BOOK REVIEWS


This book presents the fruit of several previously published essays on chapters 2 and 3 of Genesis. The principal chapter (pp. 12-46), described in the title of the book, presents in substance a paper read before the English Society for Old Testament Study in Cardiff in 1946. The rest of the book is made up of appendices (pp. 49-122) and a chapter of documentation figurée (pp. 123-134), which give evidence that supports the author's thesis. Pages 135-154 contain excellent indices and tables.

In his Preface Coppens points out that though he introduces a certain sexual interpretation into the phrase “to know good and evil” he is not in agreement with those earlier authors who favored the opinion that the sexual act was prohibited to Adam and Eve before the fall. He also warns those who would shy away from the possibility of a sexual nuance in the story of the fall that certain Fathers, Ambrose in particular, were not averse to such a possibility.

In the discussion proper, Coppens answers two questions. The first: What is the sense of the expression “to know good and evil”? The second: If sin is indicated by the expression, what kind of sin in particular is meant in Genesis 2 and 3? In answering the first question Coppens considers the principal suggestions made in the best modern studies, especially that of Paul Humbert (Études sur le récit du paradis, Neuchatel, 1940).

Coppens discusses with particular care the two principal trends in modern interpretation of the phrase. Reuss, Albert, Lods hold that it describes the beginning of discernment or the real awakening of reason. For these scholars and those who follow them, Adam and Eve were in the intellectual state of childhood before the sin; and for most of this school the sin was a childish sin, a petty theft.

At the other extreme are Humbert (generally), Th. Vriezen and others, who say that the knowledge is omniscience, divine knowledge. For Vriezen it is magical knowledge. Coppens admits that divine knowledge is the sense of the phrase as it is used by the serpent; but he denies that the serpent is a qualified exegete. This, by the way, is one of Coppens' weakest answers to those with whom he disagrees; for Adam and Eve are pictured as being seduced because they followed the serpent foolishly as if he were a qualified exegete who was using the words in question in a sense which they might at least have; and 3:22 supports the general trend of the serpent's exegesis.
Coppens, however, amends this verse to remove the offending sense, and discusses his emendation in an appendix. He then reviews the principal parallel passages which have the expression to know good and evil. For those who appeal to II Sam. 14:17, 20, to obtain the meaning "divine knowledge," "omniscience," he has the answer that this passage is not really parallel.

He then notes the weakness of other suggested interpretations such as: fear of the Lord, sense of shame, knowledge of material skills, knowledge of the use of clothing, knowledge of the tree of life. For Coppens, the only meaning in our context is cumulative knowledge. Arguing from Deut. 1:39, 30:15, and Mich. 6:8, he concludes that the expression is analogous to the Hebrew "to go in and to go out," or "to bind and to loose." These are not disjunctive expressions, but cumulative. Here, then, the expression means a knowledge of both good and evil, with accent in the context on evil, moral evil, sin. This knowledge, as the context suggests, would be new; and it could also be represented by the serpent as a privilege God had reserved to himself and forbidden to man. God, then, would not be bound by any moral law—in the serpent's suggestion—but would tyrannically so bind man. Such a concept would be a challenge to the first parents to seek complete moral autonomy. Sin is what was forbidden to the first parents, and in seeking moral autonomy they sinned and disobeyed a special divine commandment.

Coppens then takes up the second question: What sin in particular did they commit? Here he does not follow those who would find in the expression "knowledge of good and evil" a sexual idea. He admits that basically the sin was an attempt to throw off the essential condition of creaturehood, submission to the divine will. There was pride, therefore, in their action. But aside from the interior, spiritual sin, what was the external act that Genesis pictured under the figure of the eating of the fruit? Coppens believes that to take the eating of the fruit literally as the sin in question would be to make the whole narrative center around a childish peccadillo out of all proportion with the solemnity of the context and the terrible consequences of the act. He is not satisfied with the further explanation of those who say that such a small act was ordained by God to be a test of obedience. Nor will he accept the explanation of those who say that the first parents were in the condition of children before the fall. Much less does he agree with those who say that the fruit is one of mythical magic power. Nor, finally, is he satisfied with the various symbolic interpretations given to the fruit.

Coppens then proceeds to sift the data that have been adduced in favor of a sexual interpretation of the sin in Paradise. He repeatedly asserts that
the sexual idea does not stand out clearly in the text as it now reads. In fact, he believes it possible that the author who gathered these ancient traditions chose to veil an originally stronger sexual tone in these passages. And here also is an obvious weakness of his thesis. If we are allowed to read, not between the lines but behind the lines of a composition, what may we not make of it?

Coppens is quite sincere and frank, however, in appraising the many arguments that have been brought forth by others which could support his thesis. He will not concede that the phrase “to know good and evil” has of itself a sexual meaning. Nor does he take too seriously the opinion of those who would make the fruit an aphrodisiacum, and the fig-leaves and their use an evidence of sexual sin. Such arguments he calls far-fetched and inconclusive. The implications of the awakening of the sense of shame, he says, have more force; but the argument is still insufficient, since the awakening of concupiscence would be a punishment for whatever sin was committed. Nor does the naming of Eve “the mother of all the living” after the fall prove anything in view of Gen. 1:29 and 4:1.

To the argument that the only clear commandment given in the context is of a sexual nature (1:28), Coppens replies that this is from a different document than that of the text in chapters 2 and 3. However he does point out the fact that the author who joined these two traditions must have seen the possible nuance in so juxtaposing texts.

Coppens sees some force in the argument that the narrative of the fall unfolds in an atmosphere in which the problems of sex and maternity are present. We would expect such an atmosphere from the natural preoccupation of the ancient orientals with such mysteries of nature. The sanction pronounced on the woman has a hint of a sexual element in the sin itself, not in the fact of maternity—motherhood was a blessing in Old Testament teaching—but in the suffering attached to maternity. For here there might be the pronouncement of punishment which fits in some way with the sin committed. The figure of the serpent too, though not in the gross interpretation of some ancient and modern exegetes, might lead to a sexual interpretation. For the serpent in the ancient Semitic world was often a phallic emblem and was moreover connected with the fertility goddesses and their rites which contained sexual practices.

Since the sin seems to have been of some sexual kind and the idea of a prohibition of the marriage act by God is without foundation, what can the sin be? Excluding other more fantastic opinions, Coppens surmises that it would be a sin against the primary end of matrimony. He finds a hint of this in the sanctions imposed on Eve. She is bound to submissive love of
her husband; to give him numerous offspring; to accept the vocation to maternity; to become the mother of all the living; and that in pain. Here Coppens sees fulfilled the adage: *quo quis peccat, eo salvatur.* He calls attention to the double law of matrimony in chapters 1 and 2: mutual love and the duty of procreation. In Gen. 2:23 Adam, after the creation of Eve, announces to her only the first law. Coppens concludes that the author of Genesis may be hinting that Eve was not so well instructed in the second law and so could be more easily deceived on this point.

However, Coppens sees another possible interpretation. The story may be an implicit polemic against the fertility cults of the ancient peoples, especially those of Canaan in Biblical times. We have referred to the part of the serpent in fertility cults. Coppens thinks it possible that Eve's sin might have consisted in forgetting her creator, in turning to the licentious pagan ideas with regard to procreation, and in believing these ideas. Such an interpretation would give new sense to the mysterious statement of Eve after the birth of her first child in Genesis 4:1. It is understandable that, if she sinned in putting her trust in false gods and rites in her desire for children, she should say of a birth after her reconciliation: "Now I have possessed a child with the help of (or "from") Yahweh." It is from him and from no other that fecundity and life come. Coppens who has rejected a gross sexual interpretation of II Cor. 11:2 and I Tim. 2:14 (the opinions of Lietzmann and Dibelius) says that these texts can have a slight sexual nuance influenced by such an interpretation as he here suggests. The sin originally inspired by the serpent was impure irreligious thoughts.

Professor Coppens then calls attention to the remarkable way in which such a theory as he proposes would fit into the story of the beginnings of man. The divine command, "Increase and multiply and fill the earth," of Gen. 1:28 is a theme of the first eleven chapters; but it was violated several times in that narrative. The purpose of the builders of the tower of Babel would have nullified the second part of that command; the sins of the sons of men in 6:1 ff. would have nullified the first part to some extent, as also the sin of the first parents threatened to do. The spread of the human race was to be according to God's will and under his blessing.

This review has presented Coppens' thesis at some length, in order to be fair to a new presentation of the Paradise story. One or two weaknesses—basic, I believe—have been pointed out. Others will be noted by even the casual reader of this review. Still the work has much that is valuable. And one cannot accuse the author of careless or merely subjective reasoning. He has sifted so much documentation and has been so frank in his evaluation of that documentation that even when one disagrees with his conclusions,
one realizes that those conclusions were not lightly arrived at, and are not lightly to be set aside.

The Appendices, which space will allow us only to notice in passing, discuss more at length matters of importance to the author’s thesis. One could wish that the pertinent material had been worked into the study proper. The Appendices treat of the following subjects: (1) the literary analysis of Gen. 2–3; (2) the knowledge of good and evil; (3) the more radical (psychological and mythological) interpretations of the serpent in Gen. 2–3; (4) the serpent goddesses in Palestine and Syria; (5) the serpent as a symbol of chthonian divinities of vegetation; (6) the principal Egyptian and Babylonian deities in serpent form; (7) a new interpretation of Gen. 3:22 (Coppens would read: “See, man, like anyone who will be born of him, will have to undergo good and evil”; the suggestion is not too attractive, and is suspect of being suggested to avoid a meaning of “knowledge of good and evil” which Coppens will not accept). There is added a list of references to illustrations that Coppens would have liked to introduce into his text (pp. 123–134).

In summary I would say that respect for the great scholarship of the author of this work which is evidenced here as elsewhere, makes me reluctant to refuse acceptance to his thesis. Some probability must be conceded it, and I feel that is all the concession Coppens asks for at present. But some of the classical interpretations still have their probability, for Coppens’ strictures with regard to their supporting arguments are no stronger than many that can be brought against his. He promises us further work on this subject. It is sure to be welcomed.

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With increasing insistence historians have been advancing that the Renaissance constitutes a watershed in Catholic theological thought on nature and grace. In 1928 in Gregorianum Fr. Elter argued impressively that theologians prior to Sylvester Maurus took it for granted that perfect beatitude was to be had by man only in the beatific vision. With no less impressiveness in 1929, though his work does not seem equally well known, Fr. Doucet in Antonianum argued that theologians prior to Cajetan took it for granted that there existed in man a natural desire for the supernatural vision of God. Recently both these positions have been overshadowed by the more radical
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contention of De Lubac that only after Baius did it become a common view that the state of pure nature, as now understood, was a concrete possibility; and a startling confirmation of the accuracy of De Lubac's history has been given by Rondet (RSR, XXXV [1948], 481–520), inasmuch as the Tridentine theologian, Dominicus Soto, O.P., is claimed to have affirmed that, had man been created in puris naturalibus, he could not know his last end, since that would have been supernatural.

If the history of the matter is becoming clearer, the speculative issues are so complex that a generous lapse of time will have to be granted, I suspect, before all concealed suppositions have been detected and a sound judgment can be passed upon the relative merits of the medieval and the Renaissance positions. Accordingly, it is as valuable, if incomplete, contributions to the contemporary process of investigation, clarification, and criticism that the books under review are recommended.

In the main Fr. Buckley's work is speculative and systematic. His topic is very closely related to the Thomist statement, "Beatitudo perfecta est soli Deo naturalis," which was developed by O'Mahony's Desire of God over a decade ago. But, as his title indicates, he treats not of man's beatitude but of man's last end and, indeed, not of the end that might happen to be last, but of the end that intrinsically is last. Such an end is good in itself, willed because of itself (terminative), and the ground both of the goodness and of the willing of anything else (architectonic). These requirements are met by divine goodness as presented to the will in the beatific vision. Again, they are met by divine goodness considered from a metaphysical viewpoint as the final cause of all things in any order. But from the viewpoint of human psychology there appears no last end to be attained by man except through the beatific vision. For apart from the vision man knows divine goodness not directly and in itself but indirectly and per speciem alienam. Accordingly, he knows that divine goodness is the ground of all other goodness and desirableness, but he does not know it inasmuch as it is that ground. Hence, divine goodness as presented to his will is not architectonic and so lacks a property of an end that of itself is last. Again, in the vision right willing follows necessarily; but apart from the vision right willing has to be postulated to ensure stability; for apart from the vision one has to argue that men will be content with their lot because they ought to be. Finally, since divine goodness is the last end metaphysically, it is useless to look elsewhere for a last end psychologically; but apart from the vision man can attain divine goodness only per speciem alienam; and to say that man attains his last end per speciem alienam is tantamount to saying that properly he does not attain a last end at all.
This vigorous thesis, which throws not a little light on Thomist usage of the term *finis ultimus*, has its repercussions. For Fr. Buckley a merely natural order involves antinomies. The will tends to beatitude in general. In a merely natural order man can attain a reasonable perfection and satisfaction. But beatitude means more than that, so that the tendency to beatitude in general can find no good or set of goods in which it can rest simply. Again, within a merely natural order there is no concrete and determinate good which both is and is attainable as the principle of subordination and coordination of other goods of that order. Finally, within a merely natural order man's last end is, as it were, to have no last end but to remain open.

The alert reader will recognise in such statements a variation on the traditional theme emphasized by De Lubac in the section of *Surnaturel* entitled "Esprit et Liberté": a rational creature cannot be impeccable naturally. But while Fr. Buckley acknowledges a certain affinity between his thought and that of De Lubac (p. 180), he stoutly maintains the concrete possibility of a state of pure nature on the ground that De Lubac has not satisfactorily shown such a possibility not to be a necessary dogmatic postulate. And if one puts the obvious objection, *nihil in natura frustra*, Fr. Buckley would answer that he would very much like to know for certain just what that affirmation means. For him human nature as rational is determinate only with respect to broad categories such as truth, goodness, happiness. Further determinations are a matter of divine providence and of history, so that in a sense a state of pure nature is a state of indetermination.

It might be expected that Fr. Buckley is an advocate of the natural desire for the vision of God. In fact, he regards that position as a contradiction in terms. Capacity and exigence mean the same thing to him, so that if the matter of the moon had a capacity, it also would have to have the exigence to be part of an animal organism.

May we add to our congratulations to Fr. Buckley on the appearance of his well-informed, clear, alert, and solid work, a good word for the publishers who had the kindness to print the footnotes at the foot of the page and so spare readers the perpetual inconvenience, not to say annoyance, of turning to the back of the book?

André de Bovis offers a thorough, documented study of the basic ethical and religious doctrines of the Roman Stoic philosopher, Seneca (4 B.C.—65 A.D.). An introductory section is followed by seven chapters on such ethical first principles as the supreme good, the last end, and their relation to the moral goodness and the happiness of man. The dominant notion is the *honestum* defined as what accords with right reason and, again, as what accords with nature. A minor antinomy results from the twofold definition
inasmuch as conflict does arise between right reason and sensitive nature. But the major difficulty of Seneca’s position is brought out by forcing the transition from the abstract *honestum* to a concrete end, from the ideal norm of reason and nature to the real good to be attained by moral living. This reveals that probably the happiness of man, certainly his good and end, consist for Seneca simply in the self-realization effected by moral living. Now if the moral end is immanent in the individual, there spontaneously arises the question of justifying morally the sacrifice of the individual for the common good. To this there appears no adequate answer (p. 132).

