BOOK REVIEWS


This is the very badly preserved scroll which was edited, with introduction, translation, and photographic plates, by N. Avigad and Y. Yadin as A Genesis Apocryphon: A Scroll from the Wilderness of Judah (Jerusalem, Israel: Magnes Press, 1956). That publication evoked many reactions in print, mostly in the first three years. "The time has come," says Fr. Fitzmyer in the Preface to the present work, "for a more definitive translation and evaluation of the various interpretations which have been proposed. This is the purpose of the present commentary." It definitely was a timely undertaking, and it is cause for gratification that it was executed by the solid young scholar who has made Aramaic linguistics and epigraphy his specialty. Both my students and I have already benefited greatly from the results.

F.'s book does not include photographic plates, but it does contain everything else one could think of. Its core comprises the text of the Genesis Apocryphon (GA), with improved readings and restorations, and a new translation—facing each other on opposite pages—followed by a commentary. This core is preceded by Preface, List of Abbreviations, Introduction, and Bibliography, and is followed by Appendix I (Related Literature) and Appendix II (A Sketch of Qumran Aramaic), a Glossary, including Proper Names and Titles in Text, and Indices.

In the copious Introduction, F., among other things, accepts Kutscher's dating of GA in the first century B.C. or A.D., judiciously discusses its literary genre, and proposes a new classification of the Aramaic dialects. I agree with his dating, approve of his rejection of such labels as "targum" and "midrash," and have adopted his classification of the Aramaic dialects. To the question of literary genre, I should like to contribute a proposal for a term to cover works, like GA, Pseudo-Philo, and the Book of Jubilees, which paraphrase and/or supplement the canonical Scriptures: parabiblical literature. The motivation of such literature—like that of midrash—may be more doctrinal, as in the case of the Book of Jubilees, or more artistic, as in at least the preserved parts of GA, but it differs from midrashic literature by not directly quoting and (with more or less arbitrariness) interpreting canonical Scripture.

As was to be expected, F. has in most cases chosen the best suggestion made to date or has proposed a sound new reading or interpretation of his
own. But an author who in his Preface (see above) employs such an emi-
ently sensible phrase as “more definitive” instead of “definitive” obviously
expects and hopes that further progress will be made after his book has been
published. The reviewer for his part does not doubt either the certainty that
the following observations leave room for further improvement or the
distinct possibility that some of his preferences among previous suggestions
may ultimately be discredited.

First, on orthography. Against p. 178, the preceptive enclitic nh is surely
to be read ne (so East Syriac, with closed long e, which only becomes i in
West Syriac; cf. Samaritan ny). A study of the list given on p. 179 of no-
tations of (at least etymologically) short u/o by means of w leads to the ob-
server that the syllable in question is, according to the Masoretic gram-
mar of biblical Aramaic, either open or stressed or both in every case except
in a few proper names and gentilics (where the need for vowel notation is
greater than elsewhere). Actually, there is an additional exception: though
the list does not indicate it, in some of the passages cited for gušš the form
is actually gušš, whose first syllable is neither open nor, in Masoretic
grammar, stressed. Otherwise, however, we have in 20:7, 9, for example,
from a qul formation: šwpr but špr‘ and šprh(‘) (see below on 20:7).
Hence, contrary to my previous opinion, the vowel of the first syllable
may be u/o after all in (b)łyky (19:20) and ḥkm‘ (20:7).

Second, on phonology. Against p. 182, the 5 of the verb šql, “to lift or
take” (much used in eastern dialects) represents the sound š, not t. This is
not an example of an Old Aramaic dental spirant, graphically represented
by the corresponding sibilant, continuing to be represented by a sibilant
in writing after the shift of the dental spirants to dental stops (see C.
Brockelmann, Lexicon syriacum, s.v.). And although the name of Assyria
is spelled *ḥvr in Old Aramaic, in GA it is to be regarded as a Hebraism for,
rather than an archaic spelling of, the later ṭwr.

Third, on morphology and syntax. Since ṭlm is admittedly a targum-
type third person fem. pl. of the perfect, I was, despite F., right in taking
ʾštny (2:12) as another example of such a form. But I would now add that
since it is followed by ‘aleph, it may represent a haplography, or even a
haplogy, of *štny‘; cf. the fem. plur. of verba tertiae γ with i-themes in
the Targum (ed. A. Sperber) to Gn 19:33, 35; 41:53. F. thinks ʾštny is simply
the masc. sing. because he believes that there are two other examples of
masc. sing. verbs with plur. subjects; but there are not, see below on 2:16–
17; 20:4.

Fourth, observations on sundry passages. 2:2. Read wš[kt], “and she
wept.” 2:9. ʾdynty probably means “my pregnancy,” a formation like the
synonym *hrynt* which F. discovered in 2:1 (the Targums regularly render the Hebrew *hry* by ‘*dy in the Pael’). 2:15. The Aramaic word for “fruit” is not the Hebrew *piry-* but a different word *pér* (mostly employed, as a mass-word, in the plural). Hence *pry* is to be read as the plural determinate of this *pér*. After it should perhaps be restored *d’,* agreeing with *nṣḥt*, rather than *ln*. 2:16–17. F. and I have both been trying to justify grammatically something the scribe never wrote. The blank space left by F. in the middle of *šml[yn ln’] shows that he felt this restoration does not fill the lacuna. In the light of this fact, cf. Dan 3:19, and it becomes obvious that the end of 2:16 and the beginning of 2:17 read *šml[yn ln’ šlm] (17) ‘*npyk . . . šn’ wšḥt (cf. *šlm ‘npyl’, 20:2) so that šn’ wšḥt agrees not with the plural ‘*npyk, but with the singular *šlm. 2:22. Restore at the end something like [kdy y’bd ilmk], “so as to do for Lamech.” 6:2. *wqwt* kwl ywmš ḏbr means “and I practiced (lit. “conducted”) lifelong integrity.” For ḏbr in this sense, see Jastrow, Dictionary, p. 278a. Cf. the corresponding use of the Heb. *nhg* (ibid. 880b). 7:1. The context suggests something like [kšlt b’r]” wškl dy ‘lyh’ bymy’ . . . , “[you shall rule] the earth and all that is upon it, the seas. . .” (cf. Gn 9:2). That makes Noah’s pleasure in the next line understandable. 19:10. One objection to F.’s restoration is shared by mine: the assumed inverted order, stressing “grain” rather than “there was.” I shall therefore skip the others and propose a new reading: *[bd]t ṭ*,” the land/earth/soil had produced”; cf. Gn 41:47. 19:15. Read *wb’yyn*. If the preceding *ṭw* is correct, the sequence of tenses is as in 22:4; cf. Dan 2:10. Nor is there any justification for restoring *ṭwn* at the beginning of 19:24 or for reading the smudged word in a broken context in 19:26 as *w’twn* rather than as *w’tyn* or as *y’twn. There is no case for the existence of -*wn as an ending of the perfect in Qumran Aramaic. 2:15–17. Vocalize *nimiqqas* and *tiqqásu* and restore *ṭqs* (if “was cut” was the intended meaning). The jussive *tiqqásu* is to the indicative *tiqq(u)sün as the jussive *yebádü* (Jer 10:11) is to the indicative *yeb(a)dün*. The positing of a variant *qws* to the established *qss* is gratuitous. 2:16. The difficulties (there are five of them!) of the reading of the *editio princeps* are felt by F. Fortunately it is incorrect. The letter read as ρ simply cannot be a ρ and must be a n, for it has a waw-head instead of a yodh-head and its downstroke does not slope to the right. Read *tryn’ mn ẓr[b’hd]*, “we are both from the same family” (absol. of Syriac *šarbtā). That, unlike the *editio princeps*, is natural dream language for “he is my brother.” 19:17. Why the inconsistency of following the original as regards Abram but not as regards Sarai? 19:20. What is remarkable about the suffixes of *bdlyky* and *bdlyky* is that they are suffixes of plural masculine
nouns, such as are taken by 'l and qwdm. For bfl (or would it be bflw without the [stressed] suffix?) there is a parallel: Syriac meffol likewise behaves like a plural noun, albeit like a feminine plural noun, when it takes suffixes; thus the Syriac for our blyky would be meffulâtek(y). (And by the way, I agree with those who say the Qumranic bfl means "on your account"—just like the Syriac meffol.) Bdylyky, on the other hand, seems to be due to contamination by blyky, for in 20:10 we find bdylh' (not bdylyh'). 19:22. Copy what the photograph actually shows in the middle of the line and add what can be restored in accordance with 19:24; 20:14, and you get: pr'w s[n.

20:3. As can be seen from Köhler-Baumgartner, Lexicon, s.v., Dan 2:32 is absolutely unique among all Aramaic dialects with its pluralis tantum hadâyin. What is proved by 'y' lâ hdyh, therefore, is precisely that hdyh is not plural (masoretice hada(y)h) but singular (masoretice hadyh). If anything, hâwhy in Dan 2:3 is to be regarded (and I now definitely do so regard it) as corrupted from an original hâdyh (i.e., hadyh) partly through dittography before, partly through contamination by the following word wdr'why. 20:4. Does lbnh' mean simply "her chest, bosom" (Arab. labân)? 20:6–7. F.'s translation is the only possible meaning, but it surely necessitates the assumption that šwpr originally preceded nšyn, and that šprh, špr' and špr are the same word with the u/o sound no longer expressed because the stress has shifted from the syllable in question. ḥkm' means "cleverness" (not, as I formerly thought, "skill"); but my interpretation of dl ydyh' as "the work of her hands" seems preferable to the colorless dlydyh', allegedly "whatever (but why is there no kwl?) she has," since Iliad 1, 115 confirms that the three things one admired in a woman (prior to the Industrial Revolution) were beauty, brains, and manual skill. 20:14. dy dbrt can only be a mistake for dy dbr "who(m.) took away." 20:32. Read ynpg[wnny]. 20:34. "Livestock" rather than specifically "flocks"; so also elsewhere. 21:34. Read wšby (as apparently even the photo warrants), i.e., Peil singular, as in 22:3. 22:2. Vocalize šabayyâ, "the captors." 22:19. I utterly fail to understand F.'s objection to Lignée. What is the passive ptc. fem. of š'ba but šabyâ? 22:21. In the grammatical sketch 'rq' should have been included among the examples of fem. absolutes, not of masc. emphatics. 22:29. F.'s comment shows that he understands the construction. So why not translate kmn kplyn šgyw literally as "how many times they have multiplied"? 22:33. Translate: "I have plenty of riches and property. So what need have I of all that, seeing that when I die I shall depart bare, without children?"

The appearance of this book marks a kind of milestone in contemporary popularization of up-to-date biblical scholarship. In content it does not vastly differ from the analogous efforts of Protestant and Catholic authors; it follows their pattern of enlightened conservatism, taking the OT word as somehow divinely meant and therefore having a perennial significance for all who share the faith of the Bible, and it tries to demonstrate this significance by setting the word in systematic relation to twentieth-century language and ideas. Its author is altogether erudite, entirely abreast of the best and most recent in biblical and Near Eastern studies, and he truly gives the reader what the book claims to give: a genuine conception of the unique contribution of Genesis to the heritage of biblical Israel. It is an honest work of biblical theology.

It marks a milestone in view of its Jewish provenance. Jewish books on the OT are, of course, no rarity nowadays or ever. It is somewhat unusual, however, to encounter a Jewish book of this kind, which combines reverent belief with thoroughgoing criticism, which is as much interested in Genesis for its record of historical religion as for its ethical parables. The novelty of this approach is acknowledged by the publication of a 500-page companion Teacher's Guide (prepared by the Melton Research Center of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America and published by the United Synagogue Commission on Jewish Education), from which it becomes evident that Understanding Genesis is intended to be a source book for teachers adopting "new approaches to the teaching of the Torah." A final stage in this project will be a textbook on Genesis for the student based on the concepts treated in Understanding Genesis and the Teacher's Guide; an experimental edition of this text is anticipated for the coming academic year.

The chief defects of the volume are, as the reviewer sees them, these two. First of all, not all of Genesis is treated, and what is treated is not always handled with equal system. S. proceeds through the text selecting themes and topics, and ordinarily his selections are unexceptionable; but there is some imbalance involved in a distribution that allots a whole chapter (3) to Gn 11:1–9 and only one chapter (the last) to Gn 37-50. Inevitably the reader of Genesis will have questions that the author has not considered, or which he has considered far too hurriedly.

Secondly, for all practical purposes the source criticism of Genesis has been ignored in S.'s comment. Advertence to the existence of J, P, and E has for the most part been restricted to a few peripheral notes. Perhaps in the main this procedure may be justified, since the purpose of the book is to
explain the meaning of the established text of Genesis, which was intended as a unity. Nevertheless, the unity can hardly be understood realistically without recognizing the smaller unities from which it has been formed. More than once a theological under- or overstatement has followed on S.’s practical neglect of the composite character of Genesis.

However, the dominant impression created by this book is that it is a mine of useful, reliable information collected by a man well up on his science and awake to the religious moment of the text with which it deals. The book is well indexed, carefully annotated, and equipped with a serviceable bibliography. There are several splendid maps and charts. A couple of the latter, unfortunately, have not been well integrated into the text. On p. 5, e.g., there is a heroic representation of the Hebrew cosmography with a dozen numerical references which no amount of diligent searching will find advertence to elsewhere in the book.

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This gives us in English the standard study of the OT liturgy by the leading scholar in the field. It is welcome because it makes the work more widely available, and it is of interest not merely to the student of the OT but also to the sacramental theologian and especially the liturgist.

Kraus reviews the history of the important studies of the OT liturgy which have gone before him. This is a sober summary and evaluation, perhaps especially welcome for its trenchant critique of the myth-ritual formula which has so often been forced not just on the OT but on ancient religion in general. He then turns to the study of liturgical texts themselves. Perhaps “rubrical” would be a better word here, for he is dealing with the directions for worship found scattered in the OT. These can be minute particulars (as, e.g., in some of the directions for sacrifices), they can reveal something of the larger structure of feasts, or they can be cult calendars laying out the whole liturgical year. Finally, two sections are devoted to the traditions connected with the various cult centers, one dealing with the centers which seem to have flourished in the north before Jerusalem rose to pre-eminence, the other with Jerusalem itself.

This may sound formidable, learned discussion of dry and technical material. Of what interest is an out-of-date and fragmentary Rituale? One might point out that such careful study of the evidence enables K. to put the prophetic attack on abuses of the cult into a proper perspective, showing
that it is not a fundamental hostility, as has so often been claimed. However, the real answer is that a people's mode of worship reveals a great deal about its religious beliefs. Moreover, the cult has played a large part in modern OT study in so far as it has sought to push our knowledge of OT history and religion back into the era before the formation of the texts as we have them. What has largely guided the study of tradition history is the assumption that the cult is intolerant of change and so that traditions which seem closely linked with certain shrines or forms of worship are likely to contain very ancient elements. But, of course, such an assumption must be checked against the evidence for the actual character of the cult.

The reconstruction, then, of ancient Israelite cult is important. It is also somewhat problematical. The detailed rubrics which remain to us are late. The early, more interesting evidence is partial and not always easy to interpret. Thus, it is clear that certain places, Shechem, Bethel, Gilgal, Shiloh, enjoyed prestige as centers of worship at some time or other. Just what went on at these places is less clear.

The same thing is true of Jerusalem to a lesser extent. We have a great deal more evidence regarding its worship in the Psalter and the Books of Kings, but the material in these sources is fragmented and scattered, and the psalms are hard to date. Hence the problem of reconstructing the liturgy of Jerusalem, a problem which may be illustrated by the fact that scholars of the highest caliber can reconstruct quite different feasts from the same material. Thus, the late, great Norwegian Sigmund Mowinckel found an annual enthronement-of-Yahweh festival in the Jerusalem cult. Using the same evidence, Artur Weiser finds a celebration of the covenant. And K. sees in all this a royal-entry feast celebrating the coming of Yahweh to His temple symbolized by a procession with the ark of the covenant.

Apart from these disputationes inter doctores, it has always seemed to me that the reconstructions of ancient Israelite liturgy have overlooked a basic sociological fact. This is the fanatical conservatism of restoration communities, and most of our OT ritual calendars and rubrics we owe to just such a community, postexilic Jerusalem. One would expect such a community to emphasize the forms of the past (even if those forms automatically acquired new meaning in new circumstances), so as to prove its continuity with the past. This is the way of things with restorations. But this restored community put its emphasis on sacrifices and on Passover, Weeks, and Tabernacles. Where are the covenant feasts and the rest? One would expect to find them or at least their names if they really were characteristic of the old Jerusalem community which the restored exiles worked so hard to reconstitute.
All this is not to be taken as a denial of the value of K.'s book. He analyses soberly, with the technique of a master, and the hymns, processions, cult objects, and the rest with which he works are really attested in the texts. Rather it is an attempt to explain the nature and limits of the book. It is not a Bible nor even a reference work like a dictionary. One should not just consult it. He should use it as a tool, an expert guide to the texts relevant to the cult and a splendid example of the careful study they deserve. Its value for such use is enhanced by indexes of scriptural citations and of subjects. Let us hope that it does lead to the study and discussion for which K. himself asks in his preface.

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Everybody who followed the course of Vatican II is aware of the part played in it by Augustine Bea, cardinal secretary of the Secretariat for Christian Unity. Among his many vitally important contributions, his efforts in the shaping of the Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions, and in particular to the section of that document dealing with Judaism, were outstanding. The Church and the Jewish People is a successful attempt on Bea's part to fill in the context of the document in so far as it concerns the Church's relation to Judaism. One of its most refreshing features is the concrete and personal way in which Bea writes—surely a reflection of his own direct and long experience with Jewish thinkers.

Before pointing to the qualities that make this book worth while, some criticism of a somewhat negative kind is in place. The English edition is said to be a translation, but we are not told what the language of the original was. The translation, while it generally makes good sense, seems mediocre at best. "Vouchsafes" (p. 46) surely could yield place to a more contemporary equivalent. There is awkwardness in "the old, so-called [by whom?] ritualistic law" (p. 58). "Schemes" sounds odd (p. 129). An oversight of some kind obscures the meaning of the statement in lines 11-13 on p. 38. An important word is missing from a quotation of Rom 5:6-8 (pp. 106-107). The translation of Bible passages is often needlessly archaic and sometimes (as in the use of the word "indignity" in the quotation from Is 53 on p. 106) puzzling. Welcome would be an identification of person and text in the case of quotations from a "recent author" criticized on p. 83 (cf. also p. 94). There is something a bit jarring in the reference to the "proud" title of Christian (p. 94).
These defects do not disqualify this excellent book. It bears the same spirit of sensitive concern for human feelings along with clearheaded love for truth which characterizes the document on which it is a commentary. Most valuable is the way in which Bea, in keeping with his expertise in biblical studies, presents the scriptural source out of which the document grew. He skilfully makes his reader aware of the wisdom of following the lead of Jesus Himself, then the later guidance of Peter and Paul, in shaping the Christian's attitude towards Judaism and the Jews.

A few particular items can be pointed out as having special value. On p. 34 Bea begins to speak of the vocation of all nations included in Israel's calling, thus centering attention on the universalism of the OT. In the following pages we meet some refreshing lines on the problem of the salvation of men who are not reached by the Church. Lengthy footnotes on pp. 117-18 provide a good explanation of the controversial change from damnat to deplorat in the final draft of the document—a change that had been interpreted by some as a weakening of the Church's stand against anti-Jewish attitudes. A similar service is offered on p. 171 in regard to the disappearance of the term deicidium from the final text.

