip into the translation can, indeed, bring up points of disagreement. Thus, in question 94, article 4 ("Is Natural Law the Same for All?"), St. Thomas speaks of the greater contingency (and therefore the greater possibility of exception [*defectus]*) in the conclusions of practical reason as one descends more to particular cases, and of the truth or rightness (*veritas seu rectitudo*) of the practical judgment in questions of action. G.'s translation of the indicated terms varies and at times turns the objective contingency of the conclusions into a subjective mistakenness, and the objective truth or rightness of the judgment into a "right attitude" or "good will." There is, it seems to me, no basis in the text for such a shift, and it obscures St. Thomas' thought on an important point concerning concrete individual moral judgments.

The questions on the creation of the material universe, here summed up
as Cosmogony, are in some respects the most difficult in the Summa for the reader of today to approach sympathetically and with sufficient background to discern the permanently valid theological content. Two historical influences converge in these questions: the literary tradition of the commentaries In Hexaemeron and the scientific outlook of St. Thomas' own time. Fr. Wallace contributes to the understanding of both influences by his annotation of the text and especially by his appendixes, of which the third through the sixth outline the pertinent ancient and medieval scientific views, and the seventh through the tenth the In Hexaemeron tradition. (Among doubtless numerous other good histories of science, three books of Stephen Toulmin and June Goodfield may be especially recommended to the ordinary reader: The Fabric of the Heavens, The Architecture of Matter, and The Discovery of Time [New York: Harper & Row, 1961 ff.; all now in Harper Torchbook editions]. On the In Hexaemeron side, the influential works of Origen and Basil the Great are accessible in the Sources chrétiennes series, nos. 7 and 26, while the forthcoming commentary of Joseph Ratzinger on St. Bonaventure's In Hexaemeron will provide a backdrop against which to understand St. Thomas and to measure what is distinctive of his own remarks.)

Fr. Hill's volume on Hope is the first to appear of the five on the important treatise on the theological virtues. The large space given to the appendixes (pp. 123-79) is quite justified, since hope is not only the most neglected of the three virtues but also the most obscure and difficult. These appendixes cover a wide range (revelation of hope in Scripture; historical context [a brief sketch of major currents up to quietism]; natural hope [the philosophical context of theological hope]; objects, virtuousness, nature, and certitude of theological hope; gift of fear; sins against hope); they also show a laudable desire to indicate, briefly and succinctly, how problems which St. Thomas faced are related to contemporary concerns.

Action and Contemplation is part of a large triptych (questions 171-89): charisms (with concentration on prophecy); the basic forms of human life (active and contemplative); states of life (chiefly on the states of perfection, episcopal and religious). It is possible even today for readers to approach the four questions of this volume with the assumption that the active and contemplative lives are forms of the religious state only, or, perhaps more commonly, that at least "contemplation," especially as a permanent life-style (of which there is question here), is limited to religious. A further and more serious difficulty is the long history of the term "contemplation," the quarrels over its content, and the frequent implicit identification of "contemplation" with one or other kind of philosophical (i.e.,
predominantly intellectual) contemplation. Add the contemporary stress on the social dimension of Christianity (unthinkingly identified with external apostolic action) and the suspicion, founded on theory that is not given the test of personal experience, that contemplative prayer is a flight from "real" Christianity—and it will be readily seen that it is not easy for many present-day readers to approach these questions of the *Summa* intelligently. Against these last-mentioned prejudices no book can defend its readers. But the misunderstanding of the terms "contemplative life" and "contemplation" can be countered, and Fr. Aumann provides for this in his appendixes, especially those on the historical (pagan-philosophical and patristic) background and on the term "contemplation." The interested reader would do well to consult the abundant commentary of Hans Urs von Balthasar in his *Besondere Gnadengaben und die Zwei Wege menschlichen Lebens* (= *Deutsche Thomas-Ausgabe* 23 [*Summa theologica* 2-2. 171-82]; Heidelberg: F. H. Kerle; Graz: A. Pustet, 1954); the commentary on the "action and contemplation" questions runs through pp. 431-64.

Faced with volumes which give us St. Thomas' thought, its translation, annotation of it, and essays on it, the reviewer may well be puzzled about what to select for notice. In reviewing this set of volumes, I have concentrated on the blocks to understanding which the reader, often without realizing the fact, may bring with him and which serve to screen him successfully from the author. It is no small merit of these volumes that their editors have anticipated these difficulties and tried to meet them. The measure of their success will ultimately depend, of course, on whether such barriers as editors of texts can assault have in fact been dismantled for each reader—the unenviable task that any form of commentary faces.

_Fordham University_  

MATTHEW J. O'CONNELL, S.J.


We have here a presentation of five articles by Fr. Lonergan which appeared originally in _Theological Studies_ in the late forties. The articles give expression to an interpretation of elements in the writings of Aquinas relevant to Trinitarian theory. The expression has a complexity which is due both to the complexity of St. Thomas' expression and sources and, one might say, to a basic deficiency in the audience addressed by L. More important as a source of difficulty than the complexity in Thomas is this latter deficiency. To such an extent is this true that one might, e.g., have
the happy impression of reaching behind the loose terminology of Aquinas through L.'s work to a coherent view, yet still remain essentially deficient, in a manner to be specified, in one's conception of Aquinas' meaning.

The central difficulty lies in one's attitude in searching for the natural analogue for an understanding of the Trinity. One has failed entirely in that search if one adopts the attitude of Billot, who found imagination and intellect equally suitable in Trinitarian theory; it is the apparent foundation in the text of Aquinas for this attitude that L. succeeds in undermining in these articles. But there can be a less evident failure to understand: one can acknowledge the strength of L.'s case, admit the relevance of introspective psychology for an understanding of the Trinity, grasp in a fashion the fruits of that introspective psychology in Aquinas and L. as a coherent set of terms and relations, yet fail to carry out the relevant project oneself. Moreover, to fail in that project is not merely to fail in understanding a particular tract in Catholic theology; it is to fail essentially to reach authenticity as a contemporary theologian. Contemporary theology demands an attention to the existential subject of theology, a self-attention and criticism of scientific dimensions. Insofar as the subject is self-neglected, as is the case fundamentally in linguistic philosophies, or is attended to mainly in dramatic stance, as in existentialist modes, theology will continue to labor under the burden of old disputed questions and new myths. There will remain the old disputes about processions and Persons, grace and freedom, and a growing literature bears witness to the tangled flowering of muddles in theology about usage and meaning, verification and objectivity, existential categories and secular Christianity. L.'s articles are very evidently relevant to one of the old disputes; but less evidently are they relevant to contemporary debates about God and man.

These few remarks have been mainly concerned with the meaning of L.'s book on the level of contemporary history. L.'s own new introduction opens up the wider context of the insertion by Aquinas of the Augustinian mens into Aristotelian thought. Within that wider context one might discern the place of this volume in the history of thought as a clear step towards the emergence of a generalized empirical method whose pivotal act is introspective understanding. Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas all introspected with different degrees of refinement and success, but none proceeded to the thematic elevation of introspection into a scientific technique. The emergence of that thematization marks a turning point in history which some thirtieth-century Jaspers may write of as the center of one of the few great axes of cultural transformation. Verbum, like the later book Insight, is calculated to mediate the development of that technique in the
reader. It might be argued that the primary contribution of Verbum is to Trinitarian theology or to Aquinas studies, but such an argument would miss the fact that the contribution to either of these must be mediated by the introspective development of the reader. From another angle one may note that a primary principle of hermeneutics is that the understanding of a text calls for an understanding of the thing or object to which the text refers. L.’s text refers to the mind of man where uniquely is found the natural analogue for the understanding of the Trinity, and the reader’s reaching L.’s meaning involves his engaging successfully in the arduous task of introspective self-appropriation.

Campion Hall, Oxford

PHILIP McSHANE, S.J.


Since his doctoral dissertation on The Hussite Movement in History (1952), Prof. Howard Kaminsky of the University of Washington at Seattle has made valuable contributions to Hussiana which can be read with satisfaction and confidence both for their fresh presentation of recent research and up-to-date scholarship and their continuance in the steps of the European masters. In contrast to the efforts of those scholars who concentrate largely on the factual framing of events rather than their interpretation in a cause-effect fashion, his is a successful attempt to uncover the underlying impetus behind the Hussite movement as a social, political, and cultural phenomenon evolving from a reform into a revolution. This is a difficult area, still largely untouched, and a task which quite logically should be taken up by the younger generation of historians.

Seeing the “Hussite revolution” as a gradually developing historical phenomenon, K. attempts to trace its beginnings in chap. 1, “From Reform to Revolt: The Ideological Background,” by touching on the religious movement in fourteenth-century Bohemia, delineating the interplay of various influences, especially that of John Wyclif, before a final setting of the ideological structure of Hus’s movement. This is a rather traditional restatement of the so-called “precursors of Hus” theory and suffers several lapses. It is a great puzzle to this reviewer whether all the theological thinking of these “precursors of Hus” should be viewed as that of tributaries leading to Hus, or should rather be considered as independent currents with their own reformistic goals. This question is in great need of clarification, because it would seem that coverage of the historical figures of this period as mere “precursors of Hus” is an oversimplification of the complex problems of fourteenth-century Bohemia. The crux of the problem was
not the recognition of the need for Church reform, but the search for the way in which to achieve it: reform under the auspices of the Church as considered by some, or reform outside and against the Church as desired by others. There is certainly a marked difference in an analysis which concludes that the Church had to be pushed into reform and one which determines that she indeed had a concern for her own reform. The existence of frequent Church synods and councils speaks for the latter position. It would have been beneficial if K. had taken into consideration the newer views recently advanced by E. Winter, F. Dvorník, and others that due to the Early Humanism in Bohemia and the efforts of the Archbishop of Prague, John of Jenéstein, there was a genuine Catholic reform advancing parallel to the work of those usually styled as "Hussite reformers." K.'s reluctance to see this fact results in scattered sarcasms which appear whenever he attempts to state a "Catholic position," usually to be dismissed as less relevant or inadequate.

Another item must be reconsidered: the constant portrayal of the Roman Church as that of Antichrist is a little misleading, because the medieval sources, replete with the antithesis Christ-Antichrist, should be read in their medieval context, from which a modern interpretation should be derived. The medieval "secularized Church" must be viewed as existing in the spectrum of the centuries-long intrusion of the rex-sacerdos theory into the life of the Church. Thus her ties with, and abuses of, secular power had eventually to come under the fire of those idealists who longed nostalgically for a return of the "primitive Church," seeing this as the only way toward possible reform. On the other hand, the Church regarded as a sociological phenomenon seemed to have no other way than to work out her life in and with the world, while remaining a Church "not of this world."

This constitutes the difference in the approaches of all the reformistic parties involved in the problem and should be considered accordingly. This is appropriately taken up by K.'s careful grouping of reformers, depicted in chap. 2, "The Politicians and the Radicals, 1409-1413"; by his singling out of the beginnings of the Hussite left in struggling for "The Ultraquist Revolt, 1414-1415" (chap. 3), "The Establishment of Hussitism and the Crises of the Hussite Left, 1415-1416" (chap. 4), and "National Consolidation of the Reform, 1417-1418" (chap. 5), reaching a point of departure in 1419 "From Reformation to Revolution" (chap. 6). The reader will find in these excellent chapters a competent and factual account on theological justification and the opportune motivation behind the beginnings of Czech ultraquism, which eventually became the trademark of, and the cause of subsequent agony to, the Hussite movement. K.'s identifi-
cation of Masters Jakoubek of Stříbro and Nicholas of Dresden as the principal instigators of the revolt is a well-balanced account heavily dependent on the work of Czech scholars, mainly Sedlák and Barto, but competently interpreted here in a logical manner.

Very revealing is chap. 7, "Chiliasm and the Founding of Tabor, 1419–1420," with its clear-cut distinction of adventism and chiliasm and the hard core of troublemakers identified as Pikards and Adamites. K.'s clarification of these issues should be appreciated, especially since these topics are frequently treated by some historians in a rather confused manner. Chaps. 8–10, "Tabor and Prague: March to September, 1420," "The Definition of Taborite Society," and "The Cause of the Priests of Tabor," are elaborations of K.'s previous studies. All are excellent restatements of the whole ideological problem concerning Tabor, based on K.'s commanding synthesis of primary sources and the works of leading scholars, whose views are reproduced here with fineness and precision by one who has become known for his predilection for research in this area. His comprehensive coverage of the problem also includes the interpretations of some Marxist Czech historians such as Macek and others, who attempted to incorporate such concepts as class struggle, bourgeois exploitation, socialist elements, or social motivation as influential factors in the Taborite events. Needless to say, these views are not infrequently rejected by K. as lacking in objective value. There are, however, several topics, such as the case of the apostasy of the Archbishop of Prague, Konrad of Vechta, to utraquism, with all its subsequent repercussions, which should be treated more fully in order to put the situation into better perspective.

The value of the work is further enriched by three appendices: (1) the anonymous antiutraquist treatise Estote sine offensione, which K. believes should be attributed to Paleč; (2) the Taborite Synod of Klatovy, Nov. 11, 1424, and related problems with K.'s commentary; (3) the treatises of MS O 13 on adventism, chiliasm, and warfare: the Latin texts, taken from the Prague Cathedral Chapter Library and accompanied by K.'s commentary. These supplements support relevant items in the text as indicated above.

A well-selected bibliography, topically sorted and divided into works in major languages and works in Czech with special indication of primary sources, as well as a detailed index will enable the reader to peruse this volume with enjoyment and cultural enrichment.

K.'s volume is in some ways a masterpiece. Perspectively, it elucidates the whole ideological background of the Hussite movement; fundamentally, it scopes the Hussite problem in a well-structured volume; without going into their series, it transmits the best Czech and European scholarly findings
with added clarification of many controversial views; it singles out doctrinal constituents and their radical protagonists, distinguished for converting a Church reformistic platform into a Hussite revolt; it mediates their clear-cut issues and, with the beneficial coupling of the author's deep understanding of the issues and exceptional ability to communicate, it offers a logical and comprehensive view of the Hussite revolution to the international forum.