Correctly the author warns one against any anachronistic determination whether Seneca thought as a monotheist or as a polytheist. The divinity exists. But its unicity does not preclude the existence of subordinate powers and deities (p. 156). One, immortal, powerful, intelligent, it also is immense and makes of the universe its temple. Indeed it is an active member of the universe, everywhere present and effective, though not all-powerful nor a creator. Destiny, fate, world order, divine law, reason, nature are so many aspects of it; none the less Seneca at times seems to break through the logic of Stoic orthodoxy and to desert rationalist monism for a God transcendent and personal. Fear of God is rejected on the ground that God is good; but gratitude, even love, is recommended; still the possibility of the efficacy of prayer is more than doubtful. Suffering is understood in its moral significance, yet the problem of evil proves too grave; its existence seems to vitiate the whole perspective of the concept of God.

To the author Seneca provides the spectacle of a purely human, a thoroughly laicized wisdom. Ethical doctrine is based on human right reason to find in the ideals of that reason its norm and in the actuation of those ideals man’s end. As human reason is its own absolute, God is not properly the moral absolute nor is He given any significant function in moral living (p. 86). The good to be attained lies within the reach of merely human effort; it consists in man’s conquest of self by self; it places the highest of values within the self to be realized by the self; so that if Stoicism has its harsh and repellent aspects, it also has its seduction in the glory of man (p. 147). For man and God differ accidentally but essentially are alike: both have reason; but what in God is perfect, in man is perfectible. Thus, the self-perfection of moral living is equated with self-divinization. What makes a man wise is what makes God God. God is model and authority and judge of goodness. But by that very token, the wise man is the equal of Seneca’s God, in quality of being, if not in length of days!

But, if André de Bovis offers us a concrete indication of the Lyon-Fourvière concept of theological laicism, it is only in scanty asides that he
attempts to integrate this picture with the general problem of the differences between medieval and Renaissance theology. A conscientious historian of Seneca's thought, he is content with the contrast between Stoic and Christian wisdom, between a divinity cut to human measure and God at once personal and incomprehensible, between moral perfection achieved by human effort and holiness achieved by grace in answer to prayer. Yet such objective studies have the value of giving thought a concrete turn and of providing a touchstone to test necessarily abstract theorems. That is a matter of no little importance if, as it seems, the current alternatives ultimately are: (1) conceiving the supernatural as another essence or nature and so at once parallel to and utterly distinct from nature; and (2) conceiving it as some approximation to an existentialist communion of man with God as He is in Himself, and so at once the act and perfection of natural aspiration; it is man's, yet utterly beyond natural right, desert, or achievement, for it is with God as He is God.

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Fr. Doronzo's reputation as an authority in sacramental dogma was established as soon as his first volume De Sacramentis in Genere appeared in 1946; it has been enhanced by his three subsequent volumes, one devoted to the sacraments of baptism and confirmation, the others to the Eucharist. His fifth volume, the first of four projected tomes on the dogma of the sacrament of penance, is now off the press. It consists of three main parts. The first deals with the institution or existence of the sacrament (110 pages); the second (105 pages) treats of the matter and form, but only in a general way; the final 255 pages are a detailed exposition of the virtue of penance. The three future volumes will be devoted to an intensive study of contrition and confession, to satisfaction and absolution, to the effects, properties, recipient, minister and ceremonies of the sacrament, as well as to indulgences and the general power of the keys.

After a short preface by Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., former professor of Fr. Doronzo, the present volume begins with the author's 43 pages of introduction; they deserve special comment for two reasons particularly. First, they contain an exhaustive and compact list of primary and secondary sources for the sacrament of penance; second, they summarize the general opinions of Christian adversaries of the sacrament and furnish a lengthy bibliography for those who might wish to examine these opinions
more in detail. The reader may find of special value the three pages (pp. 33–35) which explain the more recent views of Oriental schismatics. The final 33 pages of the volume are composed of five indexes, biblical, exegetical, Thomistic, analytic, and an index of proper names.

This work is marked with the same excellent qualities as its predecessors. It is orderly after the pattern of St. Thomas. Although some would undoubtedly prefer to find the virtue of penance treated in the beginning, Doronzo justifies its postponement by the example of St. Thomas and by other arguments (pp. 39–42). The volume is also clear with the clarity that flows naturally from thesis form and from a dignified but simple Latin. Though terms are not defined in the mathematical order that some prefer, they are nevertheless usually explained amply in the status quaestionis and in the pars affirmativa and pars negativa. Thus Doronzo avoids the mistake of so many authors who plunge almost directly into the proofs, falsely supposing that the exact meaning of the thesis is already known to the reader.

Adversaries are not only named and the gist of their opinions given, but frequently their exact statements are quoted, sometimes at great length. Another refreshing quality of the volume is the singular emphasis placed upon declarations of Popes and Councils as proofs of the thesis. Other proofs, though subordinated, are not, however, neglected or curtailed. Scripture texts are cited, commented on, explained in themselves and in their context. Quotations from Fathers and theologians are extensive and to the point. Sufficient space is devoted to the development of rationes theologicae. Finally, copious objections with direct and convincing replies are added to every thesis.

Fr. Doronzo is aware of the dogmatic disputes that have arisen even among Catholic scholars from their different interpretations of penitential documents in the early Church. He is particularly interested in the opinion of Poschmann, Adam, Diekamp, and others, which would deny that absolution in the first centuries had as its immediate object the remission of the guilt of sin. Though his forty pages (pp. 90–130) of documentary evidence are directed mainly against non-Catholics like Harnack, who hold that absolution merely reconciled sinners in foro externo Ecclesiae, they at the same time refute the dogmatically hazardous theory of the above-mentioned Catholic scholars, a theory with which Doronzo has little sympathy.

The author reveals an astonishing familiarity with all the works of St. Thomas and deserves only praise for the large amount of space he allots to quotations and references from the Angelic Doctor. At times, however, the reader who is alert to the difficulties in interpreting St. Thomas will doubt whether his meaning is as plain as the author believes.
Various Scholastic disputes are encountered in the volume, especially in the third section which deals with the virtue of penance. In general, Doronzo is fair in his handling of these disputes. In every case he has his own definitive opinion (claimed to be that of St. Thomas), but he presents the views of adversaries, frequently quotes them verbatim, refutes them, answers their objections. The reader, however, will not always be as convinced of the validity of his opinions as he himself is, e.g., in deciding whether detestatio or dolor is the act which formally constitutes the act of contrition (pp. 337 ff.).

The volume is definitely not a textbook for the regular course in theology. It is for the professor. A few copies should be on the library shelves so that more ambitious students can refer to it. Fr. Doronzo is producing a monumental work on the dogma of the sacraments. His publisher, too, merits commendations for the excellence of his share in the labor.

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This study of the New Testament doctrine on divorce is restricted to an analysis of the crucial texts in Matt. 5:32 and 19:9. In a brief Introduction the author states that he has undertaken to publish the results of his investigations because he feels that evidence he has gathered corroborates the one solution which satisfies all serious difficulties arising out of the clauses excepta fornicationis causa and nisi fornicationis causa. Readers who know how often similar claims have been put forward for various other interpretations of these troublesome texts may react initially to this assertion with a certain cautious scepticism. However, P. Bonsirven's confidence is impressive and may not be dismissed on a priori grounds as misplaced or presumptuous. His wide learning and careful scholarship, evidenced in numerous earlier works on Palestinian Judaism as a background of New Testament exegesis, require that serious attention be given to the thesis he here develops and defends.

The book is divided into five chapters. The first is preparatory and deals with the subject of divorce among the Jews. There is excellent material here on the legislation of Deuteronomy, on its rapport with other ancient Oriental divorce legislation, on the interpretation of erwat dabar, on the sources of the controversy between the schools of Hillel and Shammai, on the actual practice and frequency of divorce at the time of Christ, on the rabbinic vocabulary and jurisprudence relating to divorce. The author concludes that Judaism preserved, in general, the customs and laws of the ancient
Orient, granting an almost absolute liberty of divorce to the husband, a limited permission to the wife.

The second chapter of the book is also preparatory and contains a summary study of Christ's teaching on the indissolubility of marriage, as we find His doctrine preserved by four distinct New Testament witnesses, Matthew, Mark, Luke, and Paul. Special emphasis is placed on Christ's discourse with the Pharisees (Matt. 19:1-9; Mark 10:1-12) and Paul's detailed explanation of our Lord's "commandment" in I Cor. 7. The author's valuable exegesis of these passages serves to place in context the two clauses which are studied in the following chapter. Chapters four and five are appendices on the interpretation of Matt. 5:32 and 19:9 in early Christian literature. They are interesting and instructive studies but not especially pertinent to the central philological argument of the book.

This argument is elaborated in chapter three. P. Bonsirven first rejects a number of the better known interpretations: the words of Christ permit divorce and remarriage in case of adultery; they allow imperfect, not perfect divorce; the clauses are interpolations; they indicate a preterition, not a concession; they have an inclusive rather than an exceptive sense. His own solution (one proposed by such earlier writers as Patrizi, Cornely, Prat, and others) he calls a "negative precision (or specification) ... by way of parenthesis." Fornicatio means an illegitimate marriage; dimittere must be understood in its ordinary sense of a perfect divorce, since the Jews at the time of Christ knew no other. Thus, our Lord says in Matt. 19:9: "Whoever puts away his wife (not a partner in an illegitimate marriage) and marries another commits adultery." And in Matt. 5:32: "Whoever puts away his wife (except in case of an illegitimate marriage) makes her commit adultery."

The principal arguments used by earlier writers to defend this interpretation are briefly listed. (1) The sense of πορνεῖα and related words in I Cor. 5:1; Acts 15:20, 29 and 21:25; Hebrews 12:16 is that of an illegitimate marriage union, suggesting that this same meaning is to be taken from Matthew's texts. (2) The interpretation removes all contradictions from the words of Christ. (3) It alone is consistent with the Greek grammar and vocabulary of the sentences. The words in Matt. 19:9, μὴ ἔτι πορνεῖα, may not be translated by the exceptive clause, "unless it be for adultery," since to indicate an exception ἐὰν μὴ or ἐὰν μὴ should be used. Moreover, ἔτι with the dative does not show the raison d'être of an action; and πορνεῖα is a less accurate word than the ordinary μοιχεῖα for the sin of adultery.

These arguments, P. Bonsirven declares, appear to give solid probability to the solution which he adopts. This solid probability becomes quasi-cert-
tude when it is strengthened by a study of the Jewish vocabulary of the period. In the time of Christ, the word *zenout* (prostitution) had taken on the specific meaning of an illegitimate marriage, a marriage which was null or invalid or illicit or irregular for one reason or another. No distinction between invalid or illicit marriages was made at this time. Various forms of *zenout* are described in the rabbinic texts, for example, marriage of a Jew with a Gentile or a slave, incestuous marriage, marriage without a contract or a dowry or due legal formalities. A woman who is party to such a marriage is called a *zona* (a prostitute, as distinguished from a *gedecha* or common courtesan) and the “union of prostitution” in which she lives with a putative husband is frequently contrasted in the literature with a true and valid marriage.

Hence, the author concludes, our Lord in Matt. 19:9 (it is significant that the words in question occur in Matthew alone, the most Jewish of the four Gospels) accommodates His expression to the current vocabulary and the recognized distinction between a valid marriage and a “union of prostitution” (*zenout*, πορνεία). A man is forbidden to divorce his true wife, but not a “wife of prostitution” (*zona*). The particle *μή*, as has been said, introduces a parenthetical negative precision or specification; the phrase *εἰπὲ πορνεία* corresponds to a Semitic expression indicating a state or condition, rather than a cause. In Matt. 5:32 (*παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας*), λόγος is the proper Greek equivalent of the Hebrew *dabar*, “affair” or “case” or “circumstance,” and the words in this text mean “apart from the case of an illegitimate marriage (‘union of fornication’).”

The present review is concerned with outlining the content of the book rather than evaluating the solution it proposes. One or two comments, however, may be permitted. The study is too brief to allow a complete presentation of other solutions to the difficulties presented by the texts in question; however, one feels that full justice is not done to other possible explanations, particularly the classic exegesis of St. Jerome and the views advanced by Ott and others who identify the *causa fornicationis* of Matthew with the expression *erwat dabar* of Deut. 24:1. P. Bonsirven’s own position would be strengthened by a more thorough and effective refutation of other interpretations which have been suggested by competent scholars.

It may also be objected that the multiplicity of examples listed in chapter three all but obscures the precise point they are intended to establish. At any rate, so much attention is given to proving that *zenout*, in post-biblical Hebrew, came to mean more and more a “union of prostitution” that other essential aspects of the argument are neglected, particularly that Christ must have had such a union in mind when He spoke, and that *nisi ob* can
not be used grammatically to translate μη εξι. It is true that P. Bonsirven makes these points, and he is probably correct in what he says; but they are not made so conclusively as to give "quasi-certitude" to his interpretation, unless this means no more than a high probability. Nor are they made so conclusively that all readers will agree with the judgment of MM. Desclée & Cie. when they advertise that "... ce petit volume... doit mettre à l'aide exégètes, théologiens, moralistes et canonistes."

West Baden College  

WILLIAM LE SAINT, S.J.


The letter Deiparae Virginis which Pius XII sent to the episcopacy of the whole world concerning the opportuneness of the definition of the corporal Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary as a dogma of faith gave new impetus to an already flourishing Mariological movement. The fruits of the intensified labors of historians, liturgists, exegetes, and theologians have been presented in many excellent articles, books, Marian days and weeks. This book presents the splendid response of the theologians of Canada, under the auspices of the Archbishop of Montreal to the Holy Father's petition. The first part (62 pages) deals with the preparation and realization of the plan to conduct Marian days and includes a souvenir album of local interest. The second part (pp. 63–443) contains a French section (pp. 63–380) and an English section (pp. 381–432), treating the subject of the Assumption from the viewpoint of the historian, the liturgist, the exegete and the theologian. In the French section the matter is extremely well organized (the problem of the Assumption, the response of tradition, the teaching of theology). Judgment both measured and moderate is passed on the current controversies and balanced conclusions enhance the value of this book for all theology professors. By way of illustration, L. Poirier, in his conclusion to the discussion of Apocalypse 12 and the Assumption says: "... Appliquer à Marie ce que est dit de la Sagesse de l'Ancient Testament, de l'épouse des Cantiques et de l'Église, c'est établir un sens spirituel mystique, c'est-à-dire non voulu par l'auteur divin, mais situé dans le prolongement de sa pensée et manifesté par la Tradition" (p. 102).

