

## NOTES

### SOME CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT POLYGENISM

In the kaleidoscopic conditions of the present time, theological questions which seemed settled or at least relatively settled have a way of being suddenly reopened. This certainly has been the case regarding the consideration of the possibility of reconciling with Catholic dogma a polygenetic hypothesis concerning the origin of mankind.

Here "polygenism" together with its cognates is understood according to the commonly accepted definition given to it by Catholic theologians: a theory that the human race descends not from a single human pair but from a group of human beings, each one of whom would have crossed the threshold from the subhuman to the human condition.<sup>1</sup> Our considerations will be limited to the discussion of polygenetic theories proposed within a Christian context, one, that is, in which God's creative act and His providence are admitted, as is the reality of original sin.

It must be admitted that it is a fact that the general theory of organic evolution is generally accepted by those who cultivate the life sciences.<sup>2</sup> Apparently it is this fact which has led some theologians to consider anew the possibility of reconciling polygenism with the data of divine revelation. Apparently these theologians believe that the attitude of scientists with regard to evolution—which the scientists for the most part regard as monophylactic but polygenetic<sup>3</sup>—creates one of those supposed conflicts between science and religion which, as happened unfortunately in the past, can only create acrimony and lead to a lessening if not a loss of influence on the part of the religious man among an important part of the intellectual community. This being the case, the thought seems to be that the theologian ought to re-examine his position, for the scientist cannot re-examine his.

Before undertaking an exegetical and theological investigation of the question of polygenism, let us for the moment assume that it is absolutely necessary to hold with an assent of divine faith that all men living today

<sup>1</sup> A. Alexander, "Human Origins and Genetics," *Clergy Review* 49 (1964) 344-53, proposes something of a different sort in advancing the hypothesis that all men are now descended from a single man but not from a single human female. This theory is not apparently opposed to the clear statements of the magisterium of the Church, which speaks of Adam as progenitor, of common forefather, etc. However, it may be asked if such a theory would convince anyone from an apologetical standpoint.

<sup>2</sup> The evolutionary *hypothesis* is that and nothing more, though there is undoubtedly much weight to the evidence which supports it.

<sup>3</sup> Cf., e.g., P. Teilhard de Chardin, as quoted by T. Fleming, "Two Unpublished Letters of Teilhard," *Heythrop Journal* 6 (1965) 36 f.

are descended from a single, arithmetically one, human forefather. Would this belief really create a difficulty for the scientist? Many obviously believe that it would.<sup>4</sup> But why? The answer to the last question can either be that such a belief conflicts with scientific fact or most probable theory, or be that the belief is in opposition not to fact or even highly probable theory but to an attitude which actually results from an absolutizing of the methodology of the sciences: generally the sciences are concerned with groups, classes, repeatedly observable or verifiable phenomena; therefore results or conclusions must be expressed as true of the group, the class, the multiple.

It is first of all true that no scientific discipline concerned with the origin of man could ever prove that man was monogenetic in origin, assuming that man is of monogenetic origin.<sup>5</sup> This is true if for no other reason than that it is impossible to state from a scientific standpoint that what is observed by paleontological procedures was mathematically unique. If one could assert with certainty of a fossil that this creature was one which had crossed the threshold from the subhuman to the human, one could not assert that it had not happened elsewhere or at another time. This assertion could only be made if one were absolutely sure that all human remains from that period persisted in fossil form and all human remains from that time had been found. No scientist would be rash enough to make such a claim. Given the realities of the scientific situation, the scientist, who qua scientist must judge in naturalistic categories—with which no one can find fault—would assert that under the same conditions another creature would cross the threshold from the subhuman to the human. The scientist could qua scientist assert that man was monogenetic in origin only if the whole evolutionary process from beginning in the distant past until conclusion in the future could be observed; obviously this is not possible.

