BOOK REVIEWS


Perhaps no volume of Ceuppens’ invaluable series on biblical theology has fulfilled its purpose more completely than the first edition of the present work on selected dogmatic questions contained in the first eleven chapters of Genesis. Intended for professors and serious students of theology, who from the very nature of things could not comb primary sources, it offered a secure path through the labyrinth of conflicting historical and textual criticism which envelops the entire Pentateuchal question. On the one hand it unveiled the shallow superficiality of formalistic and pietistic theology which is so blinded by the pseudo-splendor of ungrounded theory that it can stubbornly maintain the irrelevance of hard and undeniable facts; on the other hand, it provided objective theologians with at least probable and well founded solutions in full accord both with the latest findings of biblical science and with the teaching of the Church.

A select bibliography, divided into the following classifications: “A. Commentarii in Genesim; B. Studia specialia in Historiam Primaevam; C. Studia specialia in tria priora capita Geneseos; D. Studia specialia in Genesim 1, 1—2, 4a; Studia specialia in Genesim, 2, 4a—3, 24; E. Studia specialia in Genesim 6, 1—9, 17; F. Studia specialia in Genesim, 11, 1—9,” (pp. xi—xviii), covers all the important literature since the first edition in 1934.

Among the dogmatic questions treated, the evolution of man, the descent of all living men from Adam and Eve, and the Marian implications of Genesis 3:15 are most vital in current theological discussion. Although adamantly opposed to any theory of evolution which denies the direct intervention of God in the creation of the human soul, Ceuppens maintains that nothing for or against the simple origin of Adam’s body from an animal can be legitimately concluded from Genesis 2:7; this is an anthropological, and not an exegetical question (p. 171).

In the past fifteen years there has been a growing inclination among some French Catholic scholars toward polygenism and toward attempts at reconciling this scientific hypothesis with Genesis. Examples of this trend may be found in A. and J. Bouyssonie, Polygénisme, DTC, XII, 2536 (1936); J. Guitton, La pensée moderne et le catholicisme (1936), p. 39; R. Boigelot, L’origine de l’homme (1938), pp. 35, 38; H. Rondet, S. J. “Les origines humaines et la théologie,” Cité Nouvelle (10 Juin, 1943), p. 984; A. M. Dubarle, Les Sages d’Israel (1946), p. 21 f.; D. Dubarle, “Sciences de la vie et dogme chrétien,” Vie Intellectuelle, XV (1947), 6–24. Ceuppens does not think that
the scientific hypothesis of polygenism can be reconciled with Genesis. However he disagrees with Zalpletal, B. Jacob, and A. Vaccari, who deduce from Genesis 1:28 ("Masculum et feminam creavit eos") that in the beginning God created a single pair from whom all men have descended. With F. Hummelauer, M. J. Lagrange, and A. Loisy, he holds that the unity of the human race was undoubtedly in the mind of the author, but was not explicitly expressed in this verse (p. 38). Furthermore, his rejection of polygenism is not founded on any open and explicit affirmation of the unity of the human race, but rather on the tenor of the narration from Genesis 2:4—3:24, and especially on Genesis 3:20, in which the woman is named Eve, "eo quod esset mater cunctorum viventium" (p. 125). For this reason, his final conclusion on the unity of the human race is stated with great moderation: "S. Scriptura tenere videtur, uti pluries supra iam ostendimus, generis humani unitatem, Gen. 3, 20, ... ratione cuius admittendum est omnes homines via generationis a duobus parentibus, Adam et Eva, originem ducere...." (p. 167); "Omnes homines ergo, secundum assertionem S. Scripturae non a collectivitate quadem, sed a duobus protoparentibus, via generationis procedere videntur...." (p. 168). Obviously, Ceuppens is dealing with the question only as it occurs in Genesis, and with the scientific exegesis of the pertinent passages; he is not concerned with the broader and much more fundamental question whether polygenism could ever be reconciled with the dogma of original sin and with other truths derived from the analogy of faith, without which the dogma itself could neither be reasonably defended nor explained.

In the comparatively short time since the publication of this second edition, Ceuppens' comments on Genesis 3:15 have caused lively, and at times sharp controversy. He lists four opinions current among Catholic theologians (p. 100):

a. Mulier Geneseos 3, 15 non est Eva, sed Maria et Maria tantum, in sensu stricte litterali.

b. Mulier Geneseos 3, 15 est Eva secundum sensum litteralem, secundum sensum litteralem plenum et perfectum est Maria.

c. Mulier Geneseos 3, 15 est Eva in sensu litterali, Maria in sensu typico.

d. Mulier Geneseos 3, 15 est Eva et Eva tantum in sensu litterali; utrum sit Maria, saltem in sensu typico, non probatur."

After an objective analysis of each opinion and of its foundations, Ceuppens concludes in favor of the fourth: "Unde credimus nullum argumentum peremptorium adesse quod probaret prophetiam Geneseos 3, 15 intendisse B. Mariam sive in sensu stricte litterali sive in sensu typico" (p. 208). Formerly (De Prolo-Evangelio, Romae, 1932, p. 47) Ceuppens held the third
opinion as being more conformed to the rules of hermeneutics. The influences
which caused him to change are derived from two sources: L. Drewniak,
_Die mariologische Deutung von Gen. 3, 15 in der Väterzeit_ (Breslau 1934), and
H. Lennerz, “Duae quaedestiones de Bulla _Ineffabilis Deus_,” _Gregorianum_,
XXIV (1943), 356 ff., and “Consensus Patrum in interpretatione Mariologica
Gen. 3:15?” _Gregorianum_, XXVII (1946), 300 ff. It is unlikely that any
Catholic exegete of our day would maintain that a strictly scientific exegesis
of Genesis 3:15 alone, without any appeal to tradition, yields a certain proof
that the woman of the text is Mary in some genuine sense of Scripture.
As a matter of fact, it seems beyond dispute that, until the studies of
Drewniak and Lennerz were published, both Catholic exegesists and dogmatic
theologians felt that they were constrained to explain the text Mariologically
as a genuine sense of Sacred Scripture, because Pius IX in the bull _Ineffabilis
Deus_ taught authoritatively that there exists a _consensus Patrum_ for the
Marian interpretation. In this presupposition there are really two distinct
questions: Did Pius IX teach that there is a _consensus Patrum_? And is there
really a _consensus Patrum_ in the strict dogmatic sense? In his first article,
Lennerz dealt with the first question, and to my mind proved that Pius IX
did not teach that there is a _consensus Patrum_. In the following year, G. M.
Roschini, O.S.M., attacked Lennerz (“Sull’ interpretazione patristica del
Protovangelo,” _Marianum_, VII [1944], 76–96) and tried to impugn his
scholarship on the ground that he had utilized Drewniak’s book, which
Roschini branded as “unworthy of scientific consideration,” “substantially
vitiated,” and “conferring no honor on the university which approved it.”
In his second article, Lennerz in a sober and thoroughly scholarly reply to
Roschini, confirmed the conclusion of his first article, and went on to show
that _de facto_ there is no _consensus Patrum_, since nine Fathers who were
Doctors of the Church never proposed the Marian interpretation of Genesis
3:15. He destroyed Roschini’s affirmation of a true dogmatic _consensus_ very
acutely, by starting with the latter’s admission that the nine Doctors of
the Church did not teach the Marian interpretation. If despite this ad-
mission, there were still a _consensus Patrum_ in the strict dogmatic sense,
as Roschini maintains, the Marian interpretation would pertain to divine
faith; it must have been revealed to the Apostles and handed down to the
Church; if it were handed down in such a way that the required conditions
for a strict _consensus Patrum_ exist, then the nine Doctors of the Church
could not have been unaware of this supposed fact; on the supposition that
they knew the fact, it is totally incredible that they should not have taught
what they would have known to be the revealed meaning of Genesis 3:15.
The conclusion is therefore inevitable that these nine Fathers and Doctors of
the Church did not acknowledge the Marian interpretation as obligatory from divine faith, and that eo ipso there exists no consensus Patrum concerning this text.


This controversy is important for its signaling of two conflicting fundamental outlooks and methodological approaches to Mariology, and is particularly timely in view of the proposed dogmatic definition of Our Lady's Assumption as a revealed truth. The number of Catholic theologians, who would now deny that the Assumption is a revealed truth is rapidly approaching zero. Their certitude, however, is derived for the most part from solid dogmatic bases manifested by the teaching of the magisterium in the modern era, and by the corresponding consent of the faithful. The very lack of a compelling chain of historical fact reaching back to apostolic tradition is the reason why an overwhelming majority of theologians maintain that this truth was not revealed explicitly, but is rather contained implicitly in other revealed privileges of the Blessed Virgin.

Therefore, it seems that the attitude of Ceuppens and Lennerz toward the Marian interpretation of Genesis 3:15 is much more sound than the view of those who think they have succeeded in deriving a peremptory proof from this source. On purely exegetical grounds, such a proof is out of the question; it must then be derived from the dogmatic authority of patristic testimony or from an authoritative statement of the Holy See. It is difficult to see how one can any longer maintain that Pius IX taught authoritatively that there is a true dogmatic consensus Patrum. As to the testimony of the Fathers themselves, the following statement of Pius XII should moderate extravagant claims of a consensus Patrum: "Illud enim imprimis ante oculos habent exegetae catholici in normis ac legibus ab ecclesia datis, de fidei morumque doctrina agi: atque inter multa illa, quae in Sacris Libris legalibus, historicis, sapientialibus et propheticis proponuntur, paucus tantum esse, quorum sensus ab Ecclesiae auctoritate declaratus sit, neque plura esse de quibus unanimis Sanctorum Patrum sit sententia (Divino aßante Spiritu, AAS, XXXV [1943], 319).
Furthermore, Pope Leo XIII taught that a true dogmatic consent of the Fathers cannot only be maintained, "quotiescumque testimonium aliquid biblicum, ut ad fidei morumque pertinens doctrinam, uno eodemque modo explicant omnes: nam ex ipsa eorum consensione, ita ab Apostolis secundum catholicam fidem traditum esse nitide eminet" (Providentissimus Deus, DB, 1942). Consequently, in the present state of our theological and exegetical knowledge, Genesis 3:15 should not be proposed by scientific theologians as a certain and solidly established foundation for proving the Assumption: "Et hoc utile est, ut consideretur, ne forte aliquis, quod fidei est demonstrare praesumens, rationes non necessarias inducat, quae praebant materiam irridendi infidelibus existimantibus nos propter huiusmodi rationes credere quae fidei sunt" (Sum. Theol., I, q. 46, a. 2).

Ceuppens' conclusions on Genesis 3:15, far from deserving sharp criticism, merit the praise of Catholic exegetes and dogmatic theologians. His treatment is a noteworthy example of the need of greater cooperation between these two branches of theology. In view of Pius XII's insistence that progress in theology should not be hampered by artificial or arbitrary restrictions, Catholic exegetes should not be coerced into interpretations of Scripture based, not on the authoritative teaching of the Church, but on the insufficiently documented and forcefully expressed pronouncements of dogmatic manuals. In my opinion, Ceuppens has shown that, concerning the interpretation of Genesis 3:15, the liberty of Catholic exegetes has been unjustifiably restricted.

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PHILIP J. DONELLY, S. J.

KATHOLISCHE MARIENKUNDE. VOL. I: MARIA IN DER OFFENBARUNG

Catholics who read Italian can deepen their knowledge of Mariology in Cecchelli's Mater Christi, the first of whose three volumes has now appeared in print. Those who read German now also have the first of a three-volume set planned to provide all those interested in Marian theology with an authoritative and comprehensive study of Mary's place in Catholic life down the centuries. It will set the present work in its position to state that this first volume merely provides the sources, the second will present the systematic study of Marian theology, and the third will treat applications of Marian piety to Catholic living. Whereas in the Italian work just mentioned the whole is from the pen of one individual, the German work is a symposium, each chapter being by a scholar known for previous work in the field. Names like Bea, Böninghaus, Engberding, Merk, Müller, Oppenheim, Ortiz de
Urbina, Rahner, and Strätter give evidence of the pains taken to make this work the finest garland current scholarship could contrive.

This first volume has even now a bit of history attaching to it: its Foreword is dated Feb. 2, 1941; a post-script, under date of May 1, 1946, stated that the type for Volumes I and II was destroyed by bombs, and had to be completely reset, and that, in the meantime, two of the collaborators, the Jesuits Böminghaus and Merk, had been called to a better life.

The general editor of the work is Paul Strätter, S.J., the spiritual director of the Collegio Germanico. To him fell also the task of preparing the opening essay on revelation and history (pp. 12-23). The absolutely unique nature of the Incarnation as fact and factor in human history has had continuously its multiple Marian associations in the economy of redemption and in the unfolding of ecclesiastical history.