Since the dogma of the Assumption currently offers an excellent opportunity to clarify questions on the sources of revelation, the progress of dogma, and the object of papal infallibility, these points are at issue in all the discussion and receive explicit treatment in several papers ("Le problème de l'Assomption," L. Brien, S.J.; "Comment reconnaître une doctrine révélée," P.-E. Vadeboncoeur, C.SS.R.; "La définibilité de l'Assomption,"
A. Ferland, P.S.S.; “Problem of the Assumption,” S. Govenlock; “The Teaching of Theology,” B. Lonergan, S.J.), and are the background in which the other studies are set.

The paper of Fr. Lonergan is particularly recommended to all who desire to construct a thesis for classroom presentation today, since it isolates the three currently discussed questions: (1) Could our Lady’s Assumption be defined as a matter of faith? (2) Why could the Assumption be defined as a matter of faith? (3) Might our Lady’s death be included in a definition of the Assumption? (p. 411) After pointed and adequate treatment, the answers are given: (1) Yes; (2) because implicitly revealed; (3) while doubts concerning our Lady’s death are unjustified, theological thought on the inclusion of our Lady’s death in the definition or assertion in a preamble has not yet crystallized.

An excellent index of names and helpful index of matters close this highly recommended work.

Weston College

J. P. Haran, S.J.


Septuagintal research has fluctuated enormously in popularity and quality during the past century. Since the great masters, Paul de Lagarde and Alfred Rahlfs, Max Margolis, and J. A. Montgomery passed away, the investigation of the Greek Old Testament has lost ground. Unfortunately, none of the above scholars was able to complete his projected magnum opus. Moreover, F. X. Wutz and Paul Kahle have thrown O. T. scholars into confusion by their drastic rejection of earlier views, and this confusion has operated as a powerful deterrent to serious research along the lines of the Lagardian school. As is well known, Wutz held that the Septuagint had been translated into Greek from a Hebrew text written in Greek letters. Fanciful though this hypothesis was in Wutz’s hands, it was harmless compared to the vagaries which fill the latter work of this scholar, in which he tried to square the Greek reading of difficult poetic books like Psalms and Job by conjuring many hundreds of previously unknown Hebrew words out of the consonantal text of the Masoretic Bible. The subsequent discovery of the Ugaritic poems from the fourteenth century B.C. indicated that Wutz was correct in his premise that the Hebrew consonantal text is generally correct, but was wrong in all his further inferences. Moreover, such a capricious treatment of philological questions as that characteristic of Wutz cannot possibly be right in detail—except by sheer accident. That Wutz was utterly wrong will appear from the discovery described in the next paragraph.
In 1947 some Ta'amireh Bedouin accidentally discovered, in a small cave on the slope of the cliff above 'Ain Feshkha and south of Jericho, nearly a dozen rolls of leather in earthenware jars. These rolls were sold to the Syrian Monastery of St. Mark and the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and they are now being published by Messrs. Millar Burrows, John C. Trever, and W. H. Brownlee for the Syrians and by E. L. Sukenik for the Hebrew University. In February, 1949, Mr. G. Lankester Harding, Chief Curator of Antiquities in the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan, and Père Roland de Vaux of the École Biblique (Dominican) in Jerusalem, undertook to clear the cave where the scrolls had been found; they discovered several hundred fragments of sheepskin and quantities of characteristically Hellenistic pottery from the Maccabaean period. The date of the pottery agrees entirely with the previous inferences of the reviewer, together with Trever and S. A. Birnbaum, from palaeography, making a date for the scrolls between 200 B.C. and the end of the Maccabaean period (37 B.C.) certain.

Among the scrolls have been discovered two manuscripts of Isaiah: one virtually complete roll, belonging to the second century B.C., written in an exaggerated *plene* orthography, utilizing *waw* and *yodh*, *he* and *aleph*, to fix vocalization; one incomplete roll belonging to the Hebrew University and containing approximately the latter third of the book in a consonantal orthography said to be indistinguishable from that of the Masoretic Bible. Many verses from the first two chapters of Habakkuk are preserved in the Habakkuk Commentary; they exhibit a consonantal spelling similar to, but not identical with, that of the Syrian Isaiah scroll. Then there are numerous smaller fragments, some in the *plene* spelling and others (such as the new Deuteronomy fragment and the fragments of the Holiness Code in Leviticus) which follow the relatively defective spelling of the Masoretic tradition.

The new biblical Hebrew MSS from the last two centuries B.C. generally agree in content with the Masoretic Bible as against the Septuagint, but they sometimes agree with the Greek, and more rarely they diverge from both Septuagint and Masorah (see Burrows, *Bull. Am. Sch. Or. Res.*, Nos. 111 and 113). They thus establish the general accuracy of the Masoretic tradition and give the *coup de grâce* to Wutz’s speculations.

Paul Kahle’s point of view is very different from that of Wutz; according to him and his followers (especially his pupil, A. Sperber of New York) there was no standard Septuagint (though possibly a preferred Greek translation of the Pentateuch), but rather a whole series of independent translations, which influenced one another until a group of closely associated recensions (our “LXX”) finally prevailed (see especially Kahle, *The Cairo Geniza*, 1947, pp. 132–79). Against his view see especially Harry M. Orlinsky, “On
the Present State of Proto-Septuagint Studies' (Jour. Am. Or. Soc., 61 [1941], pp. 81–91), who follows the school of Lagarde, represented so ably by Margolis and Montgomery. The discoveries in Egypt and Palestine certainly reinforce this position, since the Greek fragments from the period 200 B.C.–200 A.D. are all definitely of LXX type, resembling the B recension more closely than the A, while the Nash Papyrus and the new scrolls are closer to the Hebrew Vorlage of the LXX than the Masoretic text is (though at the same time closer to the later Hebrew than to the Greek).

We can now turn to Prijs’s monograph, which is a detailed attempt to show that the LXX followed a Hebrew tradition closely resembling that of the rabbinic sources; so closely, in fact, that even variant interpretations of different Jewish sources are reflected in LXX variants. This point of view is far preferable to the wild innovations of Wutz, but it is not in accord with the new material from the ‘Ain Feshkha scrolls. A sound approach will avoid both an unduly skeptical attitude toward the Jewish learning of the translators of the LXX and a credulous attitude toward the antiquity of the Masoretic tradition. The translators of the LXX were learned men, and their knowledge of the traditional Jewish exegesis of the Hebrew Bible was profound. On the other hand, there was a far-reaching revolution in biblical exegesis between the time of the LXX translation and the codification of the Mishnah and its congeners (second century A.D.), to say nothing of the Gemara and Midrashim (third–sixth centuries A.D.). In general the still later Masorah (eighth–tenth centuries A.D.) reflects the interpretation of the Talmud. In many difficult passages the LXX diverged radically, not as a rule because they were ignorant of contemporary Jewish exegesis, but because the latter had not yet attained the form in which it was known several centuries later, after the wars of the Maccabees and the successive revolts against the Romans had twice transformed Jewish life and thought.

The author is most secure where he deals with legal matters (pp. 1–19), for example, his plausible interpretation of slight differences between the Masoretic Hebrew text and the LXX in Ex. 21:19 (p. 10) and Ex. 22:17 (p.12). His treatment of Lev. 18:21 (pp. 14 f.) and 21:9 (p. 15) is particularly good. On the other hand, his treatment of Haggada (pp. 20–34) often leaves the reader quite unconvinced, and his chapter on “Al Tiqre Interpretations” (pp. 35–61) is full of improbabilities. The reason for his weakness here is obvious; as he says himself (p. 35), “The LXX has not hitherto been examined for al tiqre interpretations.” This means that in these pages the author is no longer assisted by the work of his predecessors, but must strike out for himself into wholly unexplored terrain. In the reviewer’s opinion virtually all of his proposals in this chapter are erroneous, since he is left to
his own resources in dealing with the trickiest possible material. The type of interpretation in question is found in rabbinic sources, where it often begins with the words, "Do not read (this way, but rather that way)"; in other words, change the spelling of the consonantal text or (preferably) the vocalization in such a way as to bring out a different meaning of the text (which itself remains intact and sacred, at least in theory). The author often urges this interpretation of LXX translations which diverge from Masoretic vocalization even where he cannot adduce any rabbinic illustrations whatever; for example, his forced explanation of several passages where the Hebrew 'ad, lā'ād, "forever," is read lāʾēd, "for testimony," by the LXX (pp. 47 ff.). The author's approach is best illustrated by his treatment of Is. 24:23 (p. 74), where the Hebrew text may be rendered, "And the moon will be ashamed and the sun will be humiliated," while the LXX interprets, "And the brick will be melted and the wall will collapse," reading lēbēnāh for lēbōnāh and ḫōmāh for ḫammāh (without changing the consonantal spelling). The usual view is that the Greek translators simply interpreted the verbs in this passage ad sensum, doubtless influenced by such homonyms as ḫāḏr, both "dig" and "be ashamed." (In many such cases Wutz tried to discover new Hebrew words, often with the aid of extremely questionable etymological combinations.) Prijs, however, suggests that since bricks and walls are mentioned elsewhere in connection with pagan sacrifices, they are brought deliberately into this text by a translator who knew perfectly well that the words had quite a different meaning. This is decidedly hard to take.

However, Prijs's study is a careful and suggestive piece of work, and the exegete will find much useful material, whose use is greatly facilitated by detailed indices of scriptural passages, etc. It is a book to be used critically, since uncritical use will mislead the student more than it will aid him.

The Johns Hopkins University

W. F. Albright


The suggestion was almost a commonplace in the Latin-Greek Proseminar before the destruction by Hitler of the immemorial German classical tradition, that, if the young student of classical philology were to work conscientiously through two modern commentated editions of the ancients, he would be found quite prepared to pass his doctorate examination or even his Staatsexamen. These works were, for the Latin, Eduard Norden's celebrated text and commentary of the Sixth Book of the Aeneid; for the Greek, Ulrich v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff's equally celebrated commentated edi-
his own resources in dealing with the trickiest possible material. The type of interpretation in question is found in rabbinic sources, where it often begins with the words, "Do not read (this way, but rather that way)"; in other words, change the spelling of the consonantal text or (preferably) the vocalization in such a way as to bring out a different meaning of the text (which itself remains intact and sacred, at least in theory). The author often urges this interpretation of LXX translations which diverge from Masoretic vocalization even where he cannot adduce any rabbinic illustrations whatever; for example, his forced explanation of several passages where the Hebrew 'ad, lā'ād, "forever," is read lā'ēd, "for testimony," by the LXX (pp. 47 ff.). The author's approach is best illustrated by his treatment of Is. 24:23 (p. 74), where the Hebrew text may be rendered, "And the moon will be ashamed and the sun will be humiliated," while the LXX interprets, "And the brick will be melted and the wall will collapse," reading lēbēnāh for lēbānāh and hōmāh for hammāh (without changing the consonantal spelling). The usual view is that the Greek translators simply interpreted the verbs in this passage ad sensum, doubtless influenced by such homonyms as hāfār, both "dig" and "be ashamed." (In many such cases Wutz tried to discover new Hebrew words, often with the aid of extremely questionable etymological combinations.) Prijs, however, suggests that since bricks and walls are mentioned elsewhere in connection with pagan sacrifices, they are brought deliberately into this text by a translator who knew perfectly well that the words had quite a different meaning. This is decidedly hard to take.

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tion of Euripides' Heracles. When we inspect the present monumental work by Waszink, professor in the University of Leiden, it is probably not too much to say: if you know classical Latin and Greek, but have no acquaintance with the Fathers, work through this volume and you will receive a thoroughgoing graduate course in the philological and historical problems of patristic Latin literature and, to a very appreciable degree, also of patristic Greek literature. The question of patristic theology is quite another thing, as will be adverted to below.

The De anima, dated by Waszink (p. 3*) between the years 210–213 (written, therefore, after the author’s declination to Montanism) is one of Tertullian’s larger and most profound works. It has been traditional with scholars (e.g., Harnack, Bardenhewer, Altaner) to term it “the first Christian psychology.” Waszink does not find this label entirely apt, “for this work is not in the first place a scientific treatise but a refutation of heretical doctrines about the soul” (p. 7*).

In the present volume the Leiden professor aims to give “a more penetrating elucidation” of the De anima than he had offered in his commented edition, which was published (in German, with a translation) in 1933 as his dissertation and which itself rendered decidedly antiquated the CSEL edition by Reifferscheid (1890).

In the Introduction (pp. 1*-49*) he devotes six chapters to the following critical considerations: (1) the MSS authority (the text in the Codex Agerbardinus alone survives), past editions (that by Gelenius, based on two MSS now lost, is very important), translations, and commentaries; (2) the date and (3) occasion of composition; importance of the lost treatise De censu animae; (4) a thorough analysis of the treatise; (5) sources used in the treatise (especially the physician Soranus)—an extremely difficult piece of work very well done; (6) the influence of the De anima on later authors.

The critical text follows (pp. 1–80). Here Waszink has associated with his own keen penetration of Tertullian’s difficult language and thought a most judicious exploitation of the philological Kleinarbeit performed, since the appearance of the CSEL edition, by scholars such as Hartel, Hoppe, and Löfstedt. Everywhere Reifferscheid’s ever-ready conjectures and imagined lacunae have disappeared. This marked conservatism is sound throughout and, incidentally, makes us appreciate the more the thin thread of MSS tradition by which the works of Tertullian have survived.

It is difficult to appraise justly the great erudition deposited in the hundreds of large pages (pp. 81–593) of commentary. This is so arranged that the notes on each of the fifty-eight chapters are preceded by a very ample paraphrase of the chapter. The notes are philological in the widest sense of
the term and documented with a vast amount of ancient parallels and modern critical literature. The excellent grammar and word indexes also make this work particularly valuable to the translator of the Latin Fathers who in the absence of the pertinent grammatical and lexicographical instruments turns to, and gratefully acknowledges, the helps and warnings he finds in old Koffmane or in the studies of Borleiffs, Mohrmann, Teeuwen Lofstedt, Thörnell, and the other Dutch and Scandinavian patristic scholars of our day.

A previous reviewer (S. L. Greenslade, in *Journal of Theological Studies*, L [1949], 87–90) has tempered his high praise of Prof. Waszink’s monumental contribution with the observation that the Introduction and Commentary do not appear to do sufficient justice to the very strong theological and scriptural elements in the *De anima*. I suggest: let the theologian and student of the scriptural argument take this excellent text and commentary, with its profound discussion of the medical and Stoical factors—to mention only two capital considerations—and contribute what is missing. In the seventeenth century Ludovicus La Cerda attempted to write a full commentary of the *De anima*. Waszink finds it unfortunate that this contains, “in addition to many sensible remarks,” a great number of “highly complicated theological discussions” (p. 4*). However one may criticize such criticism (cf. the author’s earlier high commendation of La Cerda in his dissertation, p. 3), the challenge is there: the expounder and defender of the *regula fidei* is eminently present in this treatise; let theology make him stand out in clear light. Such presentation can be all the less “complicated” as Waszink’s many acute observations on, for example, traces of Montanism in the *De anima* are taken into account.