It is altogether legitimate for the biologist and the paleontologist to think in terms of groups or "populations."<sup>6</sup> But is it legitimate to absolutize this manner of thinking, so that one must say categorically that evolution, which takes place within a restricted group, must have resulted in a plurality of happy issues? Why in a particular instance could not the term of evolution have been a single pair of beings differentiated by sex (or possibly one being

<sup>4</sup> Fleming, *art. cit.*, pp. 36-38.

<sup>5</sup> This assumption does not mean that it will be concluded that it is not necessary to hold the monogenetic origin of the human species. I do not think that it is necessary to give any special consideration to the formation of the first human female, for I do not see any theological necessity now for such a consideration; for part of the reason, cf. my "Early Modern Theologians and Eve's Formation from Adam," *Sciences ecclésiastiques* 13 (1961) 521-28. The 1909 decree of the Biblical Commission will be discussed later.

<sup>6</sup> Teilhard de Chardin, *loc. cit.*

which was potentially bisexual)?<sup>7</sup> As has been already granted, the scientist could not come to any such a conclusion. It would also seem clear that the scientist could not really disprove that such indeed had happened in a given instance. Yet it is also true that the scientist finds some repugnance in considering such a possibility. Undoubtedly, part of this repugnance comes from an absolutizing of the scientific method, but the total reason for this repugnance is not found there.

One reason for the repugnance to entertain as the term of an evolutionary process a single pair of beings is that the term would in such a case be so fragile. If one considers seriously the upward sweep of beings—and hence of being—as it is apparently manifested in the evidence presented by paleontology and biology, one finds it difficult to think that this upward sweep ended in so small a number of beings that it could very easily have been brought to an end. Nature, it is thought, could not have come so close to frustrating itself.

Yet this type of thought is not, properly speaking, scientific thinking at all; it is romanticized naturalistic philosophizing. Perhaps the next few sentences will sound harsh, but something has to be said about what is not really a scientific matter at all, save insofar as a description of a phenomenon or a group of phenomena is given. Species and genera have become extinct during the course of the world's history. Nations, whole ethnic groups, have become extinct. Some species which have come close to extinction have continued to exist, and perhaps some of them will eventually flourish. Some peoples who have come close to extinction, as the Maori in New Zealand and the American Indians in the United States, are increasing and multiplying. Nor have great numbers insured the survival of species. The giant lizards of the Mesozoic period disappeared long ago, but the humble tuatara can still be found.

It is one thing to employ the methods and categories of thought proper to one's own discipline while remaining within the ambit of that discipline; it is another thing to take this same way of thinking and make it absolute in every respect; it is yet another thing to pass from the ambit proper to one's own discipline into another area of thought without realizing that one has actually passed from the one to the other. Paleontology and biology are basically descriptive sciences. Rightly the paleontologist and the biologist

<sup>7</sup> P. Fothergill, *Evolution and Christianity* (London, 1962) *passim*, still considers seriously the androgynous origin of the first man as a possible hypothesis; it is apparent that he was greatly influenced by E. Messenger, *Evolution and Theology* (London, 1931) pp. 252–59, 273, even though Messenger himself had abandoned that position later: "The Origin of Man in the Book of Genesis," in J. Bivort de la Saudée (ed.), *God, Man and the Universe* (New York, 1953) pp. 145–67.

try to explain the data which they observe, and in naturalistic terms; their procedures of investigation cannot reach the unseen. However, since they cannot establish the extent of the base from which development came, they cannot assert in any universal sense how broad that base must have been; they cannot deny to that base a minimal extent.