Rosemont College, Pa.

LUDVIEK NEMEC


E. has contributed a serious and readable addition to recent major studies of the Catholic doctrine about birth control. He states his thesis: "The rational apologetic for the Roman Position I cannot accept and I suggest that the appeal to tradition, while uniquely powerful, might not be as irremovable an obstacle in the way of change as is usually supposed" (p. 4). He devotes four chapters to the analysis of rational arguments used to support the doctrine and one long chapter to tradition. (On pages 4 and 171 he announces a chapter which is not found in the book.)

The argument from the appeal to values E. takes from Lestapis. He concedes that these values should be safeguarded but rejects the claim that an absolute ban on contraception in each and every act is required for this purpose. In the third chapter he succinctly states the rational argument against contraception proposed by Pius XII and Hürth and proposes three objections against it. E.'s summary of the first two objections states: "I first disclosed an ambiguity in the contention that sexual intercourse has reproduction for its purpose, and suggested that the argument takes the natural norm as a special pattern of anatomical contact rather than as the generative finality of sexual relations. The second... objection considered this 'natural norm' and tried to show that 'nature' here is too generic a term; it is the privileged position of certain human functions that is central to the Roman Position, and the argument from nature does not furnish adequate grounds for knowing what functions are so privileged, or that their sacrosancticity is absolute. The third... objection... attacks the whole philosophical method which underlies the argument from nature" (p. 48).

E. does not set out to teach any situational form of morality. "I am going to submit that this appeal to nature... far from being an instance of that doctrine of natural law so bound up with Christian tradition, is a
travesty and impoverishment of that doctrine, and vitiated by a philosophical error associated with empiricists like Locke and Hume" (p. 49).

The empirical method consists in the examination and inventory of mental objects, called "ideas" or "impressions," i.e., particular, isolated phenomena which it defines in terms of something not perceptible in them. This "something" is what happens in the philosopher when he thinks. Meaning and significance must escape his scrutiny, for these are not isolated phenomena to be inspected. In particular, "The significance or purpose of something human is to be understood against a background of human needs, obligations and destiny" (p. 56). "Propositions" about them "which confine themselves to criteria open to inspection at any one moment cannot but be defective, for they offer no proper ground for the content claimed for them" (p. 57). E. sees a convergence between the Neo-Scholastics and the empiricists in philosophical method and he uses Boyer's *Cursus philosophiae ad usum seminariorum* as an example to prove his contention.

The rational argument from nature for the Roman Position must demonstrate that contraception is illicit in itself, that the abandonment of the natural physiological pattern of intercourse is illicit in every single act. The proof must stand on its own; it cannot appeal to revelation. The argument achieves this objective only if one limits his view to the isolated, physiological act of intercourse and derives the meaning of the act from what goes on in the individual act of coition. From this point of view the only perceptible purpose and meaning of the act is "the placing of the seed in a position where in favourable circumstances further processes may cause it to fertilize" (p. 58). Therefore, the argument concludes, any disturbance of the physiological pattern—and contraception is a disturbance—destroys the meaning of the act and is absolutely illicit.

E. affirms a wider meaning and purpose of human sexuality, says his view "of sex is... inextricably bound up with the Christian doctrine which restricts the use of the sexual faculty to the state of marriage" (p. 59), and concludes: "What I am objecting to... is... the identification of the absoluteness of God's commands with the strait-jacket of a fallacious piece of philosophy" (p. 63).

The chapter on tradition was written before Noonan's book. E. summarizes his research: "All that can be done—all I have tried to do—is to question how far the *de facto* existence of this tradition entails a *de jure* and so unchangeable attitude. I have suggested that it might not, on the grounds that the whole tradition is *not simply about contraception but about the whole purpose and morality of the use of marriage*. The abandonment of
the tradition with respect to these other topics makes appeal to it with respect to contraception no longer decisive evidence, but a partial selection of testimony which itself needs justifying.” The book is worth serious reading.

Alma College

ROBERT H. DAILEY, S.J.


Fr. Healy’s doctoral dissertation is a valuable, interesting, and readable contribution to historical theological research; for in the study of the presence or absence of the concept of the just wage in the writings of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century moralists, he brings to light many aspects of the moral theology of the period. His approach at first appears lengthy and indirect, since it embraces passages on the second commandment, simony, support of the clergy, slavery, self-preservation, the duty to work, contracts, etc., but the absence of clear texts of moralists on the notion of a just wage due to the lack of attention to this concept necessitates such an approach. The thesis clearly indicates the great significance of Leo XIII’s *Rerum novarum* at the time of its appearance; for prior to its publication there had been no realistic Latin moral approach to wage doctrine, with the exception of three authors: Statler (1728–97), Lehmkuhl (1834–1918), and Aernys (1828–1915), the latter two writing during the time of Leo XIII.

Some moralists of the latter half of the eighteenth century give norms for the just reward of the work of professionals, craftsmen, laborers, and domestics, but none indicate a standard for industrial workers or seem to envision any problem in their regard. The idea of a living wage is not emphasized by these writers, even though a few expressly relate the norm with the worker’s livelihood; but it appears to be an assumption. The nineteenth-century moralists who treat the matter of a just wage are generally content with very brief and ambiguous statements which center around then-prevailing practices—e.g., “The just wage is whatever is commonly given.” Since all of the moralists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries treated in the dissertation are unanimous in their teaching on the duties of parents, H. adduces that they implicitly hold to the position of a family living wage, with the exception of a few who reject living standards as a norm.

H. gives some insights into the manner in which moralists of the period composed their moral theologies, explaining their desire to give doctrine which enjoyed the support of St. Alphonsus and to take account of recent
Roman decrees and civil legislation, and at the same time their failure to be informed about the dynamic nature of society, economics, and changing customs, and to include changing practices in the revised editions of their works. These reflections and the foundations for them constitute a valuable contribution to the still-emerging history of moral theology and attest to the problems related to attributing particular opinions to particular authors when the historical setting is not considered. In consulting a large number of moralists (150) of the 1750-1890 period, H. shows that the nationality of moralists considerably influenced the moral theologies. For example, efforts at renewal of moral theology were made almost entirely in Central Europe, because there ecclesiastical learning was basically integrated with higher secular studies, whereas in other areas isolationism prevailed. Further, H. proposes that the sheltered seminary training of the times may be in part the reason for the moralists' divorce from reality, since this training did not provide the experiences necessary to appreciate the conditions under which people earned their livelihood, and the books available dealt with the circumstances of the past rather than current times and economic issues.

H. devotes space to the problem of the influence of the thirty-seventh condemned proposition of Innocent XI (re occult compensation and the wages of servants) on the development of a wage doctrine. This condemned proposition seems to have expanded the number of authors who wrote about wages but simultaneously diverted attention away from basic principles to less important questions.

H.'s research is formidable and the work abounds in concrete citations. While the distribution of material is uneven, H. found it necessary to explain the writings of the second half of the eighteenth century in more depth in order to lay the foundation for an understanding of the nineteenth-century contributions on wages. If the work is heavy with the opinions of Jesuit moralists, it is—in addition to their significant contributions—probably because of some of the references used as a starting point and because the research was undertaken principally in Jesuit libraries. And the large number of German moralists cited for the eighteenth century may be due to the number of active German universities during that period. This work is a welcome addition to the development of historical moral theology.

Collegio di Santa Croce, Rome

WILLIAM F. HOGAN, C.S.C.


As Leslie Dewart remarks in the Foreword to this generally readable translation of L'Homme problématique (1955), "Marcel's findings are ex-
pressed in passages which may be counted among the most lucid and eloquent of his distinguished philosophical career.” But his conclusions are not “highly Teilhardian,” as Dewart also asserts. It would be more accurate to say merely that M.’s disagreement with Teilhard is less open and explicit in this book than it is in, say, _Man against Mass Society_. And M. does not disagree with Teilhard to the extent of saying, as Dewart interprets him, “that there is something fundamentally valid (albeit fundamentally distorted) in modern man’s experience of loneliness, anxiety and even nihilism.” (p. 9) These words describe the state of the “barracks man,” analyzed at length in Part 1 of this book; and according to M., “the barracks man is the victim of a crime without name, but which has something particularly atrocious about it...” (p. 50).

M.’s actual suggestion, at the start of Part 2, is less startling: there is a sort of uneasiness which “is not only compatible with genuine faith, but also strictly speaking, required in order for faith not to degenerate into an almost passive abandon...” (p. 71). But what sort of uneasiness is this? What sort of uneasiness is a good thing, at least for the majority of men? M. whets the reader’s appetite by proposing not only to pass in review the attitudes which have been adopted in the face of this problem by a certain number of great minds (Lucretius, Epicurus, Augustine, Pascal, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, Goethe, Gide), but also to attempt a solution, for the enlightenment of troubled modern man. Disappointingly, neither in his rapid survey of these varied viewpoints nor in his concluding remarks does M. come to grips with his question in the sort of detailed dialectical struggle one would expect of, say, Kierkegaard—or of one who proclaims himself a “neo-Socratic.”

It is rather in his attention to words and concepts that M. sometimes becomes quite detailed. His distinction between uneasiness and anguish, e.g., has been praised by more than one reviewer. Precisely in such studies as this one, however, M. manifests his usual unconcern for a principle which Lovejoy rightly stressed: “There is nothing about which it is more essential that a philosopher should, from the start of any inquiry or discussion, be absolutely clear in his own mind, and make himself clear to his readers, than the discrimination of his definitions from his assertions; for this discrimination is the prime requisite for the avoidance of purely verbal issues and controversies.” M. seldom recognizes the moment when reference to usage is not merely opportune but imperative (e.g., pp. 56, 67–70, 76–77). Were he aware how frequently this moment arrives in his investigations, he might more frequently direct them into other channels—away from mere concepts and towards the realities whose complexity he so often stresses but too seldom really grapples with.
The many reviews of this book which have appeared since 1955 have alluded to fine qualities which make M. worth reading. But these things too needed to be said.

**Jesuit House of Studies, Mobile**

**GARTH HALLETT, S.J.**


The central thesis of this work is that the position of Teilhard de Chardin on the creation of the human soul is not inconsistent with the teaching of Scripture or the magisterium of the Church. Approximately the first half of the book deals with the general context of Teilhard's thought regarding the origin of the human soul, treating the questions of the matter-spirit relationship, polygenism, orthogenesis, Alpha-Omega in creation, and the Cosmic Christ. These chapters of general context are followed by others on the teaching of Scripture and the magisterium on the creation of the soul, the position of Karl Rahner on hominization, the Thomist teaching on concursus as this touches the question of human co-operation in the production of the whole man (body and soul), and, finally, the future of man as a social being, "superpersonalization."

What seems the most notable defect in the book is that N. nowhere addresses himself to the task of explaining clearly from Teilhard's works just what his position on the creation of the soul was. Since not even in *The Phenomenon of Man* does he concern himself with this explicitly at any great length, it would have been very useful to know to what extent in his available writings he did undertake to answer the question or make known his views on the matter.

The work, however, is enormously erudite. The "Index of Subjects and Authors Cited" takes more than thirty columns, with each column averaging around a hundred entries. This wealth of material is generally very illuminating and helpful, but sometimes one gains the impression that some things were included because N. found them interesting and then discovered a way to include them somehow in his development.

There are some questionable interpretations of Teilhard's thought. For example, N. explains Teilhard's references to a counterpoise to entropy within the universe as meaning that without such a thrust the universe would by now have run down. But the sense actually seems much closer to that of Schrödinger in *What is Life?,* wherein life is described as negative entropy. The question of maintaining the universal level of energy above a uniformly diffused heat does not seem to be the issue.

N. quite often sees his position as differing from traditional textbook the-
ology; and undoubtedly he highlights some shortcomings in some theological manuals. But it is not always clear that he has really understood them. For instance, in trying to explain the fairly common textbook notion of "creation from nothing," he introduces a distinction between "positive" nothing, out of which we are told God made the world, and "absolute" nothing, which cannot be created at all (cf. p. 88). How much this differs from ordinary textbooks can be seen by consulting a passage from St. Thomas commonly cited in them (Sum. theol. 1, q. 45, a. 1, ad 3m), wherein it is explained that "out of nothing" simply denies any material cause and indicates a kind of order of succession: creation follows upon nothing prior.

A curious patronizing and defensive tone in certain parts of the book tends to reduce the reader's receptivity to much that is valuable in it. N. depicts what he thinks will be the reaction of "most Christian readers" to a question he has posed thus: "First we should affirm our unshakable conviction of the soul's spirituality, immortality, and unique origin, as a challenge to this materialistic and unbelieving generation. Only in second place should we listen to what contrary evidence the scientist claims to have discovered in his laboratory. This we may do with the intention of isolating and refuting his errors, but not find or admit anything that might involve altering our cherished formulas...." (p. 30). If he really thinks most Christian readers will react this way, it is hard to see for whom he wrote the book.

The most valuable contributions of the book seem to be in the area of biblical interpretation, as in dealing with St. Paul's teaching on the Cosmic Christ and with OT ways of speaking about the human soul. N. likewise well establishes his case that the doctrine of the immediate creation of the human soul, as it has normally been understood, is not as certain as many manuals of theology might lead one to believe.