It is to be hoped that this book will stimulate Christians and Jews to a much deeper study of the common OT heritage Bea loves to talk about. A strange gap in a book published in the U.S. is the failure to mention The Bridge, the excellent series of Judeo-Christian studies edited by John Oesterreicher, which began before the Council and continues to provide much of what Bea suggests on p. 129. All in all, Bea has given us a valuable help in our reading of the Council document, including much inspiration to let the otherwise dead letter of the document come alive in the attitudes and actions of Christian readers.

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Marcian Strange, O.S.B.


This brief essay intends to be theologically solid and pastorally useful. It achieves this intention because of its sound grasp of the historical context in which the (Western) Church achieved reflex awareness of herself or, in other words, developed an ecclesiological doctrine. The historical context envisaged is that of the second millennium of Christianity, that posterior to the Great Schism (1054), that which begins with the Gregorian Reform. It is the thrust of this reform that brings to light the first treatises on the Church in the struggle between medieval papacy and modern state (Boniface VIII and Philip the Fair). From this same thrust comes the ecclesiology
commonly called classical. Chap. 1 limns this our immediate ecclesiological heritage. In this there are positive gains, however intertwined with negative aspects. M. gathers them under three heads: a greatly increased sense of the unity of the Church, a strong affirmation of the Church's autonomy with regard to other human societies, and a sense of responsibility of the Church with regard to the world in which it lives and yet which it transcends. The negative aspect is that the classical ecclesiology is centered (1) about the power and authority of the Church and so (2) is an ecclesiology of the ecclesiastical institution on the universal plane, which results (3) in an effective centralization, (4) in the loss of awareness of the communion of local churches, and finally (5) in an extremely extenuated sense of the Church as mystery and of the mysterious character of her action in the world.

The second chapter sketches the process of re-entry and re-establishment of the broader, genuine tradition under the following heads: (1) the influence of J. A. Möhler, (2) the Church as Mystical Body of Christ, (3) the influence of political and social transformations, (4) the rediscovery of the laity in the Church, (5) a Church in mission (referring to the French experience), (6) rediscovery of the local church, (7) the function and collegiality of the episcopate, (8) the Church a priestly community, (9) the ecumenical movement, (10) diversity in unity (here missions), (11) religious tolerance and liberty, (12) the contribution of historical research, (13) the impact of the Council. Each of these paragraphs is provided with bibliographical indications, as also the first chapter.

I would make two comments: (1) the impact of mission experience and mission studies is too slightly recognized in n. 10; (2) the influence of political and social transformations is all-pervasive (n. 3). For almost all the other areas of renewal mentioned above are nothing but the result of faithful Christians and churchmen recognizing and accepting these transformations, while attempting to meet them precisely as Christians and churchmen. The very calling of the Council and, more so, its celebration recognized, confirmed, and in a way put order in the various trends toward re-establishment of the broader, genuine tradition in ecclesiology. But it did more. The inner dynamism of these various trends of renewal was, as I see it, a response of churchmen, prophetic and charismatic, to the changing political and social situations of modern times. When, therefore, the Council took up and approved these trends, it was driven on to an open confrontation with the world.

The third chapter is concerned with the present orientations of ecclesiology and those soon to develop and the areas of foreseeable pastoral impact.
This chapter must be read with care. Considerable space is given to the distinction of the kingdom of God and the Church. This is analogous to the use of koinonia (communion, fellowship) as the basic organizing principle of the doctrine on the Church in preference to the Body of Christ concept. Cardinal Jaeger affirms that *Lumen gentium* proceeds from the central concept of communion (*A Stand on Ecumenism: The Council's Decree* [New York, 1965] p. 214). A close reading of his commentary on the Constitution (*ibid.*, pp. 181–87; cf. p. 82) suggests that this was done deliberately so as to avoid an ecclesiological monophysitism easily conjoined with the Body of Christ concept, overdeveloped in its sociojuridical aspect. Perhaps M.'s most pertinent pastoral suggestion is that the pastoral ministry is a specific service, one of several in the Christian community (p. 110). The development of this notion would help clarify the proper role of the priest, presently quite fuzzy for many in theory and practice. Three brief but useful indexes close the volume: authors, principal subjects treated, and the chief bibliographical notes. The bibliography is dominantly French, but much of this is available also in English, as articles in *Concilium*.

This small but highly useful volume had its origin as a study of the conciliar Constitution *Lumen gentium*. But this fact, while making possible the presentation of much material in coherent form, has entrained two major limitations. The ecclesiological import of the opening sections of the Constitution on the Liturgy passes unnoticed. These, however, contain in a nutshell the doctrine elaborated in *Lumen gentium*. M. has situated his study in relation to the overcoming of the “classical” ecclesiology rooted in the Gregorian Reform. This, I think, is true to the situation as it exists among Catholics (and Christians generally); it was necessary for clarity and brevity of presentation. But the overcoming of the unilateralism of the Gregorian Reform (and its prolongations) was accomplished under a twofold thrust: the return to sources and the outlook on the contemporary world. The return to sources is dominantly to Scripture and to pre-Constantinian writers. The models, the exemplars, of the ecclesiological sections of the liturgical Constitution are, in a crucial sense, men like Ignatius of Antioch and the *Traditio apostolica* of Hippolytus. The other thrust is basically that the over-all import of Vatican II is that the Church, in effect, recognizes the end of the Constantinian epoch. That epoch has long been ended (since the French Revolution?). What happened at Vatican II was the release of energies consequent on the hierarchy recognizing this fact. Thus there is a great openness to the world, of which the conciliar witness is *Gaudium et spes*, the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, and then Paul VI's *Ecclesiam suam*, insisting on the need of dialogue with the world, risky
though it be. This second thrust has itself two aspects: the openness just mentioned and the acknowledgment that the Church no longer has a preferred status, is even a minority group. This latter leads to a questioning of our institutional modes of behavior, for so long joined with the Constantinian supposition of a Christian society. M. recognizes this in a citation (pp. 82 f.) from H. Fries; yet the structure of his own work does not permit him to bring it into focus. Apart from these limitations, we have here a tool with which to place in proper historical perspective the many various attitudes toward the Church and the many proposals for restructuring her mode of operating. Such perspective favors courageous prudence and allays needless apprehension.

St. Meinrad Archabbey, Ind.

POLYCARP SHERWOOD, O.S.B.


This book by a well-known Benedictine is a work of creative scholarship. It embodies the mature reflections of an important scholar and mystic on a spiritual culture that has evolved one of the profoundest religious philosophies known to man. The volume contains twenty-one essays and an introduction, and has eight illustrations. Most of the essays were published in various American and English journals (Commonweal, Clergy Monthly, Jubilee, New Blackfriars, etc.). It is indispensable for missionaries in Asia or Africa, and may be recommended for all opinion makers in the Church, especially priests and seminarians.

The introduction presents G.'s personal approach to the Vedanta philosophy of India and to Gandhi's ideal of nonviolence; it also describes many important aspects of India's spiritual culture. In ancient India man's whole life was oriented towards an ultimate truth to which everything in this world was relative. The modern world, says G., has lost sight of that sort of goal; to find life's ultimate meaning is our pressing modern problem. True, the structures of religion and society that prevailed in a society like ancient India's are not valid today, but their goals still are. The West can find the answer to its problem through a spiritual meeting of East and West.

Part 1, "Towards an Indian Monasticism," describes the life at the monastery that G. and the Belgian Cistercian Francis Mahieu founded twelve years ago in Kerala, South India, and explains their ideals and activities. It also outlines the history of the Catholic missionary effort in India. In the past, most Christian missionaries in India were blind to the strengths of the native religions; the fact that after more than fifteen hundred years of missionary efforts only two persons in every hundred have been con-
verted hardly speaks well for their approach. G. and his colleagues hope to bear more effective witness to Christ by leading an Indian Catholic monastic life in conformity with Hindu ideals. To emphasize prayer and asceticism (much appreciated in India), the monks follow the Rule of St. Benedict; they employ for the Mass the West Syrian rite of Antioch, which they feel is better suited to the Orient than the Latin rite. Like the great Jesuit missionary de Nobili, whose example they emulate, they respect the spiritual culture and traditions of the country. They cooperate with the local village authorities in pushing a "key village center" for the improvement of agriculture, and seek contact with Hinduism through discussions with Hindus about "ultimate truth."

Part 2, "Towards an Indian Catholicism," discusses the difficulty of expounding the Incarnation to people who already accept Christ as an avatar (manifestation of God) along with their own Rama, Krishna, and Buddha. According to G., the missionary in countries professing one of the great world faiths other than Christianity must realize he is dealing not with "false" religions, but rather with true religions, distorted perhaps, but witnessing to eternal truth. The Hindus and the followers of other Eastern religions have to be shown that their prophets are actually true precursors, preparing them for Christ. A meeting of East and West, in G.'s view, can take place only through the contemplative life; hence he advocates the founding of Indian Catholic contemplative orders modeled on the life of the desert fathers.

Part 3, "Towards a Non-violent Society," offers an understanding picture of India's people and the remarkable purity of their family life. In removing the extreme poverty that is the curse of the Indian villages, care must be taken, G. warns, not to break up the stable background of Indian society. Much of this part of the book is devoted to a detailed discussion of Gandhi's program for the villages and of his ideal of truth and nonviolence. Dom Bede accepts the principle of nonviolence as part of our commitment to Christ. Valuable information is also given here about the present activities of Gandhi's follower Vinoba Bhave, who initiated the program of persuading landowners to give land voluntarily to landless peasants.

Part 4, "The Meeting of East and West," calls for an ecumenical movement not only in Christianity but in religion itself. Christians may thus, says G., discover the common ground in the different religious traditions and, in the light of this understanding, "comprehend all these... in their vital relationship to the living Christ." Like the Belgian Jesuit Fr. Johanns, author of To Christ through the Vedanta, he believes that a system of Christian philosophy can be constructed on the basis of orthodox Hindu philosophy, with the sole addition of an adequate teaching about creation. "There
is not a treatise in Catholic theology,” he affirms, “which would not receive light from being studied in relation to the Vedanta.” Crucial for the conversion of India is recognition of the fact that Indian philosophy is never merely speculative; it is always a way of salvation. One experience underlies all Hindu spirituality: a mystical realization that the soul in the ultimate ground of its being is one with Brahman, the ultimate ground of all being. This experience of God has been so overwhelming, however, that it was difficult for the Hindus to affirm the reality of the soul and the world. It is Christianity’s task to show them that in the ultimate experience the world and the soul are not lost. But it is no less Hinduism’s task to show Christianity, G. says, how to explore the interior world, something the West has forgotten in its staggering exploration of the outer world. He points out that from the beginning God’s plan included all men; no one is excluded from that “covenant of grace.” This part of the book contains, also, a description of a meeting of Protestants and Catholics in 1962 to discuss a Christian approach to Hinduism, which gives valuable insights into Hindu philosophy, ancient and modern. G. concludes by affirming that Christ, in taking our human flesh, assumes the whole creation to Himself and fills it.

Part 5, which concerns Church renewal and the Church of the future, considers the biblical and liturgical movements in their relationship to ecumenism and advocates extension of the ecumenical approach to all the great religions of the world.

Any collection of essays around a general subject, written at different times and for different readers, must suffer from a want of system. This limitation, together with its lack of attention to any but a few key ideas, makes the present volume something less than a complete guide to modern Hinduism. (It would have been more representative, though also more controversial, had G. included his essay “Indian Spirituality and the Eucharist,” discussed by the writer in the March 1966 issue of T.S.) Any such collection also involves a good deal of repetition; in the present instance, however, the repetition should help to familiarize readers with unfamiliar Hindu concepts.

*Christ in India* undoubtedly represents a milestone in Christian thinking; if its recommendations are pursued, the results for world religion could be revolutionary. It should nevertheless be read with a few reservations. In the first place, G. tends to speak of one school of Hindu philosophy—the Advaita or nondualist—as Hinduism. This is indeed an important school; for any real dialogue with Hindus, however, the other leading schools should also be contacted. Again, in advocating the cultivation by Christian contemplatives of the ultimate Non-dualist experience of the self’s essential oneness with
the Godhead (so as to help us recover our lost sense of mystery), Dom Bede runs a certain risk. Since the self, or Atman, that the Hindus contact is interpreted by them as the quintessential reality underlying the individual self, and thus identical in all human beings, to advocate the search for it may encourage Westerners to undervalue the absolute uniqueness of the human person. Further, much clarification about the term “person” is necessary, as it is used by Hindus and Christians with respect both to God and to man. G. declares that the Hindus have not understood God’s personal relationship to His creature; but it may be found that Hindus and Christians are not always as far apart as the terms they use would make it appear.

Despite these few reservations, it may be confidently said that no book about Indian spirituality approaches this one in significance for the modern Catholic Christian.

_America House, New York City_  

JOHN MOFFITT


Althaus' _Theology of Martin Luther_ can and should be analyzed from several points of view, just as it is written with several ends in view. It is intended as an attempt to put Luther’s theology in systematic form for those whose basic theological orientation is Lutheran (perhaps a neologism—Lutherish—will eventually prove necessary), and as such it takes its place in a long tradition of such studies. I am not particularly competent to assign the book its place in this tradition; and since I rather suppose that by and large the readership of TS is not particularly interested in knowing how Althaus’ Luther compares with Theodosius Harnack’s and Karl Holl’s, I shall approach the book in terms of another of its aims. For A. also wishes to enable Luther to speak to the broader theological tradition and to make his contribution to the ongoing theologizing of the entire Church. It is in terms of this aim that I propose to evaluate the book.

A.’s book is divided into twenty-eight chapters, though why it is broken up into so many divisions is not clear. Most of the topics pursue the single theme of the distinction between law and gospel, and the pulverization of the text results at times in superficiality and repetitiveness. It is, I think, indicative of the distance separating the Lutheran and Roman Catholic theological traditions that what in A. is _the_ topic scarcely exists as _a_ topic in Roman Catholic systematics. Law and gospel is the central theme of the entire work. But on a topic which most Roman Catholics would judge to be
rather near the heart of theology, the doctrine of the Trinity, A. writes just a page and a half, and even that is padded. These twenty-eight chapters provide a good survey of Luther's theology from a systematic position not greatly different from his own, and thus is a useful guide for one who would find out what Luther held on such and such a point and how things fit together.

A. is less successful in relating Luther to the larger tradition, and this for at least two reasons. First, he indulges all too frequently in the common failing of substituting saga for history. There is a Luther über alles motif that runs through the entire book. This is unfortunate; for not only does this prove a trifle exasperating, even in these days of ecumenical euphoria, but more seriously it results in a Luther who is defined largely in terms of antithesis and discontinuity. So completely does A.'s Luther jump over and negate the post-Pauline tradition that one gets little or no sense of the ways in which Luther develops solutions to problems with which the intervening theologians were attempting to deal. Simply to write off Scholasticism, on the crucial matter of law and gospel, in terms of works-righteousness and moralism is to take too cavalier a view of Scholastic Augustinianism. And because A. tends to treat the intermediate theology in the clichés of the sixteenth-century debates, his simple juxtapositions often do not carry much conviction. When, for example, he describes Luther's exegetical principles, he writes the following: "Luther calls such interpretation of the Old Testament 'spiritual interpretation.' He definitely distinguishes it from the traditional allegorical interpretation practiced by Origen, Jerome, and others. They erred in ignoring the literal meaning of the words and the actual history of Israel; thus the spiritual meaning which they discovered is always something completely strange to the text. Luther's 'spiritual interpretation' is distinguished from all such allegorical interpretation by the fact that it is grounded in the history of salvation and that it interprets the texts in terms of their relationship to Christ. The allegorical interpreter goes beyond the literal meaning of the text because he is ashamed of the fact that it does not stand at the height of spiritual Christianity. As a result, he knows no other way of interpreting it than assuming that such texts are a secret code used to express something completely different from and unrelated to the situation described in the text. In opposition to this, Luther's 'spiritual interpretation' discusses the meaning of prophecy in its particular historical context. It is the power of this prophecy which enables Old Testament history and institutions to point beyond themselves to Christ as the one in whom the history of the Old Testament actually reaches the goal which God has set for it. Allegorical interpretation is not concerned with what actually
took place in the historical situation described by the text. Luther's spiritual interpretation is, however, particularly concerned with the meaning of the words; for the history which they describe is prophecy. Luther can thus place the original literal meaning and the spiritual interpretation beside each other and bring them into a vital relationship to each other through his concept of 'sign' or 'type.' "I have no wish to deny that there are differences between Luther and the patristic writers referred to here; but, in fact, A.'s description of Luther could without difficulty be applied to Origen et al., and the only way in which A. is able to contrast them is by using the old, half-true but also half-false canards. And thus Luther is not seen as contributing to and purifying a tradition but as its simple antithesis.

A second major difficulty is that A. assumes too easily that the precise form in which Luther experienced and articulated sin is the Christian experience and doctrine of sin. Here the question I raise is not simply the question of differences between Luther and Lutheranism and Roman Catholicism. For A.'s Luther, sin is experienced principally in terms of the individual's inescapable self-centeredness, the impossibility of ever achieving the kind of purity of intent that is required by the law, and the consequent state of guilt before the God who demands an undivided heart. Given the centrality of the doctrine of sin in Luther, it would have been immensely helpful if A. had tried to relate Luther's conception of sin to the more cosmic as well as to the more sociopolitical conceptions of sin which have flourished both before and after Luther. Instead we have a fulsome, and after a while rather monotonous, repetition of the sixteenth-century rhetoric of sin. In putting the matter this way, I do not wish to suggest that the sixteenth-century rhetoric is merely rhetoric. But from Irenaeus to Reinhold Niebuhr there have been somewhat different ways of experiencing and analyzing sin, and it would have been most helpful if A. had tried to relate Luther to at least some of the major alternatives.

Reviewers have a tendency to find fault with what is written and to praise the imaginary book which they, much wiser men, would have produced. To balance this slightly, I would note that A. is an excellent, if at times a bit hyperbolic, guide to Luther; and unlike many German theologians, he is blessed in his translator.

University of Iowa

JAMES McCUE


Newman these days is in the hands of the "scientific investigators." The time is past when it was possible for amateurs, by mere devotional reading,
to become experts on his life, works, and ideas. It is not just that work in the Newman archives is now demanded; the number of researchers has grown too; in particular, Continental scholars have discovered Newman and are publishing a steady stream of books on him. Biemer's study, which appeared first in Geiselmann's series on tradition in modern theology, is a short one, but the wealth of references, the appendix of unpublished material, and the imposing apparatus of abbreviations and bibliography are typical of the new approach.

The order of B.'s table of contents is itself reassuringly scientific: Tradition in Anglican Theology from the 16th to the 19th Century, The Historical Development of Newman's Views, The Systematic Structure of Newman's Doctrine of Tradition. The second of these three parts is very brief (it was compressed from the German, B. tells us), but two points stood out for me. One was the idea of the prophetic form of tradition, characterized not by firmness and certainty but by dynamism, search, evolution, and growth. The other was the emergence of the idea of development as a solution to the problem posed by the ambiguity of tradition. Increasingly, as he struggled with the sources of doctrine, Newman came to see the inadequacy of his view of tradition; finally, there resulted what B. calls "the breakthrough to the notion of development." The longest part of the book by far is the third, with hundreds of quotations usefully collected under systematically ordered headings. B. regards this as his own tentative effort to give structure to Newman's ideas. I think myself we exaggerate a bit the unsystematic character of Newman's thought; there is a system before systems operating in all of us (the "analogy of faith"), deriving perhaps simply from the structure of creed or catechism, and surely there is abundant evidence of it in Newman.

