BOOK REVIEWS


It is generally conceded that the average American's knowledge of the short course of events which comprise the history of his own nation, except for a few famous names and dates which have been dinned into his consciousness, is woefully vague and leaves much to be desired. And when it comes to the cultural, religious, or historical background of nations more physically removed in space, especially of those which have been traditionally considered primitive, occult, and inferior, such as the nations of the Orient, a state of ignorance is approached which may well be called abysmal. Here again, a few key names such as Confucius, Buddha, and Mohammed may be known, or terms such as Nirvana or Zen may be recalled, but even in cultured and educated circles it would be difficult to find anyone able to develop these themes with accuracy, intelligence, or understanding.

Father Ring has done just that. At a time when oriental nations are intruding themselves upon our international consciousness, he has brought forth a brief but accurate and highly readable account of their corporate vicissitudes with divinity, and the external manifestations of this in their national existence.

The word "brief" is used with regard to this book only in a relative sense; it is brief in relation to the vastness of its subject matter. And on this account it must be said that second only to Father Ring's precise, scholarly research is to be placed his power to endow necessary catalogues of persons, places, and dates with vivid and sustained interest.

The book has five generic divisions which may be said to fall roughly into two main categories, namely, the agent stimuli and the reactionary subjects. The last two sections of the book deal with the stimuli, and treat the international religions of Buddhism and Islam, their chief tenets and dogmatic evolutions, and their roles as spiritual catalysts in the religious and secular histories of the various Eastern peoples. The first three sections delineate the reactions to varying creeds of the three main national groups of the Orient: China, Japan, and India. It is a weary tale, generally, of fluctuating fervor based upon naive credulity culminating in despair or the hope of annihilation.

In China, a lofty concept of the Absolute was achieved, and the moral maxims of Confucius helped to channel an already healthy, natural virtue, but Fr. Ring, observing the tragedy of Chinese religious decay through the centuries, is forced to conclude: "That a people of such capabilities for good is in fact so scourged on in the path of base superstition can scarcely be
explained except on the supposition that it is demon ridden. . . . They turn attention from Tien (the Absolute) to fantastic idols, garble the testimony of conscience to the soul's dignity and destiny, substitute for aspirations for light and grace a vain solicitude for material prosperity.”

And Japan had even less to start with. The legendary gods of early Shintoism never evolved beyond “the embryonic stage of numina . . . and the very primitive character of cult practices reveals the extreme poverty of religious ideas and aspirations in Japan's native religion.” Then, when Japan sought firmer metaphysical foundations to strengthen the tenets of its primitive mythical beliefs, and turned to the Buddhism of its cultural parent China, it asked for bread and received a stone. Shintoism merged with Buddhism, and the resulting composite was a vague syncretism fraught with the defects of both systems.

Frustration, therefore, and betrayal in the quest for Truth is the theme which integrates the religious history of the entire Orient. It is a disheartening motif, but it serves to illuminate the causes which brought Asia to its present plight. With this book as a background, it is simple to comprehend why the Orient has succumbed to the creed of Communism. It is because the East is still seeking the Absolute. Communism offers positive tenets with cold logic to the intellectuals seeking certainty, and jingoistic rituals to the masses seeking direction and security. Sadly, however, the present is merely another episode in the tragedy of their religious betrayal.

Father Ring portrays the background clearly and objectively and allows the reader to draw his own conclusions concerning the present and future.

*Weston College*

T. Martin Curran, S.J.


This latest number in the Herntrich-Weiser commentaries on the Old Testament maintains the high standard of the other volumes already published. Dr. Weiser is a competent scholar, familiar with modern critical methods. Following in the footsteps of Gunkel and Mowinckel, who are credited with cracking the Wellhausen line of historical postulates concerning the Old Testament, he finds explanation for much of the psalm material in Israel's own cultic traditions of pre-exilic days. He recognizes too the inner spiritual vitality of Israel's religion, which enabled it to assimilate external elements from the mixed culture of Canaan without losing its own identity.
Jahweh's revelation at Sinai, and the covenant entered into there, had made a profound impression on the twelve tribes of Israel. Dr. Weiser sees in those events the roots from which developed the Israelite liturgy and the sacred literature connected with it. Avoiding the exaggerations of Gunkel and Mowinckel, he arrives at some conclusions of his own. Thus he frankly admits that there is no evidence for Mowinckel's thesis of a special Jahweh-Enthronement Festival. He believes, however, that the Jahweh-Enthrone-ment idea of such psalms as 47, 93, and 96–99 was but a part of a Covenant-Renewal Festival.

Dr. Weiser's treatment, in spite of his overloaded German sentences, is fascinating, and stimulating too to further study. He himself feels that his investigations have brought into a better perspective not only the Psalms but also some of the other Old Testament scriptures as well. Before tackling individual psalms, the student will profit by working carefully through the Introduction, particularly the sections entitled Die kultischen Grundlagen der Psalmdichtung, Die Psalmen im Bundesfestkult (Liturgische Stücke), Die Gattungen der Psalmen. Although the book was supposedly designed for the educated laity of the German Evangelical Church, it merits the attention of scholars, and no doubt will get it both pro and con.

St. Mary's Seminary, Baltimore

E. A. CERNY, S.S.


This is the second volume in the series of Jewish Apocryphal Literature, published by The Dropsie College of Philadelphia, under the chairmanship of President Abraham A. Neuman. Moses Hadas, Associate Professor of Greek and Latin at Columbia, has presented us with a model of scholarly editing joined with a clear and idiomatic translation of this valuable Jewish document. An Introduction of ninety pages provides the reader with a thorough orientation on the background, date, purpose, and literary character of the work, which is, of course, not a letter, but, as the author himself twice states, a diegesis (narratio), a recognized ancient literary form embodying conscious artistry. Allowing the author, then, to embellish his narrative according to the accepted canons of this genre, we will not be put off, any more than the first readers were, by the inconsistencies or exaggerations which appear in the Letter. For Aristeas was not writing an objective chronicle of events but a literary piece calculated to produce a sense of legitimate pride in Judaism among his co-religionists of Alexandria.

Professor Hadas, after summarizing and endorsing the arguments against
the alleged author, a pagan Greek named Aristeas, and the alleged date, the reign of Ptolemy II Philadelphus (285–247 B.C.), examines in detail the internal and external evidence for dating the book. Quite apart from the problem being directly attacked, the reader will find in these pages invaluable information together with first-class bibliography on conditions in Palestine and Alexandria during the last two centuries of the pre-Christian era. A typographical slip on page 51, footnote 78, can easily be corrected.

Where the editor feels that he is going beyond his depth he has had the good sense to rely on authoritative studies by Tcherikover, Bickermann, Tarn, along with several lengthy notes appended by the editor-in-chief of the series, S. Zeitlin. Though conclusive evidence for the date of the composition is, up to now, wanting, few will object to Professor Hadas' hypothetical date of 130 B.C., with extreme limits 150–100 B.C.

The author, on page 55, makes a good point which will broaden the scholarly approach to the Letter of Aristeas. Whereas it is customary to study the Letter for the light it sheds on Alexandrian Judaism and Christian origins, Hadas pleads also for a study of it as a Greek book, addressed to an audience already well-familiarized with Greek writings. The Introduction ends with a sketch of modern Aristeas study and a complete bibliography, including texts, translations, critical studies, and background material dealing with the history and literature of the period. No one will blame Hadas for not mentioning the Protopresbyter Oeconomus whose four fantastic volumes (Athens, 1844–49) are simply an uninformed polemic against Humphrey Hody who first (1705) conclusively demonstrated the fictitious character of Aristeas.

The text of the Letter, in very legible Greek font, is that of H. St.J. Thackeray, reproduced without change from Swete's Introduction to the Old Testament in Greek. I noticed one typographical fault on page 116 at the end of # 41. The English translation meets every requirement of that delicate art and reveals the scholar's easy familiarity with Greek texts. Even allowing for the excellence of H. G. Meecham's The Letter of Aristeas, it is very likely that, from now on, Hadas' compact, scholarly volume will be the standard text for students. That it should be studied, as an important addition to our intertestamental literature and accordingly of value to students of both the Old and New Testament, will be clear from even a cursory reading. We can only congratulate the Dropsie College and its editorial board on the high standard of this volume and express the hope that succeeding publications in the same series will compare favorably with this splendid contribution of Professor Hadas.

Weston College

Fredrick L. Moriarty, S.J.
This book is a comparative study of the sacred banquet in the religions of the world. The sacred banquet is defined as “any taking of food and drink (or drink alone) which stands in a relationship to the ‘holy’ and derives from this relationship its sacral meaning and value.” This definition itself exhibits one characteristic of the book: it is dominated by the ideas and the terminology of Otto. What gives the book its interest is not the vastness of the territory covered, nor the number of items adduced; the size of the book does not permit an encyclopedic treatment. Bammel has synthesized the phenomena of the sacred banquet under a single classification, that of the relation of the sacred banquet to life—“human existence.” This he subdivides into vital existence, sociological existence, “spiritual” (seelisch-geistige) existence, and external existence. “Vital” existence means animal life, whether as begun, preserved, or heightened by a growth of the vital powers. Sociological existence is the life of the group: the family, the clan, the tribe, the people, the city, professional and religious societies. “Spiritual” existence is the life of man in harmony with the divine; the sacred banquet confers or preserves this by its expiatory, ethical, or revelatory character. Eternal life means either the preservation of the body from final decay, or the transfiguration of the soul into a new mode of existence which is fully “spiritual,” free of the animal element, and, in some beliefs, preserved from a threat of eternal destruction. Bammel then summarizes the common elements in all sacred banquets, and indicates the distinctive features of certain rites.

For the Catholic theologian, the chief interest of the book lies in the treatment of the Eucharist. Let it be said at once that it is, except for a few lapses, generally respectful; and these lapses appear due rather to the author’s imperfect acquaintance with Catholic teaching. Most of Bammel’s documentation for the Eucharist is taken from the missals, ancient and modern, including the Missale Romanum; besides these, he quotes several of the Fathers, although not in abundance, the Council of Trent a few times, and very few modern Catholic theologians; he has taken Karl Adam as the spokesman of modern Catholic theology. Transubstantiation and the Real Presence are mentioned only once, as far as the reviewer can gather, except for a reference to “theophagy” which deals only with an ancient Greek liturgy. Bammel’s discussion of the Eucharist is weakened by his treatment of Catholic and Reformed doctrines as variations of a single Christian belief.

Arguing from the liturgies, Bammel finds that the Eucharist is significant
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for all the meanings of "life." Its vital significance he deduces from the collects mentioning such things as harvest increase, fecundity, and therapy. In one quotation he is misled; he takes *salus* in a vital sense where it has a spiritual meaning. His treatment of the Eucharist as a social rite is weak and this is surprising; the New Testament alone, not to mention the liturgies and the Fathers, afford ample material for the development of this idea. The theory which he, with others, accepts, that the "quiet of the land" of Jewish sources were a distinct religious society, of which Jesus and His disciples were members, and that the Last Supper was a communal meal of the group, has no support in the New Testament. His treatment of the expiatory-purgative character of the Eucharist is more extended; unlike some writers, he admits a continuity between the Gospels, primitive Christianity, and modern ritual and doctrine. He does not admit the same continuity for the idea of bodily immortality as a fruit of the Eucharist, basing his denial on the theory of two eschatological conceptions in the New Testament. The offering of the Eucharist for the dead he finds to be an indication of the lack of distinction between the sacrificial and the sacramental effect of the Eucharist; this misunderstanding could have been avoided by a more careful consultation of theological literature.

He finds, finally, that the Eucharist is a unique sacred banquet; and its distinctive feature is its "materially and formally dominant soteriological orientation"—"the temporal and eternal welfare of the soul." The same orientation appears in other rites, such as those of Mithra; but Bammel does not admit a true comparison between the Eucharist and these rites. The early belief in the Real Presence is likened, unfortunately, to the primitive magic of "numinous apperception"; and Bammel is at pains to show that this primitive element is altogether eliminated in the more spiritual view of the Eucharist in the Reformed churches. But, at the same time, the dominance of faith—"although in a different direction"—in the Catholic doctrine makes Catholic Eucharistic teaching altogether different from the primitive belief in a power-laden substance.

The book suffers from some careless proofreading in its quotations from other languages. An end-pocket contains a chart which presents, at one glance, Bammel's division of the significance of the sacred banquet and those rites which fall into each division.

*West Baden College*  

JOHN L. MCKENZIE, S.J.


This posthumous work is the second contribution by Father Boudou to
the well-known series *Verbum Saluitis*. Some few years back he contributed to this collection an excellent commentary on the Acts of the Apostles, but before his commentary on the pastoral epistles could be published, he was called to his eternal reward. The manuscript, which fortunately he had completed before his death, was edited by Father Joseph Huby, S.J., who added references to works which appeared since 1940, and which the war or death made it impossible for Father Boudou to consult.

The introduction contains a competent discussion on the points which are its usual object of investigation and discussion. Particularly excellent is the case that the author makes for the authenticity of the pastoral epistles. A rather detailed analysis of each epistle is given. Such analyses are always helpful to the student towards grasping the general contents and the trend of ideas and their logical nexus in a biblical book.

Then follow the translation and commentary. The text in translation of each logical unit of the epistle is given, and then the commentary. The order of epistles is I Tim., Titus, II Tim., which is determined by the chronological order of their composition.

The translation is literal, but clear, and the commentary, while not such as to add anything new to the knowledge of the specialist in the field of the Pauline epistles, will most assuredly prove very helpful to the educated laity and to priests and bishops who wish to have a better insight into these epistles whose contents make them especially suitable for the clergy’s study and meditation.

*St. Mary’s Seminary, Perryville, Mo.*

J. L. LILLY, C.M.


The New Testament carries the glad tidings of man’s release from sin. At the same time it holds out the grim warning that sin still menaces the race. Luther was led by his theological prejudices to solve the seeming contradiction with the thesis that the Christian is *simul peccator et iustus*, a position that has not yet been fully rejected by Protestant exegesis. What non-Catholic scholarship has repeatedly essayed in the field of Pauline research, has now been done by a Catholic for the whole New Testament. Dr. Kirchgässner’s monograph thoroughly and scientifically investigates the problem of sin from the standpoint of New Testament biblical theology, and may well be accepted by both Catholics and Protestants as the definitive work on the subject.

The first half of the book is devoted to a study of St. Paul’s epistles, from which Luther drew his thesis. Since the contention that redeemed man
is *simul peccator et iustus* was long regarded as the central point of Reformation theology, it has attracted the attention of Protestant divines and has been the subject of many books. The history of non-Catholic thought about the question is reviewed by Dr. Kirchgässner in his opening chapter. In the course of the discussions, misgivings gradually developed about Luther's fidelity to St. Paul. The controversy took a new turn with the publication, in 1897, of P. Wernle's *Der Christ und die Sünde bei Paulus*, which stoutly maintains a discrepancy between the Pauline and the Reformation idea of Christian man. On the other hand, Wernle found in St. Paul himself an insoluble contradiction between the doctrine, expressed in the indicative, that the Christian is free from sin, and the exhortations, expressed in the imperative, which urge him to sinlessness. Most of the subsequent works endeavor to explain this antinomy. The interpretations proposed may in general be ranged in four classes: (1) Paul regards the Christian as simultaneously justified and sinful; (2) Paul's doctrine contains a contradiction between the theory of the sinless Christian and the exhortation to sinlessness; (3) the indicative in St. Paul represents an ideal of sinlessness to be striven for without complete success; (4) the indicative and the imperative must in some way be harmonized without impairment of either. The survey therefore brings into the open the inner core of the question: how is St. Paul's declaration of sinlessness in the Christian related to his insistent demand that sin must be avoided? In other words, what is the true meaning of the indicative in St. Paul's doctrine of redemption? This is the problem the author sets out to solve by means of an exhaustive study of all the epistles.

The thorough research, conducted in a spirit of rigorous criticism, careful attention to context and parallel texts, and reflection on the findings of other exegesis, leads to a series of definite conclusions. On conversion to Christianity, the sins of pre-Christian life are forgiven, and the punishment due to those sins is remitted. The Christian is truly sinless, so that a description of him as simultaneously justified and sinful is absolutely unwarranted and has no basis in Pauline doctrine. Furthermore, apart from the lesser daily failings which scarcely enter into Paul's reflections, the Christian is capable of leading a sinless life, and indeed the normal Christian does not sin. Yet the possibility of sinning remains; danger threatens the Christian from within, as the concupiscence rooted in the body continues to exert its power, and also from without, for the devil and the world still assail him.

The relation between the indicative, that is, the declaration that the redeemed Christian is not a sinner but is free from sin, and the imperative, or the command not to sin, flows from the cooperation between God and man
in the process of redemption from its inauguration to its final consummation. God has the initiative; He it is who brings about man's salvation, He it is who effects in man the power to will and to act. Salvation is and remains a grace. Man's activity is undoubtedly required; but man is set to his activity by God Himself. Life, in Paul's teaching, is not passive but is essentially active. Man has to work out his salvation in fear and trembling; he has to overcome the enticements of concupiscence; he has to labor all his days to die to himself and to put on Christ, until at the end Christ may be fully formed in him. The ethical imperative is not an incidental afterthought, but is implied in the very essence of Christian life; it involves, negatively, an unremitting conflict against the flesh and sin, and demands, positively, the performance of good works under the impulse of the Spirit of Christ. Dr. Kirchgässner concludes his study of St. Paul with the wise remark that the indicative and imperative in St. Paul do not fit together nicely in a way to satisfy our desire for rational unification; for their content is the mystery of the divine life in man.