Alma College


Tillich is certainly one of the giants of modern theology. Yet he is something of an anomaly. Even before his death in 1965 most younger theologians and many older ones had begun to lose interest in him. There was a growing suspicion and sometimes conviction that Tillich was not really speaking to the present generation. But why should this be so? Fr. Armbruster has given us a good introduction to T.'s thought. He is a most sympathetic student of the master, although he does not miss the opportunity to offer many incisive criticisms. Most of all, he is convinced that T. has a vision of the theological enterprise which is quite relevant to our cur-
rent situation. He calls T. "an Honest-to-God theologian" and ranks him along with Barth, Bonhoeffer, and Bultmann as one of the seminal thinkers of today's theological ferment. This is undoubtedly true. But then how do we explain the fact that there is no recognizable school of Tillichian theology even in the United States, where T. lived from 1933 until his death and where he has certainly exerted his greatest influence? A. offers certain internal difficulties and failures in precision in T.'s system, but the closest he comes to answering our question is to suggest that the problem is either that T. is a metaphysician and some people do not like metaphysics, or, if they are willing to do metaphysics, they do not like the way T. does it: they feel he sacrifices the content of Christianity to the demands of his metaphysics. There is perhaps much truth in this analysis. Yet this is to see the problem largely as one of methodology. The real issue, however, seems to be much more substantive. A. rightly characterizes the essential feature of T.'s theology as an "answering" apologetics. According to the method of correlation, this means that theology will always involve at least two steps. First, analyze the existential "situation" of modern man and discover, presumably by some kind of phenomenology, the ambiguities and distortions of existence, the impotency of man before ultimate questions, and then, secondly, look to theology for the answers to these questions. Bonhoeffer saw that here we have the really central issue on which Tillichian theology stands or falls. Can one hope to reclaim for Christ a world-come-of-age by attacking man at his points of weakness and then offering him Christian answers? Put in more traditional language, how much must one convince man of his evil and sinfulness before asking him to be a Christian? A. does not raise this issue, but it is the central one for his reader and T.'s to keep in mind: Is existence really as ambiguous as T.'s existential phenomenology would lead us to believe?

A. has given us an excellent summary of T.'s views. He emphasizes the centrality of the Protestant principle, the theology of culture, theonomy, and ultimate concern, and provides a readable and detailed account of the main lines of T.'s masterpiece, the three volumes of *Systematic Theology*. One wishes that he had had space to include some treatment of T.'s doctrine of the Trinity. The treatment of symbol and analogy (pp. 140-44) seems a bit incomplete. Here A. simply follows the account in the first volume of *Systematic Theology* but does not refer at all to the substantial modifications and changes introduced by T. in the Introduction to the second volume. Thus, A. begins his summary with the statement: "'God is being-itself' is the only nonsymbolic statement about God." This is true in Vol. 1, but not in Vol. 2. In the latter volume (p. 9) T. has modified his thesis to the position...
that the only nonsymbolic statement we can make about God is the statement that everything we say about God is symbolic. The modified thesis seems to be a more readily defendable one than the original version which A. expounds.

For T., the astounding paradox of Christology is the appearance of essential manhood under the conditions of existence, but without being eroded by them. In nontechnical language this means that Jesus as the Christ is man as man ought to be, i.e., without the distortions which existence inevitably seems to imply in the rest of us. T. has thus changed the context of the whole Christological debate. Traditionally, the great paradox has been considered to be the union of God and man in Jesus. A. wisely adds: “The fact that Tillich finds no paradox here at all throws the burden of proof upon him, for it is inconceivable that, for centuries, theologians have missed the point of the paradox of their faith. At least they must know where the mystery lies.”

A. considers the most characteristic and most theologically significant doctrine of T.’s ecclesiology to be his notion of the latent and manifest Church. The manifest Church openly and consciously acknowledges the New Being in Jesus the Christ, and, united by the bonds of a common faith, it proclaims the word of the gospel and the sacraments of the New Law. However, A. notes that T. sees so many ambiguities, demonizations, and profanizations within the manifest Church that “one begins to wonder if the transition from the latent to the manifest Church is worth the price. It seems that most of the latter’s energy is expended in applying the Cross to correct its own ambiguities.”

This book is very well organized for easy reference to most of the main issues in T.’s theology. There is a useful bibliography and an excellent index.

_Yale Divinity School_  
VINCENT M. COOKE, S.J.


Bonhoeffer literature has begun to proliferate and it is already possible to witness the phenomenon of conflicting interpretations, e.g., that of Hanfried Müller vs. John Godsey, or of Eberhard Bethge (aligning Bonhoeffer with Barth) against Friedrich Gogarten (enrolling Bonhoeffer in the Bultmannian camp). Such divergence is possible primarily by focusing upon only one phase of Bonhoeffer’s life and work, and John Phillips in this newest study aims for a comprehensiveness that seeks to avoid any such exclusive angle of vision. In this respect it is one of the more successful of the many Bonhoeffer books, a success achieved only by surveying in chronological order
the entire range of B.'s writings, by investigating the varied influences that shaped his theological thought, often by way of reaction, and by exploring simultaneously the interpretations of others, especially his Protestant contemporaries.

Obviously, some interpretation is necessary and P. locates the linchpin in B.'s Christology, in an insistence that it is this rather than his ecclesiology that lies at the heart of his theology. What quickly becomes clear, however, is that this Christology is the Kondessens Christology of classical Lutheranism. Eventually this will signal, understandably, the break with Barth, who cannot entertain any thought of the finite world being capable of the infinite, but it also puts into perspective the culminating point of Bonhoeffer's thought, i.e., the concept of God as "This-Worldly Transcendence." The "religionless Christianity" of a "world come of age" that distinguishes the Letters and Papers from Prison is hereby clarified by reference to its conceptual partner, i.e., "sharing in the sufferings of God."

This is also the juncture at which the shortcomings of Bonhoeffer's vision come into focus. Barth's reaction of Kierkegaardian tristitia takes on substance, and one can wonder with P. how Christian faith is then indeed distinguishable from a form of stoicism (p. 225). Bonhoeffer's own recourse to what he called "the secret or arcane discipline" appears as a wholly unsatisfactory flight from the dilemma. The question that continues to reoccur is: Why the irreconcilable tension between faith and religion? Is B., in seeking a God beyond religion, merely activating once again the Protestant principle of protest? Or, as Daniel Jenkins has suggested, was he intending all along an eventual redefinition of the Church—a project made impossible by the Nazi hangmen? P.'s presentation favors the latter, though in at least one place (p. 190) he casts some doubt on his own thesis.

The impression that tends to remain, however, from B.'s later writings is of a sort of religious mystique, in which faith is authentic only to the extent that it looks to the weakness of God, to a God who gains significance for man only as He is more and more "edged out of the world." He suggests several times that God's removal from the world is at the same time a positive revelation of Him. It is difficult to cavil with P.'s observation apropos of this that "there is reason to doubt that Bonhoeffer has done full justice to the 'God of the Bible' by referring simply to weakness and suffering . . ." (p. 192). In the final analysis, is it the kenotic theology of Luther that prevails in B.'s thought? Was he, like the Luther whom he confessed to loving above all, a religious "genius" more than a theological thinker, a man of compelling religious intuition whose thought was fragmentary rather than integral and systematic? It is true that one has the constant impression of
the man himself casting a long shadow over his work. P.'s careful and sympathetic study points out the vulnerability of many of his positions: what R. Gregor Smith calls his "defencelessness," and William Hamilton his "attractive uncertainty." When he writes that "the beyond of God is not the beyond of our perceptive faculties...(but)...the beyond in the midst of life," so that "the Church stands not where human powers give out, on the borders, but in the centre of the village" (cited from the *Letters* on p. 189), the religious impact is unmistakable, but the question remains as to why life in the village is not constituted as properly human by the deployment of *all* man's faculties, including ultimately the reach of his speculative intelligence.

Perhaps such limitations are inevitable in the light of that distrust of reason that Bonhoeffer shared with Barth, and which necessitated his rejection of Bultmann's solution to the hermeneutical problem because the latter was founded upon an a priori from existential philosophy. His extraordinary influence as the man who "set the traditional forms of Christianity trembling" is due, first, to the fact that (once again like Luther?) he touched upon the raw nerve of contemporary Western man's religious unrest, answering to the need of a people and a time; and secondly, to the truth that God does indeed empty Himself out for man (Phil 2:6-9). This kenotic Christology, and the subsequent ethic of sacrifice to which it gives rise, is only one dimension of the integral truth of the Incarnation; but no contemporary Christian writer has projected it with more compelling clarity than Bonhoeffer.
tance of preaching in both Barth and Bultmann, and the Christology at the center of the developing conflict.

In the early chapters S. traces the profound influence of Schleiermacher on Barth, and Bultmann’s roots in the tradition of Religionsgeschichte. His interpretation of Barth’s preparation for the revolt against the liberal establishment in Protestant theology is a useful corrective for the sometimes oversimplified view that the Barthian revolt centered about the experience of World War I. Actually, Barth’s study of the Scriptures and his dialogue with Eduard Thurneysen prepared him to see in that war the judgment of God. S. also points to the significance of Christopher Blumhardt’s influence on Barth’s thinking at this time. English-language commentators have yet to realize that it was from Blumhardt that Barth learned to look upon God and not man as the starting point of theology, and that “revelation as a past and yet still present reality had become the starting point for theology, rather than religious experience” (p. 61). In addition, Barth was rediscovering St. Paul (1916-18), leading to the 1919 publication of his commentary on Romans. In these years Bultmann continued in the theological tradition of Schleiermacher, from whom he drew his conceptions of religion, and worked on his major History of the Synoptic Tradition. In a 1920 essay Bultmann began to lay the groundwork for his later programs of de-mythologizing and existential interpretation, which he was to inaugurate in 1941. For Bultmann in 1920, Christianity is indeed a revelation, but “one must find a new contemporary conceptuality to replace the old one, making sure that the essence is not lost in the transition” (p. 93). The relationship of Barth and Bultmann was friendly during this period; disagreement centered about Bultmann’s continued dependence upon Schleiermacher and his critical agnosticism towards the Gospel figure of Jesus.

S. is to be congratulated for calling the attention of English-language readers to the influence of the writings of Franz Overbeck (d. 1905) on Barth in the early 1920’s. Overbeck’s views on the past of the Church paralleled Blumhardt’s views of the future. “Both alike by their grasping the eschatological character of New Testament faith were made aware of the radical antithesis between the life of faith initiated by Jesus Christ and the ordinary life of man in history” (p. 102). S. also traces the influence of Kierkegaard upon Barth, and Barth’s collaboration with Gogarten in the journal Zwischen den Zeiten. The 1922 revision of the commentary on Romans laid out the lines of Barth’s theology and the elements which are its hallmarks. S. rightly sees in Bultmann’s otherwise favorable review of Romans in 1922 the root differences between both—differences that were to
be elaborated in time. For Bultmann, the life and death of Jesus are preparatory to the revelation in the kerygma of the Church; for Barth, it is the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus that is the moment of revelation, hidden but to be revealed to faith. For Barth, the life of Jesus is the medium of revelation through the action of the Spirit.

S. continues to trace the widening gulf during the mid-twenties, Bultmann's alliance with Gogarten against Barth, and the 1927 climax in Bultmann's Jesus and Barth's first volume of the Dogmatics. S. devotes a whole chapter to the detailed exposition of the differences, centering upon the issue of anthropology and its implications. S. also tellingly demonstrates the long intellectual alienation of Brunner from Barth (1927-33), and the naive American belief that Brunner was Barth's most faithful interpreter. In this light, Barth's famed 1934 Nein can no longer be looked upon as a bad-tempered outburst. The crucial issue between Barth and Bultmann, the watershed for contemporary Protestant theological schizophrenia, is for S. the answer to the question "Where does theology begin?" For Barth, it is in the word of God to which faith responds; for Bultmann, it is in the faith that responds to the word of God.

S.'s work will serve the reader well in sharpening the differences that not only plague Protestant thought, but are also having their echoes among Catholic attempts to restate the tract on fundamental theology. His own views tend to a Barthian distrust of natural theology, but to a Bultmannian approach to the critical study of Scripture. But, for S., Barth is the teacher, since his is a theology that refuses to absolutize anything; he finds in Bultmann the absolutism of rigid separations between history and eschatology, between this world and the beyond. "This rigidity is perhaps Bultmann's primary contribution to the divided mind of modern theology. At this point the contrast with Barth is striking. Barth's eschatological perspective has relativized all theologies including his own" (p. 227).

St. Joseph's Seminary, Yonkers, N.Y.  
JAMES M. CONNOLLY
As each month passes, a half dozen new titles are added to the growing body of literature on the death-of-God theology. It is becoming increasingly apparent that this movement is no fad or passing fancy. Too many competent theologians have addressed themselves to the problem for it to be lightly dismissed. Indeed, when the theological history of the second half of this century is written, the problem of God may well turn out to be the paramount problem of our time.

The present review reports on five contributions to the discussion that appeared in 1967. One is a history of the philosophical and theological roots of the present radical questioning of God’s existence. One analyzes and evaluates the thought of Vahanian, Altizer, Hamilton, and van Buren. Three are collections of essays: the first two provide excerpts from the writings of men who have been significant in developing the tradition of atheism or antitheism; the other provides a representative spectrum of Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish reaction to the radical theology.

Cooper’s *The Roots of the Radical Theology* would be an ideal place for one to start in introducing himself to the movement. It is a competent, if somewhat brief and sketchy, history of the movement. C. finds the most immediate antecedents of today’s rather startling questioning of the existence of God in nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophers and theologians. Comte, with his positivism, reduced the world to one dimension, the material here-and-now. Feuerbach turned theology into anthropology, insisting that God was but the projection of man’s highest values, needs, and desires. Nietzsche took this up and insisted that until God died, man could not become all he was capable of. Marx’s contribution was to see religion and God as instruments of political power, creations of the ruling classes designed to keep the proletariat in its place and preserve the status quo. Freud represents the last in this line with his insistence that religion is but the institutionalization of man’s attempt to deal with his sexual conflicts.

While philosophy was moving in this direction, nineteenth-century liberal Protestant theology was making its own contribution to the formulation of the problem of God. Schleiermacher took religion out of the order of objective reality and made of it a purely subjective experience, a feeling of identity with the universe and hence a feeling of absolute dependence upon God. But as Cooper puts it: “Schleiermacher’s theology was a grand tour de force which rejected any attempt to involve Christianity on the phenomenological (event, experience, fact) level of reality” (p. 61). Coming as it did in conjunction with Kant’s rejection of the probative value of any rational arguments for God’s existence and with Kierkegaard’s insistence that “truth is subjectivity,” Schleiermacher’s theology left the believer at
the end of the century quite uncertain about the objective and rational grounds of his belief. Was religion just subjective?

