BOOK REVIEWS


We have any number of books which present Islam to the Western world, some of them admirable, others mere repetitions of the calumnies which ignorance and fanaticism have popularized. It is only in the last few generations, however, that Moslem interpretations of Islam have obtained any wide diffusion. The translations of Asin Palacios, for example, have rendered notable service in this respect. Yet the task will never be completed until Moslem scholars themselves succeed in bringing Islam, in all its rich variety, to the notice of our contemporaries.

The two volumes of Dr. Draz, professor at the Al-azhar in Cairo, constitute no slight contributions in this field. Deeply versed in the doctrines and traditions of his own religion, he has sought to bring to his Western readers, in a form that they can understand and appreciate, many of the basic concepts of Islam. Although there is much to which one might take exception in these volumes, the fact remains that Dr. Draz's work will greatly facilitate the task of those who follow him. While assimilating much that is best in European thought, the author has avoided the fatal error of many of his predecessors whose superficial westernization blinded them to the treasures of their own religion and culture.

The first volume is an introduction to the Koran. The author wishes to bring before his reader the moral doctrine of Islam as incorporated in its Sacred Books. "Le Koran est un enseignement universel qui veut purifier les moeurs, éclairer et concilier les croyances, faire tomber les barrières raciales et les chauvinismes nationaux, remplacer le loi du plus fort par celle de la vérité" (p. xi). To show the excellence of this doctrine the author gives a short sketch of Mohammed's life and a description of the milieu in which his religious and social activity was exclusively exercised. He finds that the moral doctrine of the Koran forms a synthesis of what is best in the Gospels and the Mosaic law and that this synthesis can only be explained by supposing its supernatural origin.

The main interest of this volume lies in the fact that it is a faithful mirror of the principal Moslem positions. The volume is too small to permit discussion of each point and thus leaves the impression that the author reaches his conclusions too rapidly. Obviously one cannot accept Dr. Draz's reduction of Christianity to a mere code of morality. Yet the author's evident
good-will removes any suspicion of conscious deformation. Dr. Draz is here a simple echo of Moslem tradition in its inability to grasp the real meaning of Christianity. I am inclined to believe, however, that he is too preoccupied by the thought of presenting Islam to a certain "rationalistic" mentality. As a result, not only does he not do justice to Christianity, but he leaves essential aspects of Islam in the shade. One would expect a full treatment of such points as the relation of man to God, God's particular providence, and above all the implications of that ever-recurring epithet, "All-Merciful." On the other hand, the incorporation of various elements, taken from the Sira and Hadith, renders the life of Mohammed less plausible and obscures, to some extent, his real greatness. Being of those who readily agree that Mohammed was fundamentally sincere, I see no difficulty in admitting the high value of his religious experiences, particularly during the difficult years at Mekka. The proofs alleged, however, in favor of the supernatural character of his mission are too fragmentary and in some instances (for example, the author's theory relative to the compilation of the Koran, pp. 91-93) entirely gratuitous.

The first volume having prepared the ground for a general presentation of Koranic moral doctrine, in the second Dr. Draz embarks upon the discussion of some of the most arduous problems of moral theory. The notions of responsibility, obligation, sanctions, intention, and effort are successively treated. A series of comparisons with modern Western thinkers, whose works are perfectly familiar to the author, complicates the design. The final section of the work consists of a translation of the principal Koranic texts which go to build a "morale pratique." Several good indexes facilitate the task of studying separate questions.

It is much to be regretted that Dr. Draz accepted so wholeheartedly the suggestion of Prof. René Le Senne that he compare Koranic theory with modern thought. The names of Bergson, Kant, Rauh, and Descartes are frequently met with, yet the discussion of their theories contributes little to the clear presentation of the Koran. The author seems to have a special predilection for Kant, but this very interest may have prevented him from reaching a satisfactory solution in the reconciliation of law and liberty. It is true that he declares the relation between the divine and human wills not mere collaboration but union. "On dirait fusion des deux volontés" (p. 99). It suffices, however, to recall the steps which lead to this declaration to persuade oneself that the author has not really grasped the full sense of this solution. For example, he presents as the ideal, "soumission à la loi et liberté du moi," insisting upon the safeguard of the two elements (p. 92). The et maintains a certain disjunction between the two as if submission to eternal
law were not at the same time full liberty. Again, criticizing Bergson's distinction between two moral doctrines, one of obligation, the other of invention, he continues: "La véritable moralité n'est ni soumission pure, ni invention absolue: elle est l'une et l'autre à la fois. Ce n'est ni l'attitude d'un esclave, ni celle d'un maître absolu, mais bien celle d'un citoyen, participant en quelque sorte à l'autorité législative, par le choix et l'initiation dont il a droit" (p. 98). Not only does this seem to confirm the disjunction above mentioned and lessen the value of the formula "fusion des deux volontés," but it is in contradiction with the doctrine of the Koran. Mohammed passes from liberty to predestination without hesitation but nowhere does he seek to find a middle term. It is extremely unlikely that he would have accepted the term citoyen as an equivalent for Moslem.

Prof. Massignon had encouraged the discussion of the differences encountered within Islam itself. Dr. Draz limits his study in this field to a few pages which hardly go beyond the common data of textbooks.

Such questions as that of the "abrogations," of the sense and limits of the idjma, are not satisfactorily handled. Had Dr. Draz given us a fuller treatment of the Koranic doctrine of the double lumière touched upon on pp. 14-15, his presentation would have gained in clarity and depth. As it is, to most readers the fourth volume of Gazalis Iriya will seem an indispensable complement to the present work.

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JAMES M. FINNEGAN, S.J.


The first of these books is dedicated to the Buddhist Society of London on the occasion of its silver jubilee. Mr. Humphreys, who has been president of the Society since its foundation, professes: "Of Buddhism in the world today I know more than most, and of Buddhism in the West as much as any man" (p. 11). His attempt here is to determine, from a survey of the religion's history and of its schools of thought, what are the principles of essential Buddhism. His Twelve Principles of Buddhism (1945) was a similar attempt. Now he reduces the number of principles to seven. They are: Gautama attained total Enlightenment; the sole reality is Mind (in a monistic sense); individual personality is a delusion founded on an equally delusive stream of unreal consciousness; the Four Noble Truths and the Eightfold Path are disciplines to put off the delusions just named; compassion must be shown toward all who are bound by these delusions and who by
consequence are twirling painfully on the wheel of life; intuition, not reason, is the light on the Eightfold Path; the goal is nirvana, but it is incomprehensible and inexpressible.

Four chapters sketch briefly the history of Buddha and of Buddhism up to the time of its virtual extinction in India. A fifth chapter outlines still more briefly how the religion was established in other Eastern lands. Readers moderately acquainted with the subject will find little factually new in these summaries, yet cannot but note a propagandist and apologetic tone which rather impairs historical objectivity. Eleven chapters which follow on the diverse forms of Buddhism are the valuable part of Mr. Humphreys' work. Travel in Lotus lands, correspondence and personal contact with bonzes, a sound knowledge of books by and about Buddhists, qualify him to judge better than most westerners what Sakyamuni's followers really believe. He merits some sort of citation for patience in listening to bonzes' "explanations." After all, he is a London barrister, and this gentry's "logic" is as pellucid to a forthright mind as were the Caterpillar's answers to Alice.

A frequent refrain is the encomium of Buddhist broadmindedness and tolerance. Christian missions in Ceylon today are having experience to the contrary (a fact which Mr. Humphreys ignores in a misleading paragraph on pp. 221-22). In Japan the jealous Sangha persecuted Xavier and his followers and, when the political tide turned against Christianity, served as the Shogun's Gestapo to harry the infant Church to a heroic death. Comparisons, too (e.g., pp. 26, 30, 132), between Siddhartha and Buddhism on the one hand and Jesus and Christianity on the other are quite offensive. "The West will never be Buddhist," for "the Western mind will never be content with second-hand clothing" (p. 230). Yet Mr. Humphreys is pleased to think that the "Ancient Wisdom of the East" is infiltrating our Christian culture to a degree out of all proportion to the admittedly small number of professing Buddhists among us. He fancies that we may yet manufacture from Buddhist raw material "a Navayana, a new vehicle of salvation," and offers his own Twelve Principles by way of blueprint. Or, alternatively, the eclectic West may build into its own temple some "cut and well-used stones" such as "karma and rebirth to replace a personal God" (p. 231).

Paradox and Nirvana gives first an exposition of the religion of the Burmese, then essays an interpretation of what nirvana means to this Buddhist people as well as to Buddhists in general. Burma is chosen for detailed exposition because most of the author's first-hand observations were made in that land and because the doctrine of the Burmese Sangha is of all perhaps the most faithful to earliest scripture and tradition. The bewildering amount
of animistic belief and practice along the Irawadi and Sittang does not, it is contended, prevent Buddhism from being the core of popular religion. At any rate, *nibbana* (nirvana) is a word familiar to all strata of society. Dr. Slater labored, as other investigators have labored in other Buddhist lands, to find out from savants and simple what its meaning is. Answers were indefinite as to whether it is a state or a place, but described it as a something necessarily resulting from observance of the *dhamma* or Buddhist law, as something remote in the sense that it supervenes only after an unknown series of reincarnations, as something final, as something mysterious and indescribable. Yet Dr. Slater convinced himself that the Burmese do not look forward to *nibbana* as annihilation.

His Burmese research is his point of departure for the speculative part of his book. What does nirvana mean to Buddhists? To Buddhists, that is to say, of the Hinayana persuasion, since the nirvana of the Mahayanists may fairly be called an allotrope of the “heaven” of personal satisfactions imagined in so many non-Christian religions. The best critical opinion, spearheaded by Oldenberg and de la Vallée-Poussin, understands the nirvana of Hinayanists to be “snuffing out” or annihilation. Other critics, e.g., Mrs. Rhys Davids, emotionally revolted at the notion of a religion which they greatly admire tending to so sorry a goal, would have nirvana signify perfect enlightenment and bliss. Dr. Slater endorses the latter view for the reason that “it is difficult to reconcile the older Western misinterpretation of annihilation in the context of a living religion” (p. 6). The reason is not so cogent in the context of a religion which lies under the mortmain of karma and metempsychosis. To its votaries pure cessation of misery may well seem a *summum bonum*.

The Buddhist texts on which “the older Western misinterpretation” is founded should be understood, the author maintains, as the language of “religious paradox.” Nirvana is a “religious ultimate” which eludes comprehension, is ineffable, and expressible only in negations. To illustrate, he appeals to the Hindu and Judaeo-Christian “religious ultimates” of Brahma-Atman and God. Jews and Christians (Mohammedans are added as lagniappe) as well as Hindus “experience” the Ultimate (God, Brahma-Atman) to which their beliefs direct them as incomprehensible. The “experience,” furthermore, consists of a “Yes” and a “No”; for faith apprehends that the Ultimate is Supreme Reality, while reason challenges with the cry of “contradiction.” Yet, “mature, reflective faith... regards capitulation to the challenge as treason to truth” (p. 116). “The claim that the logician can be judge as well as challenger is rejected. If we seek the ground for this rejection, we seem to be referred to some element of compulsion derived from
the religious imagination” (ibid.). The believer, then, in formulating his “religious paradox,” “is obliged to express his knowledge in apparently contradictory terms, but he is also obliged to hold these terms together in precarious synthesis” (ibid.). Thus the Hinayanist texts, if we catch Dr. Slater's meaning, assert nirvana to be at the same time Supreme Reality and the Void or Annihilation. Frankly we prefer “the older Western misinterpretation.”

But matter of greater moment is the author’s own misinterpretation of Catholic Christian faith, specifically faith in the strict mysteries. This faith is not given due to “some element of compulsion derived from the religious imagination” nor does it affirm “apparently contradictory terms.” Catholic apologetics and theology do not follow “the party line” (Luther, Pascal, Kierkegaard perhaps) which maintains that religious assent contains an emotional and rationally insoluble element.

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GEORGE C. RING, S.J.


In this series of essays we have unquestionably the best summary, in the English language, of a generation’s arduous but fruitful work in the Old Testament. Credit for the volume is due to the Society for Old Testament Study in England, and in particular to the learned and tireless Professor Rowley who planned the work and selected the contributors. Two noteworthy qualities of the book are its comprehensiveness and its objectivity. Distinguished honorary members such as Professors Albright, Eissfeldt, and Baumgartner give it an international tone, while the British contributors reach far beyond their own island in the summaries they present. Noticeable throughout is the profound influence of the flourishing Scandinavian school in shaping current views on Old Testament questions.

Four essays are devoted to the auxiliary sciences of biblical study, sciences in which the rapid accumulation of data makes a systematic presentation all the more desirable. In a little less than fifty pages, but embracing two essays, W. F. Albright brilliantly outlines the new evidence which has emerged in Palestine and the Near East in general. This is no sterile catalogue of facts, drawn up from his immense erudition; on the contrary, at every step he is at pains to point out the direct or indirect bearing of these discoveries on biblical studies. D. Winton Thomas handles textual criticism and divides his study into the Hebrew Bible, the Septuagint, and the chief ancient versions. On the dating of the Dead Sea Scrolls, I do not think he lays sufficient emphasis on the weighty arguments for pre-Christian dating,
perhaps preferring the "wait and see" attitude of other British scholars. Nevertheless his essay will serve as a good introduction to Bleddyn Roberts' *The Old Testament Text and Versions* (1951), which treats in greater detail the questions raised in this chapter. Professor Honeyman of St. Andrews points out not only the gains of the past generation in Semitic epigraphy, especially northwest Semitic, but also the desiderata, among which he lists up-to-date dictionaries, an annual bibliography of Semitic research, or possibly an English journal devoted exclusively to this subject.

The historical books (Gen.-Kings) merit two chapters. The first, by C. R. North, presents a clear and penetrating conspectus of Pentateuchal criticism; it is the kind of writing which does credit to the mature scholarship and balanced judgment of its author. For a long time to come North's essay will remain the standard summary of scholarly opinion on this complicated problem. Professor North is very close to the truth when he says in conclusion: "As matters now stand, the history of any one of the documents may well be as complicated as the history of the whole Pentateuch was conceived to be only thirty years ago."

N. H. Snaith attempts to summarize critical opinion on the remaining historical books, i.e., from Joshua through Kings, along with Ezra-Nehemiah and Chronicles. This essay will probably leave the reader more bewildered than ever, what with the tedious accumulation of divergent and contradictory opinions. Clear synthesis (as far as possible in this matter) is badly lacking and in addition Snaith could be more exact in attributing views to other scholars. To give one example, Snaith says on page 88: "To W. F. Albright Joshua xxi is a list of Levitical Cities of the times of David and Solomon, on the ground that not one town in the list was founded after 950 B.C." Actually, Albright's chief argument is that at no other period except 975-950 B.C. were these forty-eight cities under Israelite control.

Eissfeldt's summary of work on the prophets over the past few decades is brilliant and comprehensive. The essay is built around three major areas of contemporary research: the relation of the prophets to the cult, the origin and transmission of the prophetic books, and the psychology of the prophets. His "Summary and Conclusion" on pp. 158-60 deserves special praise for its balance and sound judgment, qualities which are so often apparent in the work of this great scholar.

A. R. Johnson writes on the Psalms and devotes much of his allotted space to the stimulating influence of Gunkel and Mowinckel. A shortcoming of the report (and this could be said of Eissfeldt as well) is the failure even to mention messianism, a theme which is very prominent today in the writings of both Catholics and non-Catholics. This fault of omission is somewhat
atoned for, though not adequately, in G. A. Anderson's splendid chapter on Hebrew religion. The theology of the Old Testament, from a genetic as well as a contemporary point of view, merits essays from N. Porteous and T. H. Robinson, two conscientious scholars who have acquitted themselves well of the task.