In the second half of the book the author examines all the remaining writings of the New Testament for the light they throw on the problem. In the Synoptic Gospels conversion emerges as the central idea of the imperative as well as of the indicative. Through the work of Jesus, the redeemed convert is granted full pardon of his sins, and in his complete surrender to the divine will is made capable of striving for godlikeness. All those who believe in Jesus and accordingly accomplish God's will, may look forward confidently to eternal happiness; those who reject faith are under the menace of everlasting punishment. In the Acts of the Apostles the Christian, converted in response to God's grace, has thereby cooperated in his liberation from sin, and baptism effectively cleanses him from all stain of iniquity; normally he then goes on to lead a sinless life. The First Epistle of St. Peter depicts the Christian as one who, having been rescued from sin and punishment, is called upon and is made able to shun moral evil. The decisive motive for guiltless conduct is mainly the new being the Christian has received, and more proximately the fact that he belongs to the holy people of the latter age of the world. The Second Epistle of St. Peter is dominated by the image of the sinless man. Through Christ he has become a partaker of the divine nature; he is enabled to lead a blameless life, and has no need to fear God's judgment. If he should happen to sin, the way to conversion and pardon is open to him through God's never-failing goodness.

Among the books of the New Testament, the First Epistle of St. John treats most clearly of the relation between redemption and sin. The other two epistles expand or confirm the doctrine, and the Gospel gives precious
developments. Our Lord’s expiatory sacrifice takes away guilt and punishment, and equips us to live sinlessly. The Christian is begotten by God with a birth that imparts the power to avoid sin and, indeed, in a certain sense, makes sin impossible. The author discusses various interpretations of I John 3:9: “Whosoever is born of God committeth not sin; for His seed abideth in him, and he cannot sin, because he is born of God.” The solution favored as most satisfactory is that sin cannot coexist with the seed of life that gives to the Christian his true character; as far as this gift of God is concerned, sin is not only abnormal, but is completely unintelligible. The use of the neuter in I John 5:4: “Whatsoever is born of God overcometh the world,” indicates that the real subject of the victory is not man but the might of God dwelling in him; the seed of life implanted by God’s begetting is incompatible with sin. The Apocalypse likewise represents sinlessness as the ideal and normal state of Christian life. The imperative that directs the Christian to shun sin is governed by the doctrine of God’s final judgment of mankind at the end of the world.

Chapter after chapter, the book heaps up evidence with irresistible force. The doctrine that is brought out is not, of course, new to Catholics. But the confusion introduced by Reformation theology and only partly dispelled by later Protestant exegetes in their Pauline studies, created a situation that makes the appearance of this sound and scholarly work an event to be gladly welcomed. A certain monotony engendered by the author’s adherence to a method of parallel development throughout, the absence of a general conclusion, and lack of an index are flaws that do not impair the essential merits of the volume.

St. Mary's College

Cyril Vollert, S.J.


There is hardly any Pauline epistle which has been examined more frequently and more thoroughly than that to the Romans. And no Pauline teaching in this grand epistle has been subjected to more careful study than that on baptism. In this monograph, published on the eightieth birthday of the author, a former teacher in the Gymnasium at Krefeld, chapter 6 is considered in some detail in the light of patristic tradition as represented especially by Cyril of Jerusalem, and in connection with modern views, Catholic and non-Catholic.

Recognizing the great importance of baptism in Pauline theology as the foundation of Christian moral principles which forbid among other things a
certain Libertinismus, the author explains why Paul stresses the role of Christ rather than that of the Trinity. He declares further that the baptized Christian stands in particular relationship to Christ's death on the cross, His burial and His resurrection. He calls attention to the frequency of the prefix and preposition, σὺν, and devotes considerable space to the determination of the exact meaning of ἁμαρτία, σύμφυτοι, and ὁμοίωμα.

The new life of the baptized is truly a new creation, the work of God's omnipotence, of which the type is not the old Adam but the new, Christ. The reviewer found particularly beautiful pp. 54 and 55, when the author speaks of the privileged vocation of the Christian as a member of the living, eternal Christ. Correctly it is shown that, when Paul speaks of the union, which is sui generis, of Christ and the Christian, his use of the future and aorist tenses is really independent of time.

The importance of v. 5 for the discovery of Paul's meaning is seen in the fact that the author devotes pp. 94–102 to a consideration of the views of Cyril of Jerusalem, with which he fully agrees, and gives on pp. 103–105 four different translations and paraphrases of his own. In notes 82 and 83 he presents the German translations by Häuser and Casel of Cyril's comment on v. 5, as he had presented the Latin translation by Quasten on p. 98, favoring this last, rejecting the first and hinting that Casel's change in interpretation was due to his own earlier suggestion.

The brevity of the bibliography, which is limited to German literature, is explained by the conditions in which the author found himself, separated as he was from the larger libraries of his country. This probably explains too why he does not refer to the controversy on the subject of infant baptism between Oscar Cullmann and Karl Barth, and to the most recent English Catholic work on early baptism by Father Crehan, S.J. The notes he offers at the back of the book are very valuable and reveal the thoroughness with which he approached his subject.

One small point: on p. 123 is note 82, but in the text this reference cannot be found. Most likely it should be on p. 99 with the name Häuser.

**St. John's Seminary, Brighton, Mass.**

**M. P. Stapleton**


The concluding portion of Dölger's massive work contains two longer essays and three notes. To these are added three supplementary notes enlarging or correcting earlier parts of the work; two of these are written by the editor, Theodor Klauser. It contains also the indices for the whole of
Volume VI. This fascicle has had an adventurous career. Dölger's untimely death prevented him from making a final revision; and the work of Klauser was destroyed with the publishing house in 1944.

The first of the two longer essays deals with the origin and use of the term "savior." Dölger finds that it is used absolutely of Jesus in the second century. To the Greek soter a number of Latin words correspond, of which the latest and the most barbarous, salvator, was finally victorious over the earlier sospitator and salutificator. The absolute use of soter as a title of Jesus seems to be connected with the absolute use of the same word as a title of Asclepius. Dölger traces the antithesis of Jesus and Asclepius in both pagan and Christian writers through the second to the fourth century, after which it scarcely appears. The antithesis was employed by Christian writers, of whom Justin was the first, both in order to render the Christian doctrine of Jesus more intelligible to the pagans, and to point out the contrast between the death and the deification of Asclepius, who was slain by the lightning of Zeus as a punishment for his practice of the arts of healing, and the life and death of Jesus. Celsus also appealed to this parallel, but in the opposite sense; he reduced Jesus to a Christian Asclepius.

The reviewer hesitates to suggest that Dölger's investigations were too narrow; but this study of the use of the word soter leaves some questions hanging in the air. Granted that the absolute use of the term appears at the same time of both Asclepius and Jesus, what is to be said of the sense in which it was employed? The texts which Dölger adduces show that it was used in the sense of "healer"; medicus salvator Christus, and that it referred to the Gospel miracles of healing, and not to the strictly soteriological function of Jesus. Dölger did not trace this development of the idea. Furthermore, he makes no reference to the application of the title soter to the Hellenistic monarchs and to the emperor. The study would have been enriched by some treatment of this employment of the title.

The second of the longer essays deals with an ancient problem of moral cooperation: the relations of the Christian landowner to his pagan tenants in the fourth and fifth centuries. Pagan rites, as the word paganus itself shows, survived longer in the rural districts; after the victory of Christianity it was more likely that the landowner (absentee, most frequently) would be Christian and his tenants pagan. Dölger finds a reflection of this as early as the synod of Elvira, between 306 and 312; a canon of this synod prohibits the Christian from "accepting" (accepto ferre) anything offered to idols. Dölger shows conclusively that this obscure phrase means that the Christian owner must not accept as exempt from rent the portion of the harvest which was offered in sacrifice. As time went on, the intolerance of the Christian
ecclesiastical authorities increased. Chrysostom encouraged the Christian landowner to interest himself in the conversion of his tenants; but Zeno of Verona and Maximus of Turin forbade the faithful to tolerate the agricultural rites of pagan superstition on their estates. Dölger has amassed some noteworthy information about the character of these rites from the sermons of these prelates.

The three notes deal with the titles of "eros" and "bridegroom" applied to Christ in Origen, the effect of Christianity on the figureheads of ships, and the origin of the use of the crystal lens to kindle the new fire of the Paschal season. Each of them illustrates Dölger's encyclopedic knowledge of ancient literature and archaeology, and his remarkable skill in tracking down the significance of the most obscure allusions. One cannot always say that the questions he investigates are urgent; on the other hand, it is only by the painstaking assembly of such details that our knowledge of the world of the first five centuries—a period of almost unequalled complexity—can take a unified and intelligible form.

West Baden College

JOHN L. MCKENZIE, S.J.


The anonymous Epistle to Diognetus is perhaps best known from the scholarly efforts to ferret out its author (the suggestions range from Clement of Rome to its first editor, H. Stephanus, in 1592) and for its stirring description of Christian life in chapters 5 and 6: "Christians are not distinguished from the rest of men by country, speech, or customs.... Every foreign land is their fatherland, and every fatherland a foreign land.... In a word, what the soul is in the body, that Christians are in the world...."

The present work, essentially a doctoral dissertation in the University of Manchester, attempts a comprehensive study of the Epistle. Dr. Meecham sets himself "to discuss its aim, authorship, date, and integrity; to estimate its literary character in form, language, and style; to explore the content of its thought; to determine its relation to the Greek Bible and early Christian writings; finally to provide a translation and a commentary. The whole rests on a detailed examination of the Greek text" (p. vii).

Meecham describes Diognetus as "an apologetic treatise in epistolary dress" (p. 8). A detailed examination uncovers a predominantly classical vocabulary, a syntax that is in general correct and careful, a high literary skill. He reviews succinctly the various opinions on authorship, without adopting a definitive position. The simplicity of the theological content
classes the author in temper among the sub-apostolic writers, and Meecham leans to the middle of the second century for its composition. The total impression created by the content, vocabulary, and style of chapters 11 and 12 persuades him that they derive from a different author than 1-10, one who "belongs to the school of thought represented in Melito and Hippolytus" (p. 67). The Epistle evidences a simple form of belief (analyzed and integrated by the editor, pp. 19-53), with noticeable omissions, from which Meecham wisely draws very little. He indicates the close similarity of Diognetus with The Preaching of Peter; he sees at least a suggestion that the author was acquainted with Aristides' Apology; he summarizes neatly the grounds on which the presumed authorship by Justin Martyr is inadmissible; he concludes that "we can hardly affirm more than a general resemblance between the Epistle and the Protrepticus [of Clement of Alexandria] due to the fact that both writings move in the same orbit of thought and deal in part with the same themes" (p. 63); and in one of five Additional Notes he recapitulates Dom Andriessen's closely reasoned thesis that Diognetus is the lost Apology of Quadratus (cf. Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale, XIII [1946], 5-39, 125-49, 237-60; XIV [1947], 121-56) and raises certain pertinent difficulties.

Dr. Meecham has some fine insights, as in the section on the author's accommodation to the intellectual standpoint and convictions of his inquirer, i.e., a reasonable amount of intellectual accommodation without compromise of essential Christianity. He does well in not making much of Diognetus' silence on Church, ministry, and sacraments; that the silence "suggests that the author did not regard Church order as of primary importance" (p. 27; cf. p. 49) is problematical in view of the three limited questions the writer proposes to answer. Meecham betrays more discernment when he mentions, as possible reasons for the silence of the letter on some aspects of Christian belief, (1) an unwillingness to irritate by obtruding the uncongenial or incredible, and (2) the fact that the author moves in the main within the bounds of Diognetus' queries. Again, the definition of the Pauline view of faith as "trust in the unmerited grace of God revealed in Christ" (p. 16; cf. p. 40) is too simplistic to cover a concept that is undeniably complex in its totality. The "subordination" of the Son to the Father, which Meecham sees in Diognetus, may not be susceptible of the obvious saving distinction based on the duality of nature in Christ; but allowance must be made for the limitations of human terminology; and to assert that "the filial life as such implies subordination" (p. 26) is to close the door aprioristically to the possibility of the trinitarian life as traditionally understood.

The text followed by Meecham is that of F. X. Funk, Patres Apostolici,
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I (2nd ed.; 1901), though comparison has been made throughout with the texts of Otto, Lightfoot, Geffcken, and Lake. The translation is uniformly good, with the accent perhaps on fidelity rather than felicity in phraseology. The notes are copious (pp. 92-142) and richly illustrative of words and ideas. The brief note on "Christians" (p. 93) might have been enriched with a reference to E. Peterson, "Christianus," Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati, I (Vatican City, 1946), 355-72; the note on "superstition" (p. 94) could have mentioned P. J. Koets, Δευτεραμονια: A Contribution to the Knowledge of the Religious Terminology in Greek (Utrecht, 1929). The select bibliography (pp. 69-73) is splendid, but should have included the translation by G. G. Walsh (New York, 1947) and can now add those by J. A. Kleist (Westminster, Md., 1948) and E. J. Goodspeed (New York, 1950). With respect to the problem of authorship, add F. Ogara, "Aristidis et Epistolae ad Diognetum cum Theophilo Antiocheno cognatio," Gregorianum, XXV (1944), 74-102. In the Additional Note on "Guarded Tradition" reference might usefully have been made to A. Michel, "Tradition," Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, XV, 1 (Paris, 1946), 1252 ff. But these are minor omissions. Dr. Meecham's work is a noteworthy piece of careful research and provides an unusually thorough appreciation of the Epistle to Diognetus.

Woodstock College

WALTER J. BURGHARDT, S.J.


This volume of the well-known series is notable for its important contribution to the history of hagiography. As Professor Meyer points out in his introduction: "Saint Athanasius has either consciously or unconsciously inaugurated a third type of life story, the Christian biography" (p. 12); "The crowning achievement of Athanasius is that he combined the ancient literary forms of biography with the Christian element, and produced a type that was to influence all subsequent Greek and Latin hagiography" (p. 13). The introduction is outstanding, because it successfully combines a complex array of detailed and somewhat disparate information with unusual clarity of exposition. Among the subjects discussed are the contents, Anthony's place in the history of monasticism, the date of composition, testimonies of contemporaries for the authenticity of the work, the literary genre in relation to classical models, and a balanced treatment of Saint Anthony's conflict with demons.

Meyer translates largely from the Greek text of the Benedictine edition of Bernard de Montfaucon (Paris, 1698), reprinted in Migne, PG, XXVI (1887),
although he consulted five other translations ranging from the year 1857 to 1943 (p. 15). Professor Meyer deserves high praise for his painstaking index of fifteen pages, and for his three hundred textual notes of pertinent comment, ample bibliographical data, and other valuable references.

Shadowbrook, Lenox, Mass.  
ALPHONSUS C. YUMONT, S.J.


This work is appropriately subtitled, "An Historical Study." The author, as he himself explains at length in the preface, examines in detail the fundamental principles underlying the monastic way of life as set forth by St. Basil in his writings and codifies (almost a bit too precisely) the ideas of the great Cappodocian Doctor on this subject. But however successfully he may have avoided the pitfall of reading later and more developed interpretations of the spiritual life into the thought of a fourth-century writer, one cannot help but detect a modern note in the emphasis he places on the personal effort required of the individual who would follow Christ in the fulness of the Gospel teachings. Far too little is said of the sacramental life of grace, of the illuminating, sanctifying, divinizing power of the Holy Spirit on the soul which makes this life possible and practicable. Without this element we have definitely a one-sided picture of St. Basil's notions of what it means to be a full and perfect Christian. Again, the author has perhaps overemphasized the influence on St. Basil of Hellenistic thought—the philosophy of Plato, the Stoics, and the neo-Platonists Philo, Plotinus, and Porphyry. In his admirable study of St. Gregory of Nyssa, St Basil's brother, Platonisme et théologie mystique (Paris: Aubier, 1944), Daniélou has shown that such an influence is no more than verbal, and that the concepts which these Platonic and neo-Platonic terms are used to express are radically different.

Dom Amand has fortunately let St. Basil, for the most part, speak for himself. We are given in translation the well-known Letters 2 and 22 in their entirety and large portions of the Long and Short Rules and other lesser ascetic treatises. It would be fatal if the religious life were ever to become patterned according to formulae that might be meaningless and sterile or on the following to the letter of this or that "rule." Hence anybody who has undertaken to live strictly according to the precepts of the Gospel may well profit from a reading of such a clear analysis as this of the basic doctrines of the religious life. St. Basil was one of the first to see in a life apart from the world a reflection of the apostolic life of the early church, an intensified practice of what is required of every baptized Christian.

Portsmouth Priory  
DOM DAVID HURST, O.S.B.

St. Augustine's Confessions has been the subject of much secondary literature in our century. The present book is one of the best contributions to the study of that Christian classic. Father Le Blond has published no previous studies in the Augustinian field but he shows a thorough acquaintance with the writings of St. Augustine. His earlier work on the logic of Aristotle is well known.