The issue of the second world war has served also to emphasize the mis­sion of English as a language medium for the publication of scholarly studies. In the patristic field this became particularly apparent through the appearance in Amsterdam of the excellent quarterly *Vigiliae Christianae*. The English-speaking reader cannot fail to note and, therefore, also to appreciate the added burden assumed by Prof. Waszink when he decided to publish this work in English. There are literary blemishes here and there, some of them even quite puzzling; just the same, his presentation and style is clear and straightforward throughout and even attractive. Finally, all the exter­nals of this noble volume—the paper, the binding, the typography—are superb. In any collection of scholarly books, especially, too, in seminary libraries, this is an indispensable instrument of reference and study.

*The Catholic University of America*  

*JOSEPH C. PLUMPE*

This first volume of the biography of Monseigneur Fuzet, Archbishop of Rouen, covers his life from birth till shortly after his installation in Rouen. Born November 9, 1839, and ordained May 21, 1864, Edmond Frederic Andre Fuzet served as curé in several parishes and taught ecclesiastical history in Lille before he was consecrated bishop on June 29, 1888. In turn he filled the sees of St. Denis on the island of Reunion in the Indian Ocean, then that of Beauvais, and finally he was transferred to the archdiocese of Rouen. The author sets himself the task of recording and assessing the character, policies, the achievements, and the controversies in which the Bishop was involved. A man of strong character, entertaining fixed views, and fearless in advocating causes he once espoused, Fuzet's career was certain to be marked by controversy. Circumstances and the political climate of the time give rise to others. At times arbitrary, at times dictatorial when goaded by opposition and calumny, he was a liberal in politics and sociology but a staunch traditionalist in other respects—pedagogy, for example—and he could be an autocrat in ecclesiastical affairs.

Three great loves—the Church, France, democracy—claimed his heart. He was at all times vitally interested in the formation, education, and spiritual progress of his clergy, and this solicitude extended to the humbler members of his several flocks. In this respect he won the admiration of all, and his conduct was a challenge and inspiration to other members of the episcopacy. But it was as champion of democracy that he became conspicuous in the bitter controversies which raged between republicans and royalists. His stand made him unpopular with the nobility, the privileged classes, and their supporters. At the time the clergy of France were generally regarded as royalist, and for this reason they were opposed by the republican government, and in some instances by the people. As early as 1881 Fuzet published a brochure on the attitude of the clergy towards democracy, and he advocated collaboration between Church and State. From this time he played the role of conciliator and promoter of friendly relations; from this time too he had to face the accusations of the opposition which charged him with opportunism, ambition, insincerity, and even threw out the suggestion that secretly he was a Freemason. There may have been some foundation for the assertion that he was so obsessed with the idea of reconciling the adversaries of the Church in government circles that it colored his views and led to extreme attempts to justify his position. That is however a matter of opinion.

Of a kindred spirit to Leo XIII, whom he chose as model and guide,
Fuzet made that wise pontiff's *Immortale Dei* his norm, but it called for a brave heart to stand by his guns. Leo's encyclical to the clergy and laity of France, dated February 11, 1892, must have seemed like papal approbation of his attitude and activity. His stout soul was sorely tried when the irreligious government of France determined to tax religious orders, and thus seemed to justify the contention of the royalists. When the struggle was at its height Fuzet strove to save the Concordat, and to this end he was prepared to make concessions to the limit where conscience intervened. These were trying times, and the author's account of the bitter internal dissension among Catholics in the face of attack by an external foe constitutes the chief value of this volume.

In two respects this work is open to criticism. The last hundred pages or so lack the broad sweep of treatment that should characterize a biography. They are little more than a diary with comments on each event. The result is a disjointed narrative of limited interest to the reader. Finally the account of Americanism is quite unsatisfactory, and not at all fair to the chief men concerned. A second volume promises to deal with Fuzet's career during the desperate assault of the government on the Church despite Leo XIII's conciliatory attitude, and during World War I.

*West Baden College*

**CHARLES H. METZGER, S.J.**


This is an absorbing, thought-provoking and practical book. Written by the well-known professor of pastoral theology of the Jesuit faculty at Louvain, and dedicated to the memory of the thirteen hundred priests who died at Dachau during his three-year internment, it is concerned with the utilization of such techniques in the work of the priestly ministry as will result in both a conversion of those outside the fold of Christ, and a more profound Christian life on the part of those already within it.

In his Introduction the author clearly defines the purpose and scope of his work. The problem of adaptation is the problem of discovering and employing the most apt and effective means for accomplishing the work of the apostolate in the milieu in which the priest is laboring. Involving no compromise of the definitive dogmatic and moral tenets of the Christian faith, it is based theologically on the Pauline admonition of becoming all things to all men.

The book is divided into four parts which deal respectively with religious instruction, preaching, the laboring classes, and the parish.
THEOLOGICAL STUDIES

Bluntly charging many priests with pedagogical incompetence in regard to religious instruction, the author raises some challenging questions: Do priests, recognizing the widespread modern hostility to pure speculation, expound the relationship of Christian doctrine to life? In condemning materialism, do they sufficiently stress that the religion of Christ is one of self-renunciation? Do not theologians insist overmuch that their function is "scientific" and not "practical," thereby neglecting the aspirations of the rank and file who are yearning for truth? Are they aware that adherence to Christianity today is conditioned on something more than the presenting of "solid arguments" and the citing of "approved authors"?

In Part II, De Coninck discusses in detail types of preachers, types of sermons, the effect of preaching, preaching at Sunday Mass, and preaching to children ("the most difficult congregation"). The secret of successful preaching, he maintains, is to speak earnestly and sympathetically to the people about the pressing problems that weigh heavily upon them, and to bring to them the only effective solution for their harassing difficulties—the words of eternal life. This section of the book contains many interesting sidelights on the zealous perseverance of the priest-prisoners in the performance of their spiritual exercises amid their harrowing existence at Dachau.

The solution of the tremendous problems confronting the apostle to the laboring classes is conditioned upon the influence to be exerted on working men and women by the priest—an influence that cannot exist unless the priest’s life is characterized by austere simplicity and a spirit of Christ-like poverty. The successful adaptation of Christ's message to the psychological temperament of the working classes depends upon convincing them that their labor, properly motivated, is truly sanctifying. Moreover, they must be persuaded of the sublime truth that a manufactured product, transformed from a crude to a highly developed state, represents a victory of spirit over matter. The worker in industry, by thus "humanizing" matter, makes the universe to his image and likeness, in imitation of the Creator. Hence, to the truly Christian worker who sees in himself a secondary cause cooperating with the First Cause, religion will no longer appear as a superfluous factor completely extrinsic to his life.

The author maintains that in the work of the apostolate the parish has an indispensable function, being the center in which the disciples of Christ are formed, and from which they go forth in all directions to carry Christian life. However, the christianization of society must simultaneously be carried on in broader fields as well. Hence the importance of Catholic Action. Side by side with the parish, other Christian organizations must be established—for example, groups of employers, of employees, etc. On the co-ordination
between the parish and these organizations depends the triumph in our times of the kingdom of God. To remedy the deplorable situation whereby only one-third of the faithful in Belgium attend Sunday Mass regularly, De Coninck calls for a deeper appreciation of the liturgy, an understanding of the action of the Mass, and a more active participation by the laity in the offering of it. Stressing the need of complete and detailed parish statistics, the author gives samples of census cards that might be used, and concludes by emphasizing the importance of personal contacts between the parish priest and his people.

Although at times repetitious and lacking in unity (actually it consists of individual articles previously published in various theological periodicals), the book offers a keen analysis of many problems of the ministry, abounds in practical hints for the priest, and clearly evidences the author's zeal, resourcefulness, and knowledge of psychology. Not the least interesting of his suggestions is the recommendation that priests assemble from time to time for the purpose of becoming acquainted with the latest developments in theology and with the newest and most effective methods of conveying religious truth to the laity. While in no way minimizing the difficulties that confront the priest today, De Coninck is no pessimist. In the majority of men it is something noble which inspires their conduct, he says; and it is the task of the modern apostle to guide that motivating force into channels where it will serve God's glory. Continually throughout the work he insists that, although in modern times an extraordinary amount of activity is demanded of the priest, leaving him little opportunity for reflection or prayer, yet the success of his apostolic ministrations depends upon the intensity of his interior life. Exterior activity without a profound interior life is only agitation—the activism of one who is but sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal.

Saint John's Seminary, Brighton

LAWRENCE J. RILEY


The author here makes available to a larger public a study which appeared originally in Revista de derecho canónico. These Normae, for reasons of prudence, were never published in the AAS. Yet, as the author well points out, this Instruction from the Holy Office to all Ordinaries, is neither private nor reserved. In fact, we are given references to other recent commentaries on these same Normae. The first part of the book contains the letter from the
Holy Office to the Ordinaries, and the Normae themselves. This is followed by an excellent explanation and analysis of each one of the four Normae.

The first norm considers the confessor as judge. One point to which special attention is called is that the Instruction reads: "Quoties vel poenitentis scandalum vel ipsius confessarii ruina ex interrogatione prudenter timeatur, eadem abstinendum esse." Most moral text books say "omitti possunt," but the Instruction is couched in verbis praecptivis, not facultatvis. The second norm treats of the confessor as a spiritual doctor and urges that everything in the nature of hygiene, medicine, sexual initiation, the clinical and biological be omitted in the confessional. The third norm suggests safeguards and counsels for the confessor in and out of the confessional. Sound advice is given on excessive familiarity, using terms of endearment, control of sympathy and pity, correspondence and visiting. The fourth and last norm suggests how good future confessors may best be trained. Practice, cases of conscience, seminars, pastoral theology must be added to theoretical knowledge. This commentary of Fr. Yanguas would make an ideal text for such practical training.

Every priest and every seminarian approaching the priesthood should have this little gem of a book. With it we can adequately reconcile the obligations of confessional integrity with prudence, and of justice with mercy and sympathy.

Jesuit Seminary, Toronto

J. Elliott MacGuigan, S.J.


This rather general text is the result of a course of lectures given at the University of Louvain by the author, who is a member of the Belgian Royal Academy of Medicine. Part one deals with sexuality, primary and secondary sexual characteristics, determination of sex, sexual activity, intercourse and orgasm, masturbation, its causes and consequences, celibacy, pregnancy, physiology of the foetus, birth, lactation, fertility, and the factors causing infertility. There are added several interesting chapters on mortality, population, and equilibrium of the sexes. Part two discusses growth, the adult stage, old age, and death. Theory is reinforced with many excellent charts, diagrams, photos and tables of statistics. A special bibliography is given at the end of each chapter and there is a rather good index. There is occasional reference to moral implications.

While this text is not a "must," it will be good to have it available for periodic reference.

Jesuit Seminary, Toronto

J. Elliott MacGuigan, S.J.
BOOK REVIEWS


The theme of this book is the teleological argument for the existence of God. The work is well done in its systematic analysis of the data and logical development of the argument. There is a wealth of material drawn from the various physical sciences. This would be confusing except that the author wisely adds a summary at the end of the chapters to keep our minds focused on the main issue. Technical terminology and theory is balanced by many good illustrations to clarify the concepts. The book is a contribution to the increasing literature on the teleological aspects of the physical universe.

Weston College

JOSEPH P. KELLY, S.J.


"The mystical life," says Fr. Arintero, "is the mysterious life of the grace of Jesus Christ in faithful souls who, dead to themselves, live hidden with Him in God." By mystical evolution, therefore, he means "the entire process of the formation, growth and expansion of that prodigious life until Christ is formed in us and we are transformed in His divine image" (p. 16). He divides his study into three parts. The second and third parts, in which he describes the development of the mystical life in individual souls and in the church as a whole, will be published later as a separate volume. The volume under review constitutes only Part I of his work.

After a brief Introduction which sets forth the importance, both from the apologetic and the devotional point of view, of studying the divine life within our souls, the opening chapter (pp. 16-40) presents a general outline of the mystical life as a renewal and transformation of the natural man by sanctifying grace and the infused virtues. The second chapter (pp. 41-194) deals with Scripture and the teaching of the early Fathers, emphasizing especially the doctrines of "adoption, regeneration, justification, renewal, deification, divine filiation, the reception of new life and new energies, the development and expansion of the divine seed of grace, the indwelling of the Holy Ghost and of the entire Trinity, the friendly and intimate fellowship with the three divine Persons, etc." (p. 42). The third chapter (pp. 195-288) urges the necessity of our participation in the divine activity within our souls by diligent co-operation with the supernatural powers and faculties which God has given us. The fourth chapter (pp. 289-346) reminds us of our obligation to grow spiritually, both as individuals and as members of the church, and discusses the chief means of spiritual growth.

Fr. Arintero writes with an unction, an enthusiasm, and an abundance of
well-chosen quotations that make his work most valuable and inspiring for all who are interested in developing the spiritual life either in themselves or in those committed to their direction. While agreeing with Fr. Arintero as to the importance of the basic principles of the spiritual life, and while admitting that they are all too often ignored or forgotten, not only by the ordinary faithful but also by their preachers and teachers, we think he goes too far when he claims (p. 38) that some of the most important of these truths have been utterly and universally forgotten. Taken literally, such sweeping accusations would be hard to reconcile with the efficacious help Christ promised to His Church in teaching the whole deposit of revelation “all days even unto the consummation of the world.” They would be hard to reconcile with the spirit of Pope Pius VI’s action in condemning as heretical “the proposition which asserts that in these last centuries a general darkness has been scattered over the religious truths which are of graver moment, and which are the foundation of the faith and of the moral doctrine of Jesus Christ” (DB, 1501). They would be hard to reconcile with the numerous extracts which Fr. Arintero himself has quoted from many well-known Catholic authors of the past four centuries.

Doubtless, Fr. Arintero does not expect us to take these accusations too literally, for on the very same page he admits that “nevertheless the echo of the unanimous voice of the Fathers still resounds among modern theologians” and “notwithstanding the universal forgetfulness or—why not say it?—the shameful deviations from traditional teaching, there can yet be heard some dominant and authoritative voices.” It seems clear therefore that Fr. Arintero did not really wish to maintain that the Church had allowed any important doctrine of the spiritual life to become utterly lost or forgotten. Consequently, one may perhaps be allowed to wonder whether he would have been willing to accept the flattering title of “the leader of the modern trend back to the traditional teaching of mystical theology” (p. xii), and the still more invidious title of “the restorer of traditional spiritual doctrine in our time and the leader of the contemporary trend toward sound mysticism” (Cf. Cross and Crown for June, 1949) which his translator, Fr. Aumann, has so generously bestowed upon him.

Alma College

JOHN J. HEALY, S.J.


This book is a sort of anthology of spiritual reading concerned with the religious life of Russians. Some of the selections are biographical while others are didactical, from the minds of Russia’s own spiritual men. Professor
Fedotov has not attempted to give anything but a limited selection, since he is covering a period of many centuries in which Russian spiritual writings were prolific to say the least. He does, however, endeavor to present material which he feels will portray either traditional or special aspects of religious mentality in Russia according to a broad division of influences that affected Russian religious thought. Others who know the field might perhaps have preferred different selections within the same scope, but that, I think, is a matter of personal choice.