It is from the advantageous position of a student of Holy Writ in this twentieth century after Christ that Augustin Bea, S.J., Rector of the Biblical Institute, gives us the first of these source-collections, Mary in the Old Testament (pp. 22-43). Four lines of thought are followed: what prophets foretold, what divine wisdom planned, the concept of a “bride” for God, and Mary’s Jewish prototypes and figures.

The corresponding New Testament portrait (pp. 44-84) is the work of the late Augustin Merk, S.J., whose great scholarship was never put to finer purpose. Unfortunately the copy of the book I used was defective in that pages 68-80 were missing, and so I missed a considerable part of this chapter; the excellence of the parts read made me regret this omission.

“Mary and the Eastern Fathers” (pp. 85-118), by Ortiz de Urbina, S.J., was for me one of the most thrilling of the entire work. In reading it I regretted that it was separated by a long intervening treatment of the Eastern liturgies from the corresponding survey of the Western Fathers (pp. 137-82), here done by Hugo Rahner. Perhaps these two chapters on the Fathers are the finest in the volume in reflecting the place of Marian doctrine and the function of Marian devotion in a balanced Catholic life. In tracing the Western tradition Rahner sets the local Roman documents in a separate category, where they can be read in isolation. The inevitability of the Nestorian upheaval is masterfully disclosed, when one sees that Rome, Alexandria, Africa, Milan, Gaul, and Spain were all teaching Mary’s divine motherhood, while Antioch was avoiding the term and the fact.

After those dramatic chapters on the Fathers the present reader confesses to a certain let-down on reading those on the Eastern and the Latin liturgy (pp. 119-136, and 183-267). Both of these are carefully done, by competent Benedictine scholars, Engberding and Oppenheim respectively.
at a loss to understand my own more Platonic reaction to them; I guess it is largely the absence of controversy that made these surveys somewhat less engaging. The study of the Latin liturgy is the longest chapter in the whole volume, and at that it has recourse to small type and packed pages.

There is multiple propriety in the fact that it fell to a Franciscan, Marianus Müller, O.F.M., to treat of Mary in medieval theology (pp. 268-316). This section is intended to provide merely an outline sketch as the whole second volume of the work handles the systematic theology. Here we walk with Anselm and with Bernard (whom the author styles “Chorista Mariae”), with Albert the Great and Thomas the Greater (so to speak), with Bernardino, Bonaventure and Duns Scotus.

In the book’s concluding section, Mary in the post-Tridentine period (pp. 317–75), Böminghaus asks if devotion to Mary thrives only when general Catholic life flourishes, and languishes as this languishes. Without committing himself to a universal statement, he makes it abundantly clear that the late seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries saw a catastrophic collapse of Marian devotion, during that age of the “pale Calvinists,” the Jansenists. If Arnault’s book On Frequent Communion (1643) can be regarded as the fountainhead of this insidious poison, it had its anti-Marian counterpart in the work of a Cologne lawyer, Monita salutaria B. Mariae V. ad cultores suos indiscretos (1673), which went a long way towards stifling much Marian piety in current Catholic circles. It was not until St. Alphonsus’ great Glories of Mary (1750) that the damage done was rectified.

The nineteenth century saw that great revival of Marian study and piety, climaxing in the definition of 1854, and its subsequent corollaries at Lourdes and elsewhere. “All generations shall call me blessed.” This book makes clear in what multiple fashion these twenty centuries have called her blessed, for all the wonders God hath wrought for her, and, through her, for us all.

Saint Mary’s College · GERALD ELLARD, S.J.


In 1946 there was instituted at Rome a commission to take charge of all future Franciscan studies on our Lady. To this end it directs various Marian congresses and supervises the publication of studies given in such congresses. The theme of this first volume is the Assumption of Mary.

The twenty-three studies cover the testimony of the Fathers and the Apocrypha on the Assumption, of the eastern and western liturgies (with more than fifty pages given to the Franciscan cult of the Assumption in
Italy), of art and medieval literature. This is but part of the matter contained in the first section, which is historical and positive. The second, on exegetical and speculative matter, covers Holy Scripture, the dogmatic value of the Assumption liturgy, the belief of the Church, and the Assumption with reference to the notion of the "virtually revealed."

From among this wealth of research and thought these are a few of the conclusions worth noting. Samuele Olivieri, O.F.M., "Nozione teologica di assunzione," draws on the analogy between the Ascension and the Assumption to begin these studies with this definition: The Assumption of Mary is the taking up into heaven of her glorified body at the end of her life on earth, and her actual presence among the blessed; the death and resurrection of Mary are not essential to the mystery of the Assumption, but they are clearly implied, as the Ascension clearly implies, and in fact is consequent on, our Lord's death and resurrection.

Anacleto Mosconi and Donato Baldi, both O.F.M., "L'assunzione di Maria SS. negli apocrifi," find in them a convincing proof that the tradition which tells us of the Assumption is of great antiquity. There is in these documents a concordia discors: despite their variations, errors and contradictions, they reflect the tradition that Mary died at Jerusalem, was buried in Gethsemane and was assumed into heaven.

Celestino Piana, O.F.M., "La morte e l'assunzione della B. V. nella letteratura medioevale," shows that at least by the end of the thirteenth century belief in the Assumption was all but universal, and that this belief was so certain that no theologian who opposed the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception dared take what seems to us an obvious line of reasoning: that the Assumption, since it is a privilege concerning Mary's sinlessness, is doubtful just as the Immaculate Conception is doubtful.

Gabriele Giamberardini, O.F.M., "Il valore dommatico della liturgia assunzionistica," draws from his examination the conclusion that the liturgy is truly universal, that it has a precise object, and that it connects its object with truths that are dogmas of our faith; because these conditions are verified, it is right to regard the Assumption liturgy as part of the Church's ordinary and universal teaching of what is divinely revealed.

A study more within my competence is that of Egidio Magrini, O.F.M., "La morte e l'assunzione della B. V. Maria nella luce del virtuale rivelato." Fr. Magrini first undertakes to show that a truth which we call virtually revealed was looked on as definable of divine faith by the great Scholastics, in particular by St. Thomas and Scotus. It was only at the end of the sixteenth century that the schism in theological thought occurred on this point; and this schism is the work of Molina. All along the Franciscan school
generally had taught that one who saw the evident and necessary connection in the reasoning process leading from a revealed doctrine to a theological conclusion could assent to the conclusion with divine faith even before the Church's definition. The Thomists generally said that the assent of divine faith could be given only after the definition. It was this Thomist position which Molina attacked by saying that the Church can say whether or not a truth has been revealed, but if the truth has not been revealed she never can make it so; and therefore if an assent of divine faith is impossible before the definition, it is equally impossible after. Fr. Magrini calls this new position a genuine revolution, because its conclusion is that the Church cannot define a theological conclusion as of divine faith and never has so defined one, a position which he regards as a complete break with tradition. He undertakes to invalidate both the Thomist and Molina's stand by proving that the virtually revealed is the work of God from the beginning and can be believed as such. By corollary it can also be so defined.

Transmitting the accuracy of this historical analysis, I wish to confine my remarks to what is said on the speculative problem, whether the virtually revealed is the word of God and whether we can believe it by divine faith regardless of the existence or non-existence of a definition. Fr. Magrini argues that the virtually revealed is the word of God when it is deduced from a revealed major through a non-revealed minor, if the minor is either a metaphysical truth or a physical or moral truth which is known to suffer no exception in this case; for in such reasoning we arrive at a conclusion which is really contained in the major and so is really revealed when the major is revealed.

I find no difficulty in agreeing with this theoretical analysis, but its value is doubtful until it is applied, which Fr. Magrini fails to do clearly. It is true that he gives several examples where the analysis might apply; but I mean a detailed syllogistic argument with *alqui's* and *ergo's*, showing concretely just how he intends to use his principles. Thus, it seems to me, is the validity of the analysis tested, and thus we should discover whether the agreement in theory is real or only apparent.

For instance, I take the following from Galtier's *De Incarnatione et Redemtione* (editio nova, Paris, 1947, p. 255): "Christus, ex ipsa sua constitutione, erat caput angelorum, ita ut ab initio illum adorarent illique servirent. Jamvero dedeceret Dominum angelorum illis esse in cognoscendo Deo ullatenus inferiorem." If this argumentation is drawn out I think it should run thus: Christ is by nature Head of the angels; but it is unbecoming that the Head should be inferior to His subjects in their knowledge of God; but, again, the angels have the beatific vision; therefore so has their Head.
I accept this argument as valid and regard it as being drawn from the revealed fact that Christ is the Head of all creation. In it we apparently have the deduction of a conclusion from a revealed major. But is this really so? If the syllogism is put into strict form, then should not the general truth have the place of the major? And is not the first minor the true general principle which can contain other truths virtually? For true deduction must we not say: The head (as yet in lower case) ought not be inferior to his subjects; but Christ is the Head; therefore He is not inferior. In this line-up it is the minor that is revealed, not the major; and this seems to me to throw doubt on whether the conclusion is virtually revealed or not. I think similar inversions of majors and minors can be found frequently in our proofs from theological reasoning, and although such inversion does not throw doubt on the truth of the conclusion, it certainly makes one doubtful whether we have a conclusio theologica as it is commonly defined. This is one of the reasons why I look for examples when discussing the dogmatic value of the virtually revealed.

There are two other difficulties, theoretical ones, which Fr. Magrini takes up under the heading of the assent given to a theological conclusion. The first is that, if the premises have motives of different values (extrinsic or intrinsic evidence, metaphysical, physical or moral evidence), the motive for the conclusion is mixed; or at least the motive is not uniquely the authority of God revealing, which is the only motive for an act of divine faith. The response is that the internal necessity of the reasoning process forces us to give to the conclusion the same assent we gave to the principal premise (I suppose major is meant). Assuming that we do have a revealed major, and not a revealed proposition put in the first place, then here again some examples would be of great help. On seeing examples we begin to say: “What you call virtual, I call implicit,” and the like. It is not clear that the internal necessity of assenting to the conclusion of a deductive syllogism is as strong as that of assenting to the conclusion of an expository syllogism; that we must assent to the virtually revealed just as we assent to the implicitly. But Fr. Magrini seems to imply that it is so. In fact, he seems to deny the distinction between virtual and implicit.

The second difficulty is that when you are engaged in a reasoning process the conclusion has the value of the weaker premise, and in this case the weaker is the one drawn from natural knowledge. In his answer Fr. Magrini distinguishes between the certitude of adhesion and of evidence. The natural truth is weaker in certitude of adhesion, not of evidence; the revealed in certitude of evidence, not of adhesion. In discussing the value of a syllogism the certitude of evidence is in question, not that of adhesion. Therefore
according to the dictum that the conclusion follows the weaker premise, a theological conclusion follows the premise weaker in certitude of evidence, which is the revealed premise, and so the assent to the conclusion is of divine faith. For the third time, I should like to see this put into practice before I agree that the assent is of divine faith. But leaving the matter on the theoretical plane, I think the answer disposes of this particular difficulty once for all. Following the rules of logic, which govern the validity of a syllogism and from which the difficulty is drawn, and according to which the answer must be taken, the premise that rests on authority is the weaker premise, and the conclusion cannot go beyond it.

The third part of the article is an application of the theory to the Assumption. From what has gone before one is led to expect a strict syllogistic process showing that the Assumption is only virtually revealed and a defense that it can be thus defined as of divine faith. This hope is disappointed and one is left at the end somewhat unsatisfied.

It seems that in this and similar questions the best way to learn the truth is to look at the practice of the Church, and if one wishes to prove conclusively that the virtually revealed is of divine faith, to show that such a truth has been proposed "ab ecclesia sive soleni iudicio sive ordinario et universalii magisterio tanquam divinitus revelata."

As for the whole book, a glance will show that it is very useful for professors of dogma; a digest of the collection would make a solid proof for a dogmatic thesis. A practical recommendation is that in future collections the theme of the studies be named in the title.

Woodstock College

JOHN MANNING FRAUNCES, S.J.


Dr. Feckes, at once a noted ecclesiologist and a firsthand witness of the modern phase of what he calls the "Wandel des Kirchenbildes und Kirchenerlebnisses," was well qualified to offer a useful commentary on the recent encyclical Mystici Corporis. There has been in the past few decades all too real a danger of a reaction against a reaction within Catholic ecclesiology that would have been in its way as unilateral as the original reaction. The tedious catch words and false antitheses, often couched in spirited rhetoric, of this reaction against a reaction are well known. Dr. Feckes, with a sobriety and a pertinency not always met with, shows wherein the Pope has in the exercise of his pastoral office clearly marked out current aberrations and given authentic directives for fruitful Christian thinking and living. Encyc-
licals are at once a stopping and a starting point in the doctrinal life of the Church, and the author has happily focussed his commentary with both perspectives in mind. He emphasizes the following points of the encyclical:

- the complete identity of the Roman Catholic Church and the Mystical Body of Christ;
- the clear-cut criteria of membership in the Church;
- the primary role of the Holy Spirit in the life of the Church; Christ the Redeemer as the exemplar of His Church;
- the redemptive function of the Church;
- the rejection of all Panchristism;
- the important place of the juridic and social aspects of the Church;
- the profound significance of the Papacy; the fact that no one may rightly take scandal at the presence of sinners in Christ’s Church.