The tripartite structure of the Confessions is easily recognized. In the first nine books Augustine sings his song of divine praise by describing the stirring years of his early life. This part ends with the death of St. Monica at Ostia, after she had been granted the happiness of seeing her son become a zealous convert to Catholicism. Many readers have thought that the first version of the Confessions ended with Book IX. It is true that the concluding lines of this book have an air of finality. One of the most recent editors of the Latin text has kept alive the conjecture that the later books are but a fortunate afterthought, added after the lapse of some time. (See J. Capello, Confessiones [Turin, 1948], p. 326.) Possibly, Augustine had written the autobiographical books by the end of the year 397. It is not necessary to think that the last books were written before 400, or even 401. (Cf. Zarb, S.M., "Chronologia operum s. Augustini," Angelicum, X [1933], 482-84.)

Book X is quite long and it constitutes the second part of the Confessions. In this book Augustine reveals to God (and also to readers who have the courage to persevere beyond the superficially more interesting biographical details of the first books) the condition of his soul in the first years of his episcopacy. This section is most important to students of the religious development of St. Augustine, as it is also to psychologists. In searching for God in the depths of his memory, Augustine presents a highly original analysis of psychic consciousness. In a very real sense, this analysis is an anticipation of the interior approach to God which is presented in expanded form in the treatise De trinitate.

If the reader of the Confessions is somewhat impressed by the apparent incompatibility of the first and second parts, he cannot fail to be astonished by the further incongruity of the third. Books XI-XIII offer an allegorical commentary on the opening verses of the Book of Genesis!

Father Le Blond does not concern himself with the literary and chronological problems which the Confessions presents. His book develops the thesis that the work has a higher, organic unity, transcending the apparent diversity of its three parts. With due acknowledgment to an article published by P. Landsberg in 1936, the French Jesuit sets out to show that these three divisions are integral parts of the theme of divine praise. Father Le
Blond treats the first part under *memoria* (a looking back over Augustine’s past life to illustrate the working of God’s power and wisdom in one man’s life); the second part is studied under *contuitus* (a piercing vision into the depths of the human soul, where God is found dwelling in present consciousness, though never beheld with the clarity and permanence of the beatific vision); and the third part is explained under the term *expectatio* (a looking outward upon the created world, and forward into the future reaches of time, unto eternity and the same God who dwells there in everlasting power and glory). The basis for this striking interpretation and happy terminology is one brief sentence in Book XII of the *Confessions*: “*Expectatio rerum venturarum fit contuitus, cum venerint, idemque contuitus fit memoria, cum praeterierint ...*” (Conf. 12.15.18; the reference for this text, p. 17 of the book under review, is erroneous.)

With this trinitarian framework, the author examines Augustine’s conversions, in the light of the testimony of the *Confessions* and the other writings of the Bishop of Hippo. Three conversions, of faith, of understanding, and of the heart, are distinguished. In each, Father Le Blond estimates with precision the respective influences of Greek philosophy and Christian thought. He is much indebted to Jean Guitton in the treatment of the Plotinian background of Augustine’s theory of time and eternity.

As is the case in many recent French books, contemporary existentialism is brought into the exposition; similarities between Augustinism and existentialism are carefully noted. The works of Camus, Sartre, Scheler, and even Nietzsche, are listed in the brief bibliography and cited in the footnotes. While it may be difficult to see how these works may help one to understand St. Augustine, this is a trend to be noted. Up to the last decade, few French Catholic philosophers, or theologians, would omit some comparison between Augustinism and Thomism. There is no intrusion of Thomism in this book; the contemporary world-view, to which frequent references are made, is that of Sartre and his associates. Since there is no index, it is impossible to say that the name of St. Thomas does not appear in the book. Certainly, Thomism does not enter into the exposition to the extent that it formerly did in the Augustinian studies of Portalié, Boyer, Gilson, or Ro-meyer.

In spite of this odd contemporary emphasis, Father Le Blond’s book is a good piece of work. Its reading will benefit any serious student of Augustinism.

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Vernon J. Bourke


In two booklets recently issued, Father SpedaUeri, a professor at the Gregorian University, brings together for a wider public seven brief essays, most of which have already appeared in the Gregorianum or the Antonianum. In the two essays that compose the first book the author proposes to lift some of the obscurity that surrounds the teaching of theologians on the nature of the Church’s action and her intention in the canonization of saints. While it is generally agreed as certain that the Church is infallible when she canonizes (a certainty that is based at least in part on the fact that she demands from the faithful an irreformable assent to her decrees of canonization), there seems little doubt that there is hesitation, uncertainty, and some divergence on the immediate object and the precise sense of the declaration of canonization, as well as on the nature of the assent to be given both to the definition contained in a given decree and to the general proposition that the Church is infallible in canonizing saints (whether the assent is immediately one of divine faith or not).

As to the direct object of canonization, that which is directly and infallibly asserted, Fr. SpedaUeri maintains that it is the “nova in coeulis ac definita membri Corporis mystici, quod augeri ad finem usque saeculi aliunde jam cognoscimus.” He indicates his position again when he declares that just as all Catholics believe that Pius XII holds jure divino a primacy of jurisdiction over the Universal Church, because the power perpetually granted to Peter has so passed to the Roman Pontiff that he can be called “sensu quodam proprio iste Petrus,” and just as all admit that the Church as she here and now exists is and is believed to be one, catholic, and apostolic, because the faithful, as is clear from revelation, constitute, generation by generation in one and the same moral person, the Spouse of Christ; so “pari ratione” we can believe that, as the mystical body of Christ has been definitely revealed, so too the members and their intercommunion are divinely indicated. Nor is it a difficulty for the author that only some of the just in the Ecclesia triumphant are known to us, since he maintains that “sicut ad Ecclesiæ militantis visibilitatem nullatenu requiritur quod omnia et singula membri cognoscantur, ita et ad fidem agnitionemque Ecclesiæ triumphantis.”

If the process of canonization is one of particularizing a universal divinely revealed (as the author’s comparisons seem to indicate), it would appear that
the individual decree of canonization will call for an assent of divine faith, and that the general proposition that the Church is infallible in canonizing saints merits also that assent.

Fr. Spedalieri's position may perhaps be better understood if we contrast it as he himself does with that of the great Bollandist, P. Delehaye, in his *Sanctus* (pp. 251-52): "There are some who seem to imagine that the act of canonization consists essentially in defining that the person concerned, who died in the odor of sanctity, enjoys the beatific vision. The Church has never pretended to receive on this point a special revelation and one will look in vain in the School for one holding this position. In estimating the merits of those who have died with the signs of predestination, the Church applies the doctrine of theologians, which itself is in line with the practice of the early ages. In the case of martyrs, to testify that in fact they have sacrificed their lives for the faith is to affirm that they have *du coup* reached the perfection of charity. With those who are not martyrs the Church collects the testimonials of their practice of heroic virtue. . . . As for miracles worked by the saint during his lifetime, the Church does not depart from the doctrine of the School, which does not see in them a component of sanctity. And in those attributed to the intercession of the saint after his death, while they have played in recent times a very important role in the process of canonization they are not to be considered the credentials of a revelation from heaven which would engage our faith."

This statement of the sense and import of canonization—along with Delehaye's further conclusions that the *cultus sanctorum* does not pertain to the essence of religion, that the honor paid to the saints in heaven is an act of faith in the promises of the life to come, and that the tribute we pay to the saints does not necessarily imply the will to imitate them—Fr. Spedalieri finds to be "not a little repugnant to the *sensus fidelium* and completely at odds with the decretal letters of the Roman Pontiffs."

While it cannot be denied that the author has done a service in pointing out the uncertainty that surrounds this general subject and in attempting a solution, it does not seem that his thesis will meet with unreserved approval till he makes clearer just how the Church gains cognizance of the admission of the saint in question to the mansions of the blessed and more thoroughly examines the precise role that the miracles attributed to the candidate for canonization play in the process itself.

In the second essay dealing with this subject the author examines the rather difficult question of the "veritas personae" in canonizations: to what extent must we hold that the name given to the *canonizatus* in the Decretal Letters was really his, and hence not merely attributed to him later, or
(what is worse) the name of some other known historical figure? The author asserts in this second essay, which is an historical study of the evidence for the names of the Seven Founders of the Servite Order, that the names in the Roman Martyrology and the Decretal Letters are and were theirs. And this rather warmly against the Bollandist writer who in the Propylaeum ad Acta SS. Decembris (1940), p. 59, declares that "in the 16th and 17th centuries when the Servite writers with the intention of bringing to light the origins of their Institute had scrutinized with great but fruitless labor all the documents of an earlier age, at a loss for a better plan (potiori consilio destitui) they selected arbitratu suo seven men whom they had encountered in the legend of Petrus Tudertinus and in other chronicles, and these they made the founders of their Order (ordinis sui conditores fuisse decreverunt)."

The author's main concern is to show the historical validity of the claim that these seven men under the names now attributed to them founded the Servite Order. The more general problem is not treated at great length. But it is in the mind of the reviewer the more important problem. Granting that it is extremely unlikely that the Church could salva infallibilitate canonize one person under the name of another real and historically known person, is it impossible that the Church should canonize the Magi under the names of Melchior, Gaspar, and Balthasar, though they may have been known to their associates as, for example, Sidrach, Misach, and Abdenago? Or that she could canonize a determined group of martyrs or founders under the names traditionally attributed to them, even though there were a discrepancy between the number of names traditionally received and the number that actually constituted the group?

In the second small work Fr. Spedalieri treats in five separate essays several different themes. The first three essays group themselves around the name of St. Anselm. In the first two of these he seeks to elucidate the nature of the argumentum anselmanum, and Anselm's reply to Gaunilo. In the third, on the basis of certain writings of Eadmerus in which that disciple of Anselm seems to follow closely his master's thought, the author proposes to give reason for thinking that St. Anselm instinctively and unconsciously tended to a belief in the Immaculate Conception despite the admitted presence of one or other refractory text in his works.

The final two essays in this second collection are perhaps of more current interest. In them the author treats of the notion of the apostolicity of the Church and of the notion of the apostolicity of the faith as it relates to the problem of the progress of dogma. The first is occasioned by certain conclusions of G. Thils, who in his Les Notes de l'Eglise found discrepancies between the notion of apostolicity as developed in the writings of the Catho-
lic apologists of the early Reformation period and in those of more modern authors. Fr. Spedalieri insists that there is and has been basic agreement on the concept of apostolicity. As Father T. Zapelena (Gregorianum, XIX [1938], 88-109; 445-68) and others have already pointed out, however valuable Thils' work is as an historical study of the via notarum through the last four centuries, some conclusions of his appear exaggerated. As they, so the present author maintains that a change of focus and emphasis in the definition and application of the notes no more proves that the via notarum is a generally ineffective argument nor that those who employ it are in real disagreement, than the need for frequent resighting of field artillery—either because the enemy's position has been miscalculated or because in the course of the battle he has occupied a new position—proves the weapons to be outmoded or the captains at odds.

The final essay: "De fidei apostolicae ac dogmatum progressu," has as subtitle "Recens r.p. de Lubac dispositio diligentissimi examini subjicitur." The article by Père de Lubac appeared in the Recherches de science religieuse (XXXV [1948], 130-60), under the title "Le Problème du développement du dogme." Fr. Spedalieri in his critique of Fr. de Lubac's article first considers some points raised concerning the knowledge of revelation which the Apostles themselves had, then the difficulties moved by Fr. de Lubac against the ordinary explanation of the passage from implicit to explicit belief, and finally takes up Fr. de Lubac's general theory of the nature of the response of faith as "une perception toute concrète et toute vivante," upon which Fr. de Lubac bases his own positive theory of doctrinal development.

In the first section—on the state of apostolic knowledge—the main question (whether, if the commonly accepted opinion on doctrinal development is tenable, one must hold that the Apostles had formal explicit knowledge of all dogmatic truths today explicitly held or that shall become explicit to the end of time) is obscured in this reviewer's opinion by a discussion of the problem why, if they did have de facto such explicit knowledge, they did not pass it on or why those to whom they did pass it on failed to retain it. As to what types of knowledge the Apostles as first founders of the Church may, through altogether exceptional and extraordinary gifts, have possessed, may not one hold that we know precious little? And may not one surmise that it was not necessary that they be proximately prepared to deliver the faith which they held in just such terms, expressions, modalities as we use in the schools today? Fr. Spedalieri, however, does make his position plain when he says: "libenter concedimus quod veritates revelatae per novas notiones melius intelligantur et quodammodo explicitur, sed negamus quod per eas
not a Duodecim sed a magisterio ecclesiastico vel una veritas revelata ab integro cognoscatur ac doceatur; quod ultimum etiam modum quo difficultas supra exposita a R. P. [de Lubac] proponitur necessario implicare videtur.”

In the next section the author maintains that, while not all dogmatic development proceeds necessarily by way of strictly logical demonstration still it may legitimately proceed along those lines. For, however mysterious and supernatural a revealed truth may be, it still yields to reason sedulo sobrie et pie quaerens “aliquam intelligentiam” which, while analogous, is still proper. And on the basis of this understanding consequences can be seen not only by theologians but also by the magisterium without that recourse of which Fr. de Lubac speaks when he says: “Pour qu’une vérité fût nouvellement perçue avec l’assurance qu’elle est vérité révélée, il a fallu d’abord d’autres moyens, d’autres critères, surnaturels.”

To the last section is reserved a consideration of the basis of the disagreements already considered. The author holds that Fr. de Lubac in the article cited presents the object of faith not as “aliquid complexum per modum enuntiabilis,” which is or can be the first of a series of propositions, but as “l’Objet global, l’Objet incroyablement riche, le Tout du Dogme,” upon which we immediately begin to operate by a process of abstraction. Given this theory on the reception of revelation, there can be no objective progress of dogma because the object itself, “l’Action rédemptrice, le don que Dieu nous fait de lui-même en son Fils,” is not susceptible of any increase.

To this Fr. Spedalieri counters briefly with the teaching of Augustine and Thomas. He cites Augustine in those places in his In Joannis Evangelium where he puts belief prior to any understanding—“Non quia cognoverunt crediderunt, sed ut cognoscerent crediderunt. Credimus enim ut cognoscamus, non cognoscimus ut credamus”—and where the “verba sonantia” lead to, rather than follow upon, the “lux splendens.” St. Thomas is cited mainly from the first question of the Sum. Theol., Π–II, where he teaches that the object of faith is “quid complexum per modum enuntiabilis.” From this the author concludes that for St. Thomas the object of faith is not “res quaedam incomplexa... sed singulae veritates revelatae, quibus cognitis veluti per speculum in aenigmate ordinem supernaturalem attingimur.” The essay closes with an explanation of statements of Frs. Lebreton, Hugueny, and Simonin which Fr. de Lubac had cited in his favor, but which Fr. Spedalieri thinks are to be understood in a quite different sense.

West Baden College

Stephen E. Donlon, S.J.

Doctor Bartz tells us that his work is meant as a help "to clarify that meeting of man and God in the basic existential crisis which is supernatural faith." In order to achieve this purpose he chooses the somewhat roundabout means of a critical analysis of the writings of Joseph Kleutgen, S.J., on the nature and properties of faith. The methodology of the critique is interesting and revealing. "Faith is life, is wholeness, not a mere sum," says Bartz. It cannot be taken apart and put together again like a more or less complicated device. So it will be useful to turn to the phenomenology of human faith, which is after all in some sense similar to divine faith. The results of that phenomenology of faith serve as a partial norm to bring out Kleutgen's inadequacies and deviations. There then follows a strictly theological evaluation of Kleutgen's views on the role of the preambles, on the properties of faith, on faith as a virtue and its relation to the other theological virtues, on the socio-ecclesial aspect of faith, and on faith and the mystical life. Bartz is deeply hostile to what he considers Kleutgen's intellectual desiccation of that complex vital religious act which is faith. "One can analyze the idea of faith," he says, "not the act of faith itself." What he especially desiderates in Kleutgen is an appreciation of a trust factor in the process of faith, and of the total religious engagement of the "I" to the "You" in the complex relation of faith. We are told that Kleutgen's failures were due to the fact that he was a prisoner to the spirit of his times, a stricture that some may well think can be retorted in the present case. There are more ways than one to be unilateral, even in the matter of faith. It would seem, however, that many of the useful and often profound emphases urged by Doctor Bartz can be assimilated into the older Scholastic analysis without involving any dislocation of the basic agreed lines of that analysis.

There is a very useful bibliography, especially of German works, and also an unusually large number of interesting citations from works that are not ordinarily ready to hand.

Weston College

FRANCIS X. LAWLOR, S.J.


In this interesting essay on the development of doctrine, which, as is clear from the title, was occasioned by the recent maturation of the dogma of the Assumption, Father Koster considers that two excesses are to be avoided: the left wing, as he calls it, concretized in the doctrine of the modernists, who looked on the magisterium merely as a sort of sensitized plate registering or recording the doctrinal life of the faithful; and the rightist extreme,
which overemphasizes the doctrinal authority of the hierarchical church. It would appear that Koster wishes above all else to determine more exactly the status of the simple faithful in the growth of the doctrinal life of the church,—a difficult task, and one in which he proposes at times somewhat personal views.