Many of the treatises given cover a wide field of spiritual activity, such as the norms of monastic life, the practice of the different virtues, the conquest of the vices, the forms and rules for prayer, and a vast number of every-day Christian practices. It is thus evident that to review the book in the sense of attempting to give a fairly adequate summary of its contents and an evaluation of them is out of the question. One might as well try to present an analysis of the writings of Saint John of the Cross, Saint Teresa, or Thomas a Kempis as to review the book in this manner. Nevertheless it would be well to indicate some of the general characteristics of the spirituality here revealed.

Theodosius, whose “Life” is the first selection made, was the first monk canonized as a saint by the Russian Church; he was abbot of the Petchersky Laura or Caves Monastery of Kiev. Professor Fedotov considers him as the first “kenotic” type, by which he means the abasement of self through charity to voluntary suffering and profound humility in thought and act. If one does not care for this rather technical word, I think the spirituality of Theodosius could be called the primitive type, that is, fundamentally the primitive asceticism of the early Eastern ascetics which was based on the New Testament and their traditional faith. It is true that Theodosius inherited and used the later and more developed monasticism of the Studite Rule, but his spirit seems to be that early fundamental one of great love for Christ and great sacrifice to prove it. He loves poverty of spirit and poverty of fact; he practices severe mortifications of fasting, vigils, and corporal inflictions; he is the first to rise and the first to work, at times doing the work of others; he prays the liturgical chant of the Psalms and meditates assiduously, but does not appear to be a mystic; his charity and solicitude for the salvation of souls reaches beyond the monastery walls to the rich and the poor. Kind, patient, and very humble, it is sacrifice of self for a tender personal love of Christ.

Sergius, also a Russian canonized saint, has so many similarities to Theodosius that one wonders whether he should be considered as a really different type. He too is a monk living a life of fasting, prayer, and work and
manifesting the same spirit of humility. There seems to be a greater emphasis on solitude and contemplation than Theodosius had; in fact, Sergius was at first a dweller in the wilderness and intended to remain alone until he became convinced God’s will was otherwise. Miracles and visions are reported in the “Life”; Fedotov thinks it probable that Sergius was a mystic.

“The Tradition to the Disciples” of Saint Nilus gives factual testimony to the early sources of Russian spirituality. The Scriptures and the Fathers are to be the fundamental guides of religious life. Saints John Climacus, Barsanuphius, Isaac, Dorotheus, Basil, Ignatius, and Gregory the Great are cited to bring out points of importance in monastic life. The supremacy of the mind in the sense of interior prayer is especially emphasized. In this composition of Nilus, then, we have a combination of different elements which I might call ascetical, contemplative, and mystical. This latter is indicated principally in his citations of authors of the Hesychast type of spirituality, such as Gregory of Sinai and Simeon the New Theologian. It is a type that can be fraught with danger, as would be the case, I think, if the words of Simeon regarding the visible presence of God were to be interpreted too literally. But Nilus’ insistence on rigid asceticism would seem to preclude any false mysticism. He insists on the solid interior virtues and reminds one of Rodriguez in his exposition of them. Mr. Fedotov says that Nilus does not think highly of living authorities; I do not know just what this may mean but I have read elsewhere that Nilus strongly resisted caesaro-papism.

Avvakum is quite a different type from the preceding subjects. This archpriest was a fiery orator and a graphic writer, as his autobiography here printed testifies. He became a leader of the Raskol or schism that arose in seventeenth-century Russia over the reformation of the liturgical books by the Patriarch Nikon. His “Life” tells of his ideals, trials and persecutions and is as replete with harrowing adventures as are some of the modern books on religious persecution under the Soviets. He is naive, impetuous, and irrepressible; if his story of woes is not exaggerated, his physical constitution must have been something marvelous. His spirituality might be called liturgical, not in the sense of mere ritualism, but as seeking the spiritual efficacy of the sacraments and the liturgical prayers. He had a tender love for Christ and our Lady which filled him with confidence and zeal for the rigid ideas of the Raskol—ideas of which he seemed to have no doubt. Since the notes in the back of this book (where I do not like them) are fairly copious it would have been nice to add one indicating that Avvakum’s statement regarding confession in the Catholic Church is either false or should be explained.

St. Tychon has the liturgical type of piety, but such as is practiced by a
well-educated man; he is assiduous in genuflections, prostrations, and the chanting of the Psalms, but he is equally fervent in prayer, especially in meditations on the last things and the passion of Christ. At the same time his life manifests the old primitive tradition of humility, poverty, charity, and forgiveness of insult; he loved solitude and resigned his bishopric to live in a monastery. Some of his writings remind one of Thomas à Kempis.

St. Seraphim was like the desert fathers of ancient days; he spent ten years in the wilderness in prayer and asceticism; this was followed by periods of stylite life and complete silence and finally starets. Again we find the influence of the primitive spirituality and of the Hesychasts combined; his emphasis was on acquiring the Holy Spirit but his description of the permanence of the grace of the Holy Spirit and the recognition of that grace would, I think, bring a few questions to the lips of a theologian.

The Pilgrim is the story of a type known as “the wanderer,” one who follows the roads through city, town, and wilderness, stopping over or moving on as he pleases, living on charity and seeking only God in his life of detachment from all things and in his constant prayer. In this case it is the “Prayer of Jesus” peculiar to the Orient and dressed up in all its Hesychast terminology as found in their Philocalia, a book containing writings of the spiritual authors they liked. It has many quaint stories and, though the doctrine of prayer that it propounds might seem queer to the Western mentality and indeed could prove dangerous for an unguided novice who attempted to follow it blindly as an infallible instrument of spirituality, nevertheless there runs through the tale a deep, sincere, and tender spirit of the striving of a simple soul for the love of God.

John of Cronstadt had the simple spirituality of a fervent and zealous priest, sometimes perhaps imprudently zealous. His was the practical, active, intensely devotional type. The excerpts from his writings printed in this book are simple and frank commentaries on everyday Christian life—the virtues to be practiced, the duties to be fulfilled, the fundamental Christian attitudes towards the problems of life to be cultivated. His asceticism is the strict fulfillment of every duty with unwavering faith and hope; his interior life is that of persevering, intense, personal, and filial prayer flowering into the sublimation of motives.

The last entry is the spiritual diary of Father Yelchaninov, a priest among the Russian Christians of the diaspora. There is no order to the work, which consists in a series of personal spiritual reflections on various aspects of religion and its practice. This makes it difficult to find any particular characteristic of the author’s spirituality; it seems to be eclectic within the broad sphere of traditional Orthodox forms. Statements on
Catholicism, Orthodoxy, faith, paradisiac characters, pleasures, sin, the truth of Christianity, etc., did not read well with this reviewer. There are, however, many wise and lovely thoughts recorded; he was truly thoughtfully spiritual.

The book well reveals how much in common there is between the spirituality of the Catholic Church and these representatives of the Russian Church; as one of my professors of Oriental theology put it many years ago: “perfectio moralis pravoslava principiis catholicis nutritur.” The differences are principally in the emphasis put on certain virtues, due in large part to the tradition inherited and natural inclinations. Many things in the book will not be fully grasped except by those who have some knowledge of the history of Eastern spirituality.

Weston College

JAMES L. MONKS, S.J.


On November 9, 1947, the German Catholic Welfare Organisation, “Deutscher Caritasverband,” was fifty years old. Owing to the present situation in that country, there were no special celebrations. It was for increased efforts that this jubilee called. Under such circumstances it is important that the motives behind all charitable activities, though always the same, be seen in a new light, that the situation be understood, and that the most efficient methods be applied. This is precisely the idea of the book under review. Various authors, though not immediately connected with work of the organisation, endeavour to clarify the situation, to analyse motives, and to examine methods. The great variety of articles prevents us from giving a detailed review of each; a mere listing of the contributions may suffice: Reinhold Schneider, “World-transforming Love”; Josef Bernhart, “Metaphysics of Love”; Karl Peters, “Love and Justice”; Bernhard Pfister, “Impoverishment as Fate”; Josef Guelden, “The Pastoral Ministry in Times of Misery”; Josef Ammer, “The Pastoral Ministry and Psychiatry”; Victor E. von Gebsattel, “The Christian Professional Ethos of the Physician”; Hans Wollasch, “The Family in the Crisis”; Johannes Maassen, “Youth in the Shadow of Tomorrow”; Cilly Boehle, “Women in our Time”; etc.

As this list indicates, the various articles cover a wide field, not each and everyone being immediately connected with charity; but with its expert treatment of all the topics and their great variety this book should be very valuable to all who are engaged in the various activities called for by present-day charity.

College of Christ the King, Toronto

PETER MUELLER, S.J.

The author divides his work into three parts: "Les faits," "Les principes," "Le programme."

After briefly sketching the attitude of the Holy See toward the attempts made to establish international order during the forty years from the First Conference of The Hague in 1899 till the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, the author takes up chronologically the official pronouncements of the Catholic hierarchy from the beginning of the pontificate of Pope Pius XII to the Christmas Message of 1948. It is to be noted that in this section and throughout the work the author confines himself almost exclusively to official pronouncements, and in the field of official teaching adduces, again almost exclusively, two great and authentically Catholic voices—that of the Pope and that of the American hierarchy (p. 13). One may suggest that the author could have made it clearer to the reader whether this predominant concern with the statements of the American bishops is due to the intrinsic merits of their statements, to the extrinsic circumstance that their messages represent Catholic thought in a nation whose attitude and action in the international sphere is for the moment critical for weal or woe, or to the lack of full-dress pronouncements by the hierarchy of other countries.

Chapters II-IV review the documents from September 1939 down to the end of 1948, in the setting of the rapidly shifting international scene of war and post-war years. We can therefore gauge the evolving but consistent and unswerving attitude of the Vicar of Christ and the Church in contrast to the tortuous and apparently fickle movements of statesmen and political planners.

Primarily expository, the work is nonetheless apologetic. For the author definitely intends to provide an answer to those who like Emery Reves in his Anatomie de la paix have laid down the thesis that religion in general and religious bodies in particular have proved themselves unable to establish or maintain peace. The reason for this in the case of Christianity according to Reves is that the Christian churches have departed from their universal mission and become national organizations seconding pagan and nationalistic instincts, and for temporal pottage have sold their true universalist birthright. Against this assertion of betrayal of trust and mission by loss of an international and supranational viewpoint (at least insofar as that charge bears upon the Catholic Church) Fr. Arès directs the exposé historique of the first section of his study.
The second part of the work is perhaps primarily apologetic in that it endeavors to provide an answer to other critics who would have the Church either interpose by acting directly in matters economic and political or at the other extreme restrict herself to religious worship within the confines of the sanctuary. In this part the author deals in three rather brief chapters with the reasons for her presence and activity, the manner of her activity, and the import of her activity.

In the third and longest part, Fr. Arès arranges the teaching contained in official pronouncements so as to present us with the program of the Church for international order. First, he discusses the four facts indicated by Pius XII as basic to any permanent international order: the sociological fact, the solidarity of all men, and the natural community of nations; the humanist fact, the dignity of the human person; the moral fact, the existence of the natural law; the religious fact, the existence of God. In his treatment Fr. Arès directs greater attention to the sociological fact by indicating explicitly Catholic teaching on the principal conclusion to be drawn from this fact, namely, the "actual and urgent necessity of a sound, and efficacious organisation of the community of nations," as well as by appraising the UNO as a concrete realization of the international society. Throughout this section (pp. 134–52) the reviewer could not but feel that the citations from Catholic social philosophers and planners because of their length and significance made the text a mere connective tissue between footnotes. One may wonder too whether, given the criticism which the author himself makes of definite juridical imperfections in the UNO Charter, he should not have restricted a little his statement (p. 143, note 1) that, among the duties which solidarity imposes upon the States, one of the most pressing is precisely to cooperate toward the ever more perfect organization of the human community and "in the first instance within the actual juridical framework of the United Nations."

In the second chapter of this third part the author states the Catholic program insofar as it proposes—less here by doctrinal teaching than by pastoral directives and paternal counsel—those moral attitudes which will prevent the recognition of the basic facts already mentioned from remaining sterile intellectual assents. These attitudes include the spirit of solidarity, of justice and equity, of sincerity and fidelity, of benevolence and love. In the final chapter are brought together those more concrete proposals of the Church’s program in which she indicates in more detail the present tasks both "preventive" and "constructive" to which the leaders of the international society must turn their efforts.

The work as a whole, and particularly the third part, of necessity covers
much the same ground as other studies on Catholic principles in the field of international order and organization. It has the advantage of utilizing the statements of the Catholic hierarchy during the five or six years since Gonella wrote his series of articles in the *Osservatore Romano* and of giving us a unified picture of the Catholic position.

The bibliography presents a valuable chronological index of papal documents, addresses, radio messages on the subject of international order from the beginning of Pius XII's pontificate down to the end of 1948, as well as of the principal statements of the hierarchy of the United States, Great Britain, and France. The books and articles cited in the second part of the bibliography give us the best works in French in the field in which the present study is situated.

West Baden College

Stephen E. Donlon, S.J.


This book represents an effort to connect the phenomenology of the moderns with the Thomistic metaphysics of rational psychology. The result is a valuable work which will be welcomed by both students and scholars. In this brief review, we would like to consider it from two points of view—the subject matter and the method.

The subject matter of the book is largely that which is found in any Scholastic textbook on rational psychology. There are three fundamental divisions—knowledge, will, soul. The treatise on knowledge begins by an illuminating and rather original treatment of the *signum cognitionis*. In doing this, much that is of value in modern experimental psychology is brought to bear upon, and in a manner to complete, the Scholastic logical synthesis. For the *signum cognitionis* (gesture, language) is not only the manifestation of an idea but can become the cause of recalling such an idea. The problem of the educator, then, is to arouse in the mind of the child an awareness of the "sign." This fact manifests a distinction between man and mere animal; in an animal such awareness is restricted to one object, but in man the sign is well nigh infinite in its application.

After this interesting chapter, Marc attacks the problem of knowledge. First, knowledge in general; then, sense knowledge, the intellect, agent and patient, abstraction, objectivation, that is, the formation of the word (*verbum*), reasoning, and finally, the truth of the judgment. All these questions are proposed and solved according to Thomistic principles.

This first volume of the *Psychologie réflexive* is undoubtedly interesting and important; it shows a vast erudition and a solid understanding of the
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This first volume of the Psychologie réflexive is undoubtedly interesting and important; it shows a vast erudition and a solid understanding of the
doctrine of St. Thomas. It seems to me, however, that the manner of presenta-
tion makes the subject matter appear unnecessarily difficult. There
is a certain obscurity and perhaps an apparent lack of unity. These blem-
ishes result, I believe, from the too frequent lengthy quotations from
philosophers, both modern and ancient, and perhaps more so from the
manner of the author's expression, which at times seems to border on that
of a subjectivist.

In the second volume, we are first given an interesting study of the will,
of freedom, and of habits. The last part treats of the soul, its faculties, its
nature, the human composite, and the person.