Nor does Dr. Feckes neglect to consider, in the light of the present encyclical, the alleged somatic presence of Christ in His members. There will be less readiness to accept some of Dr. Feckes’ interpretations. He holds that the Pope, in that section of the encyclical which deals with real membership, has reference only to formal heretics and schismatics; and secondly, that the encyclical makes at least an implicit use of the body-soul membership metaphor. In neither case is the argument convincing. Besides the commentary itself, the book contains the German version of the encyclical, a short bibliography and an index. It is a most useful and solid contribution to the subject, which will profit any theologian or student of theology.

Weston College

Francis X. Lawlor, S.J.


Fr. Ternus’ work is in some ways a welcome reaction against the extreme evolutionary views of certain Catholic circles in Europe; but he goes too far perhaps in the direction of conservatism. He discusses evolution and in particular the evolution of man from the viewpoint of science, philosophy and theology. He is not always entirely explicit, but he seems to consider the evolution of man as philosophically untenable. Theologically also he is against it. As for the scientific aspect of the problem, our so-called theistic evolutionists will criticize him as being entirely too summary in his treatment. Such criticism would seem to be justifiable. Fr. Ternus cannot be said to present with adequate completeness the graded line of fossil men which a number of moderate theologians consider to be a probable argument for allowing some modified form of evolutionary hypothesis in explaining the origin of Adam’s body.

We do not wish to imply that the author’s criticisms of the doctrine of descent, as he calls it, are not in the main valid. On the contrary, he justly points out the dogmatic bias so often found in the expositions of the theory
and manifested particularly in the terminology generally accepted among paleontologists. Furthermore, he rightly uncovers the lack of logic so frequently exhibited by defenders of evolution, especially in the serological, embryological, and paleontological arguments. But here also he is perhaps too conservative and fails to allow probability where it might justly be allowed.

From the very title, one would expect an exposition of the various opinions put forward in recent years by reputable Catholic philosophers and theologians. The author offers no such discussion; but he deserves great credit for defending the right of the theologian to speak on the question of evolution. The problem of the origin of man is not the restricted preserve of the scientist.

Fr. Ternus would perhaps have more effectively attained the end he intended if he had shown how, from the philosophical standpoint, some sort of instrumental causality of the generative process of a higher ape has been proposed by reputable Catholic scholars. Some such theory would, it is contended, save the principality of divine causal intervention in the production of the body of the first man. There is an extensive literature discussing such opinions; some account of it would have been very much apropos.

From a strictly theological aspect, it would also have been well to bring out the considerable differences among Catholic exegetes concerning the interpretation of Genesis in that which has to do with the formation of Adam and Eve. Fr. Ternus should have admitted that there are Catholic theologians who do not agree with him in excluding all forms of a moderate theory of transformism. The fact is that not a few, with entire submission to the supreme authority of the Church, would allow an opinion which holds a certain instrumentality of the brute animal in the production of Adam's body, provided a special intervention of Almighty God in that production be safeguarded.

Fr. Ternus cites in support of his theological position a passage from the address of Pius XII to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences on November 30th, 1941. This statement of the Holy Father is perhaps too little known and deserves to be quoted: "From man alone could come another man who would call him father and progenitor. And the helper given by God to the first man comes also from him. She is flesh of his flesh, made to be his companion, and her name is derived from the man, for it is from him that she was taken. At the summit of the scale of living beings, man endowed with a spiritual soul was placed by God as the prince and ruler of the animal kingdom. The numerous researches of paleontology, biology and morphology on other
problems concerning the origin of man have as yet contributed nothing that is positively clear and certain. It only remains then to leave to the future the reply to the question, whether science, illuminated and guided by revelation, will be able some day to give results that are sure and definite regarding such an important problem."

These words of the Sovereign Pontiff might seem at first sight to exclude all physical connection of the first man with the brute creation. Still if they are studied closely such an exclusion is not evident. As a matter of fact, there are Catholic scholars in Rome itself who have failed to find in the Pope’s words an argument against a moderate theory attributing an animal origin to the human body.

St. Mary of the Lake Seminary

Thomas J. Motherway, S.J.


This book has the stimulating qualities which we have learned to expect in the work of Père Daniélou. As a study of Origen's work as a whole, it deserves to become standard. While Daniélou is indebted to his predecessors, especially De Faye, Koch, and Cadiou, he has, nevertheless, worked out his own picture of Origen and his achievements. His judgment on Origen's work is moderate, between the harshness of Cadiou and the somewhat over-enthusiastic apology of De Lubac in the Sources chrétiennes.

The book has three major divisions: Origen and his times; Origen and the Bible; Origen's speculative system. Daniélou offers nothing new on the life of Origen; but much of what he has to say on the times is original and interesting. Here he lays down the principle that the most remarkable part of Origen's work is his mysticism. He insists that Origen was, first and foremost, a "vir ecclesiae"—a view which most writers have not taken. But Origen's position as "churchman" must be understood according to the ideas of his times. The second and third centuries were the period of gnosticism. The charisma of the doctor and the charisma of the hierarchy were as yet imperfectly united; the teaching office of the bishops had not yet been fully vindicated. For Origen, the charisma of the doctor was the highest of gifts; for sanctity came from that spiritualizing process which was called gnosticism. Hence Origen fails to perceive the true significance of the sacramental economy; and the same spiritualizing tendency prevented him from understanding the social character of Christian life.

Daniélou points out that the philosophical background of Origen has been very thoroughly studied in recent times. But the problem of identifying
the form of Platonism which most influenced Origen has not yet been perfectly solved. Daniélou, after a review of the work of other writers, rejects the thesis of Cadiou that Origen was a Neo-Platonist; but it seems to this reviewer that he has failed to meet the objections of Cadiou against the distinct identity of “Origen the pagan.” Daniélou himself thinks that it was the Platonism of Albinus, a commentator of the second century, which most affected Origen.

Origen’s work on the Bible is called by Daniélou the heart of his work. It is the Bible, rather than Neo-Platonism, which is the key to his thought; and it is from the Bible that he derives the mysticism which is his greatest achievement. Daniélou observes that this part of Origen’s work has been very slightly treated; and he blames De Faye, Koch, and Cadiou for concentrating exclusively on Origen’s speculative system. The criticism is just. But Daniélou’s treatment of Origen’s exegesis is disappointing. He has based it upon the fourth book of the Periarchon; but one would wish to see a more purely inductive study, based on Origen’s exegetical works. It is true that this would be a fearsome undertaking, which would exceed the bounds of the present book; but there seems to be no other way of reaching an understanding of Origen’s exegesis. De Lubac has the advantage here, since his introductions to the homilies in the Sources chrét iennes are based on the text of Origen; but his description of Origen’s exegesis is by no means identical with that of Daniélou, and one feels that neither writer has succeeded entirely in giving us the mind of Origen the exegete. And this by no means implies that the man who undertakes an exhaustive study of Origen’s exegesis can ignore either De Lubac or Daniélou.

Daniélou is more cold towards Origen’s allegorism than is De Lubac; it seems better, with Daniélou, to make a distinction between typology and allegorism than, with De Lubac, to identify them. Typology was not invented by Origen; allegorism is generally identified with him, and this identification is accepted by Daniélou. Origen’s allegorism is based on the theory that human history is a projection of heavenly reality; it means that the Scriptures always have a spiritual sense, although they do not always have a literal sense. Daniélou has traced the non-Christian influences by which Origen’s principles were affected. Rabbinical exegesis had an effect on him, although it was limited. The principle of the primacy of the spiritual sense was derived from the symbolism of Philo. The same principle appears in gnostic interpretation, as well as the theory of the celestial world as the prototype of human history. It is precisely in this theoretical basis of allegorism that Daniélou finds the point of Origen’s theological deviation.
This is a very important idea, and one by which De Lubac’s apology for allegorism must be qualified. The “spiritual” sense, when it is not derived from the literal sense, leads the exegete into strange paths.

The central ideas of Origen’s speculative system are a benevolent Providence and human liberty. It is his effort to conciliate these two truths which gives his system its distinctive character. A fundamental principle is the primacy of spirit over matter, even to the belief that only spiritual being is good. Neither Origen nor Daniélou enunciates this in so many words, but it is the logical implication of Origen’s theories. Therefore the angelic history, of which human history is a mere projection, alone gives meaning to human history. This leads to difficulties concerning the Incarnation and the Redemption; and one is not certain that Daniélou is entirely successful in explaining them away. Are these doctrines of capital importance in Origen’s system? Or, to put it more exactly, is it possible that they should be of capital importance in such a system? It is a logical implication of Origen’s system that the Word should be a subordinate being; and it is hard to deny the influence of Gnosticism, and of Neo-Platonism, here. On the other hand, it is true—as Daniélou is at pains to repeat—that Origen was theorizing where there was, as yet, no dogmatic tradition.

Daniélou devotes little space to the *apocatastasis* of Origen. This, again, flows from his principles. Suffering, the severity of the divine dispensation in the Old Testament, and even sin, have a pedagogical value. They lead the soul back to its original purity. A benevolent Providence could have no other purpose; hence the chastisements of the spiritual world also are pedagogical.

The mysticism of Origen had a wide and lasting influence, according to Daniélou; this influence, however, has not been direct, but indirect through Gregory of Nyssa and Pseudo-Dionysius. Origen’s mystical doctrine is found in the allegorical exegesis of the history of the exodus and of the Canticle of Canticles.

Daniélou remarks very pertinently in his summary that Origen cannot be simplified; he believes that the fault of other contemporary works is that they attempt to reduce to a system something which cannot be systematized. Both in Origen’s exegesis and in his theology there appear irreducible elements. Origen drew his ideas from many sources, but failed to see their incompatibility. This judgment of Origen appears to be at once the most just and the most kind; and it is the merit of this book to have pointed this out. Subsequent studies of the work of Origen will be more accurate and more sympathetic if they allow this great mind the ultimate privilege of genius—the privilege of being inconsistent.

*West Baden College*  
*John L. McKenzie, S.J.*

This volume contains the four philosophical discussions of Augustine with his friends held at Cassiciacum near Milan shortly after his conversion in 386 and later revised and edited by the Saint himself. They are in order: The Happy Life (translator, Ludwig Schopp), which was the first to be completed, begun on his birthday “and finished during a three days conversation” wherein the recent catechumen finds in God the Summum Bonum, the answer to man’s yearning for perfect happiness; Answer to the Skeptics (translator, Denis J. Kavanagh, O.S.A.), the first of these disputations to be begun but only later completed, which contains the young Augustine’s vindication of the mind’s ability to acquire certitude and again brings one to the Eternal Truth Itself; Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil (translator, Robert P. Russell, O.S.A.), composed in between the first two dialogues, presenting “the important question of whether the order of God’s Providence embraces everything good and everything evil” (Retract., 1, 3); and finally the two books of the Soliloquies (translator, Thomas F. Gilligan, O.S.A.), not carried to completion, wherein Augustine (“as if there were two of us—Reason and I”) employs for the first time the method used so effectively later on in the Confessions, in exposing the soul’s dependence for its knowledge upon God.

Dr. Schopp has carefully revised his previously published translation, using the Bonn edition of the Latin text instead of the older Patrologia Latina of Migne. A comparison of the two translations of Augustine’s well-known presentation of “wisdom and measure” (n. 33 sq.) will convince anyone of the superiority of this new version.

The Contra Académicos also has some changes, but Fr. Kavanagh’s primary aim again has been to make Augustine’s thought readily intelligible to the English reader rather than to worry over disputed readings of the original text. In this he has succeeded admirably. Fr. Russell presents his former translation of the De Ordine “with some minor changes”; he has “preferred the Benedictine text to the later critical edition of the Vienna version.” We should have liked some reasons for the preference. The Soliloquies recently published by Father Gilligan are herein reprinted.

Each translation contains a select bibliography, a carefully prepared table of contents, and in most cases a completely revised introduction by the translator; there are notes and explanations; the references to the Retractiones are again printed, this time in a long footnote at the end of each translation. The juxtaposition of the Latin text, which made the former translations so acceptable to the student of Augustine, unfortunately had to be omitted in the present uniform series.
Dr. Schopp's scholarly Foreword to the volume makes reference to "Augustine's solutions of problems, still applicable to present times." For this reason we welcome the present volume as opportune. While the young Augustine of Cassiciacum is not the mature philosopher and theologian of the De Trinitate and De Civitate Dei, the same great mind is at work facing the same great perennial problems—the quest for truth and happiness. We could wish this volume were made obligatory reading for general survey courses of philosophy in colleges and universities.