The short section that attempts to define tradition (pp. 138-49) was the high point of the book for me. Tradition cannot be defined completely, for it will go on till the end of time; the whole of revelation now comes to us in the form of tradition. Materially, tradition is the life of the Church and the conscience of the Church; in fact, the act of tradition as a process is the illative sense. This and the preceding section on the modes of tradition (pp. 121-38) are full of arresting ideas. For that very reason they are disappointing. We badly need a philosophy of tradition understood in the broad sense as a force at work in life, civilization, and culture; we need a study of its dynamism, its continuity, its adaptations, its positive values, and its limitations. One would expect Newman to provide the descriptive categories on which to base such a philosophy, but B.'s quotations and comments are exasperatingly brief. He tells us, e.g., that Newman's thought
on the process of tradition and development "is derived to some extent from the formal aspects of the historical processes to which the revealed deposit was subjected, and hence it is a reflection of the life of the spirit" (pp. 134–35). This simply cries out for better documentation and discussion; it is of enormous importance; if true, it seems like Maréchal and Voegelin combined almost a century before either of them.

B. has given us a useful work on Newman, but I hope he will regard it as a basis for further study. May an amateur conclude with a suggestion that in such further work the author exclude a certain tendentiousness? All Newmanites will recognize the "divine philosophy" as distinctive, but when they find particular truths disparaged three times (pp. 59–60, 93–94, 115) in favor of this "philosophy," they cannot help suspecting a one-sided presentation; they remember too well Newman's celebration of the Quicunque, his list of particular propositions that set forth the doctrine of the Trinity, and his remarkable fondness for the dogmatic principle in general.

Regis College, Willowdale, Ont.


There are surely few master's theses in a class with this, submitted by Kierkegaard in 1841, at the conclusion of ten years of study in the University of Copenhagen. The starchy philosophy professors who had not only to tolerate its many flippancies and irreverences (including a certain nose-thumbing at their own Hegelianism) but also to try to understand its essentially ironic structure, bowed fairly graciously before the inevitability of K.'s brilliance and after a seven-hour defense accepted without important alteration ("because of the author's individuality") this thoroughly fascinating work.

I have heard that a leading Kierkegaard scholar thought this work interesting merely historically, as a record of a stage of K.'s development. Well, when you are offered in one tome penetrating insight into how the subject, in order to become a self, is to relate himself to the world, presented in the form of Plato scholarship, Hegel commentary, and criticism of romantic literature by one of the deepest and most creative minds of the last century, it is not likely that the result could be of mere historical curiosity. This may not be K.'s deepest and maturest work, but it is a mature work and a rich one, worthy to be read and reread for its own sake.

Its central concern is already the problem which will receive its supreme formulation nine years later in Sickness unto Death—the problem of how to
become an authentic self. The authentic self is poetic. In reading this work, we cannot avoid remembering Hölderlin's phrase which becomes a leitmotiv for the later Heidegger: "...dichterisch wohnet der Mensch auf dieser Erde...." The common man, sunk in unthinking routine commerce with his daily world, is prosaic (K. here borrows the concept and the word from Hegel). The unimaginative, dead literalness of daily existence drives the sensitive person back into the infinite depths of his subjectivity, whose negativity—the capacity to refuse to embrace what the world immediately proffers—finds its purest expression in irony, projected onto the world scene first by Socrates.

Classical Hellenism had outlived itself; a new principle had to come forth; but first, all the fertile weeds of corrupt anticipations needed to be ploughed under. This preparatory task was Socrates' contribution. A classical figure, he turns classicism against itself, makes it mock at itself, show up its own emptiness; this is irony at the service of world history. Socrates' strange appearance is misleading; at a glance, it is hard to take him seriously, and yet whom has history taken any more seriously, unless it be the Christ? Ordered by the oracle to "know thyself," Socrates yet professes to know nothing, and because of that is the wisest of men. And his daimon: Plato says it restrained him; Xenophon, that it pushed him to action. What was it, that daimon, that spirit that came from beyond the age? There is no penetrating the Socratic irony; we shall never know.

But if subjectivity makes its first appearance on the world scene with Socrates, it makes its latest in what Kierkegaard (obviously enjoying poking gentle fun at his Hegelian professors) terms "the subjectivity of subjectivity or reflection on reflection" (p. 260), the development modern philosophy acquired in Kant and consummated in Fichte and the developments immediately following, the era of "intensified subjective consciousness," which becomes aware of itself as irony, explicitly affirming irony as its standpoint. This is, of course, the romantic irony, a drunkenness of subjectivity, reveling in its unconstrained negativity, seeking by pure destruction of the conventional world to achieve selfhood. K. seizes on F. Schlegel's "very obscene" novel Lucinde, a work Hegel abhorred and whose conception of irony he thoroughly destroyed. If we observe carefully what K. is doing here, we shall see that he uses Lucinde to attack the staleness of conventional bourgeois relations, then uses Hegel to destroy Lucinde's reveling in the immediacy of sensuous existence—all the while leaving the suggestion (without ever saying it) that the Hegelian standpoint itself lacks irony, is not sufficiently poetic, and therefore is a major collaborator with the very bourgeois staleness Schlegel was attacking.
Yes, ironically enough (for he is spoken of throughout the book with the most sincere respect), Hegel is K.'s real opponent; for Hegel's is the most adequate and therefore most dangerous substitute for the Christian position K. espouses but is careful not to parade openly before his Hegelian philosophy professors. Just as Socratic irony opened the way through its negation of an age of stale Hellenism to an era which it could prepare but not create, just as romantic irony reveals the staleness of bourgeois relations but can offer in their place nothing but the immediacy of feeling or flight into uncontrolled subjectivity, so authentic irony can now save us from the System, by giving us the distance necessary to see that its speculation is no genuine creative principle, no substitute for the Divine Infinite's creativity of the finite, no explanation of how the Infinite "negates itself in the finite" without ceasing to be Other, or of how the finite has its positive reality in God. Irony, by reminding us of the nothingness of our own initiatives, while at the same time recalling the need of a continuous, real, positive, poetic creation, can open us to the need for grace. This, put with all the bluntness and crudity K. abhorred, is nevertheless roughly the message running below the convoluted surface of The Concept of Irony.

K. distinguishes more carefully than Heidegger (who does, however, hint in one place at this distinction) between living poetically, which is the need of every individual, and the chosen few's poetically creating the new reality, to which then all authentic individuals will have to conform. In both cases, the poetic individual and the creative poet have to espouse in their interior lives the deepest reality of their time. But, of course, "the seldom gift, the divine happiness of allowing what is poetically experienced to fashion itself poetically, naturally remains the enviable lot of the chosen few" (p. 338).

Irony as a mastered moment cannot create the higher reality the soul desires, but it prepares its way negatively by pruning off all the fruitless shoots, and positively by directing our attention to the need really, not just speculatively, to embrace the actual world as "a true and meaningful moment in the higher actuality whose fullness the soul desires.... The soul is not to be purified in such a way that it flees blank, bare, and stark naked out of life—but as a history wherein consciousness successively outlives itself, though in such a way that happiness consists not in forgetting all this but becomes present in it.... Actuality acquires its validity through action. Yet action must not degenerate into a kind of stupid perseverance, but must have an apriority in itself so as not to become lost in a vacuous infinity" (p. 341).
BOOK REVIEWS

But would not Hegel agree with every word of the above declaration? K. suggests that he would; but the deeper issue remains: How does the becoming of that authentic history occur? Upon what does it depend? If it depends only upon our becoming aware of our nothingness by our own acts of consciousness, as the Hegelian philosopher Solger appears to have claimed, "then manifestly we here have a Pelagian concept of atonement" (p. 330). So writes K. about Solger, but in fact he is worried about Hegel.

Lee Capel's translation is urbane and responsible, his historical introduction very helpful. In making this important book available to the English reader, he has performed a valuable service.

Indiana University

THOMAS LANGAN


Rather than a study of the supernatural in Teilhard de Chardin's theology, this book is an original attempt to rethink the whole problem of the relation between the natural and the supernatural. B. refers often to Teilhard's works, mostly to The Phenomenon of Man, and incorporates many of Teilhard's ideas into an original and systematic synthesis. B. believes that theological renewal is more necessary than ever, and that at bottom theological renewal depends intrinsically on renewal in philosophy. His purpose is to construct a philosophy of process which will be an adequate framework within which to situate and understand the theological notions of nature and grace and to resolve the problem of their relation, a problem that has preoccupied contemporary theology.

The first part is historical and critical. B. examines the relation between the natural and the supernatural in the theology of Teilhard, and finds that he does not safeguard the gratuity of the supernatural. He goes on to summarize the history of the problem of the supernatural and to criticize past major theological explanations of the relation between nature and supernatural. Oversimplification, both historical and critical, is a weakness of this part of the book. The work of Henri de Lubac is dismissed as inadequate and abortive. Karl Rahner's theology of the supernatural is held to leave unresolved the chief problem: the reconciliation of the immanence and the gratuity of the supernatural. B.'s principal criticism of all previous theology of the supernatural is aimed at the "Scholastics," a designation that seems to cover all previous Catholic theologians except Teilhard.

The second and main section of the book is devoted to B.'s own philosophy of process. He draws inspiration and many ideas from Teilhard, in order to
formulate a philosophy in which substance is redefined in terms of process. The insights here are profound, but the reader is distracted by frequent polemics against Scholasticism. These antischolastic forays are nearly always against straw men. For example, the Scholasticism that B. describes (pp. 101–21) as being incapable of understanding process apparently lacks any notion of substantial change; the Scholastic examples given by B. are all of accidental change, and he finds this conception of change insufficient to explain birth and death, the limit points of process. Not only this second and philosophical part of the book, but the whole book, is marred by attacks on a Scholasticism that for the most part has never existed. Almost all traditional and recent theology of the supernatural is rejected by being reduced to a rigid and exaggerated Scholasticism. B.'s philosophy and theology are worked out in opposition to, and so in the very context of, this exaggerated Scholasticism. This deforms the presentation of B.'s own philosophy and theology.

In the third and strictly theological part of the book, there is much that is important and needs saying, and there is much that is original and fruitful for further theological reflection on the relation between the natural and supernatural. B. applies his own process philosophy to two problems: the relation between human nature and grace, and the relation between a universe in evolution and the Incarnation. The solution to both problems is found in a theology that is worked out in terms of process and love rather than in terms of being and justice. Instead of considering the nature-grace problem in terms of the relation of grace to human nature, B. changes coordinates and considers the problem in terms of the relation of the person to grace. This permits him to treat grace as God's love offered to man; since love is necessarily offered in freedom—for love that is not freely given cannot be love at all—B. is able in these terms to explain the gratuity of grace. Further, since the human person is ordered to love, to union with "the other," B. can explain man's openness to and need for grace as constitutive of his person. That is, man's openness to grace and his need for grace are immanent and intrinsic to his person. By considering God's creative act as expressed in evolutionary process and directed to Christ, B. is able to show how the Incarnation is both a free gift of God and a necessity in the actual order of things. What is valuable in the book is B.'s own theology of the supernatural; the book would be more valuable if B. had simply presented his own ideas without trying to justify them by contrast with a caricatured Scholasticism.

*Catholic University of America*  
ROBERT L. FARICY, S.J.
BOOK REVIEWS


The title of this study is to be taken in the strict sense. It is not an investigation of Tillich's system as a whole or of any specific aspect or section of the system, but a critical examination of the type of argument by which Tillich tries to fulfil his fundamental purpose: to present a meaningful message today on the basis of the apostles and the prophets. The question that David Kelsey asks and answers concerns the method by which Tillich "moves from what the Apostles and Prophets said to what must be said today." In K.'s mind, this is where Tillich's originality and boldness lie. It should provide a key to Tillich's methodology and, by the same token, to the value of his conclusions and to the effectiveness of his work as a Christian theologian. This project is not entirely new, since a great deal of the growing literature about Tillich has been focused on his "method of correlation." In particular, Kenneth Hamilton's The System and the Gospel is mainly devoted to a critique of the method of Tillich's Systematic Theology. Yet K.'s essay is largely new in its findings.

Tillich's theology is shown to rely on four basic factors: description of revelatory events, ontological analysis, historical evaluation of the datum about Jesus the Christ, and esthetic analysis of the scriptural symbols. Of these, the first and the last are the most important. Revelatory events stand at the origin of the biblical picture of the Christ and also provide the occasion for receiving the message today. But in the absence of adequate language to describe revelatory events, one must have recourse to symbolic discourse. And Tillich's way of discovering the contents of a symbol and the meaning of analogia imaginis is by esthetic analysis. Ontology is indeed used, but it is adequate to the unfolding of dimensions of being rather than to the understanding of concrete events. As to historical analysis, Tillich's conception of history in general and his acceptance of the orientation of the most radical schools of thought on the historical Jesus make it impossible for him to take the historical claims of the Christian faith otherwise than as symbols of historical relevance.

Although K.'s preface notes his indebtedness to the thought of Tillich, which "deeply shaped" his religious thinking, the outcome of this enquiry seems to be devastating for the value of Tillich's system; for it is K.'s thesis that Tillich's esthetic conceptions have remained unresolved, hesitating between a dominant view, for which the value of art lies outside of the work, in the subjective experience of the person who reacts to it, and another view, which sees the value of art in the experience of the artist who originally did the work. In reference to Christianity, the theological meaning of the message
lies, on the one hand, in the revelatory situation of the apostles and prophets, which enabled them to speak of Jesus as the Christ, and on the other hand, in our own revelatory situation today whenever we also are grasped by the power of Jesus as the Christ. The crux of Tillich’s theology resides in its inability to relate these two events the one to the other: this is done neither by ontological analysis nor by historical investigation, and Tillich’s esthetics fails to join the two. In other words, it does not fulfil the precise function assigned to theology, which was to speak meaningfully today on the basis of the apostles and prophets. All it can do is speak ontologically about man’s being, existence, and life, historically about the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ, kerygmatically about the needs of contemporary man, esthetically about the power of the picture of the Christ; but it can never speak theologically and join together these various aspects of Tillich’s concerns.

To make his demonstration more effective, K. examines, perhaps too briefly, Tillich’s doctrine of God, and also, since Tillich intended his theology to be “answering” and “apologetic,” that is, adapted to the needs of today, the methods and contents of his sermons. Both tests confirm the conclusion already arrived at.

Some of Tillich’s fervent disciples may find K.’s conclusions too negative, although they will have a hard time finding fault with the method and disproving the conclusions of the book. One could wish that the basis had been broadened to include more of Tillich’s writings; yet Tillich himself considered Systematic Theology as the high point of his work and it is quite legitimate to look critically at the method which lies at the heart of the proposed system. Dialogue among theologians cannot remain a nice chat made more congenial by unquestioning admiration; it must be a dialogue of theologies and include critical studies.

Pennsylvania State University

GEORGE H. TAVARD


Any attempt to capture the whole of Karl Rahner the theologian is something like trying to catch a firefly at night. At times, like the firefly, he is brilliantly luminous; at other times the light suddenly vanishes and one is left to a frustrating groping in almost utter darkness. A distinguished German priest-theologian told the writer the other day that he cannot understand Rahner. While there is obvious exaggeration in that statement, and perhaps a bit of personal animosity, there is no doubt that even his peers in
theology find Rahner difficult and almost impossible to follow at times. His mind is so alive and fertile of ideas that these sometimes come out in a disorderedly jumble of words, like a luxuriant tropical garden that needs ruthless weeding. This lack of discipline in expressing what he wants to say is particularly evident when he speaks or writes in his native German. During the Council days in Rome it was commonly observed how clear and concise R. could be when he spoke in Latin. Then he was constrained to find the right word. Then he had to stop occasionally and consider reflectively the art of communication. The result was an economy of words and a gain in clarity. If only R. had the will and the skill of a Cardinal Newman to go back over what he has first written and rewrite and edit again and again!

In the present volume there is much first-rate Rahner theology, and much of great value for contemporary problems. Unfortunately, there is also a considerable quantity of useless verbosity. Let us be thankful that the good and clear outweigh by far the irritating obscurantisms. But publishers of R. in English translation should insist that his manuscripts be edited and cut, as well as correctly translated. This volume consists of nineteen discourses grouped around the following headings: Questions of Fundamental Theology and Theological Method; Questions of the Theology of History; Christology; Ecclesiological Questions; The Christian Life.

Space does not permit a detailed analysis and critical examination of all the essays. We would like to concentrate attention on just one, the first: “Thoughts on the Possibility of Belief Today.” Here R. speaks in an unusually personal manner, from the heart, from his own convictions, from convictions arising out of his own experience. That the problem he here discusses is real and serious is dramatically pressed home by the recent decision of Pope Paul to designate the twelve-month period beginning with the Feast of Sts. Peter and Paul, June 29, 1967, as a “year of faith.” Alarmed that many are vacillating in their Christian faith, Paul wishes individuals and local churches to reaffirm their loyalty. R.’s essay on the “Possibility of Belief [or Faith—here these two terms can be used interchangeably] Today” could be highly-recommended reading for the “year of faith.”

Religious literature today is filled with ambiguity about what is meant by “God” and by “faith.” R., on the contrary, is careful to define his terms: “I mean the possibility of belief in the infinite, unspeakable mystery we call God—of belief in the fact that this infinite mystery, as our mystery, has communicated himself to us absolutely. . . .” It is “belief in the real sense of the word . . ., belief engaged in by personal decision, with power to bring about change of heart, and not a belief arising merely out of middle-class convention and social antecedents.” A number today want to make not only
a distinction but a sharp cleavage between "inherited" faith and personal, existential, faith. R. claims that one passes readily and authentically into the other quite imperceptibly at times: "I was born a Catholic because I was born and baptized in a believing environment. I trust in God that this faith has turned into my decision."

Some wonder whether an "inherited" faith does not in fact prove inimical to a real, personal faith. At the Notre Dame International Conference on Vatican II, March, 1966, the then Sister Jacqueline asked John Courtney Murray: "If Catholic children are baptized in infancy and educated both in formal schooling and in their family situation with the conviction that they have the faith, and have a responsibility for keeping the faith, do they possess the psychic freedom to place a free act of disbelief?" To which Fr. Murray: "The answer is yes. I don't see how one's psychological freedom is in any sense diminished by the fact that one has been baptized in infancy and brought up a Catholic." R. would agree with Murray, and furthermore poses a question about valid alternatives: "One can live and grow only out of those roots which already live, and precisely as they live—only out of that beginning in which one places one's original trust in life." It is folly to suggest that the child should be deliberately protected against an "inherited" faith, should be made to grow up to adulthood in an environment of nonfaith, so as to insure a real, personal faith at the appropriate time.

"Inherited" faith will inevitably encounter severe temptations in its transition to fully reflected, fully personal faith. But as one who has experienced this transition, R. testifies that "the only possible reason permitting me to abandon it would be proof of the contrary. And nobody—not even my experience of life—has furnished me with this proof." Difficulties to faith arising out of the intellectual challenge of the various sciences, such as the history of religions, are shown on close examination to have little cogency. Not from science but elsewhere comes the real threat to faith. "The real argument against Christianity is the experience of life, the experience of darkness." I must either hold life to be absurd or believe in God. These are the ultimate choices. But "anyone who courageously accepts life... has already really accepted God." In this one is reminded of Paul Tillich's "The Courage to Be."

Surprisingly, another serious threat to faith is the Church itself. The recent shocking defection of the English priest-theologian Charles Davis makes us face up poignantly to this threat. In his newspaper article "Why I Left the Roman Church," he says: "I do not wish to give the impression that I am rebelling against the papacy alone. The lack of concern for truth, with the subordination of truth to authority, and to the preservation of the system,
pervades the whole institution...." R. is no less sparing in describing the institutional Church as almost the Antichrist and concludes: "All this represents a temptation to faith, a burden which may impose itself on the individual and almost stifle him." But what then? In order to live the faith more fully, is it better to leave the Church? To one so tempted Rahner asks searching questions: Are we not ourselves sinners? Do we not belong to this tired grey company of those in the Church who obscure the light of the gospel by their mediocrity, their cowardice, and their egoism? "Knowing all this, only one way is left open to modern man—he must bear the burden of the community, seeing it in the true way, the real freedom of the person and of truth."