One further movement in the nineteenth century shook the believer's assurance even further. Biblical criticism spent the century discovering how much of Scripture, traditionally seen as divinely inspired and therefore as free of error, was myth and legend. Reliance on the authority of God's word thus became ever more problematic.

Tillich, Barth, and Bultmann are representatives of the twentieth century's attempt to undo the damage of the nineteenth. Each was dedicated to the conviction that Christianity could and must be made meaningful to modern man. For Tillich, this quest for meaning took the form of a highly rationalized ontology. He let modern art, literature, depth psychology, and history paint the picture of man alienated and in despair, and then offered him the Christian God as the ultimate ground of his being and faith in Jesus as the way to the possession of the New Being which would heal his alienation andaloneness. Barth chose the way of reaffirming the total otherness of God, the inability, therefore, of man to know or speak of God in any meaningful sense and the consequent need for man to listen humbly as God speaks His word to him. For Bultmann, the search for meaning in Christianity took the form of reinterpreting the Scriptures. First, the essential message of Scripture—an understanding of the meaning of human existence—must be stripped of its first-century world view, which makes it so unacceptable to contemporary man. Then that message needs to be clothed in contemporary language, the existential language of Heidegger, and used to answer man's questions about the meaning of his existence.

All three failed finally in making Christianity meaningful: Barth, because his transcendent God makes no sense to secular man in his concern with this world only; Tillich, because of "the inbred resistance of modern men to the kind of philosophical thinking which Tillich represents" (p. 91); Bultmann, because, as Cooper sees it, he proved too much. "It seems possible that Bultmann's program of demythologizing has contributed to our present situation where many are saying that God is dead" (p. 84).

It is as heirs of all this history that the radical theologians come on the theological scene. Cooper competently summarizes the positions of Altizer, Hamilton, and van Buren, and echoes the conclusion of others that the questions they ask need asking, though their answers do not compel acceptance. The book ends with a précis of the thought of Teilhard. As C. sees it, Teilhard has been more successful in finding the transcendent in the immanent than most contemporary thinkers, and his thought therefore
deserves careful attention: he "will be the Dante who will guide us from the purgatory of the present to the reality of faith in the transcendent future" (p. 156).

Against the background that Cooper provides, the other books can be more briefly noted. Bent's *The Death of God Movement* would be a good follow-up to C.'s volume. In the space of fifty pages each, he analyzes in logical fashion the thinking of Vahanian, Hamilton, van Buren, and Altizer. Each of the four chapters ends with a brief but adequate pinpointing of the difficulties in each of the four views. His final judgment: "In the final analysis, the hybrid proposal of Christian atheism is essentially unsatisfactory both to the secular humanist and the Christian theist, for the secular humanist finds this kind of synthetic proposal superfluous and anachronistic, while the orthodox Christian believer finds it completely untenable" (p. 201). The right questions are asked: What do you mean by "God"? What meaning does God-language have? How do you speak of God to secular man? But the right answers have not yet appeared, at least not in the writings of the radical theologians.

Miller's *The New Christianity* and Altizer's *Toward a New Christianity* supply long excerpts from the writings of most of the thinkers who have been and are influential in this radical tradition. Nietzsche and Blake, Feuerbach and Schleiermacher, Bultmann, Bonhoeffer, Barth, and Tillich are all represented in both of these well-edited collections. The brief introductory essays provided by each of the editors help one to tie the collection together and follow the development of thought from one author to the next. The contemporary theologians are also adequately represented in either new or reprinted contributions by each of the death-of-God theologians. Altizer's own introductory essay to his collection deserves special mention. It brings to clear focus what is at issue in the present questioning about God. Read in conjunction with Cooper and Bent, the two volumes fill in some essential original source material needed for a proper understanding and evaluation of the movement.

Murchland's *The Meaning of the Death of God* rounds off nicely the treatment of the death-of-God controversy provided by these five books. It offers a series of critical essays on the movement. Some of the pieces limit themselves to trying to clarify the question that the radical theologians are asking and answering. Others, and for this reviewer the more satisfying ones, offer critiques of the radical thinking and/or offer possible alternate approaches to the questions they pose. Comstock's "Theology after the 'Death of God,'" the last in the book and the longest, is by far the best. It perceptively notes that the alternatives open to contemporary man seem
to be either the "holy secularism of Tillich" or the "radical secularism of Nietzsche." Either man must settle for a totally profane world or he must choose "Tillich’s view of a dialectical and continuing vital relation between the secular and sacred aspects of existence" (p. 237). In the process of clarifying his insight, Comstock shrewdly gets to the heart of most of the significant thinking on the subject. His treatment of Nietzsche is especially well done. Also worth particular attention are John Cobb’s offer of an alternate solution to the problem of God as found in the thought of Whitehead, Shideler’s analysis of the elements of myth and metaphysics in the controversy, and Borowitz’s essay representing the reaction of Jewish theologians to the problem. All in all, it is an excellent collection.

One final note. A reading of these books makes it clear that Protestantism has within it voices asking very radical questions indeed about God and His existence, the way we are to speak of Him, the viability of any sort of religion in today’s world. They are drastic questions and they shake many a Christian foundation. Judaism has also produced a significant voice in Rabbi Rubenstein and his brilliant (if that is the right word for one who absolutely rejects theism) study After Auschwitz. Thus far the Catholic contribution to the present concern for a meaningful understanding of God seems to be criticism of the attempts that have been made to meet the problem. Is there any sense at all in which a Roman Catholic theologian can enter the death-of-God movement? Or, put in a less startling fashion, what is the contribution that Catholic theology has to make to the necessary task of formulating a meaningful language about God and articulating an acceptable religious stance for secular man?

Le Moyne College, Syracuse

WILLIAM A. SCOTT, S.J.


After introductory remarks on "the crisis of language" troubling our whole culture and on Ludwig Wittgenstein, "a symbol of troubled times," High develops themes from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations as groundwork for a shorter, concluding section on religious discourse. The familiar theme that in the kingdom of language there are many mansions leads to the well-known conclusion that religious and other nonscientific discourse cannot rightfully be evicted. Nevertheless, H. rejects the view that there is an autonomous “language of faith” obeying its own rules and so immune from the sort of rational demands appropriate in other domains of discourse. True, language uses are many and various, but, like games, they
form a family, with multiple similarities. In fact, “there is more unity to language, a complicated overlapping, crisscrossing, and plasticity of language-games, than the analogy with games might at first lead us to suspect.” H. suggests that theologians have sought asylum in a separate language because of a basic misunderstanding about language in general and scientific language in particular, a misunderstanding which they share with many scientific-minded people; the claim that religious discourse needs no justification stems from the same exaggerated notions about justification which account for the countercharge that such discourse is “irrational.” Logic, mathematics, and the sciences—these too are human language-games. For them too justifications come to an end, not in some order of Platonic absolutes, but in custom. No abstract rule predetermines how it is to be followed; human agreement does. Consequently, no matter how “rigorous” the language-game, it must recognize a blood relationship with the rest of the family, with the other “forms of life,” including the religious. Both as exegesis of the *Investigations* and as a contribution to the discussion of faith and reason, H.’s development of these Wittgensteinian thoughts seems the strongest part of his book.

From trust and agreement as the basis of language he passes to the importance of persons in language, and from human persons to God the supreme Person. “Fideists” like Barth, Bultmann, and Tillich he criticizes not only for their attitude toward justification, but also for neglecting the personal nature of language.

Of the various religious uses of language, only belief-utterances are considered closely. H. stresses the difference between “believe” and “belief,” between “I believe” and “he believes,” between “believe in” and “believe that,” and notes implications of each distinction. The verb “believe,” unlike the substantive “belief,” warns us against too readily equating belief with a disposition; the verb suggests action. The first-person/third-person distinction conveys the same warning; for though “he believes...” or “you believe...” might be construed as reporting a disposition, “I believe...” reports neither a disposition of the one speaking nor a process in his mind, but is more akin to a performative expression like “I promise...” The form “I believe in...,” so prominent in credal utterances, brings out personal aspects presupposed in expressions of the form “I believe that...” However, in both uses of “believe”—“believe in” and “believe that”—justification is in order. If we observe our language at work, we see clearly that we do in fact give reasons for our beliefs, including religious beliefs. When we seriously express a belief, we implicitly commit ourselves to “stand back of” it. Should Barth, for instance, reply that he
is not impressed by the language-games which most people perhaps mistakenly play with the term "believe," H. would apparently counter, after the manner of St. Thomas: "Granted that it is a blunder to rob God of his deity... is it not also a blunder to rob God of his people, and people of their personhood?" (p. 192)

Some felicitous comparisons, illustrations, and observations dot these discussions. And the frequent lapses in the author's interpretation of Wittgenstein and development of his own thought do not generally affect the major points just mentioned. The writing, however, is poor throughout.

**Jesuit House of Studies, Mobile**

**Garth Hallett, S.J.**


Fr. Noon, hardly the "interested amateur" he claims to be in the Preface, ventures with vast erudition and discernment into the forest of confusion encircling recent attempts by theologians and critics to relate prayer and poetry. Cautiously but unfortunately declining to define either poetry or prayer, N. spends three important chapters describing the distinguishing characteristics of poems and prayers. He specifies "poetry" as such as provisional, recollected, mediated, self-expressive, verbally imaginative, object-centered, and predominantly interhuman communication; "prayer," however, involves an absolute response, a direct encounter which need not be mediated or verbal but is always self-forgetful, person-centered, and, above all, a divine-human communion of love in grace. He admits early in the book that poetry and prayer may coincide in language; for "the poetry is often in the prayer, and the prayer is often in the poetry" (p. 9). This fact raises a major problem in critical theory that runs through the book and is never explicitly solved.

The five central chapters test N.'s distinctions by focusing on five modern poets often considered "meditative": Hopkins, Yeats, Stevens, Frost, and David Jones. Probably the best is the scrutiny of Yeats's attempt to dichotomize sanctity and art, by making the latter his "supreme responsibility," a task he came to realize was ultimately futile. N.'s analysis not only shows why he considers Yeats the best modern poet but also uses his poetry, together with that of Stevens and Frost, as proof of the distinction between meditative, serious, truthful poetry and authentic prayer.

N.'s distinctions work even more incisively to demolish Abbé Bremond's reduction of poetry to prayer and Martz's blending of prayer into poetry. N. questions the relevance of Maritain's distinction between creative
intuition and the process of art, but, ironically, tends to confuse the vision, making, and reading of poetry in passages where semantic precision is demanded (e.g., pp. 19, 84, 89, 93, 113). The efforts to separate mystic from nonmystic prayer are tedious but helpful, and the attack on the cavalier use of the term “mystical” by literary critics is long overdue.

The final two chapters, only obliquely related to the main concern of the book, relate the Ignatian Exercises (especially their historical, personalist, and imaginative aspects) to assorted strains in contemporary literature. Despite its questionable use of the term “existentialist” with regard to the Exercises and an unprovoked attack on “impersonal apostles of personalism,” the first chapter may be of interest to other Jesuits, for whom it was originally written. The final chapter, on the Ignatian colloquy, discusses the curious question of encountering the historical Christ in prayer today. The solution, reached after an intriguing but ultimately irrelevant analysis of Proust, is in terms of Christian memory, a vague concept that calls for theological explanations prematurely dismissed by N. (the role of the glorified Christ and the hypostatic union).

N.’s essays, though far ahead of anything else written on the subject, are a pioneering effort and thus raise more questions than they answer. Perhaps the widely varying audience for such a book accounts for both the tendency to overexplain and amass cumbersome quotations, and the shifting use of terms and ambiguous presuppositions. More importantly, however, “experience outruns theories,” as N. himself remarks of poetry and prayer. In ascetical theory, recent reinterpretations of the traditional theology N. relies on, even with respect to the Exercises, raise questions about the nature of prayer that point up the inadequacy of N.’s account of prayer, and a fortiori its relation to poetry.

In literary theory, N.’s book embodies the ambiguities in most current criticism regarding the problems of poetic truth and belief. Much more cogent than even the 1957 English Institute on the subject, N.’s discussion of the areas where prayer and poetry overlap (liturgical hymns, Hopkins, Jones) seems ultimately caught in the dilemma of poetic autonomy. Does the “poetry” make the prayer better as prayer, and the “truth” of the poem make it a better poem? If so, how avoid reducing one to the other? If not, how avoid a split in the intrinsic relation of structure and meaning? N. convincingly opts for poetic truth against the verbal-icon school, but throughout the book seems to slip into the latter’s false dichotomies to avoid identifying poetry and prayer (e.g., pp. 4, 19, 38, 50, 54, 103, 200–204, 222, 280). Notions like “provisional response,” “imaginative sense,” “extra-literary affirmations” (valid in themselves) ultimately avoid the
issue, one that Allen Tate has called the major problem in literary criticism today.

In brief, the entire book calls for a clarification of its premises, both secular and sacred, an achievement that N.'s work implies he is ably suited for, and one that the entire field of the theology of literature urgently needs.

Regis College, Willowdale, Ont.  

David J. Leigh, S.J.


This book begins with a question: "What is the meaning of death?" Rheingold answers wisely that there is no single meaning of death; there are meanings. Death becomes psychologically meaningful through fantasies and feelings about death, and the images and emotions endow death with its personal and psychological impact.