According to Father Koster the treasury of the deposit of faith has been entrusted by the Spirit of truth to “the sense of faith” of the Bride of Christ, i.e., to the sense of faith of the church taken in its totality, comprehending both the teaching and learning church, both those whose part is doctrinal authority, and those whose part is discipleship. Before the Holy Spirit “all shall be taught of God” (John 6:45); and it is the Holy Spirit who in His transcendental freedom allots the roles which the bishops and simple faithful play in the slow unfolding of the treasures of the deposit of faith. The one basic organ which the Holy Spirit uses to realize this work of leading the church into the things of faith is the sense of faith of the whole church. In the concrete this sense of faith consists in the infused virtue of faith together with three gifts of the Holy Spirit: the wisdom of faith, the understanding of faith, and the knowledge of faith. It follows then that the sense of faith of the hierarchy does not, taken in itself, differ from that of the simple faithful, for the virtue of faith and concomitant gifts are essentially the same in both cases. The differentiation comes from something extrinsic to the sense of faith considered in itself, and it is this: in the hierarchy the sense of faith is ordained to their teaching office and compassed with the charism of infallibility; in the simple faithful the sense of faith is allied rather to their life of faith and to their service of faith within the people of God. Both, however, are ways which the Holy Spirit can and does use to introduce into the mind of the church truths which had hitherto been implicit in the deposit of faith,—authoritatively and infallibly in case of the sense of faith of the hierarchy, only factually (i.e., without juridic status) but yet with true certitude in the case of the sense of faith of the simple faithful. The latter have then by reason of their sense of faith an active share in the custody and explicitation of the things of the domain of faith. However, even though the sense of faith of the ordinary faithful can supply the church with certain knowledge of some part of the content of tradition, still it must in all cases, at least ultimately, be taken over, judged, and directed by the sense of faith of the hierarchy, which alone can invest the developmental process with external, social dimensions, and above all with the infallible guarantee that the hand of God is here.

Father Koster then raises the question whether the sense of faith of the simple faithful can be, by itself alone and for a long period of time, the one
and only certain way to a knowledge of the content of tradition; and whether, if that is true, the magisterium is obliged to reckon with it. Both questions are answered affirmatively. It is admitted that the sense of faith of the hierarchy is always and by itself alone a sufficient means to the knowledge of tradition; but, de facto and historically, there have been instances in which the sense of faith of the faithful has, by itself alone and with certainty, brought up to the level of consciousness of the mind of the church some portion of the deposit of faith. It has then, so to speak, presented the hierarchy with a developmental fait accompli which the sense of faith of the hierarchy must then reckon with, not by reason of any juridic claim that the simple faithful would possess, but in a spirit of obedience to the Holy Spirit who leads the church into all truth according to the ways which suit His good pleasure. The sense of faith of the hierarchy is the primary and authoritative way to the knowledge of tradition; the sense of faith of the ordinary faithful is the secondary way. Can the hierarchy's sense of faith be said to be dependent in any sense on that of the simple faithful? The latter can be in certain circumstances a de facto orientating norm of development, which awakens, alerts, and activates the sense of faith of the hierarchy. There is then no juridic dependence, but only a factual one, which ultimately depends on the good pleasure of the Holy Spirit as the prime mover of the whole developmental process.

The foregoing effort to digest some of the main themes of a very compact theological essay awakens certain reflections. That the activity of the Holy Spirit whom Christ the Head has sent to act in and through His Church, is the root of doctrinal development, is certain. Pius XII says that the Spirit of truth who dwells in the universal church infallibly directs her "ad revelatarum perficiendam veritatum cognitionem" ("Munificentissimus Deus," AAS, XXXXII [1950], 769); and Leo XIII declares that it is due to the Spirit of truth whom Christ had promised to send to His apostles "ut ipsa (the church) ne ulli unquam errori obnoxia sit, utque divinae doctrinae germina alere copiosius in dies possit et frugifera praestare ad populorum salutem" ("Divinum illud," ASS, XXIX [1896], 649–50). But along with the invisible mission of the Holy Spirit to the church one must also consider, in this matter of development, the juridic mission which the apostles and their successors have received from Christ to continue His prophetic office to all mankind, and consequently to teach with authority in the name of Christ the whole deposit of faith. It is precisely the intimate relation of these two missions in the doctrinal life of the church that is not brought out with sufficient clarity in the present work. The hierarchy are not merely infallible judges of the faith, a point which the author empha-
sizes with predilection; they are also teachers and interpreters of the whole deposit of faith, a magisterium which they exercise in a large measure in their ordinary day-by-day authentic, though not infallible, teaching office. It is in line with these considerations, it would seem, that the present Pope affirms in the “Humani generis” (A.A.S., XXXXII [1950], 569): “Deus ecclesiae suae magisterium vivum dedit, ad ea quoque illustranda et enucleanda, quae in fidei deposito nonnisi obscure ac veluti implicite continentur. Quod quidem depositum nec singulis Christi fidelibus nec ipsis theologis divinus Redemptor concredidit authentice interpretandum, sed soli Ecclesiae magisterio.” If then the Holy Spirit is given to the hierarchy with a view to the fulfilment of their mission of guarding, teaching, and interpreting the whole deposit of faith, then it becomes difficult to see how Koster can say “the faithful can, without any positive influence on the part of the teaching hierarchy, and under circumstances long before the bishops, know with certainty whether or not something falls under the faith, whether or not it is definable” (p. 81). That the simple faithful can be active in the process of development, under the positive control of the hierarchical church, must be admitted; but that they can, even though merely factually and without juridic status, contribute to development in the way just envisaged by Father Koster, seems to subtract too much from the juridic mission of the hierarchical church chartered in the last chapter of Matthew.

Father Koster’s essay is worth earnest and patient consideration, not least in the attention and emphasis which he gives to the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

Weston College

Francis X. Lawlor, S.J.


The Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge does not often publish a book of which “an important characteristic [is] that it is written from a Roman Catholic point of view.” Just how Roman Catholic was the authors’ point of view may be gathered from the general thesis of the book. Published a few months before the dogmatic definition of Our Lady’s Assumption, the purpose of the work was to argue the inadvisability of such a pronouncement. “As well as being defective in all the relevant fields of evidence, the Assumption, if raised to a dogma, would have . . . unhappy repercussions on the prestige of the Papacy, on the general trend of Roman Catholic devotion and on what is a burning question of the twentieth century, the reunion of Christendom.”

Accordingly the writers survey the “relevant field of evidence” in three
chapters, examining the historical evidence, the texts of Scripture adduced in support of belief in the Assumption, and the arguments from dogmas already received. Some forty pages are devoted to an unfavorable review of the available historical evidence, leading to the conclusion that it is insufficient to show that the Assumption occurred, though the possibility of a bodily Assumption remains. "Short of the discovery and authentication of the sacred body itself, it would be incautious to declare categorically that the Assumption did not occur."

The analysis of arguments based on scriptural data concludes that "no texts of Scripture are capable of supporting belief in the Assumption." The reader may be interested in the following complete comment of the authors on the argument from Genesis 3:15. "Understood as a prophecy of the victory of Christ over the devil, this text seems to magnify the role of the woman whose seed is destined to redeem mankind, and upon this has been based the conception of Mary as the second Eve, the virtuous woman who in bringing forth the Saviour has counterbalanced the folly of her sister in the Garden of Eden and given to mankind a new chance of enduring felicity in God. However, the supreme privilege of Mary's motherhood does not in itself warrant our believing that she was assumed and no torturing of the text can wring from it the least evidence that this was the natural consequence of her divine maternity." For more reasons than one this comment should give pause to the Catholic exegete.

There follows an examination of the arguments "of a more or less a priori character" for Mary's bodily Assumption, but here again, according to the authors, "attempts to infer it from dogmas already received end in failure." The arguments thus "refuted" are those proposed in an article by Felix O'Neill, published in The Irish Ecclesiastical Record for August, 1911, and others briefly summarized "by Mgr. Joseph Pohle in a work entitled Mariology, edited by A. Preuss, Herder, 1926." And so is dismissed a half century of devoted theological research and study on the Assumption.

If it be contended that, despite the lack of explicit evidence for belief in the Assumption, at least it can be maintained that the Church has always taught it implicitly, the authors have a simple answer: if the Assumption is implicit in traditional truths, it is deducible from those truths. But the authors had already shown how fallacious were the attempts to make such inferences. Further, "if the doctrine is implicit in Revelation in a manner which is consistent not only with our not knowing it, but with our not being able to know it, it is clear that this is not sufficient to make a definition possible; for what was not explicitly revealed and handed down in the Church, and what cannot be known by the operation of finite minds upon this revela-
tion, could only be known by a new revelation, and this the Church cannot
give us."

Enough has been said to indicate how this book touches on the main
problems that arise in connection with the doctrine of the Assumption. The
same problems have been urged with greater profundity and sounder schol­
arship by others who, like the authors of this book, seem able to discuss
such questions as divine revelation, Catholic tradition, the teaching au­
thority of the Church, and the infallibility of the Pope without once referring
to the supernatural aspect of these truths or to the continued guidance of the
Church of Christ by the Holy Spirit who is the source of its life and activity.
Granted the good will and sincerity of such discussions, there yet remains a
vast field for the enlightenment of the Christian mind on the very funda­
mentals of our religion.

Woodstock College

JOHN F. SWEENEY, S.J.

ÜBER SCHICKSAL UND VORSEHUNG. By Eduard Stakemeier. Luzern:

In the present work Prof. Stakemeier of the Faculty of Theology at
Paderborn is concerned with contemporary problems in the perspective of
contemporary general culture. In a brief introduction he recalls a remark
of Pius XI on the advantage enjoyed by Catholic doctrine inasmuch as it
can be presented in simple language, intelligible to anyone, without thereby
suffering any substantial loss. Accordingly, he has made it his aim through­
out his book to be non-technical even in the sections in which such gracious­
ness is not commonly expected of a theologian. In correspondence with the
manner is the theme that takes concrete form in the question: "Wie kann
Gott zulassen, was an furchtbarer Sinnlosigkeit und Ungerechtigkeit so
offenkundig vor allen Augen liegt?" The problem of evil is today oppressively
obvious, and it is to be handled, not with the philosophic calm of a Leibniz,
but with the religious vigor of a Joseph de Maistre.

The work falls into three parts that deal successively with belief in fate,
with faith in divine providence, and with the effects of either attitude on
human character. Accounts of belief in fate are drawn from Laotse and
Confucius, from ancient and Renaissance astrology, from the mythology
of Greek epic and drama, of Germanic saga, and of Virgil, from the phi­
losophy of Seneca, from Mohammedanism, from the anthropocentric theol­
ogy of Luther and the theocentric theology of Calvin. The sources of a new
and secularized fatalism are found in the picture of man drawn by modern
scientists, by modern historians, and by modern philosophers. Then the
problem of suffering is ushered in to provide, as it were, an experimental
test of the validity of Confucian, Buddhist, Greek, and modern views of fate. The first part closes with a chapter on literature and drama as the Liberal surrogate for catechetics and sermons and, after a review of fatalistic notions running from Goethe to Ibsen (to mention the most familiar names), there is a thesis on the function of poetry in expressing the deeper and unformulated movements of a period and in exploring the relations between fate and human character.

In the second part the doctrine of divine providence is set forth from the Old Testament, from the Gospels, and from St. Paul. There follows a dogmatic treatment of the divine plan, divine governance, free will, predestination, and the end of man, with particular attention paid to such personal issues as reliance on providence and prayer of petition. Under the title of a theodicy of providence come discussions with a slightly more speculative turn. Are the good unlucky and the evil lucky? Is suffering inevitable or is it a punishment for sin? Is suffering mere natural necessity that has nothing to do with providence? Does the evil in the world upset the order of providence? What is the meaning of the Cross of Christ?

The third part is named an excursus and deals with the respective effects of the opposed doctrines on human character. There is a general thesis that man, created in the image of God, heads for nihilism if he has no belief in divine governance. It is then shown that love of one's neighbor is a quite different precept in the wisdom of China, India, or Greece and in the wisdom of Christ: the point becomes especially vivid in a down-to-earth account of the attitudes of pre-Christian husbands to their wives. After charity there is discussed *Selengrösse*—it is without the overtones of our "magnanimity"—in its bearing on conduct, humility, and charity. The work ends with a contrast between the Stoic wise man and the Christian saint.

The author operates from the basis of a broad culture and aims at the effective communication of common doctrine. Difficulties to be met are drawn from the pages of influential names or from the depths of the heart of man. If the answers are not new, they are clear and robust. If the argument is not so much thought out as quoted out, its concrete procedures and its knack of treating questions that are asked possess the significance of a model for a needed layman's theology.

*Jesuit Seminary, Toronto*  
*Bernard Lonergan, S.J.*


The "De gratia Christi" is a new text-book, the fifth and final volume of the author's *Cursus manualis theologiae dogmaticae*, written expressly for the
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use of seminarians. And, while it has little originality about it, it achieves its purpose quite well and may be classed among the better manuals. The whole effort is not to give an exhaustive treatment, but to present the matter clearly and succinctly to the young student and leave to the professor further exposition and development of the questions treated.

Following exactly the order of St. Thomas (Sum. Theol., I–II, qqs. 109–114), Fr. Daffara divides his work into five chapters (including “Merit” as the second section of the last chapter), into which are fitted all the traditional theses of the treatise on grace. In fact, to accustom the beginner to St. Thomas’ style and method and make him anxious to go to the original, he devotes large portions of the book to the very words of the Angelic Doctor. But he does not neglect the positive side, and is always at pains to develop or at least indicate the various arguments from the Church documents, Sacred Scripture, and the Fathers. Positions of the adversaries are briefly summarized and the opinions and clarifications of later theologians given due place. In matters of dispute among Catholic theologians he proposes vigorously the solutions of the Dominican school.

Sometimes the endeavor at condensation causes the author to allot insufficient space to matters that merit more ample treatment. Thus, very little time is given to the doctrine of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, scarcely any notice being taken of the scholarly work, both positive and speculative, done on this subject in recent years; and this is not compensated for by his referring the reader to the section on the divine missions in his “De Deo trino,” since there too the indwelling aspect is inadequately treated.

Space of greater proportion is given to the controversy on the efficaciousness of divine grace, but it is regretted that his exposition and evaluation of Molinism is very liable, to say the least, to give a false picture of that doctrine. The Molinist, like all Catholics, teaches that grace is efficacious “in actu primo,” and hence antecedently to the actual consent of the will that grace is infallibly connected with the salutary act. To explain this efficacy in the actual order the Molinist appeals to the divine knowledge of the free conditioned futures, in the light of which God issues His absolute decree actualizing the present order. Hence it is not true to say that Molinism teaches a “gratia versatilis” (p. 141), whose efficacy the will would determine; the efficaciousness of grace in the actual order, which is the problem posited by revelation, is due to the Divine Will decreeing an order in which, as hypothetical, God foresaw the consent which man with the divine concurrence would give. Hence, such statements as the following are false: “cum ordo electus in hoc systemate cognoscatur quidem a Deo, sed non
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efficiatur,"—"aliquid positivi et perfectivi datur homini, quod non est a Deo, sed ab ipso homine, quodque a Deo quidem cognoscitur, sed non efficietur" (pp. 114, 128). To the Molinist the whole actual order in all its actuality and everything in that order depend on the free absolute decree of God, and God so cooperates with His creature that nothing whatsoever, specifically not the free determination of the creature, escapes the influx of God's universal causality. The Molinist holds tenaciously to the undeniable metaphysical principle, dear to St. Thomas, that "Deus est causa prima universalissima, omne ens et entis differentias profundens; ante quam nihil existere potest, post quam omnia per dependentiam ex illa" (p. 107), but he denies what the Thomist says necessarily follows from that principle, viz. therefore God must physically predetermine the creature even in his free acts. The Molinist cannot see how human liberty is preserved in such a doctrine and asserts that the supreme dominion of God, as exhibited in the fonts of revelation and demanded by rigid metaphysical principles, in no way calls for a physical predetermination.

Apart from these few reservations, the volume should prove useful to the seminarians, who will also be helped by the three indices and the various selected bibliographies which the author has taken care to include.

Woodstock College

THOMAS A. BROPHY, S.J.


War usually brings with it a renewed interest in the life beyond the grave. Fr. Jugie's work is, therefore, a very timely one. Briefly and clearly he sets forth the Catholic doctrine on purgatory, its reasonableness in the light of God's infinite wisdom and goodness and love, the vast multitude of its inhabitants, their relations with the church in heaven and on earth, their amazing happiness and their intense suffering, the methods we can use to help them and the means by which we can avoid purgatory ourselves.

The excellence of Fr. Jugie's work is sufficiently attested by the fact that the French original has gone through seven editions in a comparatively short time. (The present translation is from the seventh edition.) Its selection by the Spiritual Book Associates is probably a reliable indication that this translation will be equally popular. It is regrettable, therefore, that the translator has introduced serious errors into the text. On page 14, for instance, occurs the following passage, in which I have inserted for comparison three phrases from the original French: "We, for our part, consider that the term 'pain of the damned' (peine du dam) should be altogether
eliminated from the terminology of Purgatory. All agree in recognising that the analogy between the so-called ‘damnation’ of Purgatory (dam du purgatoire) and the damnation of hell (dam de l'enfer) is a very tenuous one. Why retain an expression which is apt to mislead the unwary as to the true state of the souls in Purgatory?” “Damnation of hell” and “damnation of Purgatory” in this passage might be benignly interpreted as the equivalent of the loss or deprivation of the beatific vision in hell and in purgatory, but the “pain of the damned” seems altogether inexcusable. The French phrase “peine du dam” corresponds to the Latin “poena damni” and the corresponding English phrase is “pain of loss.” “Peine du dam” may be a misleading translation, as Jugie maintains, but, in the judgment of this reviewer, it is not only a false translation but a false theology which inflicts the “pain of the damned” on the souls in purgatory. Unfortunately, this misleading terminology is used repeatedly all through this translation of Jugie’s book (cf. pp. 13, 14, 46, 51, and 52 for one or more repetitions of the phrase). It is to be hoped that these errors will be corrected in subsequent editions of this otherwise excellent work.