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ALBERT L. SCHLITZER, C.S.C.


"I have seen in a textbook of logic the following startling statement: 'The transition from the mental acts, which constitute the major and minor premises, to the conclusion, is spontaneous, immediate and necessary.' Would not this be a misleading account of any inference? The same might be said, but I think more exactly, of the consequence of the conjunction of the right proportions of hydrogen and oxygen, plus an electrical disturbance, or even of a slot machine: put in a penny, pull the trigger, and the transition to the appearance of a box of matches is spontaneous, immediate and necessary."

This quotation from an article on "The Syllogism" by Fr. Lonergan serves a variety of purposes here. The article is not included in the present collection, which contains sixteen articles dating from 1943 onwards. It belongs to the group of unpublished articles on mathematical method, logic, and Newman's illative sense written in the late twenties for the Blandyke Papers of Heythrop College, Oxon, where L. spent his years of philosophy. These articles, and the above quotation, serve to confirm L.'s later claim to a decisive orientation at this period. That orientation would seem to have been towards what he would thematize in more recent times as transcendental method: method which goes beyond or behind the products of the mind to the performance that produces them, to the upper context of Insight (pp. xxv–xxvi) with the focus of attention on the noetic activity, to the processes of reason which, no less than reason, are illuminated by faith (cf. "Theology and Understanding," Collection, pp. 138–39; the articles referred to throughout are in the present volume). Again, that quotation and the implied orientation serve to draw attention to the unity underlying the very diverse
articles in *Collection*. The unity is the unity of the upper context, the series of articles belong to a large extent to the lower context of particular intellectual pursuits, and in this light the series can be seen as illustrating a reciprocal mediation of development. Thus, in dealing with the question of marriage in the relevant yet neglected 1943 article "Finality, Love and Marriage," L. reveals also a development of the upper context which was to receive fuller expression in *Insight* and in later works. Inversely, the lucidity of the treatment of the problems in this and other articles would not have been possible without the prior development of the upper context. But these are questions for detailed comparative studies, studies which the publication of the present articles should do much to facilitate. The relevant studies are, of course, comparative studies of L. with himself, a type of study both necessary and rewarding. So, e.g., the first article in *Collection*, "The Form of Inference," returns more maturely to topics dealt with in the Blandyke Papers; the focus of attention is still classical logic, a focus which shifts in later work (cf. especially the unpublished notes of the 1957 Summer School at Boston College) to modern logic, where various logical systems are characterized as hypotheses on the nature of deductive system.

My approach to L.'s *Collection* may puzzle rather than please the theological reader. It might with some justification have been expected that a reviewer of such an apparently scattered collection would select for comment a number of articles immediately relevant to theology, such as "The Assumption and Theology" and "Christ as Subject." In that case, too, articles of purely philosophic interest might have legitimately been passed over. But the connotation of the phrase "purely philosophic" is precisely what has to be avoided in the present context. By present context I mean not merely that of the review or that of L.'s articles; I mean the context of contemporary theological debate. The key issues of the contemporary context are the issues of the upper context, the issues of method and meaning, of objectivity and truth, of knowledge and belief. The pressure of a range of philosophies from Whitehead to Wittgenstein, from Husserl to Heidegger, is at present being felt in theology. There is no denying the positive aspects of that invasion of theology, but there is a central negative aspect that can be adequately met only in so far as the theologian shifts to the upper context; for, as L. remarks, "the crop of philosophies produced since the enlightenment are not open to revealed truths because they possess no adequate account of truth" ("Openness and Religious Experience," p. 199). Only in so far as one shifts to the upper context in scientific fashion is an adequate account of truth forthcoming. That shift requires an openness of the subject, an authenticity that is ready to get down to the subject's own cognitive performances.
Here indeed lies the focal difficulty, and it is in an endeavor to point to a possible source of mediation of a solution that I lay emphasis throughout on the upper context which pervades the sixteen articles. Fr. Crowe remarks, in his Introduction: “Whatever the objective question on which he [Lonergan] happened to be working, be it geometry, or logic, or marriage, or the consciousness of Christ, or the communication of the divine nature to creatures, it was apt to be treated mainly as supplying materials for another, underlying question, one that had to do, not with the particular object, but with the field of method, of the operations of the subject” (p. xv). In so far as the articles are read with a similar stance, they offer the possibility of a break-through which perhaps has been unsuccessfully sought in other of L.’s works: not a few have been discouraged by the science of Insight or the complexity of the *Verbum* articles. But a break-through is only a beginning. One may well advert to the occurrence of two basic types of insight in oneself and still wonder what all the fuss is about. It is as well, then, to note that to advert to the occurrence of insight in oneself is no more transcendental method than the adverting to the occurrence of dogs is animal psychology. It is a slow and initially not manifestly rewarding process to move from the noted experience of understanding, e.g., to an appreciation of the total difference between a percept and a question, to a rejection of the naive realism for which the world mediated by meaning is just an abstraction, to a consistent implementation of that appreciation and rejection.

To advert to one’s own intelligent activity in the way described is the beginning of a long haul, the concrete possibility of which is obviously conditioned by previous philosophical position, age, and preoccupations. The latter pressure, the pressure of the pastoral and practical in particular, is a contemporary good which nevertheless menaces the urgent need of development in scientific theology. The pressure is good: there is the pressure of the laity looking for light, the pressure of worthy causes calling for support. But the pressure can harm a greater good: the quest for theological meaning and for a methodological control of meaning. There is a like pressure in the sphere of technology and science, but here the theoretician is respected, the second-rate article more easily rejected: it is admitted without difficulty that one cannot have better television sets without better electronics. But in theology a rush for wallpaper when the walls are crumbling can pass for prudence. The argument here is not for the exclusion of the pastoral in favor of science; it is for the inclusion of both, for the mediation of one by the other, for a positive acknowledgment that a focus of vitality lies within the science.

In the last paragraph we touched on one small aspect of the major problem
which has occupied L. in the past decade, the problem of method in theology. Indications of the lines of solution have already been given by L. in various lectures and in unpublished notes, and the concluding articles of the present collection, "Existenz and Aggiornamento" and "Dimensions of Meaning," give some further indications of his recent thinking. The first article mentioned deals with the self-becoming of the subject, the second with becoming on the level of history, where the breakdown of the classical mediation of meaning, the developments of modern science and historical consciousness, and the subtlety of contemporary myths call for a basic development in the control and judgment of meaning. It must be constantly borne in mind, however, that the problem of method in theology is more properly the problem of the method of the theologian, the personal control of meaning by the theologian made possible through his self-appropriation. In a recent debate between a philosopher and an exegete, the exegete admitted the inadequacy of his assumptions and expressed the hope of closer co-operation between philosophers and exegesis. But no closeness of co-operation can satisfy the need for self-criticism on the part of the exegete. Flavell's commentary on Piaget's complex characterization of the child's cognitive structure offers a useful parallel here: "The question may arise as to whether the subject himself is aware of the specific structure which his cognitive operations form, or even that they form a structure at all. No, not unless he has been reading Piaget. The system of operations is not itself something upon which the subject can ordinarily focus his cognitive instruments; rather it is with which and into which he incorporates the data of the concrete problem before him" (The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget, pp. 36-37). Familiarity with the process of interpretation does not breed the understanding of that process, the understanding required for adequate control of meaning. Nor is reading L.'s discussion of hermeneutics sufficient, no more than reading Piaget is sufficient on another level. Reading and understanding move comfortably together only when one has understood already. And here I move to the last general comment indicative of the relevance of Collection.

The book Insight appeared a decade ago unexpectedly, on an unprepared audience, Scholastic and non-Scholastic. Its clear relevance to a wide range of basic problems is only gradually coming to light, and so, e.g., while in it the axe was laid to the root of a host of disputed issues in the philosophy and methodology of empirical science, little has yet been done to further or make explicit that achievement. At present there is a certain general expectation of a volume on method in theology. Unlike Insight, this volume will not come as a surprise materially. But unless the expectation is more than hopeful waiting, the volume will be in content as unexpected as Insight, its relation
to what is thought to be contemporary obscure, and the initial implementa-
tion of the program it implies a task for a generation other than our own.

I have been expressing popularly something of the significance of the
appearance of this collection and of the meaning of its content. I have done
so, obviously, from the point of view of one who accepts L.'s stand on the
structure and content of philosophy and theology. Since that acceptance has
not been uncritical, the review is no less critical, but since the acceptance has
been whole, the critique is wholly positive. I have written, too, with an odd
vigor and honesty, precisely because our times demand such. Finally, I
allow myself to stop short of introducing in detail each article with its con-
text, because this has been so excellently done by the editor, Frederick
Crowe, in his Introduction.

Campion Hall, Oxford

PHILIP MCSHANE, S.J.

THE REALITY OF GOD AND OTHER ESSAYS. By Schubert M. Ogden. New

Every essay in this collection is marked by Prof. Ogden’s characteristic
intensity and firm theological grasp. The sweep is uniformly impressive—if
the prose at times oppresses. But if this be the price of intensity and a firm
yet sensitive handling of root issues in theology, then one ought to put up
with it.

There is a curious division throughout the book which I can only explain
by projecting two Ogdens: one of a critical cast shaped by the Bultmannian
critique and in firm possession of a discriminating Christian faith, the other
taken up with the task of revisionary metaphysics and anxious to prove its
worth to the theological community. The first Ogden is more plausible and
more at home with his material. It is from him that we have most to learn.
This Ogden has been able to push beyond the one-sided “existentialist”
form of Bultmann to discover in the more general approach a new idiom
for handling the reality of God. He is also able to employ to singular ad-
vantange the tools of logical analysis and some of the finesse of later linguistic
philosophers, notably Stephen Toulmin.

All the chapters display this critical expertise, but it shows up best of all
in those treating the reality of faith (I.2), theology and objectivity (II),
myth and truth (III), the strange witness of unbelief (IV), and what sense it
makes to say that God acts in history (VI). In the second section of the first
essay Ogden undertakes the difficult task of showing how human life itself
presupposes the reality of God; for he is sensitive to the challenge hidden in
the freedom of faith: “unless God is somehow real for every man, he is not
genuinely real for any man” (p. 22). The key to this analysis lies in the limit-
ing questions which naturally arise for the human agent—questions of worth. "Logically prior to every particular religious assertion is an original confidence in the meaning and worth of life" (p. 34). Yet this confidence remains unwarranted by ethics, since it represents the only warrant for an ethics: "moral thought and action are existentially possible only because their roots reach down into an underlying confidence in the abiding worth of our life" (p. 36). The fact of this confidence demands that we listen when one speaks of God; for "the primary use or function of 'God' is to refer to the objective ground in reality of our ineradicable confidence in the final worth of our existence" (p. 37). He underlines the propriety of this approach from worth or value by noting that any questions entertained about the "objective reference" of "God" must submit to the senses of "real" unearthed in discourse about worth and what is worth while. Dialectic of this sort cannot be quietly categorized as a (merely) "moral approach" without adverting to the role of genuineness and values in human action. If authentic persons are the most "real persons" we know, and if their reality is imbedded in an underlying confidence, then what gives them consistency can most certainly be deemed "real." (O. employs Toulmin's analysis of "real" as answering to different criteria in different areas of discourse—a useful reminder for those who often forget to use the "analogy" they invariably invoke.)

This is O. at his most direct and personal. He employs the same approach far more carefully and quite incisively in criticizing Sartre for possessing and invoking a basic confidence he cannot account for on his own principles ("The Strange Witness of Unbelief" [IV]). His critical powers are aptly displayed in two post-Bultmann chapters: "Theology and Objectivity" (II) and "Myth and Truth" (III). The first of these steers a reasoned and discriminating course between a positivistic reduction of all genuine knowledge to the scientific, and a reluctance to speak of God as an "object" at all. In steering this course, O. evidences a semantic sophistication all too rare among theologians. He discriminates different senses of "nonobjectifying thinking," and while admitting Bultmann's ambivalence, would distinguish him from a radical sense of "nonobjectifying" synonymous with "noncognitive." "Myth and Truth" (III) displays the same ability to pinpoint Bultmann's use of "myth" and show (via Toulmin's "field-dependent" analysis) that there can be ways in which myths too may be "true." And this does not presume that we can translate them without remainder into nonmythical language, but rather that we are sensitive to their function in human discourse. This function, it turns out, is closely related to that inalienable trust and confidence by which we are ourselves. Myth corresponds to our desire to probe where we cannot, coupled with the need to base our personal decisions
upon some understanding of the texture of this radical confidence. In this context and in this context alone can we begin to speak of the truth or falsity of myth.

This style of analysis reveals the power of O.'s critical mind as well as his firm grasp on the realities of the Christian faith. It also shows the utter necessity of working through the Bultmannian critique to the point where one is possessed of its power and can discriminate from its polemic. The most creative use of these talents is displayed in the sixth chapter, on God's acting in history, where this delicate question is unfolded in a frankly existentialist manner, yet with a firm logical grip. This chapter demands and will reward close analysis for the way it sets forth revelation and the analogies it invokes for God's presence to the world. The analogy tentatively suggested is fraught with difficulties—our relation to our own bodily states (p. 178)—but deserves careful examination. The conclusion of the chapter: 'to say of any historical event that it is the 'decisive' act of God can only mean that, in it, in distinction from all other historical events, the ultimate truth about our existence before God is normatively re-presented or revealed' (p. 184), must be placed within the closely-reasoned context of the chapter itself to appreciate the critical rigor supporting it.

Our appreciation of the first Ogden has been sufficiently documented. The second Ogden is convinced of metaphysics in a definite direction: the process theology developed by Hartshorne from a legacy of Whitehead. Sensitive to the inadequacy of any metaphysical scheme (p. 56), O. is nonetheless persuaded that this form of thought is most promising today, since it "offers itself as a comprehensive philosophical outlook which has something of the same dimensions of the 'Christian philosophy' of our intellectual tradition" (p. 96). But indebted as he is to Hartshorne and Whitehead, his outlook has not been shaped by them as it has by Bultmann. He invariably offers their synthesis at the end of a chapter and puts it forward with far less finesse than his own proper analysis displays. He does not so much use this mode of thought as he suggests its applicability to theological issues in a tentative and promissory way—albeit with conviction. I will suggest two reasons for this tack: (1) O. is not really at home in the heady atmosphere of revisionary metaphysics (and who, honestly, is?), and (2) the best one can do with the vague categories presently available in "process theology" is suggest areas where they might be useful.

O. supplies evidence for my first supposition by contenting himself with recapitulating Hartshorne's polemic against classical theism: its categories are static, and its preoccupation with the absolute and stricture against God's having any "real relations" with the world allow no genuine worth for
human action. He also assumes, when speaking of analogical uses of language, the wooden doctrine of analogy disseminated in the schools. The force of this polemic usually allows a relatively uncritical adoption of the Whiteheadian scheme: though process categories are far from clear, anything looks better than static old classical theism.

Now a more sensitive probing to discover what the medievals were getting at would certainly be more sportsmanlike. Furthermore, some such understanding could prove useful in pinpointing the underdeveloped areas in the metaphysics constructed around “process.” By sifting what is relative in the problematic from what remains perennial in the questions, we would be in a better position to learn from the past which idiom is best suited to our times. And there are ways of entering into their style of thinking so that we can gradually come to discriminate form from content. (I realize this distinction is tenuous. I shall suggest ways in which it can be shown rather than argue for it abstractly.) Studies have been done, e.g., to show how much more supple was Aquinas’ analogical usage than the sedimented account of the schools. I have tried to show \((TS\, 24\, [1963],\, 183-212)\) how the operative term in Aquinas’ account of divine names is “perfection,” so that the entire movement is based on the dialectic of human aspiration rather than a purported logical construction. Merold Westphal has noted \((Review\, of\, Metaphysics\, 19\, [1966],\, 550-64)\) how “only a careless reading could suggest that since God has no ‘real’ relation to creatures, he is totally unrelated to them” (p. 563). All Thomas wants to say is that God is not causally dependent upon us. It is the gratuity of God’s action which is at stake. The language he chose—no “real” (i.e., causal or physical) relation—is not perspicuous to us, but ours is, after all, an age of hermeneutic. Similarly, his use of “eternal” does not entail “static.” Quite the contrary and explicitly, Aquinas’ analysis is far more dependent on Augustine; his concern is rather to confirm God’s presence to each moment of time as well as His absolute initiative. That his account of analogy invokes a hierarchy of beings, his denial of dependence is cast in terms of an “Abolute,” and his predilection for eternity may smack of a certain disdain for becoming—these stem from the form of thought he found available. And it is no secret in the history of thought that temporal distance from actual usage allows the form to take prominence over the direction or intention of the author as embodied in his actual usage. Is not this very observation central to the project of demythologizing that O. espouses so sensitively and critically? The medieval myth was an ontology, and where that ontology is no longer used with an awareness of its insufficiency, it becomes a distortion of the original intent. (In its own time, the ontology
was also invoked as a “demythologizing” instrument: what was metaphorical in Scripture had to be somehow construed not existentially but ontologically.)

These observations are not meant to exhibit the sufficiency of medieval forms of thought today, but simply offered as a way of achieving some perspective on employing any ontology. Where do we go from here? To Whitehead via Hartshorne? That remains to be shown. Once the polemic against “classical theism” is softened and we have to examine the plausibility of the process idiom, much work remains to be done; for its superiority over the classical idiom can no longer simply be taken for granted, and its own consistency and utility remain doubtful. It does seem at first blush to be more compatible with certain aspects of the God who revealed Himself in Jesus: that God needs us, that He is always with us, and that His concerns are ours. But if He needed us not only as His coworkers but to be Himself, could He also “ground” our worth? And does it “enable us at last really to understand our confidence that the whole of life is unconditionally worth while” (p. 142) if we can say that “the final context of our finite decisions is God’s own eternal life” (p. 162)? I am not sure. And my hesitancy does not reflect a predilection for “classical categories” but a frustration at being able to make coherent sense of the use to which Hartshorne puts the initially vague and highly evocative idiom of “process.” In short, I am as disconcerted with the religious adequacy of the medieval synthesis as O., but for different reasons. Yet the resolution lies, I feel, in a metaphysics which will help us out of the transcendent/immanent polarities that have so long done violence to the genuine transformation wrought and revealed in the Incarnation. So far as I can discern, process theology cannot circumvent this dichotomy, for it is impelled to postulate two aspects in God. The reason, I suspect, is that “process” remains impersonal. Aquinas’ recommendation that the best model for understanding the mystery of God is that of the human person seems worth following. That he himself was unable to exploit this suggestion is manifest. That process theology can do much better by another route is doubtful. But its proponents, at any rate, will have to rely on their own resources and not polemic to show that it can.

If I have taken sharp issue with the second Ogden, I must now reiterate my indebtedness to the first. He presents a model of able and penetrating theological discourse, displaying competence throughout and often genuine creativity when he speaks in propria voce.

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**David B. Burrell, C.S.C.**

This book is an excellent introduction to the use of existential categories in Christian theology. It is a collection of seventeen essays and lectures, some of which appeared earlier but were all revised for inclusion in this volume. They cover the general areas of the nature, presuppositions, and method of existential theologizing, with critical consideration of some other contemporary theologies, and some applications to specific Christian teachings. The author, an Anglican priest, is Professor of Systematic Theology at Union Theological Seminary, New York.