R. narrows the focus of his analysis to the catastrophic death complex, that is, the fear of sudden, unexpected, painful, and punishing annihilation. Associated meanings have to do with separation, loss, trauma, punishment, masochism, and destruction. The concept of hell is a massive projection of the catastrophic death complex, as the idea of heaven is its negation. R. has a thesis to present about this fear of death. He feels that it is impossible to separate the catastrophic fear of death from anxiety and from the fantasies of maternal destructiveness. They are intimately associated, an interdependent and indissociable triad. Where one is found, so also are the rest. Consequently, the fear of death is much broader in its psychological implications than we are commonly used to admitting. It is not limited to mentally disturbed populations, but presents itself as endemic in normal populations as well. The root of this complex lies in maternal destructiveness. R. presents a considerable body of evidence and argument to demonstrate that maternal destructiveness, that is, the unconscious hostile impulses and wishes directed by the mother toward her offspring, are a widespread, if not universal, aspect of the mother-child interaction. The major emphasis of the thesis is that the fear of death incorporates and rehearses infantile fantasies of maternal destructiveness. The activation of such unconscious elements derived from the infantile experience of maternal destructiveness forms the inner core of the matrix of influences and experiences which culminate in the fear of death.

Psychologically, the problem to which R. addresses himself is that of the origin of the fear of death. Freud, of course, had linked the fear of death to castration anxiety in a developmental or genetic perspective. It is certainly
unclear to what extent the fear of mutilation and painful loss involved in the fear of death can be related to an infantile fear of genital disfigurement. Freud himself would go no further than to point to an association and claim that in some sense the fear of death and the fear of castration were analogous. The fear of mutilation, in any case, must come about either as a projection of the child's own sadistic impulses, as Melanie Klein would have it, or, as R. contends, the source must be sought in some form of environmental threat in the infantile experience.

Without dwelling on the psychological complexities of the argument, it can be said that R.'s thesis is undoubtedly applicable to many cases in which the fear of catastrophic death is linked to and associated with revivable fears of maternal destructiveness. The fallacy that he commits in the first order of argument is that of overgeneralization without adequate demonstration. I would be quite willing to accept the proposition that the fear of death was endogenous to human existence, but I would anticipate some better demonstration before accepting the further proposition that it derived from unconscious maternal hostilities. In fact, things are considerably more complex than that.

A further point worth making is that the argument as presented is a *forme fruste* of the reductionist fallacy. R. shares this difficulty with many psychological theorists. If one can elicit fears about death from a patient, and then by associative inquiry uncover material related to maternal destructiveness, this does not support a conclusion as to their causal relatedness. The associative method elicits associations, not causes. Fear of death and fear of the destructive mother may be built into a meaning-complex which influences the patient's unconscious emotional responsiveness, but their association does not mean that the one is causally derived from the other. What can be maintained is that the infantile fear of maternal destructiveness and the adult fear of death are both primary and that they share a community of meaning which links them in one or other degree. In consequence, infantile fears of loss, separation, and mutilation can enter into the adult fear of death insofar as death, the inescapable reality, carries the independent but related threat of loss, separation, and destruction.

It is interesting, from the viewpoint of the development of ideas, that Freud never let himself slip into this manner of oversimplification. Many of his followers, following that common human compulsion to explain, did not maintain his delicate insight into the complexity of human motivation. I would prefer to regard the fear of death as a primary fear of all mortal men, derived from no other fear, more basic than all other fears. Death
represents a meaningful and painful reality which is woven into the very fabric of life. The fact of life carries within itself the seeds of its own destruction, what Heidegger called the *Sein-zum-Tode*. There is some assuagement, no doubt, in thinking of the basic anxiety of death as somehow derivative and secondary—as if to fantasy that the mature recognition of and insight into these infantile residues would remove the sting and bitterness of death. This naivete misses the reality of the anxiety of death which is proper to itself beyond the accretion of associated fears.

I do not wish to dwell on the psychological aspects of the fear of death. Suffice it to say that the present work has provided a praiseworthy synthesis of the contemporary psychological views on death. It presents a provocative thesis which deserves serious consideration, even though, as I suspect, it will enjoy a limited applicability. For the purposes of the present review, however, I would like to pause long enough to indicate some of the relevance of the psychology of death for the theology of death. As Herman Feifel has written, "maturity demands integration of the idea of personal death and recognition that dying and death are not separate, distinct states of being but phases of the process of living and life." The theology of death serves to bring the fact of death into relevant relation to the whole of Christian life.

What becomes apparent is that considerations of death as the termination of life or as constituted by the separation of body and soul are perhaps cosmological necessities but do not capture the meaning of death. The essence of death and its meaning are of a quite different order. Rather, the psychology of death makes it apparent that the reality of death is coextensive with life. Death is a present reality throughout the whole course of life. O'Connell's acute remarks on Boros' "final option" position in *The Mystery of Death* make this same point in a more theological vein: "Rather than a theory of final option to rescue man, what is needed is a reflection on man's temporality and historicity as the context in which a genuine personal freedom matures. This does not mean that in death man as a person does not come to a new and radically more perfect fulfilment and fruition (if he has chosen the good). It means simply that human life is a place where a freedom commensurate with an eternal destiny is possible" (*TS* 27 [1966] 442). My point is that human temporality and historicity are interpenetrated with impulses and fantasies which create a context of meaning within which human freedom realizes itself.

It is also apparent that the fear of death is related to and associated with human guilt. Death is the instrument of hostile wishes and thus becomes punitive. The fear of death is linked to guilt for hostile wishes and
superego anxiety. It is of great interest, therefore, that Christian thought should interpret death as a punishment for sin. In Paul's words, "It was through one man that guilt came into the world; and since death came owing to guilt, death was handed on to all mankind by one man" (Rom 5:12). As Karl Rahner sees the relationship of death to sin, death becomes an expression of the essence of sin in the bodily constitution of man. It thus becomes the punishment for sin. "Death is guilt made visible." The outer face of death, its theological significance, has an inner face and an inner meaning. It is this inner meaning which confronts man in the fear of death. I wish to do no more here than point to this striking parallelism of the theology of death and its psychology—however independent their courses may be. That instinctive aggression which lies at the psychological root of guilt is a universal human phenomenon. The association of guilt, aggression, sin, and death forms a complex chiaroscuro of interesting themes. One might pause to wonder whether the theological doctrine of original sin does not represent a dogma of human instinctuality. If so, the theology of sin and the psychology of instincts may find some meaningful interface in the problem of death.

The mystery of Christian death runs deeper. The Christian is plunged into the death of Christ; through baptism we are taken up into Christ's death (Rom 6:3). Christian life becomes a dying in Christ. Through Christ's death, then, the death of the Christian takes on meaning and death becomes the promise of life. The theology of death reaches into the understanding of grace and extends into sacramental theology as well. The dying of the Christian is initiated through baptism but is prolonged in the Church through the sacramental life of grace. There are undoubtedly profound psychological issues at this level as well, by which the Christian soul is touched and transformed in its constant and continued struggle with the inevitability of death and the vicissitudes of guilt.

I offer these few suggestions, not because they are at all explicit in the present book about death, but because a book on the psychology of death raises many questions of human concern which reach beyond concerns and anxieties over death into the realities of man's theological existence. Such continuities are important, even though they remain for the moment unanalyzed and little explored.


Fr. Jaki, a Hungarian in origin, a Benedictine by vocation, a physicist
by training, and a historian of science by avocation, devoted many years of research, chiefly as a fellow of the Princeton Institute of Advanced Study, to the writing of the present volume. The result is a work that is at once a masterpiece and a disappointment: a masterpiece in its historical and scientific erudition, in its illumination of the development of scientific thought and of the various interfaces between physics and other disciplines, in its balanced appraisals; a disappointment in the paucity and superficiality of the positive conclusions presented.

J. has a formula which he follows for almost every topic treated. Begin with the Greeks, marshal historical summaries and apt quotations to trace the development of a problem through contemporary views, and conclude by counseling moderation in extrapolating the views and methods of physics beyond their proper domain. He begins with a survey of the chief world models of physics. Early mythical thought likened the cosmos to a gigantic organism. Though the early Greek atomists broke with this pattern of thought, Plato restored it and Aristotle enthroned it as the normative basis for interpreting physical phenomena. In an organicist view, understanding is primarily a grasp of a whole, a functioning unit understood in terms of its form and purpose. The result was a physics which proved "worthless and misleading from beginning to end." J. supports this harsh appraisal by concentrating on Aristotle's failures, particularly his Meteorologia, while slighting or ignoring the standards of scientific explanation provided by the Posterior Analytics. Though organismic physics was eclipsed by Newtonianism, it has had repeated abortive revivals. Teilhard de Chardin is surprisingly omitted from this context. The rise and fall of mechanism and the current view of the world as a pattern of numbers are traced in fascinating detail. This section is a valuable contribution to the current debate concerning the nature and significance of conceptual revolutions in science.

The second of the book's four parts treats theories of matter, theories of the cosmos, and the role of precision in measurement. A wealth of historical detail supports a rather banal conclusion. The repeated attempts to present a contemporary view as the final position or current limitations in measurement as unsurpassable barriers have usually been refuted within a generation.

In the third part J. considers the relations between physics and biology, metaphysics, ethics, and theology. Though his positive conclusions rarely go beyond the counsel that one must practice caution, the historical background provided is rich enough to be ripe for plunder. The treatment of metaphysics, unfortunately, reflects no clear or consistent idea of what metaphysics is. His treatment of theology is more striking. Theologians
have repeatedly attempted to use the latest scientific views or theories to support theological positions and proofs. Mechanism, entropy, energy conservation, the expanding universe, and the indeterminacy principle have all had their moment in the theological spotlight, only to prove a false or ambiguous prop when a new theoretical interpretation emerged. The theologian, J. argues, must recognize the atheism of science. The formal discipline that is physics does not know God, for it asks no transcendental questions.

The concluding section treats of scientism, the attempt to transform a particular interpretation of scientific method into a dogma, and of science in society. J.'s solution to Snow's two-culture problem is to insist on training in the history of science as a humanistic element in any scientific education.

The accurate and well-documented surveys presented in the present work are almost indispensable for anyone wishing to discuss the relation between physics and other areas of thought. Yet even the present reviewer, who is professionally interested in and fascinated by the history of scientific thought, eventually grew bored with the recurring return to the same cycle of intellectual development. The central problems that emerged, as J. occasionally admits, are philosophical. Yet the philosophy of science is never directly treated. The only positive conclusion that emerges here is surprisingly Aristotelian in tone. One must carefully distinguish between formally different branches of knowledge and recognize the distinctive norms operative in each.

Weston College

Edward MacKinnon, S.J.

SHORTER NOTICES

RECHT UND ETHOS: VERSUCH EINER ORTUNG DES WEISHEITLICHEN MAHNSPRUCHES. SZANT 15. By Wolfgang Richter. Munich: Kösel, 1966. Pp. 217. DM 38.— R.'s studies of the structure of Judges have established him as an expert Form Critic. One hopes that his strict methodology, Hebrew quotations, and technical devices will not discourage the theologian from the study of this important study of a vital topic: the source and nature of ethic and law. But before taking up this topic of wider significance, it seems well to note something about the technique displayed. It is a model of thoroughness and respect for evidence. One reservation: R. is committed to a total separation of form and content; he tries to work from form alone. This may seem logical, but modern literary theory has shown
conclusively that the separation is unreal. In literature, form is content and vice versa. In fact, R. must take account of content, e.g., the cultic (pp. 88-91) or customary practice (p. 184), to handle the material. However, this is a minor reservation. R. shows that the characteristic biblical admonition "thou shalt (not)" is basically a moral imperative (Sollensform), not absolute, universal law. These imperatives embody a wisdom gained from experience and so intimately bound to the variable realities of life. They are guidelines for particular classes, the powerful, the priests, etc., in the performance of their duties, norms for individual judgment in particular circumstances, not ideal formulations to be followed to the letter. Thus R.'s detailed investigation confirms the general conclusion of E. Gerstenberger that the origins of apodictic law are to be sought in short collections of traditional wisdom (cf. TS 28 [1967] 133-37). He does take issue with the claim that this wisdom stems from the ancient clan. Rather, he finds the Sitz im Leben to be the ethos of the upper classes, and he makes a case for connecting certain formulations with specific groups. However, it is hard to fault Gerstenberger's case for clan wisdom as the ultimate origin in view of the tradition of a special nomad wisdom and of the general human and familial character of much of this wisdom. Surely this indicates origins in older, undifferentiated social conditions, however much different classes later developed different aspects of the wisdom for their special needs. The larger implications of this study should be of interest to the theologian, because it has much to say about the nature and origins of biblical law and ethic (on this in detail, see my review of Gerstenberger referred to above). It is concerned, after all, with what we take to be basic biblical law, the prohibitions and commands exemplified in the Decalogue. R. questions whether this should be called law, because it deals with attitudes (Ethos) through direction and encouragement for future conduct. To a degree the distinction would help us to remember that there is a fundamental difference in the temper of such apodictic law, which is essentially guidance, from that of casuist law, which is concerned with judging exactly defined cases. However, "law" has established itself as the term for all this material, and this is not undesirable. Currently the word "law" has a bad connotation: the rigid and largely negative regulation of action even in minutiae. It might help to keep the name so that we could relearn that the biblical sense of law (torah, misha, and all the terms which become almost synonyms in later Hebrew writing) includes paresis, that is, the call to adopt basic attitudes as flexible guides to action in the manifold circumstances of life, in the family, in one's work or office, and the rest.

*Divinity School, St. Louis University  
Dennis J. McCarthy, S.J.*
SHORTER NOTICES


What is good about the book can be said quite briefly, and there is no point in being overly long on the rest. Positively, the book is an attempt to understand the NT view of priesthood and to make this available to the present, to break down some of the barriers between NT exegesis and the contemporary theology and needs of the Church. But the handling of the NT materials is so anachronistic as to doom the enterprise to failure. One may well enough agree with most of the rather pallid maxims which R. serves up for today's priest: "the apostles . . . are established 'for others,'" (p. 128)—but his handling of the text is bound to cause difficulties. He writes as though there were simply no problem involved in getting at "la conscience sacerdotale du Christ" through the Synoptics. Though he repeats the oft-repeated "Les évangiles ne sont pas une biographie de Jésus" (p. 109), he handles the Gospels precisely as though they were just that. In deciding that Mt's account of Peter's confession of faith at Caesarea Philippi is prior to Mk's, he notes that "les évangelistes (Matthieu notamment) ont été témoins oculaires des événements transmis par une tradition dont ils étaient eux-mêmes les premiers maillons" (p. 103). It may be that R. has a theory or some information that would reverse the entire course of twentieth-century study of the Synoptics; but he ought not put the theory forth as though everyone, or anyone, accepted it.