There is yet something else which causes difficulty for the scientist when he considers evolution terminating in a very small number of beings belonging to the new species. This comes from genetics. To explain organic evolution in genetic terms, it is necessary to postulate genetic mutations. Such mutations are generally considered to bring on lethal characteristics. Thus, genetically the new species would consist of sports or monsters.<sup>8</sup> Only a broad base would permit the nonappearance of the lethal characteristics in the offspring of the first and subsequent generations in such numbers as to insure the continuation of the new species.<sup>9</sup>

There can be no doubt that this consideration has force, even though there are geneticists who do not consider the emergence of species in quite the same light.<sup>10</sup> But perhaps one who is not a geneticist can ask some questions of those who are. How broad would the base have to be in order that the lethal characteristic would not manifest itself? In classical Mendelianism the characteristic would manifest itself in one case in four in the first generation. Moreover, it would seem correct to state that in any emergent species there was more than one genetic change that took place, so that one would be concerned not with only one but with many lethal characteristics; at least this would appear to be true in the higher species of living things. Thus would not the opportunities for the lethal characteristics manifesting themselves be quite high? Does it not seem, then, that genetics constitutes a difficulty for the evolutionist in any case?<sup>11</sup> Is this difficulty really resolved by broadening the base of the newly emerged species?

Let no one think that what has been said up to this point is an attack on

<sup>8</sup> For a brief survey of the actual state of the biological question, cf. A. Wolsky, "A Hundred Years of Darwinism in Biology," in W. Ong (ed.), *Darwin's Vision and Christian Perspectives* (New York, 1960) pp. 9-32. The section on genetics is found between pp. 18 and 32.

<sup>9</sup> It was this which led Alexander, *art. cit.*, pp. 344-47, to advance his proposal. His opinion is open to two purely scientific objections: for him, evolution either terminated only in a male, or if it terminated in both male and female the offspring of the human father and subhuman other mothers would not have been specifically different from the children of the human father and the human mother. It is a fact that offspring of parents who belong to different species have generally the lethal characteristic of being sterile.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Wolsky, *art. cit.*, pp. 21-27.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 18 ff.; R. Collin, *Evolution* (London, 1959) pp. 115-17.

the theory of evolution.<sup>12</sup> Rather, an attempt has been made to show that the considerations of a scientific nature advanced for a polygenetic origin of mankind—as distinguished from an evolutionary origin of the human body—are not in themselves such as to resolve the scientific difficulties which a broader viewing of the whole matter shows to exist.

It is now time to consider the doctrinal and theological aspects of the question concerning the unicity of the human race. It is the duty of the theologian and the exegete to examine their own positions, lest they be guilty of presenting as absolute what is not absolute.<sup>13</sup>

The document of the magisterium of recent years which makes direct mention of the question concerning monogenism-polygenism is the Encyclical *Humani generis* of Pius XII, issued August 12, 1950.<sup>14</sup> These are the pertinent words concerning polygenism: "Non enim christifideles eam sententiam amplecti possunt. . . cum nequaquam appareat, quomodo huiusmodi sententia componi queat cum iis quae fontes revelatae veritatis et Acta Magisterii Ecclesiae proponunt de peccato originali, quod procedit ex peccato vero commisso ab uno Adamo, quodque generatione in omnes transfusum inest unicuique proprium."<sup>15</sup>

It seems correct to say that these words of Pius XII are not to be understood as declaring absolutely that polygenism is irreconcilable with the Catholic doctrine of original sin. The words do state that in no way does it appear how polygenism could be reconciled with Catholic doctrine.<sup>16</sup> Thus, if one wanted to embrace a polygenistic hypothesis, the burden of proof would be upon the person proposing the hypothesis; he would have to show how polygenism could be reconciled with the Catholic doctrine of original sin. In saying this, I do not imply that such a showing of reconciliation is possible.

On the other hand, it is no less significant that the Pope did not say that

<sup>12</sup> From a theological standpoint it seems certain that the general theory of evolution is not opposed to revelation, provided that the divine causality, providence, and purpose are admitted; cf. P. Overhage and K. Rahner, *Das Problem der Homínisation* (Freiburg, 1961), especially the latter part of the book (Rahner); M. Flick, "Problemi teologici sull' 'omínazione,'" *Gregorianum* 44 (1963) 62-70, though Flick hedges his opinion a bit.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. my "The Censure of Theological Opinions," *Jurist* 24 (1964) 72-74.