The very possibility of theology, M. points out, demands that the word "God" be made meaningful. This is done, not by making God a particular entity among others that exist, but by recognizing in the encounter of faith that Being is gracious. This Being is transcendent as not identifiable with any particular being (not even an ens realissimum), but is also immanent as communicating itself in grace. The actual undertaking of theology must be directed to speaking intelligibly to men today about God.

Theology thus presupposes certain philosophical notions which can serve as the vehicle of its communication. In this, feelings are not to be neglected, for they have an intentional bearing upon the world and oneself. Feelings can, of course, be mistaken, but they should not be simply dismissed from theology. Heidegger’s analysis of death as man’s ultimate possibility yields two positive results for theology: death integrates human life beyond the succession of temporal relativities; and anxiety in the face of death can waken the sense of the wonder of Being. In the temporal process it is each man’s task to make himself; the soul or self is not a substantive thing given at the beginning. When we use the language of Being, this meaning is revealed not so much in statements about things as existing, as in contrast to nothing.

M. then illustrates the existential method in theology in five lucidly written essays. He explains Bultmann’s hermeneutic of demythologizing Scripture by using the “existentials” of Heidegger; this raises the question, which remains unanswered, as to the relative proportion of myth and objective fact in the Christian proclamation. Next he affirms the value of interpreting the myth, history, and dogma of the NT in terms of concrete human existence, though he acknowledges the importance of historical and ontological considerations. Then he shows how the Christian vocabulary of words like “sin,” “faith,” and “grace” can gain new vitality from existentialist words like “estrangement,” “commitment,” and “self-giving.” After this he investigates the “new quest” for the historical Jesus, and shows that the real possibilities of human existence are manifested in what was actually
realized in Jesus, even though a detailed, factual biography is not possible. Finally he deals with some differences in emphasis between himself and Schubert Ogden, and indicates some deficiencies he finds in Bultmann’s definition of “myth,” since it tends to exclude the fact that man’s faith-response is truly to the transcendent God and not just to immanent human values, as Bultmann himself recognizes.

A look at some other contemporary theologies leads M. to say that Braithwaite’s ethical interpretation of dogmatic statements is a new kind of demythologizing that implies more than a humanistic concern. He regards Teilhard de Chardin’s contribution not so much as saying something new as bringing together scientific knowledge and the religious values of our age. Karl Rahner is an example of a new vitality in Roman Catholic theology, employing existential considerations without destroying traditional formulations.

In the concluding section, dealing with some particular applications, M. shows how the patristic teaching of the atonement as Christ’s triumph over demons can be demythologized to mean our renunciation of what is opposed to God in order to share in the new life of openness to God and man. Death becomes a source of true life as Christian existence becomes a being-for-death in Christ, whose death was an affirmation of limitless saving love. The concluding essay, on the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, interprets these masterfully in an existential framework and shows the meaning of God, the Trinity, and grace in this context.

This book shows real promise for the further development of a contemporary Christian theology. Besides its imaginative use of existential modes of thought, it repeats often the dependence of these modes upon underlying ontological categories. However, the essays seem weakest when confronted with spelling out what these categories might be and how they are to be formulated and understood. To deny, for example, that God is a particular entity and to affirm that He is Being itself is certainly close to St. Thomas’ teaching that He is ipsum esse subsistens. But does M. mean this? In describing the need for the human person to create itself in time, M. seems to overlook the fact that this does not really eliminate the need for some kind of enduring subject in man, but simply defines its function more fully. Unity in man is both an initial given at one level and something to be achieved at another. The contemporary unquestioning acceptance of all angelology and demonology as “myth” seems closely linked with an unwillingness to speak unambiguously about the survival of the human self or soul beyond death; for once it is accepted that selfhood can endure without a body, the possibility of intellectual, free beings existing incorporeally from the beginning can-
not be a priori excluded. The evidence for the real intent of the teaching of Scripture and tradition in this regard should be more carefully weighed. The ontological question in Christology is likewise very obscure in these essays, though the Trinitarian interpretation of God as primordial Being, expressive Being, and unitive Being has much to recommend it. M. is definitely not the stereotyped "liberal" theologian, and his effort to interpret Christian theology is often compelling and rewarding; but he does not seem to have come to grips with the ontological and historical questions, which he acknowledges to be likewise important and fundamental.

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JOHN H. WRIGHT, S.J.


Those who remember the musky meandering of B.'s previous work on Sigmund Freud (Sigmund Freud and the Jewish Mystical Tradition, Princeton, 1958) will not be surprised at the style and content of the present volume. B. weaves a delicate web of slender threads, a gossamer network of fragile associations, which is charming to behold but to which one hesitates to commit oneself for fear that it will shatter under the weight.

The duality of existence is the duality of agency and communion. "Agency" is the modality of the living form as individual which manifests itself as self-protection, self-assertion, self-expansion, in the formation of separations, in isolation, alienation, and aloneness, in the urge to master, in repression. On the contrary, "communion" is the modality of participation in the larger whole which manifests itself in a sense of union, in the lack of separations, in contact, openness, and union, in noncontractual co-operation, in the lack of repression. As if this were not enough, the agentic also embraces the control of others, the deliberate channeling of activity, the accumulation of material goods, the high initiative and profound alienation which Max Weber identified in the spirit of Protestantism and capitalism. Under its aegis falls also scientism, Darwinism, masculine sexuality, libido, aggression, orgasm, cancer, and the death instinct. The figure of Satan is a projection of the agentic in personified form.

In the fabric of tenuous generalizations which compose the substance of this book, one could quibble with any one of a multitude of points. I will focus on one aspect because it is frequently misunderstood and because it has significant implications for understanding the psychology of religion. I refer to Freud's concept of the death instinct.
The death instinct is in many ways an enigmatic concept. To avoid unnecessary confusions, however, the concept must be seen in the context of its development. Freud arrived at the death instinct through a development of his instinct theory (cf. E. Bibring, "The Development and Problems of the Theory of the Instincts," International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 1941, p. 22). Instincts were regarded by Freud as forms of energy or stimulation which arose from the vital stratum of the mind. They were constant stimuli to the mind which arose from organic sources. Freud then distinguished two groups of instincts: the sexual and the ego instincts. The ego instincts embraced both libidinal and nonlibidinal components at this stage. The next important stage, one that is often not appreciated and is ignored in the present work, was the clarification of aggressive instincts and their inclusion under the ego instincts. The sexual and aggressive instincts were usually in conflict, but they could also be fused (sexual sadism). The next step was greatly assisted by Freud's arrival at a structural theory of the mind. Aggressive trends were no longer considered as part of the ego instincts, but could be located as independent instincts along with the sexual instincts in the vital stratum of the mind (id). The ego instincts operated in the more organized stratum of the mind and had self-preservative aims.

The difficulty arose with melancholic self-destructiveness. How can destructive impulses be directed against oneself? Freud was driven, both by his clinical experience and by his intellectual need, to find a hypothesis to parallel his already-established libido theory, to the consideration of primary self-destructive instincts. The problem of how to formulate this theoretically unavoidable but fundamentally repulsive notion was what led Freud to the death instinct.

The instincts of life and death are purely biological but are theoretically reflected in some manner in the mental sphere. They are generalized names for all libidinal phenomena on the one hand, and all aggressive phenomena on the other. But can we really point to any mental phenomenon which expresses the primary destructiveness of the death instinct? The primal instincts are something quite different from the concept of instincts as organic sources of energy. They are hypothetical constructs, postulated to fill a theoretical need. They are essentially directive principles which guide the life processes. The death instinct is a theoretically satisfying concept which unifies the understanding of destructive and aggressive tendencies. The abstract and indirect nature of the argument prevents us from finding any direct evidence to support it.

The present work makes many questionable assumptions and identifications in working the distinction of agency vs. communion into this scheme,
The entire argument dealing with cancer is unfortunate. Much is made, e.g., of ovariectomy in treatment of breast cancer, and castration plus estrogens in treatment of prostatic cancer. Estrogens are presumably anti-agentic chemicals. The use of androgens for breast cancer in premenopausal women is quickly dispatched, and the use of androgens in other life-threatening situations, e.g., treatment of aplastic anemia, is completely omitted. But then I suppose prostatic cancer may be agentic, while aplastic anemia is not.

Beyond the tissue of misunderstandings and improbabilities remains the basic distinction of agency and communion. It is difficult to discuss what the psychological relevance of agency and communion may be. The most useful key, I think, is the relation of agency to separation and repression, and the relation of communion to union and derepression or lack of repression. Psychological health lies in the direction of trying to mitigate agency with communion. If one casts the insight in terms of Freud's structural model, psychological functioning is improved by the integration of the intrapsychic institutions (id, ego, and superego). In man's most normal and mature state, their respective functions cannot be distinguished—communion prevails. When conflict arises, they become separated; repression and the other defenses of ego against id and superego are mobilized; agency is master of the field.

The consummate violation of man by the forces of agency is death. Not uncommonly, as in the present work, psychologists of religion find the source of religion in the fear of death. Death as a termination of vital functions is inescapable. There is another death which is the loss of meaning of life. Bakan writes: "The essential task of the religious enterprise is to face the actual termination of individual existence, on the one hand, and to create a transindividual ego identification, on the other. The recognition of the inexorable death of the individual need not demand anticipatory deference to it. And we can recognize that in the time before the inexorable death one can avoid that other death by allowing communion to function together with agency" (p. 234). I find myself compelled to object to this formulation. My objections are primarily religious and psychological.

The essential task of religious enterprise is not adequately described either in terms of facing the termination of individual existence or in terms of creating a transindividual ego identification. It must be said that this double objective would be acceptable to the majority of psychologists of religion. The reason is presumably that psychologists are concerned with psychology and are therefore largely concerned with religious motivation. Within this context it is perfectly legitimate to consider religion as a creative and restitutive effort of human beings to compensate for the dread of loss and abandon-
ing such mutual functioning. One does not use directive principles as instruments. If one achieves a measure of religious commitment and spiritual maturity, one thereby discovers the meaning of existence and in so doing, synchronously and not derivatively as it were, one will find agency and communion in some greater degree of complementation.

And so I must conclude that Dr. Bakan has provided us with a set of principles which deserve better treatment. They have suffered much in this book, but they have suffered nobly. But all of this only illustrates the basic problem, to which B. points quite accurately, when one tries to approach matters of ultimate concern from the perspective of preliminary concern.

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This little book appears to be an essay into scientific model-building in theology. The author calls it "an analogical approach to theological thinking." The analogy he uses is the essential process in healing by psychotherapy to provide a means of understanding the essence of atonement in Christ's redemption of mankind. Anyone familiar with model-building in science will appreciate B.'s undertaking. The endeavor succeeds well, considering that redemption is a mystery of revelation and how psychotherapy works is a mystery or at least a puzzle to psychologists, as Eysenck declared in the late fifties. The prime motive of B.'s study is the fact that at present many theological statements are being made which are based on "insights" drawn from psychology but governed by rather uncertain methodological principles. "It behooves us," he remarks, "to ask whether it can be done [B.'s emphasis] and if so, on what basis."

There are eight chapters and a postscript. The first chapter deals with previous essays along the same lines, viz., Howe and Williams, and their deficiencies. Then B. outlines the program of his study. "Our procedure will be simple: 1) Three theories of the atonement will be set forth. They will be representative of certain broad but diverse tendencies in the history of the development of this doctrine. 2) Certain broad issues that every mature theory of atonement feels compelled to address or answer will be isolated. 3) The nature of the therapeutic process will be discussed. 4) These elements will be generalized into a doctrine of atonement. 5) The formal adequacy of this clarifying analogy will be judged by determining its capacity to account for the issues. 6) A general discussion will be attempted between the clarifying analogy and the three representative theories." The program is an exten-
sive one. B. acknowledges that his study is more of an exercise than an explanation or exhaustive study and so limits himself to answering two questions: What is the possibility of informing atonement theory by a clarifying analogy derived from psychotherapy? What is an adequate doctrine of the nature of God upon which a theory of the atonement can be based?

The next three chapters discuss the three representative theories B. chooses following Aulen's categories: classic, Latin, and moral. The three theorists discussed are Irenaeus, Anselm, and Bushnell. Aulen's categories are a convenience rather than a guide for historical research. The selection of Bushnell as a representative of the moral view is based on Robert Paul's work *The Atonement and the Sacraments*.

The analysis of the three theories is systematic and well articulated and centers around four issues: the nature of God, His relationship to man and the order of the world, the event of Jesus Christ as effecting man's redemption, and the reality of redemption as effected by Christ's atonement. There can be no quarrel with B.'s systematization of the doctrine of the three theorists. What he is looking for is common elements as well as differences. The formal criteria he sets down for an adequate doctrine of the atonement biases his systematization without prejudice. These four formal criteria are: (1) The sufficient reason for atonement must rest in the nature of God. (2) Atonement must come in such a way as not to jeopardize God's basic order and structure of the world. (3) The event of Jesus Christ must add something new to effect man's redemption which is not otherwise available. (4) The atonement of Jesus Christ effects a real redemption. B. finds lacks in each of the theories. In Irenaeus, what is not clear is how the fact of Christ's victory over the devil is related to man's decision to actualize the freedom given to him in fact. In Anselm, what is not clear is how the objective fact of the removal of guilt in God's eyes enables man to accept subjectively the fact he is no longer guilty. In Bushnell, what is not clear is how man's subjective response to God's enduring love frees him from the organic forces of evil that imprison him. The needed clarification B. expects to find in the nature of the psychotherapeutic process.

The next four chapters look to psychotherapy for a clarifying analogy to fill these deficiencies. The discussion of the psychotherapeutic relation is centered around Roger's client-centered therapy. B. chooses this because it more than any other concerns itself with the essentials of psychic healing. In the theory and practice of Rogerian therapy one can find the point of contact with the four issues central to atonement theory. (1) The structure of the therapeutic relationship equals the essential structure of God viewed soteriologically. (2) The nature of human brokenness equals the nature of sin. (3)
The character of the therapeutic agent equals the person of Jesus Christ.

(4) The dynamic employment of the therapeutic relationship by the therapist equals the work of Jesus Christ.

There is no room here to discuss B.'s analysis of the theory of therapy. It moves steadily and plausibly in the direction of an analogy of proportionality between God's atonement and the essentials of psychic healing: unconditional acceptance. The systematization is ingenious and penetrating. The way all other theories of psychotherapy are brought into agreement with it is valid enough—the core of an effective therapeutic relationship is an unconditioned acceptance of the client regardless of the client's "conditions of worth."

That this analysis succeeds as a heuristic device to clarify the mystery of God's forgiveness of sin and Christ's passion and resurrection as atonement is not as clear. Among the methodological rules laid down by B. for arguing to an *analogia fidei*, the most important is that the argument proceed *a majore ad minus*. Human and created things are understood only in the light of God as known by faith. For B. as for Barth and Hartshorne, whom he uses as paradigms for his methodology, this light is found in the revelational experience of the individual. The dialogue between theology and psychotherapy, according to B., best proceeds from a synthesis of Barth's and Hartshorne's positions. If that is the case, then the real effects of grace in man are as integral to the understanding of atonement and redemption as are the effects of sin, whether known inside or outside the circle of faith.

Not enough is said about the state of man who is healed by grace, except for the broad view that he is saved who accepts his guiltlessness and freedom. B.'s clarifying analogy turns out to be not as powerful a heuristic device as he makes out—except that it leads him to kill the God of religion and from the corpse to raise a God of theism, as he says in his postscript. But that seems to reverse his argument. In psychotherapy the client heals himself; the therapist only sets optimal conditions. In atonement the sinner heals himself; God only sets the conditions by His enduring love—enduring in the sense of both continuous and suffering. So in the end we come to a paradox—and B.'s postscript is full of them, as are the last ten pages of chapter 6. A transcendent God who is immanent, a human God who is divine, a God with a strong weakness and a weak strength. One wonders whether B.'s postscript or the body of the book carries his real message.

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J. A. GASSON, S.J.

James Gustafson has said that Häring’s contribution to moral theology is his openness to the *NT* as providing the basic theological and spiritual ground for Christian morality, and that his basic difficulty is one of internal inconsistency. Others, especially those who are versed in or inclined to situationist theories, have commented that H. does not draw the logical conclusions of his newly-found biblical principles. For example, in the volume under review, H. states certain general attitudes towards ABC warfare, the lie, contraception, sterilization, and sexual abuse which would lead the reader to believe that there have to be new developments in the classic judgments on these issues. When even limited atomic warfare is condemned on the grounds that it will inevitably lead to larger warfare, we may expect H. to make stronger conclusions about our responsibility towards disarmament and the growing objective immorality of our present nuclear stance. When it is stated that couples should follow the directives of Pius XI and Pius XII about contraception “at least in normal situations,” we may expect that H. will explain on objective grounds how couples may act differently in situations which are not normal. When H. indicates that sexual abuse may not be a grave sin as frequently as moralists have supposed, the reader is left to wonder whether this judgment is based merely on new insights about subjective imputability or also signifies a changing attitude about what areas of grave matter are normally signs of basic rejection of God. Lastly, in spite of the many objections raised against our classic judgments about absolutes like the immorality of remarriage, the reader finds little new explanation of the objective and universal immorality of such actions.

On the other hand, in H.’s defense it must be said that if there is to be any reduction or expansion in the number or size of what moral theology has judged as absolutes, it can only be made possible on this condition: there must first arise new moral treatises like H.’s which will assume a more biblical and pastoral orientation. And even if there can be little change in classic judgments about absolutes, such an orientation will be welcomed by almost everyone. Now that this long-overdue translation of Vol. 3 has finally appeared in English, the reader can see for himself that even in very practical matters the present volume is a breed different than its precursors among the *Institutiones morales*. As H. strives to say something about human responsibilities, he describes them as realizations or mediations of the charity of the Lord Himself, and in this order: responsibilities in the family, the political community, and the Church, in marriage and virginity, in life and health, in the exchange of material goods, and in truth, beauty, fidelity, and communications.

Again, what is most significant about these treatises is not the detail of their moral judgments but the anthropological, biblical, and pastoral atti-
tudes behind them. While the present volume is substantially the same as
the original edition which appeared twelve long and very active theological
years ago, it is clearly a precursor of the themes of Vatican II. The pastoral
spirit of Pope John pervades its pages, and with that spirit arises new hope as
developments of doctrine now begin to reach the sphere of morality.

H. is fond of commenting that we shall be able to read the signs of the
times, we shall understand the breadth and the detail of our moral responsi-
bilities, if we will seek them not merely in the light of self-made kairotai (mo-
mments or opportunities of grace for persons and groups of persons), but in the
light of the Lord's own kairotai. Moral judgments cannot be made without
reference to contemporary cultural and scientific contributions and view-
points. In fact, cultural and scientific advances can themselves be signs of
the times. But they cannot be discerned by a moral theology which has not
listened to the word of God and is not filled with a spirit of prayer and a
sense of the real. It is only through a moral theology born from and steeped
in prayer that the Christian can be brought anew to the ultimate moral
response: "Father, not my will but thine be done." The reader may suspect
that it is this kind of prayer which is the moving spirit behind the present
volume.

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RODERICK HINDERY, O.S.B.

TOWARD A CHRISTIAN UNDERSTANDING OF THE HOMOSEXUAL. By H.

With laudable pastoral concern for the homosexual the author appeals to
Christian clergy and laity alike to seek a deeper understanding of this psy-
chological anomaly. Reviewing the familiar myths and prejudices about the
homosexual, as well as the allegations of police entrapment, Mr. Jones rightly
insists that church organizations work along with homophile groups to bring
about a larger measure of justice for the homosexual in opportunities of
employment and in fair treatment before the courts. He hopes that semi-
naries will provide clergy who will know how to cope with problems of homo-
sexuals. He describes some good work done by four organizations concerned
with the rights of the invert: the George W. Henry Foundation, the Council
on Religion and the Homosexual, the North American Conference on Church
credit to the work of Haddon and Cappon, both of whom report some meas-
ure of success in reorienting the sexual instincts by methods of group therapy,
he advises that some form of therapy is always helpful.