School of Religion, Univ. of Iowa

James F. McCue


This book rests on the exciting premise that some of the textual variants in NT texts are theologically motivated. In fact, one of the purposes of the book is to vindicate this presupposition. E. entertains the further hope that his work may contribute in a general way toward a solution of the continuing dilemma about the text of Acts—whether the original is the so-called Neutral or the so-called Western text. The specific text taken under study is the Acts of the Apostles found in the Codex Bezae. This is scrutinized not with an eye to assessing the originality or accuracy of its variants, but rather to discover the theological connotations and implications of those variants. E. believes that his study reveals an unmistakable dogmatic bias in the variants under review. Specifically, that bias is "a decidedly heightened anti-Judaic attitude and sentiment" (p. 165); for he finds that the Codex Bezae in Acts (1) exhibits a tendency to depict the Jews as more antagonistic toward Jesus and taxes them with a greater responsibility for his death; (2) plays down the importance of Jewish in-
stitutions to the new faith; (3) portrays the Jewish leaders as more vigorously hostile toward the apostles, presenting a kind of leaders-versus-leaders motif—the Jewish leaders over against the Apostles. Not every instance of proof brought forward will strike one as especially cogent, but cumulatively E. does succeed in making a case for his thesis.

*Darlington Seminary, Ramsey, N.J.*

**James C. Turro**

**Christianity According to Paul.** By Michel Bouttier. Translated by Frank Clarke. *Studies in Biblical Theology* 49. Naperville, Ill.: Allenson, 1966. Pp. 127. $3.95. Though the choice of a title for this English version of B.'s *La condition chrétienne selon saint Paul* (Geneva, 1964) is somewhat infelicitous in that it seems to exceed the design of the author, the book itself deserved translation if for no other reason than that it presents a coherent, generally satisfying, and thoroughly theological exposition of Paul's comprehension and presentation of the Christian's life in Christ. Using Phil 3:4–21 as his point of departure, B. studies the paradoxical Pauline concept "in Christ." He first analyzes the communion of the believer with Christ: union with Christ, waiting for Him, His presence to the individual, and one's imitation of Him. The second major division considers the communal life of Christians in Christ: baptism, Eucharist, death and life, suffering and comfort, *agape*. In the final section he discusses the newness of this life in its many aspects: ethics, holiness, kingship, freedom, etc. Though his treatment often smacks of the homiletic and rhetorical, it is nonetheless firmly grounded in sound exegesis. His stress on Paul's understanding of the "man for others" dimension of Christian living is decidedly welcome and his handling of it both judicious and frank. His more or less phenomenological treatment of the interrelationships of Christians in communion with Christ limps somewhat from a theological point of view in that the statements of the corporeity of that communion need more subtle nuancing than he has provided. All in all, the book is a good and reliable statement of both the simplicity and the complexity of the Pauline presentation of life in Christ. B.'s own pastoral experience has helped him articulate some heady theology with an aplomb that many a more closeted exegete could well envy.

*Weston College*  

**Simon E. Smith, S.J.**

**Mary of Nazareth: Myth or History?** By Bonaventura Rinaldi. Translated by Mary F. Ingoldsby. Westminster: Newman, 1966. Pp. xxii + 228. $4.50. This unique book raises an important question: Is Mary merely the personification of the ancient pagan mother-myth, or is she something more? R. understands myth as a "personification of the deepest
human needs sometimes to the extent of divinization, in the attempt to answer and satisfy the heart of man." By rather involved argumentation he answers his own question: revelation, centered in Christ the Eternal Word of the Father, confers a supernatural consecration on the myth of the Mother. Or, put another way, Mary is a "historical fact from which springs forth a faith that enables us to penetrate into the innermost depths of God's being, to discover the all-tender and loving Father." The idea that only in Mary's motherly embrace can we fully understand that God is a Father permeates the book. R.'s approach is remarkable. In the course of his work he manages to dwell on the key issues of Mariology, but not in thesis form. The meat of the book lies in the first three chapters: myth and Mariology, the divine promise of Mary in the OT, and the history of Mary (NT). Though generally excellent, the book could be improved in a number of areas. Thus, R. seems to miss the implications of the Canticle of Canticles for postexilic theology (p. 79), while perhaps overstressing the impact of the rest of OT wisdom literature on the Marian question (pp. 83-84). There seems to be overemphasis, too, on Peter's Mariology (pp. 91-93). And the explanation of Mary's office as mediatrix of all grace—by means of the "psychology of grace" (pp. 146-48)—leaves something to be desired. This is a well-documented work, and the sources used are among the best.

Capuchin Theological Seminary, Garrison, N.Y. Eric May, O.F.M.Cap.

A THOMISTIC JOSEPHOLOGY. By James J. Davis, O.P. Montreal: St. Joseph's Oratory, 1967. Pp. 305. Originally a dissertation presented at the University of Montreal toward a theology doctorate, presented here in revised and expanded form as first published during the years of Vatican II in Cahiers de Josephologie. D.'s purpose is strictly limited to an examination of the teachings of St. Thomas on Joseph of Nazareth; he calls attention, too, to not a few Thomistic principles which can be applied to Josephology. He presents Thomistic foundations of the theology, first justifying terminology in the field, then proceeding to Joseph's marriage, virginity, age at time of marriage, fatherhood, and co-operation in the redemption. The consequences for Joseph result in his unique dignity, holiness, and possible privileges. Joseph's relationship to the Church comes in for explicit mention under the headings of his patronage and corresponding cultus. Despite the fact that this material parallels customary divisions of Josephite theology followed in the past, D. professedly avoids any independent direction except the direct passages of St. Thomas, located in context and then discussed in text. The fact that D. revised his work at a time when he already had access to Vatican II's Dogmatic Constitution on the Church can in-
dicate how deeply he feels that the Constitution in no way cancels out past
genuine developments of Josephite theology—which truly depended on
Thomistic encouragement to build on Augustinian and other patristic anal-
yses—but rather points to further growth, by the principles of cultus of
the saints and by implication and proper application of principles regarding
the cultus of Mary. D. appears to have fulfilled his goal. His work may
serve as some antidote to the published statements of Vatican II theological
luminaries who unfortunately confused Josephology with devotional excess
or exclusive and unbalanced emphasis on a claimed assumption of St.
Joseph.

Loyola Univ., Chicago

Francis L. Filas, S.J.

IL SÍMBOLO DI NICEA E DI COSTANTINOPOLI: EDIZIONE CRITICA. By Giu-
core of this book is a critical text of the Nicene Creed and that of Constantinople, some
twenty-five pages setting out the Greek and Latin texts with critical appa-
ramus. This is preceded by a careful and leisurely examination of the
sources (Fathers, conciliar decrees, and canonical collections) where the two
Creeds are found. Syriac, Coptic, Arabic, and Armenian documents are not
neglected. Where the source is rather inaccessible, D. has given its text in
full, or a retroversion into Greek or Latin of the text, but he does not aim
at printing out all the sources in full. This examination is the major portion
of the book; some thirty pages of conclusions come after the critical text.

C. H. Turner, for the Latin sources, and E. Schwartz, for the Greek, have
done so much of the spadework in editing the texts that D.'s task is all the
lighter. This does not mean that it was not a necessary task. Sudden death
deprived Turner of the opportunity of making many theological deductions
from his editorial labors, though he does tuck away a few conclusions here
and there in his critical apparatus. Schwartz was possessed of an unhappy
theory about the early Church being a Reichskirche, very much after the
pattern of the Prussian church under the Kaiser in the days before 1914,
when Strassburg was still a German university; his theory made him look
on the Creed of Constantinople as something which the Emperor Theodo-
sius promoted to secure religious conformity in his empire, while the happen-
ings at Chalcedon (where Nicene and Constantinople Creeds were read out
publicly in the second session, and then appear at the end of the Council in
a slightly different form) were explained by him on the hypothesis of an in-
tervention by the Empress Pulcheria. Schwartz had no evidence for this,
but made the hypothesis to account for the phenomena in the texts. Since
his day, Msgr. Lebon, J. N. D. Kelly, and most recently A. M. Ritter of
Göttingen have given other explanations of the phenomena. D. supplements these, pointing out usefully that Chalcedon had the Creeds introduced by the formula “The creed of the 318 Fathers at Nicaea; and the same of the 150 holy Fathers who assembled at Constantinople.” Thus the Constantinople Creed, which brought in the whole of the credal statements about the Holy Spirit, was understood to be the same creed as that of Nicaea, in spite of this addition. The importance of this for those who construct hasty theories of the development of doctrine hardly needs to be underlined. There will be other uses for the tool which D. has provided; one might begin with a search into the history of the phrase “according to the Scriptures” added to the statement of the Resurrection.

London, England

J. H. Crehan, S.J.


During the eight years between Calvin’s death (1564) and the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre (1572), the French Reformed Church was concerned with its consolidation in a non-Calvinist realm. Of the threats that arose against this consolidation, K. studies two: (a) the attempt of Jean Morély to “democratize” the Calvinist synodical structure, and (b) the Wars of Religion. Morély offered suggestions on the structure of ecclesiastical polity, advocating a “popular” Church government, with voice in the congregation in the choice of pastors and elders and in enforcing Church discipline. But what were meant to be suggestions were interpreted as a categorical attack on the ruling body of the Church, i.e., the Consistory of Pastors and Elders. In response, both Churches (in France and Geneva) condemned and excommunicated Morély. K. relates these internal difficulties and M.’s several subsequent hearings before Church synods with uncommon scholarship, interesting narrative, and balanced objectivity. For a decade M. (with his growing faction) proved to be a thorn inextricably lodged in the ecclesiastical body, and only ceased his irritation when the massacre abruptly destroyed this trend towards “congregationalism.” The M. affair failed in France, but K. concludes “that the main importance of the entire Morély controversy was that it hardened the orthodox Calvinists in their commitment to presbyterian polity and consistorial discipline” (p. 135), and that “it provides yet another demonstration of the increasing rigidity and narrowness and clericalism which closed in upon Calvinism in the years following its founder’s death” (p. 137). In writing of the Wars of Religion K.
is more brief, but he notes the existence of two factions, one preferring to submit to persecution rather than offer resistance, the other advocating war against the state. K. concludes his admirable monograph noting that after the massacre Geneva had more control over the French Reformed Church than ever before, and that its synodical structure was never again to be as seriously challenged.

Woodstock College

JOHN CALVIN, THE CHURCH, AND THE EUCHARIST. By Kilian McDonnell, O.S.B. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1967. Pp. ix + 410. $10.00. Ecumenical writing on the Eucharist is "in" today, and from this point of view M.'s contribution may be considered "relevant." Because he chooses to study Calvin's Eucharistic doctrine in its variegated but coherent relationship to the whole of the Reformer's theological thought, M. treats a number of diverse areas, e.g., the theological atmosphere prior to C.'s coming on the scene, C.'s thought on the transcendence of God, ecclesiology, election, Christology, and Pneumatology. M. seems to have tarried a bit too long in these fields, with the result that the hoped-for in-depth treatment of C.'s Eucharistic doctrine does not emerge. What M. does present on the Eucharist is faithful to the Reformer, but what could be of benefit to today's ecumenical dialogue is not the fact that C. engaged in polemics versus the Roman position, but a serious study of the two areas C. claimed as the sources of his Eucharistic teaching, i.e., C.'s interpretation of the scriptural data and his use of the Fathers, especially Augustine. If disappointment was experienced because of the above, and some disagreement felt in minor points, e.g., M.'s treatment of C. on the subject of concomitance (pp. 124 f.) and the insistence that C. insisted on a "real" presence (pp. 224 f.) while C. in fact speaks only of a "true" presence, nevertheless satisfaction was found in having at hand an able synthesis and evaluation of the many scholarly monographs already published on a variety of Calvin themes. The present volume is a revision and expansion of M.'s doctoral dissertation.

Woodstock College

THEOLOGY OF THE ENGLISH REFORMERS. By Philip Edgcumbe Hughes. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1967. Pp. 283. $5.95. H.'s aim is a restricted one: to make more available the teaching of the English Reformers (the Parker Society edition of their writings has long been out of print), "a compendious statement of their theological position." The method is descriptive: the Reformers' theology in their own terms, their own language. H. analyzes the theology around seven important topics, each a chapter:
Scripture, justification, sanctification, preaching and worship, ministry, sacraments, Church and state. He writes from a conservative evangelical standpoint, and his warm sympathy for, and admiration of, the Reformers shine through. But his standpoint imposes its own limitations. The insistence on *sola scriptura*, which he sees as the principle of the Reformation, leaves little room for the development of theology; nor is the principle interpreted by Protestants today exactly as it was by the Reformers; and the theological preoccupations of the Reformers were different from those of their present-day successors. H. deals only incidentally with the Reformers' Catholic opponents. He speaks sympathetically of Bellarmine. But one suspects little living contact with Catholic theology, especially that of Vatican II. Surprising is this statement: "This delivery of the instruments of his ministry (*porrectio instrumentorum*) together with the authorization to function as a sacrificing priest constitutes the essence of valid ordination in the Roman rite" (p. 161). A useful compendium, sympathetic but uncontroversial, limited in theological value.