St. Mary's College

E. J. WEISENBERG, S.J.


The present volume maintains the scholarly standard set by previous volumes of the "Mana" series. Fully competent in their several departments, the four writers contribute monographs which those interested in the history of religion will find reliable and readable. As much as clarity of exposition permits, the text itself is disencumbered from distracting details by the device of relegating archeological and philological discussions to appendices. The reader, however, is gratefully aware how faithfully the arguments and conclusions of the text have been checked with the known facts. Romanticism of the Frazer-Reinach type is passé in the comparative study of religions, having served perhaps a temporary purpose of enkindling curiosity and interest in the field. Exemplifying the realism which now dominates is the present writers' solicitude for factual data combined with cautious reserve in interpretation. Only so much theorizing is indulged as the evidence renders plausible.

Etruria, to whom infant Rome went to school, had derived its own culture from the eastern Mediterranean. In that region, probably in some locale of Asia Minor, ancestors of the Etruscans became adepts in extispicium and kindred branches of Babylonian pseudo-science. Confidence in these occult practices grew to be the most prominent facet of Etruscan religious psychology. The lore of the haruspices was codified in sacred books, for which was claimed the authority of revelation from the prophet Tages and the prophetess Vegoia. Omen-reading revealed the will of the gods, while auxiliary sciences furnished rites and incantations to bend their will to human desires. The gods of the Etruscans, as the immigrants became a powerful nation (c. 1000–600 B.C.), were identified with Italic gods and with the gods of the Grecian colonies of the peninsula. To her adopted child,
Rome, dying Etruria bequeathed many of her gods and most of her oc­cultism.

Handicapped by the meagerness of written Etruscan sources, M. Grénier is duly restrained in his conclusions. Turning to Roman religion, where documentation is adequate and where savants like Warde Fowler have published excellent interpretative studies, he is able to reconstruct the whole history coherently. The earliest stage of Rome’s religious experience is described with sympathetic appreciation of the *pietas* and *prisca fides* of these worshippers of the old *numina*. Republican Rome, winning her way to peninsular and then to Mediterranean dominance, was herself conquered culturally by Hellenism and took to her bosom the brilliant Olympians and the pageantry of the *ritus Graecus*. The long anguish of the civil wars left behind it religious and moral chaos. The Augustan reforms, according to M. Grenier’s analysis, were the implementing on the governmental level of the desires of all the better minds to reestablish the *pax deorum* and so avert impending doom. What the reforms envisaged was a national religion closely tied in with patriotism. But the religious currents aflow within the imperial borders were too many and too diverse to be confined in the reser­voir of an establishment. Until the triumph of Christianity vital religion was found not in the Graeco-Roman, emperor-centred establishment, but in the mystery-cults.

Both Greece and Rome in the heyday of their greatness knew the Celts as troublesome northern borderers. Of their culture classical writers have much to say, but M. Vendryes is properly cautious in his use of these accounts. They are based in large part on the rather superficial observation of mer­chants and soldiers. Furthermore, Greek and Roman writers are bent on finding parallels everywhere between the religion of their own peoples and that of the Celts. To check and control classical statements, M. Vendryes employs his fine knowledge of Celtic philology, Irish literature, and monu­mental remains on the continent. He concludes that at present we cannot say to what extent the greater gods and their attributes were borrowed from the Graeco-Roman pantheon. Genuinely Celtic, on the other hand, were fecundity-spirits and water-nymphs, sacred animals and trees. The first-named, “personifications des forces éparses dans la nature et grâce aux­quelles se produit la vie,” were called “mothers” and distinguished one from another by place-names. Springs and river-sources were the residences of the water-nymphs and also the chief locales of their cult. The same ingenuous nature-worship would seem to explain the Celts’ cult of animals and trees. It is a bit sad to see the judicious M. Vendryes leaning toward Reinach’s totemism as an explanation (pp. 281, 289). Another slip of the author must
be noted in his assertion (p. 284) of a total lack of liaison between the gods and human morality—an assertion resting on the silence of the sources in regard to this liaison. Yet M. Vendryes himself laments the inadequacy of source-material. After these lapses the author regains our confidence by a brilliant chapter on the Druids.

The sources for the study of the religion of the Germanic tribes parallel those for the Celtic field—rather abundant classical references, monumental and philological indications, the Norse sagas. Space does not allow detailed notice of M. Tonnélat's generally satisfactory reconstruction of Germanic paganism. He finds many Indo-European affinities, emphasizes the magical use of the runes, is too facile in stating that the chief reason for conversion to Christianity was that it came as "the religion of conquerors" (p. 382). In the last section of the book, where sources supply only "connaissances fragmentaires et fragiles," M. Unbegaun is perforce tentative in his conclusions about old Slavic religion.

St. Mary's College

George C. Ring, S.J.


St. Robert Bellarmine defines canonization as "the public testimony of the church concerning the real sanctity and glory of some deceased person, being at once judgment and sentence by which are decreed to him those honors which are due to those who reign with God." These honors, he says, are seven, which he lists as follows: (1) the deceased person's name is inscribed in the catalogue of the saints, i.e., it is decreed that all the faithful must recognise him as a saint; (2) his intercession is invoked in the public prayers of the church; (3) churches are dedicated to God in memory of the saint; (4) the Mass and Divine Office are publicly celebrated in his honor; (5) his festival is observed; (6) in his pictures he is surrounded with an aureole of heavenly light; (7) his relics are publicly venerated.

Mr. Kemp frankly admits that the fourth, fifth and "something like the seventh" of these honors were paid to the martyrs of the second century, while the second, third and sixth appear a little later. However, he is mainly interested in the first of Bellarmine's seven points, and the purpose of his book is "to trace the history of the public recognition of saints and thus to throw some light upon one aspect of the development of ecclesiastical authority."

The well-known incident of "the wealthy matron, Lucilla," is generally recognised as the earliest convincing evidence of formal ecclesiastical control
of the public recognition of the saints, which would later be called beatification and canonization. One of the comparatively few women who have attained a melancholy notoriety in the turbulent history of heresy, her career as the financial backer of the Donatists is attributed to her hostility to Bishop Cecilian, who succeeded to the see of Carthage after a bitterly disputed election following the death of Mensurius in 311. The unfortunate Cecilian had incurred the lady’s animosity while still a deacon by rebuking her for publicly kissing the relics of a martyr who had not yet been officially recognised as a saint by the church.

The public veneration of the Christian saints, especially the martyr-saints, was, of course, an old and well-established custom by this time. Some would see the first instance of it in the care shown to the body of the proto-martyr, St. Stephen (Acts 8:2), and it is quite clear that, by the time of the martyrdom of St. Polycarp in 156, the veneration of the martyrs by the Christians was so well-known, even to their enemies, that the Jews begged the Roman magistrates at Smyrna not to give the body of the martyred Polycarp to the Christians “lest they should abandon the crucified One and begin to worship this man.”

In these early years, the cult of a martyr is usually strictly localised. He is the hero of the community which has witnessed his martyrdom, and, even as late as the fourth century, Eusebius thinks it necessary to explain why he lists among the Palestinian martyrs the deacon Romanus, who had been martyred at Antioch. Canonization in the age of the martyrs may have been to some extent a spontaneous act of the local community, with the tacit or express permission of the clergy and bishop. At least, there is no convincing evidence of, and usually there was probably little need for, a preliminary judicial investigation. The members of the local churches were so well known to each other that, when an outstanding member of the community was put to death for the faith, no prolonged investigation was necessary to demonstrate his right to be honored as a martyr. The martyrdom of St. Polycarp, for instance, was obviously a civic event of the first magnitude, and it is hardly likely that the faithful waited for the election of another bishop to determine whether they might venerate his heroic predecessor as a saint.

Mr. Kemp finds nothing in the nature of a judicial sentence of canonization in the first and second centuries. In the third century he discovers “a little evidence for something like judicial action.” Not at Rome, however; for, like Marucchi and Delehaye, he refuses to follow De Rossi and Archbishop Benson in interpreting the belated addition of the word “martyr”
to the tombs of Pope Pontian and Pope Fabian as evidence for the existence of some kind of a process of canonization at Rome in the middle of the third century.

"It is in the more extended churches such as that of Africa that the legislation about canonization really begins, when the church found itself compelled, in the face of persecution, heresy and schism, to control the veneration of martyrs and pseudo-martyrs." The beginning of this control can be seen in the epistle of St. Cyprian to the clergy of Carthage urging them to "mark the days on which they (i.e., the martyrs) die, that we may celebrate their memories among the commemorations of the martyrs."

The need of episcopal control became especially necessary after the outbreak of the Donatist schism. To demonstrate their right to be considered members of the church, some of the Donatists, as St. Augustine tells us, "went so far as to offer themselves for slaughter to any travellers whom they met with arms, using violent threats that they would murder them if they failed to meet with death at their hands. Sometimes, too, they extorted with violence from any passing judge that they should be put to death by the executioners, or by the officer of his court. . . . Again, it was their daily sport to kill themselves, by throwing themselves over precipices, or into the water, or into the fire." No wonder that the council of Carthage in 348 found it necessary to forbid the faithful to venerate such suicides as martyrs; no wonder that the bishops of North Africa were gradually compelled to take into their own hands the decision as to who might or might not be honored as a saint.

Episcopal control became all the more necessary at this period because confessors were now beginning to take their place beside the martyrs in the catalogue of the saints. Doubtless St. John the Evangelist had been honored as a saint from the beginning, despite the fact that he had not died a martyr's death. Others, too, who had died after sufferings endured for the faith, or while in prison awaiting their trial, had been accepted and honored as martyrs. But, from the fourth century on, a new kind of saint began to be canonized; men like Anthony, Paul, Simeon Stylites, Athanasius and Hilarius in the East, men like Martin of Tours, Hilary, Ambrose, Augustine and Leo in the West. Since the heroic sanctity of such men could not be attested by any easily recognisable public fact like martyrdom, the need of some kind of authentic decision by a competent authority became an increasingly obvious necessity. Hence the frequent decrees on the subject by local councils at Carthage, Gangra, Laodicea, etc.

Most of these decrees were incorporated in the famous collection of church laws compiled by Dionysius Exiguus in the first half of the sixth century.
They also found a place in the Spanish collection, the *Hispana*, early in the seventh century. Through these two widely-circulated collections they exercised a profound influence on canon law in western Europe all through the Merovingian period. But, while canon law commanded each bishop to make sure that the saints venerated in his diocese were truly saints, this does not mean that he had to conduct a formal investigation in each case. It would seem probable, from the *Dialogues* of Gregory the Great and the writings of Gregory of Tours, that canonization at this period still remained quite frequently a more or less spontaneous act of the local community, while, as a rule, ecclesiastical authority intervened only to give more éclat to the cultus or to suppress an abuse.

It was only natural that Charlemagne's concern with church problems should extend to the veneration of the saints. By his time, the translation of a saint's body had become the equivalent of canonization. Naturally, this could easily lead to abuses. The Roman deacon, Deusdona, and his relatives were probably not the only family who organised a flourishing "black market" to supply bodies from the catacombs of Rome to the churches beyond the Alps; and, even though these may have been exceptional cases, the profit to be derived from the pilgrimages to the shrine of a celebrated martyr could easily become a temptation to invent fictitious saints. Hence, a growing body of legislation on canonization from the ninth to the twelfth century; hence, too, a growing tendency to make the translation or canonization of a saint more impressive by invoking the authority of a group of bishops assembled in a local or national synod.

From this it was but a step to canonization by an ecumenical council or a pope. Mr. Kemp agrees with Pope Benedict XIV and the Bollandists that, while there are several probable examples of papal canonization to be found in preceding centuries, the canonization of St. Ulric (Udalricus) of Augsburg by Pope John XV in 993 is the first such case of which we can be absolutely certain. (We may remark, in passing, that it represents, too, the first formal canonization, in the strict sense of the word, as distinct from the local canonization, by one or more bishops, which should really be called beatifications, unless, through subsequent acceptance by the whole church, they became equivalent to canonization.) From 993 on, instances of formal papal canonization, in the strict sense of the word, become increasingly numerous, though the word "canonization" does not seem to have been used in this sense until well into the eleventh century.

During the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Catholics gradually became conscious of the difference between what would later be called beatification and canonization, as is clear from the growing tendency to try to have the
local canonization, by one or more bishops, made universal by the decision of an ecumenical council or a pope. By the time Alexander III ascended the papal chair in 1159, the opinion was widely prevalent that the pope should be consulted in cases of canonization, but it is not easy to determine when the right of canonization was withdrawn from the bishops and reserved exclusively to the pope. In a letter to the king of Sweden in 1171 or 1172, Alexander III explicitly forbids the Swedes to continue to venerate as a saint one of their compatriots who was killed while drunk. "Even if he has worked many miracles," says the pope, "they may not publicly venerate him as a saint without the authority of the Roman church." Many Catholic authors think that Alexander's words refer to some decree recently passed on the subject; others hold, and Mr. Kemp agrees with them, that the pope was merely expressing what he believed to be the law, though perhaps only the unwritten and customary law, on papal authority in canonization, whether on a local or a universal scale.