My review does scant justice to the valuable and carefully indexed material contained in this volume. The reader will see for himself the renewed vitality of Old Testament research and the new horizons which are opening, together with the directions in which further study will move. No scholar in the field can afford to neglect so informative and stimulating a synthesis.

Weston College

FREDERICK L. MORIARTY, S.J.


Though opinions may differ on the merits of his translation, Msgr. Knox has undoubtedly reawakened interest in the reading of the Old Testament. In the present chatty little volume Fr. Jones offers a kind of companion to Knox—a guide to biblical interpretation from the Catholic viewpoint. The author has described his style as "a shade unconventional," but that will bother no one who has been accustomed to large doses of Knox, Lunn, and other British writers. However, he might well have eliminated some of the local coloring and terminology with a view to a large American audience. The important thing is that Fr. Jones has come to grips with a real problem which faces every teacher of Scripture. For this reason alone the book will probably prove far more interesting to the teacher, who must deal with the problem, than to the student as yet unaware of it. The difficulty he confronts is the adequate, honest exposition of the biblical message to those who come to the Old Testament either with little preparation or, what is worse, with naive notions as to what it means. Only the scholar can adequately realize both the progress which Catholic exegesis has made, say, in the past twenty-five years, and the lag between this progress and common but outmoded opinions. To have, in his own cheerful and modest way, attempted to narrow this gap is the one great merit of Fr. Jones' book.

While not exhausting the knotty questions of the Old Testament, the author has a good deal to say on the nature of inspiration, literary forms and their bearing on interpretation, the first three chapters of Genesis, biblical numbers, and borrowings from the literature of Israel's neighbors. In the last two chapters, written with profound humility and delicate charity, Fr. Jones speaks especially to the children of Abraham "according to the flesh."
The book's amusing turns of phrase and little anecdotes should not mislead us into thinking that Fr. Jones takes his theme lightly or that he has given it little serious thought. Even a casual reading discloses his reliance on up-to-date and dependable Catholic sources, especially the documents of the Church and solidly scientific articles in *Biblica* and the *Revue biblique*.

Here and there one detects a lapse; for example, in putting Hammurabi three centuries before his time. And, although he accepts the explanation of biblical inspiration given by Synave-Benoît, not all will agree in detail with the latter's theory, particularly in what concerns the speculative and practical judgments. But, minor criticisms aside, Fr. Jones has made a contribution, as necessary as it was difficult, to Catholic interpretation of the Old Testament and for this he deserves our gratitude.

*Weston College*  
*Frederick L. Moriarty, S.J.*


Hans von Soden, son of the distinguished New Testament text critic, Hermann von Soden, had already gained some distinction of his own in German university circles when the Nazis came into power. His outspoken opposition to their interference in theological faculties and in the affairs of the Evangelical Church of which he was also a minister brought him into national prominence. In that conflict he played a leading part. Now his friends feel that his addresses and other papers, occasional as they may have been, are worth preserving for a wider circle of readers.

Under the general title of *Urchristentum und Geschichte*, Hans von Campenhausen of Heidelberg has assembled ten papers which will give the reader a good insight into the basic convictions and motivating forces of Hans von Soden's career. An interesting foreword by Rudolph Bultmann supplies some necessary background material. Fittingly the list begins with Hans von Soden's inaugural address in 1927 as rector of Marburg University. At a time when sophistry was attempting to "take over" even in staid university circles, an address on *Was ist Wahrheit?* was timely. Calling attention to the use made of the Gospel scene of Christ before Pilate in Oswald Spengler's fantastic *Untergang des Abendlandes*, the author launches into a philosophical consideration of truth and reality, and proceeds to a lengthy comparison of the Greek *aletheia* with the Hebrew concept of *emunah*. It is a good piece of work.

Then follow papers on a variety of themes: "Die Krisis der Kirche,"
"Christentum und Kultur," "Vom Wesen christlicher Kunst," "Religion und Medizin in der geistigen und sozialen Krisis der Gegenwart," "Hat Ludendorff recht?" "Jesus der Galiläer und das Judentum," "Die synoptische Frage und der geschichtliche Jesus," "Ein erdichtetes Markusevangelium," and "Sakrament und Ethik bei Paulus." They are concerned chiefly with the religious crisis in Germany, particularly in Protestant circles, and reveal the breadth and depth of Hans von Soden's learning. They indicate too, we believe, his blunt honesty and religious sincerity of purpose. Each is worthy of the reader's attention. While we have reservations regarding some of his statements and the possible implications of others, we recognize the general excellence of this Erster Band of his collected papers.

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Edward A. Cerny, S.S.


The history of patristic exegesis receives a notable contribution in this published dissertation of a Canon Regular of the Lateran, Doctor in Sacred Scripture (1950), and author of an excellent biography of St. Jerome (1949). The volume provides not only a welcome key to Jerome's interpretation of the Scriptures, but also a model worthy of imitation for similar research into the methodology of other leading patristic exegetes, which recent discussions on the senses of Scripture show to be an almost painful need.

"My purpose," the author states in his preface, "is not to exhaust the very broad theme [of St. Jerome's exegesis], but, far more modest, to gather the fundamental principles which guided Jerome as an exegete, and to render a rather synthetic judgment on the character of his work, especially in relation to its originality." The execution has been conceived according to the terminology of modern manuals of hermeneutics, so that, after a general view of Jerome's exegetical tendencies in Part I, the evidence scattered throughout all his works concerning his theory of interpretation is gathered in Part II under noematics, where his views on the nature, divisions, and relations of the senses of Scripture are discussed; while data regarding the practical application of his theory are construed in Part III as heuristics, where factors that promote the discovery of the scientific and traditional meaning of Scripture are organized. The author concludes with a series of value-judgments on Jerome's work that recommend themselves for evident balance and objectivity, and that show the pertinence of Jerome's example for modern times.

In exegetical temper, Jerome appears to Dr. Penna as neither Antiochene
nor Alexandrian, but eclectic, and almost fatally so in view of his culture, travels, and contacts. Such influences as his study under Roman grammarians, his contact with the rabbis (he was not anti-Semitic in principle; cf. p. 7), his initial exegetical formation in the *ambiance* of Antioch, gave him a permanent orientation toward literal exegesis, even while his admiration for Origen, which persisted as regards exegetical method but reversed itself on dogmatic grounds (p. 14), led to an ample use of spiritual exegesis, but subject to control. Gregory of Nazianzus may have encouraged this eclecticism, which gave Jerome's work the character of a mosaic.

Two disturbing characteristics of his method contributed to the eclectic tendency: Jerome's excessive speed in composition, and a singular idea concerning the essence of a commentary which favored the practice of useful borrowings, two elements that were hardly conducive to personal work. While there was an evident transition from the use of the LXX to the Hebrew text, Penna finds no real evolution from the allegorical to the literal method of exegesis (contra Schade, pp. 12 and 45), but a stable even though eclectic use of both, with the shifting emphasis on each determined by secondary factors, such as the polemical, ascetical, and epistolary character of his writings.

In noematics, Jerome is completely outside the Bede-Eucherius-Cassian tradition of a quadruple division of the senses of Scripture, even though its adherents drew on his interpretations to illustrate it (pp. 47, 110, 124). Moreover, in practice, Jerome rarely refers to a triple interpretation after the manner of Origen. Rather, his great merit is that he espoused a twofold sense, literal and spiritual, and his originality consists in the fact that he is the *sole* patristic exegete (cf. Introduction, p. iv; elsewhere, the *first*, in general, p. 219) who clearly included metaphorical language in the literal sense (pp. 70 ff., 92, 155). Dr. Penna fortifies this important conclusion by examining and classifying as "improperly literal" a wide range of figurative expressions, both rhetorical-grammatical forms and those that constitute the simpler literary genres.

According to our author, the modern term "typical," though well founded in N.T. usage, has not done full justice to the entire range of phenomena viewed under the higher sense by patristic writers. It would be more just to consider the typical sense as a species of a generic spiritual sense, under which genus Jerome, like other Fathers, includes figurative adaptations of the texts to illustrate Christian faith or morals.

Jerome's theory of the real typical sense was strict, even if his practice in explaining it was not always so. From Penna's analysis a definition emerges (p. 135) which has all the modern notes except a clear criterion of the divine
intention. As criterion, Jerome took the scriptural doctrine in general (esp. I Cor. 10:11) as a basis, rather than requiring by explicit rule a specific revelation of God for each case.

Jerome’s mind on the relation between the literal and spiritual senses conceives the harmony between them like that of a foundation supporting walls and roof: both need each other, each has its role, the one humble, the other great. In theory (akin to Antioch), not any supposed relation will do for the spiritual sense; in practice (akin to Alexandria), the Stridonian was often less demanding. Although Jerome gives no formal teaching with regard to the modern conception of the limits of the two senses, Penna, confessing the difficulty of instituting a comparison where identical terms of different epochs may express different concepts, finds that the view which restricts the literal sense to that comprehended by the inspired hagiographer is the true opinion of Jerome, rather than that which extends it to the meaning comprehended by God beyond the ambit of the human author. As to the authority which Jerome attributes to spiritual exegesis, which he obviously prefers, Penna is a little less than clear in affirming that Jerome considers it a genuine sense of Scripture, despite certain inept applications of it in practice (p. 159).

The particular Antiochene process called theoria, which found the use of hyperbole in typically messianic prophecies an indication of a fuller or more perfect meaning, which is said to remain within the ambit of a single literal sense, is found verified in Jerome by Penna, in apparent corroboration of Vaccari’s exposition of the famous definition of Julian of Eclanum, and is construed as an additional illustration of Jerome’s attachment to the balanced viewpoint of Antiochene exegesis regarding the literal and spiritual senses.

Though Jerome does not list his principles for heuristics, he never fails to invoke the grace of God, the teaching of distinguished authorities (doctrina majorum), the mind of the Church (iuxta ecclesiasticam intelligentiam), and the resources of human science.

In his conclusions Penna finds that Jerome’s exegesis, which influenced the Middle Ages far less than one would expect, is chiefly of historical value to moderns, offering the earliest witness to the improper literal sense, and testifying to the importance in Church tradition of double exegesis pursued with circumspection, and to the advantages of Antiochene theoria. In regard to spiritual exegesis Penna offers some interesting generalizations. The modern tendency towards is (which has had its extremists) can yield good fruit, if it is wedded to a sure knowledge of theology and mysticism, and linked with a deeper penetration of the literal sense and a real appreciation of patristic
teaching and the practice of the Church. Moderation and sobriety are needed for a truly allegorical, non-typical exegesis. The Fathers use spiritual exegesis, but serve more as an example than as a treasure. The desirable field of imitation concerns authentic typology, whereas any pure allegorical exegesis could not claim to be an echo of patristic teaching, for not even a moral consensus could be established in its favor. Even if considered patristic in its appeal to one Father, any such interpretation would lose its current pertinence, its attualità, which is properly the purpose of pure allegorical exegesis.

The author is to be congratulated for his careful scientific work in a field where the terminology can be truly “insidious” (p. 135), especially since Jerome himself used it with a certain liberty (p. 56). Modern exegetes will welcome the objective report on such terms as tropologia, anagoge, allegory, and τυπικώς, and the classification of Jerome’s vocabulary for the literal (proper and improper) and spiritual senses, although there was room (as Penna was doubtless aware; cf. p. 155) for a brief philological treatment of them, to assure us that modern ideas are not being read into patristic terminology. Penna’s exposition tends to narrow the field of antagonism between the schools of Antioch and Alexandria, to the advantage of Origen (p. 69), although the brevity of his treatment of Antiochene theoria will raise more problems in the reader’s mind than it solves.

The reader may be slightly confused by the seesaw between, e.g., theory and practice, spiritual, allegorical and typical, etc., as Penna weaves his synthesis. Yet each part and major division of the work has excellent topic and final sentences, and recurring summaries of conclusions prove very helpful. There are good indices of proper names and topics, but none of scriptural passages. The bibliography is professedly brief, and the works of A. Roerich and K. Hartung (the latter available at Harvard’s Widener Library) were not accessible to the author. Both in its own subject matter and as a model, this work will prove an open sesame to the treasures of patristic exegesis.

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FRANCIS S. ROSSITER


Is the statement, ideo Filius quia Verbum, a matter of faith, or a permanently valid contribution to theology, or an intrusion of philosophic speculation into Catholic doctrine? Such approximately is the question to which Fr. Paissac seeks an answer by studying ecclesiastical pronouncements (pp. 11–33), outlining the thought of St. Augustine (pp. 34–60), indicating earlier sources (pp. 64–102), recalling the contributions of Aquinas’ medieval
predecessors (pp. 103–116), and in three main sections investigating the thought of Aquinas himself (pp. 117–231). The general conclusions that emerge from the work are (1) that, while the Church has shown marked favor to the psychological analogy, official documents do not imply more than the validity of some comparison between divine generation and human mental process; (2) that St. Augustine was not engaged in philosophic speculation but in carrying forward a long-standing Catholic effort to attain an *intelligence fidei*; (3) that St. Thomas' effort was similarly theological; and (4) that the Church might take advantage of theological clarifications to allude to the intellectual character of the generation of the Son.

The more concentrated part of the work is the study of St. Thomas; in general it is conducted admirably. Relevant texts are taken in chronological groups. The *De natura Verbi intellectus* is regarded as spurious. Later distinctions between impressed and expressed species, between transcendental and predicamental relations, are ruled out as irrelevant in an historical inquiry. The absence in Aristotle of any explicit theory of an inner word, Richardian influence in Aquinas' *Commentary on the Sentences*, the procession of the Son from the knowledge of the Father, the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Word, all are acknowledged. Finally, though Fr. Paissac can insist upon a theory of the course of St. Thomas' intellectual development, he is also capable of pointing out when he goes beyond the text.

This interpretative theory finds its inspiration in the surprising Augustinian contention that the name Word is relative in the same fashion as is the name Son. The surprise has its ground in our Aristotelian habits of mind: we take for granted the existence of real distinctions both between the soul and its potencies and between the potencies and their acts, so that for us an inner word is not in the category of relation but in the category of quality. Fr. Paissac sees the same surprise behind the fact that, when St. Thomas in his *Sentences* asked whether the name Word is applied to God personally, his answer was hesitant because he distinguished, as did St. Albert, between relations *secundum esse* and relations *secundum dici*. The name Word belongs to the latter class: it denotes something absolute to which a relation accrues, and not something relative as does the name Son. Hence we are given the rule that in the transition from the creature to God only relations *secundum esse* survive: "ce qui chez nous est relatif seulement par dénomination ne peut pas conserver son caractère relatif quand on le transpose en Dieu; au contraire, ce qui chez nous est relatif par essence peut, une fois transporté en Dieu, demeurer relatif" (p. 134). It is in the light of this criterion that the development of St. Thomas' trinitarian thought is studied, that the position in the *De veritate* is assimilated to that of the *Sentences*, that the dawn is
found in the *Contra gentiles*, and the fully developed position in the *De potentia*. Clearly this is an exceedingly complex issue. I shall endeavor to indicate what seems to me to be correct by formulating precise questions and offering reasoned answers.

First, does St. Thomas hold the rule enunciated above, that a relation *secundum dici*, when transferred to God, ceases to be relative? I do not consider that statement descriptive of the facts. According to *In I Sent.*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 1, and *De veritate*, q. 4, a. 5, the name Word denotes something absolute to which a relation accrues. This is what is meant by a relation *secundum dici*. But in the *Sentences* the name Word is applied to God either essentially or personally. In the *De veritate* the name Word in its proper sense is applied only personally. In both cases, then, the rule breaks down, for the relation *secundum dici* can or does remain a relation when transferred to God.