There is naturally nothing particularly original or striking in the above-
mentioned division and enumeration, nor indeed could any originality
regarding the subject matter of a book on rational psychology be expected
of a Scholastic philosopher. At most, one might question the wisdom of
placing the study of the soul and of its faculties in general after discussing
the knowledge of the intellect and the will. Certainly that is not the order
used by St. Thomas in the Summa, and it seems to me that some unity
in the treatise is lost by such a departure.

There is, however, a problem missing, which in St. Thomas as well as
in the moderns is of prime importance. It is the existential problem, which
in the case of a living being becomes the problem of life; for vivere est esse
viventium. A solution of the problem of understanding as well as of the
will is not complete without a realization that the operation of the intellect,
the "to understand" (intelligere), as well as the act of the will (velle), has
to be faced in the light of the "to be" (esse). For the act of a perfect being
(actus perfecti) is the act of an existing supposit, and its nature can only
be determined when we understand the existential metaphysics of the sup-
posit. But perhaps such omission as well as the type of solution which
Marc offers to the problem of knowledge—a solution somewhat after the
manner of Maréchal—results from the method used by the author. What is
this method?

The author himself designates it the "reflexive" method; the title of the
book indicates it. This method, he explains, is not merely experimental
nor purely subjective but goes beyond both. Let us quote his words:

Par cette méthode et cet objet, l'enquête entreprise ici se distingue d'une en-
quête strictement expérimentale. Le point de vue qu'elle adopte n'est pas le point
de vue empirique des phénomènes. La psychologie qu'elle veut construire, pour y
greffer ensuite une ontologie générale et une morale, n'est pas une psychologie
d'observation pure ni de description. Expérience et réalité ne sont pas synonymes
d'empirique et d'expérimental, qui sont d'ordre sensible. Elles incluent ces deux significations et les débordent, car elles dépassent le niveau des apparences.

This method is supposedly a modern interpretation of the "reditio," the return of the soul upon itself. "The reflexive method," Marc declares (II, 407), "studies the operating thought (la pensée agissante); and inasmuch as it (la pensée) takes hold of itself (elle se saisit) while operating, the thought reflects upon its acts."

It seems to me that such a method is poles apart from the objective realism of St. Thomas; for the method of St. Thomas in his treatise on man is not based on a "reditio." It is true, St. Thomas admits and defends this return of the soul—not of the thought (actiones sunt suppositorum)—upon itself as a mark, as an objective manifestation of the perfection of the operating nature. He never claims that, in the contact with self, the soul—never "la pensée"—is able to attain to a philosophical knowledge of self. The objective method of St. Thomas proceeds always from the knowledge of a sensible effect to its reasoned existential cause. The reason is that the proper object of the human intellect, as Marc declares, is a material essence. Hence, any knowledge of what the thinking subject, not "la pensée," is can be obtained only from the manifestation of its operation.

As a matter of fact, although presenting his reflexive method in a manner reminiscent of the method of the philosopher of Königsberg, and although frequently using expressions which recall the terminology of subjectivism, Marc is a Scholastic philosopher, who for the most part follows the objective method of the Angelic Doctor.

That is why we must declare that, in spite of Marc's expressions (II, 415), such method is not intuitive but deductive. We begin with the reality of the act of knowledge and rise from such an analysis, by means of causality, to a knowledge of the subject. In this method, then, the inclination of the thinking subject to an intentional union with the object results in the existential judgment, the "this is," which expresses the "liaison" of the mind with reality. In this, says Marc, the moderns have rediscovered the Middle Ages.

Psychologie réflexive is not without flaws, but it is an important addition to the philosophy of the day. It is an honest effort to present the metaphysics of psychology of St. Thomas to the modern mind.

Creighton University

HENRI RENARD, S.J.

This little book, No. 201 in the *Home University Library*, attempts to give a compendium of comparative religion. The reviewer sympathizes with any one who is asked to compress such a vast subject into such a small space, and congratulates the author for achieving a fair degree of success. In order to bring the subject within reach, the author has based his treatment upon five fundamental "moments" of religion: the impersonal sacred, animism, ancestor worship, nature worship, and high gods. The author then traces these "moments" in the great religions of the world. He does not subscribe to any of the classical theories of rectilinear evolution. To the reviewer, the position of animism and ancestor worship as fundamental "moments" seems questionable. Here the author appears to fail to distinguish properly between religion and superstition, a distinction which he makes elsewhere.

The attempt to unite various religions under a few heads involves certain over-simplifications; to be quite fair, the author is aware of this. Such groupings as Brahmanism, Buddha, and Epicurus under "the impersonal sacred," Taoism, Stoicism, astrology, and Neoplatonism under "religion of nature," Zoroaster, Ikhnaton, St. Bonaventure, Spinoza, and Lord Herbert of Cherbury under "the high gods," inevitably leave the impression of a strain on reality. The author does not seem to know what to do with Christianity. He is obviously unwilling to submit it to a purely comparative treatment, and, at the same time, he feels unable, viewing it with scientific detachment, to accord it that unique position which it claims for itself. On this he writes, summarizing a passage of Augustine: "...the new element in Christianity distinguishing it from the nobler religions of the world lay in the historic figure of Jesus Christ. A survey of human religion would tend on the whole to support this judgment" (152). And he refuses to place Jesus Christ or Christianity in any single religious category. On the other hand, his remarks on p. 98 are pure religious indifferentism.

Here, it seems, is where the author has failed: he has not distinguished scientific detachment from indifferentism. Historically, the science of comparative religion has been pursued with great detachment. In the hands of a Reinach, it has been turned to a virulent attack on Christianity; in the hands of a Frazer, it has been a tool of unbelief. The believing Christian, such as Wilhelm Schmidt and Pinard de la Boullaye, has shown more scientific detachment, precisely because he knows that Christianity has nothing to fear from a purely objective comparative treatment, and has not been afraid to submit it to such a treatment. This science is inevitably an apologetic, in one sense or the other, whether it is deliberately intended
or not; and the author would have improved his book by yielding to the inevitable.

*West Baden College*  
**JOHN L. MCKENZIE, S.J.**


During recent years several works dealing with Muslim theology have been published. Wensinck’s *The Muslim Creed* was a scholarly discussion and examination of several important credal formulae, preceded by chapters of a more general nature that still form a valuable introduction to the general subject of Muslim theology. Tritton’s *Muslim Theology* offers a mine of information gathered from Arabic sources, but presented in a rather abrupt and undigested manner. Klein’s English translation of al-Ash ‘ari’s *Al-Ibānah ‘An Usūl Ad-Diyānah* (*The Elucidation of Islam’s Foundation*) is a good specimen of the more specialized work that is being done. On the Arabic side, many of the classical treatises have been published by the Muslim presses in Cairo and elsewhere. Two years ago the second volume (four were planned) of Sweetman’s *Islam and Christian Theology* appeared, and it is to be hoped that Prof. Sweetman will be able to finish his work. These works, and the many other studies, editions of texts, translations, single chapters, and monographs that might be mentioned if space allowed, prove the existence of a fairly large field of religious thought that was, up to recent years, relatively unknown to occidental scholars. It may still come as a surprise to many to learn that there is a well developed discipline which can properly be called Muslim theology. Yet the Muslim theologians were not unknown to St. Thomas.

The present work should be most welcome to Catholic theologians and scholars for many reasons. It forms Volume XXXVII of the excellent series *Études de Philosophie Médévale,* published under the direction of Étienne Gilson. It has a warm commendatory preface by the distinguished Catholic Professor of the Collège de France, M. Louis Massignon, one of the world’s leading orientalists. It has been written by two men particularly well equipped to deal with the subject. Père Anawati is a Dominican Father who carries on his scholarly pursuits mainly in Cairo, where for some years he has been engaging in theological discussions with Muslim doctors. “Louis Gardet” is the pseudonym adopted by a priest-theologian who has already revealed his power of penetration and sympathetic analysis in many published articles. Both of the authors are profoundly at home with
the Thomist synthesis and almost equally well versed in the theology of Islam. What gives their work a unique value is indicated by the subtitle, *Essai de théologie comparée*. There have been many works on comparative religion, but I am not aware of any that can rightly be called works on comparative theology. Muslim theology, which has so many features recalling Catholic theology, offers a most fertile field for such study. It is true that the resemblances seem to be more superficial than certain orientalists would admit, and that the differences are radical and fundamental. Yet the Catholic theologian is perhaps the one best qualified to understand the work of the classic Muslim divines. The Aristotelian terminology is familiar to him and he can easily grasp the import of questions involving and stemming from notions of Scripture and tradition, the *praeambula fidei*, predestination and reprobation, etc., provided his knowledge of Arabic and of Islam is sufficient to guarantee that he will be able to supply the necessary corrections. This the two authors have been able to do, with results that will prove an enrichment for the Catholic theologian and may well open new perspectives to contemporary Muslim doctors.

The book is not easy reading, chiefly because of the profusion of Arabic names and technical terms that have to be considered. However the authors explain the terms carefully and one soon becomes accustomed to the unfamiliar names. The system of transliteration used was forced upon the authors by circumstances and is no hindrance to the reader unfamiliar with Arabic. It is well to underline the fact that the book makes no claim to be more than an introduction, though it is an introduction solidly based on source material and embodying a vast amount of scholarship. The authors are preparing two more volumes which will deal in more detail with the main problems of Muslim theology: *Dieu, son existence, ses attributs*, by Père Anawati, and *Dieu et l’homme*, by “Louis Gardet.” The first will presumably deal with the proofs for God’s existence as elaborated by the Muslim theologians, and the thorny question of the divine attributes once so hotly debated by Ash ‘arites, Mu’tazilites and Māturīdites. The second should be an examination of the Muslim positions respecting the divine transcendence, human liberty, predestination and predetermination of human acts, prophetology, etc. The authors promise to continue the same sort of comparative study that makes the present work so valuable for Christian and Muslim alike.

After some important “Notes liminaires” setting forth what the authors believe to be the main conditions on which should be based the sort of work they are undertaking, the book falls into three main divisions. In
the three chapters of the first division Muslim theology is placed in its historic and cultural context, its position in the Muslim hierarchy of knowledge is indicated (with references to the Aristotelian classification and various Christian syntheses), and several typical Muslim treatises are analyzed in chronological order, with a final word on the structure of the treatises of St. John of Damascus, Peter Lombard, and St. Thomas. The second main division of the work is a long but very interesting excursus on the genesis of Christian theology considered in its references to Muslim thought. Here the emphasis shifts from Muslim to Christian theology. The first chapter sketches the encounter of Muslim theology with patristic thought, and the second deals with the period of Scholasticism. The third main division is called "Nature and Method," and is doubtless the most interesting of all for the Catholic theologian. The first chapter is a consideration of faith and reason in Muslim theology and in Christian theology. In the second chapter the authors investigate the uses of the theological loci and the oeuvre théologique properly so called in the two disciplines. Once again emphasis is put on a fundamental difference mentioned several times in the course of the work: whereas the function of Catholic theology is both defensive and illuminative, that of Muslim theology is almost entirely defensive. That the latter discipline cannot truly be called fides quaerens intellectum in the Catholic sense is due to the absence in Islam of any strictly supernatural mysteries. For the orthodox Muslim divine the great mystery is Allah himself, and his theological speculation on the mystery of Allah is apt to be little more than what we should call natural theology. There is no Christology, no soteriology, no sacramental theology, no treatise De Gratia Christi to bring the Muslim into intimate contact with One Who is a God of love as well as a God of infinite majesty. The lack was certainly felt by the Muslim mystics, but the consideration of their efforts to make up for it is beyond the scope of the work under review.

The final section of the work is titled, "Perspectives d'avenir." It is these perspectives that are of primary interest to all who have the real well-being of Islam at heart. Theology as such is not in very great favor with many of the modern Muslim thinkers. Others are interested in the edition and critical study of texts, but their interests are seemingly more philosophical than theological. Left to itself the classic system will not be able to enjoy a very vigorous life. And if it is not left to itself it may cease to be theology in any real sense of the term. It is to be hoped that some Muslim readers of Père Anawati and M. Gardet will find in their pages an indication of the fullness of our own grand theological heritage. Catholic
readers will certainly find that and should moreover be encouraged to hope and pray that it may soon be shared by those whose own theological heritage is by no means inconsiderable.

I find little to criticize in the competent work of Père Anawati and M. Gardet. The second main division of the book is printed in smaller type than the other two divisions, a feature that some might find trying, but no doubt dictated by the necessity of not making a large book larger. There is probably a too free use of the term "the school of Bāqillānī," freer, that is, than the actual state of our knowledge would seem to warrant. But the point is open to discussion. Again, the authors deal almost exclusively with what is called the "orthodox" school of Muslim theology, leaving aside the Shi'i and 'Ībādite schools. This does not strike me as a positive fault, since there is still much research to be done on these schools and the "orthodox" school is by far the most important. Perhaps the authors will have more to say on these other schools in a second edition, or in other works. It is a pleasure to recommend this volume to thoughtful students and professional theologians as an outstanding example of scholarly competence and of what the authors somewhere speak of as "charité intellectuelle."

Campion Hall, Oxford

RICHARD J. MCCARTHY, S.J.


About seven years ago, a group of physicians in southeastern France, members of the Société médicale Saint-Luc, Saint-Côme et Saint-Damien, conceived the plan of making a thorough scientific investigation of the cures of Lourdes by enlisting the services of experienced specialists. To each of five specialists was assigned the task of investigating the cures pertinent to his particular field and of reporting the results of his study to the group, together with his opinion as to whether the cures could have been accomplished by natural means or must be regarded as effected through the intervention of a superior cause. The five general types of diseases which were the subject of this study represented the afflictions of most of the sufferers who come to Lourdes for succor—ailments of the eye, neurological troubles, pulmonary tuberculosis, affections of the bones and joints, and maladies of the digestive system.

The reports of these five specialists, presented to the Society in the course of the years 1943–1946, have now been published in the Cahiers Laënnec, a medico-theological journal, which has devoted to "Les Guérisons de Lourdes" the issues of July and October, 1948. To the five separate
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reports are added a summary of medical conclusions by Dr. Pierre Béhague, and an exposition of the Christian idea of a miracle, by Père Henri Bouilllard, professor of theology at Lyon-Fourvière. In the Introduction we are told that there are at Lourdes no archives, no documents concerning past cures, but only oral traditions. Hence, it was from works previously published that the doctors had to derive the information on which they based their findings. However, every measure was employed to guarantee exactness and precision. Naturally, only a few outstanding cases were selected out of the many thousands of cures attributed to the intercession of Our Lady of Lourdes. To be precise, twenty-five cases were examined by the five specialists.