All these features render the book useful for someone who wants a quick
kind of digest of the problem; but for the individual already well read in the
field there is little new. The attempt, moreover, to construct an ethical argument in favor of private homosexual acts between consenting adults if their relationship is "responsible" and "fulfilling" is not convincing.

Following Thielicke (The Ethics of Sex, pp. 269-94), J. holds that almost all sexual acts, heterosexual as well as homosexual, have elements of lust and selfishness: "Due to man's sinful nature, lust and selfishness are never completely absent from coitus, and in most instances they are very much present. . . . Yet the inevitable presence of these factors within the sexual relationship does not make it impossible for a fulfilling, satisfying experience to result. Insofar as love and commitment are present, we expect the relationship to be fulfilling, knowing at the same time that it can never be completely selfless as long as we remain human.

"What does this mean for the homosexual? . . . It means that, given man's sinful nature, the primary problem in sex relationships is not sex within marriage versus sex outside of marriage, or sex within a heterosexual relationship versus sex within a homosexual relationship. The problem is rather sex as a depersonalizing force versus sex as the fulfillment of human relationship. Thus, the important question would appear to be whether or not it is possible for the homosexual to achieve a responsible, fulfilling relationship" (p. 98).

The author believes the Church must accept the homosexual in the situation in which he actually is, and allow him to decide whether he can work out an ethically responsible homosexual relationship. He is critical of Thielicke's "refusal" to draw the conclusion that the homosexual should have the possibility of ethically overt acts with another homosexual, but rather should sublimate his desires into other creative channels. But he does not hold with Robert Wood that the churches should celebrate "marriages" between homosexuals. Thus, he falls into the same inconsistency for which he criticizes Thielicke.

The fundamental weakness of J.'s argument is its failure to distinguish objective and subjective elements in the act of homosexuality. After casting a sort of fog over the whole question by the assertion that we are all sinners, he seeks justification for some acts of homosexuality in terms of possible human fulfillment. While such fulfilment cannot equal that between heterosexuals, it remains the best practical solution for the homosexual who wants a responsible relationship with another person. By the same kind of reasoning one could justify various other forms of sexual activity between heterosexuals who cannot get married but desire a responsible and fulfilling relationship. One may ask whether the expression of a sexual act is the only adequate way in which one may develop a responsible relationship; whether
society can afford to maintain that "the primary problem in sex relationships is not sex within marriage versus outside of marriage"; and whether it is necessary to integrate the objective finality of human sexuality with the subjective intentions of the individuals who want to express a sexual act.

Another weakness in J.'s argument is his assertion that a mature homosexual relationship can be relatively creative, but remain an unnatural expression of sexuality, falling short of the will of God. Can it be all this and not sinful? He seems at the point of changing his mind when he adds that this relationship "is doomed, by its very nature, to never pass beyond a certain point" (p. 109). Two homosexuals cannot complement one another in the same way as male and female can, and they cannot have children. One wonders why J. develops such tortuous reasoning while neglecting two facts, namely, that enduring and fulfilling homosexual relationships are not the usual data of students of the subject, and that sublimation of sexual desires, though difficult, is practical and desirable.

The recent CBS Television Report "The Homosexuals" (March 7, 1967) stressed the narcissistic and promiscuous nature of most homosexual relationships. The assumption that sublimation is impractical, if not impossible, is based upon the fallacy that there is only one kind of sublimation, a sick kind, in which the drive of sexuality moves in a disguised fashion "onto a new and higher plane of operation and object" (W. Lynch, *Images of Hope*, p. 120). Fr. Lynch describes another kind of sublimation: "It is a free, generalized energy or love or capacity for wishing that may be sexual, cultural, spiritual, friendly, interested, wishing, planning, according to all the needs and realities of human life. Where it is free and adaptive, it can be sexualized or desexualized according to the wishes and decisions of conscious human beings. Where it is fixated in sexuality, or rather in an inappropriate sexuality, it has become univocal in my sense of the word" (*ibid.*, p. 120). Surely the Christian homosexual who learns how to sublimate his sexual drives with the help of competent counselors has a much better chance for genuine fulfillment than the promiscuous or one-love homosexual. The reviewer has counseled homosexuals who reflect healthy sublimation.

Other weak points: J. fails to take into account in his discussion of the prevention of homosexuality the importance of preschool roughhouse play as a means of identification for the male. His interpretation of Rom 1:27 is gratuitous (p. 70). The weight of scriptural teaching on homosexuality is forgotten in his attempt to justify, however qualifiedly, some homosexual relationships. Finally, his analysis of the homophile movement needs
seasoning with sophisticated criticism. Where this book reviews movements and opinions, it is useful; where it theologizes, it is less than satisfactory.

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This astonishing series continues to come off the press with regularity. What is astonishing about it is not its scope (though that is impressive enough), but rather the calm competence with which the author treats each figure in the tortuous history of philosophic thought. Throughout the entire series, C.'s procedure is to give first a brief biography of the philosopher under consideration, then a lucid exposition of the principal phases of his thought; there is then (sometimes but not always) a brief critique. The expositions are almost universally good, but the occasional critiques are even better, since C. accomplishes the difficult task of evaluating the philosopher on the latter's own grounds, pointing out both successes and failures, importance and inconsistencies. This reviewer has often been repelled by attempts at critique by other historians, since they infrequently meet the philosopher on his own ground but rather set out their evaluation on the historian's, not the philosopher's, presuppositions. This is a fault, however, that one simply does not meet in Copleston. The biographies are usually functional as well as factual: C. selects his details with a view to showing how events in his subjects' lives influenced the development of their philosophies, and vice versa.

The present volume covers English and American philosophers from the inception of the Utilitarian Movement down to the flowering of the Analytical School. Thus it treats of the years 1748 (the birth of Jeremy Bentham) down to the present (in the person of the still-voluble Bertrand Russell), covering, as it goes, British Empiricism, Idealism in England and in America, Pragmatism, the Realistic revolt against Idealism, and Analysis. Taken as a whole, this is a difficult period to handle, in a sense, since it involves a large number of relatively minor figures and only a few of major importance. You do have such men as J. S. Mill, Spencer, Bradley, Bosanquet, Royce, Peirce, James, Dewey, Moore, and Russell, all of whom are of considerable stature. You also have a plethora of philosophic unknowns, not particularly important in themselves but of whom account must be taken insofar as they contributed to one or other movement. To give an adequate account of such figures, without at the same time losing the reader in a welter of
detail, is no easy task. But it is a task that C. handles with his usual aplomb, treating briefly of some forty of them in the course of the book.

It is possible to quarrel somewhat with C.'s parceling out of available space. His explanation for omitting a detailed consideration of Wittgenstein from this volume is acceptable enough: Wittgenstein has an emphasis on language and a revolutionary concept of the nature and scope of philosophy that rather makes him a maverick to this period; to consider him in extenso would interrupt the development that C. is tracing at this point. But this reviewer was distressed at seeing Whitehead accorded only two pages. C. comments that although Whitehead's philosophy certainly qualifies for consideration in this volume, it is far too complicated to summarize in a few paragraphs (p. 400). True enough; but one wishes that C. had summarized it anyway, taking as many paragraphs as he needed. Possibly the space accorded Russell (three chapters) could have been pared down to allow for this.

By way of an appendix, the volume contains a sympathetic and penetrating section on the thought of John Henry Newman, which, though defying classification into one or other ism, C. feels cannot for that reason be omitted from any treatment of this period of philosophic thought. An epilogue of some fifteen pages offers some preliminary thoughts on Wittgenstein. The book concludes with a twenty-six-page bibliography, arranged according to schools and major figures; this is followed by a rather thorough index.

C. remarks in his preface that it would be natural to devote a further volume to nineteenth-century Continental thought, but that he hopes rather to postpone this in favor of a book on the philosophy of the history of philosophy or a general reflection on the development of philosophic thought and on its implications (p. x). The latter is a project which he ought to be eminently qualified to undertake, and historians of philosophy will await the results eagerly. They will also, however, await with equal eagerness the volume on Continental thought, as also an eventual revision of C.'s first volume, on the philosophies of Greece and Rome. The latter volume is generally recognized as being the weakest in this monumental series, which is likely to be the definitive English work in the field for many years to come.

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SHORTER NOTICES

THE HISTORY AND RELIGION OF ISRAEL. By G. W. Anderson. Oxford Univ. Press, 1966. Pp. x + 210. $3.75. This little volume from the pen of the present Professor of Old Testament Literature and Theology of the University of Edinburgh for the Clarendon Bible Series in place of W. L. Wardle's contribution to the preceding series is a good and very readable summary of the light shed by modern biblical scholarship and the most recent archeological discoveries on the history and religion of Israel from the time of the patriarchs until the Maccabean era. While accepting in principle the documentary hypothesis still adhered to by the overwhelming majority of critical students of the Bible in our day, A. advises caution in the application of this theory on the ground that the traditions recorded are apt to be much older than the time when they were committed to writing. While, e.g., he would not consider Moses, whom he regards as the founder of Israel's religion and not as some mythical figure that never really existed, "a monotheist in the abstract sense of the term" (p. 34), he feels that there is justification "for the claim that the Mosaic faith exemplifies a practical or incipient monotheism." So far as the Ten Commandments are concerned, it seems to him "not unreasonable to suppose that in a terser form they are of Mosaic origin" (p. 37). A. indicates broadly how history influenced the development of the religion of Israel, the theology and institutions of which, like the Sabbath, were quite unique. He concludes that the two chief factors that maintained the distinctiveness and cohesiveness of Jews as a religious community in the Dispersion, which began after the destruction of the first Temple of Jerusalem and the liquidation by the Babylonians of the Kingdom of Judah, were the Scriptures and the Synagogue (p. 176).

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Samuel Rosenblatt

JUDAISM IN A CHRISTIAN WORLD. By Robert Gordis. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966. Pp. xxxix + 253. $6.50. By his evocative thinking, G. illuminates for an ecumenical age the basic problems and hopes of Jews in our contemporary society. He is firmly convinced that the Judeo-Christian tradition, far from being a myth, is a historically provable fact. Hence he is not afraid to examine the sources, internal and external, which could currently undermine the structure of Jewish life. Jews the world over, no matter what their temporal situation, will retain their self-identity only insofar as they consciously accept themselves as a unique people. In our Western civilization, still nominally Christian, such acceptance of necessity implies that this particular religio-cultural-ethnic group must continually resist the temptation on the one hand to religious indifference and on the other hand
to religious separatism. The price of this resistance, costly though it is, will produce in the future what it has produced in the past, "integration without assimilation and acculturation without absorption." If the categorical imperative within the Jewish community today is a rethinking of its theological stance, no less important now for Jewish survival is Christendom's attempt to understand its endemic relationship with the chosen people. The recognition of the bonds uniting Jews and Christians requires an in-depth study of biblical and rabbinic Judaism. Anyone who reads G.'s significant book will come to the conclusion that "while each component has its own individuality, there are fundamental elements they hold in common." In this period of crisis, humanity needs our combined efforts to overcome its lack of spiritual vitality. Scholars like G. demonstrate how, by deepening our union among ourselves, we can enrich the world at large.

Maryville College, St. Louis  Katharine Hargrove, R.S.C.J.

The Mystery of Jesus. By Pierre R. Bernard, O.P. Translated by Francis V. Manning. 2 vols. Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba, 1966. Pp. 507, 544. $15.00. B. with loving care gathers together the four accounts of Jesus' life and meditates on every word, every nuance of a word, comparing and contrasting particularly the ways the Synoptics describe the same scene. His aim is to pierce, if only a little, the mystery of our Lord's personality. His erudition is great, if on the conservative side. He puts up, e.g., a good case for the thesis that the three Marys were Mary Magdalene. He does not envisage the possibility that the Last Supper was a day or two earlier than is usually supposed. The Qumran documents play no part in his exposition either of the Supper or of the life of the Baptist. Midrash has little scope in his interpretation of the Infancy chapters. He does not even mention the possibility of a growth of knowledge in Christ's human mind, and seems to accept the medieval doctrine that He had the beatific vision from the first moment of His existence. For all its reverence and insights, the book is maimed by a hurried translation (cf., e.g., 1, 250–51).

St. Louis Priory, St. Louis  Columba Cary-Elwes, O.S.B.

The Collection: A Study in Paul's Strategy. By Keith F. Nickle. Naperville, Ill.: Allenson, 1966. Pp. 176. $3.75. The dissertation by which Nickle earned his doctoral degree at the University of Basel. A Presbyterian minister with several years of experience in the pastoral ministry, N. pursued his graduate studies under such scholars as Karl Barth, Walter Eichrodt, and Oscar Cullmann. The latter's interest in and outlook on Christian unity cast a strong light on N.'s author's choice and develop-
ment of his thesis. The work is a fine specimen of careful investigation, good method, and close reasoning. This reviewer agrees heartily with N. that the establishment of good chronology for the events of Gal 2:1–10 as compared with Paul’s visits to Jerusalem recounted in Acts is very important. By the same token he disagrees in the solution adopted, and consequently also with the time and the role of the Jerusalem Council (Acts 15) in Paul’s missionary work. N. is to be especially commended for the insight he offers into the theological connotations he reads into Paul’s collection for the Jerusalem Christians. Paul’s triple concern for exemplifying Christian charity, promoting Christian unity, and hastening Christ’s second coming by urging the conversion of Israel is well substantiated by rigorous cross examination of the biblical texts. The book is supplemented by a double index, one of authors, one of biblical references.

_Crosier House of Studies, Fort Wayne_  
_Martin W. Schoenberg, O.S.C._

**CREEDS, COUNCILS AND CONTROVERSIES: DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH A.D. 337–461.** Edited by J. Stevenson. New York: Seabury, 1966. Pp. xix + 390. $9.00. This volume, a continuation of the same editor’s _A New Eusebius_ (reviewed in _TS_ 19 [1958] 300), is based on the second volume of B. J. Kidd’s _Documents Illustrative of the History of the Church_. Kidd’s 238 texts covered the period from 313 to the Council of Orange in 529. The 236 passages in S.’s present work extend from Constantine’s death in 337 to the death of Leo the Great in 461. S. has put slightly more emphasis on Church-state relations than did Kidd, perhaps owing to the publication of Clyde Pharr’s English translation of the Theodosian Code. Every student of early Church history could afford to have his own copy of Kidd’s second volume, which cost only ten shillings. Unfortunately, the price of S.’s present work will be prohibitive for many—a pity, since it is the sort of book which should be read at leisure and returned to again and again. The chronological tables alone should always be at hand for ready reference. Some day _A New Eusebius_ and _Creeds, Councils and Controversies_ should appear in a moderately priced paperback edition for students. The study of early Church history deserves at least this much encouragement from the publishers.

_Woodstock College_  
_Robert E. Carter, S.J._

**DAS LEBEN DES HEILIGEN JOHANNES CHRYSOSTOMUS.** Edited and translated by Lothar Schläpfer, O.F.M.Cap. Introduction by Walter Nigg. Düsseldorf: Patmos, 1966. Pp. 240. The importance of this volume is that it contains the first complete German translation of Palladius’
Dialogue on the Life of St. John Chrysostom (Moore’s English translation appeared in 1921). The introductory material, intended for a popular audience, is stronger on piety than on Wissenschaft. The authors have used Coleman-Norton’s edition of Palladius’ Dialogue, but otherwise have remained innocent of non-German scholarship—and of some important German scholarship as well. Generally they have followed Baur’s life of Chrysostom (Munich, 1929–30) uncritically. Thus, e.g., in the Zeittafel (p. 49) Chrysostom is made a student of Bishop Meletius during the years 372–75, a time when in fact Meletius was in exile far from Antioch. The translation of chap. 5 of the Dialogue and the accompanying notes accept Baur’s interpretation with no indication of the extensive discussion in German, English, and French of this crucial passage. Even a general reader may be confused by the unexplained shift of Chrysostom’s birthplace from Tarsus (p. 10) to Antioch (p. 49). Having Moore’s translation, readers of English will probably never need to consult this book.

Woodstock College

ST. JÉRÔME ET L’ÉGLISE. By Yvon Bodin. Paris: Beauchesne, 1966. Pp. 382. In his brochure The Church after the Council, Karl Rahner cautions that today’s theologian should not attempt to demonstrate his scholarship by writing books that no one but his colleagues and successors would read on topics of no abiding significance to anyone but himself. It is a harsh thing to have to say, but B.’s book on Jerome’s ecclesiology might well have benefited from this observation before he set himself to the immense labor involved in this detailed compilation. With apparently taxative cross references, he outlines Jerome’s every reference to the typology of the Church, and then his ecclesiology. The latter is divided into two sections: the growth of the Church, and the ecclesial institution. But the integrated information is far from worth the effort, for as B. admits in his general conclusion: “There is no question of composing a tract De ecclesia with the aid of Jerome’s texts. Such a project would be open to great errors of perspective. For Jerome is no theologian . . . .” On the nature of the Church and its mission, Jerome was simply a great compiler, and thus witnesses to the traditions set by his predecessors, mainly Origen and Eusebius of Caesarea. The material collected here could have been neatly analyzed in a medium-sized essay instead of occupying 382 pages of closely-packed, repetitious detail. The bibliography is strictly of French vintage, with two or three German items mentioned mainly in translation—nothing in English.

Academia Alfonsiana, Rome

Francis X. Murphy, C.SS.R.
FORERUNNERS OF THE REFORMATION: THE SHAPE OF LATE MEDIEVAL THOUGHT ILLUSTRATED BY KEY DOCUMENTS. By Heiko Augustinus Oberman; translations by Paul L. Nyhus. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966. Pp. x + 333. $7.95. Translated selections from various late-medieval theologians, to illustrate for college and university students aspects of the theological movements of the fourteenth, fifteenth, and early sixteenth centuries. Since many—on both the Catholic and Protestant sides—have, in the author's view, exaggerated the discontinuity between the late-medieval period and the sixteenth century, the theologians are presented as participants in an ongoing dialogue which is continued into the sixteenth century. Accordingly, the selections generally represent opposed points of view on the same question. In speaking of forerunners, Oberman does not mean thinkers who taught doctrines pointing beyond themselves; the classification is based rather on the similarity of questions asked than of answers given. O. regards Luther's break with Rome not as a Reformation to which the Counter Reformation was a reaction, but both Reformations—somewhat after the manner of the old view of the Church of Cain and the Church of Abel—as continuations of movements within the late-medieval period. The selections are arranged under five headings: (1) Scripture and tradition: John Brexicoxa (+1423), and an exchange of letters between Jacob Hoeck and Wessel Gansfort; (2) predestination and justification: Holcot and Bradwardine, Biel and von Staupitz; (3) Church: Huss and Pius II; (4) Eucharist: Cajetan, Prierias, Cornelisz Hoen (+1524); (5) exegesis: Faber Stapulensis, Erasmus. The introductions are meant to give the setting for the selections, but are often imprecise and unclear. The translations are quite readable, but must be used with great caution; the translation, e.g., of merilum de condigno and meritum de congruo as full and partial merit (p. 143) betrays a complete misunderstanding of the Scholastic doctrine.

Freiburg i. Br. Charles H. Lohr, S.J.