The papal reservation of the right of canonization, thus asserted by Alexander III, was incorporated in the Decretals of Gregory IX, published in 1234. Even after this time, however, there are occasional instances of local canonization by individual bishops, and a few medieval authors occasionally maintain that the local bishop still has the power to canonize for his own diocese.

As might have been expected, the papal reservation of canonization reduced, but did not entirely eliminate, the abuses connected with the veneration of the saints. In expounding the Catholic teaching on the invocation of the saints and the veneration of their relics and images, the Council of Trent thought it necessary to deplore certain abuses that had crept in and to express the wish that they might be abolished. That wish was not entirely fulfilled, and, in 1625 and 1634, Pope Urban VIII found it necessary to pass the well-known legislation which has remained the canon law on the subject of beatification and canonization down to our own day.

These few paragraphs merely touch the highlights of Mr. Kemp’s survey of canonization in the western church, and they give only a very inadequate idea of the wealth of interesting material that he has crowded into a comparatively small space, a wealth of material that is not easily available outside the huge tomes of Pope Benedict XIV, Mabillon and the Bollandists. The work is based chiefly on Catholic sources, which are indicated in a valuable bibliography. While the book is largely historical, it devotes considerable attention to the doctrinal questions connected with papal authority and infallibility in beatification and canonization. Mr. Kemp is always scholarly and impartial, and, though Catholic theologians and canonists
will not agree with all his interpretations and conclusions, they will find his book highly interesting and extremely helpful. It should prove especially suggestive and stimulating to those who have to direct seminars in theology or canon law.

Alma College

JOHN J. HEALY, S.J.


A very closely reasoned, pleasantly readable volume, embracing both Testaments, Old and New, presenting careful exegesis of the major trends in the Scripture. Paramount in the author's approach is the notion of revelation; at the very beginning of the book this notion is analysed into several concepts which, if not altogether acceptable, have the merit of making his meaning very clear and understandable. The term revelation, once defined, serves as the basis of divisions throughout the book; hence such chapter titles as "Noachian Revelation," "Revelation in the Patriarchal Period," etc. This method of handling his subject wins for the author a smoothly-flowing presentation, though it may disappoint an inquiring mind looking for, say, a full discussion in one place of Old Testament ideas about the soul.

The author is conservative and rigidly objective in the main, so much so that at times it is difficult if not impossible to discern his own stand on points on which one might legitimately expect him to take a definite stand. A mythological interpretation, for instance, will receive as careful a consideration as one that more naturally fits the nature of the book under examination; while such an opinion is never embraced, a reader gains the impression that the opinion has value even if not chosen.

In a short review, only a passing exemplification may be given of the merits and of the defects of the book as a whole. A text which has considerable interest to Catholics, Genesis 3:15, is the main subject of Chapter IV, and its treatment manifests the author's leisurely and orderly analysis. He notes that three curses are pronounced, one against the serpent, and one each against Eve and Adam. Then his attention focuses on the first, as being of greatest importance, and in it he distinguishes three elements: (a) the divine initiative in the work of deliverance ("I will put enmity . . .") of mankind; (b) the essence of that deliverance, which consists in a reversal of the attitude of man both toward the serpent and toward God; (c) the continuity of the deliverance, through extension of enmity to both "seeds." Obviously in such analysis there is no room for Mary, nor, seemingly, even for the Messias. On the latter point the author is rather vague; he asserts that the
O.T. approach to the concept of a personal Messias is very gradual, and that we are not warranted in seeking an exclusively personal reference to the Messias here.

Habitually the author pays careful linguistic attention to text and context in his discussions, but gives little or no attention, especially in the O.T. section, to the uniqueness of his material as a religious history; as a result, more frequently than not in the first half of his work, his study has more of a naturalistic overtone than perhaps he intended. Opinions differing from his are presented with scrupulous fairness, but he omits any presentation of pertinent Catholic viewpoints. In the section of the book devoted to the New Testament the reviewer finds a lamentable vagueness, despite considerable verbiage, on such vital points as the messianic consciousness and the divinity of Christ.

Woodstock College

Francis X. Peirce, S.J.

Ezechiel. By Dr. Joseph Ziegler. Daniel. By Dr. Friedrich Nötscher


The standard already set by the other volumes in this series is here maintained (cf. THEOLOGICAL STUDIES, IX [1948], 607–610). The results of the best research are given briefly; textual criticism receives a minimum of attention; emendations in the text are given in transliteration in a special section intervening between the translation and the commentary. The translation is readable modern German, and the commentary is explanatory, without homiletic amplification.

The reviewer notices that Ziegler's Ezechiel shows acquaintance with the best publications on the subject, although these are not indicated, in accordance with the scope of the book. The text is divided intelligently into sections which are provided with suitable headings. The comment is brief but adequate. It is regrettable that the portion of the book beginning with Chapter 40 was not furnished with appropriate diagrams, which are almost indispensable for understanding the text.

Like Ziegler, Nötscher in his commentary on Daniel preserves a prudent restraint in his attitude towards modern critical theories. As we might expect, the great problems of the book remained unsolved—Belshazzar, Darius the Mede, the Seventy Weeks; but there is an honest, though extremely brief review of them.

St. Mary's College

Michael J. Gruenthaner, S.J.

When a teacher of Sacred Scripture is handed a book on his subject by a “literary and dramatic critic, writer of books, articles, and novels,” as the author of this book is described in the blurb, he is likely to view it with a cold and hostile suspicion, born of bitter experience. It is so difficult for the orator, the poet, the novelist, to restrain their imagination and their rhetoric by the reins of sober scholarship, and the professional scholar is so broken in to these reins that he has almost forgotten that his subject has elements of romance and poetry, of color and adventure. For those of us who, like the reviewer, have been rattling the dry bones of erudition too long, the present book may be recommended as a refresher in the best sense of the word. For the novelist has beaten us at our own game. His faults in erudition and his errors in interpretation are neither more numerous nor more serious than one finds in a book of the same size by any but the few top-ranking scholars; and he has accomplished something which the professional scholars have failed to do—he has brought the Old Testament to life with a wit, a flair, and a knowledge of the world of men which are thoroughly Gallic. The reviewer confesses to a twinge of professional jealousy; but he hopes he can summon enough humility to praise another for doing his work, and doing it better.

The book has four major divisions: The Patriarchs; Moses and Canaan; From Glory to Exile; Judaism and Messianism. It thus includes the whole of Hebrew and Jewish history from the beginnings to the birth of Christ. It is the first of three projected volumes; the second, dealing with the life of Christ, and the third, with St. Paul, have already appeared in French. We hope to see them translated also. The original work received the ecclesiastical approbation of the Archbishop of Paris. (There is, however, no sign of any special approval of the translation [cf. CIC 1392].) The publishers have discreetly revealed this fact to any one who happens to stumble on it on the real flyleaf. The author gives no bibliography, nor does he acknowledge his authorities in the course of the work. But he has obviously consulted the standard recent works, and he once mentions advice received from M. A. Robert, of the Institut Catholique. Certainly he had abundance of good advice, and that from the most competent guides; the book is evidence of this. But if the original work had a preface where such things are acknowledged, it has not been translated.

The author’s erudition is sometimes at fault. He has Abram set out from Ur instead of Haran. He describes Mesopotamia as a country where violent
earthquakes are frequent. He extends the conquests of Sargon I to the Tagus (this may be a faulty translation). He dates Abraham and Hammurabi about 2000 B.C.; but he qualifies this in a footnote, and remarks elsewhere that all dates before the seventh century are hypothetical. The biblical designations of the pre-Israelite inhabitants of Canaan are said to be Canaanites and Ammonites, instead of Amorites; this, again, may be faulty translation. Merodach-Baladan appears as a king of Assyria who threatens Babylon; shall we ascribe this inversion also to the translator? The Biblical Commission does not maintain the attribution of the whole book to that prophet, but denies that multiplicity of authorship is proved; there is a difference. Ashurbani-pal is called the greatest of the kings of Assyria, a judgment in which no historian whom I have read concurs. The last king of Assyria is said to have leaped into the flames; we are more skeptical of the Sardanapalus story. Nebuchadnezzar is called "a magnificent ruffian who loved the arts." Now this is the kind of pen-sketch which gives this book so much of its charm; unlike most of them, it is not quite accurate. The old theory of the madness of Nabonidus is repeated; this is scarcely possible since Dougherty's study in 1929. The Talmud is described as "a continual dialogue in which great questions are raised and solutions hammered out, in which the only end pursued is the search for truth and certitude." The Pharisaic observance of the Law is attributed to the Jewish people as a whole.

The translation is not altogether worthy of the original. Besides the faults suggested above, there are a few sentences which have come apart beyond possibility of restoration. There are a few instances where French idiom has been misunderstood. Thus an observer is said to look "towards the Levant" instead of towards the east. How the "sluices" of Hamath came in instead of the "entrance" of Hamath I do not pretend to know. The Dome of the Rock is called the Cupola of the Rock; Xenophanes of Colophon has become "Xenophon and Colophon"; the kingdom of Mithridates, Machaerus, and the Piraeus appear in a Frenchified form as Pont, Macheronti, and Pireus. In general, however, the translation is good idiomatic English and sounds faithful; the translator was, perhaps, not sufficiently familiar with the material, while competent enough in the languages. In any case, we should be grateful for the translation, while we wish it were better.

Catholic Biblical scholarship in France has long been more advanced, to use an inoffensive word, than in the United States. The reviewer does not believe the cause of biblical studies is served by crying "rationalism" at opinions which are maintained by Catholic scholars of acknowledged competence and good standing. The interpretations advanced by Daniel-Rops represent contemporary French exegesis; and it will do American Catholics
good to acquaint themselves with these interpretations. The historical fact of the sacrifice of Isaac is said to be less precise than its moral significance. Jacob's wrestling is described as a mystical experience rather than an external event. The biblical account of the origins of man is said to be the Hebrew expression of traditions conserved in Mesopotamia; the author has a clear, concise, and accurate discussion of oral tradition. The serpent and the fruit are treated as symbolism. Natural forces are invoked in the plagues, the passages of the Red Sea and the Jordan, and the fall of Jericho. The morality of the herem is analyzed with no attempt to justify it objectively. The literary work of David and Solomon is reduced to small proportions. It is suggested that the language of the discovery of Deuteronomy is symbolic, meaning that "it was decided in the time of Josiah that the Mosaic principles should be strictly applied." Deuteronomy is treated as the work of Hezekiah and the priests, who "spiritualized the old conceptions," "extracted from them their human (lege humane?) content." Nahum is said to represent exalted nationalism, in contrast to Zephaniah and Jeremiah. Judith is a symbolic figure, or so it is suggested; and the book of Tobias is frankly called a fable. One wonders why the author did not do the same for Esther. The Pentateuch is compiled from variant versions of the Mosaic tradition. The reviewer objects to the description of the primitive religion of Yahweh as one "to which monotheism and a cut and dried morality seemed all-sufficient" as inadequate and misleading. The book of Daniel is not attributed to its hero. Most of these are points which are still the objects of scholarly investigation, or in which the settled opinion of scholars has not yet shifted down to the non-specialist level. It seems to the reviewer an excess of zeal to insist that, until ironclad conclusions are formed, one may propose nothing except the most conservative traditional views, which are themselves often extremely hypothetical. On this principle, a book like this has never been written, nor could be.

But these are details. It is impossible to write a book on the whole of the Old Testament which would not be faulty in detail. What is the general impression that the book leaves? Does one rise from it with a greater reverence for the Bible, a more profound understanding of God and His dealings with men, of the human heart as it unfolds in the words and the events of Old Testament history? Does one become more sensible of the workings of Divine Providence, of the religious motivation of the events related in the Bible, of the impact of God upon human life and history? Does one realize more fully that the history of the Hebrews is a history of God manifesting Himself in sundry times and in divers manners, as well as the truth, in the words of the author, that "the drama of Israel is the drama of the soul"? It is the considered judgment of the reviewer that there is no book in English by a Catholic
which does these things so well. The author has synthesized the learning of
the historian and the archaeologist into a living picture. One would like to
quote many of the author's fine pages, such as those on the idealization of
the nomadic life in Israel; Palestine in the spring; the numerous passages in
which he recreates the ancient world in which Israel dwelt, where ancient
civilizations—Egypt, Assyria, Babylonia, Greece, Rome—their cities, their
armies, and their religion rise before our eyes; the religion of the patriarchs;
the men of the Bible, such as David and Solomon; the birth, growth, and
significance of the Messianic idea. Those of the clergy and the educated
laity who do not read this book really do not want the Old Testament to
take intelligible and interesting.