Further, the name Love is applied to God both essentially and personally. When applied essentially, it denotes something absolute; when applied personally, there accrues to it a real relation, indicated by the designation, *Amor procedens*. Nor is this relation *secundum dici* considered a defect of trinitarian thought but merely a shortcoming of human language (*Sum. theol.*, I, q. 37, a. 1). Indeed, the *De potentia* (q. 7, a. 10, ad 11m) explicitly, and the already cited solution in the *Sentences* implicitly, advance that the distinction between relations *secundum esse* and *secundum dici* regards the meanings of names and not the reality of relations.

Secondly, are the relations of origin of the names, Word and Proceeding Love, intrinsic to what these names denote? It is, I think, this intrinsic or essential relativity that Fr. Paissac finds in the *Contra gentiles* and the *De potentia*. An inner word, whether concept or judgment, is essentially the term of the cognitional process of objectification. Moreover, such essential relativity is not asserted in the *Sentences*, though it is present in the *De veritate*. Finally, it is not to be confused with the relation *secundum esse*. Just as one cannot abstract “son” from “father,” so one cannot abstract “foot” from “animal” (*In Boet. de trin.*, q. 5, à. 3); but “son” is relative *secundum esse*, and “foot” is relative *secundum dici*.

Hence, despite essential relativity, the names, Word and Proceeding Love, denote something absolute in the *Contra gentiles*. The Word is God’s concept of God, *Deus intellectus*; and *Deus intellectus* is shown to be identical with divine being (*C. gent.*, IV, 11, n. 11). Similarly, Proceeding Love is *Deus amatus*, which is identified with divine willing and so with divine being (*C. gent.*, IV, 19, n. 7).

Thirdly, is this position maintained? If one examines the *Contra gentiles,*
one finds that it argues, as did St. Athanasius and Richard of St. Victor, from God the Father to God the Son. In the De potentia God the Father remains the starting point, and if relations are treated before persons, still persons are treated before processions. But in the Summa there is a new beginning: it is from God, the common name of Father, Son, and Spirit, as in St. Augustine and the Quicumque. From that starting point, by means of the psychological analogy, are developed the notions of procession, relation, and person, and then in reverse order is undertaken the presentation of trinitarian doctrine with the relations reappearing as properties and the processions as notional acts. It is this via doctrinae that in full clarity exhibits God as a single absolute being in which there are processions and relations. It is within this context that there emerges the doctrine that the name "person" denotes a relation as subsistent; as Cajetan has noted (In I Sum. theol., q. 29, a. 4), and as Paul Vanier has recently reaffirmed (Sciences ecclésiastiques, I 1948, 143–59), this involves an advance upon the De potentia. It would seem that, as the name "person," so also the name of a person, will denote a relation as subsistent. Further, if the names of persons denote relations as subsistent, then they are relations secundum esse; and so our conclusion is the same as Fr. Paissac's.

Fourthly, what precisely is the relation of the inner word to its origin? Fr. Paissac has the exceptional merit of not attempting to answer this question by appealing to empty metaphysical categories. He is out to expound and defend the psychological analogy and so he gives metaphysical categories their psychological content. The inner word is the immanently produced term of the cognitional process of objectification, and essentially it is relative to the objectifying knower. This is excellent. Still, what is the producing, the objectifying? Both Son and Spirit know, yet neither produces a word. If all knowing involves an object, not all knowing involves a process of objectification. Fr. Paissac does not face this issue, yet it is the heart of the matter, the essence of the psychological analogy. In us, as I have argued previously, the act of defining thought is both caused by and because of the understanding that grasps an essence; the act of judgment is both caused by and because of the reflection that grasps the sufficiency of the evidence; the act of will is both caused by and because of the judgment of value, the verbum spirans amorem. Now God understands, utters, and wills. He does so by a single infinite act. Since there is only one act, there is no causation. Still the uttering is because of the understanding and the willing is because of both understanding and uttering. In us that "because" is operative not naturally but intelligibly. But God's nature is intellectual; His esse intelligibile is His esse naturale (C. gent., I, 47, n. 5); His intellect is His substance and
His understanding is His being; and so in Him that "because" is an eternal *emanatio intelligibilis* (*Sum. theol.*, I, q. 27, a. 1), a communication of nature, and the ground of real relations of origin. Moreover, though the procession of Love is not a generation, the procession of the Word is a generation; and so *ideo Filius quia Verbum*.

Fifthly, what is the theological status of the psychological analogy? Fr. Paissac admits that it is only probable, yet would contend that it is unique, so that a theologian is not altogether at liberty to fall in with contemporary sociological preoccupations and set up some new analogy that conceives the divine persons as a sort of divine family. I agree with this conclusion; its paradox is, I suggest, only apparent. Judgments are true or false, certain or probable. Acts of understanding are perfect or imperfect, fruitful or sterile. Primarily the psychological analogy is not a judgment but a technique for understanding; since what is to be understood is a mystery, the understanding it yields cannot be more than imperfect and fruitful (*DB*, 1796) and the judgments resting on imperfect understanding will be only probable. On the other hand, since the psychological analogy is suggested by Scripture, since its formulation was repeatedly attempted by the Fathers, since St. Thomas made it so thoroughly his own, its position is unique. The need is not to invent something new but, as Fr. Paissac contends, to master what has been achieved. Like an old painting protected by successive coats of dust and varnish, the brilliance of the psychological analogy has been obscured. *Théologie du Verbe* is a laudable effort at restoration.

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**BERNARD LONERGAN, S.J.**


What is the Incarnation? Who is Christ? These are modern questions which must be faced with twentieth-century solutions. Twentieth-century man with a problem will call upon Freud or Jung for a solution. This Dr. Matthews does in his book which he subtitles "An Essay on the Incarnation." For him Christ was not understood in the infancy of Christianity when the struggles with Nestorianism, Monophysitism, Monothelism, and the rest put the subject of the Incarnation on the defensive. This defense mechanism served to foist upon the Christian mind a wrong idea of Christ. This idea must be sloughed off by a new Christology which emerges from the subconscious drives of modern man.

Modern psychology of the human person forces the Christian to examine Christ in a new light. Neither the Church nor Barth understands Christ.
They fail to do so for three reasons: because they will not submit the New Testament data to a severe revision, because they do not perceive the defects of the classical doctrine of the Incarnation, and because they neglect modern psychology.

These three defects can be overcome by jettisoning the inerrancy of Scripture, especially of the Fourth Gospel, by realizing that the Church created her dogmas, her formulas of exclusion, to answer the questions about Christ which the New Testament failed to solve, and by applying modern findings about the unconscious, the libido, telepathy, extra-sensory perception, and mystical inspiration to Christ.

From Schweitzer the author accepts the eschatological view of Christ for whom the end was imminent. With Schleiermacher he embraces the key idea of God-consciousness in Jesus as absolutely powerful. Dr. Matthews rejects the Ritschlian distrust of metaphysics and mystical experience. Both are useful for the modern understanding of Christ.

To achieve this understanding the author, disclaiming any heresy, insists on the necessity of invoking the unconscious, whether one understands it in the exclusively individualistic sense of Freud or in the racial sense of Jung. Dr. Matthews opts for the latter view. With this hypothesis he goes on to see in Christ the presence of the libido which is completely subordinated to Schleiermacher's "God-consciousness." As for the redemption, it cannot be wrought merely on the level of conscious mind but must embrace the unconscious, the hidden springs of personality. How this takes place he does not know, especially in Jung's hypothesis of a common universal unconscious.

Two other psychological phenomena help to understand Christ: telepathy, which explains His knowledge of men's thoughts, emotions, and sins; and extra-sensory perception, which helps Him to transcend time and space.

Psychology alone, however, cannot explain Christ. A metaphysic of personality is essential. But for modern man it cannot be based on substance or relation to substance, which has no meaning today. Rather "behavior patterns" of willed actions are at the core of personality. If a personal life were to be of the same pattern as the temporal will of God, it would be the supreme revelation of God, it would be "God in the flesh." Thus, for Matthews, the essential reality of the temporal personality of the Son is the pattern of the Father's will. But can the temporal will of God include in it unconscious desire? If not, how can a personal human life be said to exhibit the pattern of the will of God? At this point the concept of pattern fails him and the author seeks refuge in the idea of "inspiration."

"Inspiration" is an insight or perception of the will of God which is not
normal. It engenders a conviction that whatever is done under its influence is inevitable and right. Jesus is the completely inspired person; He is the temporal manifestation in a human life of the Eternal Word. But His inspiration does not abolish the human being: He remains human, He is fully man, the representative man, the human person after God’s image.

Thus, in his effort to demonstrate that the orthodox doctrine can be stated in terms of contemporary understanding, Dr. Matthews has failed. For he has jettisoned the doctrine, making Christ a human person with concupiscence. This eclectic view of Christ is confused, inconclusive, and contradictory. It disclaims heresy, but in name only. Such a picture of Christ may please the modern mind; it does not solve the problem of Christ in the twentieth century.

**Woodstock College**

**James T. Griffin, S.J.**


Some twenty years ago Père Congar resolved to work out a treatise on the Church which would redress what he considers the imbalance of so many tracts *De ecclesia*: they are all too often little better than “hierarchologies.” The title of this treatise (unhappily not yet written)—*L’Église, peuple de Dieu et corps du Christ*—is meant to bring out more clearly the ecclesial dimensions traced too lightly by earlier writers. The Church is the people of God living under the new disposition in which the ministry of the Spirit dwells among men corporeally and permanently, in order to appropriate to them the life given in Jesus Christ; and the people of God living under this new disposition of the faith of Christ and the sacraments of Christ, both committed to the Christian ministry, is the Body of Christ. In order, it would seem, to work out more carefully the doctrine of the Church as the people of God living out in time and space the new disposition, Congar has resolved to write first a series of *essais* (there will be eight, of which the present one, the first to appear, is the fourth *cahier*), which will deal with the life of communion within the Church, as distinct from an atemporal consideration of the structural principles of the unity of the Church, i.e., the deposit of faith, the sacraments, and the apostolic ministry to which the deposit and the sacraments have been entrusted. It is clear, then, that the present essay, though meant to stand by itself, will best be understood in the perspective of the completed opus, comprehending the other seven *cahiers* and above all the treatise on the Church. Many questions had to be raised in the present work
which could not be treated with the amplitude they deserve. To do justice to Congar’s thought and to the queries of restless readers, it were better to wait until the complete work is at our disposal.

Until now, says Congar, Catholic theologians, barring Moehler and Newman, have given their attention chiefly to the “structure” and very little to the “life” of the Church. This life of Catholic communion (the content, the criteria, and the means of life within the unity of the Church) constitutes the general theme to be treated theologically in the proposed cahiers. Catholic communion is the unity of the Church in so far as it is exercised or lived out by the people of God; it is the Christian realities considered as vitally received in the religious subject, and thus existing in the developmental flux of history. This general theology of the life of Catholic communion will constitute, at least in part, a sort of supernatural sociology of ecclesial communion, in which doctrinal principles are conjoined with the data of history and experience to deliver a deeper penetration of the dynamic process of the gradual development of the life of the Church.

Against such a background the general significance of the present cahier is clear. Reform is a constant factor in the life of the Church, and at times a crisis for Catholic communion. The plan of the cahier is the following. Between an introduction which describes the factor of reform in the life of the Church today, and a conclusion which assesses very optimistically the contemporary reform spirit, there are two main parts to the book: (1) Why and in what sense does the Church admit of reform? (2) What are the conditions which allow reform to be realized without prejudice to Catholic communion? To these have been added a third long section dealing with reform and Protestantism, and various appendices elaborating at length certain points touched on in the main body of the book.

It will be enough to offer some few reflections on a book whose range is so great, in the fields of history and of theology, that the reader is all but dismayed. Congar uses the term “reform” in a sense that some will think at once too narrow and too broad: too narrow in that he seems to undervalue the worth, and perhaps also the current need, of the reform of what he calls “simple abuses,” i.e., the failure to live up to the canons already in force; and too broad, in that the area of reform seems at times identical with the simple development of the life of the Church by way of assimilation and adaptation. We are indeed warned that the phenomenon of reform is not co-extensive with the complex reality of the life of the Church, but is only a moment or succession of moments therein. Some, too, will find it not too clear in what sense the life of the hierarchy is comprehended within these theological essays on the life of Catholic communion. There is a life of
communion within the hierarchical structure of the Church, and there is the life of that hierarchical structure itself. The *majores*—the living and vivifying hierarchic principle or organs—live within the unity of Catholic communion; they live as parts, though differentiated parts, of the whole, just as do the *minores*. Or, to put it another way, the Church lives out its common life as a family, and it is precisely the maternal functions of the hierarchic Church that enter so profoundly into that life of family communion, not merely as a sort of external criterion, but as an inwardly fostering principle. This want of clarity may arise from the fact that at times Congar insists that the Church is structured by things, with no mention made of persons; while at other times he seems to assimilate the hierarchic activity of the apostolic succession to the structural side of the Church. This life of the hierarchy seems then to squint both ways: now towards structure, now towards life. Perhaps the ultimate reason of this ambiguity is to be found in the unsatisfactory conceptual analysis of that complex reality which is the Church. Without scrutinizing further this analysis of the various senses in which the idea "church" can be understood, it is enough to say that in the present *cahier* sin and defect (and therefore the area of reform) are by the device of this analysis made to fall on the side of the life of the members of the Church, and not on that of the unflawed principles of internal unity which, in so far as they proceed from God, constitute the structural elements of the Church. It is not from the *ecclesia de trinitate*, but from the *ecclesia ex hominibus*, that sin and defect come. Yet it seems that this solution forces too far apart the human and the divine in the theandric structure and the theandric life of the Church. The problem is to say in what sense, if any, sin and defect can touch the symbiosis and synergy of the human and the divine in the life and work of the Church. It seems simpler to say, as Congar does indeed say, that where sin enters, to that degree a man is not of the Church; and to hold that where there is a question of inculpable deficiencies, especially on the part of those who are our fathers in God, one may appeal to the inherent limitations of the human coefficient which God uses in a more or less strict sense as His instrument. One could make a distinction in the theandric life of the Church not wholly dissimilar to that involved in the admission of *defectus irreprehensibles* in the Incarnate Word, the exemplar of the Church. Dogmatically speaking, ought we to be too nervous about those who take scandal at the inculpable defects of judgment and policy, at the unawareness and insensitivity that can all too frequently characterize those who are of the household of God?

There is almost an opulence of material in these brilliantly written, if at times diffuse, pages. One can often dissent, or reserve judgment for later clarification, and still gladly claim that this is a book which compels and de-
serves attention, perhaps one of those important books which men will quarry from for years to come. It is a courageous and serious book, for one does not approach in a spirit of pusillanimitiy or levity the question of auto-criticism in the Church. It is a book which conscientiously strives to avoid the extremes of exhibitionism and of the immobility of partisan spirit. It is a book, finally, which is a profession of loving faith in the eternal youth of sancta mater ecclesia. It is to be hoped that the many businesses of which Congar speaks so feelingly in his preface will not long keep from us the riches that are to come.

Weston College

Francis X. Lawlor, S.J.


Most Reverend George Grente, Archbishop of Le Mans and member of the French Academy, is a prolific writer on religious subjects, especially for the laity. In the current volume he undertakes in a lively conversational style, reminiscent of Saint Francis de Sales, to synthesize and present in an orderly way the sacramental doctrine of the Church. The French title La magnificence des sacrements is more accurately translated The Grandeur of the Sacraments, since grandeur or sublimity is the book’s over-all impression. It is written primarily for layfolk, for those in the Church who do not sufficiently appreciate the sacraments and hence do not frequent them as they should, and for those outside the Church who do not understand why Catholics consider the sacraments so important in their spiritual life.