Alma College

JOHN J. HEALY, S.J.


A French cynic and anti-clerical once remarked that the Christian faithful reminded him of sheep at Candlemas time: they are first blessed and then fleeced. With no touch of cynicism, a French cleric, Père Dabin, agreed that the role of the layman had been reduced at least in his own eyes to the uninspiring task of contributing to the support of his local pastor. The cynic was convinced that the fault lay with the hierarchical constitution of the Christian Church; the cleric suggested that the fault might be found in the failure of theologians to develop not so much a theology for the layman as a theology of the layman, a laicologie. Convinced that traditional ecclesiology was overly hierarchical, P. Dabin decided some twenty years ago to explore the possibilities of a new treatise in theology that would be devoted wholly to the essential dignity and function of the Christian layman. In 1941 he published the scriptural basis for his laicology: Le Sacerdoce des fidèles dans les livres saints (Paris: Bloud, 1941). The present volume, a companion piece to the first, presents and weighs the teaching of tradition on the significance of the “royal priesthood” as it is applied to the faithful.

The scope of this second work is as vast as P. Dabin’s own generous concept of tradition. Beginning with Pope St. Clement of Rome at the close of the first century and ending with Pope Pius XII, some 400 authors are cited.
These include not only the Fathers of the Church and the great Scholastic Doctors, but lesser theologians and controversials, with due consideration given to ascetical writers and pulpit orators, principally of the French school. To complete the portrait of the Christian layman as given to us by tradition the author concludes with a very valuable section on the significance of the unction of baptism and confirmation as found in the various liturgies of the Eastern and Western Church.

Although the scope of P. Dabin's work is vast and includes much that has never been assembled before, the reader will be disappointed to learn that an untimely death preceded by a long illness prevented the author from bringing his documentation up to date. Actually, no author is cited who wrote after the year 1941. This means that the two great encyclicals of Pius XII on the Mystical Body and on the Christian Liturgy, *Mystici Corporis* and *Mediator Dei*, together with the literature that these documents occasioned, are not even alluded to. And yet what has appeared on the subject of the "royal priesthood" in the past ten years has, for the most part, substantiated and confirmed the basic concept arrived at by P. Dabin.

Without denying that the expression "royal priesthood" is at times predicated of the laity in a wholly metaphorical sense—and this is particularly true of the Catholic controversials at the time of Trent—P. Dabin believes that the weight of Christian tradition demands the following very real elements in any definition of the "royal and prophetic priesthood" of the faithful: "(1) A functional participation, at once individual as well as collective, basically passive and yet to a certain extent active, in the triple office of Christ, King, Priest, and Prophet. (2) Inaugurated by the baptismal incorporation into Christ in so far as He is King, Priest, and Prophet. (3) Perfected ultimately by the reception of the sacrament of confirmation. (4) Identified with the sacramental character imprinted on the soul of the baptized and the confirmed. (5) Externalized as a speculative sign by the public rite of the post-baptismal unction and manifested as a practical sign by the unction of confirmation. (6) Qualifying [the recipient] for the exercise of certain acts of worship or acts related to worship. . . . (7) Creating, correlative to rights and prerogatives, a certain number of obligations both moral and religious. (8) Without prejudice in any way to such incommunicable rights as pertain to the hierarchical powers of order and jurisdiction" (p. 52).

As is clear from the very first element of P. Dabin's definition, the layman's function is not only priestly but prophetic and royal as well. Unquestionably, P. Dabin was anxious to extend the concept of the priesthood of the laity and thus broaden the scope of any *laicologie* of the future. The
layman’s function would not be restricted to such actions as are more intimately bound up with Christian worship; it would include such activity as comes under the general heading of Catholic Action.

Now if we consider Christ’s priesthood in the wider sense as including His prophetic or teaching office as well as His strictly sacrificial function—a view defended by St. Thomas and developed at some length by the present reviewer (cf. *Sum. Theol.*, III, q. 26, a. 2; “The Lay Priesthood: Real or Metaphorical?” *Theological Studies*, VIII [1947], 590–94)—we can readily agree that the layman is called upon to exercise a priestly function that is prophetic or apostolic as well as strictly sacrificial. Sharing in Christ’s priesthood, he will be privileged to offer to God through the liturgical ministry of the priest in orders the Eucharistic sacrifice; but he will be expected as well to offer to men through the mediacy of the magisterium God’s truth, to teach to others what he himself has been taught by the official teaching body of the Church. And in this sense we can agree that the “royal priesthood” implies a real “functional participation” in the office of Christ as Priest and Prophet. We feel, however, that P. Dabin is on less sure ground when he endeavors to extend the concept of the “royal priesthood” to a functional participation in the office of Christ as King. We will admit that the individual Christian in virtue of the baptismal character is a member of a royal household, a prince or princess in the kingdom of God on earth, destined to reign with Christ in the kingdom of heaven. But to argue from this to some regal function that is real and not sheerly metaphorical is not warranted by the evidence. As a matter of fact, the author himself in discussing the active participation of the layman in the office of Christ as King, has to content himself with the simple observation that the layman will be called upon at times to administer fraternal correction (p. 51). Rather than prejudice the case for the real character of the layman’s priestly and prophetic function by equating it with a royal function that appears at most metaphorical, we would suggest that the expression “royal” be retained as an adjective to qualify and to enhance the dignity of Christ’s priesthood in which the layman shares.

Whether there is need for a special theological treatise on the layman, a *laicologie*, is perhaps debatable. Less debatable is the need of enriching the treatises that exist by emphasizing the exalted dignity and function of the Christian layman. The source material from Scripture and tradition is both rich and abundant, and P. Dabin has made it easily available in his companion volumes on the “royal priesthood” of the faithful.

*Woodstock College*  
*Paul F. Palmer, S.J.*

During the past fifteen years scholarly interest in the remarkable reform movement known as the devotio moderna, or Christian Renaissance, has been greatly intensified. In the vanguard of this historical research is the Calvinist, Dr. Albert Hyma, professor of history at the University of Michigan, who among other works has published Renaissance to Reformation and a special edition of the Imitation of Christ. His latest volume, pleasant to read, though somewhat repetitious, is a significant contribution towards a better understanding of an obscure and often misunderstood section of Church history.

The "New Devotion" movement was founded in the valley of the Issel in the Netherlands by the zealous but prudent lay-apostle, Gerard Groote, who later became a deacon and an extremely successful preacher. Against much unreasonable opposition from certain lax elements among the clergy and monastic orders it slowly spread to a considerable portion of Western Europe and to the New World. Dr. Hyma’s purpose therefore is "to show how this ‘New Devotion,’ or Christian Renaissance, between 1380 and 1520, absorbed the wisdom of the ancients, the essence of Christ’s teachings, the mystic religion of the Fathers and the saints of medieval Europe, as well as the learning of the Italian humanists; how it assimilated all these ingredients and presented them in a new dress to the old world and the new.” This purpose he carries out with competence.

Dr. Hyma first narrates the life of Gerard Groote (1340–1384) and his varied career as theologian, philosopher, reformer, and educator. Then he sketches the rise of the “New Devotion” and the part played in it by Groote, Florentius Radewijns, Gerard Zerbolt of Zutphen, John Celie, Thomas à Kempis, and others, as the center of the movement shifted from Deventer, to Windesheim and Diepenveen, to Zwolle. Three forms of it existed simultaneously, all three including both men and women: the members living without vows separately in private homes; those living without vows in community, known as the Brethren and Sisters of the Common Life; and finally the Augustinian Canons and Canonesses Regular of the Windesheim Congregation, who took the vows of religion. Hence, priests, religious, and layfolk were participants, the last being the most numerous.

Since the first group did not endure but was absorbed by the other two, Doctor Hyma leaves it aside and concentrates on the two more important ones, giving their historical development, general characteristics, and influence, particularly in the reform of religious discipline, in the practice of the corporal works of mercy, and in the education of youth. This influence for
good was extraordinary, both in extent and in intensity, so much so, that we do not hesitate to say that with time it could have brought about from within the true disciplinary betterment of the whole Church, particularly the reform of the clergy and religious of those troublous times. Luther's impetuous, wrongheaded, pretended reform or rather revolt checked this slow-working but effective yeast that was gradually leavening the whole mass. The "New Devotion," not the Protestant Reformation, was the proper remedy being used by Divine Providence to cure the Church's disciplinary and educational ills. However, the author does not draw this conclusion but incorrectly looks upon the devotio moderna, mainly because of its stress on the Bible, and its seemingly strong stand against religious vows and ecclesiastical authority, as the forerunner of Luther and the Protestant Reformation, especially since Luther himself in his youth had spent a year of study in a house of the Brethren at Magdeburg.

In this splendid work of religious and educational reform, the ideas and spirit contained in the Imitation of Christ played a decisive role. The little book is the embodiment of the "New Devotion" and its initial phenomenal popularity has continued down to the present day. Its influence on Ignatius Loyola, the Spiritual Exercises, and the early Jesuits of the Counter Reformation, is well known. Who wrote it? All agree that Thomas à Kempis at least edited it, and gave it its final form. But who wrote the original draft? Was it Gersen, or Gerson, or Groote, or Thomas à Kempis himself? Doctor Hyma proposes a new name: Gerard Zerbolt of Zutphen (1367-1398), a prominent member of the Brethren of the Common Life in Deventer, a learned scholar, librarian, and polemical defender of the Brethren's way of life. Besides showing the improbability of its author being Groote, Dr. Hyma bases his choice of Gerard Zerbolt on his study of the external and internal evidence of the Eutin manuscript and the documentary discoveries at Lübeck. He does formulate a probable argument and a lead meriting further study.

Dr. Hyma has read widely on the "New Devotion" and the Imitation, and has consulted just about every primary and secondary source. The notes are full and interesting; the bibliography, choice; the index, adequate. He explodes the canard that the devotio moderna and the Imitation are anti-intellectual and anti-monastic. The movement rightly opposed decadent Scholasticism and lax monasticism; hence, any extreme statements must be understood in that light. No anti-intellectualist movement could have made the contribution to education and the renewal of learning that this one did. No anti-monasticism could have produced such reforms in so many monasteries.
The book has some flaws. Its author occasionally shows a lack of familiarity with Catholic doctrines and practices; he quite often misuses the words mystic and mysticism; his comparison of Groote with Christ is just a little extravagant. The devotio moderna is not Protestantism in germ. Had it been allowed to continue to increase its benign influence, it would have made Protestantism's claim to reform wholly unnecessary. Dr. Hyma presents us with the facts, but he does not draw this conclusion. Perhaps further research will lead him to it. His book is a good introduction but not the definitive work on the devotio moderna and its immortal charter, the Imitation of Christ.

St. Mary's College

Augustine Klaas, S.J.


In the spiritual and religious formation of members of the Society of Jesus few men have exerted a more profound and extensive influence than Father Jerome Nadal, S.J., and it is with undeniable justification that he has been called "the second founder of the Society." Without any doubt, as Polanco, the secretary of St. Ignatius, testified, Nadal possessed a most intimate understanding and appreciation of the mind and spirit of St. Ignatius, and it was for this reason that he was deputed by the latter to promulgate and establish this spirit throughout the early Society, especially in Spain, Portugal, Sicily, Northern Italy, and Germany. Despite this extraordinary formative influence which he enjoyed, Nadal's spiritual doctrine has been undeservedly neglected and left in relative obscurity. It is true that the Monumenta Historica Societatis Jesu published four volumes of his works, but it seems to be Father Nicolau who, during these last ten years, has done most to bring to light Nadal's great contribution to Jesuit spirituality.

In his present scholarly and well-documented study Father Nicolau's purpose is to present the spiritual doctrine, ascetical and mystical, which was propagated by Nadal in the early Society. As a background for appreciating this spiritual doctrine, Nicolau presents a fifty-page biographical sketch of Nadal, in which he includes a brief study of his character and interior life. He then follows this with a complete, sixty-page critical evaluation of all of Nadal's spiritual writings, both edited and unedited, but especially the conferences and instructions at Coimbra and Alcalá, and the Adnotationes et meditations in Evangelia and Evangelicae historiae imagines. These last two works, which put art at the service of prayer, were undoubtedly influential in the history of spirituality.
The most important and interesting chapters of the book are the next ten (3–12) which examine the spiritual doctrine of this illustrious ángel de S. Ignacio. In his numerous writings Nadal frequently treats, and uses as a starting point of his spiritual teaching, the theology of the religious state. In addition to the general grace common to all religious there is a special grace proper to each institute, by which a religious can fulfill all the particular duties proper to his institute and thus attain its end. According to Nadal, the grace which is particular to the Society of Jesus is known primarily in its founder, St. Ignatius, then in the meditations of the Kingdom and Two Standards, the compendium of a Jesuit’s life, and lastly in the consideration of the end of the Society. Father Nicolau orders the chapters of this central part of the book according to the particular graces which were given to St. Ignatius, for here can be found the model of Jesuit perfection.

Nadal’s teaching on prayer is illuminative and interesting, for it demonstrates that in the early Society there was a greater spirit of prudent liberty in regard to Jesuit methods of prayer than often appears today. Nicolau explains well such points as the apostolic end of Jesuit prayer, the relative ease—for this belongs among the graces proper to a Jesuit vocation—with which Jesuits should be able to practice the Ignatian prayer of finding God in all things, and the importance which Nadal made of “the four parts of prayer,” the elevation of the mind to God, petition, thanksgiving, and supplication. Nadal also taught, although not in the modern terminology, that mystical prayer has a very true place in Jesuit spirituality, and in his exhortations he stressed the need of disposing oneself for these graces. Another of Nadal’s central doctrines was the relation between prayer and apostolic activity. These two should be so closely united that a member of the Society should be able to find no less devotion in his apostolate than in his prayer. Some of the other interesting points in this section of the book are the influence which Ignatius’ vision at La Storta had on the doctrine of Nadal, the importance of the Kingdom and Two Standards in a Jesuit’s vocation, and the primacy of the divine in Ignatian spirituality. Before concluding with a critical evaluation of Nadal’s doctrine, Father Nicolau examines the sources of Nadal’s spiritual teaching and the influence which he exerted on others. There are added four appendices, which contain some hitherto unedited manuscripts of Nadal. The book is very well indexed.

Although Father Nicolau might have been able to condense the same matter, without any important omission, into a far less number of pages—repetitions are too frequent—it must be admitted that his study of Nadal is a scholarly and valuable contribution to the history of Jesuit spirituality.

Weston College

THOMAS G. O’CALLAGHAN, S.J.

This book, published with a Catholic imprimatur, is an attempt to describe Russian spirituality. The first, and by far the more important part (pp. 1–159), deals with canonized sanctity; the last twenty pages (160–80) are an essay on monastic spiritual life.

An Introduction examines how Russian sanctity may be discussed and analyzed, and this leads up to some notes on canonization. The procedure is “not complicated” (p. 35). “The Russian Church proceeded several times to decanonization, and even to recanonization of decanonized persons, without thereby causing scandal among the faithful” (p. 25). In fact, canonization “depends more on the vox populi than on an external magisterium” (p. 20). The people are moved by three things: the spiritual deeds of the saints, their miracles, and especially the incorrupt state of the body after death, though the latter impresses far more the people than the Church itself (p. 33). Little is said of the intervention of civil authority. The author’s views, strongly influenced by the slavophile doctrine of sobornost’, seemed to this writer vague, incomplete, and subjective. The Western reader will find more accurate information on Russian canonizations in an article, “La Canonisation des saints dans l’église russe,” by P. Peeters, S. J. (Analecta Bollandiana, XXXIII [1914], 380–420, and XXXVIII [1920], 176, supplementary note). This is a very thorough review of Golubinsky’s History of the Canonisation of Saints. Father Peeter’s commentary seems to have escaped Behr-Sigel’s attention.

The Russian saints are classified by Behr-Sigel in the following categories: (1) The “holy princes” of Kiev; (2) the “holy princes” at the time of the Tartar invasion; (3) the “holy monks” of South Russia; (4) the “holy monks” of North Russia; (5) Nil Sorksij and Joseph of Volokolamsk; (6) the “fools for Christ” and lay sanctity in ancient Russia; (7) the startsy (Elders) of the XVIII and XIX centuries. When this is over, the author returns to three categories: the murdered “holy princes” to whom he adds a bishop and some three children who died violently, though they were not martyrs in the Western sense of the expression; the “fools for Christ”; and the “Elders.” The author seems anxious to impress the reader that these three categories were typically Russian.