The general conclusion of these doctors is that there have been cures at Lourdes—or elsewhere, with some relation to Lourdes—which could not have been effected by any ordinary process of natural forces. A very good summary of the most extraordinary cases is given by Dr. Béhague in his general conclusions (II, p. 18). Two phenomena seem to be usual concomitants of the cures at Lourdes. First, at the moment of the cure there is a unique physical sensation. In the words of Dr. Robert Leroy: "The cure is ordinarily accompanied by a sensation that is violent, strange, unaccustomed, often painful, characteristic" (I, 47). Second, marks of the previous affliction often remain after the cure. As Dr. Louis Merlin expresses it: "All the wounds cured at Lourdes have been replaced by corresponding scars" (I, 20). Thus, the right eye of Louis Bouriette, badly injured by an explosion, was healed in 1858, but afterward it retained a scar, and in consequence the vision was not perfect. Pierre de Rudder was instantly cured in 1875 of a suppurating fracture of the leg, which had rendered him incapable of walking for eight years; but when he died, seventeen years after the cure, the marks of the juncture of the bone were plainly visible to the surgeon who performed an autopsy.

An interesting theory based on this latter phenomenon, and favored by some of the doctors, is thus expressed by Dr. Merlin:

Since it seems contrary to the divine will to transgress the laws of nature (and one can easily realize that God does not wish to violate the laws which He has Himself established) it follows that the healing of ailments which are miraculously cured is not contrary to the laws of nature—in other words, there are no incurable diseases. How fitting it would be, then, to revise our list of supposedly incurable diseases in the light of the events of Lourdes! What hope would be awakened in us by meditating on these ideas! Let us admire the fact that God in His goodness has willed by miracles, not only to cure bodies, not only to give the soul arguments which greatly facilitate the act of faith, but also to give us physicians a lesson and
a hope. Too often we have all been wrong in not according to miracles any more than an apologetic value, whereas, once the reality of the supernatural has been established, we should study them as clinical facts, in order to perfect our art.

If these words of Dr. Merlin be taken literally, they would seem to indicate that the distinguished physician admits only that type of miracle which theologians call *miraculum quoad modum*. Now, while it may be true that the majority of the miracles that have taken place at Lourdes—or even all of them—have been of this type, it certainly would be wrong to assert that God cannot (and does not) effect miraculous happenings which are entirely beyond all the forces of nature (*miraculum quoad substantiam*) or at least are beyond all natural forces as regards the particular subject in which they are produced (*miraculum quoad subjectum*). The medical conclusions contain the statement that no miraculous happening at Lourdes has ever included the slightest element of creation (II, p. 20); but it would certainly be illogical generalization to conclude from this that God could not, if He willed, work a miracle which would include a creative act in the strict sense of the term.

The exposition of the Christian idea of a miracle by Père Henri Bouillard—who is apparently a follower of Blondel in the matter of apologetic method—contains some statements which, I believe, would not be accepted by all theologians. Thus, he repeats approvingly a sentence from the medical conclusions: "The supernatural cure is nothing else but a natural phenomenon, the rapidity and the extent of which surpass the ordinary rules," and then adds: "The miracle multiplies, transforms or cures; it does not create. It surpasses the forces of nature, but it does not transgress nature's laws" (II, p. 35). Moreover, he believes that a miracle as such cannot be the object of a scientific demonstration; to perceive a miracle, one must have what he calls a *religious attitude* (II, pp. 31, 33).

In assigning to miracles a place among the motives of credibility, Père Bouillard makes the following statement:

The miracle is not our only reason for believing. Christ and the Church in their entirety give testimony to themselves. The Christian message inasmuch as it gives an answer to the ultimate questions of man, the sanctity of Christ, the sanctity and the catholicity of the Church, the accomplishment of the messianic design, and still other aspects are also divine signs. The miracle has its place among them, and it is not the first place. Christ appealed to His miracles to convince men very little receptive of spiritual realities. But He also blames those who do not cease to demand miracles, and He indicates clearly that it is more perfect to believe in Him without them (II, 36).
To say the least, this does not represent the more common theological opinion as to the value of miracles as motives of credibility. It must be remembered that the Vatican Council, in treating of the external arguments for the credibility of the Christian religion, declared that imprimis are miracles and prophecies, and that these are accommodated to the intelligence of all.

At any rate, whatever one may think of the theological notions expressed in this study, the medical testimony is of great value. And all should agree with the doctors’ statement that in the future the most painstaking efforts should be made to obtain complete medical histories of those apparently cured at Lourdes, and the latest scientific methods should be employed to discover what actually has taken place when one claims to have received a miraculous cure at this highly favored shrine of Mary. Faith has nothing to fear from science; on the contrary, medical and surgical knowledge, honestly employed, will necessarily cast greater light on the transcendent power of the Creator.

_Catholic University of America_  
FRANCIS J. CONNELL, C.SS.R.


These articles are written with a view to bringing moral theologians and psychoanalysts together for thorough discussion and clarification of some of the principal concepts of Freud. The book is made up of five treatises written by men who can speak with authority in their fields of learning. The writers manifest a clear understanding of the difficulties involved in the questions which they discuss and they offer solutions which are well worthy of careful consideration.

By way of introduction to the inquiry into the relationship between moral theology and psychiatry (and especially psychoanalysis), Fr. Tesson explains the nature and the workings of man’s moral conscience. After describing the origin and evolution of the moral sense in man, he warns against identifying the feeling of guilt with the sense of sin. The feeling of guilt, the author states, is but an affective reaction and has merely the appearance of a value-judgment. The feeling of moral culpability, however, necessarily implies a true value-judgment. The sense of sin in the Christian meaning of the term cannot be had except by faith; for it is revelation
alone which can teach us what we are in respect to God, namely, sinners, who have been redeemed. It is advisable, then, not to confound the feeling of guilt, the realization of moral wrong-doing which everyone, be he Christian or not, will have when he fails to obey his conscience, and the sense of sin.

In the second treatise Dr. Nodet examines in detail the moral aspects of psychoanalysis. He explicitly limits his study to the works of Freud himself and has nothing to say about the latter’s pupils. Dr. Nodet discovers in Freud’s writings three things which must be clearly distinguished one from the other—Freud’s psychotherapeutic technique, his psychology, and his metaphysics. Freud’s therapeutic technique is aimed at the cure of those suffering from psychic affections which are not psychoses. These nervous disorders, says Freud, correspond to badly managed conflicts of one’s childhood days, which continue to live in the unconscious and prove to be a source of torment. The psychoanalytic cure is based on the hypothesis that such conflicts, if recalled from the unconscious to the conscious memory, will disappear. This exploring of the unconscious has led to the discovery of a new psychology. The unconscious of which Freud speaks is quite different from the collection of memories apparently forgotten, which with some effort can be rather easily recalled. The unconscious of which Freud writes cannot be spontaneously brought into one’s conscious memory. Freud’s philosophy consists of a certain empirical materialism. Dr. Nodet comments on the moral problems that can arise with regard to Freud’s therapeutic procedure, his psychology, and his metaphysics.

The third treatise in this publication deals with Freudian psychoanalysis and man’s moral conscience. In a short but learned article that follows this, Fr. Beirnaert studies the value of religious symbolism and its explanation by Freud. Dr. Caruso devotes the last pages of the work to stressing the importance of spiritual values in psychoanalytic cures.

_Psychanalyse et conscience morale_ is a stimulating work and contains much that should prove of genuine value both to the moralist and to the psychoanalyst.

*West Baden College*  

EDWIN F. HEALY, S.J.


In this investigation of the theory and practice of psychotherapy the author presents an exposition and critique of the basic works in the field, an analysis of the only philosophy and theology of man that can be the foundation for the sound interpretation of psychic phenomena, his own
schema of the structure of a neurosis and his technique of treatment with cases drawn from his own clinical experience.

Dr. Stocker devotes the greater part of his study to the systems of Janet and Freud without neglecting the contributions of Jung, Adler, von Monakow, Dubois (of Berne), Déjerine, Kretchmer, and Pavlov. Direct quotations from their works show that he is conversant with the literature of psychiatry, and in a subject where terminology is often confusing and inconsistent he offers an exposé of the basic tenets of these authors that should be understood even by the layman. While praising their painstaking research and accepting their recorded facts, he is too well-grounded in Scholastic philosophy to accept the interpretations they are forced to make by reason of their materialistic and deterministic theories on the nature of man. Although he rejects the pan-sexuality of Freud, his own practice has taught him that sex can be at the root of many nervous mental diseases. However, he does not resort to the easy and too often false explanation of repression but finds the original trauma more often due to false ideas on the nature and purpose of sex. These, in turn, are due to a complete lack of proper instruction or to crude initiation during the period of childhood and adolescence. A sharp dividing line must be drawn between modesty and prudery, and Dr. Stocker draws it. Especially good is his consideration of those neurotics whose malady originated in an "angelism" complex—a contempt for the body and for its natural functions, normal instincts, and necessary temptations, which leads to a type of revolt in which the will tries to suppress normal bodily activity. In one such case, a young lady, the victim of an "angelism" that was not helped by the clumsy and Jansenistic direction of her confessor, was brought to Dr. Stocker when she was an advanced neurotic with a secondary amenorrhea. After tracing the source of her trouble to her mental errors, there followed a period of reeducation in which he taught her Christian reverence for her body and enabled her to change her will to suppress its functions to a will to control those that can lead to sin. With the disappearance of her neurosis, menstruation was restored without resorting to medicines. The author does not hold with Freud that all neuroses have their origin in some frustration of childhood; but he admits that childhood and adolescence, when the mind is still undeveloped and the emotions easily aroused but controlled with difficulty, are the favored time for the incubation of some future neurosis. The child is father of the man. There is in the child the potency for much future good but it can be realized only by the proper instruction, formation, and example in a morally healthy family and social milieu. As for Freud's infant libido, it is shown to be a contradiction in one whose
generative organs lie sexually dormant. It is the child’s instinctive desire to love and be loved that is often wounded in infancy. Even in adult neurotics, whose difficulties are too often ascribed to repressed sex, it is this same instinctive but unfulfilled desire for love that is the real cause of the trouble.

In the exposition of his philosophy of man, the author follows sound Scholastic doctrine and is even familiar with the works of spiritual writers and directors of souls, among others Eymieu, de Tonquédec, Raymond, de la Vaissière, de Guibert, St. Theresa of Avila, and St. John of the Cross. The three levels of life in man are shown to be different in essence and not merely in degree. Between them there is a God-given hierarchy that must be maintained for peace of soul. Within the soul itself, there is a difference between the “heart,” the faculty of intuitive knowledge, and the “spirit,” the instrument of discursive reason. It is this thinking “heart” which is mentioned in Pascal’s oft-quoted aphorism and in the works of St. Theresa of Avila and of other saints. It bears a close resemblance to the synderesis of the Scholastics. The hierarchical order is “heart,” the reasoning intellect and body; with the “heart” at the apex of the triangle and the body as its base. To observe this order means internal harmony; to invert it means an interior stress that will lead to a neurosis. Even some of the determinists, especially Dubois, admit that moral fault can lead to a neurosis; but they reject the only explanation of this fact—that a life of morality corresponds to a natural need of man, the necessity of living in conformity with the moral law placed in the “heart” of man by God. It is often a fight for supremacy between the thinking “heart” and discursive reason which originates the interior conflict. Thus, the “spirit” will often try to reason itself into a justification of a course of action in opposition to the “heart” which instinctively knows that it is morally wrong. Although moral fault, particularly in the sexual sphere, can often be the cause of a neurosis, Dr. Stocker insists that a justified sense of guilt for a real sin cannot of itself explain the obsessive nature of the emotional reaction. To it must be added a state of anguish which is not due to the sexual instinct itself but to false judgments about it, surcharged with contradictory emotions associated with them.

The author concludes that, in the last analysis and despite surface differences, the cause of every neurosis can be traced to an error of judgment complicated by an affective reaction, a violent emotion. If this seems an over-simplification, he calls his own clinical practice to his defence. At first, the emotional reaction that follows the intellectual content is normal; in the end it becomes an agonizing irresolution that is due to the
absence of rational justification. More often, it is due to the appearance of a new intellectual content, again inadequate, which substitutes for the original generating cause of the blockage which has now become an automatism. The neurotic anguish that follows is the result of a fear which has no perception of real danger as its cause or which falsely interprets a harmless external situation as a real danger.

The first step in the treatment is to find the cause, the original error of judgment. This must often be drawn out of the long-forgotten past after the practitioner has won the complete confidence of his patient, and it may be a long process. In the case histories given by the author, he used only psychological analysis. In the chapter entitled, "The World of Dreams," he gives instances in which their interpretation has helped him find the cause of the neurosis and elsewhere he speaks without condemnation of hypnotic sleep when other means have been unsuccessful and the subject willing and apt. When the revelation of the original error of judgment appears totally inadequate to explain the emotive reaction, one must seek the personal coefficient, the particular circumstances in the life of this patient which by association make this particular error of judgment, harmless in itself, the source of such serious disturbances for this patient.

It is not enough to reveal to the neurotic his original error of judgment and tell him that his fears are therefore groundless. These automatisms are part of a vicious circle which will not be destroyed if the therapist limits himself to explaining the unreasonableness of the fixation. A neurosis is a fact, and it is not going to disappear merely by telling the patient that his trouble is the result of an error on the part of others (in neuroses of infantile origin) or of himself (in actual neuroses). In the process of rectification, the psychotherapist must persuade the neurotic to accept his present disturbance as one accepts the fever of an infectious disease. By accepting it he ceases to nourish it. This means that, during the period of rectification, the patient must not pass value judgments (moral?) on his condition, he must not let himself be worked up over it and must even try not to notice it. It is this part of the cure that often involves much suffering, but it is impossible to escape suffering without suffering. His value judgments on his present condition, his preoccupation with and rebellion against it have the same effect on the neurotic as the sound of the bell had on Pavlov's dog with the conditioned reflex. When the neurotic begins to accept the inescapable suffering of his present condition, his cure is begun. This submission demands both a courage and an objective respect for self whose real name is humility.

The case histories, far too few for me although Dr. Stocker says they
should suffice, are interesting in themselves and a confirmation of his principles and methods. It would have been helpful if he had given the amount of time and the number of interviews that elapsed before he uncovered the original trauma; also, the amount of time he had to spend in explaining and continually repeating the original error of judgement in the process of reeducation. If there were failures, we should be told of them with an indication of the reason. Dr. Stocker does say that the possibility of cure rests entirely with the neurotic. The therapist can supply only the indicative; it is the patient alone who can pass to the imperative, and this can involve such suffering that some prefer the pain of the neurosis to the pain of the cure. I would add another element of which Dr. Stocker is not ignorant although he does not explicitly mention it—the grace of God. It is the grace of God that will help the neurotic to “pass to the imperative.” Every confessor has had scrupulous penitents who, after a period of stubbornness, have begun suddenly and with no naturally adequate reason to follow his injunctions. In one case, of which I know, a confessor sent his penitent to a psychiatrist who had no more success with him than the confessor had had. Shortly after finishing with the psychiatrist, he began a novena to the Immaculate Conception in the course of which he announced to his mother that he had been suddenly freed of his anguish and sense of guilt. That was many years ago, and it has not returned. The psychiatrist, as well as the spiritual director of the scrupulous, must not become impatient at his initial lack of success but calmly await the time when the grace of God will change a recalcitrant patient into an active and willing cooperator with his efforts.