ORTHODOXY AND CATHOLICITY. By John Meyendorff. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1966. Pp. vi + 180. $4.50 A collection of articles that have appeared in various journals. The level of the chapters is consequently uneven. Some are popular studies, others more technical; but almost all deal with common ecumenical problems. M.'s views, always forcefully enunciated and stimulating, provide an interesting sampling of modern Orthodox opinion on many areas of the Catholic-Orthodox dialogue. However, the book is not without its defects. At times M. uses rhetorical emphasis to
bolster assertions that are not so "self-evident" to his reader. An occasional use of emotional language (e.g., p. 32), or the offensive reference to the Council's sincere expressions of esteem for the Eastern rites as "patronizing" (p. 171), does not agree with the book's ecumenical tone. Chap. 1 is well done, but M.'s view of the "universal" ecclesiology of Rome is somewhat distorted. Catholics do not hold the local church to be a "part" of the Church in the sense in which M. uses these terms, i.e., as not containing the whole reality which is the Church, but only a "part" of it. The summary of Church history in chap. 2 is superficial and at times misleading. E.g., M. states that there are no exempt religious in the East, for this would injure the sacramental unity of the Church (p. 45). But the stavropegic monasteries of the East amount to the same thing, at least as far as M.'s argument is concerned. Also, the case of Pope Honorius (p. 30) is no threat to Catholic ecclesiology. Chap. 3 is especially good, and its conclusion provides a basis for dialogue on the role of Peter in the Church today. Chap. 4 gives a good summary of reunion attempts. But in chap. 5 one is surprised to see M. state so clearly that reunion can only be realized in the Orthodox faith (p. 102). This sounds like the calls to "return" that arouse Orthodox ire when uttered by Rome. In chap. 6 M. faces up frankly to certain problems of Orthodoxy in the diaspora. Catholics might well ponder the remarks on pp. 115–16 with respect to their own multiplication of ritual bishops in certain areas. Chap. 7, on the Reformation, is well written and interesting, but something of a tour de force. Augustine is unfairly treated, and M. seems to lack a sympathetic and irenic understanding of certain aspects of Catholic theology. The final chapter, on Vatican II, is one of the best and should be studied by Orthodox and Catholics alike. It is to be hoped that the Orthodox will soon give us an adequate study of their ecclesiology. One hears much about the "eucharistic" ecclesiology of Afanassiev. But one sees no advance, no attempt to pursue in detail this recent formulation and test it against the whole of tradition. It is altogether too comfortable to explain the past in the light of one's present point of view, and to explain as regrettable Western influence whatever in other Orthodox ecclesiologies does not agree with this contemporary insight. In spite of these few faults, the reader will find this book refreshing and stimulating.

Pontifical Russian College, Rome

Robert F. Taft, S.J.

THEOLOGIA DOGMATICA 1. By Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1966. Pp. 924. $7.00. The distinguished author of fifteen tomes on sacramental theology now presents the first of four volumes that will cover the entire seminary course of dogmatic...
theology. It is divided into four sections: the nature and history of theology (92 pp.), revelation (306 pp.), the loci theologicorum (145 pp.), God's existence, essence, and attributes (348 pp.). The treatise De ecclesia will be expounded dogmatically and in its logical position after De Verbo (Vol. 3). An analytical index of subjects and authors (31 pp.) completes the book. It contains much more than the average manual. Consequently, the less talented student is expected to learn only the matter presented in the largest print, whereas the more gifted will find a vast amount of related matter in three types of smaller size. Each section is divided into Articles, Questions, and Assertions. Despite its systematic arrangement, the book reads like a series of condensed essays, many of which are followed by summaristic tables. Objections, e.g., are not listed en bloc, but are answered as they arise. Extensive bibliographies of books and articles in several languages are provided throughout and are up to date, including references to Vatican II. D. is a master at condensing without oversimplifying, e.g., in his treatment (pp. 429–32) of whether any revealed truths are found solely in tradition. He is clear without being shallow. A skilled Thomist, he inveighs against certain kinds of modern philosophy, e.g., existentialism (pp. 605–6, 611–12). He assimilates the legitimate requirements of current theology but does not hesitate to point out the flaws of some theories. This easy-to-read volume, especially by the vastness of its bibliographies, supplies an argument for seminary textbooks, but at the same time reveals that only a master of all dogma can write a superior manual.

St. Mary's College, Kansas

C. McAuliffe, S.J.

An Existential Approach to Theology. By G. M. A. Jansen, O.P. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1966. Pp. xii + 128. $3.95. This brief, popular, and eminently practical book attempts, and generally with excellent success, to present a synthetic treatment of Christian theology in personalist and existentialist categories. It can be highly recommended to religious educators who are anxious to make acquaintance with the "new" theology but lack the time or background to study the first-rank theologians of this school. Even those familiar with its contents can learn much from J.'s simplicity of expression and attractive presentation. The book bears the earmarks of its origins. For thirteen years, J., a Belgian missionary in South Africa, has been authoring and editing a correspondence course in theology for fellow missionaries. With the growing conviction that his earlier presentations in the traditional terms of Scholastic theology were failing to meet the needs of his readers, J. began in 1964 to develop his "existential approach to theology." The present volume is a revised compilation of some of these
lectures. Its heart is the third chapter: with acknowledged indebtedness to Schillebeeckx, J. develops the central message of Christianity, the Incarnation, under five headings: (1) the hypostatic union; (2) the mystery of the Trinity; (3) the humanity of Christ; (4) salvation, predestination, and reprobation; (5) Christ in the Church. The first two chapters prepare the ground for this Christology by synthesizing a philosophical anthropology drawn from Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger. The final chapter treats the virtue of charity (with some good material on the progressive stages of prayer), while the Epilogue provides an admirable treatment of ecumenism in the spirit of Vatican II. Throughout, J. displays solid familiarity with the best in current theology: grace as personal union, the "inliving of God"; the hypostatic union as the highest perfection of humanity; Christ's 

*L. intima* through self-consciousness, etc. We look forward to seeing a fuller treatment of a greater range of topics from an author whose initial effort is worthy of warm welcome.

*Loyola College, Baltimore*  

*James L. Connor, S.J.*


H. teaches systematic theology at Duke University Divinity School. This is his first book. In his preface, H. explains its purpose: "The book attempts to give an overview of the present debate in Protestant theology, focusing on the new quest of God. Theological issues of the new quest of the historical Jesus and the new hermeneutic, and ethical queries of the new morality and the secular city are viewed as integrally related to the new focus." Concerned primarily with views about God expressed by Protestant thinkers since 1960, H. evaluates the positions of such men as Langdon Gilkey, Gerhard Ebeling, Helmut Gollwitzer, Paul van Buren, Ernst Fuchs, and many others. He also takes the opportunity to express his own position. He speaks of man's encounter with being. "The encounter with being raises the problem of articulation. Does being mean anything? ... Contemporary man is not sure. Thus we spoke of the ontological aporia. With the aporia in mind we turned to Jesus' history. Historical reflection as such, however, does not answer man's ontological aporia. The New Testament witness to Jesus' history seems to face the very same difficulty. But in the witness we also discover a creative word that overcomes man's puzzlement: God is love, costly love. This love gives meaning to being and to the religious word for being, the word 'God'" (p. 132). In the judgment of this reviewer, H. has achieved the purpose for which he wrote.

*Mt. St. Mary's Seminary, Norwood, Ohio*  

*Edward J. Gratsch*
THE EXPERIENCE OF FAITH: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE BIBLICO-THEOLOGICAL DIALOGUE. By Ingo Hermann. Translated by Daniel Coogan. New York: Kenedy, 1966. Pp. vii + 119. $3.95. In this brief study of the biblical understanding of faith, H. is concerned to show that faith is rightly understood as an “existential experiment.” The starting point of this experiment is the apostolic preaching or testimony in which Jesus is proclaimed and made present as Lord and Christ. In accepting this testimony, the believer does not merely affirm the truth of what is preached but also, and much more importantly, accepts the exalted Christ as his own Lord and “plans his own future on the basis of God’s ‘trustworthiness’” (p. 45). This initial acceptance of Christ as Lord is, however, only a first step towards the fulness of faith. As the beginning of a new existence, faith is not a decision which can be made once and for all but must be lived out in time. It is an “experiment,” not in the sense that the believer sets out to test impartially the truth he affirms, but rather in the sense that he consents to test and verify in his own life the truth he has confidently received. To this extent faith is a “hazardous enterprise,” uncertain and subject to the crises and growth characteristic of all interpersonal commitments. For all its unrest, faith does, however, become knowledge insofar as the believer comes to “abide in Christ” and thus to know as his own the truth he has received. Much that is said here is not really new. Some of it, at least in translation, is quite unclear (cf., e.g., p. 77: “‘Consistent with reason,’ however, does not mean simply reasonable, as, say, in the sense that the contents of belief of ratio are reasonable [discerning].”). At many points H. merely suggests a line of thought without really developing it. His suggestions are, however, good ones and should prove useful to anyone trying to correct an overintellectualistic understanding of faith. He is especially good in showing the “unfinished” character of faith and in stressing the time needed to move through the various stages of faith. In his dialogue with Bultmann, he is quite successful in locating the objective character of faith within the context of a personally significant commitment. His brief comments on Buber’s Two Types of Faith (pp. 61–70) are excellent. This is, in short, a good book which needs to be expanded and developed.

Woodstock College

John W. Healey, S.J.

THE CHANGING CHURCH. By Bertrand van Bilsen, O.F.M., Adapted by Henry J. Koren, C.S.Sp. Duquesne Studies, Theological Series 6. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1966. Pp. 440. $7.95. Attempts “to present a synthesis of the manifold changes that are taking place in the Church, to place them in their historical context and to analyze their bearing on the
future." A rather bold project, and the attempt is not entirely successful. So many books are in print treating specific areas of change and commenting on various documents of Vatican II that the forest is lost for the trees; but putting all the trees together does not help the situation. Too much is attempted, with the result that almost all possible topics are mentioned, some being overdeveloped, others acutely underdeveloped. The historical introductions are both too brief for the better-informed reader and not very helpful to the uninformed; see, e.g., in the treatment of pastoral theology, details that can be of no interest or significance to the average lay reader. The original edition appeared on the eve of Vatican II, and though the author manifests great prophetic insight into the decisions of the Council, the over-all perspective of the book is clearly not post-Vatican II. The editor's critical judgment regarding both points of emphasis and the inserting of Council decisions is good but many sections still give the impression of saying what everyone has heard so many times. The basic outline in development is not evident and one topic leads to another more often by "thought association" than by any clear, logical connection. This is not to deny all value to the book. Some sections (chap. 1, e.g., on the Catholic reformation) are quite good, and there are a few other bright spots; but as a general synthesis the book lacks the clear, logical topical structure, the detailed index, and the full summary of Vatican II positions that would make it truly useful.

Rathfarnham Castle, Dublin

Louis Lambert, S.J.

THE CHURCH RENEWED. By Peter J. Riga. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1966. Pp. x + 246. $5.50. R., now professor of theology at St. Mary's College, Oakland, California, presents here some reflections on Vatican II's Lumen gentium (Dogmatic Constitution on the Church). Possibly as much as one third of the book is actual quotation from the conciliar text itself. Chap. 7, "Authority, Dialogue and the Life of the Church" (pp. 177-231), appeared in an earlier form in Thought, Summer, 1966. Short bibliographies, four to seven entries, to current and easily available literature follow each chapter. There is an appendix with the Constitution's "Explanatory Note" (with commentary), a subject index, a name index, and an index to the quoted passages of the Constitution as they are found in the book. Intended for the average Catholic, the book is not a complete commentary on the document, but a general guide, with R. interspersing various elaborations of his own suggested by the themes. R. shows special interest in issues with which he is known to have concerned himself elsewhere: poverty, dialogue, ecumenism.

Corpus Instrumentorum, Wash., D.C.

Earl A. Weis, S.J.
THE CHURCH IN THE NEXT DECADE. By Eugene Carson Blake. New York: Macmillan, 1966. Pp. viii + 152. $4.95. It seems obvious enough that this collection of essays, articles, and sermons has been published because their author has recently been chosen as general secretary of the World Council of Churches. These twenty-four pieces, mostly from the sixties but from as far back as the late forties, are grouped under three general headings, beginning with four background pieces on B.'s understanding of the Christian faith and the task of the Church. The second and largest section deals with specific problems which B. considers the great challenges in the world to any Christian group in our time: race, poverty, and peace. The final section presents a vision of where the Church is moving and should be moving in this ecumenical age. What kind of man does this collection reveal? First, not a man to waste words. He is a "no-nonsense" type who gets to the point immediately and seems most at home when dealing with practical issues. It is a practicality, however, which is always driven by Christian idealism in the best sense. He shows a courageous passion for making the gospel of love live in a world where racial hatred, international injustice, and callous indifference to war become daily more intolerable. The Christian who thinks of the Church primarily as a dispenser of soothing comfort to the individual can hardly help being disturbed to discover what kind of man has been chosen to the most influential post in the WCC. But those who find themselves in sympathy with the general line taken by last summer's Geneva Conference on Church and Society and Vatican II's Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World will recognize in B. a kindred spirit.

Alma College

Daniel J. O'Hanlon, S.J.

THE ANONYMOUS CHRISTIAN. By Anita Röper. Translated by Joseph Donceel, S.J. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1966. Pp. vii + 179. $4.50. R.'s book is remarkable on two counts: it offers a fresh, personal, yet faithful synthesis of Karl Rahner's treatment of the anonymous Christian, as well as an afterword by Klaus Riesenhuber, S.J., which contains theological precisions and bibliographical data that handsomely complement R.'s effort. Especially noteworthy is R.'s explanation of subjective implication (Rahner's "horizon-consciousness"); her treatment combines philosophical sensitivity with a fine use of examples. The chapters dealing with Being and Mystery as subjective implications of man's self-transcendence provide the basis for her analysis of faith as possibility and achievement. R. sees faith as a supernatural act occurring whenever a man consents to his own life in all its unforeseeable ramifications. The supernatural character of such a resolve is due to the fact that it is a real, if explicitly unrecognized, response to God's offer of His own
infinite reality; such an act, if it is to be at all, must be God’s gift as well as man’s achievement. According to R., all men can be called Christians and believers, even if they have explicitly or implicitly rejected God’s self-offer. It would seem that R. wishes to use the term “faith” analogously, so that it can be applied to man as modified by the supernatural existential as well as to the man of living faith. Recently, Rahner himself wrote: “And there is no man who is not already in some way or other a Christian in that reality which precedes his freedom and with which he can never quite catch up—which can never be utterly destroyed by this finite freedom” (Theological Investigations 5, 20). Yet when R. maintains that the rejection of one’s anonymous Christianity “is done in connection with, or by virtue of the thing that is rejected” (p. 128), the phrase “in virtue of” is ambiguous at best. But this is indeed a minor defect when viewed against the background of R.’s accomplishment. The translation is excellent because it is just that; one always has the impression that he is reading English and not decoded German.

Woodstock College

THE CHRISTIAN AGNOSTIC. By Leslie D. Weatherhead. Nashville: Abingdon, 1965. Pp. 368. $4.75. This is something of a plain man’s Honest to God. W.’s “Christian agnostic” is an intelligent layman “who is immensely attracted to Christ” but cannot “sign on the dotted line that he believes certain theological ideas about which some branches of the Church dogmatize” (p. 15). W. himself is passionately convinced that “Christianity is a way of life, not a theological system with which one must be in intellectual agreement.” He therefore suggests that his Christian agnostic be less concerned about creeds and more faithful to what he finds in the fellowship of Christian experience. What he finds baffling or meaningless he puts “into an imaginary drawer to be labeled ‘Awaiting Further Light.’ ” Into this drawer go a good number of traditional Christian doctrines, including of course the Virgin Birth, physical resurrection, infallible Scriptures, the possibility of eternal punishment, and the personality of the Holy Spirit. Theologians will find themselves objecting again and again that W. does not really give theology a chance. On the other hand, W. himself is more than impatient with the “mental reservations” and misleading language which theologians use to defend ancient doctrines. Under these circumstances, dialogue with W. and his fellow agnostics might prove to be a difficult undertaking but one which would be in its own way profitable for all concerned.

Woodstock College

O.P. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966. Pp. 212. $4.95. **The Hungry Generation.** By John A. Hardon, S.J. Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1967. Pp. 345. $5.75. These three books are a good indication of the contemporary concern with the religious situation on the American campus. K., chaplain to the Catholic students at Wayne State University, has written a highly compassionate description of the questions and anxieties of the Catholic student on the secular campus. Separate chapters deal with the way students approach the problem of God, handle their moral dilemmas, and worry about the institutional Church. While not even pretending to answer all these variegated challenges, K. does manage to show his approaches to the problems and insight into the anxieties and doubts that his charges express. This book could be recommended for a broad impressionistic view of the Church on the campus. B’s book would seem a logical sequel to K’s. In *God on the Secular Campus* (cf. TS 25 [1964] 125-29) B. wrote about the student and his environment; here he desires to write a book “for them, about the personal problems (psychological and social, religious and moral) which especially concern them and prompt their inquiries and discussions” (p. 11). The work is only a partial success. B. rightly recognizes the problems; his chapters deal with the search for the self, the search for God, personal morality, sexuality, Christian origins, and individual freedom. However, this far-ranging commentary is precisely the source of the book’s greatest weakness. Each question is so pressing and so real for the modern student that a “package approach” is more likely to repel than to persuade. One of the most common complaints of those on the campus is that the Church tends to wrap up everything into neat conceptual bundles. E.g., B. enunciates the valid moral principle that the use of the sexual faculty outside marriage is a violation of the moral law. It then only takes seven pages to outlaw pornography, masturbation, petting, homosexuality, early dating, premarital relations, adultery, and contraception, with space left over to discuss and dismiss the population problem. Similar objections could be raised about the chapters on God’s existence (simply too metaphysical for our notoriously nonmetaphysical young) and on evolution (heavily indebted to Nogar and dismisses Teilhard in less than a page). If one wants to see just how serious college students are about religion and how little impact B.'s book would have on them, H.’s work could be read with profit. He taught in the religion department of Western Michigan University 1962-66. During these years he asked his students (of various religious affiliations) to write rather thorough autobiographical papers on their own religious ideas and convictions. The present work is based on (and makes rather generous use of) these papers. To anyone who thinks that the young of today are unconcerned about religion, these papers would come as a bit of a revelation. Not surprisingly, the individual
chapters run more or less according to the chapters of the B. and K. books: God, prayer, the Church, sex, etc. H. wrote with a thesis in mind: to demonstrate the deep religious quest of the young person and the relevance of that quest for his total education. H. contends that the religion taught in a state school should take cognizance of that quest and teach religion as a viable world view and value system. This is a controversial stance, and the phenomenological versus the value approach will undoubtedly exacerbate educators for some time to come (as it did at Western Michigan) as more and more state schools institute schools of religion. Whether H.'s view will predominate is problematical. Whatever the outcome, his book will have an independent value as a testament to the religious searching of the contemporary student and as an excellent source work for those who have the care of souls in the academic community.

Florida State University, Tallahassee

Lawrence Cunningham

THE ART OF BEING A SINNER. By John M. Krumm. New York: Seabury, 1967. Pp. 128. $3.50. Rector of the Episcopal Church of the Ascension in New York City, K. was formerly Chaplain of Columbia University for thirteen years. He firmly believes that the Christian teaching about sin is a corrective of the romantic notion of evil prevalent both in contemporary Christian social action and in present-day discussions of Christian morality. The worst part of man's sin is that it does not allow itself to be admitted. If a man sins, he must pretend it really is somehow a virtue. Consequently, the refusal to admit sinfulness insulates man more and more within the walls of egotism and false reputation. Sin is pervasive and persistent; apropos of this K. quotes T. S. Eliot: "Your business is not to clear your conscience but to learn how to bear the burdens on your conscience." Only on the Cross does man glimpse unconditional forgiveness, since the Cross condemns and conquers sin decisively. Just as the Cross is the prelude to the Resurrection, the sinner's repentance is the prelude to a new life in Christ. Only Christ has the power to transform man's arrogant, anxious, fearful self-centeredness into the trusting and loving compassion of self-giving. K. maintains that the admission of sin is one of the most difficult acts of faith. This confession of sin is the humbling art that K. calmly discusses in this stimulating book. None of us is without sin. The problem is to see the difference sin makes in our lives and how it affects the total spectrum of man's social and political situation.