<sup>14</sup> It was proposed to define the monogenetic origin of the human race in the First Vatican Council; cf. *Collectio Lacensis* 7, col. 515, 516, 544, 555, 1633, 1637. It is no secret that the Second Vatican Council has purposely not treated the question. All that these facts prove is that the question has not been definitively decided in either council.

<sup>15</sup> *DB* (31st ed.) 2328.

<sup>16</sup> K. Rahner, "Theological Reflexions on Monogenism," *Theological Investigations* 1 (Baltimore, 1961) 237.

a polygenistic hypothesis is absolutely excluded by the teaching of the Church concerning original sin. To put it in another way, we can say that the Holy Father apparently wanted theologians to examine the teaching of revelation and the magisterium in order to see what was contained therein; at the same time theologians should have to keep in mind the apparent impossibility of holding the doctrine of original sin and a polygenetic hypothesis concerning the origin of mankind at the same time.

Let us admit that polygenism is not absolutely excluded by the declarations of the Council of Trent<sup>17</sup> or earlier declarations of the magisterium,<sup>18</sup> and proceed to a consideration of the data contained in Sacred Scripture.

It seems that it is the New Testament which should be examined regarding the possibility of polygenism's being reconciled with the data of revelation. The reason for this is that it is in the New Testament that the doctrine of original sin and its consequences is given in the most explicit fashion. Moreover, *Humani generis* states that it is the doctrine of original sin which makes it apparently impossible to entertain a polygenetic hypothesis.

First of all, we shall examine five texts which have been considered by some as demanding monogenism: Rom 5:12-19; Acts 17:25; Heb 2:10-13; 1 Cor 15:22; 1 Cor 15:45-48. The texts will only be examined to see if they demand monogenism.

<sup>17</sup> Rahner, who strenuously defends monogenism, says that it is not proved that *generazione* means more than *non imitatione* in the Tridentine declaration on original sin (DB 790-91) and that it is not proved that "this unique individuality of 'Adam' is itself thereby defined" (*art. cit.*, pp. 244-47). J. de Fraine, *La Bible et l'origine de l'homme* (Bruges, 1961) p. 109, says that what Trent definitely defined is: "At birth man incurs a culpability which is due to the sin of Adam"; cf. also pp. 104-12. (It is to this section of de Fraine that Rahner refers, but to the 1953 Dutch edition, of which the 1961 French edition is a translation and a revision made by de Fraine himself; C. Ernst, the English translator of Rahner, notes that he could not find the reference given by Rahner. The reason for this apparently was that Rahner cited a passage in de Fraine's book, but only mentioned in his bibliography a previous article written by de Fraine.) Whatever else may be said, two points should be considered. De Fraine seems incorrect in understanding *generazione* as meaning "at birth," for the ablative used seems to be one of means and not one of time; something more than *non imitatione* seems implied by the use of *generazione* (and *propagatione*) in the Tridentine decree, for there are other expressions than these which could have been used to exclude the Pelagian heresy, including quite obviously *non imitatione*. It is debated somewhat whether Rom 5:12 was actually defined as referring to original sin; nevertheless, it is certainly in the ordinary magisterium of the Church that it does; cf. S. Lyonnet, "Le péché originel en Rom 5, 12," *Biblica* 41 (1960) 326, n. 4. For recent exegesis of Rom 5:12, cf. L. Ligier, *Péché d'Adam, péché du monde* 2 (Paris, 1961) 266-77; W. Neenan, "Doctrine of Original Sin in Scripture," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 28 (1961) 54-64; Lyonnet, "A propos de Romains 5, 12 dans l'oeuvre de s. Augustin," *Biblica* 45 (1964) 541-42.