West Baden College

JOHN L. MCKENZIE, S. J.

LUTHER UND DAS ALTE TESTAMENT. By Heinrich Bornkamm. Tübingen:

One may doubt whether Martin Luther would be pleased with this evalua­
tion of his doctrine and method. Unlike Luther, who wrote with passion,
fiery earnestness and scorching invective, pitting strong personal convic­
tions against century-old traditions, Heinrich Bornkamm proceeds in a
cold, unimpassioned manner, with the meticulous precision and exacting
devotion to objectivity of a scholar, particularly a German one. His study
therefore bears the marks of credibility, but between text and footnotes the
pendulum of personality and style cuts a full arc.

From the viewpoint of content the book summarizes the reformer's posi­
tion on more than a score of Old Testament subjects. The order followed is
topical, the whole bearing a resemblance to a biblical theology. After the
opening chapter, which discusses Luther's teaching on the relation of Jewry
to the Old Testament, follows what might be the most practical section of
the work—Luther's interpretation of the Old Testament as a mirror for life.
By far the most space is devoted to the relationship between the two cove­
nants, e.g., the Gospel and the Law, Christ and Moses, the Church of the Old
and of the New Dispensations. The point continually emphasized is Luther's
Christological conception of the Old Testament; in fact, with the evidence at
hand after reading the discussion of Luther's translation of the Old Testa­
ment, one feels tempted to regard his version as a recasting of it along New
Testament lines, lines at times typically Lutheran.

What makes this book interesting, and at the same time boring, is the
fact that fifteenth- and sixteenth-century biblical hermeneutics left so much
to be desired. Principles which we now take for granted, e.g., historical
approach, literary forms, progressive revelation, literal sense, seem to have
had as substitutes allegory, moralization, and the philosophically inexplicable four-sense theory. One wonders what chance Protestant explanations would have had, had Catholics been aware of present day hermeneutical norms, or if the message of the Bible had been popularized in the light of these norms.

A number of quotations from Martin Luther will not be out of place; they are the spice of the book. “Hieremias dicit: Ach domine, ego sum imperitus. Ita hodie dicimus: Ach, bin zu gering darzu contra universitates loqui” (p. 24). “Die junge Kuh, die noch kein Joch getragen (Deut. 21:3) = Christus in seinem sündlosen menschlichen Fleisch” (p. 79). “Man soll nicht mit Ochse und Esel zugleich ackern (Deut. 22:10) = nicht Glauben und Werke zugleich lehren” (p. 80). “(Christus) ex illibata virgine natus est” (p. 96).


St. John's Seminary

WILLIAM G. HEIDT, O.S.B.


The purpose in this work, which carries the sub-title L'Arrière-plan du récit évangélique de la Transfiguration de notre-Seigneur, is to examine the details of the Transfiguration narrative, abstracting from the quaestio facti, in order to determine what impression they left on the minds of the disciples of Jesus.

The method followed by the author, a clergyman of the Church of Sweden, produces a work which pertains rather to the history of religion than to the field of exegesis. Taking as his starting-point the theories of S. Mowinckel, he examines in minute detail the cult and eschatological beliefs of the people of Israel as they are described in the Books of the Old Testament, in the O.T.
Apocrypha and in rabbinical literature. Thus he finds that the principal element in the cult of ancient Israel was the annual ceremony of the enthronement of Yahweh and the king. But this festival, unable to preserve its vital force, gradually disintegrated, breaking up into a number of distinct rites. These rites were preserved in the later Jewish feasts, particularly those of autumn, and especially Tabernacles or Sukkot. However, owing to a further process of "spiritualization" and "democratization" the primitive forms did not always preserve their original function. Thus, for example, the ancient ritual of the investiture of the king on the occasion of his enthronement gradually became "spiritualized," as the clothing with the sacred robe came to be associated with messianic expectations, and "democratized," as it came to figure the entry of the pious Israelite into heavenly rest.

The various elements which pertained originally to the liturgical or cultual scheme, and which in course of time suffered democratization and spiritualization the author terms "motifs" (p. 13). Henceforward, the work is given over almost entirely to an investigation of these inherited motifs and their applicability to the Transfiguration narrative in the Synoptics. The book is divided into two unequal parts, followed by three appendices, a lengthy bibliography, and two plates on the Dura Synagogue. The first part, of 240 pages, deals with general concepts, the autumnal feasts, cult and eschatology, the Messiah and his functions, and finally various particular motifs. The second part, containing only 63 pages, applies the conclusions reached in the first part to the Transfiguration. Various details of the episode, e.g., the mountain, glory, the cloud, the voice, Moses and Elias, the tents, rest, are all classified as direct or indirect motifs and viewed in the light of their derivation from ancient cultual sources. The transfiguration is then seen as an enthronement, directly connected with the Jewish Feast of Tabernacles, but embodying many motifs proper to the ancient enthronement of Yahweh and the king of Israel. The Transfiguration represents an expression of the Evangelists' belief in the fulfillment, in the person of Jesus, of the messianic hopes of Israel.

The reader is forced to tender this book much more than polite interest. In many ways it is an important book; it is original, stimulating, and carefully worked out. After the first few pages of substructure you can see the roof coming; admit the premises and with relentless logic the author carries you on to the conclusion. You are given a careful analysis of O.T. facts and pertinent data from later Jewish sources. In fact the author taps all available founts with skill and painstaking effort. He finds the rationalistic explanations of the Transfiguration account altogether inadequate, and says so. However, he is never blatant or inconsiderate; he proceeds cautiously and
mildly. His documentation is rich and copious; and his twenty-five page bibliography is extremely valuable. The work has the precise appearance of a doctorate thesis although this is not expressly stated anywhere. The author makes clever use of the paintings from the synagogue at Dura-Europos to supplement his literary findings. Moreover, he is reasonably impartial in his use of sources, and it is refreshing to see the names of eminent Catholic scholars in his bibliography (he appeals very frequently to the work of P. Bonsirven), a phenomenon that until quite recently would have occasioned surprise in some biblical circles. In particular, the author has contributed not a little to the study of Jewish messianic hopes. Much of his treatment of the suffering Messias, especially the Ebed Yahweh theme in Isaias, is distinctly valuable.

The principal objection to the main thesis of this book centres on the author's premises and extends to his interpretation of the data presented. It is now well over thirty years since P. Volz first enunciated his views on the primitive festival of the New Year, and more than twenty years since Mowinckel evolved his enthronement theories in connection with his interpretation of the Psalms. These hypotheses, although frequently discussed, have been received favorably by but a very small group of scholars. They seem to be shared in whole or in part by Riesenfeld's colleagues at Uppsala, I. Engnell and G. Widengren, but certainly have not received general acceptance. This is significant. For it is precisely in connection with the main point of the theory that the evidence is lacking. Despite the abundance of assumed allusions offered, and despite the (in some instances) questionable parallels discovered in other oriental religions, it still remains that there is no reliable evidence in the O.T. sources to prove that a primitive enthronement festival was ever celebrated by the Israelites. The notion remains a theory or hypothesis, a very far-reaching hypothesis, it is true, but nevertheless also far-fetched. The author's examination of sources is still valuable, but his conclusions and applications cannot be accepted until he proves his starting-point. To gain acceptance of his thesis he should have brought forth new evidence or proof to bolster Mowinckel's main postulate, but this he does not do. The presentation of forced or questionable allusions to a hypothetical enthronement festival is not new evidence. Riesenfeld seems to have hammered out a large framework into which he forces Jewish ritual as well as the facts of the Transfiguration.

Although it is unfair to criticize the author for dealing mainly with the background of the Transfiguration, his method seems to reverse the proper order. Why not deal first with the synoptic accounts of a fact that really happened and then trace O.T. foreshadowings and the fulfillment of types?
The present work leaves the reader suspicious that Jesus is believed to be under some inevitable necessity of surrounding the Transfiguration with ancient cultual forms, or that the Evangelists had to relate the events as they did through the force of inherited motifs. Further, although one cannot quarrel with the author’s purpose in abstracting from any attempt to deal with the facts of the Transfiguration narrative, there are times when the reader, confused by a constant searching for motifs, would welcome a profession of faith in the divinity of Christ and the historicity of the Gospels.

A complete analysis of the book can hardly be given here, but a few instances may be mentioned where the author is found unsatisfactory in details. His suggestion of the legendary coloring (p. 98) of Ex. 40:34; Num. 9:15; 14:10; 16:19; 20:6 is scarcely warranted. His interpretation of Ps. 8 (pp. 100, 110) is forced and unacceptable. He appears to go beyond the data supplied when (pp. 116, 117) he discusses the sacred robe. The notion that the account of the theophany on Sinai was embellished with ritualistic elements (p. 131) seems far-fetched. A number of assertions in the chapter on the tent or “booth” (c.10) are unconvincing, especially pp. 147, 148, 149, 156, 158, 159, 160.

At the end of his examination of a very careful piece of work, this reviewer must, somewhat reluctantly, render a verdict of “not proven,” although there is surely ample room for further discussion.

St. Alphonsus Seminary, Woodstock, Can. C. F. Devin C.Ss.R.


This book is a symposium by three Protestant clergymen and educators on the sources, meaning and efficacy of morality in the framework of Christian religion.

In the introduction, Jean Boisset first establishes God as the ultimate source and authority of all moral truth. He then insists that any Christian system of morality must be one of total demands: there can be no question of minimum law, no greater and lesser commandments, no mortal and venial sin. The real purpose of morality is to present an ideal and to show that it can be attained through God. The ideal is revealed in the words: “Be you therefore perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect” (Matthew 5:48). The Gospels contain no systematic code of moral behavior, and the fundamental moral rule is to live for God through love.

In the first of the two main articles, Éthique et théologie, Roger Mehl claims that all mere ethical systems, starting as they do without the aid of revela-
tion, must necessarily be insufficient for that very reason. They start with a study of the nature of man and proceed to build up a hierarchy of moral principles and values. When these are applied to the various ethical situations of life, the only result can be a life of mediocrity, an avoidance of excess, either of good or evil. By such a system of virtues and duties, a man seeks simply to live in harmony with himself and his neighbor, to be a man of good conscience.

But Christian morality cannot be content with a mechanical application of ethical principles to the changing circumstances of life. When a Christian faces a given ethical situation, he must seek primarily the radical transformation of himself in making his decision, not the mere solution of a moral problem. For this, he must want to make an absolute beginning, to experience a new birth; and he cannot resolve any ethical situation with the personal transformation it demands unless he is willing to renounce the helps, lessons and inspirations that past experience has given him. Christian morality must be an ethic of hic et nunc, in which obedience to an order received today is of more importance than adherence to eternal principles. This is what the Holy Spirit teaches us in the words: “Today if you shall hear his voice, harden not your hearts” (Hebrews 3:7).

The fundamental defect of all ethical systems is that they fail to see man as he is revealed by God, essentially a sinner, separated by sin from God and in hostility to him. Moreover, the rebirth of which Christ spoke to Nicodemus can have meaning only if we premise that man has been totally corrupted by sin, which is not an accident of his nature but consubstantial with it. However, if a man accepts his humanity from Christ, he is justified, his existence takes on an eternal meaning, and he has already entered (and is not merely disposed to enter) the way of salvation. What distinguishes the Christian from a mere moral person is that his is a living God and that for him Jesus Christ is not merely a symbol but the effective presence of God in history. All his moral values derive solely from the concrete act of God which is his revelation. And, as the Christian abandons a closed system of autonomous moral values and adheres to the word of God, the source of all values, he places himself outside the problem of right and wrong. A moral act has validity only in its meaning and its ultimate purpose is to bear witness to a cause. By adherence to a Church, the Christian lives his moral experience in a community that is itself devoted to the cause of Christ to whom he thus gives testimony.

The role of theology is to deprive morality of its very nature. This was the purpose of the reformers of the sixteenth century when they set them-
selves to solve the problem of good works. The practise of these may be justified, but only on condition that they are pure signs, giving testimony to Him who loved us so much.

In the second article, *Le Crise de la morale et le christianisme*, a totally different explanation of the existence, the source and the efficacy of the Christian moral system is given by Jacques Bois, who sees in the "theologism" of Roger Mehl a distortion of certain revealed truths and an unwarranted suppression of the role of reason. Bois holds that, even after the fall, there still remained in man a residue of the good that God had originally given him. God still operates in the world through His grace and men must be cooperators with God. While it is true that the Scriptures describe all initiative in the work of salvation as coming from God, they also portray a God who communicates and maintains in man a sense of justice and goodness. Man's efforts to put his life in order are not vain nor need he stand by helplessly while his salvation is accomplished by God in the role of a *deus ex machina*. Of the three elements of which the Christian religion must be a harmonious synthesis, the ethical, the mystic and the dogmatic, the most important is the ethical. The New Testament emphasizes the moral qualities of Christ as the perfect picture of the moral character of God. The Sermon on the Mount is a program of action. *Ortho-praxie* must be valued above *ortho-doxie*. For the Christian, the moral perfection of God, revealed in Christ, is the motive and the measure of his own perfection.