*What is the Christian Orient?* By Ignace Dick. Translated by C. Gerard Guertin. Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1967. Pp. x + 176. $4.50. Vatican II stressed the importance in this age of ecumenism for Catholics to acquire a knowledge of the Eastern Churches. G.'s book will be useful as an introduction to a vast and almost limitless field. A general picture of the peculiarity of Eastern Christianity is drawn from its geographical situation, historical evolution in ecclesiastical organization, and fragmentation by doctrinal disputes. The distinction between the Churches according to their various liturgies is explained, with some pertinent observations on the cultural aspect of rites and the abuses. The origin and expansion of the liturgical language of each rite is combined with an enumeration of some of the principal Christian writings in these languages. The cultural diversity and its impact on the Churches of the East is brought to light by dividing the East into two spheres of influence: the Islamic world and the Byzantine. The historical development of the individual Churches is briefly rehearsed against the background of these two environments. A summary of the present status of all of these Churches according to their rite, doctrine, location, and numbers concludes this section. Part 2 reviews the history of the causes which led to the schism between East and West and the influences which have made reunion difficult. An essay on the attitudes necessary for both East and West, based on the lessons of history, emphasizes the place
of mutual knowledge and respect. Very little in this book has not been previously presented, but here it is summarized in handy form. Minor criticism of terminology or accuracy could be made, but the book is not written for scholars and will be a real help to others.

Boston College

James L. Monks, S.J.

Weihnachten heute—Das Weihnachtsfest in der pluralistischen Gesellschaft. Edited by Theodor Bogler, O.S.B. Liturgie und Mönchtum 39. Maria Laach: Ars Liturgica, 1966. Pp. 120. DM 4.50. The somewhat pretentious title is a vain effort to give an appearance of unity to these disparate essays on Christmas. The title covers, in fact, only four of the fifteen items: these four offer comments of a North-German Lutheran pastor, a Church of England priest, a German Jew (seemingly of the Reform or Liberal wing), and an atheist on what Christmas means to them; the two Christians speak of their Churches as a whole and agree that Christmas has been increasingly secularized, even to the point of becoming the "Feast of St. Consumer," but that a genuine grasp of what Christmas is persists in large numbers of the faithful. The meat of the volume is not in these essays but in Heinz Schürmann's pages on Lk 2:1-20; Hieronymus Frank's on "Gründe für die Entstehung des römischen Weihnachtsfestes" (updating of Part 4 of his "Frühgeschichte und Ursprung des römischen Weihnachtsfestes im Lichte neuerer Forschung," Archiv für Liturgiewissenschaft 2 [1952] 1-24); Margaret Horn's on "Eschatologie der Weihnacht," with its pithy review of how Christmas (the Incarnation) is treated by various views on eschatology; and the editor's concluding essay on representations of the Nativity scene, with brief dips into early Christian, Romanesque, Renaissance, and post-Renaissance art, and the contemporary Christian art of Africa and Asia.

Fordham University

M. J. O'Connell, S.J.

Liturgie übermorgen: Gedanken zur Geschichte und Zukunft des Gottesdienstes. By Klaus Gamber. Freiburg: Herder, 1966. Pp. 288. G. is a liturgist who has produced numerous book- and article-length editions and studies of texts, along with theories of their provenance and interrelationship, as well as several valuable handbooks, e.g., Codices liturgici latini antiquiores (cf. TS 24 [1963] 724-25). Here he seeks to put his imposing knowledge at the service of liturgical reform, examining the history of the Eucharistic liturgy in order to discern its basic laws and the basic forms that must mold the "ecumenical" liturgy of the future. He reconstructs (as many others have) the Lord's Supper as it was celebrated in the first centuries,
and then presents the "classical liturgy" of the patristic period (the "Gothic-Greek" liturgy, the "African-Roman" liturgy, the Irish liturgical books as evidence of the classical Roman liturgy, and the "Gallican" liturgy). G.'s concern is not primarily to give a simple objective presentation of these liturgies, but to highlight what seem to him to be their permanently valid good points; "Volksnähe" seems to be his foremost criterion (thus the use of the vernacular in the Gothic, Slavic, and Byzantine liturgies is stressed, as is the amount of active participation by the congregation in the classical liturgies generally). Against the background of the patristic liturgies and as measured by the criteria G. applies, the medieval liturgies inevitably appear as "Spätformen"; G. presents the liturgy of Carolingian times in three forms: a papal liturgy of the eighth century, the translation of the Roman liturgy by Cyril and Methodius, and the Byzantine liturgy of the period. Finally G. turns to an "ecumenical" liturgy, that is, one that will allow a unity of rite all over the world, without imposing the rite of any one part of the Church. Such a liturgy will really be but a basic framework which can be variously filled in according to the culture in which it is celebrated; it will have to be a popular liturgy in the sense that it will not require a large number of clerics and singers to celebrate it in its full form, yet it will also have to have enough solemnity and style to raise men out of their everyday routine and be for them a representation and anticipation of the heavenly liturgy (pp. 175–76). G. finds that these requirements were already realized in the "classical liturgy": a basic structure everywhere the same; clear and simple forms; prayers with theological depth yet understood by the people; a solemnity in which all could actively share (pp. 178–79). Against this background G. describes his liturgy of the future (liturgy of the word and Eucharistic liturgy), and sketches out more briefly a "house Mass" and a morning and an evening liturgy. In deciding what elements of the classical liturgy should be kept, there is, perhaps inevitably, the frequent recurrence of "obviously," unsupported by arguments that are more than the expression of sentiment. A simple example: G. would keep (after the sermon) a litany to which the congregation would answer with "Kyrie eleison." He argues that the response "te rogamus, audi nos" was unknown by the Roman liturgy at this point; however, he had earlier mentioned (p. 196) that neither did the Roman liturgy know any litany at this point. Furthermore, G. wants "Kyrie eleison" (along with "amen" and "alleluja") to be used in untranslated form—for the sake of universality and as a reminder of the ancient languages! But these minor irritations do not prevent the book as a whole from being informative and suggestive.

_Fordham University_  
M. J. O'Connell, S.J.
The third volume of collected papers by Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant authors, originally presented during the annual Liturgical Study Week at the Institut Saint-Serge in Paris, is another impressive testimony to the vitality and depth of contemporary European theological and liturgical scholarship. Dom Botte makes his usual painstakingly concise contribution with a study of the Maranatha, but the influence of his pioneering labors is made evident by the repeated references to his "The Origins of Christmas and Epiphany," published thirty-five years ago. K. Hruby, proving again his familiarity with rabbinic literature, makes available these comparatively unknown sources in his article on "Messianism and Eschatology in the Rabbinic Tradition." "The Eschatological Cross" by C. Vogel deserves special mention because of its wide range and abundant documentation, from which V. draws the conclusion that the Cross was originally an expression of the Christians' faith in the Second Coming, which orientated their prayers towards the East. Although basically a study of the mosaics at St. Mary Major and of selected Byzantine liturgical texts, A. Garbar's contribution on "The Iconography of the Parousia" calls attention to several theological concepts necessary for a fuller understanding of the Incarnation and its liturgical celebration. Interesting articles on the origins of Epiphany and Christmas in Egypt, Jerusalem, Constantinople, and Cappadocia open up new insights into the meaning and relationship of these two feasts. Equally informative, but concerned with more restricted aspects of the general theme are the contributions by A.-M. Dubarle on the manifestation of God's presence in the Jewish liturgy and by J. Daniélou on the origin of the term "Epiphany," the two articles on the role of "light" in the Byzantine and Syriac liturgies, and the three articles by Protestant contributors on the celebration of Christmas in the Reformed Church and on the content and use of Christmas hymns in the Anglican and Lutheran tradition. A deeper understanding of religious truth is achieved if the efforts of individual scholars and their insights concerning a particular theme are combined. The reader of this volume for whom Christmas and Epiphany acquire new dimensions will be grateful to the editors whose efforts and sacrifices made possible the publication of these papers.

Humacao, Puerto Rico

Agustín Cornides, O.S.B.

twelve essays in the area of sacramental theology, treating principally of
the Eucharist, written by Protestant and Orthodox liturgists. "The time
for serious inter-faith conversations on the Eucharist is long overdue; it is
hoped that these essays might act as partial preface to such conversations" (Preface). While serving this end admirably well, the essays illustrate both
that the liturgical revival among Protestants and Orthodox is a matter of
real substance and that in this crucial field we even now have much in com-
mon. The authors and their contributions are: Arthur M. Allchin (Anglican),
"The Liturgical Movement and Christian Unity"; Cyril C. Richardson
(Episcopal), "Word and Sacrament in Protestant Worship"; Nicolas Zernov
(Orthodox), "The Meaning of Holy Communion"; George W. Webber
(United Church of Christ), "Worship in East Harlem"; Max Thurian
(Taizé), "The Eucharistic Sacrifice and the Real Presence"; Roger
Greenacre (Lutheran), "Worship and the Cross and Resurrection of Christ";
Thomas F. Torrance (Church of Scotland), "Come, Creator Spirit! For the
Renewal of Worship and Witness"; Boris Bobrinskoy (Orthodox), "Worship
and the Ascension of Christ"; Massey H. Shepherd, Jr. (Episcopal), "Lit-
urgy or Cult: Source or Resource?" Douglas Webster (Anglican), "The Wor-
ship of the Church and the Modern Man." In addition to Shepherd's article,
I would suggest to the reader the remainder of his stimulating book Liturgy
and Education, from which the article is taken.

Trier Liturgical Institute, Germany

Lawrence J. Madden, S.J.

IST DER MENSCH VON HEUTE NOCH LITURGIEFÄHIG? Edited by Theodor
Bogler, O.S.B. Liturgie und Mönchtum 38. Maria Laach: Ars Liturgica,
1966. Pp. 128. DM 4.50. The question here asked is not a new one
nor, as might be expected, do any of the answers given by thirty-two people
(of various ages and callings) provide startling new insight. The question-
anaire was touched off by Romano Guardini's letter to Johannes Wagner,
German liturgiologist, in 1964 (translated as "A Letter from Romano
Guardini," Herder Correspondence 1 [1964] 237–39), in which the question
of the viability of the whole idea of liturgy today was seriously
raised. Burkhard Neunheuser's essay, "Liturgiefähigkeit: Mindestmass der
Vorbedingungen" (pp. 10–27), maintains that the presuppositions in man
for liturgy (as the answer of the community to the great deeds of God in
the history of salvation—this in festive action and songs of praise, or in even
simpler forms of participation) are elementary and inseparable from man
as man and as Christian, though they can be fruitfully implemented only
when man is awakened to himself and when the liturgy is purified
and stripped down to its essential forms. The people who answered the questionnaire would, on the whole, agree with N. Their reactions are summed up in the editor’s Introduction: “All who answered agree that man has and will continue to have a capacity for liturgy. This is a significant agreement. But many problems were also raised... It would seem that, especially for the young, the ‘liturgy’ is so historically conditioned—by antiquity or the Middle Ages or the baroque period—that the liturgical renewal is still faced with enormous tasks and that, as Guardini suggests, we are only at the beginning of our work” (p. 8).

*Fordham University*  
*M. J. O’Connell, S.J.*

**Foundations for a Psychology of Grace.** By William W. Meissner, S.J. Glen Rock, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1966. Pp. 246. $4.95. M.’s purpose is not to propose a formulated psychology of the divine influence upon human activity, but “to bring into focus a more or less common image of man at once psychologically relevant and theologically sound” (p. 10) which may serve as a point of departure for such an undertaking. This he attempts through an unfolding commentary on selections from the writings of modern psychologists and theologians. In the process he seeks to establish the feasibility of a genuinely psychological investigation of grace and to relate such an investigation to theology of grace. In an Epilogue he offers the notion of “spiritual identity” as an integrative formulation of the psychological effects of grace upon the soul. The desideratum is clear enough: a scientifically valid psychology within a theological context, i.e., in which theology serves as an extrinsic guarantee of the genuineness and ontological nature of the psychic phenomena in question. However, the methodological validity of “an image of man incorporating the fundamental insights of the theological approach to grace with those of the psychological approach” (p. 231) remains in question for this reviewer. M. endorses (with Peter Fransen) a “scrupulous respect of the subject and methods proper to each science” (p. 198). Yet the emergent common image, which is “more than a translation of the relevant insights of the Christian tradition into psychoanalytic terms” (p. 219), seems an example of the “confusion [which] can never breed unity” (p. 198). Can a “common” image, many of whose elements are nonscientific, i.e., derived from philosophical or theological reflection, provide a basis and point of departure for scientific psychology? Can we ask of the scientific psychologist more than an indeterminate openness and recognition of the limits of his method? It is nonetheless a thought-provoking book. There are questions for discussion at the end of each chapter.

*Georgetown University*  
*John K. McCormack, S.J.*
THE GRACE OF GOD, THE RESPONSE OF MAN. By James P. Mackey. Albany, N.Y.: Magi, 1966. Pp. 192. $3.95. M., Professor of Dogmatic Theology at St. John's College, Waterford, previously gave us The Modern Theology of Tradition, a careful and somewhat dense scholarly treatise. The first reaction to the present work is surprise. The style is crisp and vigorous. The eye of M.'s interest ranges from the insights of Brunner to Teilhard de Chardin, Blondel, Camus, and comparative religion. A freshness of perspective is maintained throughout. The title is somewhat misleading, since only the first essay treats of grace. The other three chapters discuss morality, tradition, and the Fall. The first chapter contains a fine critique of the "superstructure" approach to grace. M. finds this model hampered because it attempts to mirror nature. "When nature tyrannized man, man's God tended to be tyrannical and his society also" (p. 45). M. suggests a philosophy of interpersonal relationships as the model for grace. The chapter on morality contains a clear presentation of the defects of "legalism" as found in scholastics like Billot, Lehmkuhl, and Vermeersch. The rest of the chapter is more tantalizing than illuminating; e.g., "much of the moral teaching, particularly in the Old Testament but also to some extent in the New Testament, is historically conditioned" (p. 88); "it is not the function of love, human or divine, to elucidate the content of our duty for us" (p. 89). M. decries the legalist temptation to legislate too minutely for every situation, since moral precepts "can never cover every possible situation" (p. 103). The chapter on tradition is outstanding. The point of departure is the universal human community which religious tradition itself established through "man's natural impulse to record, communicate and interpret experiences that have an all-compelling and unique significance for him" (p. 123). In Christianity the single aim of tradition is "to forge the same relationship with Christ which He forged with His first disciples" (p. 138). The original "deposit" is not a number of abstract propositions but a concrete event. But the reader is merely teased by M.'s explanation of the Assumption: "We must not understand the event to be one of those which are part of our spatio-temporal environment and are, therefore, perceptible" (p. 139). This suggests that the definition does not concern itself with the disappearance of Mary's body from earth but only with her fully personal existence in eternal life. In the chapter on the Fall, M. opts for an approach similar to that of Irenaeus and Teilhard. We look forward with great interest to M.'s next work on tradition and change in the Church.