There are three preliminary chapters: the desire for God, which nothing else can ever satisfy; the meeting with God through Christ in His Church; the gift of God through Christ, namely, grace, which is acquired by prayer and the reception of the sacraments. Then, after a chapter on the sacraments in general, the author devotes one chapter of proportionate length to each of the seven, giving the main points of doctrine and liturgy, interspersed with customs peculiar to France that have grown up around the administration of some of the sacraments. The sources utilized are Scripture, the Fathers, the councils, the liturgical books, more particularly the Catechism of the Council of Trent. Selections from Bossuet, Francis de Sales, Pascal, and other more modern writers illustrate and enliven the text.

In a compressed work of this kind which tries to meet the needs of the laity one might expect some passages that are at least ambiguous. For instance, on page 89: “baptism and baptism alone makes us children of the same Father, members of the same Church and of the same Mystical Body of Jesus Christ.” Surely the “right to administer the Sacrament of Penance” is not
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conferred on the newly ordained priest when the bishop imposes hands and repeats the words of the Savior: “Whose sins you shall forgive, etc.” (p. 125). And is it true to say that “the form of confession varied before it was established in its present form as it has been for the past ten centuries” (p. 129)? Or this: “In the last case [the consecration of a bishop], the office of three bishops is required” (p. 177). Or this statement on extreme unction (p. 214): “St. James states everything clearly and precisely: the matter, the form, the minister, the subject of the sacrament, and its effects.” Do the early ecclesiastical writers before the fifth century show the doctrine of extreme unction with any conclusiveness (p. 215)?

Despite the lack of precision in these and a few other passages, the matter in general is solid, well-documented, adapted to modern times, and is both theoretical and practical. The method throughout is not argumentative, but expositive and inspirational. Copious footnotes are placed at the end of each chapter. The translator has thoughtfully adapted the notes and bibliography to American readers and on the whole has done a difficult translating task with competence, though not faultlessly. For example, sacrament is not spelled the same in French and English.

The book is recommended to layfolk interested in Catholic Action. It could also serve as a text-book in colleges or in summer-school courses. If the flaws are eliminated in a second edition, the book will merit unqualified approval, for in its own way it is a model of how theology should be written for those who are not conversant with its technical terms and methods. Archbishop Grente has done well his episcopal duty of instructing the people in the true faith.

St. Mary's College

AUGUSTINE KLAAS, S.J.


Apart from the text of Scripture and a copy of Denzinger, there are few books so necessary to the theologian as a good modern history of dogma. Herder has undertaken to supply this need in its new Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte, auspiciously begun with the publication of Dr. Poschmann's study on the sacraments of penance and extreme unction. Four volumes and a supplement are projected. The first volume will treat of the development of dogma; the second, of God, creation and sin; the third, Christology, soteriology, Mariology, and grace; the fourth, sacraments and eschatology. The supplementary volume will deal with apologetics and miscellaneous questions including the history of the theological method. Individual fascicles will appear as they are ready, and apparently no special effort will be made to see
that they are issued in the order which they will eventually occupy in the completed work. The general editorship has been entrusted to M. Schmaus, J. R. Geiselmann, and H. Rahner, scholars whose known competence gives assurance that the highest standards of accuracy and objectivity will be maintained throughout the work.

Dr. Poschmann divides his study of the theory and practice of penance into four chapters, treating, in order, Christian antiquity, the Early Middle Ages, the Hochscholastik, and the period from Trent to the present day. A final chapter contains a useful account of the origin and theology of indulgences, synopsized from the author's recent monograph, Der Abluss im Licht der Bussgeschichte. The most detailed section of the book is that which describes ecclesiastical penance in Christian antiquity. Dr. Poschmann carefully examines pertinent passages in the New Testament and in writers of the post-apostolic age, devoting particular attention to the Pastor Hermae, with its valuable evidence for the existence of a paenitentia secunda after the reception of baptism. He also treats at considerable length the important developments of the third century which resulted from the Montanist and Novatian crises, and he explains, clearly and consistently, the gradual decline of canonical penance from the fourth to the sixth century. The history of extreme unction is briefly summarized in nine pages at the end of the book.

One does not disparage the present study by saying that it repeats much of what Dr. Poschmann has already written on the history of penance. His knowledge of the subject is unsurpassed, and it is fortunate that he has been given the opportunity of synthesizing in one work the conclusions which he has arrived at during a lifetime of concentrated efforts to untangle the intricacies of this extremely difficult question. These conclusions are well known and, in part, still controversial. In the early Church the one, ordinary, officially recognized form of ecclesiastical penance was the public penance. This required the enrollment of the sinner in the ranks of the penitents and, juridically, consisted in an excommunication from and reconciliation with the Church. It was in this excommunication and reconciliation that the Church exercised her power to bind and to loose, to retain and to forgive sin. The effect of reconciliation was sacramental, since sin itself, secundum reatum culpae, was forgiven indirectly, mediante pace ecclesiae. Private penance, in the proper sense of an ecclesiastical forgiveness of sins, withdrawn from the external forum and regularly available in place of public penance, did not exist in Christian antiquity. Probably the first reference we have to it is in a decree of the Third Synod of Toledo (589) where it is condemned as an execrabilis praesumptio. Finally, it was only about the year
1000 that the practice became general of giving absolution immediately after confession and before the performance of penance.

Particularly interesting are a number of solutions to current problems in the theology of penance which the author proposes as _sous-produits_ of his historical studies. For example, the difficulties involved in the analysis of judicial power as a _potestas bipartita_, in which sin is positively and directly retained by the denial of absolution, would appear to Dr. Poschmann to be difficulties created by the theologians themselves. A simple solution would be to return to the early idea that the priest exercises judicial power in determining the amount of penance to be imposed, and not in passing a sentence of remission or retention which directly affects the _debitum peccati_ itself. Such an explanation, he contends, accords much better with the view of the primitive Church that the power of binding and loosing, forgiving and retaining, is exercised in the imposition of an ecclesiastical penance and the subsequent reconciliation of the sinner to the Christian community. Readers will decide for themselves whether, and in what sense, such an explanation can be reconciled with Jo. 20:23, or with passages in the Fathers and the Council of Trent which seem to suppose that it is the _reatus culpae_ which is forgiven by the Church and, _per consequentiam_, that it is the _reatus culpae_ itself which is retained. Dr. Poschmann and the increasing number of theologians who accept his basic conclusions are satisfied that there is nothing in these sources which requires them to think that this action of the Church is more than mediate and indirect.

Similarly, the author believes that the Attritionist controversy would be resolved by rejecting the idea of a direct, formal efficacy in the sacrament of penance. This controversy has now reached an impasse. Contritionists have the difficulty of explaining how there is ever any real, sacramental efficacy in the ecclesiastical forgiveness of sins; they seem to be driven inevitably to the position of Peter Lombard that the effect of absolution is a mere declaration that the sinner has been forgiven by God. On the other hand, the notion of attrition as a disposition of sorrow, insufficient in itself but sufficient with the sacrament of penance to effect the forgiveness of sins, appears to be an invention of the theologians, with a very uncertain foundation in early tradition. Moreover, it seems to reduce the sacrament of penance to little more than a substitute for the defective disposition of the sinner himself, while, at the same time, it contributes to the erroneous idea that the act of perfect contrition is extremely difficult for the average Christian. Dr. Poschmann is convinced that the controversy exists because of an unfortunate turn given the theology of penance during the Middle Ages, when the
res et sacramentum of penance was said to be the paenitentia interior of the sinner. If the Scholastics had described the res et sacramentum as the pax ecclesiae, according to the idea, if not the terminology, of the primitive Church, a totally different evolution of dogma would have resulted, and one in which the Attritionist controversy would have had no place. If the pax ecclesiae is considered as the proximate effect of the sacrament of penance, then the sacrament retains its essential significance even when it is received with perfect contrition, nor is it necessary to postulate imperfect contrition in order to justify its existence as an efficacious cause of grace. The explanation is both bold and plausible, but the solution which it suggests bristles with its own difficulties.

The great, persistent problem of the sacrament of penance remains: How do the subjective-personal elements of penance and the objective-ecclesiastical elements conspire in effecting the forgiveness of sins? Dr. Poschmann has followed this problem patiently and skillfully in all of its ramifications through the centuries. The result is a fascinating story; and while it is unlikely that all of his conclusions will be accepted by historians, or all of his solutions to controversial questions adopted by theologians, they are conclusions and solutions which demand, as well as deserve, the careful attention of all who approach the study of the sacrament of penance with a spirit of scientific curiosity and a faith which searches for understanding.

West Baden College


The spirituality of the diocesan clergy has been the subject of lively and enlightening discussion among French theologians for more than ten years. Very few magazine articles have appeared in English on this topic and Msgr. Fenton's Concept of the Diocesan Priesthood is the first book to be completely devoted to this subject in our language. This new book is no mere historical account of the controversy; it makes its own valuable contribution to the discussion. In fact, Msgr. Fenton's book would have been much clearer and more useful if he had written two or three chapters giving a resumé of the theories proposed by such established authorities as Archbishop Guerry, Thils, Masure, Martimort, Lemaître, Delacroix, Catherinet, and Carpentier. Had this been done, he would have seen the inappropriateness of the title selected. On pp. 11–13 the author attempts to explain why he chose the words "diocesan priesthood." He prefers the term "diocesan" to "secular" and gives his reasons, which appear valid to me. But he never comes to grips with the word "priesthood," which has been the point of so much animated dis-
cussion. Is there a diocesan priesthood and a religious priesthood, or only one priesthood common to the diocesan clergy and to the religious clergy? Lemaître and Thils maintain correctly—so it seems to me—that there is only one priesthood, because the priesthood results from the sacrament of orders which is received commonly by all priests. But a distinction can and should be made between the diocesan clergy and the religious clergy, and this distinction is not of divine but of ecclesiastical origin, as Pius XII has emphasized in his address Annus sacer.

When the French theologians write about the spirituality of the diocesan clergy, they do not all agree upon precisely what they mean by spirituality. For clarity's sake we may say with Archbishop Guerry and Fr. Thils that they are trying "to grasp the distinctive characteristic of the diocesan clerical state." Now according to Msgr. Fenton what is the distinctive characteristic of the diocesan clerical state? It is the fact that the diocesan priest belongs to the local bishop's presbyterium. Msgr. Fenton has devoted his book to a study of the presbyterium and of its implications for the spiritual progress of the diocesan priest. Martimort, Thils, and Delacroix speak of the presbyterium, but Fenton is the first to concentrate on this concept. He writes: "The early Christian writers used not only the individual term presbyter, but also the corporate word presbyterium. The fact that they used the name of what was, in the Jewish community, a collegiate body, and the further fact that they continued to speak of the priests of the local Church as a presbyterium, as a definite social unit (while not employing any such corporate designation for the deacons), constitutes a clear and positive indication that they considered the priests of the local Church as in a special way forming a brotherhood with their bishop and among themselves, within the larger Christian and supernatural family unity of the local Church" (p. 22). The presbyterium, then, is a corporate fraternity of priests which functions to aid the bishop in performance of his divinely constituted duties. St. Ignatius of Antioch is the first and foremost witness to the presbyterium. Pope Cornelius writes of the Roman priests as his compresbyteri and Dionysius of Alexandria speaks of his clergy with the same expression. Msgr. Fenton also cites an anonymous anti-Montanist writer referring to Zoticus of Otrous, a fellow bishop, as his compresbyter. That Ignatius of Antioch, Pope Cornelius, and Dionysius of Alexandria are speaking of the presbyterium in the sense proposed by Fenton is clear enough. But when a bishop refers to another bishop as his compresbyter, he is not using the presbyterium in the sense of the local Church. Herein appears to be a weakness in Fenton's argument. Moreover, his citations concerning the presbyterium are relatively few and not too impressive. In an institution as widespread as the presbyterium must have been, there
should be a wealth of evidence from patristic literature. Why does Msgr. Fenton fail to account for this silence?

Furthermore, in a theological work of this nature one should expect the author to cite authorities who disagree with him and to dispose of their arguments if they are invalid. Batiffol, in his *Etudes d'histoire et de théologie positive*, agrees with De Smedt that the title of presbyter was one of the honors given to converts of long standing, to benefactors and patrons of the Church, to martyrs, to those who survived punishments to which they were subjected for the faith, and that this title implied neither ordination nor jurisdiction (I [1920], 264-65). In one of his letters St. Cyprian confers upon two lectors the *presbyterii honorem*, and even though still only lectors they were allowed to sit with the priests (CSEL, III, 584-85). Then there is the letter of Hesychius, Pachomius, Theodorus, and Phileas to Miletius, Bishop of Lycopolis, which indicates that there were a number of priests traveling about from place to place taking care of souls (PG, X, 1566). Can we be sure that these traveling priests belonged to the *presbyterium* of a local Church? It is a serious defect of this book that it does not explain how these historical facts can be reconciled with the *presbyterium*.

It is a minor point, but the author states that the deacons were not regarded as a definite social unit (p. 22). Yet J. Forget disagrees (DTC, IV/1, 706), and we find the corporate use in funeral inscriptions too, e.g., “Fausstinus presb. vixit in diaconatu annis XXXIII, in presb. annos II, mens. VI” (Römische Quartalschrift, 1891, p. 207).

Supposing that the historical existence of the *presbyterium* were definitely established, all will agree with Msgr. Fenton that the diocesan priests were *de facto* members of the bishop’s *presbyterium* in the primitive Church because there were no other priests at that time. But to conclude from this fact that only the diocesan priests are *de jure* members of the bishop's *presbyterium* seems illogical. Msgr. Fenton, of course, does not employ the distinctions *de facto* and *de jure*. But he certainly makes statements which read as though only the diocesan priests are *de jure* members of the bishop’s *presbyterium*. Thus we find: “Within the Catholic Church the diocesan priest and only the diocesan priest is a member of the bishop’s *presbyterium* and of no other established sacerdotal brotherhood” (p. 26). “In each one of these local Churches, however, by reason of the way in which our Lord has instituted and formed the society of His disciples, the bishop has a brotherhood or collegium of priests to assist him in the sacerdotal administration of his diocese. This brotherhood of priests, subject to the bishop and organized *unice et ex integro* for the task of assisting him in the care of the faithful, is called the diocesan *presbyterium*” (p. 61).
Msgr. Fenton emphasizes these words *unice et ex integro*, which are taken from the Apostolic Constitution *Provida mater ecclesiae*, where Pius XII speaks of embracing “a new canonical state strictly so called, *exclusively and completely* dedicated to the attainment of perfection” (*AAS*, XXXIX, 117). Fenton applies this same phrase to the diocesan clergy in reference to the *presbyterium*. If by “exclusively” he means the same as “completely” devoted to the *presbyterium*, we may agree with him; but if by “exclusively” he wishes to confine the *presbyterium* to the diocesan clergy, then he is maintaining a doctrine contrary to Pius XII, who in his address *Annus sacer* said: “Undoubtedly it is according to the divine law that every priest, be he secular or regular, should fulfill his ministry in such a way as to be a subordinate assistant to his bishop. This has always been the customary practice in the Church and the prescriptions in the Code of Canon Law which deal with the members of religious societies as pastors and local Ordinaries make this clear. And it often happens in missionary territories that all the clergy, even including the bishop, belong to the regular militia of the Church. Let no one think this is an extraordinary or abnormal state of affairs to be regarded as only a temporary arrangement, and that the administration should be handed over to the secular clergy as soon as possible” (*AAS*, XLIII, 28). It is unfortunate that one cannot be certain from this book just what the author means by *unice* or “exclusively.”