I would like to hear the author’s views on the relation between the psychotherapist and the confessor. In a case already mentioned, he claims that faulty direction by the confessor so aggravated a nervous condition that it became a neurosis which demanded his intervention, and no one doubts that this can happen. In another case, there is question of a young girl who committed a serious sin against chastity on a Sunday. On Monday morning she sought her confessor who gave her absolution but his “Go in peace” did not produce that result. On the next three mornings she again sought absolution for the same sin because she was tortured by a sense of guilt and considered herself well on the way to damnation. Finally, the confessor told her that she must seek help elsewhere, and she came to Dr. Stocker who was able to discover the personal coefficient that made her sense of guilt so deep and persistent. Dr. Stocker might be able to help us decide at just what point the ordinary confessor must conclude that he is not dealing with a routine case of scruples but with a type of mental disturbance that demands for its cure more than he can offer. I must mention, in connection with this
particular case, an error of doctrine. When the young lady returned to her confessor seeking absolution for the same sin, he merely tried to quiet her and sent her home because, as the author states, it is impossible to have a new confession and absolution for one and the same sin already judged and absolved. That, of course, cannot be the reason why he dismissed her. Perhaps he had already recognized a scrupulous penitent and would not accept a second accusation for fear of strengthening her sense of guilt.

This book is a good introduction to the whole field of nervous mental diseases but reading it confers no license to practice psychotherapy. The confessor, however, with the background of knowledge he receives from this book, will be more competent to handle the ordinary cases of scruples and will realize that mental disturbances can reach the point where he is incompetent to handle them.

Woodstock College

JOSEPH DUHAMEL, S.J.


These essays were composed in defense of the high Protestant doctrine of the inspiration and inerrancy of Scripture between 1892 and 1915. The Scriptural warrant for the doctrine is developed at great length, as indeed it must be if one maintains that Scripture is to be taken as proof of its own divine origin. Although the intensive research given to the expressions “Scripture,” “Scriptures,” “God-inspired Scripture,” “It says,” “Scripture says,” “the Oracles of God,” etc., find easy expression in a most scholarly exposition, the inevitable ultimate reaction even to this lengthy investigation is the distinct feeling that a more definite and universal foundation for inspiration is still drastically needed.

The book will be more acceptable to Catholic scholars than to the majority of those outside the Church. While carefully avoiding any relationship with Catholic doctrine, it is vigorously opposed to higher criticism. The closing chapter, “Inspiration and Criticism,” is excellent.

Although the section, “The Church Doctrine of Inspiration,” might well be interpreted as a partial equivalent of the Catholic argument from tradition, it is by no means indicative of a favorable attitude on the author’s part toward the Catholic idea of dogma. The very opposite attitude is found even on the last page of the book. “Look but to those who have lost the knowledge of this infallible guide (Scripture): see them evince for themselves an infallible Church or even an infallible Pope” (p. 242).
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In a lengthy Introduction C. Van Til brings the volume into a modern setting by contrasting the basic principles of interpretation expressed in Warfield's idea of an infallible Bible with the principles of interpretation expressed in present-day theology, philosophy, and science. "The issue may be stated simply and comprehensively by saying that in the Christian view of things it is the self-contained God who is the final point of reference while in the case of the modern view it is the would-be self-contained man who is the final point of reference in all interpretation" (p. 18).

This is a point well made. The same cannot be said, however, for the treatment given to Catholic doctrine which also rejects the modern view without at the same time espousing the position of what is called traditional Protestantism. This section of the Introduction is neither adequate nor clear, and the partial conclusion that there is "no fundamental difference between the Roman and modern principle of interpretation" (p. 55) does not even merit a refutation.

Weston College


Bishop Weber gives a long Introduction of some sixty-three pages in which the ordinary questions connected with the Psalms are discussed in a conservative and traditional way, with no new approach suggested. In the main part of his work, he presents the Latin of the new Roman Psalter on the right hand page, and on the left his own French translation based upon the Hebrew. (By the way, it would be well if a name for this new Roman Psalter were agreed upon soon, for, as it is now, one is not always certain whether an author has in mind the new Roman translation or the Roman Psalter of St. Jerome.) Then in small print he offers a defense of his reading from the Hebrew, constantly referring to other proposed readings and to the testimony of the ancient versions. Although praising the new Roman Psalter, he departs from it very often. Finally, he gives a brief commentary on the literal meaning of the text and concludes each psalm with a spiritual, moral, and liturgical application.

The order of the Roman Breviary is followed except in I and II Lauds where the Canticles are placed after the fourth psalm instead of after the third. The other Breviary Canticles (Benedictus, Magnificat and Nunc Dimittis) are placed immediately after Ps. 94, the Invitatorium. A page of
Errata (to which many others could be added) is found at the end of the book.

Now that Bishop Weber has the onerous task of administering the large Diocese of Strasbourg, he will hardly have an opportunity to make a new strictly scientific study of the Psalms. And that is unfortunate, for he evidently prepared this commentary after much study of the Hebrew text and after prolonged consultation of ancient versions. He certainly would be most capable of giving to the Catholic biblical world, which already has many popular commentaries, a work that could rank with the great non-Catholic studies of the Psalms. The bibliography is very short; unfortunately it ignores works in English and it is not completely up-to-date. More attention should have been given to non-biblical poetry, e.g., to the religious hymns of Ras Shamra.

In the second volume under review, the author presents us with another ouvrage de vulgarisation with its origin in his lectures to the students at Issy. First, there is a brief Introduction, then a French translation based upon the Hebrew (for Proverbs and Canticle of Canticles) and Greek (for Wisdom.) In the middle of each page is a series of critical notes referring usually to the Hebrew and less often to the LXX and Vulgate. Finally there is a simple, literal, and edifying commentary. The bibliography is short and is based almost entirely upon continental works.

After a brief but clear description of Old Testament Wisdom and wise men, Bishop Weber divides Proverbs into some eight collections with their individual characteristics. Then the question of authorship and purpose is treated with the same conclusions that are reached in the ordinary Catholic manual. Egyptian sources were freely used but Proverbs is distinctly superior to and far more original than pagan literary works (pp. 18–142). It is not a mystical book but one based upon solid reason and faith. Like the Psalms, Proverbs is a sort of encyclopedia of Israelite life, touching as it does upon the spiritual and material.

Naturally, His Excellency treats the question of Wisdom in Chap. 8 at greater length: there is no direct affirmation of a second divine Person but there is at least a tendency towards such affirmation, which may or may not have developed under Greek philosophical influence. 30:20 is independent of 30:18,19 of which it is a reflexion on the part of a reader or collector. An interesting description of the valiant woman (31:10–31) concludes the commentary on Proverbs. The section on the Book of Wisdom (pp. 197–340) is really an abridgment of the author's same work found in Tome VI (1946) of La Sainte Bible, edited by Pirot-Clamer, where the French translation is identical with that found here.
Wisdom was written in an Alexandrian-Jewish atmosphere, not in Greek verse or ordinary prose but in solemn prose. The date of its origin is between 150 and 50 B.C., more precisely after 88 B.C. The personification of Wisdom is now far more advanced; one is already on the road which leads to the revelation of the dogma of the second divine Person (pp. 208, 209, 263–266). So too, the doctrine of the afterlife is far more clearly taught, even though the sacred author does not speak explicitly of the resurrection of the body. The Messias does not appear; the just man of 2:10–20 only figuratively represents Him.

Several pages (212–216) are devoted to Wisdom and Hellenism and one full page to Wisdom and the New Testament. On pp. 271–272 a defense is made of the sacred author against the charge of unorthodoxy because of 8:19–21. It is interesting to note that Isaias is one of the more frequently cited references in the commentary.

The literary form of the Canticle of Canticles, written sometime in the Persian Period (5th–4th cent.), is not an unrelated collection of Israelite love songs; nor is it a drama, royal or pastoral; rather it is a related collection of spoken love songs. These songs are six in number, divided into two series: 1:2–5:1 and 5:2–8:14. The fifth song (6:10–8:4) presents most clearly the idea of marriage (p. 399). The songs are not of profane love. The allegorical interpretation of Hontheim, Joüon and Ricciotti is hardly provable. The parabolic explanation of Dhorme, Ruffenach, and Buzy has more to be said for it, as has also the typic interpretation of Miller and Pouget-Guitton. In reality, there is hardly any difference between these last two and one may choose either. Many critical notes are given for this Book because of the uncertainty of the text, and among the many difficult verses 6:12 and 7:1 are treated at length.

The entire volume may profitably be brought to the attention of seminarians.

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M. P. Stapleton
assembled, sifted and evaluated by a scholar who in twenty-five years of intense activity has won renown for his studies and publications on the doctrinal and literary history of the twelfth century and the first third of the thirteenth century. His present work will be as indispensable to the student of early Scholasticism as de Ghellinck's *Le Mouvement théologique du XIIe siècle* and *L'Essor de la littérature latine au XIIe siècle*, or Grabmann's *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*.

The author conceives his work as a necessary prelude to a history of theology. Such a history would have to trace the development of theological thought. But what is thought without the men who conceived the thoughts and without the works in which as in a treasury the product of their thinking is stored? The author's aim is to introduce the student to the Scholastic writers and writings of the period extending from 1080 to 1230. The *Einführung* is made up of three sections; the first section presents a survey of the development of early Scholasticism, its notion, formation of schools, problems, laws, and characteristics (pp. 9–33); the second section lists and describes the various classes of literature (pp. 34–50); the third section, which comprises two-thirds of the book (pp. 51–137), classifies the writers of the period according to schools; after each founder and his disciples is marshaled a fairly exhaustive array of bibliographical and manuscript data.

Scholasticism, as the author shows, meant as early as the ninth century the application of dialectics to the solution of theological problems. Theological questions are treated scholastically, according to contemporary testimony, when they are discussed philosophically, i.e., dialectically. Early Scholasticism begins at the end of the eleventh century with Anselm of Canterbury, who is commonly hailed as its father, and extends to the third decade of the thirteenth century. Theological stagnation had set in after St. Augustine with the result that for four hundred years little or no progress in knowledge was registered. Men repeated in stereotyped phrases what St. Augustine and one or other Father had handed down. Early Scholasticism presents a picture of re-awakened activity which advanced theological knowledge from primitive beginnings to the grand syntheses of the Golden Age. Interesting are the characteristics by which the author finds this period marked off from previous times.

Chief among the characteristics is the recognition of the authority of *Magistri* besides that of the Fathers. Far from abandoning the treasure left by the Fathers these masters dug deep into the patristic veins open to them, sank new shafts of knowledge and brought to light new aspects of old problems. Under the influence of the *Magistri* schools were formed which kept alive, spread and developed their teaching. A school in this period does not
necessarily mean a community of kindred spirits formed by a master's oral instruction. The common element, which supplied the indispensable bond of union, was in some cases the subject matter; in others, similarity or harmony of ideas despite diversity of works; in others again, the repeated use and development of the same source. Closely linked with the growth of the schools is the development of doctrine, for theology advanced with the effort of the schools to propagate their ideas.

Real advance in knowledge was accepted without regard to the person who made the contribution. Abelard and Gilbert de la Porrée, though censured by ecclesiastical authority, influenced by their teachings the development of the doctrine on grace and the virtues.

The use of the sources of revelation in early Scholasticism would fall short of modern scientific demands. Since interest was centered mainly on dogmatic questions, the need was not felt of determining critically and exegetically the sense of a Scriptural text. Texts were taken in their obvious traditional sense and were used not so much to prove a doctrine as to illustrate a dogmatic truth or to embellish a theological teaching. Patristic "sentences" were understood in their obvious literal sense without regard to their connections. In most cases the context was unknown. The texts were cited because behind them stood the authority of a Father. Little did the Scholastics realize, however, that the Father cited could have meant something quite different from what the Scholastics read into him. Often, too, unauthentic documents were quoted, which on account of their supposed patristic authority bore weight. An instance is the work *De vera et falsa poenitentia*, ascribed to St. Augustine, which influenced the development of the doctrine on penance.

The early Scholastics possessed but a meagre collection of classical patristic "sentences" to work with. The vast arsenal of patristic thought was in large part closed and unknown to them. Neither did they have available all of the pronouncements of the magisterium, especially on subjects that were no longer to the fore, with the result that controversies broke out anew on questions that had been settled long before by ecclesiastical authority. This was the case in Christology. Discussion arose in the twelfth century about the adopted sonship of Christ, though the Council of Frankfurt, ratified by Hadrian I, had condemned the doctrine. No traces are found in the Christological debates of the twelfth century of the eighth anathematism of Cyril of Alexandria, which contains clarifications on the adoration due to the sacred humanity of Christ.

Ignorance of metaphysical knowledge made itself felt especially in questions on the attributes of God and the Trinity. Only deficient metaphysics can explain the obscurities out of which arose Nihilism, Adoptianism and
Dualism. The neat distinction between potency and act and the difference between the infused virtues and sanctifying grace were as yet unknown. Rudimentary in particular was the knowledge of grace. Explanations of *gratia iustificans* were to a large extent influenced by the current teaching on sin. As sin was considered primarily from the physical point of view as a disturbance of intellect and will, so justification meant the restoration of the right intellectual and volitional order through the virtues of faith and charity.

Noteworthy are the author’s descriptions of some of the forms of early Scholastic literature. The collections of “sentences” went through an interesting evolution. First, a tendency manifested itself in the middle of the ninth century to epitomize theological lore in collections of “sentences” culled from patristic literature. Next came collections in which “sentences” both from the Fathers and from the *magistri* stand side by side. Lastly patristic “sentences” yielded almost entirely to the preoccupying interest in the master’s teaching.

The *lectio* and the *quaestio* were companion forms of school instruction. The *lectio* was a commentary on Scripture based on patristic interpretation. The *quaestio* was, as early as the ninth century, a form of disputation in which the pros and cons of a problem, which often arose on the occasion of a *lectio*, were presented and followed by a solution of the seeming contradiction. Genuine fully developed *quaestiones* appeared first in the circle of Odo of Ourscamp and reached their perfection in Simon of Tournai. With the beginning of the twelfth century appear the *Summae*, systematic elaborations and abridgments of the whole of current theology. The most prominent of these are the *Summa de sacramentis christianae fidei* of Hugo of St. Victor, the *Summa sententiarum* of Odo of Lucca and the *Summa aurea* of William of Auxerre. Obscurity still veils the genesis of these *Summae*. Some of them at least are in part redactions of the writer’s *Quaestiones*. Digests which have become the vogue in our own day find their counterpart in the *Abbreviationes* which were abridgments of the Sentences of Peter Lombard.

Students of early Scholasticism will welcome in a subsequent edition any supplements that may be inspired by the literature which was not available to the author during and after the war. The reference to the Fifth Council of Constantinople which pronounced on the cult due to the human nature of Christ (p. 31) needs clarification.

The author was consecrated Auxiliary Bishop of Bamberg in Germany in the year 1943. His elevation to the episcopal office was a fitting tribute to his scholarly merits and outstanding service to the Church. *Ad multos annos.*

*Clement J. Fuerst, S.J.*
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