Fordham University

John J. Heaney, S.J.

NATURRECHT IN DER KONTROVERSE: KRITIK EVANGELISCHER THEOLOGIE
A short, clear, concise, readable introduction to the differences and similarities of the traditional Catholic and some leading present-day Protestant natural-law theories. P. limits his examination to five outstanding German-speaking Protestant theologians, with the justification that the natural-law discussion is today most actively and most thoroughly pursued in Germany. He presents in five autonomous chapters K. Barth, E. Brunner, P. Althaus, H. Thielke, and H.-D. Wendland (for the latter, see also TS 27 [1966] 511) by first gathering each thinker's natural-law-related statements into a harmonious theory, then isolating the various critiques on the traditional Catholic theory, followed in turn by a refutation of some of the criticisms and further clarification of others. P. then attempts a unification of the Protestant criticisms of the Catholic natural-law theory into three basic principles. He concludes that the differences between the Catholic and Protestant positions are not as great as is commonly accepted, and that terminology and peripheral issues are more to blame than basic differences of theory. He suggests that the rising interest of Protestant theologians, combined with a sincere effort on the part of their Catholic colleagues, may achieve a relatively early synthesis. P. himself has contributed greatly to a possible solution by clarifying and explicating the points of conflict.

University of Minnesota, Duluth

Helmut J. Schweiger

THEOLOGY OF SOCIAL MAN. By Pascal Foresi. Translated by Julian Stead, O.S.B. New York: New City Press, 1967. Pp. 184. $3.25. A survey of theology in a framework of two aspects of the human condition: sociality and labor. The social dimensions of the Fall, the Incarnation, and the Church are explored. In general, it must be stated that the theology of the social man has yet to be written; this work has not reached that goal. Nevertheless, many of the chapters would furnish excellent material for homilies. What seems to be the work's principal weakness is the lack of sociological insight, combined with a certain measure of triumphalness that does not seem to fit the facts. That Christianity has contributed to equality and the abolition of castes (p. 120) is at least open to question. That Christ dominates history (p. 180) ignores the larger part of the history of the Orient. The chapter on "Christian and the State" seems to need updating in the light of Vatican II; we have advanced beyond the position of Gelasius. Again, to call Mary the type of society is quite a leap from calling Mary the type of the Church, as did Ambrose and other Fathers. It is my hope that this interesting vol-
ume will inspire others gifted with sociological as well as theological acumen to begin writing in this frontier area.

University of Scranton

James J. Conlin, S.J.


F. has attempted to construct a theology for Christian education by recasting theological terminology into educational terms. To accomplish this, F. feels that both process and substance philosophy must be eschewed, because "there is no framework more seminal and adequate for both thought and life than the Christian categories themselves" (p. 12). What this amounts to is an attempt to formulate Christian theology from the perspective of God the Educator. There are two large sections. The first attempts to relate the Christian faith to the learned disciplines. Successive chapters treat science, theologies of various orientations, psychology, sociology, and various modern philosophical trends, always with the purpose of listening and, in turn, broadening theology from the insights of these autonomous disciplines. F. is not, by his own admission, an expert in all the fields covered. Consequently, some chapters are sketchy and a few individual statements are misleading, e.g., his observation (p. 75) that the "You-knowledge" of Harvey Cox means the "work of the involved thinker," when in fact Cox presents You-knowledge as simply describing a functional relationship. The latter section outlines a theology based on the idea of God as Educator. Many insights into this typology are rewarding to read and note. However, F. is far too eager to dismiss the notion of Christ as King and Judge, in diminishing the soteriological work of Christ and in minimizing the sacramental dimension (F.'s sacramental theology is naive at best) of Christianity. F. might well recall his own earlier advice to "be acquainted with the original foundations of the Faith and its long history" (p. 31). The task he set for himself was provocative and insightful, but somehow his case for a theology done in terms of education is overstated.

Florida State University

Lawrence Cunningham


A. believes that the death-of-God theologians have not put their finger on the real center of uncertainty with regard to faith today: the Church. "Rapidation," i.e., a concentration of historical events such as increasingly to widen the gap between past and present, is a characteristic
feature of the contemporary world. This phenomenon has, in fact, provoked the crisis of credibility and confidence in the Church, whose mode of being, imperial, triumphant, authoritarian, legal, appears appropriate only to the past, and whose social structure no longer appears to be within the "zone of truth." This criticism A. applies as well to the Church as she emerges from the documents of Vatican II. The Church has thereby become an obstacle to her own future and in this sense her social structure has turned heretical: she is no longer the image of what is to come. Has the Church, then, a future in the world? Can we plan for that future, or is the Church simply the grave of God (Nietzsche), who is not to be sought among the dead but among the living? A. replies that the Church can indeed make an impact on the world and participate in the decision-making processes that will determine the world of the future, provided that the Church becomes a kenotic Church, empties herself of all the irrelevancies of centuries of tradition and comfortable, institutionalized accommodations to past ages, and becomes the pilgrim Church, the sign of contradiction. This is a counter-balancing factor. The incarnational aspects of kenosis, involvement in the world, must be complemented by an eschatological transfiguration. Relevance must not be merely a new accommodation to the world, for the world too must change radically under the impact of the Church. Whether the rather novel and at times disconcerting twists of language employed to elaborate the theme do full justice to the mystery of the apostolic Church and the diad Church-world, and whether (as it will undoubtedly seem to many) an overly impatient and therefore strident analysis of past and present social modes of the Church is a fully satisfactory approach to a problem in which all are involved, the all-pervading and ever-present need for renewal will surely provoke varying responses. In any case, A. has written a clear, if summary, articulation of a point of view of many disenchanted with the Church as they know it, but desirous of believing and hoping in her future.

GOD IS A NEW LANGUAGE. By Sebastian Moore. Westminster: Newman, 1967. Pp. 184. $3.50. Brief and provocative, M. addresses himself to the present-day need for revitalizing theological language. The style is crisp, the language modern, and the main thesis is stated vividly: "God is a new language—the clasp of your brother's hand made articulate in death, a risen Body. Otherwise God is a dead word." His answer to the alternative issued by this challenge is to be found in this work consisting of three parts. The first is a short sampling of random impressions which have left behind
“a Catholic neurosis” and have given rise to a discontent with the “oldness” of our way of thinking. The second, the longest section, admittedly “exploratory and unsystematic,” is M.’s attempt to breathe a freshness into our language about God, His love of us and ours of our neighbor, sin, morality, eternity, death, and resurrection. The third section is the application of “the Christian mind” to the above. “What we want is a Christian revolution, but a Christian revolution can only come from a Christian mind.” It is this mind which animates Dom Sebastian’s whole work in his attempt to recover the Christian experience and to interpret it in meaningful terms to modern man. His book is filled with insights that call for further theological reflection. At the same time it is refreshing reading in an age bent on secularizing theology even at the expense of God; for it offers us the possibility—quite successfully, too—of a true Christian theology of the secular. M. is pointing perhaps to the path theological reflection must take in making God, the Cross, and the Christian message seem less out of focus to modern man.

*Loyola Univ., New Orleans*  
J. Emile Pfister, S.J.

**Nuclear War, Deterrence and Morality.** By William V. O’Brien. Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1967. Pp. viii + 120. $3.75. The author’s realistic outlook stems from his thorough knowledge of moral principles combined with his professional competence in international law and politics. He begins with a lucid summary of the state of the question, the balance of terror concept, the just-war theory, and a comparison of the first draft with the final form of Vatican II’s statement on war. The most valuable part is the application of the ideas of Vatican II and the recent popes to the present United States defense policy. O’B. does not pretend that they do correspond but tries to work out some way in which they could be brought into correspondence. Offensive wars are now out, but the right of national defense is maintained; total war in its absolute sense is out, but limited nuclear war could be inadequate as defense; countercity retaliation is renounced and denounced, but counterforce retaliation is essential to nuclear defense; possession of weapons as a threat with the intention of never using them is unrealistic in view of war’s possible escalation. O’B. sees no solution so long as the principle of noncombatant immunity is maintained. He has the courage to challenge it, making it a customary principle based on old modes of fighting when weapons could be aimed at visible individuals. The principle is still applicable to conventional war but not to nuclear war. Justifying nuclear counterforce operations by the double-effect principle is a strained legalism. Better abandon the principle of noncom-
batant immunity as never having been an absolute or natural-law principle and as being historically outmoded in nuclear war. On arms control and disarmament, O'B. prefers to idealistic approaches the realistic one of accepting the balance of terror as an existing fact and working from there; since all politics is power politics, the thing is to control power, not abolish it. Here the Church's pronouncements tend to confuse immediate with long-range goals. In all, this little book is an excellent summary of the realistic view. We should like to see it expanded into a full treatise, especially with a thoroughly documented history of the principle of noncombatant immunity, which has been too long accepted without question. Even as the book is, we recommend it to all.

University of Santa Clara
Austin Fagothey, S.J.

The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism. By Louis Dupré. New York: Harcourt Brace & World, 1966. Pp. xiv + 240. $3.50. To introduce the reader directly to the original texts of the major works of Marx and Hegel by presenting their ideas "with as few structural barriers as possible" is indeed a worthy goal. The first three chapters do offer informative and useful summaries of Hegel's religious, ethical, and political philosophy, as well as a short section on Feuerbach. Another three chapters give equally adequate accounts of the Marxian critique of Hegel, the humanism of the early Marx, and the "historical materialism" of "the German ideology." Unfortunately, D. is not entirely successful in achieving his goal of complete objectivity. At the end of chap. 6 he raises the un-Marxian question of whether Marx is materialist or humanist. To interject this issue into a presentation of Marx's notion of "historical materialism" is unfortunate; for, as D. himself admits, this is a question raised by "many readers of Marx" rather than by Marx himself (p. 172). The same is true of D.'s critique of the Communist Manifesto in chap. 7: although Marxist and non-Marxist alike may find confirmation or refutation of the Manifesto in subsequent historical developments, yet this is hardly a question which Marx was in a position to raise, however much he might have expected it to be asked by succeeding generations. The concluding "Critique of Historical Materialism" seems based upon an inconsistency in D.'s interpretive and critical framework. Although we are told flatly that "Marx himself was not a materialist" (Preface, p. viii), yet the critique of Marx is founded upon the contention that Marx has restricted "the scope of human praxis to the fulfillment of physical needs" (p. 220). Despite these difficulties, the first three quarters of this book can still stand on their own as a useful and informative introduction to the philosophical background of the thought of the early Marx.

Loyola College, Montreal
Richard Hinners
AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN THE SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL. Edited by Vincent A. Yzermans. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1967. Pp. xvi + 684. $16.50. The complete texts of the 118 interventions spoken by the members of the American hierarchy on the floor of St. Peter's during the four sessions of the Vatican II. Preceding the interventions (here assembled according to the sixteen conciliar documents) Y. offers a historical introduction in which he outlines the genesis and development of each document, taking into consideration not only the oral interventions (as contained in the volume) but also those submitted to the commissions in writing, which he hopes to edit in the near future. The volume also contains authoritative commentaries on the documents, in most cases written by individuals closely affiliated with the writing of the particular document.

THE CANON OF THE MASS AND LITURGICAL REFORM. By Cipriano Vagaggini, O.S.B. Translation editor Peter Coughlan. Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba, 1967. Pp. 200. $4.50. Taking his cue from Vatican II's desire for liturgical renewal, V. sets out to evaluate the merits and defects of the Roman canon and finds that the defects outweigh the merits, i.e., the canon "sins in a number of ways against those requirements of good liturgical composition and sound liturgical sense" (p. 90). These are defects in "structure and liturgical expression" (and not dogmatic or doctrinal errors) and "so hinder its pastoral effectiveness as a source of spirituality" (p. 107). The answer is not in a revision or rearrangement of the present canon (V. does not favor the attempts made by Küng and Amon), since any such attempt "will inevitably lead to an awful mess" (p. 122). The solution is in a new canon, and V. offers two of his own composition, indicating by documentation their similarity to, or dependence on, earlier anaphoras. Since V. so heartily advocates renewal and a canon which will express "the theological interests of the Church of our day" (p. 145), it is especially difficult to agree with his insistence that any new canon first "must be thought out and written in Latin, even if it is afterwards to be translated" (p. 147), and that these canons "must observe the stylistic rules of the best Roman and Latin traditions of prayer" (p. 148).

THE DICTIONARY OF RELIGIOUS TERMS. By Donald Kauffman. Westwood, N. J.: Revell, 1967. Pp. 448. $8.95. A comprehensive volume of terse definitions and/or descriptions of some eleven thousand entries taken from the history and beliefs of the world's major religions (past and present) and of every denomination in the United States. Besides the expected biblical and theological terms, K. offers condensed biographical data on religious leaders and thinkers, interprets liturgical rites, symbols, and festivals, and
Theological Studies explains architectural and musical expressions as well. Such comprehensive information in a single handy readable volume makes it a must for the non-expert but theologically interested.


Books Received
[All books received are listed here whether they are reviewed or not]

Scriptural Studies

Giblin, Charles H., S.J. The Threat to Faith: An Exegetical and Theological Re-ex-
Books Received 181


Doctrinal Theology


Luther's Prayers. Tr. by Charles Kistler; ed. by Herbert Brokering. Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1967. Pp. 120. $3.00.


Selected Writings of Martin Luther. Ed. by Theodore G. Tappert. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1967. Pp. 403; 483; 408; 484. $10.00 set of 4 vols.; $2.95 each.

Moral Theology, Canon Law, Liturgical Questions

Pastoral and Ascetical Theology, Devotional Literature


History and Biography, Patristics


**Philosophical Questions**


**Special Questions**