Msgr. Fenton has spoken of a fully established local Church and he may regard the Church in missionary countries where the bishop and clergy are religious as not fully established. But would he deny that the *presbyterium* really exists in such a missionary diocese?

From these observations it appears obvious that the concept of the local Church and of the *presbyterium* needs much more study and research than can be found in this small book. We need to know more about the development of the local Church, how parishes arose, the bonds that united the bishop to his priests after they became pastors of distinct churches, the historical evolution of the institution of canons. In all this it would be wise to eliminate all comparisons between diocesan and religious priests; these comparisons only lead to useless quarrels, as Catherinet has observed (*L’Ami du clergé*, LVII, 736). If the *presbyterium* itself as it is explained by Msgr. Fenton can be demonstrated to be of divine origin, certainly the part played by the diocesan priest in the *presbyterium* is not of divine but of ecclesiastical origin, as Pius XII has explicitly stated in *Annus sacer*: “One would therefore be mistaken in appraising the value of the foundations which Christ laid in building His Church, if he should judge that the peculiar form of the secular clerical life as such was established and sanctioned by our divine Redeemer,
and that the peculiar form of the regular clerical life, though it is to be con­sidered good and worthy of approbation in itself, is still secondary and aux­iliary in nature, since it is not derived from Christ. Wherefore, if we keep before our eyes the order established by Christ, neither of the two special forms of clerical life holds a prerogative of divine right, since that law singles out neither form, nor gives to either precedence over the other. What, then, the difference is between these two forms, what their mutual relations are, what special task in working out the salvation of mankind has been assigned to each, all these details Christ left to be decided according to the needs and conditions of succeeding ages; or rather, to express Our mind more exactly, He left them to the definitive decisions of the Church herself" (AAS, XLIII, 28).

This review has dwelt upon the introduction and the first four chapters, where the author endeavors to establish the concept of the presbyterium. The following chapters are all built upon this concept and they stand or fall depending upon its validity. They offer splendid reflections upon the ministry of the diocesan clergy, the place of the poor in the local Church, spiritual perfection and learning in the diocesan clergy, and the powerful influence of the Mass in the life of the diocesan priest. The concluding chapter on devo­tion to the Holy Ghost and its American advocates, while worth reading in itself, really has nothing to do with the book as a whole.

It is good that Msgr. Fenton has brought these ideas to the attention of the American clergy, even though we must take exception to some of them. I do not share the view of certain theologians that this discussion will cause disunity between the diocesan and regular clergy. Archbishop Guerry writes discerningly when he states that great spiritual profit will come from these studies on the special vocation of the diocesan clergy in the life of the Church. They will strengthen the bond between the diocesan priest and his bishop, they will give him a strong sense of fraternity with his brother priests, and they will clarify the principal fonts of his spiritual life.

St. Mary of the Lake Seminary

HARRY C. KOENIG


The thesis of the present comparatively small volume was developed with greater leisure and detail at the Catholic Institute of Paris. This may explain the directness and even abruptness of the author's approach to the problem of the origins of the monarchical bishop in the primitive Christian commu­nities. The problem receives no historical setting, nor is any attempt made to
catalogue or to assay the conclusions reached by other Catholic scholars. For this reason we shall take the liberty of stating two conceptions of the early episcopate that have gained rather wide acceptance in Catholic circles, and in the light of these two views compare and contrast the conclusions reached by Colson.

According to Batiffol, the resident dignitaries in the various local churches, who were called indifferently "presbyters" or "bishops," were all bishops. They enjoyed the fullness of the power of orders, but exercised their teaching and jurisdictional office collectively. They formed in each community a college of bishops subject to the apostles or to one of their delegates. A resident bishop enjoying monarchical status, surrounded by a group of presbyters and deacons, is a later development, a conclusion that leads Batiffol to assure the simple priest or presbyter: "We as priests are the successors of primitive bishops and not of presbyters" (Études d'histoire et de théologie positive, ed. 7, I, 264).

Limiting himself to the churches founded by St. Paul, Prat will agree that Paul never, so long as he lived, appointed resident bishops. Timothy and Titus enjoyed full episcopal powers but they were missionary or itinerant bishops, acting as Paul's delegates or coadjutors wherever he might send them. The resident "presbyters" or "bishops"—the terms are synonymous and interchangeable—were all simple priests (The Theology of St. Paul, I, 341 ff.; II, 299 ff.).

Abbé Colson definitely sides with Prat against Batiffol when he denies that these presbyter-bishops had the power of continuing the hierarchy by ordaining others. This is particularly true of the "presbyters" of Ephesus: "To conclude, it seems evident that there is not in this presbyteral college of Ephesus a bishop in the proper sense of the word, that is to say, a minister possessing full apostolic powers and capable of transmitting them in whole or in part to others, since Timothy is given the precise charge of laying hands on 'trusted men capable of instructing others,' a commission, therefore, of setting up priests or bishops. The two terms are equivalent..." (p. 63).

Oddly enough Abbé Colson delivers this verdict on the very same page in which he introduces the presiding presbyters of Ephesus as those "who along with Paul laid hands on Timothy in order to ordain him to the apostolate," a fact which led Chrysostom to conclude that some at least of the presbyters must have been bishops. Simple priests do not lay hands on a candidate for the episcopacy, even by way of an accompanying ceremony, a rubric, incidentally, that occurs in the earliest ordinal that we possess: "Let the bishops lay hands on him [the candidate for bishop] and the presbytery stand by in silence" (The Apostolic Tradition of Hippolytus, ed. Gregory Dix, p. 3).
The author's failure to resolve this difficulty, not to mention the manner in which he gives it even sharper focus, can be explained perhaps by his preoccupation with a point that is alone essential for his main thesis. Whether the presbyters of Ephesus or of the other churches founded by Paul were bishops or priests is quite inconsequential. The fact remains that no one of them enjoyed the privileged position of a monarchical bishop, a conclusion that is basic to what the author distinguishes as the Pauline conception or tradition of the primitive hierarchy. "Thus Paul conceived the hierarchy, the Christian communities, as an acephalous college, reserving to himself the actual control of its unity, fearing to see the local churches form so many religious groups, independent of each other, wherein Christ would end up by being a name common to all, but obscured by a variety of representations. For this reason he [Paul] travels from one to another or sends on a temporary mission, with full powers, his alter ego, 'apostles' by way of participation, to make sure that 'Christ be not divided' (I Cor. 1:13). The whole role of the hierarchy shades off into this conception of the unity of the Body of Christ, to guarantee which is its essential function. And it is this same perspective of unity that commands the Pauline conception of the hierarchy's organization. A single people has been called from the extremities of the world to be gathered into the one Jesus Christ. Thus the bond of unity is regarded as an 'apostolate' essentially itinerant, supra-local, inter-ecclesial" (pp. 65-66).

Quite different is the organization of the church at Jerusalem. For a time it is governed by the apostles themselves with Peter acting as primate. With the death of the apostle James and the deliverance of Peter from prison, the church undergoes a new phase. The church is ruled by a college of presbyters but with James, the "brother" of the Lord, acting not only as spokesman but in the strictly episcopal role that tradition has assigned to him as first "bishop" of Jerusalem. The author is convinced that James, the kinsman of the Lord, is not to be confused with the apostle, James the Less. If this be true—and the author is supported by the tradition of the East if not the West—we find in the primitive church of Jerusalem the first instance of a resident bishop with monarchical status, who is actually a successor of the apostles themselves.

And what is true of the monarchical constitution of the church at Jerusalem is equally true of the churches organized by the apostle John at the close of the first century, a conclusion that leads the author to discover a Johannine conception or tradition of the hierarchy. Thus, Abbé Colson sees in the "angels" of the seven churches of Asia a reference to individual bishops to whom the care of their respective churches has been entrusted. There is no longer question of an acephalous group of presbyters governed from
without. Rather, as we learn from the letters of St. Ignatius of Antioch, the presbyters surround the bishop "as his crown." The bishop—the term has now become precise and fixed—is the center of unity in his own community. To him all are to be subject "as Christ, in His humanity, was subject to the Father and to the Spirit, in order that the unity may be incarnate as well as spiritual" (Magnesians, 13). The unity of a given church, incarnate in the person of a "bishop enfleshed," the visible representative of Christ on earth—such is the Johannine conception of the hierarchy as it is developed with unparalleled eloquence in the letters of Ignatius.

The Johannine tradition of the hierarchy has for its focal point the unity of a local church under the guidance of its bishop. The Pauline tradition emphasizes the unity of the churches, guaranteed by an apostolate which is more universal and "inter-ecclesial." The Pauline tradition, the author believes, is developed "within the perspective of the mystery of the universal redemption. One alone has died for all. Therefore the world must take cognizance of its unity in Christ" (p. 123). And it is the Pauline tradition of unity that dominates the ecclesiology of St. Clement of Rome and which explains, if not the origins of the primacy of the Roman church, at least the early realization on the part of Western Christians of the need of a primacy as the controlling factor of unity. "Thus Paul, once again, providentially complements Peter" (p. 124). The Johannine tradition, on the other hand, emphasizes the mystery of the Incarnation which is continued and multiplied in the bishop of each church. And it is the Johannine conception of the hierarchy that has been emphasized in the churches of the East.

Actually, as the author points out, the two traditions are not opposed. The monarchical principle of John, as applied to an individual bishop, guarantees the unity of a given church, while the no less monarchical principle of Paul, as applied to an apostolate which is supra-national and inter-ecclesial, guarantees the unity of the churches and their intercommunion. And, if we may conclude with a corollary of our own, not only are the two traditions complementary; they are actualized in a single individual whose solicitude for the unity of his own local church is second only to his solicitude for the unity of Christendom. What would be regarded as presumptuous on the part of any other bishop has long been accepted as the characteristic gesture of the bishop of Rome: the bestowal of an "apostolic" blessing on his own city, in the tradition of John, and on all the cities of the world, in the tradition of Paul, a blessing that is given urbi et orbi.

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This collection of twenty-one articles was published in honor of Fr. Joseph Jungmann, S.J., on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday and as a tribute to his monumental work, Missarum sollemnia. The general editors, Dr. Arnold of Tübingen and Dr. Fischer of Trier, contribute each a short introductory greeting to the illustrious scholar who has done so much to advance and to synthesize our knowledge of liturgical history. These essays are divided into four sections: (a) the basis of Mass instruction, (b) history, (c) modern methods, (d) instruction by means of the form of the Mass. Eighteen of the essays are by German scholars, two by French Jesuits (Daniélou, Doncoeur), and one by the well-known American scholar, Gerald Ellard, S.J. A list of Fr. Jungmann's writings and an excellent index complete the volume.

As the title of the book suggests, the writers are primarily concerned with the problems involved in making the Mass a vital factor in the lives of Catholics. Since proper instruction is the essential element in attaining this end, the volume begins with four essays on the basis for such instruction. Dr. Fischer discusses the possibility of using the results of historical research in sermons on the Mass; such information may well be used to elucidate the form and texts of the liturgy, but the historical approach should serve as a negative rather than a positive guide in sermons and instructions. Professor Söhnigen of Munich deals with the presence of Christ in us through faith; he distinguishes between the spiritual presence and the sacramental presence of Christ: the latter is transitory and is sustained and nourished by the former. Fr. Doncoeur, S.J., emphasizes the importance of a clear understanding of the terms sacrum and sanctum. Dr. Pinsk's essay on the theological significance of variable texts of the Mass closes this section of our volume.

The second section comprises five essays under the general title of History. The writers are interested in showing how instruction on the Eucharist has been given at various periods of the past. An outline of the preaching on the Eucharist in the early Church is given by Dr. Baus. That the homilies of St. John Chrysostom on the "Incomprehensible" are a rich mine of information on the liturgy at Antioch in the fourth century and on Eucharistic theology is clearly demonstrated by Daniélou. Dr. Eisenhofer, O.S.B., illustrates from the sermons of Leo the Great the teaching of that pontiff on the sacrifice of the faithful. Abbot Dold of Beuron finds in a fifth-century pseudo-Augustinian sermon an excellent example of how to preach on the Eucharist. Dr. Arnold shows in a brilliant and scholarly paper how the Reformation and the Council of Trent influenced and changed the preaching
on the Mass. The previous stress on the Sacrament yields to a greater stress on the Sacrifice. The dogmatic aspect of the Mass, rather than the liturgical, moves to the fore with special emphasis on the notion of the re-presentation of Christ's death and satisfaction for us.

The third division of the book gives six essays on modern Mass instruction; two of these are of general interest. Dr. Casper has an interesting article on the instructive character of Eastern liturgy: liturgy and dogma are merged in a unique manner; the lessons, orations, hymns (in the vernacular), signs, and symbols are so effective that the Eastern Christian "experiences" rather than "learns" his faith through the liturgy. Fr. Hofinger, S.J. (Peking-Manila), points out the special difficulties that arise in missionary countries—with special reference to China—in making the Mass intelligible to the people. The question of the Latin language is here a real problem; he hopes that this thorny question may eventually be solved by a harmonious combination of Latin for the priest and vernacular for parts addressed to the people or spoken by them.

A final series of six essays endeavors to show how the manner in which the Mass is celebrated can add to its vitality as an instrument of instruction. The problems of the High Mass, the Children's Mass, afternoon devotions, and some local German customs are set forth briefly. Thus, Bishop Paul Rusch of Innsbruck has some interesting and instructive remarks on how to put shape and life into the celebration of Mass. The first need is a properly trained clergy; priests should be educated towards a uniform attitude on liturgical practices and should act uniformly. He emphasizes the role of the schola as the bond between priest and people. These choir boys should be dressed liturgically and should be carefully trained not only in the singing of the Proper but also in reading to the people such parts of the Mass as the orations and the lessons. For the congregation, the step from passive to active participation should be taken slowly; keep present customs but develop them gradually; train special groups who will soon be followed by the congregation as a whole.

Fr. Ellard's article, which brings this series to a close, is a concise and well-presented analysis of the growth and development of the Mass in the West as we now know it from Fr. Jungmann's Missarum sollemnia. In view of our present knowledge of the "real" Roman Mass and the subsequent accretions, he expresses the hope that the reforms desired by the Council of Trent—but not carried out through lack of knowledge—may in our day be realized. The history of the Mass is the best evidence that the Church was ever ready to adapt her services to the needs and conditions of the times.
“When all the qualifying safeguards have been made, it remains true that man was not made for the Mass, but that the Mass was made for man, be he layman or priest” (p. 373).

Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies V. L. Kennedy, C.S.B.


This is the initial volume of a new annual. Abbot Ildefons Herwegen of Maria Laach and his talented subject, Odo Casel, were the primary and scholarly factors in the publication of the former Jahrbuch der Liturgiewissenschaft, which appeared from 1921 through 1941 in fifteen volumes, attracting to its pages the leading scholars in liturgical research in all countries. The volumes are an indispensable item in any comprehensive library. But the war-years brought a stop to the publication, and first the Abbot (Sept. 2, 1946) and then the monk (Mar. 27, 1948) were called to a better life. In 1948 the Abbot Herwegen Institute for Liturgical Research was set up at Maria Laach, and the first sheaf of productions has appeared in the thick volume, Archiv für Liturgiewissenschaft (Regensburg: Pustet, 1950). But that the pastoral problems of the present-day liturgical movement, the enormous task of translating the Mediator programs into parish observance, might also have a scientific examination and discussion, the Liturgical Institute of Trier has now inaugurated this new Jahrbuch. The first volume contains ten regular articles, as well as announcements, records, surveys, and detailed bibliography.