<sup>18</sup> For a brief but excellent résumé of the earliest teaching on the subject, cf. C. Dumont, "La prédication du péché originel," *Nouvelle revue théologique* 83 (1961) 113, n. 1.

It was to Rom 5:12 that Trent appealed in its chapter on original sin. Any exegesis of the text demands that it be considered at least as part of Rom 5:12-19. Vv. 12-14 speak of one man, of Adam, who brought sin and death into the world—sin and death which affected not only the one man but all men. Moreover, Adam is compared to Moses, who here is considered as the lawgiver, as therefore an individual. In v. 15 Adam is the type of “the one who is to come,” identified in the following verse as “the one man Jesus Christ”; Jesus, moreover, is compared to the “one” who had the delict. In vv. 17-19 this comparison is continued. Nor is it possible to understand Jesus Christ collectively here, for He is “one man” placed in contrast to “all men” who obtain “justification of life” by reason of Jesus’ act.<sup>19</sup>

It also seems impossible to speak here of Paul’s thinking not in terms of “temporal succession” but in terms of “extratemporal concentration.”<sup>20</sup> What, if not temporal succession, is thought of when one notes the contrast between the periods before and after Moses in v. 13? Sin has extratemporal results, but it is men living in time who are sinners and who sin; thus chronological succession is certainly included in the comparison, even though it is undoubtedly correct to state that the Apostle’s thought is not limited to the mere assertion of chronological succession. Rather he considers both the historical and extratemporal aspects of the works of Adam and Jesus respectively.

After we have said all of this, it remains true that Paul does not say anything explicitly about how sin—what in our theology is called original sin—precisely comes to affect each man, though he does state the effects of such sin in the individual. To put it in other words, we must say that the Apostle does not treat explicitly what we can term the mechanism of transmission. Thus Rom 5:12-19 cannot be said to exclude explicitly every possible polygenistic interpretation of the origin of mankind.

Acts 17:25 is often adduced in proof of monogenism; however, it certainly is possible to hold that what is directly taught here is the doctrine that the one God, the only God, made all things come into existence, including man.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>19</sup> It is one thing to speak of solidarity, as de Fraine rightly does, *op. cit.*, p. 89, which “renders possible the substitution of Christ in our favor,” and yet another to speak of collectivity. To follow de Fraine, *op. cit.*, p. 90, could lead one to the concept of a plural Christ. De Fraine, *op. cit.*, p. 90, n. 2, rightly says: “. . . the original of Rom 5, 18 is equivocal. It can be translated ‘the fault of one sole (person)’ or ‘a single fault.’” Yet in the context of Rom 5 the more likely translation is the latter, for genitive pronouns or substantives limiting a noun governed by *dia* with the genitive follow the noun in vv. 1, 6, 19 (twice); moreover, *henos* as an adjective precedes the noun following *dia*—as in v. 18.

<sup>20</sup> As does de Fraine, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-93.

<sup>21</sup> Rahner, *art. cit.*, pp. 264-68. It must be noted that Rahner makes certain assertions regarding the nature of an ancient historical work which simply are not correct. Given

Heb 2:10-13 may seem pertinent to our subject; indeed, it would provide an apodictic proof from Scripture for the descent of all men from Adam if *ex henos* refers to a common forefather for all men. However, this interpretation of the text, while accepted by many exegetes both in antiquity and in recent times, is not certain. The expression may be understood as referring to God Himself,<sup>22</sup> to Adam, or to Abraham. To me, at least, the reference seems to be to the father of the Jews as a race, to Abraham who is mentioned in Heb 1:16, for the Epistle is directed to the Hebrews directly and its references are to them as the brothers and children of Jesus.<sup>23</sup> The universal expressions found in the context seem restricted, therefore, to the world of the Jews. At best, therefore, only an analogous argument for monogenism could be based on this text.