Man's search for the meaning and rule of life by the use of his reason is not contrary to the will of God, and the principles of the natural law retain their validity even in the light of revelation, since God is the author of each. Moreover, were man's nature totally corrupt as a result of sin, he would be incapable of using his reason to understand and apply even a revealed moral criterion. Man must have his reasons for believing. Since there are many creeds and orthodoxies, man must reserve to his reason the right to choose between them in the light of their moral content. In fact, it is because his reason recognizes the purity of the moral content of Christian revelation that he accepts it as the word of God; and not vice versa. Revelation does not come to man mysteriously, catastrophically and vertically from on high. Supra-nature does not destroy nature. Religion and morality, then, constitute one harmonious whole, or better, they are identified. Everything that touches the relations of God and man is a question of morality. There is a fidelity to God and a fidelity to truth. Without moral truth nothing remains but blind inspiration. The morality of *hic et nunc* must also be a morality *ubique et semper*.

In the concluding chapter, Jean Boisset returns with a list of practical
moral conclusions. These are to be considered as guiding principles, directives, inspirations; and it is impossible to tell whether the way of life here presented is to be considered obligatory or whether it may be followed or omitted at pleasure. This is entirely in keeping with the ideas proposed by the author in the introduction.

There is much in this book that is deeply spiritual, inspirational and devotional. However, any student of Catholic theology will see that the problem of morality, which it raises and seeks to solve, derives from these more fundamental problems: the relation between reason and revelation; the effects of original sin; the precise part played in man's justification and salvation by God and man, by faith and good works. Catholic moral theology does have its problems but they are not these. It is interesting to note that nowhere in this book is reference made to the answer given these problems by Catholic writers, although passing reference and criticism is given to the systems of such authors as Kant, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Berdiaeff, Bergson, Durkheim, Sartre and Marx.

The Catholic theologian or philosopher who has a particular interest in modern Protestant thought on the foundations of morality will find some interesting matter in this book.

Woodstock College

JOSEPH DUHAMEL, S. J.


Eichmann's first edition appeared in 1923; the fourth, enlarged edition, in 1940. Dr. Klaus Moersdorf, a pupil of Eichmann's and his successor at the University of Munich, on Eichmann's own commission undertook a further revision of the work. The present volume covers the matter contained in the first two books of the Code; it is to be followed by two more volumes. Before his death the original author at least in part read and approved the present sixth edition.

Eichmann's Lehrbuch is intended for the beginner, and is meant to be read with a copy of the Code at hand, and supplemented by the lectures of a professor.

The first six chapters present a very practical introduction to the study of canon law. Chapter 1 deals with the notion of law, its norms and divisions, and its relation to morality. Chapter 2 gives a brief but very clear notion of the Church, its purpose here on earth, its powers. Canon law, its meaning, divisions, and special character are explained in chapter 3, while chapter 4 is devoted to the sources of canon law. Canon law as a science is treated in chapter 5 by giving its development, purpose, its auxiliary sciences, and a
brief bibliography. The relation of Church and State forms the subject matter of chapter 6; here Eichmann gives a masterful summary of the nature and extent of this relation considered both from an historical and from a juridical point of view. On this topic Eichmann was an acknowledged specialist.

In his text the author follows the order of the Code most exactly. He gives a brief, clear statement of the law with a view to practice, deliberately omitting the history of the law, which he considers should be given as a separate course. There is little of commentary properly so called, but the method of giving the text compensates for this to a certain extent.

The editor himself tells us what he has done in this new edition:

"As in previous editions, the present essentially follows the same order of presenting the text of the law, since this has proved very useful for academic instruction. But in the more detailed subdivisions of the matter an effort has been made to give a special systematization, and to present the student with an outline-summary of the matter which will no doubt be welcome since it will also provide him with an easy method of finding the canons treated. . . . With the enlargement of the *Lehrbuch* the opportunity offered itself for a deeper penetration of the extensive field of Canon Law, and for a more detailed treatment of important questions regarding the juridical, administrative, and pastoral practice of the Church."

*St. Mary's College*  
Adam C. Ellis, S. J.


Guelluy provides, in the present work, a thorough analysis and interpretation of the *Prologue* to William Ockham's commentary, *Super quattuor libros Sententiarum*. In the course of this dissertation, many of the distinctive features of Ockhamistic theology and philosophy are treated. The book may be recommended, in fact, as an introduction to this field of late mediaeval thought, because it includes a good survey of the life and words of Ockham, and an up-to-date bibliography.

William faces the same great question in his *Prologue* that was considered by nearly every professor of theology in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries: "Is theology a science, a wisdom, or what is it?" The same problem opens the *Summa* written in honor of Alexander of Hales, and is broached at the beginning of the major theological works of St. Albert, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus. In his *Summa Theologica* (I, q. 1, a. 2 c) St. Thomas says rather briefly that theology is, of
course, a science; it is also a wisdom. At the beginning of the fourteenth century, Duns Scotus (Opus Oxoniense, Prolog. q. 3, a. 9; ed. Garcia, I, 71–73) still insists that it is a science, but more properly a wisdom.

When Ockham answered the question, about the year 1322, he said bluntly that theology is not a science. In simplest form, his reasoning is that the starting-point of the theologian is the act of faith. According to Aristotelian logic, this principium cannot give rise to conclusions of a special science. Ockham does not deny that the theologian may develop scientific habits of reasoning. What he does deny, is that there is any scientific habitus proper to the theologian qua theologian.

To appreciate the answer given by William, one should know something of the position of Duns Scotus. It is evident, both at the beginning of the De Primo Principio and of the Opus Oxoniense, that Scotus has a very strict and rigorous interpretation of Aristotelian demonstration. The latter is a process from confused to clear knowledge. In the a priori movement of any true science, the scientist must have one primary object, known intuitively but capable of expression in a variety of concepts, expressive in whole or in part of the essence of that object. Such concepts are arrived at by a priori analysis of the primary object. Thus, a theo-logic would have God as its primary object, and its conclusions would consist of various judgments whose predicates are a hierarchy of concepts reached by logical analysis of the first object. Such predicates would be formally distinct. A. Wolter’s recent dissertation on the transcendentals in Scotus is the best work in English on the way in which such a theory works out.

Now, a critic (such as William Ockham) may well doubt whether it is possible for man in this life to grasp God as the primary object of any such science. Nor does this necessarily make Ockham a skeptic. Would St. Thomas have granted that such a rich concept of God is initially possible to the theological scientist—that he might go on, independently of comparison with other beings, to deduce many of the divine properties? Even Scotus does not claim that unaided reason is adequate to such a task. He does suggest that, with the help of revelation, the homo viator can approach a true theological science. The question remains, however, whether a strict Aristotelian logician could accept such a beginning, with a primary concept resting on faith.

The second point which Ockham attacks lies in the movement of reasoning to the conclusions from this original concept. Scotus seems to see this as a process from a one to a many: it starts with one all-embracing concept, and moves by analysis to a clearer knowledge in terms of a manifold of concepts. Already, there is here a certain fusion of the problem of abstraction with the problem of deductive reasoning. William sees abstraction as a synthetic
process; that is to say, he thinks that one *reasons* to a universal concept, by
taking knowledges of many realities and rising to the comprehension of a
unity which is the universal meaning of the manifold. This is the logic of the
opening and closing chapters of the *Posterior Analytics*. According to it,
science must be empirical and inductive, even the science which deals with
God. But the "universal" of the *Posterior Analytics* is a first principle, a
judgment which does not correspond to any existing and real thing. In that
case, how can we be sure of the existential reference of the conclusions of
science? How can we be sure of the necessary and logical connection between
the conclusions of any science (which conclusions are universals) and the
substantial reality which this science may have for its primary object, its
*principe*?

One can see that the examination of Ockham's position requires a study of
a special logic, above all. A theory of knowledge and a view of reality are
bound up with it, but fundamentally it is a question of logic. Guelluy will
not be distracted by the controversy over the nature of Ockham's nominalism
or conceptualism. He reminds us that a nominalist may be a realist (in the
modern sense) and yet deny reality to universals. He avoids the further
question: can a thinker be a philosopher, or a theologian, and deny *all*
reality to universals?

The tone of this study is objective, scholarly, unemotional. In fact,
Guelluy is inclined to smooth over differences of interpretation, with the
suggestion that they are not important to his thesis. As he proceeds with each
section of his problem, he provides frequent summaries which aid the reader
and show that the author is not unaware of the ramifications of the doctrine
throughout the whole position of Ockham. The work has much to offer the
historian of philosophy, but, if there be any theologians prone to dogmatic
slumbers, this study is just the thing to jolt them into insomnia.

*St. Louis University*  

**Vernon J. Bourke**


The first edition of Father Maréchal's renowned fifth *Cahier*, published in
1926, was quickly exhausted. In composing his text, the author, well aware of
the extreme sublety almost unavoidable in the rarefied stratosphere of meta-
physics, used all the devices of precautionary restatement and repetition to
prevent misunderstanding of his central theme and to preclude unwarranted
deductions. The urgency of demands for a second edition was paralleled by
an ever broadening field of literature, in which the author's premonitions
were fully realized; strangely contradictory interpretations sprang up, and his own point de départ became the putative parent of others which he could not recognize as legitimate. Understandingly, he resisted all pressure for a second edition until he could complete a revision which would leave the organization of his thought intact, but would disavow not a few unjustified interpretations. Unfortunately, the execution of this project was arrested by the author's failing health and was stopped by his death.

The complete work of revision was impossible. But the work itself, justly considered almost a classic with wide philosophical and theological implications, could not rightfully be withheld from scholars to whom the first edition was unavailable. The author's friend and colleague, Léopold Malevez, S. J., was entrusted with the delicate task of editing a posthumous edition. Despite his detailed familiarity with the lines of Maréchal's proposed revision, the editor was convinced that any tampering with the original text could not avoid being maladroit. Therefore, he confined himself as editor to a foreword, and to the addition of an appendix. The appendix contains a brief article of Maréchal, "À propos du Point de départ de la métaphysique" (Revue néo-scolastique de Philosophie, XLI [1938], 253-61), in which he clarified certain fundamental themes. Curiously enough, as the editor points out in his foreword, this article does not signalize an error of interpretation which Maréchal in private conversation often rejected. It concerns the question whether in Cahier V the doctrine of a natural desire for perfect beatitude in the supernatural possession of God is made the definitive ground for the objective validity of metaphysical knowledge.

Not a few expressed this erroneous interpretation as Maréchal's own view. Malevez shows that it is without foundation in the text itself, since the natural desire for God is always described as "implicit," "confused," "never expressed distinctly as a point of departure," "inefficacious, i.e., incapable of stirring up in us any proportion, any right to fulfillment," "conditioned, or more exactly, a desire of an end which is conditional, whose attainment remains subordinate to a free gesture of God which is entirely unowed," "a desire which authorizes solely the conclusion that the vision of God is, absolutely speaking, possible, but nothing more." Furthermore, in an unedited note which would undoubtedly have been included in his revision, Maréchal expressly repudiated this interpretation of his thought as follows: "Imprimis notare velim, hoc unum ad stabilendam doctrinam meam epistemologicam fuisse logice requisitum ut ostenderem Ens absolutum in omni operatione intellectuali naturaliter appeti, tamquam finem ultimum obiectivum: quod profecto verum manet, sive in immediata Dei visione, sive in analogica Eius cognitione reponamus finem nostrum ultimum subjectivum" (p. 9 f.).
Owing to the acute modern interest in the supernatural and its relation to
the natural desire of spiritual creatures, theologians who are becoming in­
creasingly aware of the importance of the problem will be grateful to Malevez
for this clarification of Maréchal’s genuine view.

Weston College

PHILIP J. DONNELLY, S. J.

WILLE UND DRANG. By Rudolph Hauser. Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand

As the subtitle indicates, this book intends to give “Fundamental Outlines
towards an Understanding of Human Character,” a sketch of the forms in
which psychological forces act and react. It is divided into two major sec­
tions, the first dealing with the soul in general, and the second giving certain
standards to describe the peculiarity of the individual.