Woodstock College

Raymond A. Adams, S.J.

of four essays, all originally published separately between 1949 and 1951. The fourth, “Living Freedom,” comprises 70 pages out of the 160. Of the other three essays, two deal with men—one with Francis of Assisi, and it is a reflection on his spirit as manifested in his life; the other with Kierkegaard, and it is a reflection on a number of passages dealing with melancholy. The third essay deals with community. The English title places the theme in freedom, and this is correct enough, though perhaps G.'s focus is more properly “spirit” than “freedom.” There is a close connection; for “spirit” in G.'s analysis has a double dimension, that of freedom, the dynamic developing freedom of the spirit in the world and in community, and the dimension of personal relationship to God. It is perhaps to this last realization that G. is leading his readers, namely, to the awareness that the fullest meaning of man is found in the relationship of his spirit to God achieved in the gradual development of his freedom. G.'s phenomenological, Bonaventurian style achieves this realization not by any Plotinian flight from the world, but by a gradual appreciation of the ascending-interior levels of man within the world and community. The essays, though of different lengths, are uniformly excellent in content and style. The essence of Francis is found in his liberating poverty which is an expression of the love of God. Community is not some sort of external fusion, but an interior affirmation of the other which respects the uniqueness and ultimate mystery of each. Kierkegaard’s melancholy is a manifestation of man’s desire for the infinite. The freedom of man is found ultimately in his power to respond personally to his creator. Running through all the essays is a certain Augustinian and Cartesian interiorism, a certain sympathy with Kierkegaard. G. is a man of reflection rather than of action.

Oak Park, Ill. Robert F. Harvanek, S.J.
pursuit, God, in an interpersonal, prayerful manner. We may add that Vatican II reinforces this reminder when it asserts that we grow in understanding revelation through contemplation and experience of divine realities as well as in study of them (Constitution on Revelation, no. 8). Though there is much of value in this volume, its title illustrates an annoying contemporary practice in the religious field, the use of catchy (and catchall) but misleading titles. This book says relatively little about the future of Western spirituality.

Marycrest College, Davenport, Iowa

Thomas Dubay, S.M.

DER MENSCH IM GOTTESDIENST. By Alfons Kirchgässner. Munich: Ars Sacra, 1966. Pp. 191. DM 13.80. Some years ago K. wrote an encyclopedic volume, Die mächtigen Zeichen (Freiburg: Herder, 1959), on the phenomenon of cultus, investigating the multiple relationships (in terms of origins, forms, laws) between Christian rites and the cultic traditions of mankind at large. The present small book is, in some respects, a compendium of the earlier work, not in the sense of being a selection of examples from it, but in the sense that the major ideas which emerged from it are presented here with brevity and clarity. K. is a good teacher; his first chapter ("Ritus") exemplifies this, with its fresh version of an often-explained fact: the link of many Christian rites and indeed of the whole reality of cultus with man's immemorial traditions, and with its demonstration of how Christianity also relativizes cultus. Other chapters deal with generic ideas (assembly, center [Christ as symbolized in various ways], action or gesture, word [broken down into speech, call, confession, thanksgiving, dialogue, song, silence]), or with concrete actions and realities (eating and drinking, meal, bread and wine), or with general qualities and attitudes (solemnity, participation, tradition, artificiality, rhythm, etc.). There is a wealth of enlightening observation here that will send the reader back to K.'s earlier book for further details and analysis (the earlier book has been translated into French: La puissance des signes [Paris: Mame, 1962]).

Fordham University

M. J. O'Connell, S.J.

MANUALE DI STORIA LITURGICA 3: LA MESSA. By Mario Righetti. 3rd ed.; Milan: Ancora, 1966. Pp. xxiv + 676. L. 4500. R. began the third edition of his four-volume work a few years ago, chiefly to take into account the decrees of Vatican II. Vol. 1 has been issued (cf. TS 25 [1964] 694); Vol. 2 is in the press. The chief reason for the increased size of Vol. 2 (the second edition, 1956, had 614 pages but only six fewer illustrations) has already been indicated. This increase is spread through the book; e.g., the pages on
concelebration have been expanded. But even the parts not affected by the conciliar decrees have been revised. Thus, chap. 1 of Part 1 (on the origins of the Mass) has been rewritten; it now has a separate section on the *NT* sources for the Eucharist (the Table of Contents has not been appropriately modified to indicate this), while the section there on the Eucharistic rite in apostolic times has been expanded (chiefly by a more extensive use of the *Didache*). The bibliography, both general and special, has been brought up to date; this fact, along with the range of topics covered, is a major reason for the great value of R.'s *Manuale*. Pietro Borelli’s long appendix on “La messa ambrosiana” has likewise been revised to incorporate references to work of the last decade.

*Fordham University*  
*M. J. O’Connell, S.J.*

GALILEI UND DER IRRTUM DER INQUISITION. By Oswald Loretz. Kevelaer: Butzon und Bercker, 1966. Pp. 219. DM 16.80. Loretz here makes conspicuously clear—for the very first time since the notorious incident took place—just what the Galileo affair was all about. What clarifies the murky historical atmosphere is, in short, the immensely illuminating Vatican II redescription of Sacred Scripture as salvation history. For in this renewed perspective the polar concept to the truth (Wahrheit) of Scripture is not *inerrantia* (Irrtumslosigkeit) but rather infidelity, untrustworthiness, untruthfulness (*die Lüge*). This insight, authentically Semitic and genuinely biblical but not indigenous to intellectual culture in the West, was familiar neither to Galileo nor to his inquisitors nor to their *periti* theologian consultors. The consequence was that neither party to the dispute could understand how the Scriptures could be “true” even when they contained “errors” of a historical or scientific sort. But if Galileo and his inquisitors were both trapped by the *sine ullo errore* theory of theological tradition, Bellarmine, at least, discerned the methodological error in Galileo’s persistent argument that the telescopic verification of certain astronomical consequences of the Copernican hypothesis (such, e.g., as the phases of Venus) proved conclusively its absolute and factual truth. For the rule of reductive inference which enfranchises a thinker first to detach and then independently to affirm the antecedent sentence of a compound conditional sentence which is such that its consequent sentence is, first testable, then subsequently verified or confirmed—although indispensable to the successful conduct of all scientific inquiry—is not infallible in any instance of its application and simply because such a rule of inference is not grounded on an indefeasibly valid law of logic. This Loretz book is a superb contribution to a pivotal and pernickety problem in the intellectual history of the West from both the
scriptural and theological points of view, just as I. M. Bocheński’s Logic of Religion (New York, 1965) is an equally superb contribution (especially p. 86) from the logical and methodological points of view. No contemporary scholar interested in any way in an aspect of the Galileo affair can afford to miss either of these two books.

Canisius College, Buffalo

Joseph T. Clark, S.J.

HISTORY AND FAITH IN THE THOUGHT OF ALAN RICHARDSON. By John J. Navone, S.J. London: SCM Press, 1966. Pp. xiv + 161. 30s. Richardson is a British theologian who deserves more of American readers than he has been accorded. No one will assert that he is of the stature of a Bultmann or a Tillich; nor has he as yet collected about himself a school of disciples. Still, he is of extraordinary importance for theologians, especially for those concerned with the historicity of the basic Christian facts and with the construction of an “apology” for those facts. In this dissertation N. provides a very sympathetic survey and appraisal of R.’s views on historical thinking. The book commences with a careful situating of R. in his theological context: he is fundamentally a committed Anglican who recapitulates many of the facets of theological development from Gore to Temple. A far remove from Bultmann, Tillich, Brunner, and Barth, he displays marked affinities for the thought and principles of Cullmann, Dodd, and Reinhold Niebuhr in that he sees history as the principal method for solving the problem of apologetics. The core of N.’s book and its real contribution is a thorough analysis of what R. thinks history to be. Eclectic though R.’s approach is (and N. shows how he has been influenced by many: Dilthey, Collingwood, Croce, Meinecke, and especially C. Becker), he thoroughly rejects absolute relativism, positivism, and rationalism, to conclude that “no more rational explanation has been given for the existence of the Church and its faith than that of the Christian interpretation of history.” The touchstone of this position is evidently the resurrection of Jesus, and so N. devotes a considerable part of his book to analyzing R.’s position on the relation of historicity to faith in understanding the resurrection. Finally, N. notes a few inconsistencies and cites some ecumenical problems implicit in R.’s views. Theologians, especially those concerned with fashioning a viable modern apologetic, cannot afford to neglect R.’s contribution. They will find N.’s study a masterful introduction to it.


Simon E. Smith, S.J.

hope,” M. states in his preface, “that the reflections presented in this book will enable larger numbers of people—concerned laymen, students of philosophy and theology, and professional philosophers and theologians alike—to participate more intelligently, and thus more constructively, in the ongoing dialogue between philosophy and Christian theology.” His aim, therefore, is not to establish positions of his own, but to present and critically comment on a large number of recent contributions to the dialogue. Though his survey is limited to the dialogue between theologians and analytical philosophers, the list of names is long. After tracing the roots of analytical concerns in certain perennial themes of Western philosophy, M. recounts the rise of logical atomism and logical positivism and the theological responses to their challenge, then the emergence of broader forms of analysis and a variety of theological responses to these. Feeling that “It has . . . become increasingly clear throughout this study that assessment of language and its use inevitably entails assessment of ontological and metaphysical issues and positions” (p. 166), in a final chapter M. introduces some analytical philosophers who find new relevance in the task of metaphysics, and some theologians who are again stressing the inevitability of metaphysical reference for theological statements and systems. Though the sketches of successive positions are roughly accurate, a number of statements about major philosophers are imprecise, misleading, or inaccurate. M.’s criticisms, too, do not always seem justified (pp. 94, 96–97, 157, 163). Despite these flaws, his intelligent, well-written, and well-informed account should contribute effectively to the important purpose for which he wrote it.

Spring Hill College, Mobile

Garth L. Hallett, S.J.

The Sexual Doctrine of Cardinal Cajetan. By Dennis Doherty, O.S.B. Regensburg: Pustet, 1966. Pp. xvii + 372. $9.00. This doctoral dissertation is a thorough, systematic, and critical synthesis of Cajetan’s extensive sexual doctrine, skilfully placed in the context of his time. It reflects C.’s pervasive dependence on St. Thomas as commentator on his works as well as C.’s own original genius. C.’s doctrine is remarkably viable today, though out of date in many points. To the modern reader his conclusions will appear as a surprising blend of rigid and liberal positions: e.g., he is severe in requiring that spouses have an intention of children in order to avoid sin in conjugal intercourse, liberal in seeing the possibility of divorce even in some consummated sacramental marriages; he has severe norms limiting manifestations of affection between the unmarried, liberal norms for judging the modesty of women’s dress. C. has something to contribute to the method and content of moral theology because of his emphasis on
critical reflection on the reality involved in sex and marriage and his willingness to explore questions boldly within a balanced reverence for community tradition. Obviously, C.'s knowledge of human sexuality was deficient by today's standard; to his credit, he often worked from principles that would allow him to correct himself in the light of new factual knowledge. Hence this book is valuable as a nuanced picture of Christian doctrine at one time in history. It is still more valuable within the context of similar historical studies for the unfinished development of a sound sexual doctrine so much needed today. It is not an easy book to read; but D. has made it as pleasant as possible to move in a world of distinctions, categories, and presuppositions which we have long forgotten but which have powerfully shaped the content of the sexual teaching we have inherited. Serious students of Catholic sexual doctrine will want to read this book, and anyone interested in the continuity and discontinuity of our moral tradition will find here an excellent sample.

*Lewis Memorial Residence, St. Louis*  
*Thomas P. Swift, S.J.*

**The Human Mystery of Sexuality.** By Marc Oraison. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1967. Pp. x + 180. $3.95. Purporting to explain the mysteries of human sexuality, O. treats its importance, its physiological aspects, psychosexual evolution, the meaning for man of genital sexuality, and the teaching of revelation on sexuality. In my judgment, as in that of other reviewers, the book suffers from O.'s oversimplistic, loyal, pansexual Freudianism. He seems to think that Freudian psychological theory solves all problems and replaces Scholastic philosophy and traditional biblical exegesis as the solution to all problems (cf. pp. 142-43). In the Introduction, O. sees importance in the fact that flowers, so much admired by all and used to convey messages of all kinds, are really the sexual organs of the plants. Of some interest is a sort of Freudian proof of the wrongness of contraception in which O. declares that to frustrate a woman's fecundity "is a decided kind of incoherence, so to speak" (p. 129) and that contraceptionists "do not live out the twofold meaning of marital sexual life, properly so called" (p. 131). O. hardly helps his standing as a scientific writer when he states without qualification that the Scriptures protected the name of God so much that "even the consonants of his name were written backwards lest readers dare pronounce them" (p. 146). Even the anonymous translator (I trust it is not the author) is somewhat scientifically inept in saying that relations "between these women and that man" constitute polyandry (p. 132). All in all, I cannot think of any audience that would benefit from the book. As one reviewer put it: "One begins to think that the ecclesiastics who con-
demned this book may have been, as is not unusual, right for the wrong reasons." This is in reference to the fact that the book was apparently the occasion of a warning from the Sacred Congregation for Teaching of the Faith against too easily granting O. permission to publish. Nevertheless, the book does have an imprimatur.

Alma College

Joseph J. Farraher, S.J.


A dissertation for the theology doctorate at C.U. Its subject is the sacramentality of Christian marriage—more precisely, the duration or extension of this sacramentality. Does marriage have permanent sacramentality or transient, only at the moment of the mutual personal surrender through consent? After pointing out the structure of both natural and sacramental marriage, G. presents the various views on the problem. He accepts one, that for the permanent sacramentality of marriage, and then attempts to show this from the language of the Church and tradition, and finally from theological analysis. He considers his conclusion not as an official and authentic declaration of the magisterium, but as a solid and truly probable theological view. It would seem to the reviewer that the study is truly solid, even though not new in any sense of the word. The information contained therein and the well-presented synthesis will be helpful to students and professors. Perhaps a more thorough and truly historical section could have been added, as well as some of the most recent thinking of theologians.

Holy Cross College, Wash., D.C.

Charles A. Schleck, C.S.C.


A comprehensive anthology of representative texts illustrating the religious beliefs of man according to themes, e.g., gods, creation, prayer, eschatology, mysticism, etc. E.'s explanatory notes and introductions are restricted to the bare essentials; he gives samples of all the important religious traditions but deliberately omits Judaism and Christianity. His purpose is not a source book, but a readable work for the man curious about the religious beliefs of his fellow man.


C. commences and terminates his all-too-brief exposition of the Greek Orthodox Church with an affirmation of its relevance for our times, as being
capable of fulfilling (p. 11) and illuminating modern man with a light all
her own (p. 107). The book is intended for the nontheologian, and presumably
for one completely unfamiliar with the Orthodox tradition. In delineating
its history (in thirty pages), C. employs too wide a brush and yields to
touches of "triumphalism"; in interpreting the spirit, faith, tradition, and
practices of the Church, his brevity makes these read like a catalog rather
than a faith to be lived by modern man. Orthodoxy occupies a most hon­
orable place among the Christian Churches, and C.'s book can serve as a
first introduction to the richness of this faith.

A HISTORY OF THE ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT 1517–1948. Edited by Ruth
Pp. xxiv + 838. $10.00. A reissue of the 1954 edition long out of
print. The increase of interest in ecumenical matters and the unsurpassed
merits of the book are sufficient reasons for this reprinting. The text and
pagination remain the same as in the earlier edition; where factual and typo­
graphical errors occurred, they are now corrected. The revision is specifically
in the augmentation of the bibliography by some two hundred new titles
covering the history of the movement up to 1948. The Foreword announces
a projected companion volume to continue this history from 1948 and to in­
clude the Fourth Assembly of the World Council of Churches in 1968. The
publishers hope to have the volume ready by the end of 1969.

REVENIR À DIEU: PÉNITENCE, CONVERSION, CONFESSION. By Bruno
fr. Present-day discussion on the sacrament of penance and its diffi­
culties for contemporary man is becoming more and more frequent. S.-C.'s
exposition of the sacrament is not being offered as the solution to the problem,
but he hopes that what he does offer can serve as the basis for a mature,
serious, and fruitful reflection thereon. In developing the theology of pen­
ance, he follows the direction of St. Thomas and acknowledges indebtedness
to his former professor Père Dondaine. A brief history of the sacrament pre­
cedes the main body of the text.

SERVICE IN CHRIST: ESSAYS PRESENTED TO KARL BARTH ON HIS 80TH
BIRTHDAY. Edited by James I. McCord and T. H. L. Parker. Grand Rapids,
Barth by twenty distinguished British and American scholars. The theme
of the essays is diakonia, "from active faith in Christ to faithful activity in
Christ," investigating how the Church which is Christ's body is both His
servant and the servant of mankind. The contributing authors explore
**SHORTER NOTICES**

**diakonia** in its Christian origins, its life in the early and medieval Church, among the Reformers, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and in the Church of the modern world. The volume’s scholarship and the timeliness of the theme are a fitting tribute to one of the world’s great systematic theologians.

**Enchiridion Liturgicum Complectens Theologiae Sacramentalis et Dogmata et Leges. By Polycarp Radó, O.S.B. 2 vols. 2nd ed.; Rome: Herder, 1966. Pp. xvi + 1520. L. 12,800.** Basically, this is a synthesis of sacramental theology with liturgical treatises introducing and concluding the work. R. divides his *Enchiridion* into two parts, “general” and “special.” The “general” area has four treatises: (1) liturgy and public cult; (2) ceremonies and rites; (3) the different liturgical “families”; (4) sacraments in general. In the “special” area, R. offers eleven treatises beginning with (1) the Sacrifice of the Mass and (2) the Church at prayer, with discussion of breviary, psalmody, and various pious exercises. There follow (3) the Eucharist as sacrament and (4–9) the remaining sacraments, concluding with (10) the liturgical year and its principal feasts, outlining their origin, history, and purpose, plus specific characteristics, with the final treatise (11) devoted to sacred art, vessels, and vestments. What makes this unique and valuable is the fact that R. has assembled from dogmatic and moral theology, history, liturgy, and canon law the elements dealing with cult and sacraments. The work is further enriched by numerous lengthy bibliographical references and by the supplement appended to the present edition. This edition is a complete revision of that of 1961 and takes into account the recent liturgical decrees and reforms of Vatican II.

**A Christianity Today Reader. Edited by Frank E. Gaebelein. New York: Meredith, 1967. Pp. 271. $7.95.** On the tenth anniversary of *Christianity Today*, G., a former editor, offers a selection of the best articles, editorials, features, book reviews, and poems which reflect “the thoughts and power of present-day evangelical Christianity.”

BOOKS RECEIVED

[All books received are listed here whether they are reviewed or not]

Scriptural Studies


BOOKS RECEIVED


Doctrinal Theology


Moral Theology, Canon Law, Liturgical Questions

BOOKS RECEIVED


O'Brien, William V. *Nuclear War, Deterrence and Morality*. Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1967. Pp. 120. $3.75.


History and Biography, Patristics


Pastoral and Ascetical Theology, Devotional Literature


Philosophical Questions


Special Questions


### SIGLA

#### OLD TESTAMENT

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Ap Apocalypse