The book leaves one unsatisfied. The author chooses in the lives of his heroes that which he considers typically Russian, and omits the rest. I regret to say that a stronger impression of salesmanship than of scholarship is conveyed. Something should have been said of the importance of the political factor in determining the fama sanctitatis. Some thirty years ago, N. A. Klepinin wrote an historically worthless biography of Saint
Alexander Nevsky, whom he held up as the first Eurasian. Nevsky never saw that far ahead. If we are to judge by the way he treated his brother Andrew, his son Vasily, and the Novgorodians, he was one of the most unscrupulous politicians of his day and anything but a saint. Saint Alexis, metropolitan of Moscow, condoned some wretched crimes committed against the dynasty of Tver, and was severely reprimanded by Constantinople for sacrificing the interests of the Church to those of the Moscow princeling. His sanctity, to a greater degree than that of his predecessor Saint Peter, whose chief merit was that he transferred illegally the metropolitan see from Kiev to Moscow, was chiefly political. It might be pertinently asked how much Saint Sergius of Radonezh would have been honored had he not been such a devoted servant of Prince Dmitri Donskoy, when the latter extended his sway over the other princes of North Russia. These are not the most dazzling pages of Russian history. The canonization of Dimitri of Uglich had little to do with sanctity, but much to do with very dark politics. When one nationalizes sanctity (and Behr-Sigel is emphatic in her will to describe Russian sanctity), one might usefully examine the political activity or influence of the canonized saint. This cannot be done by a Western writer. Only a Russian, but of a greater penetration than Behr-Sigel (though he may not have the charming way of writing of our author), will some day dissect the interaction of politics and religion in so closed an autocephaly as Russia.

The author brushes off Ivan Martinov’s (+1894) contribution to Acta Sanctorum as insufficiently critical. This is a harsh judgment on so famous a scholar. The Annus Ecclesiasticus Graeco-Slavicus (Acta Sanctorum, Oct. XI [1870]), is a monument of erudition, not only for the extension of the investigation (as is witnessed by the Introduction), but by the numberless references given to each notice. This work, unsurpassed then in the West and in Russia, has not been superseded. Martinov also published in Acta Sanctorum (Oct. X, 863–83) a remarkable dissertation on the Kiev monastery: “De B. Aretha, monacho Cryptensi in Russia,” unknown to our author, who was ill-advised to take such a maladroit swipe at the Bollandists.

Very interesting is the essay on monastic spirituality, even if this writer is far from sharing Behr-Sigel’s enthusiasm over hesychasm.

Centre d’Action Sociale et Religieuse, 
La Maison Bellarmin, Montréal

JOSEPH H. LEDIT, S.J.


Pierre Pascal, who published in 1938 a splendid book on Protopop Av-
vakum, has translated for the readers of *Russie et Chrétienté* this most delightful autobiography of a Russian Orthodox monk, Archimandrite Spiridon (born 1875, died after the Soviet revolution), which first appeared in Russian in 1917. There is an enchanting sympathy, a luminous other-worldliness in this sweet tale of prayer, pilgrimage and, in later years, preaching to Siberian convicts.

Young Spiridon, called Georges before his profession, grew up in a pious family of peasants. His parents, like all good Russians, were charitable to pilgrims, beggars, monks, nuns, everybody. As a boy, he was strange, not quite able to adapt himself, but he found God in the most intimate contemplation. When about fourteen years of age, he left for Kiev on a pilgrimage with a local holy man by the name of Simeon, who called every one by the title of “servant of God.” “[Simeon says:] ‘Did you ever have visions?’ ‘No,’ I answered. ‘Because many Saints had visions.’ ‘Uncle, I don’t need anything. I want to be transformed in the love of God! What draws me most to this love, is that God seems to me to love more His creature than Himself. When I think that there are so many stars in heaven, and that in those stars too, there are living beings, and I look upon the earth, where everything is green, and blooms, and birds sing in gladness, and crickets murmur! How can I not love him? This is why I would like to change myself entirely in the love of God’ ” (p. 26).

Let us forget about the beings who live in the stars, and remember only this great love. On they go to Kiev, to Odessa, and Georges is thrilled on the way by the contemplation of beautiful nature, from which he rises to a thrilling song of divine love. He often weeps for sheer gladness, but are his tears always healthy? Athos scandalizes him, because the monks were divided in petty nationalist factions, and because of “money, money, always money!” We follow him to other places and share his intense spiritual life. Before leaving Russia for the East, he meets a queer mad saint who prophesies, has visions, and expounds a strangely powerful doctrine on prayer:

“Without prayer, all the virtues are like trees without earth. No, there is no prayer in the life of Christians, or it is a lifeless prayer. Our Lord himself prayed; he prayed especially on mountains, on mountain tops, where he was alone, with no one. The Christian, friend, is a man of prayer. His father, his mother, his wife, his children, his life, all this for him is Christ. The disciple of Christ must live only by Christ. When he will love Christ so much, he will necessarily love all the creatures of God also. Men think that they must first love men, and then God. I tried this myself, but it is of no avail. When I began to love God before all, I found my neighbor in this love of God, and in that same love of God my enemies became my friends and God’s creatures” (pp. 41–42).
There are some pages of rare spiritual beauty in this fascinating book. Some good common sense, too; for instance in the sorties against the love of money he finds too often in his way. Yet, this mysticism does not exclude grievous sin (pp. 49, 56), followed by intense repentance. There are, at times, signs of morbidness: "When we were in the thick of the forest, Maxim fell to earth, raised his arms to heaven, and sang: 'Holy God, Powerful God, Immortal God, have pity on us.' When he sang for the third time, I crumbled to earth and lost consciousness. I do not know how long I remained in this state, but when I came to my senses, I saw Maxim standing at the same spot" (p. 41).

The latter part of the book tells of conversions made in Siberian jails. Spiridon appears in the light of a very kind priest, softening through God’s love the most obdurate criminals. This is a precious little book, interesting not only to the theologian, and to any one who loves a touching spiritual story, but to the religious psychologist as well.

Centre d’Action Sociale et Religieuse, 
La Maison Bellarmin, Montréal 

JOSEPH H. LEDIT, S.J.


In order that the Sacred Congregation of Religious might be enabled more effectively and fruitfully to perform its assigned functions, on January 24, 1944, Pius XII approved the erection and establishment in the Sacred Congregation of a special Body or Commission of chosen men, which was to deal with all questions and matters pertaining in any way to the religious and clerical education and to the training in literature, science, and ministry, of aspirants, novices, and junior members of all religious institutes and societies living in common without vows. The recently created Commission has especially the following duties: (a) to define and to outline the principal criteria and peculiar characteristics according to which the education and training of religious must always be conducted; (b) to watch over the ordinances which are enacted by superiors and chapters in matters which concern education and instruction; and to inspect and review the reports made on this matter by superiors and Apostolic Visitors.

In accordance with the first of its special duties the Commission has published in this Enchiridion a number of valuable documents culled from Apostolic Constitutions and Encyclicals of Pontiffs, Acts of Councils, Decrees and Instructions of Sacred Congregations. The parade of documents manifests particularly the praises of Supreme Pontiffs for the monastic life, their timely warnings against decline in religious fervor, and their
solicitude and wise guidance for the proper intellectual and spiritual training of subjects.

The selection of documents is well balanced. There are enough citations from the works of the first eighteen centuries to sketch out clearly the manner in which the Supreme Pontiffs have continually fostered a traditional method of intellectual and spiritual formation of subjects. Quite understandably and desirably, from the pontificate of Pius IX onward the flood of documents is more abundant. One finds in this collection the schemata drawn up at the Vatican Council on the subjects of vows, obedience, common life, and studies. From the pontificate of Leo XIII are given documents dealing with simple vows, confession and communion, manifestation of conscience, requisites for ordination, and the attendance of religious at secular universities. Out of the treasury of Pius X's writings have been selected the Motu Proprio on sacred music, the laws for the extirpation of Modernism, the instruction on sacred eloquence, excerpts from Pascendi dominici gregis on the study of St. Thomas, and the decree on military service for religious (January 1, 1911). From the de religiosis section of the Code a generous number of canons has been accumulated. The editors have selected from the pontificate of Pius XI the entire letter on the formation of subjects (March 19, 1924), the Apostolic Constitution Deus scientiarum Dominus, the instruction on the proper examination of candidates for the priesthood (December 1, 1931), and the entire letter on the Catholic priesthood. Among the excerpts from the pontificate of Pius XII are given the allocution of June 24, 1939, with regard to the proper method of teaching and learning, an exhortation to military chaplains on fidelity to religious duty, the Apostolic Constitution on secular institutes, and the instruction on the quinquennial report.

This brief sketch of some of the documents contained in this volume gives an indication of its value to masters of novices and other spiritual directors. Superiors will find this work a handy volume for ready reference with its elaborate system of indices that extend over forty pages, and often it will save ecclesiastical students many minutes otherwise spent in searching through ancient and oversized tomes.

Weston College

JOHN V. O'Connor, S.J.


The history of canon law is a field which is not often written up. Further, the books that have been published on this subject usually are not adaptable for class use because they are either too brief or too long. This volume tries
to steer a middle course by giving the necessary information in a quite readable form.

This volume is the first of a set planned to cover the whole history of canon law. The subject at hand is a study of the sources or fonts of canon law. Later a study of the science and institutes of canon law will be published.

The system followed is chronological and territorial. The four epochs of canon law history are subdivided into periods. Then in each period the sources produced in various countries are dealt with. To distinguish grades of importance in material three sizes of type are used; the larger the type, the more important the matter.

In addition to a critical evaluation of the more important collections and editions, Fr. Stickler devotes a whole article (8½ pages) to a review and criticism of the theory proposed by Fr. Peitz, S.J., to explain the origin of the collections of the early centuries of Christianity. This theory would overthrow much heretofore taught. Fr. Stickler admits a definitive evaluation of the theory cannot as yet be made. Further evidence must be sought.

A suggestion offered by the author is that the present method of citing the decretals be abandoned for a more logical system. Thus he suggests writing X, II, 28, 26 instead of c.26, X, II, 28; VIa, III, 14, 4 instead of c.4, III, 14 in VIa; etc. In other words, begin with the principal reference and work down to the least instead of the present mixed system.

The book proper ends with a nine-page summary of all that has been treated. Then six appendices are added dealing with the sources of Oriental canon law, liturgical law, concordats, Roman, German, and modern civil law. A fine alphabetical index and table of contents conclude the volume. The book should prove very useful in its field.

West Baden College

JAMES I. O'CONNOR, S.J.


Another in the University of Notre Dame Religion Series, Fr. Sheedy's volume purposes to provide a text in moral theology for college students and lay readers. The book goes a long way toward realizing that ambition. As the title indicates, the author has admirably chosen to present Christian morality as a positive accomplishment, the product of the exercise of the theological and moral virtues. It is this approach which imparts to the work an especially attractive flavor, and which will prove to be a prime factor in influencing its readers, who are not expected to emerge from its study as professional moralists but rather as better informed and more exemplary Christians. Prohibitive legislation necessarily receives its share
of treatment, but it is the challenge of virtue, rather than the bogy of vice, which the book strives to emphasize throughout.

The first four chapters—perhaps the least satisfactory of all from a moralist's viewpoint—are devoted to a disappointingly brief summary of general principles. The author justifies the brevity of this section partially on the score that "these principles are more a matter of natural moral theology (ethics) than of supernatural moral theology" (p. 21). Without pausing to appraise the quotation itself, it is unfortunately true that the book as an isolated whole suffers because of the inadequate treatment of these very principles, so essential to a proper understanding of the solution to subsequent moral problems. The principle of the double effect, for example, is disposed of in a footnote (p. 22) with a reference to Fr. Healy's Moral Guidance for further explanation; the resolution of a doubtful conscience is accorded but a single paragraph.

The chapter on Divine Life and Supernatural Virtue finds Fr. Sheedy at his pedagogic best. If such elusive concepts as those of supernatural elevation, grace, and virtue are not thereafter more intelligible to the student, then it would seem that one must despair of theological education for the laity. Perhaps if the author could rightfully have presupposed in his readers a grasp of basic ethics, he could have made this excellent chapter a more effective initial point of departure.

The remaining and major portion of the book treats of the individual theological and moral virtues, exclusive of contractual justice and the obligations of the married state. It is doubtless difficult in a restricted work such as this to avoid the extremes of oversimplification and unnecessary complication; but most will probably agree that the author has in this instance succeeded notably well, both in his choice and in his solution of moral problems. The great majority of those solutions will evoke from fellow moralists either ready agreement or at least the deference which is due legitimate theological opinion. Some few, however, may not pass unchallenged. Is the author, for example, too rigorous in forbidding universally and absolutely the Catholic architect to accept a contract for designing a Protestant church, and in juxtaposing that problem with the case of Catholic printers who would produce heretical books (p. 95)? Too benign on the other hand would appear his seemingly universal condonation of divorce grants by Catholic judges (p. 154). Without denying the justifying force of such circumstances as here cited by Fr. Sheedy, it does not necessarily follow that those circumstances always obtain. Yet one is exposed to the erroneous impression that in practice no Catholic judge need scruple about the matter. (And by way of realistic subsumption upon circumstances as
envisioned by the author, one might cite the growing tendency in this
country to concentrate all divorce proceedings under the jurisdiction of
one domestic relations court. If the whole *raison d'être* of such a court is to
consider—and hence in many cases to grant—petitions for divorce, how
lenient can a moralist then afford to be in allowing a Catholic judge to
preside?) And finally, when discussing the morality of war, Fr. Sheedy makes
this statement: "*And in no case* [italics added], even while the fighting is
going on, may civilians fire upon enemy soldiers" (p. 193). So sweeping a
proposition, even in context, begs for qualification.

Somewhat conspicuous a departure from common teaching is the author's
insistence upon the intent to deceive as being of the essence of lying; and
his subsequent defense of legitimate mental reservation accordingly depends
to a marked degree on the same questionable supposition. His definition of
suicide could be sharpened considerably in anticipation of the vital distinc-
tion between direct and indirect killing of self; while to speak of suicide in
terms of commutative injustice against God is, it would seem, a less than
accurate mode of theological speech.

It will require but a minimum of reflection to realize that the foregoing
adverse comments affect a relatively insignificant fraction of what is actually
an otherwise commendable achievement. To say that seminarians will
probably not find the book especially helpful for their own education as
future confessors, is merely to emphasize the fact that the author remains
intensely aware throughout of his selected audience. But *The Christian
Virtues* offers a two-fold and timely challenge: to lay students who may have
developed the conviction that Christian morality is adequately served by
obedience to a grim code of calvinistic prohibitions; and to professors of
moral theology who may unconsciously operate on the same supposition.
Fr. Sheedy has imparted no small impetus to the cause of a more Christian
moral theology for the laity.

*Weston College*  

JOHN J. LYNCH, S.J.

*Grundriss der Liturgik des römischen Ritus*. Edited by Joseph

Two intriguing questions spring to mind on opening this excellent volume.
The first asks with grateful memories how long the Seminary of Eichstädt
will continue to produce outstanding scholars in the field of liturgy. Modern
liturgical science is still living on the fruits of Adelbert Ebner's great work
on source-study, *Iter Italicum* he called it, and published a year before his
death in 1897. Even before that date Eichstädt had already produced in
Valentin Thalhofer a man to fill the Ebner role: Thalhofer created the Herder Handbuch der Liturgik that has maintained itself since 1883.

The second question now arising is this: To what extent does individual personality "color" or "shape" the tradition being handed down?

Thalhofer's special interest made ample room for a comparative study of the ritual of Catholic and non-Catholic Christian circles, not unlike the side-by-side comparisons in Möhler's celebrated Symbolik. After Thalhofer's death the Handbuch was revised by his successor, Msgr. Ludwig Eisenhofer, and both their names appeared on that edition. But when Eisenhofer undertook the next revision (the two volumes appeared in 1932 and 1933), he edited out most of Thalhofer's speciality, and replaced it by more detailed studies of the literature of the field. Thalhofer's name was then dropped from the now standard work. Doctor Eisenhofer then also brought out the handy little Grundriss der katholischen Liturgik (1924), which in turn went through four editions before its author's demise in 1941.

With this volume Joseph Lechner, present incumbent of the Eichstädt professorship, has reworked this Grundriss from cover to cover, so as to bring it abreast of current writing. Two names again appear on the title-page. As Lechner's special interest has dealt with the history of canon law, one can doubtless expect that the next revision will be canonically flavored, so to say. But the Handbuch marches on!

St. Mary's College

Gerald Ellard, S.J.


The first volume, Greece and Rome, of Fr. Copleston's history of philosophy evidenced such wide erudition, painstaking scholarship, and sympathetic understanding that the present reviewer expressed the hope that the succeeding volumes would measure up to its high standards of objectivity and fine critical judgment; however, he also took occasion to regret that the general excellence of the work was marred by a lack of care in editing and proofreading the text (cf. Thought, XXII [1949], 404 ff., and the New Scholasticism, XXI [1947], 421 ff.). It is a pleasure to report that this second volume surpasses our most sanguine expectations; it possesses all the virtues of its predecessor, yet leaves nothing to be desired as to accuracy and little that is open to criticism as to content, appraisal, or style.

Only one thoroughly conversant with the vast and complex field of patristic and mediaeval thought, who is besides a competent philosopher and theologian in his own right, could display such good judgment in the
selection, ordering, and evaluation of his material and in the emphasis that he gives to certain dominant themes and doctrinal developments without detracting in any way from the comprehensiveness of the work as a whole. The author is not content with merely detailing in chronological order a detached account and descriptive analysis of various opinions and systems of thought. He attempts to make the contributions of past philosophers live again for us by situating their ideas in their proper historical setting, tracing, where possible, their doctrinal origins and filiations, and with a few broad well-chosen strokes delineating the political and social background conditioning their development. The philosopher reveals himself in the historian when he expounds the various solutions advanced by early thinkers to such intricate problems as the universal, seminal reasons, the forma corporeitatis, or the real distinction between essence and existence; he is not satisfied with merely outlining the various positions taken by successive philosophers on such questions but in the course of his exposition he tries to acquaint the reader with both the historical and philosophical significance of the problem, its peculiar complexities, and the actual reasons, often not purely philosophical, that dictated the proffered solutions. Yet he does not allow himself to become involved in the idiosyncrasies of individual philosophers or in doctrinal details which, however interesting in themselves, are irrelevant to the synoptic view at which he aims. Without evading any of the main issues and without sacrificing anything of completeness, he has succeeded in presenting with calm reasonableness and common sense a closely concatenated history of the salient developments of patristic and mediaeval thought in a style whose clarity, simplicity, and vigor make for absorbing reading.