A monk of Maria Laach, Theodor Bogler, who last year published a world survey, Liturgische Erneuerung in aller Welt, here presents a leading article on the liturgical movement since the appearance of the Mediator Dei (pp. 15–31). One cannot but marvel at the widely differing manifestations of popular participation in the various language areas at the present time. In view of the decree of last year granting permission (for 1951) to celebrate the Easter Vigil in the night between Holy Saturday and Easter, there is special timeliness in Father Jungmann’s article as to how and when the vigil service began to be anticipated (pp. 48–54). It is assumed that language and language-problems will bulk large in the liturgical apostolate, and so Walter Dürrig of Munich presents an extended treatment on current research in Church Latin (pp. 32–47). A second Munich priest, Fritz Paepcke, in a study of the pronunciation of Latin in the liturgy (pp. 102–21), recalls that seldom-cited letter of Pope Pius X to Cardinal Dubois of Bourges, urging the use everywhere, at liturgical functions, of the Italian mode of pronounc-
ing the Latin (AAS, IV [1912], 577–78). Pius XI later (Nov. 30, 1928) again expressed the wish that this be regarded as a directive norm everywhere: “Quapropter non modo, haud alter ac decessores Nostri, f.r. Pius X, et Benedictus XV, romanam latinæ linguae pronuntiationem probamus, sed etiam optamus vehementer, ut omnes cuiusvis nationis episcopi eam in liturgico cultu peragendo sequi velint.” Despite the giant strides that the liturgical movement is making in the German-speaking countries, this Jahr­buch has a wide field before it, and all will wish it God’s blessing.

St. Mary’s College  

GERALD ELLARD, S.J.


Could it be that a thorough understanding of the genuine mystical experience has been trammeled by the attempt during the period since Trent to force it too exclusively into the frame of Aristotelian-Thomistic thought? This is not at all to suggest that one might disregard this particular system or by-pass it to find an adequate explanation of what the mystical life is. Yet what is often overlooked is that St. Thomas, using Aristotelian concepts for the most part, is himself a link in the vital chain of tradition, and one must go back beyond him for an over-all view of this tradition. Further, the answer to the question of what human knowledge in itself is (to take something quite basic), is much too complicated and profound to rely solely upon any one school of thought.

It is obvious that it is to the real experiences of those who have enjoyed the closest of contacts with the Godhead that we must have recourse if we are to grasp what mysticism is. Hence Moses and St. Paul have always been regarded as the prototypes of the true mystic. It is on them that the Fathers of the early Church fastened in order to explain how the Christian might achieve personal union with his Creator and thereby attain the destiny for which he was created—in this life first, that he might possess its fulness in the next. Throughout the succeeding centuries others too have been granted this rare privilege of “seeing” God, as far as is possible for a mortal in this life. To give an account of their experience they did not employ any philosophic system, but they did make use of terms that had been given a particular connotation before them. This is precisely where the importance of the continuous tradition comes in. There is a definite reason for the sameness and unanimity that underlies the accounts of all true mysticism, be it to Moses, St. Paul, St. Theresa, or St. John of the Cross that we turn.

One point might serve as a demonstration. The expression “dark night”
(of the senses or of the spirit) goes back through Denys the pseudo-Areopagite and the Cappadocians (especially St. Gregory of Nyssa) to the earliest allegorical interpretation of Moses' encounter with God on Sinai. "Now will I come to thee in the darkness of a cloud... And when the Lord was come down hidden in a cloud, Moses stood with him" (Exod. 19:9; 34:5). St. Thomas, in fact, used the writings of pseudo-Denys abundantly. Denys was probably the most influential link between East and West in providing a vocabulary for explaining that direct contact between God and the soul of man which is of the essence of mysticism.

But where the pre-Scholastic and later writers part company is in the effect of this contact on the intellect and will of man. This profoundly affects the whole nature of the mystical experience. According to the earlier point of view, any direct apprehension of the divine essence by the speculative intellect is impossible. The union of the soul with God, then, after a period of intensive purification, consists essentially in a realization of His presence in the soul through the action of grace. This union is predominantly one of charity rather than an intellectual grasping of God. (And yet how, in the concrete, can intellect and will be regarded entirely separately?) St. Bernard adopted this idea as one of the basic premises of his mystical theology. He thought of the main activity of man in this life as that of restoring the soul to its proper image, so that God's presence might be reflected therein as in a mirror and thus our union with him be achieved. The activity of the intellect is by no means excluded, but the accent is placed more strongly on the analogical aspect of knowledge in one's approach to God and the direct "savoring" of His presence is stressed.

As regards the present volume (Volume I was reviewed in TS, X [1949], 599-600), it might be said that it is limited in this one important respect: it gives the impression that the mystical experience is largely a result of pursuing God in order to bring Him more and more closely into one's consciousness. This would follow logically from Aristotelian epistemology. Might not much have been gained by taking more into account the aspect mentioned above? Then contemplation would lose some of the flavor of a doctorate awarded for the completion of one's study of God. In other words, the process of deepening something already possessed would be given greater prominence than that of acquiring. More emphasis, too, might in this way be placed on the value of the sacramental life of the Church as a means of union. The feasibility of contemplation could possibly in this way be brought within the range of the ordinary Christian instead of its being made to appear something reserved solely for extraordinary souls. Mysticism, if it is to be
considered attainable by all, must be regarded as in se nothing more than the intensification of the ordinary Christian life, and extraordinary phenomena commonly associated with mystical experience left up to God's intervention and the individual's peculiar psychological make-up.

Fr. Arintero's work contains much that is indubitably admirable. The only criticism that might be made of it is that it does not go far enough in trying to explain what is a vital and complex subject. Readers familiar with the writings of Garrigou-Lagrange will find in the present work great similarity with the doctrine of this eminent Dominican.

*Portsmouth Priory*  
*Dom David Hurst, O.S.B.*


During the last twenty years the life and times of Constantine have been the subject of considerable debate among historians. The traditional description of the emperor was questioned in the nineteenth century by Jacob Burckhardt. In recent years, Grégoire, Piganol, and others have attempted to accredit a new story of conversion of the first Christian emperor. Their novel theses have been examined in detail by Baynes, Alföldi, Ernst Stein, and others and have not been accepted.

Professor Vogt, who is thoroughly acquainted with all the problems and also with the tentative solutions, studies the career of Constantine carefully and dispassionately. He too rejects most of the recent interpretations and maintains traditional opinions all along the line. In so doing he shows himself a master of clear writing and judicious interpretation. Although the documentation is brief and general, the book will help scholars as well as the general reader.

The Constantine who emerges in these pages is the emperor. Dr. Vogt focuses his study on the empire, its economy, its military problems, its political framework. Constantine who dominates the scene after 306 finds in Christianity a force with a future and resolves to use it to the utmost. The shrewd statesman was perspicacious enough soon to see that the dynamic of the Christian religion was far greater than he had dreamed. As the years went by, he became increasingly devoted to this God who never failed him. At the same time Constantine was wise enough to avoid an attempt to enforce his religion on the inhabitants of the empire. Scornful of paganism and enthusiastic for Christianity, he always maintained an official tolerance. At the end of his life this great soldier and statesman was baptized and died while in the white robes of a neophyte.
Dr. Vogt rightly sees in Constantine the bridge-builder who planned what links there were to be between ancient and modern times.

Woodstock College

E. A. Ryan, S.J.


Dr. Zeeden is Dozent of Modern History at the University of Freiburg in Breisgau. In the work before us he studies the growth or change of German Lutheran opinion—not of Calvinistic, much less of Catholic—concerning Luther and the Reformation. The study carries us from 1546, the year of Luther’s death, to the end of the eighteenth century, thus through the period of the Reformation itself, Pietism, and the Enlightenment. This provides us with the three main divisions of the work. A careful and rich selection is made from the vast Luther literature of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries in such a way as to give the main typical ideas of each period. This extensive use of source material distinguishes the work from that of Horst Stephan, *Luther in den Wandlungen seiner Kirche*, published in 1907, which treated the same subject but with comparatively little recourse to source material. The work recommends itself not only to the historian but also and especially to the theologian who is interested in the modern forms of German Lutheranism and their historical genesis.

While later ages saw in Luther a genius, a national hero, a pioneer of progress, he considered himself as the instrument of God, and his mission, the preaching of the Gospel, as a purely religious one. It is this mission of Luther that his contemporaries, such as Bugenhagen, Coelius, and Melanchthon consider and not so much the man himself, although in their works they portray him as they knew and loved him, thus producing a picture full of warmth and true to life.

The writers of the late sixteenth century had either not known Luther personally at all, or at least not known him intimately. Accordingly their descriptions of the Reformer lack a warm, personal touch and become stereotyped. These writers take their doctrine not directly from the Bible as Luther had done, but from the writings of Luther, erecting them into a system that constituted Evangelical orthodoxy.

In the seventeenth century the personality of Luther completely disappeared behind this doctrinal system, while his writings were scarcely read. Granted that this point of view was one-sided, nevertheless it was a deeply religious one, for Luther and the Reformation were considered only against the background of revealed truth. This religious attitude changed essentially
towards the end of the seventeenth century. Now, besides theologians, intellectuals among the laity began to study the theological problems of the Reformation. In 1692 Veit Ludwig von Seckendorf's *Historia Lutheranismi* appeared. The author, a practical statesman, examined the Reformation from an historical viewpoint instead of evaluating it, as had been done in the past, in terms of dogma. Here Luther, besides being the instrument of Providence, became a living man full of warmth and passion. It is worth noting that von Seckendorf regarded as Luther's main work his translation of the Bible and not his doctrine.

With Leibnitz we have a new approach to the Reformation. The unity of the Church was in his eyes more important than the tenets of the different confessions. For him the Church and Christianity were the important thing. While still Lutheran in his emphasis on the role of conscience, he was quite at variance with the traditions of the Lutheran Church in his slight regard for dogma. Pietism arose with Spener. Stressing the Bible more than Luther's writings Spener venerated Luther more for the freedom of conscience he had brought to the world than for the true doctrine. He thus created a Christian subjectivism and individualism, the stuff out of which Pietism was formed. Gottfried Arnold in the Church History published in 1699 praises Luther for his natural talents, generosity, and heroic courage, but he has little use for dogma. He is interested not so much in the content of a man's creed as in the intensity of faith with which he lives. Henceforth, notes Zeeden, there exist in Germany, under the common name of Protestant, two tendencies that continue into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries under the party-names of Orthodox and Liberal, the former stressing the teaching of Luther, the latter Luther's principle of freedom of conscience.

With Johann Semler we come to the critical theology of the Enlightenment. Dogma is completely put aside. The events of the Reformation are considered not from the theological but from the historical viewpoint. A church may be founded on some confession or other, but it has no right to enter into the consciences of its followers and to lay this doctrine on them as a duty. Zeeden goes on to evaluate the contribution of Lessing who, although he held views similar to those of Semler, spoke with greater decision against dogmatic Lutheranism; then the contribution of Frederick the Great. The latter he treats as a man of the world steeped in the views of the Enlightenment rather than as a representative of Lutheran thought. For King Frederick all religions were the same, since none alone possessed the truth.

The continuing change of attitudes towards the main Christian concepts is clearly seen in Johann Herder. Herder was drawn to the human side of Luther, his geniality, his impetuosity. He saw in him a free, strong per-
sonality that aroused interest and enthusiasm, the man who successfully strove for the right of free opinion. Christianity should be free from dogma. For Herder religion was founded on feeling, experience, and national consciousness. After some pages on Johann Hamann and his deep orthodox veneration for Luther coupled with an endeavor to carry out in his life the principles of Luther's teaching—so different an attitude from that of the followers of the Enlightenment—Zeeden concludes with a short but excellent consideration of the effects of the Enlightenment on German Lutheranism.

A forthcoming volume will give the documents from which so many quotations have been given in this book, together with a translation, where necessary. This second volume will, we hope, give an index for both volumes; there is none for the first.

Alma College

EDWARD HAGEMANN, S.J.
“Whereas E. Mach expresses Galileo’s basic question in the indicative mood: ‘How do bodies fall?’ W. Heisenberg transposes it into a conditional formulation: ‘How would they fall, if there were no air resistance?’ These two sentences do not differ merely in grammatical structure. For beneath this superficial difference a more profound disparity is latent. The objectives and the method of research are differently construed . . .” (pp. 38-39). The valuable residue of this analysis is that there is no single and unique conceptual scheme of scientific interpretation of physical experience, universally applicable to all areas of research, but rather plural and alternative schemata, each of which is only relatively independent of the others and valid only within the areas within which it is confirmed. Conceptual schemes, in other words, have an “open texture” which diversified experience progressively and asymptotically fills. Dolch puts it in a manner which is in point of contemporary and ascertained fact altogether unexceptionable, but patently provocative of serious problems in systematic epistemology of conventional type: “The activity of cognizing is a perpetual process wherein whatever is assumed as valid is to be tested and reformulated in terms of ever fresh experiences and in constant correlation with allied ideas. In precise language concept-formation is not the formation of a concept but the reformation [Präzisierung] of a previously moulded and presented idea. The complete significance of a concept, for example, the notion of ‘place,’ is unattainable without a thorough exploration of the phenomena whence the mind extracts the notion and without a constant confrontation of it and other associated ideas. The concept is not just the fruit of intellectual activity. It is a constituent factor in its structure. A concept is consequently not a simple result, a rigid entity, capable of being cognized in the last analysis independently of any other idea. It is rather a dynamic multiplicity-in-unity. Every concept is essentially ‘open’ . . .” (p. 44). This is indeed how physics thinks. Dolch is not here concerned to explain the process in a systematic way. Nor does he try to explain it away. He accepts the situation and indicates its relevance to theology and one of its fundamental problems.

For if there are acknowledged diverse levels in experience and different, alternative, and irreducible ways of interpreting variegated areas, then rifts are found in the inherited homogeneous explanatory scheme of pre-quantum physics, and a “parallel” theological explanation of exceptional events in the realm of phenomena as signa divina is vindicated and rehabilitated as admissible in scientific discourse. For Dolch argues well that the acknowledged shift in the structure of scientific knowledge renders possible and logically necessary a mutual understanding between physics and theology with reference to the possibility and cognoscibility of miracles as such.
For it now appears as assured that (1) the supernatural is not impossible, (2) a visible intersection of this level with experience is not impossible, and (3) a theological interpretation of such points of intersection does not imply a disavowal of the entire scientific and empirical enterprise. To the standardized objection, therefore, that "if there are miracles, then there are no scientific laws," the informed theologian may now reply with good conscience: "just as quantum physics restricts but does not abolish the area of valid application of classical Newtonian concepts and laws, so the presence of miracles restricts in a higher degree but does not abolish the range of valid reference of scientific ideas and laws." It is intended that this correct analogy with contemporary physics should both comfort a besieged theology and commend its overtures with better grace to the modern scientific conscience.

This is a good and sound book. But it is unnecessarily difficult to read, and this for two reasons. First, the author constantly correlates the specific issue of miracles with the very wide and very elevated general theme of comprehensive relationships between science and theology. Decisive points do not always come neat and clean. Secondly, this ore rotundo procedure unduly complicates content, style, and sentence structure. A modest footnote (p. 75) gracefully exempts from the focus of present consideration all miracles secundi ordinis. Although one may easily excuse this exclusion on theoretical considerations and for economical reasons of treatment, practitioners of apologetics, who are alert to classical criticisms of miracles, will perhaps regard this restriction in scope as a damaging omission in point of fact.