The unicity of Adam is proclaimed in 1 Cor 15:22, where the comparison is made of Adam and Christ. Christ is obviously understood as an individual, for He is clearly distinguished from "those who are His" mentioned in the next verse; therefore, Adam is understood as a single individual. Yet it seems correct to state that nothing more can be drawn from this verse considered in itself concerning the origin of man than can be found in Rom 5:12-19. The nature of all men's connection with Adam is not specified explicitly.

Does 1 Cor 15:45-48 contribute anything to the solution of the question concerning the possibility of polygenism? Here again we have a comparison

---

some of the practices of ancient historians, it is not absolutely necessary to assert: "Inspiration . . . with the inerrancy proper to it is thus referred primarily to the fact that this speech with this content was actually delivered, not to the correctness of what was said." Ancient historians did occasionally place speeches in the mouths of the men whose actions were described; as such, therefore, the question which the exegete has to answer is what force the sacred author wants to give to his including the episode in his narrative. Furthermore, it is most unlikely that Paul would have only given an address of 192 words on an important occasion; cf. my "Some Reflections on the Gospels," *Australasian Catholic Record* 40 (1963) 331-33. On the other hand, it is indeed likely that Luke does give here substantially the teaching of Paul; cf. for this and the rest of the questions touched upon here, B. Gärtner, *The Areopagus Speech and Natural Revelation* (Lund and Copenhagen, 1955) pp. 9-36. The exegetical question, in point of fact, involves how the passage is directed against the Athenians' view of their autochthony. If directly the passage only asserts that there is but one God, then it can be held that the question of monogenism is not considered directly. If, however, to the Athenians' view is opposed a statement that the only God made them and all others *from one*, it would seem to be a teaching of monogenism. I personally believe that it is this latter interpretation which should be accepted, that Paul (and Luke) here is not just mouthing Gn 2 but, by the way in which he uses it, shows what the force of Gn 2 is.

<sup>22</sup> C. Spicq, *L'Épître aux Hébreux* 2 (Paris, 1953) 40 f.

<sup>23</sup> F. Ceuppens, *Theologia biblica* 3 (2nd ed.; Turin, 1950) 53 f.

made between the single Adam and the single Christ; neither can be understood collectively or as constituting a unity of some sort with those who depend upon them, whatever be the nature of such a dependency: "As we bore the image of the earthly, we shall indeed bear the image of the heavenly." Obviously this means that we are like Adam in this, that we have mortal bodies, just as we shall be like Christ when we possess immortal bodies; however, it is not stated explicitly how we derive this similarity from Adam.

Now let us proceed to see what Scripture does tell us about Christ's relationship to us, to see if anything directly pertinent to the question of man's origin can be derived therefrom. Rahner has stated:

The emphasis laid upon the identity of origin and on the assumption of a human nature precisely as historically incriminated . . . shows clearly that Christ's brotherhood with us can be neither a mere community of disposition or of grace, nor one based purely upon the specifically identical human nature. Rather he enters redemption into our *one* common history of guilt, which is one because it is the history of our physically real common stock. That *sarx* which is his is not just a quidditative but an historical concept . . . .<sup>24</sup>

This is, I think, correct.<sup>25</sup> However, what constitutes this historic unity? The obvious answer is that it is community of descent from a common forefather, and yet common descent from a forefather did not provide common rights for Ismael and Isaac (cf., e.g., Gn 21; Gal 4:21-31), nor does membership in the Old Testament community always depend upon birth into that community, as can be seen in the stories of Rahab and Ruth (cf. Jos 2:2-21; 5:17,23,25; Ru 4; Mt 1:5-6; Heb 11:31).<sup>26</sup> We are in sin because of a connection with Adam;<sup>27</sup> yet how we are connected with Adam is not explicitly stated in the New Testament.<sup>28</sup> It cannot be excluded, therefore, that some connection similar to those found for assimilation to the Israelite nation

<sup>24</sup> Rahner, *art. cit.*, pp. 276 f.