The soul is the principle of life; but, as a human soul, it is the principle
of a human life. Human life, however, is more than merely biological activi­
ties; it comprises also artistic, scientific, technical, organizational, and cul­
tural endeavor. Being more than a mere reaction to present needs and wants,
it includes the possibility of planning and acting with anticipation and re­
sponsibility. An orientation as to values is intimately connected with the
general impression of an obligation or a calling upon whose fulfilment or
failure the value of a human life may depend. Further, life means develop­
ment, differentiation and consolidation; and this again not only biologically
but also spiritually: habits are being formed, standards set, and motives
accepted, which will exert their influence (favorably or otherwise) for the rest
of one’s life. Heredity and environment are influential factors in this process
of formation and consolidation. Two tendencies oppose one another: the
dynamic-progressive which calls for adaptation to and readiness for a new
task which is demanded by conscience and is orientated towards values; and
the static-conservative, which clings to habits and customs, irrespective of
values. And there is no sphere in life where these two tendencies do not exist.

As far as the peculiarity of the character of the individual is concerned, the
fixation and consolidation of habits, attitudes, motives, and standards is of
paramount importance. Habits, as a rule, are intimately connected with
hereditary qualities and show a marked consistency and continuity, all
through life; they give distinctiveness to man’s actions. The standards and
motives accepted (or the lack of them), a man’s attitude towards values (or
his blindness to them), strength of will (or weakness) are further components
of the character of the individual.

The book is a publication of “The Catholic Adult Education Work,”
Dortmund; and as such it is meant for a wide circle of readers. For this
reason, the author avoids technical terms, as far as possible. Index and bibliography add to its practical value.

Christ the King College, Toronto  

PETER MUELLER, S. J.


Written in 1846, the work under review was included in the volume of Edifying Addresses of Varied Tenor that appeared in Copenhagen in March, 1847. The title Edifying Addresses may sound quaint and uninviting. Really they are not addresses in the accepted sense; they were never spoken aloud to an audience; they were written for men and women to speak aloud to themselves; they were aimed at an audience that read and pondered what was read. That may account for the unusual degree of intimate intensity which characterizes them. They were prepared, not to entertain or to provoke, but to convert and to upbuild. This translation, first published in 1938, was one of the first translations of Kierkegaard to appear in English. It is made from the eighth volume of the Danish edition of Kierkegaard’s collected works edited by Drachmann, Heiberg and Lange, published in Copenhagen, 1903–06. The present fourth printing has been subjected to a thorough re-examination of the translation in order to correct certain errors and misprints, and in places to improve the form of expression. The translator, Mr. Douglas V. Steere, professor of philosophy at Haverford College, with discerning taste and judgment, has prefixed an illuminating Introductory Essay, and supplied the fifteen sectional divisions and headings.

The entire treatise is one closely-associated, sincere, earnest appeal from the heart of the author to that of his reader. Central in the thought of Kierkegaard is his category of the individual, the individual as separated from the crowd, the individual as he would be if he were solitary and alone, face to face with his destiny, with his vocation, with God. The author aims consistently at constraining man to confront his sovereign responsibility as an individual. He conceived it his function as a writer to strip men of their disguises, to compel them to see evasions for what they are, to cut off men’s retreats, to enforce self-examination and to bring them alone before the Eternal. Here he left them; here the individual must make his decision. For Kierkegaard the real problem was the awakening of the individual. Mere changes of outward conditions, whether they be ecclesiastical, social or political, seemed to gloss over the problem. The conscience must not be allowed to remain dulled by the crowd, dissipated by business, lulled by carefully chosen rotation of pleasures, by false theories of man’s nature, of
his place in the social pattern, of his way of salvation. The isolation of man from the mass and the heightening of his consciousness as an individual are fundamental. As individuals we are what we are before God, and no mob psychology affects this in the least. The one thing to be willed and to live for is the perfect fulfillment of the will of God.

In his polemic against the mass, the crowd, Kierkegaard could never be accused of snobbery. For him, the mass is not the common herd; it is not a group of menials or of aristocrats, of rich or of poor; it is the mass understood in a purely conceptual sense. He grounded the equality of all men in the unchanging relation between the individual and God, not in the secular whim or political fashion of the crowd. And here, too, he discovered the root of enduring love for the neighbor. When we love our neighbor as ourselves, we separate him from the abstract mass or public, and he becomes an individual, and we testify to the equality of all men as individuals before God.

With the personal responsibility of the individual man or woman inescapably set before the reader, Kierkegaard appeals for a frank acknowledgment of our sins, for repentance, for an investigation of the barriers to willing the one thing necessary, the personal sacrifices exacted, and finally poses the momentous question, what then must we do. Live as an individual and discharge all your duties to God, is the straightforward reply: "Purity of heart is to will one thing. To will one thing cannot mean to will the world's pleasures and what belongs to it. To will one thing a man must will the good and he must will it in truth; he must be willing to do all for it and he must be willing to suffer all for it" (p. 121).

Though at times the author's language lacks definiteness, the underlying theme is never overlooked. He is not always clear on the nature of the remission of sin; here and there he underestimates subsidiary motives of repentance, and often becomes ambiguous through the use of the Good instead of God.

Woodstock College        D. J. M. CALLAHAN, S. J.


The whole of Father Garrigou-Lagrange's treatise on the interior life is now available in English. This second volume deals with the illuminative way of proficients, the unitive way of the perfect, and extraordinary graces. Faithful readers will find this work repetitious, containing, as it must, many ideas already developed by the author in other books. All readers will find
it somewhat repetitious within its own framework, owing to the author's unflagging concern with the problem of infused contemplation and its place in the spiritual life. The same preoccupation leads to the inclusion of many controversial pages.

Father Garrigou-Lagrange writes about the interior life as a theologian. Though he draws on the descriptive testimonies of the saints as well as on his own wide experience, he is not mainly concerned with the description and classification of psychic states. His object is to construct a theology of the spiritual life, understanding by that "an application of theology which determines the nature of the intimate union of the soul with God and the means (the acts, trials, graces) which lead to this union. It thus establishes, according to fixed theological principles, juxtaposed with the experience of the saints, the superior laws of the life of grace."

Since the theological principles invoked by the author are not always fixed principles, but sometimes only debatable opinions, this treatise cannot hope to establish the superior laws of the life of grace in a generally acceptable way. Many theologians consider that the theology of the gifts of the Holy Ghost is too uncertain to bear the weight that Father Garrigou-Lagrange puts on it. And even those who would like to believe that infused contemplation is a normal development of the life of grace may yet grow weary of the continued insistence on a thesis that still lacks decisive proof.

On the positive side, Father Garrigou-Lagrange is hard to match as a spiritual theologian when he is dealing with accepted theological principles and showing their bearing on Christian life. This treatise is filled with good things. It touches all the main points and is especially notable for lengthy, profoundly beautiful explanations of the Christian virtues.

Weston College

F. A. HARKINS, S.J.

**Cross and Crown: A Thomistic Review of Spiritual Theology.**
Vol. I (March, 1949). Pp. 117. $4.00 per annum.

This latest addition to the growing volume of English scientific periodicals in the various branches of theology will be warmly received, not only by theologians, but by all who feel the need of a greater integration between dogma and spirituality. *Cross and Crown* is edited by the Dominican Fathers of the Province of St. Albert the Great at their house of studies in River Forest, Illinois. The editor, Rev. John Leonard Callahan, O. P., in his urbane *Apologia* (p. 3 f.) states the purpose of the new quarterly as follows: "The magazine is not intended to be a trade journal for theologians, clergy, and religious, nor is it meant to be a literary fillip to piety. Its aim will be the
presentation of the principles, conclusions, and applications of spiritual theology according to the traditions of the Thomist school in a manner that will have appeal and interest to all who value the interior life."

The first issue, with a preface by the Very Reverend Emmanuel Suarez, O. P., Master General of the Dominican Order, and solid contributions by such well known scholars, as R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P., Gerald Vann, O. P., Walter Farrell, O. P., I. Menendez-Reigada, O. P., and others, not only fulfills the aims set forth by the editor, but augurs well for the future. Cross and Crown is recommended sincerely and enthusiastically to readers of Theological Studies.

Weston College

Philip J. Donnelly, S.J.
BOOKS RECEIVED

Fernand Aubier: *La Conversion au Christianisme*, by Gustave Bardy (pp. 356); *Le Problème du mal*, by R. P. Sertillanges (pp. 414).

Beauchesne et ses fils, Paris: *Le Traitement moral des nerveux*, by A. Stocker (pp. 220); *Tu Solus Sanctus*, by Jules Lebreton (pp. 269).

Bloud et Gay, Gentilly: *Le Forçât Mindszenty accuse*, by Bela Just (pp. 192, 240 fr.).

The Bruce Publishing Company, Milwaukee: *De Poenitentia*, by Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. (pp. x + 517, $7.50).

Casterman, Tournai: *Mariologie de Saint Bernard*, by Dom Dominique Nogues (pp. xviii + 236); *Problèmes de l'adaptation en apostolat* (le quatrième cahier de la *Nouvelle Revue Théologique*), by L. de Coninck, S. J. (pp. 166, 45 fr.).


Cuesta, Salamanca: *Commentarius in quasdam Sti. Officii normas de agendi ratione confessoriorum circa 6 decalogi praecipum*, by Aurelius Yanguas, S. J. (pp. 52, 4 pes.).

Dacre Press, Westminster: *A Rebirth of Images*, by Austin Farrer (pp. 348).

Desclée de Brouwer, Bruges: *La Vie est sacrée*, by M. A. Ricaud, des Frères Prêcheurs (pp. 303).


Les Editions de la Revue des Jeunes, Paris: *Je crois en Toi*, by Jean Mouroux (pp. 126); *Optimisme devant ce monde*, by D. Dubarle, O.P. (pp. 165).


Les Facultés de philosophie et théologie de la Compagnie de Jesus, Montréal: *L'Eglise catholique*, by Richard Arès, S. J. (pp. 269).

Fides Publishers, South Bend: *The Presence of Mary*, by Francis Charmot, S. J. (pp. 164, $2.50).

B. Götschmann, Zürich-Altstetten: *Der Christusritter aus Assisi*, by Hilarin Felder, O.F.M. Cap. (pp. 165).

Harper and Brothers, New York: *Saint among the Hurons*, by Francis X. Talbot, S.J. (pp. 251, $3.75).

B. Herder Book Co., St. Louis: *Blueprint for a Catholic University*, by Leo R. Ward (pp. iv + 402, $5.00); *Liturgical Meditations*, 2 vols., by the Sisters of Saint Dominic (pp. viii + 533, $10.00); *Man's Last End*, by Joseph Buckley (pp. xii + 249, $3.50); *The Mystical Evolution in the Development and Vitality of the Church*, Vol. I, by John C. Arintero, O.P. (pp. xix + 358, $4.50); *Social Ethics: Natural Law in the Modern World*, by J. Messner (transl. J. H. Doherty) (pp. xiii + 1018, $10.00).

Herder Verlag, Freiburg im Breisgau: *Christliches Gebetsleben*, by Franz M. Moscher (pp. 337).

P. Lethielleux, Paris: "Cahiers Laënnec": *Psychanalyse et conscience morale* (pp. 64); *Les Guérisons de Lourdes* (deux cahiers, pp. 48 and 45); *La Castration*, by M. Riquet (pp. 64, 90 fr.); *Lumières sur le sacerdoce de Jésus-Christ*, by L. Soubigou (pp. vii + 144, 190 fr.).


The Newman Press, Westminster: *Abbot Marmion: An Irish Tribute*, edited by the monks of Glenstal (pp. ix + 140, $2.75); *Arnobius of Sicca: The Case Against the Pagans* (transl. by George E. McCracken) (pp. 372, $3.50); *The Book of Infinite Love*, by Mother Louise Margaret Claret de la Touche (pp. xvi + 129); *The Interior Life*, by Rev. Joseph Tissot (ed.) (pp. xx + 292, $3.00); *The Nature and Treatment of Scruples*, by Dermot Casey, S.J. (pp. 66, $.90); *The Sacred Heart and the Priesthood*, by Mother Louise Margaret Claret de la Touche (pp. xxxi + 224); *Two in One Flesh* (three volumes): *Introduction to Sex and Marriage*, by E. C. Messenger (pp. xv + 61); *The Mystery of Sex and Marriage* (pp. vii + 236); *The Practice of Sex and Marriage* (pp. 71); *Two Ways of Life*, by F. Sherwood Taylor (pp. viii + 111, $2.00).


Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn: *Die Botschaft in der Frühe*, by Heinrich Mohr (pp. 253); *Grundfragen der Philosophie im Denken der Gegenwart*, by Hans Pfeil (pp. 239); *Jesus von Nazareth*, by Hilarin Felder, O.F.M. Cap. (pp. vii + 391).
St. Anthony Guild Press, Paterson: *A Catechism of Christian Doctrine* (Revised edition of the Baltimore Catechism, No. 3) (pp. xiv + 426, $1.00); *Courtship and Marriage*, by John A. O'Brien (pp. v + 217, $1.50).

A. C. Zollikon, Zürich: *Die Kirchliche Dogmatik*, by Karl Barth, Vol. III. 2 (pp. x + 800).