There remain two major items of critical inquiry. Is Dolch not aware that the irrepressible thrust of theoretical physics, as illustrated for example in the contemporary Einstein, is to unify at all costs different conceptual schemes under a single, comprehensive one? And can one have today any solid guarantee that both Newtonian mechanics and quantum theory will not (soon?) be integrated and subsumed under a new, unified scientific outlook that will reproduce for posterity a replica in other terms of the blanket homogeneity, universality, and uniformity of the classical mechanics? These are questions that pertain to the logic of Dolch's analysis. In terms of its psychological relevance and apologetic importance, it may be asked whether Dolch does not erroneously assume that Newtonian Mechanism and Naturalism are identified and indissoluble in the consciousness of physicists. This assumption seems contrary to fact. For quantum physicists may still be unalterable and implacable naturalists in fundamental philosophical insights. Finally, when Dolch publishes, as here promised, a fuller treatment of the general topics sketched in this book, it is to be hoped that he will
explore further the implications for philosophy and therefore also for theology of the epistemological character of the newer and spectacularly successful physical sciences.

*Woodstock College*  
JOSEPH T. CLARK, S.J.


The title of this work is doubly deceptive. First of all, it is not, as we might be led to expect, a piece of advanced professional or technical philosophical analysis of the problem of evil. In depth and rigor of argumentation it rarely attains even the level of the ordinary brief technical discussion in Scholastic textbooks but remains most of the time within the limits of everyday common-sense analysis. The author tells us as much in his preface, where he says the work is intended principally for students, educators, pastors, etc. But it is somewhat disappointing to find that his qualification must be taken so literally, since ordinarily even this class of readers would not take up a book with such a title unless they were looking for a more profound and complete treatment than they can find here.

The second deception is the incompleteness of the matter handled. A large portion of the present work is a translation or adaptation of the same author's *Le problème du mal*, published in Rio de Janeiro in 1942. New chapters have been added on the optimism of Malebranche and Leibnitz and on the pessimism of Schopenhauer and Eduard von Hartmann. But unfortunately the general historical survey given in the earlier volume has been considerably reduced, resulting in the unaccountable omission of such key figures in the history of this problem as Plotinus and the Manicheans. Still more unfortunate is the omission of any discussion of moral evil, especially in relation to God's providence and sanctity,—surely an indispensable part of any treatment of the problem of evil which could pretend to be at all complete, even from the philosophical viewpoint.

But perhaps the most serious and disappointing omission in a work professedly dealing with the philosophy of evil is the absence of any detailed analysis of the ontological status or nature of evil in itself, namely, that it cannot consist in any kind of positive being or active hostile force in the universe, as not a few philosophers have maintained, but is merely a *privatio boni debiti in subjecto*, and precisely what this means as distinguished from a simple negation. The only thing approaching such a properly metaphysical analysis which we have been able to find in the book is the following generalized conclusion in the first chapter based on little more than a rather hasty induction from a few examples: "Evil is not simply a negation, a kind
of limitation of being, but an obstacle which bars the way to perfection. It is a tenacious enemy that reduces, impoverishes, destroys. It is a 'privation' rather than a negation; a kind of 'veto' on the orders of immanent finality” (p. 28). The lack of any further explanation of what this obviously technical term “privation” means, plus the danger of misunderstanding or ambiguity inherent in speaking of evil as “an obstacle . . . a tenacious enemy,” leave this analysis seriously incomplete, even for students. It is true that the complete Scholastic analysis is clearly implicit throughout the book. But in a work professing to deal with the philosophy of evil it is just such an important point that we expect to be treated most carefully and explicitly and not taken for granted or left implicit.

As a result of the above limitations neither the specialist nor the serious student of philosophy will find in this book what they are seeking if they are looking for a deeper professional exploration of the philosophical problems connected with the existence of evil in the universe.

The work does, however, make one genuine contribution, namely, its detailed explanation of just how evil manifests itself in the concrete at the different levels of being, inanimate, vegetative, sensitive, and human. It comes to the interesting conclusion (by no means rigorously proved, but with which the reviewer is inclined to agree) that evil properly so called can have meaning only in a context of living beings, endowed with spontaneous immanent finality, where frustration is possible; hence it can have no place in the inanimate world, where all events proceed according to fixed natural laws with no room left for mistakes, tragedies, or privations of what should be.

The author points out clearly, though sometimes with unnecessarily long detours into disputed questions of experimental and metaphysical psychology, how evil on the level of plant life consists only in some variety of organic disorder or frustration unaccompanied by any pain. On the level of sensitive life it consists in both organic disorder and sensible pain, the latter to a large extent playing a role of protective warning for the good of the animal. On the level of human life there is a much wider gamut of evil to which man can be subject, not only organic disorder and sensible pain but above all psychological pain, greatly augmented by man’s peculiar ability to remember the past and to look forward to the future. Here, too, pain plays an important positive role, protective, therapeutic, and stimulative.

The historical chapters are informative and contain a sufficiently solid common-sense criticism of the other positions, though the discussion is not particularly deep or rigorous.

In summary, neither will the specialist find in this book much that is
new nor the student a complete and satisfactory treatment, but a quick
perusal of its contents may be profitably informative for both.

Woodstock College W. Norris Clarke, S.J.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SARTRE. By Peter J. B. Dempsey, O.F.M.Cap.

The title of the present work is ambiguous. It may mean the psychological
doctrines of the author or the psychology of the man. In fact, it does mean
both. Either of the two approaches is legitimate and may yield interesting
results. The author, however, combines them. While he analyzes the ideas
of Sartre, he also interprets them in terms of an analysis of Sartre's per­
sonality, or as Fr. O'Mahoney, O.F.M.Cap., says in his preface, “as a form
of human behavior” which is “conceivably a dangerous approach.” It might
have been better if the two viewpoints had been kept apart. The psycholog­
ical interpretation of why and how an author came to form his ideas has no
bearing on the truth or falsity of his system. False assumptions have some­
times led to valuable results, and an abnormal mind may discover an im­
portant truth. Not to intermingle philosophical and psychological analysis
would have been the easier, since the author’s discussion and criticism of
Sartre's ideas is exhaustive, penetrating, and very much to the point. But
it loses some of its impressiveness by the repeated shifting from one to the
other approach.

The book has two parts. Part I surveys the main doctrines of a psycholog­
ical nature in seven chapters: sources; the world and man; liberty; existential
psychoanalysis; knowledge; imagination; emotion. Part II comprises the
chapters on man, world, and psychology; cognitive processes; emotivity;
freedom. The first part is mainly analysis and discussion; the second is
criticism, to which is added in each chapter a section, “Principles of Solu­
tion,” in which the author shows how the problems of Sartrean philosophy
may be solved on the basis of a sound philosophy.

There are two pages of index and more than four of bibliography. Some
works are missing which might have deserved consideration, e.g., Kuhn,
Encounter with Nothingness, but particularly the whole work of L. Bins­
wanger. To compare the latter’s ideas with those of Sartre would be in­
teresting because Binswanger too depends on phenomenology and Heidegger
on one hand, and on Freud on the other, and also speaks of “existential
analysis.”

The intellectual ancestry of Sartre goes back to Descartes. “Both Des­
cartes and Sartre are men haunted by the spectre of deception. . . . The ob­
session of the former is predominantly operative in the cognitive sphere,
that of the latter extends also to the affective.” Thus begins the brief but instructive chapter on sources. Sartre is well acquainted with the philosophy of his predecessors. Descartes, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, Freud, and the experimentalists as well, contribute to his ideas. The parallel Descartes—Sartre might be carried further: Descartes’ worry concerning deception stems from the scepticism of Montaigne; the uncertainty of Sartre, one would surmise, from Freud and the idea that a mental state might not be what it is believed to be. When certitude vanishes, man is delivered up to scepticism, pessimism, and the overemphasis of the Nought. Out of this mentality arises either the heroicistic attitude of Heidegger or the exaggerated individualism of Sartre. It is regrettable that no consideration is given to the differences of Sartre and Heidegger; see the latter’s *Letter on Humanism*, appended to his *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit* (Bern, 1947).

All his criticism notwithstanding, Fr. Dempsey realizes that there are points in Sartre’s work which must be taken up and questions raised which require answer. His own study is a notable contribution in this direction. He understands Sartre’s endeavor as aiming at a unified idea of human nature, to achieve which is indeed a demand of our days. However false this philosophy, however untenable its last suppositions, it is certainly indicative of a definite intellectual situation with which one has to cope. It is to be hoped that Fr. Dempsey will add to this study on Sartrean psychology another on the whole of this philosophy as set over against other types of “existentialism,” and particularly a more realistic conception.

Anyone interested in the problems and the intellectual climate of the present will find the perusal of this work stimulating and profitable, even though he might resent the numerous misprints, especially in the Latin quotations.

*Georgetown University*  
**RUDOLF ALLERS**


This work, first published in 1938, now appears in its third edition with considerable revision and enlargement. The author’s development of the subject is not a markedly logical construction. The exact “why” of the development along the particular lines chosen is not always clearly evident, but there is a definite basis given in the first chapter, upon which the philosophical discussion of the topics is founded. That philosophical basis seems to be the most fundamental aspect of the book. It is the approach by which you enter all the other chapters. This is the philosophy of form and matter—for matter in some aspects rivals form in importance. The coupling of these
two words makes one think of an Aristotelian philosophy, but the work is neither Aristotelian nor Thomistic except in use of this terminology. The terms must be explained from the context, not in reference to an historical position.

First of all, the whole of created being is explained in terms of matter and form. God is spoken of as Pure Form or Form of Forms. Thus matter is divided, but only by a division of degree, into corporeal and spiritual matter (p. 13). "St. Thomas' objection, I imagine, to calling the potency of pure spirits their matter, and his refusal to admit in man any other matter than his body, was due to an exaggeration of the gulf between corporeal being—matter in ordinary parlance—and spiritual. If however we conceive the distinction as one of degree—a difference in the self-concentration of energy and a corresponding difference in its reality—a minus and a plus in the scale of energy, this objection loses its weight" (p. 28). For St. Thomas matter would thus lose its meaning, for degrees of matter, the more gross and the more subtle, would already be informed matter; and thus his position on the unity of form would be denied; and lastly the vast difference of the notion of potency in the corporeal and the spiritual would be negated, for potency in these two realms is as distant, he believes, as act is from potency. He holds that spiritual matter can only be considered as potency existing or being in act; while matter in the corporeal thing is pure potency to form and in no sense actual.

St. Thomas' objection, it seems, is based not on an exaggeration but on metaphysical principles which are not those of this writer. The pure potency of matter has not the same significance in a philosophy that demands a plurality of forms. But though the plurality is stated and gives an explanation of the organization of a complex living being (pp. 16, 22), yet Mr. Watkin does not clearly face the problem of how the plurality does not exclude unity, especially in view of the very distinct and independent character given form. Form makes an object what it is (p. 9). Form as such cannot change. It is precisely what it is (p. 7). "Matter changes as it assumes different forms" (p. 7). But the nature of anything is form, a "Divine Gift" (p. 34). This form is so positive and complete that it tends to fix things in its own eternal sameness which seems to be that which it has as an idea in the Divine Mind (p. 50). Form seems to be defined in and by itself, not as a principle of a thing, even though he does insist that outside the Divine Mind it cannot exist independently of matter. God, it seems, creates the thing but not the form as form.

Form, he maintains, is what the thing is; it makes a thing to be thus; but what a thing is must also be this or individual. And matter is the principle
of individuation. Each thing is a “this through matter, and is so seen as an existent. Reality, that is to say, consists and must be recognized as consisting of both factors, existence and essence, matter and form” (p. 35). Even though the author modifies this statement slightly in a note saying that “matter gives rise to an existent only by receiving form,” it still is not clear how, in the composite, matter is not the principle of existence, of individuality as well as individuation. He also appears to hold that “thisness,” the aspect of existence, arises from matter and is the contingent aspect, while the “thusness” form, or essence, is necessary and eternal. This point, together with the difficulty of the author’s manner of discussing the subject, is best illustrated by the following: “Therefore since matter is a possibility of receiving form it can have no place in God. This thisness of creatures is a possibility of being thus and thus, a this which could be otherwise than it is. If a thisness must be as such what it is, if, that is to say, a particular thusness must necessarily exist as a thisness, thusness and thisness would be identical, and matter as the possibility of receiving form, a thisness which need not be thus, would disappear.” Could one blame the humorist who defined metaphysics as a study of the “thisness of the this”?

After the study of these basic philosophical notions the author develops his notion of contemplation in senses analogous to religious contemplation. In its purely natural and broadest meaning contemplation, he says, is perception or intellectual intuition in partial fashion of form in the various depths and in the order in which form is found in beings, e.g., metaphysical form, aesthetical form, value or ethical form. This contemplation, however, is an act, a union between the concrete energy of subject and object. And such energy actualized by union in its highest intellectual levels and in the order of being is the very source of freedom and unity. Sociological considerations bear this out.

In the second part he develops the various species of contemplation. To mention but one, the axiological contemplation or contemplation of value or ethical form makes evident again the very absolute and static character of form mentioned in the first chapter. Here the ethical intuitions, intuitions of values showing us a hierarchy of values, i.e., forms of moral good, seem to be given as objectively as the forms of being and in the same evident hierarchy. “For being and value are inseparable because correlative” (p. 235). These values, though forms, are, as it were, the material of ethics, but the formal factor in ethics is the law of love. The choice of value must be guided by this disinterested love. Thus the material as the value, or as desirable, or possessing worth (p. 216), seems opposed to the formal law of love as disinterested. Again the difficulty seems to arise from defining the ethical values.
in such a rigid, objective fashion that they appear in their moral nature absolutely independent of any reference to a voluntary and so moral being. It can be questioned, I think, whether moral values are given in the same way as being is given.

*A Philosophy of Form* is very difficult reading. Aquinas, Bonaventure, and Augustine seem lucid in comparison, but the work is provocative of thought with respect to many problems that are not just surface problems.

*Fordham University*  
Elizabeth G. Salmon


Systems of Social Order is the fifth volume of Herder's new Dictionary of Politics. Here the first fascicle is reviewed. We have become accustomed to expect solid scholarship in Herder's various lexicons and the present volume does not disappoint us. Further guarantee are the names of the editors.

Two world wars have wrought such changes in the social and political orders in the past thirty years that we need to take stock of our social and political philosophy. And that opportunity is here afforded. The titles alone—Anarchism, Bolshevism, Chinese Communism, Existentialism, Familiarism, Fascism, Humanism, Imperialism, Individualism, Interventionism, Capitalism, Collectivism, Communism, Conservatism, Laicism, and Liberalism—give some idea of the richness offered here. All these “isms” are delineated, evaluated, and criticized, where need arises, in the light of natural law and revelation. Also, the papal encyclicals are fully capitalized for all that they can offer on these systems.

Not all of this array is of equal importance or interest. But none are mere pads or outdated. Perhaps the best-handled topics are Waldemar Gurian's treatment of Bolshevism, Chinese Communism by Hermann Sacher, and that on Capitalism. The various contributions by Fr. v. Nell-Breuning hardly need enumeration or commendation. Not only are they solid but the characterizations which he gives of such systems as Communism are invaluable. Of Communism he says that it is a system which attempts to cure symptoms instead of getting at the causes.

The plan envisaged might not have warranted the inclusion of democracy, but it is hard to see how it should be excluded when Chinese Communism merits special attention. There are of course references to democracy, though not very favorable ones. But the merits of the book far outweigh any such doubtful defects. We eagerly await the second part of this volume.