In the present work there is none of the dogmatism or bias, none of the narrowness or obscurantism to which the subject could easily lend itself in the hands of a less resolutely objective historian. When a philosopher is clearly in error the author does not hesitate to criticize his doctrine or to indicate the faulty reasoning behind it; more often than not, however, he leaves it to the benevolence of the reader to judge the merit of any particular theory. His objectivity is never more in evidence than when he discusses the great mediaeval schools of Thomism, Augustinianism, and Scotism. Here his practice is to present the opposing views in the most favorable light possible and without taking sides, observing more than once that it is not the historian's function to decide such issues. This procedure has the merit of being thought-provoking and not just informative. His tendency is to stress fundamental agreements and the complementary character of apparently opposing views rather than to exaggerate systematic differences,
though he cautions against the danger of carrying such conciliation too far, as, for instance, do some "Thomists who wish to show St. Augustine the same reverence that St. Thomas showed him" (p. 63) and therefore unduly dilute the differences between them. It is refreshing to find a Catholic historian of philosophy less ready to condemn than to seek a defensible meaning behind questionable terminology such as the Pseudo-Dionysius used in his trinitarian teaching or Tertullian in formulating his "materialism." Another case in point is the author's attempt to explain what Gregory of Nyssa may have had in mind when he contended that bodies are ultimately constituted by immaterial qualities; he refers to the "analogous difficulty" (p. 35) in the peripatetic doctrine of prime matter, which, though "immaterial" in itself, has an exigency for quantity. Fr. Copleston tries to penetrate beyond the words of a philosopher to his intentions; yet he is careful not to stretch the meaning of words or to water down a doctrine in minimizing divergencies from more traditional viewpoints. His understanding of the authors whom he treats is based throughout on their own writings, to which he makes frequent references in his footnotes; hence he is slow to follow the lead of other historians who do not hesitate to ascribe objectionable theories to philosophers, such as ultra-realism to St. Anselm or nominalism to Eric of Auxerre or even to Roscelin, simply on the basis of a passing remark or of words wrenched from their context or on the authority of some contemporary author who quite possibly had an axe to grind. Abelard is no more to be trusted on the teaching of William of Champeaux than is St. Bernard on the doctrine of Abelard.

Perhaps nowhere does the author's sane, balanced judgment and sympathetic comprehension better reveal itself than in his analysis of the philosophical system of John Scotus Eriugena, "one of the most remarkable phenomena of the ninth century . . . which stands out like a lofty rock in the midst of a plain" (p. 112). In attempting to express in the formulae of Neoplatonic emanationism the specifically Christian doctrine of creation and its correlative notion of "participation," Eriugena, like the Pseudo-Dionysius, was unfortunate in the illustrations he chose to explain how creatures are the "theophanies" of God. However, the monistic pantheism that as a result has been attributed to him may very well be more a matter of naive translation of revelational data into an uncongenial philosophical medium than of heterodox thought or intention. It is easy enough from our modern vantage ground to criticize Eriugena for his failure fully to appreciate the relation of creature to Creator in terms of the analogy of being and thus to elaborate a more successful syncretism of faith and reason. His philosophy, however, should be judged only in the perspective of the ninth century; as
such it reveals itself as a rather precocious endeavor to formulate divinely
revealed truths in the alien language of a purely rational discipline which
had not as yet become adequately conscious of the full implications of the
philosophical notions of creation and of the analogy of being.

The brief section which the author devotes to patristic philosophy is a
masterpiece of selectivity and compression. He is well aware of the futility
of looking for a formal philosophical synthesis in patristic literature or, in
fact, for any clear-cut distinction between philosophy and theology. Yet the
writings of the Fathers contained many strictly philosophical concepts,
such as purely rational proofs for God's existence, and it is the function of
the historian of philosophy, as the author realizes, to disengage these ideas
from their theological context. Patristic philosophy deserves mention in a
comprehensive history of philosophy, if for no other reason, in order to
stress the fact that Christian philosophy is not simply to be equated with
Aristotelianism. For "Plato, and not Aristotle, was the Greek thinker who
won the greatest esteem from the Fathers of the Church" (p. 39). Fr. Cople­
ston succinctly expounds the principal philosophical themes pervading the
thought of the Fathers, the extent of their indebtedness to Plato, Philo, and
Plotinus, and the originality with which they succeeded in incorporating
these borrowings within the framework of Christian revelation. Of particular
importance is the connection which he indicates between patristic mystical
theology and later mediaeval speculation, especially among the Victorines,
in the field of a symbolic and negative theology that is based on the philo-
sophical premise of God's utter transcendence.

Fr. Copleston's exposition and evaluation of St. Augustine's contribution
to Christian wisdom is one of the best introductions to the philosophic
thought of the Bishop of Hippo which we have ever read. His analysis of
the Augustinian theory of illumination seems to penetrate to the heart of
the matter with the observation that, though "the illumination would seem
to fulfill some ideogenetic function," yet "this function has reference not to
the content of the concept" but to the "form" of necessity in certain judg-
ments (p. 65); this necessity is based on the relation of the mind's object to
the normative eternal truths or divine ideas. The author stresses the fact
that St. Augustine never wrote formally as a philosopher because he was
not concerned with man in abstraction from his actual supernatural destiny;
however, this is not to imply that he confused philosophy and theology or
that he denied the capacity of the mind to attain truth independently of
revelation. Though he did not explicitly discuss the respective roles of
reason and faith, he was quite aware of the distinction—otherwise we could
not extract "'purely philosophical' ideas from the total fabric of his thought"
(p. 49)—but he fused them both as inseparable ingredients in one Christian wisdom. In this connection it should be noted that the recurrence of the question of the relation between faith and reason as a constant theme in the present work is not due to any substantial divergence of view that the author notes among patristic and mediaeval thinkers; his aim in dwelling on the subject is to present a complete historical refutation of the popular canard that pre-Cartesian philosophy is basically, if not exclusively, theological: that it is either founded on faith or intended to be at the most a propaedeutic to theology.

St. Augustine's contribution to the philosophy of the future did not consist so much in an explicitly formulated system of ideas as in certain basic philosophical insights veiled in a language that was often imaginative and sometimes ambiguous. As Fr. Copleston observes so well: "The rigid type of Thomist would, I suppose, maintain that Augustine's philosophy contains nothing of value which was not much better said by St. Thomas, more clearly delineated and defined; but the fact remains that the Augustinian tradition is not dead even today, and it may be that the very incompleteness and lack of systematization in Augustine's thought, its very 'suggestiveness', is a positive help towards the longevity of his tradition, for the 'Augustinian' is not faced by a complete system to be accepted, rejected or mutilated: he is faced by an approach, an inspiration, certain basic ideas which are capable of considerable development, so that he can remain perfectly faithful to the Augustinian spirit even though he departs from what the historic Augustine actually said" (p. 50). It is with this in mind that one must approach, as the author does, the philosophy of St. Bonaventure, the foremost of mediaeval Augustinians. However unsuccessful the Seraphic Doctor may have been at times in transfusing the static metaphysical categories of the Stagirite with the dynamic intuitions of the Bishop of Hippo, he has none-theless preserved for us the genuine spirit of St. Augustine, particularly his emphasis on existentialism, psychology, and concrete historical anthropology, even at the cost of continuing the traditional Augustinian fusion (though not confusion) of the rational and the revelational.

As to the other great Scholastic thinkers of the thirteenth century Fr. Copleston has admirably succeeded in his aim "to put in clear relief their salient characteristics, show the variety of thought within a more or less common framework and indicate the formation and development of the different traditions" (p. 217). In as concise a treatment as is commensurate with their respective contributions to the history of thought he outlines their master ideas and their inferences from these concerning the philosophical issues that agitated the minds of their times. Since the author
rightly regards the Thomistic synthesis to be the crowning achievement of mediaeval speculation, it is understandable that he should devote almost a fourth of his volume to the Angelic Doctor and propound his system as teacher and advocate as well as historian and in more than usual detail. One might signalize as especially illuminating his discussion of St. Thomas' relation to Aristotelianism and his exposition of the Thomistic doctrines of the analogy of being and of man's "natural desire" of the vision of God. The author is correct in saying that St. Thomas "rejected the Augustinian theory of rationes seminales" (p. 328), if "Augustinianism" is understood of mediaeval Aristotelian Augustinianism and not of Augustine's own teaching. On more than one occasion St. Thomas explicitly stated that he held the same theory of seminal reasons as St. Augustine, e.g., De Ver. q. 5, a. 9, ad 8. What he denied was "that there are inchoate forms in prime matter. This last theory he either rejected or said that it did not fit in with the teaching of St. Augustine" (ibid.). The author might have pointed out that, though Augustine employed the terms "form" and "matter," he used them in a Neoplatonic, not in a peripatetic hylomorphic sense. It is more than probable that St. Augustine never read any of the metaphysical or physical treatises of Aristotle, even in translation.

The author's discussion of the thorny question of the distinction between a created essence and existence is marked by laudable caution. In view of the fact that "St. Thomas did not state his doctrine in such a manner that no controversy about its meaning is possible," it cannot reasonably be objected that the author has "evaded the real point at issue, namely the precise way in which the distinction between essence and existence is objective and independent of the mind" (p. 335). Since later controversy about the mind of St. Thomas is, we suspect, largely a lis de verbis, exception might be taken to the statement that the point at issue was "whether St. Thomas considered the distinction between essence and existence to be a real distinction or a conceptual distinction" (p. 333). The words "conceptual distinction" without further qualification can be misleading, especially in view of the author's definition of a real distinction as "a distinction which is independent of the mind, which is objective." Suarezians, for instance, deny that essence and existence are distinct in the same sense in which matter and form are really distinct; yet they do not deny that the distinction is objectively grounded and in this sense independent of the mind. In short, they admit something more than a purely rational or conceptual distinction. It is their contention that the distinction is no less objective and real than is the formal universal, which, though an ens rationis, has a fundamentum in re: the actual finitude and contingency of the creature, in contrast to the infinity and necessity of
the Ipsum Esse of the Creator (whose existence cannot even be conceived as received by His essence), affords the objective ground for the mind to conceive created existence as received and limited by its essence, just as the specific similitude between individual natures is sufficient objective warrant for the mind to conceive the universal.

We detect a similar lack of precision in terminology when the author discusses the difficult Scotistic doctrine of the univocity of the concept of being. Though Scotus held that the logical concept of being is univocal, he did not deny, as Fr. Copleston makes quite clear, that being itself is metaphysically analogous. But how can a univocal concept, which in traditional Scholasticism is necessarily a universal or generic, not a transcendental, notion, represent objects that are intrinsically analogous? In other words, if opposition to nothingness is actually verified in God and creature in different ways, God being infinite and the creature finite, how can it be the foundation in reality of a univocal concept of being? Here one would expect the author to mention the Scotistic “intrinsic modes” of infinity and finitude by which the concept of being is contracted to its immediate inferiors, God and creatures (Cf. Op. Ox. I, 8, 3, no. 17). The fact that he does not do so would seem to imply that he considers them to be “formalities” distinct from being ex natura rei. Scotus certainly considers the infinite-finite, viewed as transcendental “passiones disjunctae” of being, to be formalities, but it is disputed whether he considered the “intrinsic modes” of the infinite and the finite to be such. In any case the author does not dispel any of the obscurity of Scotus’ doctrine when he writes: “As intentio prima the concept of being is founded on reality, for otherwise it could not be abstracted, and has objective reference, while as intentio secunda it is an ens rationis; but the concept of being as such, whether considered as intentio prima or intentio secunda, does not express something which has a formal existence outside the mind. It is, therefore, a logical concept. . . . One may say, then, that the univocal concept of being is an ens rationis. On the other hand, the univocal concept of being has a real foundation in actuality. The case is not without parallel to that of the universal” (p. 507). It is difficult to understand what the author means in the above passage, especially in view of the fact that Scotus’ understanding of the universal, viewed as intentio prima and intentio secunda, does not differ from that of Thomism, except that he considers the object of intentio prima, the “absolute quiddity” which prescinds from both singularity and universality, to be a distinct “formality” ex natura rei (cf. De Anima, q. 17, no. 14.). The author’s courageous effort to explain the famous distinctio formalis ex natura rei is characterized by his usual objectivity and sympathetic understanding. He resists the temptation to reduce
it to the Thomistic virtual distinction or to the Suarezian *distinctio rationis cum fundamento in re*, even though the distinction appears hardly intelligible in any other sense. The interpretation of the philosophy of Scotus will vary appreciably, as the author emphasizes, depending on whether he actually wrote certain works attributed to him, particularly the much controverted *Theoremata*. Since the arguments for the authenticity of this work are by no means conclusive, we commend his prudent reserve in prescinding from it in his exposition and evaluation of the philosophical system of the Subtle Doctor.

There are one or two other points to which objection might be taken. In discussing the Anselmian arguments for God’s existence the author calls attention to the fact that in the *Proslogium* St. Anselm proposed proofs other than the so-called “ontological” argument of the *Monologium*. In expounding this latter proof he might have observed that its import has often been misconstrued, even by St. Thomas himself, whose knowledge of Platonism was restricted to the perverse version of Aristotle, through confusing a Platonic intuitive idea with an Aristotelian abstract concept. It was for this reason, as it is now generally recognized, that Descartes, who knew only the “traditional” Thomistic version of the Anselmian argument, believed that he had hit upon a new proof for God’s existence, when as a matter of fact he was simply restating the argument of Anselm. In fairness to the author, however, it must be noted that, when expounding the ontological argument, as it occurs in St. Bonaventure (p. 256), he adverts to the Platonic-Augustinian context in which the argument should be interpreted.

Commenting on William of Auvergne’s refusal “to admit Avicebron’s notion that the Intelligences or angels are hylomorphically composed,” Fr. Copleston asserts (p. 222) that “it is clear that Aristotle did not think that the rational soul contains *materia prima*, since he clearly asserts that it is an immaterial form.” We cannot concur in the implication that Aristotle would have rejected the Franciscan notion of a *materia prima spiritualis* in the soul, if *materia* is understood only analogically as synonymous with potentiality and therefore without its usual connotation of the quantitative. It was in this sense that Franciscans, such as Alexander of Hales, taught that the active intellect was the spiritual form of the soul and the passive intellect its spiritual matter (cf. p. 237). In at least two places Aristotle seems to have adumbrated this notion; cf. *De Anima* III, 5, 430 a 10–19 and *De Generatione Animalium* II, 3, 736 b 30–34. Even in Thomism prime matter is only exigently quantitative and, therefore, in itself immaterial in a sense.

Fr. Copleston acknowledges his indebtedness to mediaevalists such as
Baeumker, Ehrle, Grabmann, De Wulf, Pelster, Geyer, Mandonnet, Pelzer, and Gilson. It was the corporate research of these scholars that has thrown patristic and mediaeval thought into proper relief and dispelled once for all the convenient illusion that the philosophical spirit lay dormant between the philosophy of the Greeks and Descartes. The author deserves special commendation for the original way in which he has synthesized and evaluated the results of previous scholarship and for having presented in a convincing and engaging style a synoptic and comprehensive view of patristic and mediaeval thought as an essential development of the *philosophia perennis*. A valuable bibliography and indexes of names and subjects conclude the volume.

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JAMES I. CONWAY, S.J.


It is generally recognized that the Jewish golden era of philosophy and science during the Middle Ages, which began with the publication of the writings of Saadia ben Joseph, Gaon of Sura in Babylonia, and reached its zenith in the scientific and philosophical works of Moses Maimonides, who, though a native of Cordova, Spain, spent the greater part of his life in Fostat, a suburb of Cairo, Egypt, was not productive of any independent system of metaphysics nor of any original scientific theories. The Jewish thinkers and intellectuals of the Middle Ages were no more given to innovation in the realms of philosophy or science than were their Christian or Mohammedan counterparts and confreres. They merely took over the heritage of the Greeks, the views propounded and the rules laid down by Plato and Aristotle, by Archimedes and Euclid and Galen and Ptolemy, and elaborated upon them. They did not dare to blaze completely new trails, to strike out for themselves on paths that the ancients had not trodden. Even so bold and intrepid an adventurer in the world of thought as the foremost of medieval Jewish philosophers, Moses Maimonides, did not contest the authority of the Stagirite in all matters pertaining to the sublunar world. Only above the moon did he refuse to follow him.

Nevertheless, according to Dr. Bokser, it is not to be deduced herefrom that the intellectual activities of the Jewish philosophers and theologians of the Middle Ages were all of them a sheer waste of effort, that there is nothing in their literary remains by which we, who live in the twentieth century, might benefit. On the contrary, there is much in the writings of thinkers of the caliber of a Moses Maimonides which would profit us greatly.
That is the thesis that Dr. Bokser attempts to prove in his 110 pages of text, plus eighteen more of notes and index.