<sup>25</sup> Cf., e.g., W. Kümmel, *Man in the New Testament* (Philadelphia, 1963) pp. 66-68; also D. Stanley, "Paul's Interest in the Early Chapters of Genesis," *Studiorum Paulinorum congressus internationalis catholicus 1961* 1 (Rome, 1963) 251-52.

<sup>26</sup> Also one must consider the probability that Israelites were in Canaan before the arrival of Joshua; cf., e.g., J. Bright, *A History of Israel* (Philadelphia, 1959) pp. 124-27.

<sup>27</sup> But cf. *supra* n. 21.

<sup>28</sup> I have consistently refrained from treating the Old Testament material, because I believe that in this question one can reach relative certitude from the New Testament alone, given the approaches made by some to the opening parts of Genesis; cf. the comments of Rahner, *art. cit.*, p. 236, n. 1. By doing this I do not deny that many of the essentials of the teaching concerning original sin are contained in Gn 2; for they are. Cf. also A. M. Dubarle, "Le péché originel dans la Genèse," *Revue biblique* 64 (1957) 30.

could suffice for the pertinence of a person to the group affected by the sins of Adam, unless something more positive would seem to preclude such a possibility. This we seem to have in the Lucan genealogy.

In Lk 3:23–28 the Evangelist wants, it seems, to inculcate two points: Christ was born of a virgin mother; He belongs to mankind. The former is brought out by the qualifying clause *hōs nomizeto*, “as it was thought”; the latter is brought out by taking Jesus’ line through His putative father back to Adam. While it cannot be claimed that one is always concerned in this genealogy with physical generation, for Adam was not physically a son of God nor did Jesus physically descend from Joseph, is it not the thought of the Evangelist that in normal cases pertinence to a line is by birth into that line? Is it stretching the thought of Luke if it is said that he teaches that to belong to mankind one must have or be thought to have a father? Even Adam, who did not have a physical progenitor,<sup>29</sup> must have had someone responsible for his coming into being—which in the case could only be God. In the case of Jesus, the lack of a physical father is compensated for by His appearing to have a father. There are no other exceptions; all other men had a father.

It is essential to the thought of Luke that Jesus be attached not only to the Jews but to all mankind. This the Evangelist shows by joining Jesus genealogically to Adam, who is presented in Scripture as the father of all the living (cf. Gn 3:20). It does not satisfy Luke’s thought that Jesus merely appear as a human being; Jesus had to appear as a descendant of David, of Abraham, and of Adam, so that the threefold descent necessary for the completion of His work would be had: Jesus was king, Israelite, and man. In this we have our security (cf. Lk 1:1–4).<sup>30</sup>

*St. Charles Seminary, Phila., Pa.*

JOHN J. O’ROURKE

<sup>29</sup> This is even true in the evolutionary hypothesis, for only a human being can, properly speaking, be the father of another human being.

<sup>30</sup> This use of the Lucan genealogy was suggested by Rahner, *art. cit.*, p. 277, n. 1. While it is true that the genealogy is not historical in the modern sense, and while it is probably true that what A. Vögtle (“Die Genealogie Mt 1, 2–16 and die matthäische Kindheitsgeschichte,” *Biblische Zeitschrift* 9 [1965] 48–49) says of the Matthean genealogy applies *mutatis mutandis* to the Lucan, viz., that it is a literary composition of the author, it is also true that Luke uses it to attach Jesus to Adam, just as Matthew uses his to attach Jesus to Abraham; thus for both Evangelists the essential attachments are meant to be accepted as facts. I should like to add one afterthought. I do believe that Teilhard gives in *The Phenomenon of Man* a very clever and very forceful *argumentum convenientiae* directed to a particular group; his themes can be usefully used to show the fittingness of the Christian proclamation: the supernatural is built upon the natural. I do believe, too, that some of the attacks made upon him have not taken into account that his work was not intended as a finished systematic presentation of theology. His *phenomenological* presentation should be taken, I think, as meaning how things can seem to be.