*Woodstock College*  
Hugh J. Bihler, S.J.
The most significant distinction of *Quadragesimo anno* as compared with *Rerum novarum* is that Pius XI thought the time ripe for the "reconstruction of the social order," for the "reorganization of social economy," while *Rerum novarum* was mostly concerned with immediate remedies to improve the "condition of workers" in industrial capitalism, by means of self-help and social legislation. As an essential part of this reconstruction of the social order and the redemption of the proletariat—a significant analogy—Pius XI proposed, together with the diffusion of property and the promotion of the society contract instead of the labor contract, the reorganization of our society around the functional groups, i.e., according to the product or service which both, labor and capital or management, contribute as their share to the economic common good by actual co-operation. Pius XI thought that the present social organization around the labor market and the essential opposition of interests therein, result in a class society with incessant class struggles. Now if economic society were organized instead according to function, i.e., into vocational groups of production and service in which labor and capital share a common interest by their daily *de facto* co-operation, a more organic and peaceful form of society would result. This would be so much the more true if these groups were given a wide degree of self-government in the legal form of public corporations and charged with the tasks of social security, etc., which today threaten to transform the overburdened social legislation state into an all-provider state (*Versorgungsstaat*). For this latter trend is caused by the structure of the class society and its often bitter class struggles which the state wants to alleviate by constant intervention and expanding social legislation. The more the administrative state expands, the more the two opposing classes are interested in getting political control of this all-provider state, and thus the economic class struggle becomes also a political struggle for the state apparatus. This makes it all too difficult for the state to fulfill its primary function of lending to the lower societies and economic groups the legal forms for the autonomous fulfillment of their functions and social services and of becoming the impartial social umpire over the group interests or class interests, guided only by the objective common good.

The Pope proposes, then, a functional or vocational organization of society in which these co-operative groups, legally vested as public corporations, have the right and the duty to regulate their interests, their disputes, social security problems, labor relations, etc., in self-government (instead of this being done by centralized national state agencies). Such a vocational
group order could then be charged with the execution of the general economic policy, the determination of which would be the right and the duty of the state.

Catholic social thought, especially in France and Germany, for many years made similar proposals after having rid the idea of the corporative or vocational group order of the medievalism in which it had been steeped by Romanticism. More recently it carefully distinguished its idea of this order, wholly compatible, nay, even congenial, with democracy, from the fascist "corporative state." For fascism first and then nazism had kidnapped merely the name of this genuine product of Catholic social thought for their own ideological propaganda and for the establishment of their totalitarian states. They had thus falsified the very essence of the idea of this order for which autonomy, far-reaching self-government, and free political institutions are essential.

The kidnapping of this excellent idea and the rise of totalitarianism and the coming World War II—a necessarily total war and one with a total-war economy for belligerents and neutrals alike—and the continuance of such a war economy for the lack of an enduring peace, all these have produced a silence even in Catholic circles about the corporative order. The immediate problems of a war economy have pushed the question of a reorganization of the social order into the background.

Any book treating the corporative and vocational group order is, therefore, to be greeted with thanks and approval, and so is the translation of Fr. Azpiazu's book. This reviewer regrets only that the title uses the term "state" instead of corporative "order" or "society." Pius XI and most Catholic writers—with the exception of Spann and his disciples and the Austrians—were careful to avoid this term for obvious reasons. Otherwise the book is quite a reliable introduction—not more—to the idea, the problems, and the literature of the corporative order. The author is familiar with the rather extensive French and German literature, and for this reason alone the translation is worthwhile. Fr. Azpiazu is rightly critical of Othmar Spann's universalism and is always careful to distinguish the corporativism of our Catholic tradition from the many simulated corporativisms which have abused a good idea for political ideologies incompatible with it. Another merit of the book is that it shows how many modern socio-economic institutions, products of social expediency, though they were never intended to further the vocational group order, nevertheless can easily serve its development.

The book is divided into three parts: the corporative society, the corporative economy, the corporative state. In each part the author introduces
the reader to often involved problems and the appropriate literature; he also discusses the diverse schools of thought concerned. Where the book reports on the practical attempts to realize the corporative or vocational group order, many a reader interested in this order will be struck by a feeling of resignation. For the author can only discuss Franco’s Spain, Salazar’s Portugal, and the ephemeral Austrian Ständestaat of the martyred Dollfuss. All authoritarian, though by no means totalitarian, states! Is this a sign of an inner affinity between the corporative order and the non-democratic authoritarian state? The vital question with which this reviewer and many of his friends have always been concerned, namely, the compatibility, nay, the affinity, of free democratic political institutions with the corporative order of society, is scarcely touched by the author. But this will be the definitive test of corporativism. It must be shown that the free democratic state and the values meant and implied by this term need not be sacrificed either to a totally planned economy of centralizing socialism or to a reactionary return to neo-liberal capitalism. A third choice is left: political and personal liberty, i.e., democracy and the corporative constitution of social economy. The author fails to elaborate on this third choice, yet it is a task urgently needed.

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H. Rommen

DESCRIPTIVE NOTICES


A combination notebook and guide for a survey course in the history of the Israelites. The historical portions of the Old Testament are outlined, but, while the author states that he has included data from history and archaeology that are pertinent to an intelligent study of the Old Testament, still the only references in the outlines are to the biblical texts to be read. The difficulty with a simplified textbook like this is the fact that not only are no problems treated but there are no indications that problems exist.


As the result of thirty years’ work on the text of the New Testament H. J. Vogels was able to produce a critical text for students which now appears in a third edition. The book is very attractively printed and easier
to handle than most manual editions. In his critical apparatus the author does not give as many variants as does Merk and he limits himself to the principal texts. The Latin is the Sixto-Clementine Vulgate, but the readings of Wordsworth and White are added in the apparatus. Priests, seminarians, and educated laymen would do well to consider buying a copy. The first volume, containing the Gospels and Acts (cf. THEOLOGICAL STUDIES, XI [1950], 141-42), costs DM 9 and the entire New Testament in one volume is priced at DM 15.

A reproduction in a two hundred and fifty page book of the author’s article, “Judaïsme,” in the Dictionnaire de la Bible, Supplément. That article was, in turn, an abridgement of Père Bonsirven’s two-volume work, Le judaïsme palestinien au temps de Jésus-Christ, sa théologie.


The background and essential method of Müller’s Athanasian Lexicon were sketched in the notice given to fascicles 1–4 in THEOLOGICAL STUDIES, XI (1950), 268–69. Fascicles 5–9 take us from θεός to τόξος, and leave but one fascicle for the completion of this monument of patient, exacting research.


The full title indicates very well the contents of the work: The Treatise of the Pseudo-Augustine on the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary and Its Influence on Latin Theology of the Assumption. The treatise is dated in the Carolingian period and assigned tentatively to Alcuin. Its background, contents, and method are analyzed, then its influence traced up to present times. This is done with a thoroughness that is the work’s best recommendation, but makes it difficult to read. The most interesting parts are those which show the struggle between Alcuin’s treatise and the sceptical Pseudo-Jerome to gain the upper hand, with Alcuin winning out by turning into the Pseudo-Augustine.

In this introduction to dogmatic theology a number of problems usually treated in the tracts on revelation and the Church are taken up in somewhat greater detail than is possible there. These include the existence and knowability of mysteries, theological notes and censures, ecclesiastical faith, and the development of dogma. The author discusses the scope and divisions of dogmatic theology, and gives a brief outline of its history. The bibliographies are comprehensive and up-to-date. There is no index.


An attractively printed dictionary of Catholic doctrine for educated laymen. Each entry includes a brief bibliography on the topic under discussion; the original bibliographies have been revised and augmented for English readers. These references are for the most part excellent, but one wonders why articles in standard reference works are repeatedly referred to. The articles are gems of precise, concise statement of philosophical thought and Catholic dogma. Inevitably, there are inadequacies. Thus tradition is treated as though the concept were formally identified with the passive or objective element; and the revised bibliography on State and Church omits any reference to the current American contribution.


Forty-seven pages of commentary following the Latin text of *Humani generis* and the author's own translation make this book a valuable introduction to the encyclical and, in the words of the author, “a stimulus to a more intensive study of it.” The commentary is paragraph by paragraph, thus avoiding overemphasis of any one topic, and is general in nature. The headings and subheadings of the commentary provide a very clear and helpful outline.


This is a reprint of a biography originally published in 1930. Designed for the general reader, it makes no claim to completeness; rather its author has used the chief events of Newman's life as a woof on which to weave his impressions of, and responses to, the richness and beauty of an outstanding personality and character. Written in a smooth and rhythmic style that does
justice to the nobility of the figure it portrays, it should stimulate readers to pass on to Newman's own writings and to the more scholarly biographies and commentaries.


The quantity and quality of the archival material which is the main source of this study, make this work worthy of note. The title describes the contents accurately; obviously this monograph is a book for specialists.


A small anthology of Jewish thought on those elements of law and custom which have a bearing on family life. Fifteen scholars and leaders contribute essays which provide not only information on Jewish traditions but also stimulating insights for anyone concerned over contemporary dangers to home life. The critique of the "sacramental theory" of marriage (p. 149 ff.) is quite inadequate.


In this doctoral dissertation at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto, the author sets himself the task of discovering in its purity Aristotle's doctrine of being in the *Metaphysics*. His method would combine all the resources of modern historical research with a healthy measure of philosophical reflection, but his approach is, in intent, simply that of the "hearer," unbiased by any medieval or modern prejudices. He therefore seeks first of all to determine the order in which Aristotle would have us read his metaphysical treatises—their methodical sequence—and secondly, following out that order, to glean from each what is pertinent to his problem. His findings are conveniently summarized in the concluding chapter.


This manual contains the usual theses of the Scholastic cosmology, with considerably clearer explanations than usual. It includes good summaries of modern physics and mathematics, covering such matters as relativity, inde-
terminism, non-Euclidian geometries, etc. The judgments on these theories are cautious and, for the most part, based on the careful distinction between the subjectivity of measurement and the objectivity of reality. The volume also includes a good treatment of inorganic compounds, with some of the author's solutions to problems arising from his fine historical treatment of subatomic structure.


This historical introduction to the problem of the relation between the concept of law and the philosophy of intellect and will offers an analysis of that relation as expressed or implied in the writings of twelve leading Scholastic thinkers. As will or intellect is assigned the primacy in the nature of man, so the concept of law and consequently of obligation will vary. The author points out a particular consequence of this relation in the question of purely penal law. He concludes with a description of subsidiary problems and a plea for the proper understanding of the true nature of man.


Fr. Prentice restricts his scope to an analysis of St. Bonaventure's doctrine on purely human, natural love. After a consideration of the affective potency itself and of love in general, he devotes considerable space to the problem of self-centered love and altruistic love. There are illuminating comparisons with such writers as Scheler and Rousselot.


The present volume of *ZntW* includes, among others, the following articles: W. Eltester, "Christianity and the Crisis of the Ancient World" (pp. 1–19); R. Abramowski, "The Theological Legacy of Diodore of Tarsus" (pp. 19–69); M. Pohlenz, "Paul and the Stoa" (pp. 69–104); F. Büchsel, "Paul's Formula 'In Christ'" (pp. 141–58). J. Sickenberger, "Two New Expositions of the Adultery Clause in Matthew," deals with the investigations of A. Allgeier, *Angelicum*, XX (1943), 128–42, and of K. Staab, *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie*, LXVII (1943), 36–44.
BOOKS RECEIVED

[All books received are listed here whether they are reviewed or not]

Scriptural Studies


Iglesias, Eduardo, S. J. El Apocalipsis. 2a ed. Mexico, Buena Prensa, 1951. viii, 495 p. $3.15.


Roberts, Bleddyn J. The Old Testament text and versions; the Hebrew text in transmission and the history of the ancient versions. Cardiff, Univ. of Wales Press, 1951. xv, 326 p. 21s.


Doctrinal Theology

Balducelli, Ruggero. Il concetto teologico di carità attraverso le maggiori interpretazioni patristiche e medievali di I ad Cor. XIII. Rome, Catholic Book Agency, 1951. 244 p. (Thesis—Catholic University of America)


Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald, O. P. Our Savior and His love for us; tr. by A. Bouchard. St. Louis, B. Herder, 1951. xii, 398 p.

Thomas Aquinas, Saint. On the virtues (in general); tr. with introd. and notes by John Patrick Reid, O.P. Providence, R.I., Providence College Press, 1951. xxix, 188 p. Paper $2.00, cloth $3.00.

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**Theological Studies**

**Moral Theology, Canon Law, Liturgical Questions**


García Gutiérrez, Jesús, comp. Bulario de la Iglesia Mejicana; documentos relativos a erecciones, desmembraciones, etc. de diócesis mejicanas. Mexico, Buena Prensa, 1951. 595 p. $6.25.

Good, Frederick L. Marriage, morals and medical ethics, by Frederick L. Good and Reverend Otis F. Kelly. N.Y., Kenedy, 1951. xvi, 202 p. $3.50.


**History and Biography, Patristics**


Bosher, Robert S. The making of the Restoration settlement; the influence
of the Laudians, 1649-1662. N.Y., Oxford Univ. Press, 1951. xvi, 309 p. $5.00.

Endrody, Ladislao, S.J. Esteban Kaszap: La vida por Cristo! Tr. del húngaro por el Dr. D. Antonio Sancho. 4a ed. castellana. Mexico, Buena Prensa, 1951. 276 p. $.75.

Grabmann, Martin. The interior life of St. Thomas Aquinas; presented from his works and the acts of his canonization process; tr. by Nicholas Ashenbrener, O.P. Milwaukee, Bruce, 1951. ix, 92 p. $2.75.


Schuster, Ildephonse, O.S.B., Cardinal. Saint Benedict and his times; tr. by Gregory J. Roettger, O.S.B., with a preface by Alcuin Deutsch, O.S.B. St. Louis, B. Herder, 1951. ix, 396 p. $6.00.


**Ascetical Theology, Devotional Literature**


Mindszenty, Josef, Cardinal. The face of the heavenly Mother; tr. from the German by Charles Donahue. N.Y., Philosophical Library, 1951. vii, 150 p. $3.00.

Puente, Luis de la, S.J. God’s friendship; selections from the meditations of the venerable servant of God Luis de la Puente, S.J.; tr. and supplemented by John M. Thill. Milwaukee, Bruce, 1951. x, 215 p. $3.50.

**Philosophical Questions**

Bourke, Vernon J. Ethics, a textbook in moral philosophy. N.Y., Macmillan, 1951. xii, 497 p. $4.25.

Bryar, William. St. Thomas and the existence of God; three interpretations. Chicago, H. Regnery, 1951. xxv, 252 p. $5.00.


Runes, Dagobert D., ed. Spinoza dictionary; with a foreword by Albert Einstein. N.Y., Philosophical Library, 1951. xiv, 309 p. $5.00.

Williams, Gardner, Humanistic ethics. N.Y., Philosophical Library, 1951. xii, 223 p. $3.75.

**Special Questions**


Bokser, Ben Zion, Rabbi. The wisdom of the Talmud; a thousand years of Jewish thought. N.Y., Philosophical Library, 1951. xx, 180 p. front. $3.75.

Brod, Max. The Master [a novel]; tr. from the German "Der Meister" by Heinz Norden. New York, Philosophical Library, 1951. 426 p. $4.75.


Herberg, Will. Judaism and modern man; an interpretation of Jewish religion. N.Y., Farrar Straus & Young, 1951. xi, 313 p. $4.00.


Moore, Thomas Verner, O.S.B. The nature and treatment of mental dis-
orders; foreword by Edward A. Strecker. 2d enlarged ed. N.Y., Grune & Stratton, 1951. x, 362 p. $5.50.
Rowley, H. H. Submission in suffering and other essays on eastern thought. Cardiff, Univ. of Wales Press, 1951. ix, 170 p. 12/6