Divided into six chapters, the fourth and fifth of which are the longest, the slender volume, which, as the author notes in the preface, is an outgrowth of a series of lectures delivered by him at the Institute for Religious and Social Studies of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America in the spring of 1944, starts out with a brief summary of the life and work of the sage of Fostat. Having painted the background and introduced the reader to the personality of the man whose ideas he wishes to discuss, Dr. Bokser comes to grips with the crux of his problem, namely: "What was it that bothered Moses Maimonides? What motivated him to write his *Guide of the Perplexed*?" The reason, says the author, was that Maimonides was both a rationalist and a believing and observant Jew. He recognized that his brain was the only instrument man possessed for thinking his thoughts. On the other hand, however, there was the body of Jewish tradition, which came to the Jew by way of revelation and which he, Maimonides, revered as being sacred. He could not go on being a rationalist and a traditionalist at one and the same time unless he could effect some compromise between revelation and reason. He does so by demonstrating the insufficiency of human reason in discovering all that man must know in order to be able to live a full and satisfying life. Reason has its limitations and needs to be supplemented by other insights.

In the next chapter Dr. Bokser takes up Maimonides' conception of God and shows wherein it differs from the impersonal *primum motor*, the cause of all causes of the Greek philosopher Aristotle, who operates not by will or design but from necessity. Religion cannot accept so impersonal a god, who is so indifferent to the fate of his creatures and so completely detached from their lives. True, God created Nature, and Nature has its laws which are not meant to be disturbed. But if God could not interfere with the operations of that Nature which He had consciously and deliberately brought into being, He would be as impotent as His creatures. To be sure the true essence of the Creator is beyond our ken. We can, however, obtain an inkling of what God is from the results of His activities in the world and by ruling out those imperfections that can definitely not be ascribed to Him.

The chapter following is devoted to a discussion of Maimonides' theory of prophecy and his justification of the existence of a specifically Jewish religious tradition and its defense over against the claims of the rival faiths of Christianity and Islam. The fifth, again, takes up such matters as Maimonides' treatment of the dilemmas of man's freedom of will versus
divine determinism, and of the operation of divine providence versus the existence of evil. It is also pointed out here that, although in the main the Jewish Aristotelian followed his Greek prototype in recognizing "the golden mean" as the fundamental rule of ethics, he attached to this theory certain conditions. Contemplation rather than conduct is the final goal of man's existence. The fulfillment of the commandments of the Torah is but a means to the end, which is the knowledge of God, to the extent that God can be known by man, or to use the expression coined by the foremost of Maimonides' disciples, Spinoza, "amor intellectualis dei."

Dr. Bokser concludes his dissertation with a brief chapter on what is still valuable for modern man in the legacy of Maimonides, and it is regrettable that this chapter, which, to justify the title of the book, should have been the longest, is so short. Nevertheless he deserves the gratitude of those who have not been initiated into the mysteries of Jewish medieval philosophy for this on the whole correct, sober, sympathetic, and readable presentation of the quintessence of the finest example of Jewish theology and ethics of the Middle Ages.

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If any Christian theologian or philosopher feels the need of a strong intellectual irritant to prevent him from sinking down too comfortably into what Kant called "the dogmatic slumber," the first of these two books can be prescribed as filling the bill admirably. It is a posthumous reprint of a series of five articles which appeared in the *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* between 1930 and 1932, in which the distinguished French rationalist clarified his basic positions in the face of the critiques made against his principal work, *Le Progrès de la conscience dans la philosophie occidentale*. Together with these articles the publishers have taken the happy initiative of reprinting the text of the famous discussion on atheism which took place in the March 24, 1928, session of the *Société française de philosophie*, in which Brunschvicg crossed swords with several of the leading French Catholic philosophers of the day, such as Blondel, Gilson, Gabriel Marcel, etc.

The peculiar interest of Brunschvicg's thought for the Christian thinker lies in the fact that till his death in 1944 he was one of the last outstanding
representatives of what was the dominant attitude of French university philosophy during the first third of the century, namely, a certain secularist and science-inspired rationalism uncompromisingly hostile not only to Christianity but to any religion professing belief in a transcendent personal God. His works are therefore an ideal source in which to study this attitude in one of its clearest and most intransigent expressions.

The central message of Brunschvicg's philosophy, repeated in a hundred variations on the same theme in this as in all his works, is that the supreme value of human existence, the unique goal of the intellectual and moral life of each man and of humanity as a whole, is the cultivation of the life of pure, autonomous reason as such. A human being rises to his full dignity and fulfills his destiny only when he deliberately converts himself to this inner life of reason and dedicates himself thereafter to fulfilling so far as he can the vocation of reason in the universe. This vocation consists in the progressive rationalization or spiritualization of the exterior universe, by reducing it to an ever more complete and more unified system of pure intelligible relations immanent within mind itself; by this activity (of which the most perfect example is the elaboration of the modern mathematical and physico-mathematical sciences) mind or spirit (l'esprit) gradually arrives at the full realization of its own nature and dignity as pure, autonomous spiritual act and advances towards its final goal of perfect, immanent self-realization as free and autonomous creator of the intelligible universe.

Brunschvicg calls his philosophy an idealism, but it is obviously an idealism understood in a very limited and special sense. He has only contempt for the great metaphysical idealists, such as Hegel, who attempt to spin the universe out of their heads by an a priori deduction of concepts. For him, mind cannot create its object out of whole cloth but presupposes a certain vital contact with experience, in all its novelty and unpredictableness, as the raw material upon which to exercise its organizing activity.

On the other hand, this world of experience receives all its intelligible structure—and hence for Brunschvicg all its intelligible reality—from the autonomous activity of reason reconstructing it within itself. Hence all the problems raised by the traditional "realist" metaphysics regarding the nature and origin of extra-mental reality in itself, and a fortiori regarding the origin of mind itself, are rejected on principle as illegitimate and insoluble philosophical problems, which involve a contradiction in their very formulation. Accordingly, Brunschvicg argues that his philosophy should more truly be classed as an idealism than as a realism, since it consists exclusively in reflection on the life of mind or spirit in the concrete history of its self-development through the ages of mankind, as manifesting itself
in, but always transcending, its successive productions in the domains of
science, art, religion, philosophy, etc.

In the light of this theory, the meaning of the title of the book, *De la vraie et de la fausse conversion*, becomes clear. The "true conversion" (borrowed from the passages in Book VII of the *Republic* where Plato speaks of the true conversion to the world of ideas) is the conversion to the only true "divinity"—if one wishes to use this word—the "God" of spirit and truth, which is really nothing else but the supremely free and autonomous activity of pure reason immanent in each individual man. This pure reason exists, it is true, only as immanent in individuals and identified with them, so that all transcendence is rigorously rejected as mere anthropomorphic, spatial projection of the human imagination. Yet of itself, if the life of reason is lived in its full purity and objectivity, reason necessarily appears as unique, universal, and eternal, transcending the limits of each thinker's personal, that is, merely biological individuality.

The "false conversion," on the other hand, essentially incompatible with the dignity of reason as such, is the conversion to the so-called objective and transcendent God, the "clockmaker" fabricator of the universe and imposer of dogmas impenetrable to reason, proposed for adoration by the traditional "revealed" religions. The scandal of such a God, or rather idol, the adorers of which are the true atheists, is that he is the negation of the true God of pure universal reason and thus to submit one's reason to him is to degrade one's essential dignity as man. By being transcendent and objective he denies the identification of the true God with the immanent subjective activity of each thinking mind. By imposing from without, by sheer authority, immutable moral codes and dogmas, especially mysteries impenetrable to the clear light of critical reason, he violates the autonomy and creative spontaneity of pure spirit in man, which, in the course of its dynamic self-unfolding through history, is forever outgrowing its outmoded conceptual products of the past and forging new ones. By an exclusive revelation of truth to a particular race or group in a particular historical context by means of a particular language, he is materializing and particularizing truth and thus betraying the pure, incorruptible spirituality and universality of the true God of pure Reason as such. The bloody wars and cultural divisions that have been the sequel of every so-called "revealed" religion are the most eloquent refutation of the contradiction inherent in the very concept of a universal revealed religion.

The chief offender among these religions of idolatry is, as might be expected, Christianity, with its double scandal of a God of pure spirit becoming incarnate, i.e., materialized and particularized in space and time, and its
rendering of the spiritual unity of mankind by dividing men into two classes, believers and heretics, saved and damned, according as they accept or reject an immutable set of propositions communicated in a particular conceptual framework at a still half-primitive period of the rational evolution of mankind. To be a Christian, therefore, and to be a true philosopher represent two mutually exclusive spiritual attitudes. Both Christianity and Thomistic philosophy (which for Brunschvicg is but a syncretism of grammatical analyses and Aristotelian astro-biological cosmology covered over with a veneer of abstract terms) are now but outmoded survivals of the primitive myth-making period of the development of human reason that corresponds to the phase of naive, egocentric realism characteristic of the years between eight and twelve in the mental growth of a modern child. Thomistic philosophy is evidently the particular abomination of Brunschvicg, and his pen fairly drips acid whenever he speaks of it or of its contemporary representatives such as Gilson and Maritain.

We have outlined in some detail this virulently anti-metaphysical and anti-religious philosophy of Brunschvicg because in its clarity and almost crusading earnestness it offers us a privileged insight into the "mystique" motivating the anti-clerical and secularist current of thought that has exercised so powerful an influence on French culture for the past century. The present work, however, is not a systematic exposé of Brunschvicg’s philosophy. Having been written as an answer to his critics, it cannot avoid being somewhat fragmentary and disconnected as it takes up one after another the different charges made against his doctrine. But it compensates for this defect by enabling the author to situate clearly his own position with reference to the different philosophical currents represented by his critics. This atmosphere of the clash of mind with mind, in which the philosophical "personality" of Brunschvicg emerges in rather unpleasantly sharp relief in its acid and cutting aspects, adds a certain note of liveliness and interest to the book, which rises to a peak in the concluding discussion on atheism.

The whole first part of the volume may be said to carry its own antidote with it in the above-mentioned text of the public discussion on atheism held in the Société française de philosophie in 1928. This is by far the most interesting and rewarding part of the book. As the reader follows the lively and often barbed interchange of opinions between Brunschvicg and Gilson, Marcel, Blondel, and the others, mostly Catholics, who took part in the discussion, it becomes painfully evident that Brunschvicg, though never at a loss for a ready and often cutting answer, consistently sidesteps the incisive questions of Gilson and the others and never meets their challenge to carry his analysis beyond the limits he has arbitrarily set to philosophical investigation and
thus justify rationally the presuppositions and postulates of his own system. The most convincing demonstration of the narrowness and inadequacy of Brunschvicg's philosophy of life, even from the point of view of reason itself, is his inability to validate rationally in terms of his own system, and his persistent refusal even to submit to philosophical investigation, these fundamental suppositions of his own doctrine, namely, the origin and nature of the external or material universe, which is the raw material of mind and hence must somehow exist independently of it; the origin of each individual mind and its relation to universal Reason as such; and above all the explanation of why Reason itself is submitted to evolution and must advance so slowly and painfully against the resistance of matter and sense-life towards its full self-realization—all of which remain as mere unexplained postulates or primitive irrational "facts" in the "rationalism" of Brunschvicg.

The second book, *La Philosophie de Léon Brunschvicg*, though not particularly brilliant or profound, especially in its critical evaluations, is nevertheless a very competent and sympathetic analysis. It is particularly valuable as being the first full-length study of Brunschvicg's philosophy to have appeared thus far. Its approach is almost entirely one of positive exposition, with little attempt to explain the serious lacunae or unanswered problems in Brunschvicg's doctrine.

*Woodstock College*  
W. Norris Clarke, S.J.


*Sciences ecclésiastiques* for 1950 maintains the standards we have come to expect. Two articles on theology, two on asceticism, and one on moral philosophy occupy over 180 pages. Notes on psychology and theology occupy 30 more, and there are some 40 pages of book reviews. To discuss all contributions would be impossible; therefore, I shall direct my attention particularly to the leading article of over 60 pages by R. P. Jules Paquin on John of St. Thomas' account of the *lumen gloriae*.

With unfailing clarity and precision Fr. Paquin follows John step by step through an extremely complex issue. The *lumen gloriae* is an accident, a quality of the first species, a disposition, a supernatural operative habit, an illumination, a *medium sub quo*. It is not the act of vision, nor divine concursus, nor purely extrinsic, nor the divine essence as object or as species. It is with respect to the divine essence a material cause and with respect to the act of vision both an efficient and a material cause. The intellect elicits
the act of vision, and it does so as no mere instrument. Still the whole operative power for the act comes from the lumen gloriae.

Dogmatic notes are worked out with care. A single exception is, perhaps, the question whether the act of vision can be infinite. There is overlooked a relevant distinction between (1) a truth, and (2) the metaphysical conditions of a truth. To say that the humanity of Christ exists by an infinite act does not mean that the humanity of Christ does not exist. Again, to say that an immanent activity such as knowing cannot have an extrinsic metaphysical condition is false; God contingently knows finite existences, for He would not know them as existing if they did not exist and they need not exist; still there is no contingent entity in God. Probably enough, John of Ripa's views do not call for such careful treatment; but a general theological note does.

The main speculative problem in the beatific vision was, for John of St. Thomas, the "vitality" of the act of vision. This is a rather remarkable notion. It has nothing to do with the Thomist doctrine of the natural desire to see God. It is not conceived as denoting a substance "cui convenit secundum substantiam movere seipsam, vel agere se quocumque modo ad operationem" (Sum. Theol., I, q. 18, a. 2 c.). Its most conspicuous instance is not God as Aquinas held (ibid., a. 3 c.) nor is its meaning so elastic that one might claim "quod se intelligit, dicitur se movere" (ibid., ad 1m.). On the contrary each vital potency of a creature has to move itself, as in the doctrine of Peter John Olivi (In II Sent., q. 58, ad 14m, [Quaracchi, 1924, vol. II, 461-515]), with the important difference, however, that John of St. Thomas accepts the Aristotelian axiom of "quidquid movetur, ab ali movetur." As one would expect, a syncretism of views from such opposed sources calls for an exceptional display of mental gymnastics. The act of vision has to be the product of the efficient causality of the possible intellect, otherwise it would not be a vital act. At the same time, the possible intellect cannot have the slightest native capacity for producing the act, otherwise the act would not be absolutely supernatural. John rejects the alternative solution to his problem, namely, the equally extraordinary "potentia obedientialis activa," and correctly on his suppositions concludes that the total operative power comes from the lumen gloriae, that none the less it is the possible intellect that does the producing.

Fr. Paquin is to be congratulated on his thorough account of a really splendid specimen of dialectical ingenuity and, no less, on his care to make it plain that he is expounding John of St. Thomas' thought on John of St. Thomas' suppositions.

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BERNARD LONERGAN, S.J.
It is a pleasure to announce and welcome the first number of this theological review which resumes publication after a lapse of nearly thirty years. The various branches of theology are well represented in the first number. Msgr. Kissane presents a new solution to the imprecatory psalm 108 (109). Professors of moral theology and canon law will be interested in a study of the recent report of the Archbishops’ Commission on Canon Law for the Church of England by Father Cremin, as well as Father Mitchell’s contribution, “St. Columbanus on Penance.” Besides full-length articles there are useful Notes and Comments, especially Father J. McCarthy’s study, “Towards a Definition of Impotence.” Book reviews and the Latin text of Humani generis complete the number. The Irish Theological Quarterly is warmly recommended to seminaries and theological libraries, with one serious reservation. The reviewer sees no justification whatsoever for charging $5.00 (U.S.A.) as an annual subscription rate for a periodical selling at 20 shillings in the sterling area.

Weston College

Frederick L. Moriarty, S.J.
BOOKS RECEIVED

Aschendorff, Münster: *Vom Wort des Lebens: Festschrift für Max Meinertz*, ed. by Nikolaus Adler (pp. 167, 10.00 DM); *Die Eucharistie in der Darstellung des Johannes Eck*, by Erwin Iserloh (pp. xvi + 370, 19.00 DM). Aubier, Editions Montaigne, Paris: *Thèmes bibliques* (Théologie, XVIII), by Jacques Guillet (pp. 279, 495 fr.).


The Catholic University of America Press, Washington: *Vocation to the Priesthood: Its Canonical Concept*, by Aidan Carr, O.F.M. Conv. (pp. vii + 124, $2.00); *Moral Problems of Interracial Marriage*, by Joseph F. Doherty (pp. x + 177, $2.00); *The Functions of Faith and Reason in the Theology of St. Hilary of Poitiers*, by Joseph E. Emmenegger (pp. xx + 243, $2.50); *Orestes Brownson's Approach to the Problem of God*, by Bertin Farrell, C.P. (pp. xiii + 140, $1.75); *The Monk and the Martyr*, by Edward E. Malone, O.S.B. (pp. xxi + 157, $2.00).


Desclée, Tournai: *The Fundamentals of Gregorian Chant*, by Lura F. Heckenlively (pp. x + 308).


Peter Hanstein, Bonn: *Der Sinn philosophischen Fragens und Erkennens*, by Dietrich von Hildebrand (pp. viii + 98, 4.50 DM).


Herder, Freiburg: *Die Messe in der Glaubensverkündigung*, ed. by Franz
Xaver Arnold and Balthasar Fischer (pp. xiv + 392, 19.50 DM); *Die vielen Messen und das eine Opfer*, by Karl Rahner, S.J. (pp. v + 118, 3.50 DM).

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